ML20153E328
| ML20153E328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1986 |
| From: | Bennett W, Jaudon J, Mcneill W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153E316 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-86-02, 50-458-86-2, NUDOCS 8602240571 | |
| Download: ML20153E328 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1986002
Text
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APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-458/86-02
License NPF-47
Docket:
50-458
Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities
P. O. Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas
77704
Facility Name:
River Beno Station
Inspection At:
River Bend Site, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted:
January 13-17, 1980
Inspectors:
IN
W. M. McNeill, Project Engineer, Project
Date
Section A, Reactor Projects Branch
(paragraphs 1, 2, and 5)
YY
W/YNd
W. R. Bennett, Project Engineer, Project
Date
Section A, Reactor Projects Branch
(pars. 1, 3, 4, & 5)
Approved:
M//
// U
,
J./P.
udon, hief, Proje 4 Section~A
Date
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(Rea or Pr jects Bran-h
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted January 13-17, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-02)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup, surveil-
lance testing, and maintenance.
The inspection' involved 74 inspector-hours
onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the three areas inspected, one violation was identified
(failure to properly iseplement the temporary alteration procedure).
8602240571 860214
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ADOCM 05000458
G
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Gulf States Utilities (GSU)
- R. E. Barnes, Mechanical Engineer
- W. H. Benkert, Quality Engineer
- J. B. Blakley, liechanical Engineer
- W.
J. Cahill, Sr. Vice President
D. Cathey, Systems Engineer
- T. L. Crouse, QA Manager
- J. Deddens, Vice President - River Bend Nuclear Group
G. Englert, Mechanical Engineer
- J. W. Evans, Stenographic
A. D. Fredieu, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- P. E. Freehill, Superintendent, Startup and Test
- D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager-0perations
- P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager-Services
E. Grant, Supervisor, Licensing
- G. K. Henry, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering
J. Huff, Planning and Scheduling Specialist
- R. King, Licensing Engineer
- A. D. Kowalczuk, Assistant Plant Manager-Maintenance and Materials
- I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Engineering
- J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer
- J. McWhorter, QA Engineer
- T. G. Murphy, Supervisor, Planning and Scheduling
- T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
- W. J. Reed, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- lf. L. Reeves, Mechanical Engineer
- D. Reynerson, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- L.
Schell, Electrical Engineer
- rs . B. Suhrke, Hanager, Projects Planning and Coordination
- P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services
- D. M. Williamson, Operations Supervisor
- J. A. Wright, Supervisor, liechanical Engineering
Stone and Webster (S&W)
- li. R. Gaudette, Engineering Assurance
- B. R. Hall, Plant Services Supervisor
Cajun Electric
- J. D. Gore, Operations Monitor
- R. E. Perkins, Resident Engineer
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The NRC inspectors also contacted other site personnel including
administrative, clerical, operations, and maintenance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on January 17, 1986,
2.
Onsite Followup of Reports of Nonroutine Events
The inspection objectives were to determine whether the licensee nas taken
corrective actions as stated in written reports of events and whether
responses to events were adequate and met regulatory requirements, licensee
conditions, and commitments in regard to recent problems with motor
operated valves.
On January 5, a safety-related valve, feedwater block valve 1FWS*MOV-7B,
was inadvertently closed by control room operator, who immediately
attempted to open this same valve. Af ter several attempts to open, with
the valve breaker tripping each time, it was found that the valve operator
had broken off. The valve operator was found laying on the floor. The
licensee issued Condition Report No.86-022 to document this event. The
engineering evaluation of this problem concluded that this event was the
result of a combination of insufficient thread engagement and improper
torque of the bolts which secure the operator to the valve. The NRC
inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation. The improper torque was
based on the observation that all of the 10 other safety-related valves
with the same model Limitorque operator (SMB-4) were found to be torqued
from 100 to 400 foot-pounds (f t.-lbs.).
The valve manufacturer's (Velan
Inc.) maintenance manual requirements are 1270 ft-lbs. for a 11 bolt.
Inquiries of the valve manufacturer and the operator manufacturer have
redefined this requirement to 700 f t.-lbs.
All of the gate and globe
valves used at River Bend have been supplied by Velan through S&W with the
exception of seven in the high pressure core spray system. These seven
were supplied by Anchor / Darling Valve Co. through General Electric (G.E.).
The Anchor / Darling maintenance manual was found to be nonspecific on torque
requirements (" tight as sufficiently possible"). However, inquiries to
Anchor / Darling have established that there are similar torque requirements.
The SliB-4 type Limitoruge operator is a large model of high horsepower
(13-26 horsepower). The sampling was expanded to other models of
Limitorque operators above six horsepower. This inspection was performed
before the torque requirements were established and was somewhat inconclu-
sive. The bolts were checked to be " snug" with a 12" wrench. However,
three of eight operators were found to be less than " snug". An additional
four operators in this category were checked with the established torque
requirements and three of these failed to meet torque requirements.
It was also found that the failed valve operator 1FWS*l10V-7B had short
bolts. An inspection was made of the 10 other SMB-4 operators. Two valve
operators, which were supplied by Anchor / Darling, were found to have
short bolts.
It will be further discussed by the licensee with
,
Anchor / Darling if the requirement for bolt length of 11 times the bolt
diameter is applicable to their valves.
