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{{#Wiki_filter:Exelon Generation 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 RS-16-245 www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50, Appendix E 1 O CFR 50.54(q){5). 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 72.44(f) December 9; 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 | |||
==Subject:== | |||
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Facility Operating License No. DPR-2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-010, 50-237, 50-249, and 72-37 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69 NRC Docket Nos. 50-220, 50-410, and 72-1036 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265, and 72-53 Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Revisions In accordance with 1 O CFR 50.4(b)(5), "Emergency Plan and related submissions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) is submitting the Emergency Plan document revisions identified in the table below for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (Nine Mile Point), and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). [ Procedure No.* Revision Title EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3 5 Emergency Action Levels (or Dresden Station EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2 1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates EP-AA-1006 38 Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station EP-QC-1000 0 Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan --EP-AA-1000 (superseded 28 Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological for Quad Cities) Emer_aencv Plan The changes to the Emergency Plan documents were evaluated under the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(q) and were determined not to result in a reduction in the effectiveness of the Emergency Plans for Dresden, Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities. As noted in the table above, EP-AA-1000, Revision 28 was superseded for Quad Cities and a copy of the superseded document . I c:.... is not included in this submittal. This notification is being submitted within 30 days of .4 X Jf-__) implementation of the changes as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5). The changes continue to I' * } meet the applicable planning standards established in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Iv'] 5 SD Appendix E. tJ S Z,(p j\ !/v1 S> . /V tJf_.fL rJMs7. | |||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Plan Revisions December 9, 2016 Page2 In addition, as required by 1 O CFR 50.54(q)(5), this submittal includes a summary analysis of the changes to the Emergency Plan Addendums for the cited plants (Attachment 1 ). This submittal also satisfies the reporting requirements associated with 10 CFR 72.44(f), which stipulates that within six months after any change is made to the Emergency Plan, the licensee shall submit a report containing a description of the changes to the Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation. Copies of the revised Emergency Plan documents are included in Attachments 2 through 5 of this letter. There are no regulatory commitments in this submittal. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Richard Gropp at (610) 765-5557. Resp{f ully, ... j J J. =4--) yu--David T. Gudger Manager, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: 1. 1 O CFR 50.54(q)(5) Procedure Change Summary Analysis 2. EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3, Revision 5, "Emergency Action Levels for Dresden Station" 3. EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates" 4. EP-AA-1006, Revision 38, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station" 5. EP-QC-1000, Revision 0, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan" cc: w/ Attachment 1 only Regional Administrator -NRC Region I Regional Administrator -NRC Region Ill Director, NRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, ONMSS NRC Senior Resident Inspector -Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Project Manager, NRR -Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC Project Manager, NRR -Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Illinois Emergency Management Agency -Division of Nuclear Safety A. L. Peterson, NYSERDA ATTACHMENT 1 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) Procedure Change Summary Analysis Change Summary Analysis Page 1 of 18 1 O CFR 50.54(g)(5) Procedure Change Summary Analysis Dresden Nuclear Power Station-Procedure/Title Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG) is submitting the following Emergency Plan Addendum revision for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden): | |||
* EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3, Revision 5, "Emergency Action Levels tor Dresden Station" Description of Procedure EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3 describes the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) implemented at Dresden for entering Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs). Description of Changes The following changes were made to EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3 under this revision: 1. The EAL thresholds for MG1 (Prolonged Loss of all AC Power) and MS3 (Failure to Scram) were revised based on a change to the Minimum Steam Cooling Water Level (MSCWL). The change to the MSCWL is due to the Unit 3 use of ATRIUM fuel or a mix bf ATRIUM and OPTIMA fuel versus all OPTIMA fuel. A full-core or partial-core load of ATRIUM fuel changes the minimum active fuel length percentage covered to maintain Peak Centerline Temperature (PCT) < 1500 degrees Fahrenheit; therefore, the need for MSCWL change. The change in MSCWL was developed by the site and is documented in calculation DRE15-0015, Revision 1. 