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{{#Wiki_filter:NRC PORM SCS it 77l LlCEINSEE EVENT REPORT U*NUCI.EAR RECULATORY CCVIMISSION 1 3 CCaai't~O I 5*""""*"LJ-''''O (PI EASE PAlttT OR TYPE AI I.REQUIRED INFORIAATIOr43 I'I'IQ'-'"'I'I'Q~l''Q~O 9 LICC.'cSCC CQQC!'CSNSC NUNS CA 3$5~C'a4$aa TYPC 48$1~a"":.::LJZ'''~O~O 50 4 I QQCICCT NUMSSA 45$9 KV~+VT Q*TC rl rs RCPORT Q*ta$8 EVENT OESCRIPTION
{{#Wiki_filter:NRC PORM SCS it 77l 1
'NO PROSAEl E CCAISEcUENCES QIO A review of Haint enance Procedure D TS 4.15.3.a compliance revealed that a fire hose station was not full operable as required by TS 3.14.3.a, in that the installed fire hose was 25 ft.too short.Due to a misunderstanding of what constituted operability, the hose station remained ino erable for 4 months.Durin the eriod that hose station HS-AB-02 was ino er,~Q8 was available at nearb stations f or emer enc re 1$9 38~Os what constitutes opex'ability, (2)lack of understandin of the action SYSTCAI CAU5$CAUSC COMP.VALVC CQQC CQQC SU5CQQC CCMPQt4CNTCQQC SuCCQQC SUSQQQC aJLJS L'JS MS~G aJS aJO.1 4 9 III I I.I1 IS IS I9 22 SCCUCNTIAIa OCCVAACa4CC ACPQAT A CVISIQA4~UCAIAO SVCNTYsWA ACPQAT NO CQQ 5 NQ.QIa aiaaar~80~~00 3'~~03~L~QJ.1l I'2 11=1l 15 11 25 29 38 11 ACTION PVTVAC CPPCC StaVTQQWN AYTACIIMCNT 4PAOA PAIMC~C alPQNKNT TAKCt4 ACTION CNPLANl'CTIIQQ NQUAs 22$U8MtTTco PQAAI su8.$UPPLtcA MANUPAclvASA LlSLJS aJS LJS''JS L'JO LJS~S JS 5 14~s8 l I ll 41 CAUS'E OESCRIPTION ANO CORREctIVE ACTIONS Qit Q The fire hose station ino erabilit was due to l m u required if a Limiting Condition of 0 eration is not met and 3 failure of administrative controls which re uire both strict comoliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.CZ3 ACTIVITY COND'IT RCI.CASCQ QP RCL~C AMQVNTQP ACTIVITY Q$$cd~O Lz!O 3 9 10 II AA PCRSQNNCV SCPQSUACS NVMSCR TYP~QCSCRIPTIQN
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~00 0~Qaa~ZQaa KA I I I2 13 PSRSCNN5!INtuAICS l5 t$9 9 AC I LI~P MCTIIQQ Qta$TATUs", POYrcA QTIICR STA'aaS gj QISCQVCilV LJO LLLJSI-" I L'JS I"'IO 11 I 1 ll 45$0 orscovcAY QcscAIATICN Q2 Contxol Surveys.llance LQCATIOII QP RCLKASC Q$$30 9 I2 L~~QA QR QAMAQi TO P*CILITY QAS QCSCA!STION 9~Z'2 NA 1 5 3'O PUSUC:.Y;ssuCQ QCSCAII TIQ4 Q o LN IQ~NA 3 3!0'.A.SchoPP>>n NRC USE ONIY paIQNs.(305)552-3802 8004 080&cg REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 250-80-05 LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT PACE TWO Additional Cause Descri tion and Corrective Actions: The fire hose station inoperability was due to (1)a misunderstanding of what constitutes Operability, (2)lack of understanding of the action required if a Limiting Condition of Operation is not met, and (3)failure of administrative controls which require both strict compliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.Maintenance Procedure 15537.2 incorporates the requirements of TS 4.15.3.a, the property insurance underwriter, and the preventive maintenance program.Hose station HS-AB-02 is atypical in that it should have been fitted with an extra length of hose to reach remote areas of the Auxiliary Building.The need for the additional hose length to reach safety related equipment was identified by the licensee in our report,"Fire Protection
CCaai't
>>A Re-evaluation of Existing Design Features and Administrative Controls," which was transmitted by letter dated February 25, 1977 (L-77-57).
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Through an oversight, the additional length of hose and a new hose reel were not installed.
9
However, MP 15537.2 was revised to require the proper length of fire hose at this location.The Fire Marshall had noted the deviation on the surveillance procedure, and had ordered the equipment necessary to properly equip the fire hose station.He, however, was not aware of the timely response required by the"Action Statement" in the event a Limiting Condition of.Operation associated with the fire hose stations could not be met.The deviation noted in the completed copy of the procedure was overlooked during review of surveillance results by the On-Site Fire Protection Coordinator.
              *""""*"LJ LICC.'cSCC CQQC
However, a third xeview (required in the procedure) by QC personnel detected the deviation, and corrective action was initiated.
                    "":.::LJZ 'I50
A review of previously completed copies of the procedure disclosed similar instances of deviations that had not been corrected.
                                          'I'IQ '
The corrective action will include revision of MP 15537.2 to require notification of the on-shift Nuclear Plant Supervisor should any fixe protection system/component (required by Technical Specifications) be found in a condition other than specified by the procedure.}}
I 4
                                                      ''
EVENT OESCRIPTION 'NO PROSAEl E CCAISEcUENCES
                                                                    '' ~O~O
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LlCEINSEE EVENT REPORT
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                                                                                              'I'I'
                                                                                    'CSNSC NUNS CA
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rs aa TYPC   48 RCPORT Q~O $1 Q*ta
                                                                                                                                                                    ~a
                                                                                                                                                                        $8 A     review of Haint enance Procedure                                                                         D TS 4.15.3.a compliance revealed that a                                                     fire     hose       station was not full operable as required by TS 3.14.3.a, in that the installed fire hose was           25 ft. too short.                           Due to a misunderstanding of what constituted operability, the hose station remained ino erable for 4 months. Durin the eriod that hose station HS-AB-02 was ino er,
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        $ 9 4
was available at nearb UCAIAO 9
SYSTCAI CQQC aJLJS SVCNTYsWA III CAU5$
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                                                                                      '
ACTION PVTVAC                    CPPCC TAKCt4 ACTION                 CNPLANl'CTIIQQ                               NQUAs     22     $ U8MtTTco       PQAAI su8.         $ UPPLtcA         MANUPAclvASA LlSLJS aJS JS                    5 LJS 14                          ~        s8    lI              L'JO LJS                       ll             41 CAUS'E OESCRIPTION ANO CORREctIVE ACTIONS                             Qit Q         The       fire         hose       station ino erabilit was due to l                                                     m     u what constitutes opex'ability, (2) lack of understandin of the action required             if       a Limiting Condition of 0 eration is not met and 3 failure of administrative controls which re uire both strict comoliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.
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3   3 A. SchoPP>>n                                                 paIQNs.(     305 ) 552-3802 8004 080&cg
 
