ML11234A427

Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR

ML11234A427
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/18/2011
From:	Swartz J Florida Power Corp, Progress Energy Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F0811-01, TAC ME6527
Download: ML11234A427 (91)

Text

aProgress Energy Crystal River Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 August 18, 2011 3F081 1-01 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 - Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)

References:

1. CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 - License Amendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (Accession No. ML112070659)

2. Email from S. Lingam (NRC) to D. Westcott (CR-3) dated July 19, 2011, "Crystal River, Unit 3 EPU LAR - RAIs from Instrumentation and Controls Branch (EICB)"

Dear Sir:

By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed license amendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 19, 2011, via electronic mail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to the new Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS), new Fast Cooldown System (FCS), and the new Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) needed to support the Instrumentation and Controls Branch acceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).

Attachment A to this submittal, "Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR,"

provides the CR-3 formal response to the RAI.

In support of the EPU acceptance review RAI responses, four enclosures are provided. , "Markup of Proposed ITS 3.3.19, Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System Instrumentation, and Associated Bases," provides proposed changes to the new ICCMS Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) and associated Bases to include ICCMS instrument Allowable Values. Enclosure 2, "ICCMS Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology and Summary Calculations," provides the setpoint methodology and summary calculations associated with the new ICCMS consistent with the guidance of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)

Traveler - 493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions." Enclosure 3, "IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971 Compliance Matrix," provides a summary of how the ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and affected portions of the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System will meet applicable clauses of IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971. Enclosure 4, Progress Energy Florida, Inc.

Crystal River Nuclear Plant 15760 W. Powerline Street Crystal River, FL 34428 AD,) _

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 3 3F081 1-01 "ICCMS Simplified Schematic and Control Logic Diagrams," provides simplified schematic and control logic diagrams associated with the new ICCMS.

This correspondence contains no new regulatory commitments.

The information provided by this response letter does not change the intent or the justification for the requested EPU license amendment. FPC has determined that this supplement does not affect the basis for concluding that the proposed license amendment does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration. As such, the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation provided in the June 15, 2011 submittal remains valid.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott, Superintendent, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4796.

Sincerely, Jeffrey Swartz Director-Site Operations Crystal River Nuclear Plant JS/gwe

Attachment:

.

A. Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Instrumentation and Controls Branch Acceptance Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR

Enclosures:

1. Markup of Proposed ITS 3.3.19, Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System Instrumentation, and Associated Bases

2. ICCMS Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology and Summary Calculations

3. IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971 Compliance Matrix

4. ICCMS Simplified Schematic and Control Logic Diagrams xc: NRR Project Manager Regional Administrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector State Contact

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 3 3F081 1-01 STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF CITRUS Jeffrey Swartz states that he is the Director-Site Operations, Crystal River Nuclear Plant for Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

Jeffrey Swartz Director-Site Operations Crystal River Nuclear Plant The foregoing document was acknowledged before me this !I day of ACA ___' __-I ,2011, by Jeffrey Swartz.

Signature of Notary Public State of Florida CAROLYN E. PORTMANN Commission # DD 937553

• %*-o Expires March 1,2014 d,)rd Thru Troy Fain Insurance 800-38537019 (Print, type, or stamp Commissioned Name of Notary Public)

Personally / Produced Known V -OR- Identification

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT A RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT NRC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS BRANCH ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F081 1-01 Page 1 of 6 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT NRC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS BRANCH ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. The proposed license amendment is considered an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). On July 19, 2011, via electronic mail, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) related to the new Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS), new Fast Cooldown System (FCS), and the new Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) needed to support the Instrumentation and Controls Branch acceptance review of the CR-3 EPU License Amendment Request (LAR).

NRC Request for Additional Information We need the responses for the following RAIs. Please note that RAI responses for 1 thru 4 are required for our acceptance review, and therefore, need your immediate attention.

1. LAR Attachment 2, Table 3.3.19-1, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS) Instrumentation" (Pages 3.3-48 and 3.3.49) and Table 3.3.20-1, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System Automatic Actuation Logic" do not list Allowable Values or Limiting Trip Setpoints. Provide Allowable values and/or Limiting Trip Setpoints for each FUNCTION in these two Tables, or provide your justification for not listing these values.

2. TSTF-493, Option A "with changes to setpoint values" requires the licensee to provide summary calculations for each type of setpoint being revised, including Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP), Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP), Allowable Value (AV), As-Found Tolerance (AFT), and As-Left Tolerance (ALT). Provide all these values and analytical safety limit value for each revised setpoint listed in Table 3.3.19-1, and Table 3.3.20-1 (the NRC staff prefers a table of values of all above variables for each LSSS setpoint).

Also describe how these values were determined including examples and/or diagrams to support the determination.

3. The application did not describe how the new ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) meet NRC's requirements for safety systems described in 10 CFR 50.55a(h), which endorses IEEE Standards 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations," and 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations." Describe how these systems meet each applicable clause of the applicable industry standard, as well as all other regulatory requirements.

4. Provide instrument loop schematic diagrams and control logic diagrams including sufficient information to show the input, output parameter signal logic flow, and bistable devices which implement the setpoints for each FUNCTION of ICCMS to support the safety evaluation.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F081 1-01 Page 2 of 6 CR-3 Responses:

1. LAR Attachment 2, Table 3.3.19-1, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS) Instrumentation" (Pages 3.3-48 and 3.3.49) and Table 3.3.20-1, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System Automatic Actuation Logic" do not list Allowable Values or Limiting Trip Setpoints. Provide Allowable values and/or Limiting Trip Setpoints for each FUNCTION in these two Tables, or provide your justification for not listing these values.

As described in Attachment 1, "Description of Proposed Change, Background, Justification for the Request, Determination of No Significant Hazards Considerations,"

of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1), the ICCMS monitors specific parameters; High Pressure Injection (HPI) System flow, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure, and core exit thermocouples (CETs). The ICCMS automatically trips the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and automatically adjusts the steam generator secondary side water level control setting to the inadequate subcooling margin (SCM) level when inadequate SCM is coincident with a reactor trip signal. Also, when a loss of SCM occurs concurrent with inadequate HPI flow and a reactor trip, the ICCMS automatically initiates the FCS which opens both ADVs to ensure sufficient core cooling during certain spectra of loss of coolant accidents. Core degrees of subcooling is compared to a reference curve of incore temperature versus RCS pressure to determine if a loss of SCM exists. Total HPI flow is compared to a reference curve of minimum HPI flow versus RCS pressure to determine inadequate HPI flow.

ITS 3.3.19, ICCMS Instrumentation The only ICCMS instrument functions listed in Improved Technical Specifications (ITS)

Table 3.3.19-1 that provide an initiation channel trip are Loss of Subcooling Margin Function (Functions 1.e, 2.d, and 3.d) and Inadequate HPI Flow Function (Function 1.f).

All other instrument functions listed in ITS Table 3.3.19-1 are instrument inputs to either the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function or the Inadequate HPI Flow Function and have no trip settings. Additionally, the trip setting values associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions are a function of generated curves and thus do not have discrete instrument Allowable Values analogous to the RCS Variable Low Pressure Allowable Value in the Reactor Protection System Technical Specification (Reference 2). As a result, an Allowable Value column is not included in ITS Table 3.3.19-1.

Enclosure 1 provides changes to the new ICCMS instrumentation Technical Specification and associated Bases proposed in the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1). SR 3.3.19.3 is modified and two new figures are added to indicate the Allowable Values associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions. Enclosure I includes a markup of the affected ITS 3.3.19 pages and affected Bases pages of ITS B 3.3.19.