2. The Initiating Condition (IC) for the Hot Reference Matrix and Basis section for EAL MS3 was revised to use the phrase "RPV water level" versus "core cooling" since this is consistent with the guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels tor Non-Passive Reactors," for use with Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants. The phrase "core cooling" is terminology used for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plants. Using standard site wording is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 schemes and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. 3. The Basis section for EAL RC4 was revised to reference "Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs)/Target Rock SRV" versus "safety relief valves (SRVs)" as this is equivalent specific wording when referencing the generic term "safety relief valves (SRVs)." Using standard site wording is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 schemes and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Description of How the Change Still Complies with Regulations 1. The change to the EAL thresholds reflects a change in the plant design parameter for MSCWL. This change in the MSCWL set point is used in both Dresden Emergency Plan EALs MG1 (Prolonged Loss of all AC Power) and MS3 (Failure to Scram). The change is due to the use of ATRIUM fuel or a mix of ATRIUM and OPTIMA fuel versus all OPTIMA Change Summary Analysis Page 2 of 18 fuel. The minimum active fuel length percentage covered to maintain PCT < 1500 degrees Fahrenheit (Fafl-15) has changed from 66.7% for OPTIMA fuel to 85.6% for ATRIUM or a mix of ATRIUM and OPTIMA fuel. This value is multiplied by the Length of Active fuel in inches (Lfuel). For ATRIUM fuel, Lfuel is 145.24 inches. To determine the MSCWL in inches, the following equation is used: Lfuel(Fafl-15) + WLrpv-baf = MSCWL in inches Where Lfuel = Length of active fuel in inches Fafl-15 = Minimum active fuel length percentage covered to maintain PCT < 1500 degrees Fahrenheit WLrpv-baf =Water level at bottom of active fuel in inches 145.24 inches (85.6%) + (-286.69 inches)= -162.4 inches, this has been rounded to -162 inches for use in Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and EALs. This MSCWL change is documented in calculation DRE15-0015, Revision 1 and DEOP 100 RPV Control (Unit 3). Updating the EAL threshold values based on an approved technical basis change does not alter the meaning or intent of the basis of the approved EAL. 2. Planning Standard 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part: "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters; is in use by the nuclear facility licensee." In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.D.1 states in part: "An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall identify .the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class." The IC Hot Reference Matrix and Basis section EAL MS3 was revised to state "RPV water level" versus "core cooling" as this terminology is consistent with the guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6 for use for BWR plants rather that terminology used for PWR plants ("core cooling"). Revising the terminology does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. 3. Planning Standard 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part: "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee." In addition, the guidance NUREG-0654, Section 11.D.1 states in part: "An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall identify the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class." The Basis section for EAL RC4 was revised to reference "Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs)ffarget Rock SRV" versus "safety relief valves (SRVs)" as this is equivalent specific wording when referencing the generic term "safety relief valves (SRVs)." Using standard site wording is consistent yvith the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 scheme and Change Summary Analysis Page 3 of 18 does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Additionally, the regulations and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Description of Why the Change is Not a Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) 1. Updating the EAL threshold values EALs MG1 (Prolonged Loss of all AC Power) and MS3 (Failure to Scram) as noted above based on an approved technical basis change does not alter the meaning or intent of the basis of the approved EALs. Additionally, Emergency Preparedness (EP) requirements have not been deleted or minimized under this revision and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Therefore, the changes to the cited EALs do not result in a reduction in effectiveness in the Emergency Plan for Dresden. 2. Using standard site/reactor type terminology for EAL MS3 as noted above is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 schemes and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Additionally, EP requirements have not been deleted or minimized under this revision and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Therefore, this change would not result in a reduction of effectiveness of the Emergency Plan for Dresden. 3. Using standard site wording in Basis section for EAL RC4 as noted is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 scheme and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Additionally, EP requirements have not been deleted or minimized under this revision and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Therefore, this change would not result in a reduction of effectiveness of the Emergency Plan for Dresden. Change Summary Analysis Page 4 of 18 Procedure/Title Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon is submitting the following Emergency Plan Addendum revision for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (Nine Mile Point): | |||
* EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates" Description of Procedure EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2 provides the Evacuation Time Estimates {ETEs) for the Nine Mile Point Station. The ETEs are calculations of the time to evacuate the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), which is an area with a radius of about 1 O miles (16 km) around a nuclear power plant. The ETEs are primarily used to inform protective action decision-making and may also be used to assist in development of traffic management plans to support an evacuation. The ETEs are developed to provide the time to evacuate 90 percent and 100 percent of the total population of the EPZ. The 90 percent ETE provides the time value that would typically be used to support protective action decisions. The ETEs are used as an information tool, and therefore, no minimum evacuation time must be achieved per the regulatory guidance. The ETEs should be used by licensees in the development of offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and by Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) when making offsite protective action decisions. The ETE studies are incorporated as an addendum to Nine Mile Point's Emergency Plan Annex, (i.e., EP-AA-1013) to satisfy 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, which provides direction that the content of the Emergency Plan contain the ETEs. Description of Changes The following changes are included in this revision to EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2: | |||
* The Nine Mile Point ETEs were revised to implement the use of standard cardinal wind directions in the development and application of affected Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) in the ETEs for Nine Mile Point. This aligns the sectors in the Nine Mile Point and FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ETEs with the sectors suggested in the industry guidance, NUREG/CR-7002, "Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies." Specifically, the ETEs would be based on the 16 secondary-intercardinal directions (e.g., NNE, ENE). Note that the ETEs are applicable for both Nine Mile Point and the FitzPatrick (currently operated by Entergy) as they have the same EPZ. (Note: Exelon and Entergy have requested NRG approval to transfer the FitzPatrick license from Entergy to Exelon.) In September 2015, Exelon received a question from Oswego County, NY regarding ETE Table 6-1 of the KLD ETE report TR-521, {dated November 2012) for the "Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 1 O Miles" Regions -Regions R15 through R36. Specifically, Oswego County questioned why ERPAs 7, 14 and 15 would evacuate for Evacuation Region 16 (wind from 234° Change Summary Analysis Page 5 of 18 to 240°) when they are generally the same direction relative to the plant as ERPA 4, but ERPA 4 is closer to the plant and it does not evacuate, which was depicted on figure (i.e., Figure 1) in the ETEs. The ETEs for Nine Mile Point (and FitzPatrick) have been rewritten under this revision to reflect new wind ranges. The wind ranges have been revised to be equal sizes consistent with the examples provided in NUREG/CR-7002. As a result of this change, the total number of Evacuation Regions evaluated was reduced. Table 6-1 of the previous ETE report (KLD TR-521) identified 54 total Evacuation Regions. Table 6-1 of the revised ETE report (KLD TR-823) identifies 29 total Evacuation Regions. The previous number of Evacuation Regions is based on the unnecessarily narrow and inconsistently sized wind ranges used in previous ETEs at the site. These extraneous_ Evacuation Regions have been eliminated in the revised ETE report. However, the revised ETE report continues to address all of the Evacuation Regions suggested in NUREG/CR-7002 (i.e., an evacuation of the 2-mile radius, 5-mile radius, and full EPZ, as well as keyhole evacuations of the 2-mile radius and downwind to 5 miles for both staged and un-staged evacuation). The table below presents a summary of the differences between the present ETE study and the 2012 study. Resident Population Basis Employee Population Table -ETE Study Differences ArcGIS Software using 2010 US Census blocks; area ratio method used. Population= 41,887 Employee estimates based on information provided by Oswego County about major employers in EPZ. 1.09 employees per vehicle based on telephone survey results. Employees= 1,714 ArcGIS software using 2010 US Census blocks and projecting out to 2015 using 2014 population changes published by the US Census; area ratio method used. Population= 41,423 Employee estimates based on information provided by Oswego County about major employers in EPZ. 1.09 employees per vehicle based on telephone survey results. Employees= 1,714 Change Summary Analysis Page 6 of 18 Transit-Dependent Population Transient Population School, Preschool, and Day Camp Population Network Size Modeling Evacuation Cases Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of the telephone survey. A total of 1,881 people who do not have access to a vehicle, requiring at least 63 buses to evacuate. An additional 208 homebound special needs persons require transportation to evacuate (151 ambulatory and 57 wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 wheelchair vans). Transient estimates based upon information provided about transient attractions in EPZ, supplemented by observations of the facilities during the road survey, internet searches and from phone calls to facilities. Transients = 8,315 (including 2,349 commuting SUNY students). School population based on information provided by