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE   250-80-05 LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT PACE TWO Additional   Cause Descri tion and Corrective Actions:
The fire hose station inoperability was due to (1) a misunderstanding of what constitutes Operability, (2) lack of understanding of the action required if   a Limiting Condition of Operation is not met, and (3) failure of administrative controls which require both strict compliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.
Maintenance Procedure 15537.2 incorporates the requirements of TS 4.15.3.a, the property insurance underwriter, and the preventive maintenance program.
Hose station HS-AB-02 is atypical in that     it should have been fitted with an extra length of hose to reach remote areas of the Auxiliary Building. The need for the additional hose length to reach safety related equipment was identified by the licensee in our report, "Fire Protection >> A Re-evaluation of Existing Design Features and Administrative Controls," which was transmitted by letter dated February 25, 1977 (L-77-57). Through an oversight, the additional length of hose and a new hose reel were not installed. However, MP 15537.2 was revised to require the proper length of fire   hose at this location.
The   Fire Marshall had noted the deviation on the surveillance procedure, and had ordered the equipment necessary to properly equip the fire hose station. He, however, was not aware of the timely response required by the "Action Statement" in the event a Limiting Condition of .Operation associated with the fire hose stations could not be met.
The   deviation noted in the completed copy of the procedure was overlooked during review of surveillance results by the On-Site Fire Protection Coordinator. However, a third xeview (required in the procedure) by QC personnel detected the deviation, and corrective action was initiated.
A review of previously completed copies of the procedure disclosed similar instances of deviations that had not been corrected.
The   corrective action will include revision of MP 15537.2 to require notification of the on-shift Nuclear Plant Supervisor should any fixe protection system/component (required by Technical Specifications) be found in a condition other than specified by the procedure.}}

Revision as of 11:19, 22 October 2019

LER 80-005/03L-0:on 800229,during Review of Maint Procedure 15537.2,fire Hose Station Found Not Fully Operable.Caused by Misunderstanding of What Constitutes Operability & Failure of Administrative Controls.Procedure Will Be Revised
ML17339A853
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/31/1980
From: Schoppmann M
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17339A852 List:
References
LER-80-005-03L-01, LER-80-5-3L-1, NUDOCS 8004080608
Download: ML17339A853 (2)


