ML20153E328

Insp Rept 50-458/86-02 on 860113-17.Violation Noted:Failure to Properly Implement Temporary Alteration Procedure

ML20153E328
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	02/14/1986
From:	Bennett W, Jaudon J, Mcneill W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153E316	List: ML20153E311 ML20153E318 ML20153E328
References
50-458-86-02, 50-458-86-2, NUDOCS 8602240571
Download: ML20153E328 (6)

See also: IR 05000458/1986002

Text

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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/86-02 License NPF-47

Docket: 50-458

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities

P. O. Box 2951

Beaumont, Texas 77704

Facility Name: River Beno Station

Inspection At: River Bend Site, St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: January 13-17, 1980

Inspectors: IN

W. M. McNeill, Project Engineer, Project Date

Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

(paragraphs 1, 2, and 5)

YY

W. R. Bennett, Project Engineer, Project

W/YNd

Date

Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

(pars. 1, 3, 4, & 5)

Approved: , M// // U

J./P. udon, hief, Proje 4 Section~A Date

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(Rea or Pr jects Bran-h

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted January 13-17, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-02)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup, surveil-

lance testing, and maintenance. The inspection' involved 74 inspector-hours

onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the three areas inspected, one violation was identified

(failure to properly iseplement the temporary alteration procedure).

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8602240571 860214

PDR ADOCM 05000458

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Gulf States Utilities (GSU)

• R. E. Barnes, Mechanical Engineer

• W. H. Benkert, Quality Engineer

• J. B. Blakley, liechanical Engineer

• W. J. Cahill, Sr. Vice President

D. Cathey, Systems Engineer

• T. L. Crouse, QA Manager

• J. Deddens, Vice President - River Bend Nuclear Group

G. Englert, Mechanical Engineer

• J. W. Evans, Stenographic

A. D. Fredieu, Assistant Operations Supervisor

• P. E. Freehill, Superintendent, Startup and Test

• D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager-0perations

• P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager-Services

E. Grant, Supervisor, Licensing

• G. K. Henry, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering

J. Huff, Planning and Scheduling Specialist

• R. King, Licensing Engineer

• A. D. Kowalczuk, Assistant Plant Manager-Maintenance and Materials

• I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Engineering

• J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer

• J. McWhorter, QA Engineer

• T. G. Murphy, Supervisor, Planning and Scheduling

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• W. J. Reed, Director, Nuclear Licensing

• lf. L. Reeves, Mechanical Engineer

• D. Reynerson, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• L. Schell, Electrical Engineer

• rs . B. Suhrke, Hanager, Projects Planning and Coordination

• P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services

• D. M. Williamson, Operations Supervisor

• J. A. Wright, Supervisor, liechanical Engineering

Stone and Webster (S&W)

• li. R. Gaudette, Engineering Assurance

• B. R. Hall, Plant Services Supervisor

Cajun Electric

• J. D. Gore, Operations Monitor

• R. E. Perkins, Resident Engineer

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The NRC inspectors also contacted other site personnel including

administrative, clerical, operations, and maintenance personnel.

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on January 17, 1986,

2. Onsite Followup of Reports of Nonroutine Events

The inspection objectives were to determine whether the licensee nas taken

corrective actions as stated in written reports of events and whether

responses to events were adequate and met regulatory requirements, licensee

conditions, and commitments in regard to recent problems with motor

operated valves.

On January 5, a safety-related valve, feedwater block valve 1FWS*MOV-7B,

was inadvertently closed by control room operator, who immediately

attempted to open this same valve. Af ter several attempts to open, with

the valve breaker tripping each time, it was found that the valve operator

had broken off. The valve operator was found laying on the floor. The

licensee issued Condition Report No.86-022 to document this event. The

engineering evaluation of this problem concluded that this event was the

result of a combination of insufficient thread engagement and improper

torque of the bolts which secure the operator to the valve. The NRC

inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation. The improper torque was

based on the observation that all of the 10 other safety-related valves

with the same model Limitorque operator (SMB-4) were found to be torqued

from 100 to 400 foot-pounds (f t.-lbs.). The valve manufacturer's (Velan

Inc.) maintenance manual requirements are 1270 ft-lbs. for a 11 bolt.

Inquiries of the valve manufacturer and the operator manufacturer have

redefined this requirement to 700 f t.-lbs. All of the gate and globe

valves used at River Bend have been supplied by Velan through S&W with the

exception of seven in the high pressure core spray system. These seven

were supplied by Anchor / Darling Valve Co. through General Electric (G.E.).

The Anchor / Darling maintenance manual was found to be nonspecific on torque

requirements (" tight as sufficiently possible"). However, inquiries to

Anchor / Darling have established that there are similar torque requirements.

The SliB-4 type Limitoruge operator is a large model of high horsepower

(13-26 horsepower). The sampling was expanded to other models of

Limitorque operators above six horsepower. This inspection was performed

before the torque requirements were established and was somewhat inconclu-

sive. The bolts were checked to be " snug" with a 12" wrench. However,

three of eight operators were found to be less than " snug". An additional

four operators in this category were checked with the established torque

requirements and three of these failed to meet torque requirements.

It was also found that the failed valve operator 1FWS*l10V-7B had short

bolts. An inspection was made of the 10 other SMB-4 operators. Two valve

operators, which were supplied by Anchor / Darling, were found to have

short bolts. It will be further discussed by the licensee with

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Anchor / Darling if the requirement for bolt length of 11 times the bolt

diameter is applicable to their valves.