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A review by the NRC inspector of the S&W installation records found that
the operator of the failed valve had been removed and returned to
Limitorque for rework. The records also document that the operator was
reassemblied to the Velan mantal requirements. There was no evidence of
bolt replacement which would account for the short bolts.
It was also
found by the licensee, Auring replacement and reassembly of the operator
for the failed valve, tMt, when the operator was torqued with the valve
in a closed position, there was a gap between the mating surfaces of
operator and valve.
The NRC inspector reviewed the inservice test plan, maintenance procedures
and a computerized listing of safety-related valves to establish the scope
of reinspection necessary.
It appears that there are 262 Limitorque opera-
tors on safety-related valves, Table 1 summarizes the distribution of
Limitorque models found on safety-related valves.
Table I
SMB-4
10
SMB-3 & SB-3
6
SMB-2 & SB-2
13
SMB-1 & SB-1
16
SMB-0 & SB-0
57
SMB-00 & SB-00
63
SMB-000
86
SMC-C
11
The NRC inspector noted that the licensee has an inspection plan
established to verify the torque of all Limitorque operators. After
verifying and correcting any torque deficiencies, a torque seal will be
applied so that a long-term monitoring program can be implemented. This
appears necessary because the root cause of untorqued bolts has not been
positively established, although, it appears to be the result of applying
preload torque to the operator valve bolts with the valve in a closed
position. The verification effort and investigation of why the operator
bolts became under-torqued is an open item to be reviewed further by the
NRC in subsequent inspections (458/8602-01).
During the replacement and reassembly of 1 FWS*H0V-7B it was noted that the
selected spare valve had unqualified wiring in its operator. This was
documented by the licensee on Condition Report No 86-038. This spare and
six other operators had been procured by G.E. through Anchor / Darling for
Unit No. 2.
G.E. has supplied seven valves per unit at River Bend.
The
Unit No. 2 valves are being used as spares for Unit No. 1.
Previously, in
1985, all M0Vs (62) installed inside containment had been inspected for
proper wiring. A sample of five valves outside containment were inspected
and they were found acceptable. An inspection of all (14) G.E.-supplied
valves found seven with unqualified wire.
This included one Unit No. 2
spare that had been installed in Unit 1, the spare that was to be
installed, and the remaining spares. All installed valves with unqualified
wire were tagged and Maintenance Work Requests issued to replace the wire.
The remaining spares have been tagged as nonconforming. This appears to be
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a limited problem associated with G.E.'s procurement through Anchor / Darling
of 1978 vintage Limitorque operators when Limitorque apparently did not
have sufficient manufacturing process controls to assure use of correct
wire. All other Limitorque operators installed at River Bend post date
this procurement by 2 years and were procured mostly by S&W through Velan.
No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the
inspection.
3.
Quality Assurance (QA) Program (Surveillance Testing)
The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to ascertain whether the
licensee has implemented programs for control and evaluation of surveil-
lance testing, calibration and inspection required by Section 4 of the
Technical Specifications (TS) and Inservice Inspection of Pumps and Valves
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as described in 10 CFR 50.55a.(g).
The NRC inspector reviewed 22 completed surveillance procedures. All
precedures were properly prepared and approved, and were ircluded in a
master schedule. All procedures were completed satisfactorily and met all
TS requirements. The NRC inspector noted that, in several instances, set-
points were found within TS requirements but outside procedural require-
ments.
Utilizing the surveillance procedure, the setpoints were adjusted
to be within the requirements set forth in the procedure.
The NRC inspector
asked how these adjustments were documented and trended.
Discussions with
instrument and control personnel and supervisors, disclosed that these
adjustments are reported on the surveillance completion / exception form and
thus are properly trended.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the
inspection.
4.
0A Program (Maintenance)
The purpose cf this portion of the inspection was to ascertain whether the
licensee has implemented a QA program relating to maintenance activities
that is in conformance with TS, regulatory requirements, commitments in the
license and industry guides or standards.
The NRC inspector reviewed six maintenance work requests and determined
that they had been properly initiated, reviewed, and approved. The main-
tenance activities were performed in accordance with appropriate procedures.
The NRC inspector reviewed the temporary alteration log.
Two temporary
alterations (85-RHS-28 and -29) each required lif ting of two leads.
Each
temporary alteration request showed that only one of the two leads had been
signed for as being lifted and neither lead was verified as being lifted as
required by River Bend Procedure ADM-0031. The NRC inspector verified that
both leads specified in 85-RHS-28 had been lif ted and temporary alteration
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tags had been installed. This is an apparent violation (458/8602-02). The
licensee subsequently performed a complete audit of the temporary altera-
tions log and found 13 procedural implementation deficiencies which are
documented in Condition Report No.86-064.
Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed that no testing is being
perfonned when temporary alterations are implemented. The NRC inspector
questioned whether testing was required, The licensee stated that this
question of whether testing is required when temporary alterations are
installed has been addressed by the Facility Review Committee (FRC) and is
an FRC open item. The requirement for testing of temporary alterations is
considered an NRC open item (458/6602-03).
No other violations or deviations were identifi2d in this portion of the
inspection.
5.
Exit Interview
An exit interview was held on January 17, 1986, with the personnel denoted
in paragraph 1 of this report.
The NRC senior resident inspector also
attended this meeting. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and
the findings were summarized.