ITS 3.3.20, ICCMS Automatic Actuation Logic Consistent with the instrumentation presentation in NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and Wilcox Plants" (Reference 3), ICCMS instrumentation requirements are covered by two specifications. ITS 3.3.19 provides requirements for the

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F0811-01 Page 3 of 6 ICCMS initiation channels and ITS 3.3.20 provides requirements for the ICCMS actuation logic. The ICCMS automatic actuation logic consists of analog relays and contacts which do not have discrete setpoints (i.e., logic trains are either tripped or untripped). As a result, no Allowable Values or trip setpoints are provided in ITS 3.3.20.

This is consistent with CR-3 ITS 3.3.7, "Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Automatic Actuation Logic," and ITS 3.3.13, "EFIC Automatic Actuation Logic" (Reference 2).

2. TSTF-493, Option A "with changes to setpoint values" requires the licensee to provide summary calculations for each type of setpoint being revised, including Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP), Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP), Allowable Value (AV), As-Found Tolerance (AFT), and As-Left Tolerance (ALT). Provide all these values and analytical safety limit value for each revised setpoint listed in Table 3.3.19-1, and Table 3.3.20-1 (the NRC staff prefers a table of values of all above variables for each LSSS setpoint). Also describe how these values were determined including examples and/or diagrams to support the determination.

The only ICCMS instrument functions with Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) trip setpoint values are Loss of Subcooling Margin Function (Functions 1.e, 2.d, and 3.d) and Inadequate HPI Flow Function (Function 1.f). All other instrument functions listed in ITS Table 3.3.19-1 are instrument inputs to either the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function or the Inadequate HPI Flow Function. Also, ITS 3.3.20 provides requirements for the ICCMS actuation logic. The ICCMS automatic actuation logic does not have discrete setpoints (i.e., logic trains are either tripped or untripped). As a result, setpoint calculations are required to support only the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions listed in ITS Table 3.3.19-1.

The proposed ICCMS instrumentation Channel Calibration requirement, SR 3.3.19.3, and associated Notes (Reference 1, Attachment 2) require measurement errors and bistable setpoint errors to be within the assumptions of the ICCMS instrumentation calculations, and the Channel Calibrations must also be performed consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses in which the ICCMS Functions are assumed. These Notes are consistent with Notes (f) and (g) in CR-3 ITS Table 3.3.1-1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation," (Reference 2) and the guidance provided in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler - 493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," (Reference 4).

Currently, the overall methodology used for safety-related instruments at CR-3 is described in CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument Loop Uncertainty Calculations," (Reference 5). The existing RCS pressure input parameter is currently calibrated using Category A methodology, which is the most stringent method defined in ICDC-1 and meets the 95/95 tolerance limit as identified in Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 6). A copy of this calculation is provided in Attachment 8, "Sample Instrumentation Setpoint Calculation,"

of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1). Calibrating the new ICCMS input parameters using this methodology ensures the generated curves for the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions are within the required As-Left Tolerance (ALT).

An overall summary of the methodology of calibrating the ICCMS instrumentation is provided in Enclosure 2, "ICCMS Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology and Summary

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F081 1-01 Page 4 of 6 Calculations." Enclosure 2 includes summary calculations associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions. Each summary calculation provides a table indicating the Nominal Trip Setpoint/Limiting Trip Setpoint, Allowable Value, As-Found Tolerance, ALT and a description of how these values are determined.

Enclosure 2 also includes the analytical limit curves assumed in the safety analyses for minimum subcooling margin and minimum required HPI System flow.

The new ICCMS design is being developed in accordance with the CR-3 engineering change (EC) process, with the conceptual design phase complete. Initial instrument calculations for the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions required by ITS 3.3.19 have been established. Final instrument calculations will be completed during finalization of the ICCMS plant modification. The final calculations will preserve the Allowable Value established in the initial calculations. Further, CR-3 provides a commitment, as stated in the List of Regulatory Commitments of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1, Attachment 10), to implement EPU modifications prior to exceeding 2609 MWt. This includes installation of the ICCMS modification and calibration and testing of the ICCMS instrumentation in accordance with the Progress Energy design control processes.

3. The application did not describe how the new ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) meet NRC's requirements for safety systems described in 10 CFR 50.55a(h), which endorses IEEE Standards 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations," and 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear power Generating Stations."

Describe how these systems meet each applicable clause of the applicable industry standard, as well as all other regulatory requirements.

The CR-3 Final Safety Analysis Report Section 7.2.4 (Reference 7) states the EFIC System meets the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 as required by NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.2. As stated in CR-3 EPU LAR Section 2.4.2.2, "Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC)," the EFIC pressure control circuitry is being modified to add the new safety-related FCS function for mitigating specific small break loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) concurrent with inadequate HPI System flow. With the exception of the automatic transfer relaying scheme, the FCS function is separate from and independent of the EFIC System. No revision to the EFIC instrumentation requirements of CR-3 ITS 3.3.11, "Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System Instrumentation," (Reference 2) are required for EPU. Based on analysis, the control actions of the EFIC System will support the EPU. As a result, the EFIC System continues to meet applicable industry standards and other regulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current licensing and design basis.

The new ICCMS, FCS, ADVs, and affected portions of the EFIC System (e.g., automatic transfer relaying scheme) are currently being designed in accordance with the CR-3 EC process, with the conceptual design phase complete. The CR-3 EC process requires new safety-related systems be designed and installed in accordance with applicable industry codes and standards and other regulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F081 1-01 Page 5 of 6 licensing and design basis. As indicated in Appendix E, Enclosure 3 of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1, Attachment 7), the ICCMS is classified as a Class 1E, safety-related protection system, meeting the requirements of IEEE-603 and IEEE-279. The FCS and ADVs are also considered safety-related systems/components and are being designed/modified to meet the applicable industry codes and standards and other regulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current licensing and design basis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2). The design specifications for the ICCMS, FCS, ADVs and affected portions of the EFIC System provide industry codes, standards, and regulatory requirements applicable to the design of each of these systems, including how these systems meet the relevant clauses of these documents. Enclosure 3, "IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971 Compliance Matrix," provides a summary of how the ICCMS and FCS, including the protective system portions of the ADVs and affected portions of the EFIC System, will meet each applicable clause of IEEE 603-1991 and IEEE 279-1971. For clauses not met, the matrix identifies the CR-3 licensing basis alternative in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2). As stated in the List of Regulatory Commitments of the CR 3 EPU LAR (Reference 1, Attachment 10), EPU modifications will be installed prior to exceeding 2609 MWt. This includes installation of the ICCMS, FCS, and ADV modifications in accordance with the applicable industry codes and standards and other regulatory requirements as specified by the CR-3 current licensing and design basis.

4. Provide instrument loop schematic diagrams and control logic diagrams including sufficient information to show the input, output parameter signal logic flow, and bistable devices which implement the setpoints for each FUNCTION of ICCMS to support the safety evaluation.

Enclosure 4, "ICCMS Simplified Schematic and Control Logic Diagrams," provides simplified schematic diagrams showing the ICCMS input instruments (i.e., HPI flow, RCS pressure, and CETs), reactor trip status input, ICCMS initiation channel strings -

including Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow modules, ICCMS logic trains, and output logic flow to the actuated devices.

References I1. CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 - License Amendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate." (Accession No. ML112070659)

2. Crystal River Unit 3 Improved Technical Specifications, Through Amendment 238.

3. NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and Wilcox Plants,"

Revision 3.

4. Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler - 493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," Revision 4.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F081 1-01 Page 6 of 6

5. CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument Loop Uncertainty Calculations," Revision 4.

6. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3, December 1999.

