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{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATEDD1SIBUTJONDEMONSTRATIONSYSTEM'REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:8807250040DOC.DATE:88/07/18NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50-336MillstoneNuclearPowerStation,Unit2,NortheastNu05000336I,50-423MillstoneNuclearPowerStation,Unit3,NortheastNu05000423'UTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMROCZKA,E.J.NortheastUtilitiesRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED D1SIBUTJON DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8807250040 DOC.DATE:
88/07/18NOTARIZED:
NODOCKETFACIL:50-336 Millstone NuclearPowerStation,Unit2,Northeast Nu05000336I,50-423Millstone NuclearPowerStation,Unit3,Northeast Nu05000423'UTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MROCZKA,E.J.
Northeast Utilities RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ForwardsinforeECCSsingle-failureanalysis.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A001D,COPIESRECEIVED:LTR(ENCLISIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTES:IDRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-4LAJAFFE,DINTERNAL:ACRSNRR/DEST/ADS7ENRR/DEST/ESB8DNRR/DEST/RSB8ENRR/PMAS/ILRB12OGC15-B-18RES/DSIR/EIBEXTERNAL:LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1011661111111110111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-4PDFERGUSON,RARM/DAF/LFMBNRR/DEST/CEB8HNRR/DEST/MTB9HNRR/DOEA/TSBllNUDOCS-ABSTRACTI01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL551110111111111111jDDS'hTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR29ENCL26 mammalunLmamTHECCNNECTaoVTllOHTANOPOWEIICOMPANYWESTERNA$5AQtuKTTSELECTRCCOMPANYHOLYOKEWATERPOWERCOMPANYNORTHEASTVTIITEMSSERWCECOMPANYNORTHEASTNVCLEARENEROYCOMPANYGeneralOfficesmSeIdenStreet,Berlin,ConnecticutP.O.BOX270HARTFORD,CONNECTICUT06141-0270(203)665-5000July18,1988DocketNos.50-33650-423B12969U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555
ForwardsinforeECCSsingle-failure analysis.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001D,COPIESRECEIVED:LTR (ENCLISIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:
GeneralDistribution NOTES:IDRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-4LAJAFFE,DINTERNAL:
ACRSNRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OGC15-B-18RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:
LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1011661111111110111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-4PDFERGUSON,R ARM/DAF/LFMB NRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DOEA/TSB llNUDOCS-ABSTRACT I01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL551110111111111111jDDS'hTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR29ENCL26 mammalunLmamTHECCNNECTaoVT llOHTANOPOWEIICOMPANYWESTERNA$5AQtuKTTSELECTRCCOMPANY HOLYOKEWATERPOWERCOMPANYNORTHEAST VTIITEMSSERWCECOMPANYNORTHEAST NVCLEARENEROYCOMPANYGeneralOfficesmSeIdenStreet,Berlin,Connecticut P.O.BOX270HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 (203)665-5000July18,1988DocketNos.50-33650-423B12969U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
Gentlemen:(1)E.J.HroczkalettertoU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommis-sion,InformationRegardingECCSSingleFailureAnalysis,datedHay12,1988.HillstoneNuclearPowerStationUnitNos.2and3InformationReardinECCSSinle-FailureAnalsisAsaresultofvalvefailure(CH-HOV-257,locatedbetweenthevolumecontroltank[VCT]andthechargingpumpsuctionheader)identifiedduringin-servicetestingonHay2,1988,ConnecticutYankeeAtomicPowerCompany(CYAPCO)evaluatedthecauseandpotentialimplicationofsuchafailureandnotedapotentialsingle-failurevulnerabilityinoneportionoftheHaddamNeckPlantemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS),specificallythechargingsystem.InReference(1),CYAPCOprovidedtheNRCwithinformationonthesingle-failureanalysisoftheHaddamNeckPlantECCS.Asaprudentmeasure,NortheastNuclearEnergyCompany(NNECO)conductedareviewoftheaboveinformationforapplicabilitytoNortheastUtilities'thernuclearplants(PWRsonly),namely,HillstoneUnitNos.2and3.ThepurposeofthisletteristoforwardtotheStafftheresultsofourreview.HillstoneUnitNo.2EmergencycorecoolingatHillstoneUnitNo.2isaccomplishedusinghigh-pressuresafetyinjection(HPSI),low-pressuresafetyinjection(LPSI),containmentspray(CS),shutdowncoolingheatexchangers,SIaccumulators,chargingpumps,andassoc'iatedpipinginstrumentationandvalves.HillstoneUnitNo.2hasthreepositivedisplacementchargingpumpsratedat44gpmperpump.The"A"andvC"pumpsareconnectedtoemergencyelectricalbus222andPDP0<0SS071SSSoy2~ADOCK0500033PDC  
 