Oswego County Emergency Management. School enrollment = 15,377 (including SUNY commuter students) Buses required = 160 Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of the telephone survey. Dispatching a total of 76 buses to provide transit for 1,860 people who do not have access to a vehicle. An additional 208 homebound special needs persons require transportation to evacuate (151 ambulatory and 57 wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 wheelchair vans). Transient estimates based upon information provided about transient attractions in EPZ, supplemented by phone calls made to facilities from the previous 2012 ETE were reviewed. Transients = 8,495 (including 2,349 commuting SUNY Oswego students). School, Preschool, and Day Camp population based on information provided by Oswego County Emergency Management. Total enrollment= 15,735 (including SUNY Oswego commuter students and Ontario Bible Conference) Buses required = 156 1,057 links; 716 nodes 1,075 links; 729 nodes DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.8.0 DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.19.2 54 Regions and 14 Scenarios producing 756 29 Regions and 14 Scenarios unique cases. producing 406 unique cases. Change Summary Analysis Page 7 of 18 Evacuation Time Estimates for the entire EPZ, 90th and 1 OOth percentile Winter Midweek Midday, Good Weather: 2:55 and 4:00 Winter Midweek Midday, Good Weather: 2:55 and 3:50 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:35 and 3:40 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:30 and 3:40 The resultant ETEs have been nominally impacted. The table below summarizes the changes to the Average 901h Percentile ETE. Table -Comparison of ETE and PAR for Previous ETE Study and Revised ETE Study Average 1 901n Percentile ETE (hr:min) Evacuation Previous Revised Comment Region ETE ETE (KLD TR-(KLD TR-521) 823) 2-mile ETE 1 :30 1:30 Less than 2 hours, PAR for RPSA would be to evacuate 2-mile immediately. Same result for Previous ETE and Revised ETE. Keyhole (2-5 1:39 1 :40 Less than 3 hours, PAR for RPSA would be mile) to evacuate keyhole to 5-miles immediately. Same result for Previous ETE and Revised ETE. Full EPZ 2:41 2:37 Less than 3 hours, PAR for RPSA would be to evacuate keyhole to EPZ boundary immediately. Same result for Previous ETE and Revised ETE. Staged Not effective Not effective Staged evacuation would not be Evacuation of implemented under any circumstances. Keyhole (2-5 Same result for Previous ETE and Revised mile) ETE. The major factors contributing to the differences between the ETE values obtained in this study and those of the previous study can be summarized as follows: | |||
* The population has been updated using the 201 O US Census and projected out to 2015 using 2014 growth rates. EPZ population decreased by 1.11 % since the last study, which contributes to the slightly shorter ETE. 1 Excludes snow, special event, and roadway closure scenarios. Change Summary Analysis Page 8 of 18 | |||
* The number of regions considered was significantly reduced (i.e., 54 in the previous study versus 29 in this study) due to the omission of slivers (i.e., small pieces of an ERPA within the keyhole that have little or no population) and the use of the sixteen cardinal wind directions (i.e., 22.5° sectors in accordance with Federal guidelines, rather than the narrow sectors, as little as 4°, used in legacy PAR for the sites). Description of How the Change Still Complies with Regulations 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires that ETEs are developed in accordance with the Federal guidance (i.e., NUREG/CR-7002). In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.J further requires that Nine Mile Point's Emergency Plan contain time estimates for evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ. Additionally, the time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances shall be based on a dynamic analysis (time-motion study under various conditions) for the plume exposure pathway EPZ. 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E requires that the ETE analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations are performed using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC. Further guidance is provided by NUREG/CR-7002 and NUREG-0654, Appendix 4. These requirements are satisfied with KLD's Revision 1 to the Nine Mile Point ETEs and have been demonstrated in part by the satisfactory performance of NUREG/CR-7002, Table B-1 ETE Review Criteria Checklist. It is concluded that the Nine Mile Point ETEs are in compliance with the regulatory guidance of 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(1 O) as well as 1 O CFR 50, Appendix IV. As discussed above, all of the Evacuation Regions suggested in NUREG/CR-7002 have been considered in the revised ETE report. Furthermore, the critical ETE values for PAR development outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3 have not significantly changed. * | |||