Text

NRC PORM SCS it 77l 1

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CCaai't

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9

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EVENT OESCRIPTION 'NO PROSAEl E CCAISEcUENCES

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QQCICCT NUMSSA

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LlCEINSEE EVENT REPORT

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'I'I'

'CSNSC NUNS CA

$9 KV~+VT Q*TC 3$ 5 U *NUCI.EAR RECULATORY CCVIMISSION (PI EASE PAlttT OR TYPE AI I. REQUIRED INFORIAATIOr43 Q~l' '

rl

~C'a4$

rs aa TYPC 48 RCPORT Q~O $1 Q*ta

~a

$8 A review of Haint enance Procedure D TS 4.15.3.a compliance revealed that a fire hose station was not full operable as required by TS 3.14.3.a, in that the installed fire hose was 25 ft. too short. Due to a misunderstanding of what constituted operability, the hose station remained ino erable for 4 months. Durin the eriod that hose station HS-AB-02 was ino er,

~Q8 1

~Os 1

$ 9 4

was available at nearb UCAIAO 9

SYSTCAI CQQC aJLJS SVCNTYsWA III CAU5$

CQQC L'JS I

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CAUSC SU5CQQC MS I1 SCCUCNTIAIa ACPQAT NO

~G stations for emer enc re IS

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SuCCQQC aJS aJO.

I9 ACPQAT VALVC SUSQQQC 22

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38

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~S aiaaar ~80 3 ~03 QJ.

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=

1l 15 11 25 29 38 11 StaVTQQWN AYTACIIMCNT 4PAOA PAIMC~ C alPQNKNT

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ACTION PVTVAC CPPCC TAKCt4 ACTION CNPLANl'CTIIQQ NQUAs 22 $ U8MtTTco PQAAI su8. $ UPPLtcA MANUPAclvASA LlSLJS aJS JS 5 LJS 14 ~ s8 lI L'JO LJS ll 41 CAUS'E OESCRIPTION ANO CORREctIVE ACTIONS Qit Q The fire hose station ino erabilit was due to l m u what constitutes opex'ability, (2) lack of understandin of the action required if a Limiting Condition of 0 eration is not met and 3 failure of administrative controls which re uire both strict comoliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.

t CZ3 LJO

$ 9 9 AC I LI~ P

$TATUs ACTIVITY COND'IT

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"

I1 QTIICR STA'aaS AMQVNTQP ACTIVITYQ$ $

gj MCTIIQQ Qta QISCQVCilV llI L'JS45 I"' orscovcAY QcscAIATICN Q2 Contxol Surveys.llance LQCATIOIIQP RCLKASC Q$ $

$0 cd ~O Lz!O 3

RCI.CASCQ QP 9 10 PCRSQNNCV SCPQSUACS II AA l5 NVMSCR TYP ~ QCSCRIPTIQN

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ssuCQ QCSCAII TIQ4 Q NA o LN IQ~

3 3 A. SchoPP>>n paIQNs.( 305 ) 552-3802 8004 080&cg

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 250-80-05 LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT PACE TWO Additional Cause Descri tion and Corrective Actions:

The fire hose station inoperability was due to (1) a misunderstanding of what constitutes Operability, (2) lack of understanding of the action required if a Limiting Condition of Operation is not met, and (3) failure of administrative controls which require both strict compliance to procedures and independent review of surveillance results.

Maintenance Procedure 15537.2 incorporates the requirements of TS 4.15.3.a, the property insurance underwriter, and the preventive maintenance program.

Hose station HS-AB-02 is atypical in that it should have been fitted with an extra length of hose to reach remote areas of the Auxiliary Building. The need for the additional hose length to reach safety related equipment was identified by the licensee in our report, "Fire Protection >> A Re-evaluation of Existing Design Features and Administrative Controls," which was transmitted by letter dated February 25, 1977 (L-77-57). Through an oversight, the additional length of hose and a new hose reel were not installed. However, MP 15537.2 was revised to require the proper length of fire hose at this location.

The Fire Marshall had noted the deviation on the surveillance procedure, and had ordered the equipment necessary to properly equip the fire hose station. He, however, was not aware of the timely response required by the "Action Statement" in the event a Limiting Condition of .Operation associated with the fire hose stations could not be met.

The deviation noted in the completed copy of the procedure was overlooked during review of surveillance results by the On-Site Fire Protection Coordinator. However, a third xeview (required in the procedure) by QC personnel detected the deviation, and corrective action was initiated.

A review of previously completed copies of the procedure disclosed similar instances of deviations that had not been corrected.

The corrective action will include revision of MP 15537.2 to require notification of the on-shift Nuclear Plant Supervisor should any fixe protection system/component (required by Technical Specifications) be found in a condition other than specified by the procedure.