~.r~epf1hI1 U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionB12969/Page2July18,198822F,respectively.The"B"pumpisaninstalledsparewhichcanbealignedtoeitheremergencybus.ThechargingpumpsarenormallyalignedtotakesuctionfromtheVCT.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjectionactuationsignal(SIAS),suctionistransferredfromtheVCTtotheboricacidstoragetanks(BASTs).TheVCTisisolatedbyagatevalve(2-CH-501)andacheckvalve(2-CH-118).FluidfromtheBASTsisdeliveredtothechargingpumpsuctionbyeitheroftwoboricacidtransferpumpsoragravityfeed(valve2-CH-508or2-CH-509)fromeachofthetwotanks.Bothboricacidtransferpumpsareonemergencyelectricalbus22F(MCCB61)andvalves2-CH-501,2-CH-508,and2-CH-509areonemergencybus22E(MCCB51).Therefore,ifbus22E(MCCB31)weretofailorvalve2-CH-501weretofailtoclose,thedischargepressureoftheboricacidtransferpumpswouldholdcheckvalve2-CH-118intheclosedpositionandeffectivelyisolatetheVCT.Conversely,ifbus22F(MCCB61)weretofail,bothboricacidtransferpumpswillfailtostart.However,valve2-CH-501willcloseonSIASandvalves2-CH-508and2-CH-509willopentoprovidethepathfromBASTstothechargingpumpsuction.ThechargingpumpsarenotrequiredduringsumprecirculationnoraretheyrequiredoncethewatersupplyintheBASTsisexhausted.IthasthereforebeenconcludedthattheMillstoneUnitNo.2chargingsystemisnotsubjecttoalimitingsinglefailuresimilartotherecentlyidentifiedproblemattheHaddamNeckPlant.MillstoneUnitNo.3EmergencycorecoolingforMillstoneUnitNo.3isaccomplishedbythecentrifugalcharging(CHS),safetyinjection(SI),andresidualheatremoval(RHS)pumps,accumulators,containmentrecirculation(CR)pumps,CRcoolers,RHSheatexchangers,andtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST),alongwiththeassociatedpiping,valves,instrumentation,andotherrelatedequipmentasapplicable.AmongtheECCSfunctionsistheautomaticdeliveryofboratedwatertothereactorvesselforcoolingthecorefollowingaloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA).Inthecaseofthechargingsystem,deliveryofwatertothecoreoccursbytransferringchargingpumpsuctionfromtheVCTtotheRWST.Specifically,onasafetyinjectionsignal(SIS),thenormalchargingsupplyfromtheVCTisisolatedbytwoseriesisolationvalves(3CHS*LCV112BandC)andtwonormallyclosed(3CHS*LCV112DandE),parallel,motor-operatedgatevalvesopentoaligntheRWSTtothechargingpumpsuction.Thesevalves(3CHS*LCV112DandE)stayopenuntiltheoperatorrealignsthesystemfortherecirculationphaseofECCSoperation.AfailuremodeandeffectsanalysisispresentedintheMillstoneUnitNo.3FSARTable6.3-10.ThisanalysisdemonstratesthatnotonlythisportionofECCScansustainthefailureofanysingleactivecomponent,butoverallECCScansustainthefailureofanysingleactivecomponentineithertheshortorlongtermandstillmeetthelevelofperformanceforcorecooling.  
Gentlemen:
,~QW~U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionB12969/Page3July18,1988Insummary,theMillstoneUnitNos.2and3chargingsystemsarenotsubjecttoapotentialsingle-failurevulnerabilitysimilartotherecentlyidentifiedproblemattheHaddamNeckPlant.Ifthereareanyquestionsregardingthissubmittal,pleasecontactourlicensingrepresentativedirectly.Verytrulyyours,NORTHEASTNUCLEARENERGYCOMPANYE..MroczSeniorVicePresidentcc:W.T.Russell,RegionIAdministratorD.H.Jaffe,NRCProjectManager,MillstoneUnitNos.2and3W.J.Raymond,SeniorResidentInspector,MillstoneUnitNos.1,2,and3}}
(1)E.J.HroczkalettertoU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commis-sion,Information Regarding ECCSSingleFailureAnalysis, datedHay12,1988.Hillstone NuclearPowerStationUnitNos.2and3Information ReardinECCSSinle-Failure AnalsisAsaresultofvalvefailure(CH-HOV-257, locatedbetweenthevolumecontroltank[VCT]andthechargingpumpsuctionheader)identified duringin-service testingonHay2,1988,Connecticut YankeeAtomicPowerCompany(CYAPCO)evaluated thecauseandpotential implication ofsuchafailureandnotedapotential single-failure vulnerability inoneportionoftheHaddamNeckPlantemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS),specifically thechargingsystem.InReference (1),CYAPCOprovidedtheNRCwithinformation onthesingle-failure analysisoftheHaddamNeckPlantECCS.Asaprudentmeasure,Northeast