7. Final Safety Analysis Report, Progress Energy Florida, Crystal River Unit 3, Revision 32.1.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 1 MARKUP OF PROPOSED ITS 3.3.19, INADEQUATE CORE COOLING MONITORING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION, AND ASSOCIATED BASES

ICCMS Instrumentation 3.3.19 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.19.3 ----------------

NOTES----------------

1. If the as-found channel setpoint is conservative, but outside its predefined as-found acceptance criteria band, then the channel should be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel is not conservative, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel shall be reset to within, or more conservative than, the pre-established as-left tolerance:

otherwise the channel shall not be returned to OPERABLE status. The pre-established tolerance and methodology used to determine the predefined as-found and as-left acceptance criteria are specified in the FSAR.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months 0

'The Allowable Value shall be:

a. Loss of Subcooling Margin Function: within the Acceptable Region specified in Figure 3.3.19-1; and

b. Inadequate HPI Flow Function: within the Acceptable Region specified in Figure 3.3.19-2.

. . . . *. * * ...

• . . . . . . *. * *. *. . *. * *. * . . * *I * *- . . * *. *.

• I . *. *. *. *. . . . *. *. *. *. . . .

Crystal River Unit 3 3.3-47 Amendment No.

ICCMS Instrumentation 3.3.19 LZDUU

200,0.

Acceptale R'egion 1500 F TIT

'0 (01000 4

0 250- 3O :350 400 450 500 550: 600 650 In Core Temperature (TF)

Figure 3.3.19-1 (page 1 of 1)

Loss of Subcooling Margin Allowable Value Crystal River Unit 3 3.3-50 Amendment No.

ICCMS Instrumentation 3.3.19 C)

C,,

-U 0

U)

U)

C

-o U)

(0 250. 1300 350 400 450 500 ,550 600 :

Total HPI Fow-(gpm)

Figure 3.3.19-2 (page 1 of 1)

Inadequate HPI Flow Allowable Value Crystal River Unit 3 3.3-51 Amendment No.

ICCMS Instrumentation B 3.3.19 BASES LCO 1.c. 2.b. 3.b Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range (continued) channel includes a sensor, function generator, and associated analog modules. The analog and bistable portions of each pressure channel are ICCMS initiation channel specific.

Therefore, failure of one channel renders one channel of the Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range in one ICCMS initiation channel inoperable to each ICCMS actuation logic train.

Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range Function is automatically selected when RCS pressure is

> 500 psig. To ensure the Reactor Coolant Pressure -

Wide Range Function is not bypassed when required to be OPERABLE by the safety analysis, each channel is required to be capable of automatically enabling on increasing RCS pressure when below the enabling setpoint.

1.d. 2.c. 3.c Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs)

One of two channels per core quadrant of CETs is required to be OPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel.

Each CET channel includes a sensor, temperature transmitter, and associated analog modules. Each CET channel is ICCMS initiation channel specific.

Therefore, failure of one required CET in a core quadrant renders one required channel in one ICCMS initiation channel inoperable to each ICCMS actuation logic train.

i.e. 2.d. 3.d Loss of Subcooling Margin One channel of Loss of Subcooling Margin is required to be OPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel. Inputs are provided from the CETs and RCS pressure instruments. Actual saturation temperature is compared to a reference saturation temperature curve to determine a loss of subcooling margin. Each Loss of Subcooling Margin channel includes a comparator, function generator, and associated analog modules.

Failure of one channel renders one ICCMS initiation channel inoperable to each ICCMS actuation logic train.

Crvstal River Unit 3 B 3.-1-7 Revision Nn XX

Insert B 3.3.19-1 The Loss of Subcooling Margin Allowable Value is specified in Figure 3.3.19-1 and was selected to be conservative enough to detect a loss of subcooling margin thus ensuring the reactor coolant pumps trip will before reaching two phase conditions within the RCS during LOCAs with loss of offsite power available. The Allowable Value includes severe environment induced errors because ICCMS input sensors and associated instrumentation (e.g., RCS pressure sensors and transmitters) must function in a harsh environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4).

ICCMS Instrumentation B 3.3.19 BASES LCO 1.f Inadequate HPI Flow (continued)

One channel of Inadequate HPI Flow is required to be OPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel of the FCS Actuation Function. The total HPI flow input is compared to a generated curve of HPI flow versus RCS Pressure to determine inadequate HPI flow. Each Inadequate HPI Flow channel includes an actual HPI flow input, reference RCS pressure input, comparator, function generator, and associated analog modules.

Failure of one channel renders one ICCMS initiation channel inoperable to each FCS actuation logic train.

1.g. 2.e. 3.e Reactor Trip Status InsertB3.3.19-2 Six channels of Reactor Trip Status are required to be OPERABLE per ICCMS initiation channel. Each Reactor Trip Status channel includes an auxiliary contact and associated analog modules. Each ICCMS initiation channel receives six independent auxiliary contacts from the CRD trip breakers. Therefore, the auxiliary contacts of the Reactor Trip Status Function channels are ICCMS initiation channel specific. Failure of an auxiliary contact renders one Reactor Trip Status Function channel in one ICCMS initiation channel inoperable.

APPLICABILITY The ICCMS instrumentation channels are applicable as specified in Table 3.3.19-1.

FCS Actuation Functions The ICCMS instrumentation required to actuate FCS shall be OPERABLE with THERMAL POWER > 2609 MWt. The FCS and operation of the ADVs are assumed with THERMAL POWER > 2609 MWt. With THERMAL POWER < 2609 MWt, the ECCS provides sufficient core cooling during a small break LOCA assuming a single failure of one HPI subsystem without the need for the FCS function of the ADVs.

RCP Trip Functions The ICCMS instrumentation required to trip the RCPs shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to minimize the rate of inventory loss which would reduce the time to the core becoming uncovered during a LOCA.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.3-158 Revision No. XX

Insert B 3.3.19-2 The Inadequate HPI Flow Allowable Value is specified in Figure 3.3.19-2 and was selected to be conservative enough to ensure adequate HPI flow is available during a SBLOCA. The Allowable Value includes severe environment induced errors because ICCMS input sensors and associated instrumentation (e.g., RCS pressure sensors and transmitters) must function in a harsh environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4).

ICCMS Instrumentation B 3.3.19 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.19.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS instrument calculations. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the channel performance prior to returning the channel to service.

For channels determined to be OPERABLE but degraded after returning the channel to service, the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP). Entry into the CAP will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.

The second Note requires the as-left setting for the channel be returned to within, or more conservative than, the pre-established as-left tolerance. Where a setpoint more conservative than the pre-established as-left tolerance is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left channel setting cannot be returned to a setting within the pre-established as-left tolerance, then the channel shall be declared inoperable. The second Note also requires the pre-established tolerance and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in the FSAR (Ref. 1).

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [7.3.4].

2. CR-3 EPU Technical Report, Section 2.8.5.6.3.

3. FSAR, Chapter 14.2.2.

4.

10 FR 5049.

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3. 3-164 Revision No. XX

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 2 ICCMS INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINT METHODOLOGY AND

SUMMARY

CALCULATIONS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 1 of 15 ICCMS INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINT METHODOLOGY AND

SUMMARY

CALCULATIONS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this document is to provide a summary description of the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) setpoint methodology used to determine the Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP), Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP),

Allowable Value (AV), As-Found Tolerance (AFT), and As-Left Tolerance (ALT) for the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions of the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS) in support of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Project.

The new CR-3 Improved Technical Specification (ITS) 3.3.19, "Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS) Instrumentation," ensures that adequate core protection is provided for a specific range of small break loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). The ICCMS detects a loss of SCM and initiates mitigation functions based on this condition. The ICCMS also detects inadequate high pressure injection (HPI) flow and initiates a mitigation function based on this condition. As a result, these functions, Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions, are the only ICCMS instrument functions with Limiting Safety System Setting trip setpoint values. All other instrument functions listed in ITS Table 3.3.19-1 are instrument inputs to either the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function or the Inadequate HPI Flow Function.

