ML22021B551

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Compensatory Measures Not Implemented Per Site'S Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (Mux) Power Supply Failure
ML22021B551
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 01/21/2022
From: Fleming J
Holtec Decommissioning International
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
HDI-OC-22-002 LER 2022-01-00
Download: ML22021B551 (5)
v • d • e


Text

H O LT Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 E C - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - Te ep_h_o_n_e -(8_5_6_) 7--0

- 9_0_0 D EC OMMISSIONING 1NTERNA T 10NAL Fax (856) 797-0909 10 CFR 73.71 (a)(4)

January 21 , 2022 Attn : Document Control Desk Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , DC 20555-0001 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility License No. DPR-16 NRC Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15

Subject:

60-Day Written Report 2022-001-0, Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73. 71 (a)(4), Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) 2022-001-0, "Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure". NRC Forms 366 and 366a were utilized as specified in NUREG 1022, Revision 3.

This letter contains no new commitments. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact me at (856) 797-0900, ext. 3578.

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Jean A. Fleming Jean A. DN: cn=Jean A. Fleming, c=US, o=Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, ou=Regulatory and Fleming Environmental Affairs, email=J.Fleming@Holtec.com Date: 2022.01.21 12:59:18 -05'00' Jean A. Fleming HDI Vice President, Regulatory and Environmental Affairs Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC Day Written Report 2022-001-0, Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure cc:

USNRC Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards USNRC Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response USNRC Regional Administrator, Region I USNRC Project Manager, NMSS - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station USNRC Region I, Lead Inspector- Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station HDI-OC-22-002 Page 1 of 1

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~i~~;;'~;;;','~t~~~ Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909 ATTACHMENT 1 To OCNGS Letter HDI-OC-22-002 60-Day Written Report 2022-001-0 Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A PPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES : 08/3112023 (08-2020) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and lnfonmation Collections Branch IT-6 A10M), U.S.

~~. (See Page 3 for req uired number of digits/chara cters for each block) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to

\~---~) (See NUREG-1 O22, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r30 lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the 0MB reviewer at: 0MB Office of lnfonmation and Regulatory Affairs, 13150-0104), Attn: Desk ail: oira submjssjon@omb eop goy. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of infonmation unless the document requesting or requiring the collectiondisplays a currently valid0MB control number.

1. Facility Name 2. Docket Number 3. Page Oyster Creek, Unit 1 05000 219 1 OF 3
4. Title Compensatory measures not implemented per site 's Physical Security Plan due to Multiplexer (MUX) fai lure
5. Event Date 6. LER Number 7. Report Date 8. Other Facilities Involved Sequential Revi sion Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Month Day Year Number No, 05000 05 07 2021 2022 - 01 - 0 01 21 2022 Facility Name 05000 Docket Number
9. Operating Mode 110. Power Level Permanently Defueled 000
11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to t he Requirements of 10 CFR §: {Check all that apply) 10 CFR Part 20
  • 2O.22O3(a)(2)(vi)
  • 5O.36(c)(2)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(x)
  • 2O.22O1(b)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(3)(i)
  • 5O.46(a)(3)(ii)
  • 2O.22O1(d)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(3)(ii)
  • 50.69(9)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(v)(B) [Z] 73.71(a)(4)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(1)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(4)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
  • 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C)
  • 73.71(a)(5)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
  • 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D)
  • 73.77(a)(1)(i)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(2)(ii)
  • 21 .2(c)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(vii)
  • 73.77(a)(2)(i)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(i i)(A)
  • 5O.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
  • 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(2)(iv)
  • 5O.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
  • 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
  • 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
  • 2O.22O3(a)(2)(v)
  • 5O.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A}
  • 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
  • 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
  • OTHER (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A).
12. Licensee Contact for this LER Licensee Contact Phone Number (Inc lude area code)

Joseph Dwyer, Site Security Manager (609) 971-2115

13. Complete One Line for each Com ponent Failu re Described in this Report Cause System Component Manufacturer Reportable to IRIS Cause System Component Manufacturer Reportable to IRIS X IA MPX ADV PWR N
14. Supplemental Report Expected Month Day Year
15. Expected Submission Date

[Z] No ID Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)