NuclearEnergyCompany(NNECO)conducted areviewoftheaboveinformation forapplicability toNortheast Utilities'ther nuclearplants(PWRsonly),namely,Hillstone UnitNos.2and3.ThepurposeofthisletteristoforwardtotheStafftheresultsofourreview.Hillstone UnitNo.2Emergency corecoolingatHillstone UnitNo.2isaccomplished usinghigh-pressuresafetyinjection (HPSI),low-pressure safetyinjection (LPSI),containment spray(CS),shutdowncoolingheatexchangers, SIaccumulators, chargingpumps,andassoc'iated pipinginstrumentation andvalves.Hillstone UnitNo.2hasthreepositivedisplacement chargingpumpsratedat44gpmperpump.The"A"andvC"pumpsareconnected toemergency electrical bus222andPDP0<0SS071SSSoy2~ADOCK0500033PDC  
~.r~epf1hI1 U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission B12969/Page 2July18,198822F,respectively.
The"B"pumpisaninstalled sparewhichcanbealignedtoeitheremergency bus.ThechargingpumpsarenormallyalignedtotakesuctionfromtheVCT.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjection actuation signal(SIAS),suctionistransferred fromtheVCTtotheboricacidstoragetanks(BASTs).TheVCTisisolatedbyagatevalve(2-CH-501) andacheckvalve(2-CH-118).
FluidfromtheBASTsisdelivered tothechargingpumpsuctionbyeitheroftwoboricacidtransferpumpsoragravityfeed(valve2-CH-508or2-CH-509) fromeachofthetwotanks.Bothboricacidtransferpumpsareonemergency electrical bus22F(MCCB61)andvalves2-CH-501, 2-CH-508, and2-CH-509areonemergency bus22E(MCCB51).Therefore, ifbus22E(MCCB31)weretofailorvalve2-CH-501weretofailtoclose,thedischarge pressureoftheboricacidtransferpumpswouldholdcheckvalve2-CH-118intheclosedpositionandeffectively isolatetheVCT.Conversely, ifbus22F(MCCB61)weretofail,bothboricacidtransferpumpswillfailtostart.However,valve2-CH-501willcloseonSIASandvalves2-CH-508and2-CH-509willopentoprovidethepathfromBASTstothechargingpumpsuction.Thechargingpumpsarenotrequiredduringsumprecirculation noraretheyrequiredoncethewatersupplyintheBASTsisexhausted.
Ithastherefore beenconcluded thattheMillstone UnitNo.2chargingsystemisnotsubjecttoalimitingsinglefailuresimilartotherecentlyidentified problemattheHaddamNeckPlant.Millstone UnitNo.3Emergency corecoolingforMillstone UnitNo.3isaccomplished bythecentrifugal charging(CHS),safetyinjection (SI),andresidualheatremoval(RHS)pumps,accumulators, containment recirculation (CR)pumps,CRcoolers,RHSheatexchangers, andtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST),alongwiththeassociated piping,valves,instrumentation, andotherrelatedequipment asapplicable.
AmongtheECCSfunctions istheautomatic deliveryofboratedwatertothereactorvesselforcoolingthecorefollowing aloss-of-coolant accident(LOCA).Inthecaseofthechargingsystem,deliveryofwatertothecoreoccursbytransferring chargingpumpsuctionfromtheVCTtotheRWST.Specifically, onasafetyinjection signal(SIS),thenormalchargingsupplyfromtheVCTisisolatedbytwoseriesisolation valves(3CHS*LCV112B andC)andtwonormallyclosed(3CHS*LCV112D andE),parallel, motor-operated gatevalvesopentoaligntheRWSTtothechargingpumpsuction.Thesevalves(3CHS*LCV112D andE)stayopenuntiltheoperatorrealignsthesystemfortherecirculation phaseofECCSoperation.
Afailuremodeandeffectsanalysisispresented intheMillstone UnitNo.3FSARTable6.3-10.Thisanalysisdemonstrates thatnotonlythisportionofECCScansustainthefailureofanysingleactivecomponent, butoverallECCScansustainthefailureofanysingleactivecomponent ineithertheshortorlongtermandstillmeetthelevelofperformance forcorecooling.  
,~QW~U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission B12969/Page 3July18,1988Insummary,theMillstone UnitNos.2and3chargingsystemsarenotsubjecttoapotential single-failure vulnerability similartotherecentlyidentified problemattheHaddamNeckPlant.Ifthereareanyquestions regarding thissubmittal, pleasecontactourlicensing representative directly.
Verytrulyyours,NORTHEAST NUCLEARENERGYCOMPANYE..MroczSeniorVicePresident cc:W.T.Russell,RegionIAdministrator D.H.Jaffe,NRCProjectManager,Millstone UnitNos.2and3W.J.Raymond,SeniorResidentInspector, Millstone UnitNos.1,2,and3}}