The ICCMS consists of three initiation channels which provide input to two actuation logic trains. Each actuation logic train is initiated by two-out-of-three ICCMS initiation channels. Either actuation logic train initiates the associated equipment. The input parameters are processed in the ICCMS circuitry to determine subcooling margin and HPI flow margin.

Each ICCMS initiation channel receives input from the core exit thermocouples and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure instruments to determine if a loss of subcooling margin (SCM) exists. When inadequate SCM is coincident with a reactor trip signal, each ICCMS initiation channel will generate a loss of SCM signal.

Additionally, each ICCMS initiation channel receives HPI System flow input from each of the four HPI System injection lines. The four signals are summed and the total HPI flow is provided to determine inadequate HPI flow. Upon a sustained loss of SCM coincident with a reactor trip signal and inadequate HPI flow, each ICCMS initiation channel will generate a trip signal.

The following are simplified block diagrams of the ICCMS instrument loops indicating the input parameters associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions.

1.1 Instrument Loops Loss of Subcooling Margin 8 Core Exit Thermocouples ICCMS channels each calculate Subcooling Margin based on selecting the highest Core Exit Thermocouple.

Wide Range orLowRanAbove 500 psig, Wide Range RCS Wide Range or Low Range RCS Pressure is selected and below 500 Pressure J psig, Low Range RCS Pressure is selected.

Inadequate HPI Flow Four HPI Flow Transmitters - one on ICCMS channels each calculate HPI each injection line Flow Margin. The four HPI flow signals are summed. Above 500 psig, Wide Range or Low Range RCS 1 Wide Range RCS Pressure is Pressure selected and below 500 psig, Low Range RC;,S Pressure is selected.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 2 of 15 2.0 SETPOINT METHODOLOGY The CR-3 setpoint methodology is described in CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument Loop Uncertainty Calculations," (Reference 1). Per ICDC-1, the CR-3 setpoint program establishes four category levels with Category A being the most stringent. Category A calculations are consistent with the calculation methodology of ISA-$67.04, Part I, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 2) and ISA-RP67.04, Part II,"Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 3) and meet the 95/95 tolerance limit as identified in Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," (Reference 4).

At CR-3, Category A applies to, but is not limited to, the Reactor Protection System, Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System and Engineered Safeguards Actuation System instrumentation calculations.

The ICCMS instrumentation calculations associated with the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions utilize ICDC-1 Category A setpoint methodology. The ICCMS instrument setpoints are derived from the safety analysis values (i.e., analytical limit) and are corrected for sources of uncertainty as defined in ICDC-1 (Reference 1). The methodology used for combining uncertainties for CR-3 Technical Specification setpoints utilizes the Square Root of the Sum of the Squares (SRSS) taken at 2 sigma (Y) confidence level for random uncertainties and taken at 3Z confidence level for direct summation of systematic (correlated) uncertainties. The amount of uncertainty by which a setpoint can deviate from the Technical Specification setpoint is identified as allowable uncertainty. The field setting is the Technical Specification setpoint offset by the allowable uncertainty.

The instrument Calibrated Loop Error (CELOOP) is the overall instrument error and is used to determine setpoints (NTSP and LTSP) and Allowable Values from the analytical limit or design limit. The following algebraic expression is used to determine the overall instrument error:

CELOOP = +/- [(ELooP)2 +.(AFLOOP)2 ]1/2 +/- EBIAS +/- EPROCESS Calculated Loop Error (ELooP) is the instrument channel error, not taking into account calibration, drift, process errors and known biases. The following algebraic expression is used to determine the calculated instrument channel error:

2 ELooP = +/- [(Ecomp)2 + (EcoMP2) + (ECOMPN) ]1/2 Component Error (EcoMp) is the SRSS of the errors associated with an individual component (i.e.,

Reference Accuracy, Temperature Effect, etc.), with the exception of Drift.

Bias Errors (EBIAS) are known biases that affect the operation of an instrument loop, such as static pressure shifts, insulation resistance effects, etc.

Process Errors (EPROCESS) are the errors that result from the range of process operation limits, based on the scaling of the sensing instruments. These errors include either normal or accident conditions.

The ALT or Calibration Tolerance (ALLooP) is the tolerance to which an instrument channel loop is left after calibration. This term is determined from the Reference Accuracy (EREF) of the components. The following algebraic expression is used to determine the ALT:

2 112 ALLOOP = +/- [(COMP1 -EREF) 2

+ (COMP2-EREF) 2 + (COMPN-EREF) ]

The AFT (AFLooP) is the tolerance in which an instrument channel loop can be found after a period of operation, prior to calibration. This term includes the errors due to M&TE and Drift/Stability. The following algebraic expression is used to determine the AFT:

AFLOOP = + {ALT + [(MTELooP) 2 + (SBLoop) 2 ]1 2 }

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 3 of 15 Maintenance & Test Equipment (M&TE) error (MTELooP) consists of the errors due to the M&TE used in the calibration of the instrument loop.

Stability/Drift (SBLooP) is the error due to the stability and drift of the components in the loop.

The new instrument calculations use the existing AFT and ALT from instrument loop uncertainty calculations associated with the existing ICCMS input instrumentation. The existing AFT and ALT are also assumed for the new ICCMS input instrumentation. These instrument tolerances form the basis for the AVs of the Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Margin Functions. Since the summary calculations are bounding calculations for the ICCMS instrumentation and no plant-specific margin has been added, the NTSP is equal to the LTSP. Future adjustments to these instrument calculations may be required as a result of instrument component changes. As a result, a less conservative LTSP may be established thereby allowing for additional instrument margin being available to maintain the trip setting at the existing NTSP. In this event, the NTSP may be more conservative than the LTSP. Ifthe NTSP is set more conservative than the LTSP, the AFT and ALT will be maintained around the more conservative NTSP. For the purposes of this report, all references to the NTSP equate to the LTSP.

The Allowable Value is the limiting value at which an instrument trip setting may be found, when tested periodically, beyond which appropriate action must be taken. The Allowable Value is determined by the instrument calculations considering the maximum possible value for process measurement at which the analytical limit is protected. Maintaining the instrument channel within the Allowable Value ensures the analytical limit and associated safety limit are protected. For the ICCMS instrumentation, the AFT for the bounding calculations is conservative and therefore, the Allowable Value is equal to the AFT on the non-conservative side of the LTSP. Future adjustments to these instrument calculations may also result in a more conservative AFT or NTSP. In this event, the AFT will be more conservative than the Allowable Value.

The following provides a simplified visual presentation of the above terms consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.105 (Reference 4):

Safety Limit Analytical Limit Difference between Analytical Limit AL and NTSP is CELOOP 2 2 CELOOP = + [(ELooP) + (AFLOOP) ]112 +/- EBIAS +/- EpROCESS CELOOP Allowable Value -------------------- AFT+

ALT+ ALT+ NOTE: The Allowable Value is NTSP LTSP equivalent to AFT on the non-ALT - ALT- conservative side of the NTSP.

AFT- AFT-Normal Operating Point ------------

3.0

SUMMARY

OF ICCMS INSTRUMENT CALCULATIONS The analytical limit for ICCMS is based on meeting the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) criteria to mitigate a small break LOCA as defined in 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors." The ICCMS initiates the Fast Cooldown System (FCS) to support the ECCS meeting the 10 CFR 50.46 criteria. The calculations begin with the identification of the analytical limits for Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions and derive the Allowable Value settings based on these analytical limits.

The analytical limit for the Inadequate HPI Flow Function is derived from small break LOCA analyses which determined the minimum required HPI flow, corrected for RCS pressure and HPI flow uncertainty.

For the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function, the analytical limit is the TSAT curve defined in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Steam Tables (Reference 5).