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A review by the NRC inspector of the S&W installation records found that

the operator of the failed valve had been removed and returned to

Limitorque for rework. The records also document that the operator was

reassemblied to the Velan mantal requirements. There was no evidence of

bolt replacement which would account for the short bolts. It was also

found by the licensee, Auring replacement and reassembly of the operator

for the failed valve, tMt, when the operator was torqued with the valve

in a closed position, there was a gap between the mating surfaces of

operator and valve.

The NRC inspector reviewed the inservice test plan, maintenance procedures

and a computerized listing of safety-related valves to establish the scope

of reinspection necessary. It appears that there are 262 Limitorque opera-

tors on safety-related valves, Table 1 summarizes the distribution of

Limitorque models found on safety-related valves.

Table I

SMB-4 10

SMB-3 & SB-3 6

SMB-2 & SB-2 13

SMB-1 & SB-1 16

SMB-0 & SB-0 57

SMB-00 & SB-00 63

SMB-000 86

SMC-C 11

The NRC inspector noted that the licensee has an inspection plan

established to verify the torque of all Limitorque operators. After

verifying and correcting any torque deficiencies, a torque seal will be

applied so that a long-term monitoring program can be implemented. This

appears necessary because the root cause of untorqued bolts has not been

positively established, although, it appears to be the result of applying

preload torque to the operator valve bolts with the valve in a closed

position. The verification effort and investigation of why the operator

bolts became under-torqued is an open item to be reviewed further by the

NRC in subsequent inspections (458/8602-01).

During the replacement and reassembly of 1 FWS*H0V-7B it was noted that the

selected spare valve had unqualified wiring in its operator. This was

documented by the licensee on Condition Report No 86-038. This spare and

six other operators had been procured by G.E. through Anchor / Darling for

Unit No. 2. G.E. has supplied seven valves per unit at River Bend. The

Unit No. 2 valves are being used as spares for Unit No. 1. Previously, in

1985, all M0Vs (62) installed inside containment had been inspected for

proper wiring. A sample of five valves outside containment were inspected

and they were found acceptable. An inspection of all (14) G.E.-supplied

valves found seven with unqualified wire. This included one Unit No. 2

spare that had been installed in Unit 1, the spare that was to be

installed, and the remaining spares. All installed valves with unqualified

wire were tagged and Maintenance Work Requests issued to replace the wire.

The remaining spares have been tagged as nonconforming. This appears to be

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a limited problem associated with G.E.'s procurement through Anchor / Darling

of 1978 vintage Limitorque operators when Limitorque apparently did not

have sufficient manufacturing process controls to assure use of correct

wire. All other Limitorque operators installed at River Bend post date

this procurement by 2 years and were procured mostly by S&W through Velan.

No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the

inspection.

3. Quality Assurance (QA) Program (Surveillance Testing)

The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to ascertain whether the

licensee has implemented programs for control and evaluation of surveil-

lance testing, calibration and inspection required by Section 4 of the

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Technical Specifications (TS) and Inservice Inspection of Pumps and Valves

as described in 10 CFR 50.55a.(g).

The NRC inspector reviewed 22 completed surveillance procedures. All

precedures were properly prepared and approved, and were ircluded in a

master schedule. All procedures were completed satisfactorily and met all

TS requirements. The NRC inspector noted that, in several instances, set-

points were found within TS requirements but outside procedural require-

ments. Utilizing the surveillance procedure, the setpoints were adjusted

to be within the requirements set forth in the procedure. The NRC inspector

asked how these adjustments were documented and trended. Discussions with

instrument and control personnel and supervisors, disclosed that these

adjustments are reported on the surveillance completion / exception form and

thus are properly trended.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the

inspection.

4. 0A Program (Maintenance)

The purpose cf this portion of the inspection was to ascertain whether the

licensee has implemented a QA program relating to maintenance activities

that is in conformance with TS, regulatory requirements, commitments in the

license and industry guides or standards.

The NRC inspector reviewed six maintenance work requests and determined

that they had been properly initiated, reviewed, and approved. The main-

tenance activities were performed in accordance with appropriate procedures.

The NRC inspector reviewed the temporary alteration log. Two temporary

alterations (85-RHS-28 and -29) each required lif ting of two leads. Each

temporary alteration request showed that only one of the two leads had been

signed for as being lifted and neither lead was verified as being lifted as

required by River Bend Procedure ADM-0031. The NRC inspector verified that

both leads specified in 85-RHS-28 had been lif ted and temporary alteration

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tags had been installed. This is an apparent violation (458/8602-02). The

licensee subsequently performed a complete audit of the temporary altera-

tions log and found 13 procedural implementation deficiencies which are

documented in Condition Report No.86-064.

Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed that no testing is being

perfonned when temporary alterations are implemented. The NRC inspector

questioned whether testing was required, The licensee stated that this

question of whether testing is required when temporary alterations are

installed has been addressed by the Facility Review Committee (FRC) and is

an FRC open item. The requirement for testing of temporary alterations is

considered an NRC open item (458/6602-03).

No other violations or deviations were identifi2d in this portion of the

inspection.

5. Exit Interview

An exit interview was held on January 17, 1986, with the personnel denoted

in paragraph 1 of this report. The NRC senior resident inspector also

attended this meeting. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and

the findings were summarized.