Revision as of 16:38, 29 June 2018

Forwards Results of Review of ECCS Single Failure Analysis. Facilities Charging Sys Not Subj to Potential Single Failure Vulnerability Similar to Recently Identified Problem at Haddam Neck Plant
ML17222A804
Person / Time
Site: Millstone  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/18/1988
From: MROCZKA E J
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
B12969, NUDOCS 8807250040
Download: ML17222A804 (5)


Text

ACCELERATED D1SIBUTJON DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8807250040 DOC.DATE:

88/07/18NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-336 Millstone NuclearPowerStation,Unit2,Northeast Nu05000336I,50-423Millstone NuclearPowerStation,Unit3,Northeast Nu05000423'UTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MROCZKA,E.J.

Northeast Utilities RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

ForwardsinforeECCSsingle-failure analysis.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001D,COPIESRECEIVED:LTR (ENCLISIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

GeneralDistribution NOTES:IDRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-4LAJAFFE,DINTERNAL:

ACRSNRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OGC15-B-18RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1011661111111110111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-4PDFERGUSON,R ARM/DAF/LFMB NRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DOEA/TSB llNUDOCS-ABSTRACT I01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL551110111111111111jDDS'hTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR29ENCL26 mammalunLmamTHECCNNECTaoVT llOHTANOPOWEIICOMPANYWESTERNA$5AQtuKTTSELECTRCCOMPANY HOLYOKEWATERPOWERCOMPANYNORTHEAST VTIITEMSSERWCECOMPANYNORTHEAST NVCLEARENEROYCOMPANYGeneralOfficesmSeIdenStreet,Berlin,Connecticut P.O.BOX270HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 (203)665-5000July18,1988DocketNos.50-33650-423B12969U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555

Reference:

Gentlemen:

(1)E.J.HroczkalettertoU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commis-sion,Information Regarding ECCSSingleFailureAnalysis, datedHay12,1988.Hillstone NuclearPowerStationUnitNos.2and3Information ReardinECCSSinle-Failure AnalsisAsaresultofvalvefailure(CH-HOV-257, locatedbetweenthevolumecontroltank[VCT]andthechargingpumpsuctionheader)identified duringin-service testingonHay2,1988,Connecticut YankeeAtomicPowerCompany(CYAPCO)evaluated thecauseandpotential implication ofsuchafailureandnotedapotential single-failure vulnerability inoneportionoftheHaddamNeckPlantemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS),specifically thechargingsystem.InReference (1),CYAPCOprovidedtheNRCwithinformation onthesingle-failure analysisoftheHaddamNeckPlantECCS.Asaprudentmeasure,Northeast NuclearEnergyCompany(NNECO)conducted areviewoftheaboveinformation forapplicability toNortheast Utilities'ther nuclearplants(PWRsonly),namely,Hillstone UnitNos.2and3.ThepurposeofthisletteristoforwardtotheStafftheresultsofourreview.Hillstone UnitNo.2Emergency corecoolingatHillstone UnitNo.2isaccomplished usinghigh-pressuresafetyinjection (HPSI),low-pressure safetyinjection (LPSI),containment spray(CS),shutdowncoolingheatexchangers, SIaccumulators, chargingpumps,andassoc'iated pipinginstrumentation andvalves.Hillstone UnitNo.2hasthreepositivedisplacement chargingpumpsratedat44gpmperpump.The"A"andvC"pumpsareconnected toemergency electrical bus222andPDP0<0SS071SSSoy2~ADOCK0500033PDC

~.r~epf1hI1 U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission B12969/Page 2July18,198822F,respectively.