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 4 of 15 3.1 Input Parameter Instrument Calculations Current CR-3 approved instrument calculations provide the AFT and ALT for the RCS pressure transmitters, HPI flow transmitters, and in-core thermocouples that provide input to the ICCMS for determination of a loss of SCM and inadequate HPI flow. These calculations were performed in accordance with CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1 setpoint methodology (Reference 1) and provide the AFT, ALT and CELOOP. ICCMS input parameter instrument calculations will be revised during finalization of the ICCMS modification. Ifthe final calculations result in larger values for AFT, ALT, or CELOOP, the NTSP will be adjusted in the conservative direction maintaining the same Allowable Value.

For calculation purposes, a 30-month interval is used to compute CELOOP to account for a surveillance frequency interval of 24 months plus 25% as allowed by the CR-3 ITS.

3.2 Calculation of Allowable Values for Loss of Subcoolinq Function A summary of the Loss of Subcooling Function initial instrument calculation is provided and a final calculation which will be completed during finalization of the ICCMS modification. The final calculation will preserve the Allowable Value established in the initial calculation.

The CELOOP from the input parameter instrument calculations are currently used to determine the display error for TSAT on the CR-3 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The SPDS instrument calculation uses the Monte Carlo method to establish the TSAT display error and these display errors are used to generate the curves for TSAT in the SPDS.

The current SPDS instrument calculation lists 32 data points from the SCM curve; both temperature and pressure points. The calculation uses linear interpolation for intermediate values. The SCM data points and methods of interpolation are also used to determine the AFT and Allowable Value for the Loss of Subcooling Margin Function. The following are the existing AFT and ALT from the existing SPDS calculation:

Table 3.2-1, SPDS Tolerances Calculation Recall Points ALT AFT RCS Wide Range Pressure Recall-4 and Recall-5 +/-11.3 psig ,+/-0.45% +/-25.8 psig, +/-1.03%

TINCORE N/A +/-4.78F, +0. 19% +6.21'F, +0.25%

The analytical limit is the TSAT curve as indicated in Figure 3.2-1 and is obtained from the ASME Steam Tables. This ensures the reactor coolant pumps are tripped before reaching two phase conditions in the RCS during LOCAs with offsite power available. The Loss of Subcooling Function NTSP is conservatively established as the SCM curve from the SPDS instrument calculation as indicated on Figure 3.2-1. This SCM curve is obtained by calculating the total CELOOP and adding it to the TSAT curve.

The AFT for the Loss of Subcooling Function is determined by using the AFT values from the RCS pressure and TINCORE instrumentation calibration tolerances listed in Table 3.2-1. Pressures (PNTSP) are selected from the data table in the current SPDS instrument calculation. The AL, AV, NTSP, AFT and ALT are expressed in units of temperature.

The Loss of Subcooling Allowable Value, in units of temperature, is obtained as follows:

" Select a PNTSP from the SPDS data table (Table 3.2-3).

• Add AFTPRESS (25.8 psig) to obtain PAy.

• Using PAy perform linear interpolation to obtain associated temperature TA

• Add AFTTEMP (6.21 'F) to TA to obtain TAV

• The Allowable Value is TAV and is for a given pressure - PAv.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 5 of 15 Example:

PNTSP is 1967.3 psig. Add the AFT of 25.8 psig from Table 3.2-1 which results in 1993.1 psig.

Linearly interpolate between T(N), P(N) and T(N+1), P(N+1) to obtain the temperature that corresponds to 1993.1 psig. This is 612.48°F. Add the AFT for the incore temperature (TINcORE) from the incore thermocouple loop accuracy calculation and listed in Table 3.2-1 which is 6.21'F.

TAV = 612.48°F + 6.21°F = 618.69°F T(N) is the NTSP = 610.58°F AFT = 618.69°F - NTSP = 618.69°F - 610.58°F = 8.1 1°F Allowable Value = 618.69 0 F A similar method is used to obtain the ALT.

• Select PNTSP from the SPDS data table (Table 3.2-3).

• Add ALTPRESS (11.3 psig) to obtain PAy.

• Using PAy perform linear interpolation to obtain associated temperature TA

• Add ALTTEMP (4.780F) to TA to obtain ALT The following table provides a list of results from the above Loss of Subcooling Function instrument setpoint methodology using selected RCS pressure values:

Table 3.2-2 Selected Pressure (psig) 650.00 887.30 1187.30 1587.30 1967.30 2500 Analytical Limit (OF) 497.35 532.22 567.40 605.04 634.52 668.98 AV (0F) 471.54 510.15 548.06 587.87 618.69 654.52 NTSP (°F) 460.53 500.30 539.00 579.41 610.58 646.66 AFT (°F) +/-11.01 +/-9.85 +9.06 +/-8.46 +/-8.11 +/-7.86 ALT (OF) +/-6.88 +/-6.38 +/-6.03 +/-5.76 +/-5.61 +/-5.50 The following is a summary table using the 32 data points from the SCM curve of the SDPS instrument calculation. These data points are provided in the NTSP columns. The AL pressures are also provided from the SPDS instrument calculation and the temperatures (TSAT) are from the ASME Steam Tables.

The AV, AFT and ALT are generated using the methodology described above.

Table 3.2-3 Analytical Limit (AL) NTSP Allowable Value (AV) Tolerances NTSP NTSP Allowable Allowable AFT ALT Pressure TSAT pressure temperature Value Value (psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (OF) (OF) 72.30 317.89 72.3 212.96 83.60 239.93 56.88 26.97 91.16 331.96 91.16 250 102.46 267.70 35.71 17.70 132.30 356.84 132.3 297.04 143.60 310.08 25.06 13.04 172.30 376.21 172.3 326.27 183.60 337.19 20.23 10.92 213.30 392.94 213.3 348.55 224.60 357.81 16.45 9.26 259.30 409.12 259.3 366.8 270.60 375.29 14.68 8.49 328.30 429.81 328.3 389.44 339.60 397.31 13.27 7.87 397.30 447.50 397.3 408.31 408.60 415.70 12.18 7.39 489.30 467.83 489.3 429.6 500.60 436.70 11.50 7.10 535.30 476.94 535.3 439.03 546.60 445.94 11.06 6.91 604.30 489.57 604.3 452.01 615.60 458.90 11.02 6.89 650.00 497.35 650 460.53 661.30 467.41 11.01 6.88 707.30 506.54 707.3 471.2 718.60 477.93 10.67 6.73 767.30 515.60 767.3 481.57 778.60 488.17 10.36 6.60 827.30 524.13 827.3 491.23 838.60 497.72 10.11 6.49

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 6 of 15 Analytical Limit (AL) NTSP Allowable Value (AV) Tolerances NTSP NTSP Allowable Allowable AFT ALT Pressure TSAT pressure temperature Value Value (psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (psig) (OF) (OF) (OF) 887.30 532.22 887.3 500.3 898.60 506.68 9.85 6.38 967.30 542.38 967.3 511.6 978.60 517.88 9.63 6.28 1027.30 549.60 1027.3 519.56 1038.60 525.76 9.44 6.20 1107.30 558.74 1107.3 529.58 1118.60 535.69 9.25 6.11 1187.30 567.40 1187.3 539 1198.60 545.03 9.06 6.03 1287.30 577.62 1287.3 550.06 1298.60 556.01 8.88 5.95 1387.30 587.26 1387.3 560.42 1398.60 566.30 8.73 5.88 1487.30 596.38 1487.3 570.18 1498.60 576.00 8.59 5.82 1587.30 605.04 1587.3 579.41 1598.60 585.17 8.46 5.76 1707.30 614.89 1707.3 589.87 1718.60 595.58 8.33 5.71 1825.00 624.05 1825 599.55 1836.30 605.21 8.21 5.66 1967.30 634.52 1967.3 610.58 1978.60 616.19 8.11 5.61 2068.14 641.58 2068.14 618 2079.44 623.57 8.00 5.57 2247.30 653.47 2247.3 630.46 2258.60 635.96 7.86 5.50 2500.00 668.98 2500 646.66 2511.30 652.16 7.86 5.50 Figure 3.2-2 presents a graphical representation of the AL, AV and NTSP based on Table 3.2-3. The margin between the AV and the NTSP is the AFT and this margin increases as the pressure and temperature decrease.