16. Abstract (Limit to 1560 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines}

On May 7 , 2021 , at 1638 a power supply inside of Multiplexer (MUX) associated with the security computer system located in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) failed. The failure of the MUX power supply interrupted the communication pathways between the Security Computer System, Select Line Board (SLB) and Card Reader lnterface (CRI) equipment in the field. Security performed an extent of condition but were not knowledgeable of what security equipment the SLB affected. On May 8, 202 1, at 0815 the alarm station operator discovered an issue with the Protected Area (PA) Intrusion Detection System (IDS) when an anticipated alarm was not generated . An extent of condition was performed, additional PA IDS zones were found to be inoperable. The cause of the PA IDS zones inoperability was connected to the MUX power supply fa ilure and SLB alarms received more than 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> earlier on May 7, 2021 . Compensatory measures for the inoperable IDS zones exceeded the time allowed by the site's Physical Security Plan (PSP). Furthermore, security missed the 1-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with Appendix G of Part 73 (l)(c) any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed. On January 5th, 2022, at 0911 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.466355e-4 months <br />, a 1-hour report was made to the NRC.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2023 (08-2020)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to CONTINUATION SHEET lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the 0MB reviewer at: 0MB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oira submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid 0MB control number.

1. FACILITY NAME 2, DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REV I 05000- I Iv... NUMBER NO.

NARRATIVE 219

!2022!-1 01 1-LJ BACKGROUND The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is located in Lacey Township, New Jersey. On May 7, 2021 , the plant was configured in the permanently defueled mode, post-zirc fire window for decommissioning with Plant Risk at the Green level. The Spent Fuel Pool Gates were installed and spent fuel relocation activities were in progress.

EV ENT DESCRIPTION At 1638 on May 7, 2021, an acrid odor was identified in the security Central Alarm Station (CAS). While Security, Maintenance and Operations personnel were attempting to identify the source of the odor, security computer system alarms began actuating . The alarms received included a Multiplexer (MUX) Supervisory Line Board (SLB) communication alarms and 2 CRI (Card Reader Interface Alarms).

Security personnel immediately attempted to determine the cause for all alarms received. Some alarms had not been experienced prior to this event (i.e., MUX 8 and SLB). Security was unable to determine the source of SLB alarms after reviewing the security computer vendor manual. Security personnel made an incorrect assumption that the SLB communication alarms must have been associated with card reader alarms and a non-conservative extent of condition review was performed.

During the day shift on May 8th, 2021, the source of the actual SLB alarms became self-revealing when several IDS perimeter zones were found to be nonfunctional during a scheduled work evolution in an affected perimeter zone. It was later determined that the received SLB alarms affected several perimeter zones. The affected perimeter zones did not have the proper compensatory measures in place on May 7, 2021 per the PSP, therefore a 1-hour notification to the NRC was required per 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1).

Furthermore, security he 1-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with Appendix G of Part 73 (l)(c) any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT Power supplies to the MUX had failed. Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) personnel did not adequately identify and assess in a timely manner the equipment impacted by a failure of a MUX power supply for more than 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and did not establish adequate compensatory measures within the time required by the site Physical Security Plan (PSP).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS An interim standing order is put in place on the action's security personnel are required to perform following upon the loss of a MUX. Root Cause (OYS-02250) was performed, and corrective actions are documented in the sites Corrective Action Program (CAP). Procedure DPP-OC-101-102, Compensating for Security System Failures was updated to contain directions for compensatory actions and recovery actions of a MUX loss on Oyster Creek's ISFSI security computer system.

REPORTABILITY On January 5th, 2022, at 0911 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.466355e-4 months <br />, a 1-hour report was retroactively submitted to the NRC.

NRC FORM 366A (08-2020)

Page 2 of 3

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2023 (08-2020)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 , or by e-mail to CONTINUATION SHEET lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the 0 MB reviewer at: 0MB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oira submission@omb.eop.gov. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/}

requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid 0MB control number.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REV I 05000- I I ,... NUMBER NO.

loyste, c,eek, u,;11 219

!2022!-1 01 1-~

NARRATIVE REPORTABILITY CONTINUED Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b)(1 ), licensees shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I of Appendix G to Part 73.10. Appendix G paragraph I identifies events to be reported to the NRC within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report in 60 days.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Additional information required by security reports (Items required by section 3.2 of RG 5.62 "Reporting of Safeguards Events," provided below):

5. Type of security force onsite : Proprietary
6. Number and type of personnel involved: 4, Security
7. Method of discovery: Self revealing, work in area
8. Procedural errors involved: NA 11 . Local, State, or Federal agencies contacted: None
12. Description of media interest or press release: None
13. Similar events: None 14: Knowledgeable

Contact:

Joseph Dwyer

15. Description of failed or malfunctioned equipment: MUX power supply, Advanced Power Supply Model #APS60PU
16. Apparent cause of each component or system failure . Unknown
17. Status of the equipment prior to the event: Operating
18. Secondary functions affected (for multiple-function components). IDS, card readers
19. Effect on plant safety: Uncompensated security zones
20. Unusual conditions that may have contributed to failure , e.g., environmental extremes: None NRC FORM 366A (08-2020)

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