The"B"pumpisaninstalled sparewhichcanbealignedtoeitheremergency bus.ThechargingpumpsarenormallyalignedtotakesuctionfromtheVCT.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjection actuation signal(SIAS),suctionistransferred fromtheVCTtotheboricacidstoragetanks(BASTs).TheVCTisisolatedbyagatevalve(2-CH-501) andacheckvalve(2-CH-118).

FluidfromtheBASTsisdelivered tothechargingpumpsuctionbyeitheroftwoboricacidtransferpumpsoragravityfeed(valve2-CH-508or2-CH-509) fromeachofthetwotanks.Bothboricacidtransferpumpsareonemergency electrical bus22F(MCCB61)andvalves2-CH-501, 2-CH-508, and2-CH-509areonemergency bus22E(MCCB51).Therefore, ifbus22E(MCCB31)weretofailorvalve2-CH-501weretofailtoclose,thedischarge pressureoftheboricacidtransferpumpswouldholdcheckvalve2-CH-118intheclosedpositionandeffectively isolatetheVCT.Conversely, ifbus22F(MCCB61)weretofail,bothboricacidtransferpumpswillfailtostart.However,valve2-CH-501willcloseonSIASandvalves2-CH-508and2-CH-509willopentoprovidethepathfromBASTstothechargingpumpsuction.Thechargingpumpsarenotrequiredduringsumprecirculation noraretheyrequiredoncethewatersupplyintheBASTsisexhausted.

Ithastherefore beenconcluded thattheMillstone UnitNo.2chargingsystemisnotsubjecttoalimitingsinglefailuresimilartotherecentlyidentified problemattheHaddamNeckPlant.Millstone UnitNo.3Emergency corecoolingforMillstone UnitNo.3isaccomplished bythecentrifugal charging(CHS),safetyinjection (SI),andresidualheatremoval(RHS)pumps,accumulators, containment recirculation (CR)pumps,CRcoolers,RHSheatexchangers, andtherefueling waterstoragetank(RWST),alongwiththeassociated piping,valves,instrumentation, andotherrelatedequipment asapplicable.

AmongtheECCSfunctions istheautomatic deliveryofboratedwatertothereactorvesselforcoolingthecorefollowing aloss-of-coolant accident(LOCA).Inthecaseofthechargingsystem,deliveryofwatertothecoreoccursbytransferring chargingpumpsuctionfromtheVCTtotheRWST.Specifically, onasafetyinjection signal(SIS),thenormalchargingsupplyfromtheVCTisisolatedbytwoseriesisolation valves(3CHS*LCV112B andC)andtwonormallyclosed(3CHS*LCV112D andE),parallel, motor-operated gatevalvesopentoaligntheRWSTtothechargingpumpsuction.Thesevalves(3CHS*LCV112D andE)stayopenuntiltheoperatorrealignsthesystemfortherecirculation phaseofECCSoperation.

Afailuremodeandeffectsanalysisispresented intheMillstone UnitNo.3FSARTable6.3-10.Thisanalysisdemonstrates thatnotonlythisportionofECCScansustainthefailureofanysingleactivecomponent, butoverallECCScansustainthefailureofanysingleactivecomponent ineithertheshortorlongtermandstillmeetthelevelofperformance forcorecooling.

,~QW~U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission B12969/Page 3July18,1988Insummary,theMillstone UnitNos.2and3chargingsystemsarenotsubjecttoapotential single-failure vulnerability similartotherecentlyidentified problemattheHaddamNeckPlant.Ifthereareanyquestions regarding thissubmittal, pleasecontactourlicensing representative directly.

Verytrulyyours,NORTHEAST NUCLEARENERGYCOMPANYE..MroczSeniorVicePresident cc:W.T.Russell,RegionIAdministrator D.H.Jaffe,NRCProjectManager,Millstone UnitNos.2and3W.J.Raymond,SeniorResidentInspector, Millstone UnitNos.1,2,and3