3.3 Calculation for HPI Flow Margin A summary of the Inadequate HPI Flow Function initial instrument calculation is provided and a final calculation which will be completed during finalization of the ICCMS modification. The final calculation will preserve the Allowable Value established in the initial calculation.

Conservative error corrected RCS pressure and total HPI flow were established in an analysis performed to determined the minimum required HPI flow for small break LOCAs at EPU conditions. The error corrections for RCS pressure and total HPI flow are 150 psig and 50 gpm, respectively, and are conservative and larger than the existing CELOOpfor both parameters. Figure 3.3-1 shows the minimum required HPI flow for small break LOCAs at EPU conditions. The following tables (Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-

2) provide a list indicating the relationship between RCS pressure and total HPI flow:

Table 3.3-1 Table 3.3-2 Non-error Corrected - Error Corrected -

Analytical Limit NTSP RCS Total Flow RCS Total Flow Pressure (gpm) Pressure (gpm)

(psig) (psig) 0 608.5 150 658.5 600 546.5 750 596.5 900 511.7 1050 561.7 1200 473.6 1350 523.6 1500 431.2 1650 481.2 1800 383 1950 433 2100 326.2 2250 376.2 2400 254.4 2550 304.4 These cardinal points are used to establish values at a given total HPI flow. The non-error corrected points represent the minimum required HPI flow for small break LOCAs at EPU conditions and therefore

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page7 of 15 are considered the analytical limit. The error corrected points are considered the NTSP and are represented by the following algebraic expression:

y = -0.0095 (x) 2 + 2.4222 (x) + 2693 Equation 3.3-1 where y corresponds to RCS Pressure and x corresponds to total HPI flow The following table provides the AFT and ALT values used in the existing CR-3 HPI System flow loop accuracy instrument calculation:

Table 3.3-3 Calculation Recall Points ALT AFT RCS Wide Range Pressure Recall-4 and Recall-5 +/-0.45%, +/-11.3 psig +/-1.03%, +/-25.8 psig HPI Flow Recall-260, 261, 262 +/-1.0 gpm +/-4.0 gpm and 263 (one transmitter) (one transmitter)

A flow AFT associated with the Inadequate HPI Flow instrument loop is established by considering the AFT of 4 gpm from each HPI flow instrument loop and combining the individual loop AFTs using the SRSS method which yields; [(4.0)2 + (4.0)2 +(4.0)2 + (4.0)2]1/2 or +/-8 gpm.

The pressure AFT associated with the Inadequate HPI Flow instrument loop is established by using a two-step process and an input pressure AFT of 25.8 psig from the existing wide range RCS pressure loop accuracy instrument calculation.

Similarly, the Inadequate HPI flow instrument loop flow ALT is derived by using the SRSS method and yields +/-2.0 gpm. The Inadequate HPI flow instrument loop pressure ALT is derived from an input pressure ALT of 11.3 psig from the existing wide range RCS pressure loop accuracy instrument calculation.

To determine the Allowable Value a two step process is used. The Allowable Value, in units of pressure, is obtained as follows:

• Select HPI flow from non-corrected error total HPI flow value data table (Table 3.3-1).

• Add AFTHPI (8 gpm) to obtain FNEW.

• Using Equation 3.3-1 obtain PNEW

" Subtract AFTPRESS (25.8 psig) from PNEW to obtain the Allowable Value

• The Allowable Value is for a given flow FAV Example:

The overall HPI flow AFT of 8 gpm is added to the non-corrected error total HPI flow value (Table 3.3.1) as follows:

473.6 gpm + 8 gpm = 481.6 gpm The resulting HPI flow value is used to calculate a resulting RCS pressure y = -0.0095 *(481.6)2 + 2.4222"(481.6) + 2693 y = 1656.12 psig The RCS wide range pressure AFT of 25.8 psig is subtracted yielding:

Allowable Value = 1656.12 - 25.8 = 1630.32 psig The overall Inadequate HPI Flow Function instrument loop pressure AFT is determined as follows:

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 8 of 15 For x = 473.6 gpm y = -0.0095 *(473.6)2 + 2.4222*(473.6) + 2693 y = 1709.33 psig (PNTSP)

AFT = PNTSP - PAV = 1709.33- 1630.32 psig = 79.02 psig Table 3.3-4 Assumed HPI Total Flow (gpm) 546.50 511.70 473.60 431.20 383.00 326.20 254.40 Analytical Limit (psig) 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 Allowable Value (psig) 1089.34 1360.18 1630.32 1898.51 2161.91 2415.65 2648.67 NTSP/LTSP (psig) 1179.44 1444.99 1709.33 1971.08 2227.16 2472.26 2694.37 AFT (psig) +/-90.10 +/-84.81 +/-79.02 +/-72.57 +/-65.25 +/-56.61 +/-45.70 ALT (psig) +/-27.26 +/-25.94 +/-24.49 +/-22.88 +/-21.05 +/-18.89 +/-16.16 To generate intermediate points, Excel 2007 was used to graph the selected pressure and Allowable Value temperatures as an X-Y scatter plot. A trend line was applied to the curve and a curve fit was performed for the Inadequate HPI flow Allowable Value and the following algebraic expression was obtained:

y = -0.0095*X2 + 2.2702*x + 2686 Equation 3.3-2 where x represents total HPI flow in gpm and y represents RCS pressure in psig This curve closely matches the calculated Allowable Values at selected RCS pressures and is off-set by less than 0.1 psig as shown in Table 3.3-5:

Table 3.3-5 RCS Pressure Total HPI Flow Error Analytical Limit Analytical Limit AV (psig) (psig) (Allowable Value (psig) (gpm) - Curve Fit) 600 546.5 1089.34 1089.37 -0.03 900 511.7 1360.18 1360.21 -0.03 1200 473.6 1630.32 1630.35 -0.03 1500 431.2 1898.51 1898.54 -0.03 1800 383 2161.91 2161.94 -0.03 2100 326.2 2415.65 2415.68 -0.03 2400 254.4 2648.67 2648.70 -0.03 A curve fit was performed using Table 3.3-1 data from 600 psig to 2400 psig. 0 psig was not used since the small break LOCA analysis assumes FCS lowers and controls secondary pressure to approximately 350 psig. The curve fit resulted in the following algebraic expression:

y = -0.0095*X2 + 1.4755*x + 2639.5 Equation 3.3-3 A comparison of the errors in this curve fit with the points from the minimum HPI flow analysis for small break LOCAs yield the following:

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 9 of 15 Table 3.3-6 EPU Analysis Curve Flow Points fit (gpm) (psig) (psig) Error 608.5 0 19.76 -19.76 546.5 600 608.57 -8.57 511.7 900 907.06 -7.06 473.6 1200 1207.48 -7.48 431.2 1500 1509.37 -9.37 383 1800 1811.07 -11.07 326.2 2100 2109.95 -9.95 254.4 2400 2400.03 -0.03 As indicated by Table 3.3-6, the curve fit is conservative with respect to the minimum HPI flow analysis data table because the curve fit predicts a higher pressure at all points.

3.3.1 Summary of algorithms for the Inadequate HPI Flow Function Analytical Limit: y = -0.0095*X2 + 1.4755*x + 2639.5 Equation 3.3-3 Allowable Value: y = -0.0095 "X2 + 2.2702*x + 2686 Equation 3.3-2 NTSP: y = -0.0095 (x) 2 + 2.4222 (x) + 2693 Equation 3.3-1 where y corresponds to RCS Pressure and x corresponds to total HPI flow Figure 3.3-2 shows the resulting curves for the analytical limit, Allowable Value, and NTSP.

4.0 RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS 4.1 Loss of Subcooling Margin Function Selected Pressure 650 psig 887.30 psig 1187.30 psig 1587.30 psig 1967.30 psig 2500 psig Analytical Limit 497.35°F 532.22°F 567.40'F 605.04'F 634.52°F 668.98°F Allowable Value 471.54°F 510.15'F 548.06'F 587.87°F 618.69°F 654.52°F LTSP/

NTSP 460.53°F 500.30'F 539.00°F 579.41'F 610.58°F 646.66°F AFT +/-11.01'F +/-9.85°F +/-9.06'F +/-8.46°F +/-8.11°F +/-7.86°F ALT +/-6.88°F +/-6.38°F +/-6.03'F +/-5.56°F +/-5.61 °F +/-5.50'F

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 10 of 15 Safety Limit N/A Analytical Limit --- ------- 605.04'F Difference between Analytical Limit AL and NTSP is CELOOP CELOOP.

CELOOP = +/- [(ELooP) 2 + (AFLOOP) 2 ]112 + EBtAS +/- EPROCESS Allowable Value 587.87°F ALT + 584.97°F LTSP/NTSP 579.41 °F ALT - 573.85°F AFT- 570.95°F NOTE: The Normal Operating Point is the post reactor trip RCS temperature.

Normal Operating Point ----------------------- -550'F For a normal trip -550'F is the Normal Operating Point.

All of the temperature data points in this graphical representation assume an RCS pressure of 1587.30 psig.

4.2 Inadequate HPI Flow Margin Assumed HPI 546.50 511.70 473.60 431.20 383.00 326.20 254.40 Total Flow gpm gpm gpm gpm gpm gpm gpm Analytical 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2400 Limit psig psig psig psig psig 2100 psig psig Allowable 1089.34 1360.18 1630.32 1898.51 2161.91 2415.65 2648.67 Value psig psig psig psig psig psig psig LTSP/NTSP 1179.44 1444.99 1709.33 1971.08 2227.16 2472.26 2694.37 psig psig psig psig psig psig psig AFT +/-90.10 +/-84.81 +/-79.02 +/-72.57 +/-65.25 +/-56.61 +/-45.70 psig psig psig psig psig psig psig ALT +/-27.26 +/-25.94 +/-24.49 +/-22.88 +/-21.05 +/-18.89 +/-16.16 psig psig psig psig psig psig psig Safety Limit N/A Analytical Limit 1500 psig Difference between Analytical Limit AL and NTSP is CELOOP CELOOP.

CELOOP = +/- [(ELooP) 2 + (AFLOOP) 2 ]112 +/- EBIAS +/- EpROCESS Allowable Value 1898.51 psig ALT- 1948.2 psig LTSP/NTSP 1971.08 psig ALT+ 1993.96 psig AFT+ 2043.65 psig NOTE: The Normal Operating Point is Normal Operating Point ----------------------- -2200 psig based on a 2-Pump curve operating curve.

All of the pressure data points in this graphical representation assume a total HPI flow of 431.2 gpm.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 11 of 15 5.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION APPLICATION OF INSTRUMENT SETPOINTS The Loss of Subcooling Margin and Inadequate HPI Flow Functions are demonstrated Operable by applying the following guidance during instrument Channel Calibrations and Channel Functional Tests:

If the instrument setting is found within the ALT, the results are recorded in the surveillance procedure and no further action is required for the instrument surveillance.

If the instrument setting is found outside the ALT but within the AFT, the instrument setting is reset to within the ALT, and no further action is required for the instrument surveillance.

If the instrument setting is found outside the AFT but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel is Operable, but considered degraded. The degraded condition must be further evaluated during performance of the surveillance. This evaluation, as a minimum, consists of resetting the instrument setting to the LTSP/NTSP (within the ALT) and evaluating the channel response. Ifthe channel is functioning as required and expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is Operable and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. Also, for channels determined to be Operable but degraded after returning the channel to service, the performance of these channels will be evaluated under the CR-3 Corrective Action Program (CAP). Entry into the CAP will ensure required review and documentation of the condition.

Ifthe instrument setting is found non-conservative to the Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable until the instrument setting is reset to the LTSP/NTSP (within the ALT), and any evaluations necessary to return the channel to service are completed. The instrument setting may be more conservative than the LTSP provided the AFT and ALT are applied to the actual instrument setting (NSTP) used to confirm channel performance.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. CR-3 plant procedure ICDC-1, "I&C Design Criteria for Instrument Loop Uncertainty Calculations,"

Revision 4.

2. ISA-$67.04, Part I, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," September 1994.

3. ISA-RP67.04, Part II,"Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation," September 1994.

4. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3, December 1999.

5. ASME Steam Tables For Industrial Use, Second Edition, 1967.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 12 of 15

~VIE-RA-IGE P-T LINMI - NOR~MAL MODE WITM PERMANENT CURAES MA~hTAIK A 50 PSI -MARCT;1LOM4 TIM SIJRC=LIM & SCM LETST 3WSTA1RTInG 1WC PUMPS 2300 2250 1750 1500 a.

d 750 500 o

250 30) 350 400 450 50 550 6C0 650 RCS COOLA.NLT TEMPRATURE, (IF)

Figure 3.2-1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F081 1-01 Page 13 of 15 2500 Subcooling Margin 2000

• 1500 1000 JL 4 LW 4 W-44 -

-AV

-AL NTSP psig psig psig 500 0

250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 In Core Temperature °F Figure 3.2-2

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0811-01 Page 14 of 15 CR-3 Degraded HPI Flow for I and 2 HPI Pumps with a Cv = 6.2 2500

,;2000 -

1500 1000 U

500 240 340 440 540 640 740 840 HPI Flow, 9prn

-I HPIPumip(C-4 2) - -Required HPI Flow 2HPI PurnpHPI UneBr~iIl)

--- RequiredW~O10psi and 50 gomrnror --- 2-Pump (CLPE)) Pay. (Required W150psi and50 y m inm)

Figure 3.3-1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0811-01 Page 15 of 15 3000 2500 '"

a-2000 1500 - NTSP

-AV i000 -AL 2

y =-0.0095x 500

+ 2.2702x + 2686 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 Total HPI Flow (gpm)

Figure 3.3-2

0 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 3 IEEE 603-1991 AND IEEE 279-1971 COMPLIANCE MATRIX

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 4 ICCMS SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC AND CONTROL LOGIC DIAGRAMS

Low Range RCS Pressure Instrument Loop Enclosure 4 (RC-147-PT / RC-148-PT / RC-244-PT) 15 of 19 Ra CC cc EQ Zone 65 EQ Zone 58 EQ Zone 13 Int.Instr.

E (RC-1147-pifl)'1 (R-14&-PI2Z2 4 Di xsori Foxcboro N-2A0-V21SIli (RC-147-PV3) aR-4-P3 (RC-148-I'41)

Rosemount Foxboro FoxboroBailey U54SH9RA :Nt-2AI-12V N-ZAG-VAI 5250E PT - 0"MAýK0-1 VDC E E s (RC- 14?PT (RC-.147-PYI) CRC-147-PY3) ( RC- 3A-P58)

(RC-145- PT) c?-4Pn 0-600 PSIG Foxboro N-2A0-VA2[

BailIey 6623819-1 (RC-147-PYZ)i E

4'5z Foxboro Bie Ba 1ey (Rc- 30-PS)

W-MVA 6624610-Il1Z 6624610-1211 E

• E 8 -10 to +1DVOC E Fi CRC-148- PY2 (RC- 14 5-181) ORC-1468-EI)

NUS-A304DB Sht. 5 of 14 Rosemount The 4 - 20 mA current loop signal for Low Range RCS Pressure is ICC~ AlSCH 1 1154SH9RA __(RC-147-PT) taken from the instrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter. The (RC-224-PT) 4- 20 rnA ICCMS CH 2 block diagram only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs to SPDS 0 - 600 PSIG for RC-147-PT and RC-148-PT are RECL-243 and RECL-40 respectively (RC-148-PT) i* 4 - 20 MA ICCMS CH 3 and highlighted in the loop drawing above. RC-224-PT will not be (RC-224-PT) routed to SPDS and will only be used for ICCMS.

• • • Isolation is provided by the Foxboro N-2AI-12V which is a fully qualified, safety related, current to voltage converter that accepts a 4 to 20 mA input and provides a 0 to 10 VDC isolated output.

Core Exit Thermocouple Instrument Loops Enclosure 4 16 of 19 Current Configuration Reoter Owfr"O loItTIrd ate MCB SPDS 119,' elevation Uuiid'ng Sectia" Cabinets EQ tone 39 EQ Zone. 87 FRA R~ector Cotrol Comptex i Core 124' elevation COPIjef Copper COntrol CAýOftSdX Exit ITT' Camnn But Butt I 48 elevation Thermocouple SplICe IST CONAX Splice EO zone 13 ButdkVg OW $W4 IFabdthraugh Pelletttom Con"ro VOW / bmoc u*

APssem200i0s Eurotheml comolex 14gr 4

1 elevwtioo ThiSmtaooupie I Etn In p 7J21-21M01 01 ~ThWMOCOi"0 C"'sel 12 Ci b61e 7J21 .21001-02~Extensibn Recorder Plarnt Pon 400 14.0' 019 Cable 4100(3 Compator UI.

Po4913,5i eI n New Configuration for ICCMS Channels 1 and 2 4- 20 mA New Configuration for ICCMS Channel 3 AUMII Temperature i CH 3

- II flTransmitter Incore T/C NUS-A304DB Sht. 4 of 14 The core exit thermocouples are currently routed to the ***Eurotherm Chessell Recorder 4100G in the PSA section of the Main Control Board. The eight core exit thermocouples that are designated for ICCMS channel 1 are currently routed to one recorder (Train A) and eight core exit thermocouples that are designated for ICCMS channel 2 are routed to the other recorder (Train B). The Eurotherm Chessell Recorder 4100G are fully qualified, safety related recorders with each recorder providing outputs to SPDS.

The eight core exit thermocouples that will be used for channel 3 that are not currently qualified are not routed to SPDS but they are sent to the plant process computer system. These eight core exit thermocouple signals will be routed to the plant process computer system via the non-safety related online monitor portion of ICCMS.

Wide Range RCS Pressure Instrument Loops Enclosure 4 (RC-3A-PT3 / RC-3A-PT3 / RC-223-PT) 17 of 19 a:

4QU6 EQZONE5S EQ ZOM 13 66~0MA1 6619J0A II =0A -RC-3-EFM

- ,4BT3 RC-4TS

-- - - - -- -

PASO MI Ui MA 6619BM RC-BV9 RC-O3110 RC3-T12 GU67ML3A141 0 -10 iIDC 0 -10 VDC IIC-13A.VA (wunsAed) ft6U-PV

?(WWA14

-2in 0 10 Voc 66Z461 ES-MO t MRC-1i-P53 RCC-3A-W4 tI ICM (R -3 C

-P3 o -10VD(

(UnWA IE38 wt-JU-SIG 1CMS CH (R -13 M

~RW Rosemouni 1154GP9Ri (RC-223-PT 0 - 2500 PS ICCMS CH 3 4 - 20 mA (RC-223-PT)

NUS-A304DB Sht. 5 of 14 The 4 - 20 mA current loop signal for Wide Range RCS Pressure is taken from the instrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter. The block diagram in NUS-A304DB only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs to SPDS for RC-3A-PT3 and RC-3B-PT3 are RECL-4 and RECL-5 respectively and are highlighted in the loop drawing above. RC-223-PT will not be routed to SPDS and will only be used for ICCMS.

• • • Isolation is provided by the Bailey Buffer Amplifiers RC-3A-PY3 and RC-3B-PY3 for Trains 'A' and 'B' respectively. The Bailey 6621670A1241 is a fully qualified, safety related, voltage buffer.

Low Range HPI Flow Instrument Loops Enclosure 4 (MU-23-dPT5 / MU-23-dPT6 / MU-23-dPT7 / MU-23-dPT8) 18 of 19 (MU-23-dPT13 / MU-23-dPT14 I MU-23-dPT15 / MU-23-dPT16)

Alk ccc F~UNW 1154IIIUPA t%'2A(4V MWNA~.z (MU 2-V1 T) (WU-23-FtS-~

0- 10Vdc tM11-23-FE4) PMU-3-4UfI) (MUZ23-Y~il ZAOIP 0- M~PWW

-- -- - -- -- - -- -- - -- -- - -- -

(M -3F74 0M4- F17-IJ

0. 10 VdiC a-2 $w qMU-Zi.T'IIroC4 W

(MtI-JJ1.P-)F51

-~Ei 1axdbWO-2 I 131 ooo g00 TWO01 ICCMS CH 1 (MU-23-dPT7) 4-20 mAT (MU-23-dPT8)

ICCMS CH 2 NUS-A304DB Sht. 3 of 14 Rosemount (MU-23-dPT5) The 4 - 20 mA current loop signal for Low Range HPI flow is taken from the 1154HH5RA (MU-23-dPT6) instrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter. The block diagram in ICCMS CH 3 (MU-23-dPT13) NUS-A304DB only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs to (MU-23-dPT13)

(MU-23-dPT14) (MU-23-dPT14)

SPDS/RECALL for MU-23-dPT5, MU-23-dPT6, MU-23-dPT7, and MU (MU-23-dPT15) (MU-23-dPT15) dPT8, are being added as part of the Fast Cool Down System Engineering (MU-23-dPT16) (MU-23-dPT16) Change package and they will be designated as RECL-113, RECL-119, RECL-120, and RECL-121 respectively. MU-23-dPT13, MU-23-dPT14, MU dPT15 , and MU-23-dPT16 will not be routed to RECALL/SPDS and will only be used for ICCMS initiation channel 3.

• • • Isolation is provided by the Foxboro N-2AI-12V which is a fully qualified, safety related, current to voltage converter that accepts a 4 to 20 mA input and provides a 0 to 10 VDC isolated output.

Low Range HPI Flow Instrument Loops Enclosure 4 9 of 19 (MU-23-dPT9 / MU-23-dPT10 / MU-23-dPT11 / MU-23-dPT12i 1* Za 93 (AZ) E OU q* I1.J*-SM 43.fl4 23.dt"I MU2S1 F"I.O **

t52A1-QV O-11tV*

9W Ew:"L (MU43-FVPZ4 p NUS-A304DB Sht. 3 of 14 The 4 - 20 mA current loop signal for Low Range HPI flow is taken from the instrument loop at the Rosemount transmitter.

The block diagram in NUS-A304DB only shows the Channel 1 cabinet. The inputs to SPDS/RECALL for MU-23-dPT9, MU dPT10, MU-23-dPT11 , and MU-23-dPT12 are designated as RECL-260, RECL-261, RECL-262, and RECL-263 respectively.

• • • Isolation is provided by the Foxboro N-2AI-12V which is a fully qualified, safety related, current to voltage converter that accepts a 4 to 20 mA input and provides a 0 to 10 VDC isolated output. The Dixson SA202P flow indicators MU-23-FI9, MU-23-FI1O, MU-23-FI11, and MU-23-FI12 are classified as safety related 1E instrumentation and they do not need to be isolated from ICCMS.