* It is noted that both the Revision 1 and Revision O ETEs utilized the same industry methodology from NUREG/CR-7002. This has been validated and documented through the completion of the NUREG/CR-7002 ETE Criteria Checklist provided in Appendix N of the ETE Report. It is understood that ETEs are used as an information tool, and no minimum evacuation time must be achieved per the regulatory guidance. The nominal changes identified with this revision do not impact conclusions made regarding Sheltering or Staging of Evacuees in the protective action process. Existing requirements and capabilities under the station's Emergency Plan have not been deleted or reduced as part of this revision and as such, the station's Emergency Plan continues to meet regulatory requirements. A review of existing regulatory commitments was made to ensure existing commitments continue to be met. Description of Why the Change is Not a Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) As previously discussed, it is understood that ETEs are used as an information tool, and no minimum or target evacuation time must be achieved under the regulatory guidance. A resultant change in any of the evacuation times between Revision O and Revision1 does not infer a reduction in effectiveness of the ETEs. The methodology for completing the ETEs Change Summary Analysis Page 9 of 18 continues to be provided by NUREG/CR-7002. All of the Evacuation Regions suggested in NUREG/CR-7002 have been considered in the revised ETE report. The critical ETE values for PAR development outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3 have not significantly changed. Existing requirements and capabilities under the station's Emergency Plan have not been deleted or reduced as part of this revision and as such, the station's Emergency Plan continues to meet regulatory requirements. A review of Nine Mile Point's outstanding commitments to the NRG was performed, which included commitments through EP-related regulatory correspondence and commitments made through the Exelon Standard Radiological Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures. There was no reduction in stated regulatory commitments based on this revision to the Nine Mile Point ETEs. Therefore, the changes to use cardinal wind directions in the revised ETE report does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the Emergency Planning for the Nine Mile Point. Change Summary Analysis Page 10 of 18 ProcedurefTitle Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exelon is submitting the following Emergency Plan revisions for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities): | |||
* EP-AA-1006, Revision 38, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station" | |||
* EP-QC-1000, Revision 0, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan" | |||
* EP-AA-1000, Revision 28, "Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan" (superseded for Quad Cities) Description of Procedure | |||
* The Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan (i.e., EP-AA-1000), referred to the Standard Plan, outlines the basis for the response actions that would be implemented during an emergency. The planning efforts common to all Exelon nuclear stations are encompassed within the Standard Plan. Station Annexes and their associated Addendums contain information and guidance unique to each station. This includes facility geography, emergency response facility locations, and process and radiation monitoring instrumentation that provides a description of each station's emergency response capabilities, as well as any station unique commitments. The Station Annex is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the Exelon Standard Plan. Quad Cities announced the intent to permanently shut down the reactor in June 2018. In conjunction with the shutdown, Quad Cities intended to submit changes to the station's Emergency Plan under 1 O CFR 50.90 to seek relief from commitments and regulatory requirements no longer applicable to a permanently shutdown reactor. This revision to the Emergency Plan establishes the Quad Cities Emergency Plan as an independent Emergency Plan separate and de-linked from the Exelon Fleet Standardized Emergency Plan. This revision is necessary such that future changes to the Emergency Plan in support of decommissioning can be implemented without impacting the Standard Plan by inserting multiple Quad Cities specific exceptions. A new Emergency Plan pro6edure was created for Quad Cities to contain the regulatory commitments applicable to Quad Cities which are currently held in the Exelon Standard Plan. The new procedure is EP-QC-1000, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan." Description of Changes The changes primarily consist of deleting requirements which would not be applicable to a stand-alone Quad Cities' Emergency Plan (e.g., removing references to the Exelon Nuclear fleet, removing descriptions relating to States and agencies applicable to other Exelon stations). The changes do not introduce new or remove any existing regulatory requirements or commitments currently applicable to Quad Cities. Change Summary Analysis Page 11 of 18 A change is also being made to the Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan Station Annex (EP-AA-1006) to reflect the existence of the new Quad Cities' Emergency Plan (EP-QC-1000). References to the Standard Plan (EP-M-1000) are replaced with references to EP-QC-1 OQO, since the Standard Plan has been superseded for Quad Cities. Specific exceptions to the Standard Plan contained in the Annex are removed and incorporated in the EP-QC-1000 procedure. The changes to the station's Emergency Plan Annex do not introduce or remove any regulatory requirements or commitments currently applicable to Quad Cities. Following the implementation of this revision, the revised Quad Cities Emergency Plan will be independent of the Exelon fleet Standard Plan. The new Quad Cities Emergency Plan will form the regulatory basis for developing and submitting license amendment requests to the NRC to support the decommissioning effort. Any changes to the Emergency Plan commitments will not occur until the NRC has approved any license amendment requests and certain decommissioning milestones have occurred (e.g., fuel removed from the reactor, zirc fire milestone, and ISFSI). The changes are described in more detail below. Description of How the Change Still Complies with Regulations ' Administrative Changes EP-QC-1000 As part of the conversion of the Exelon Standard (EP-AA-1000) into the stand-alone Quad Cities Emergency Plan (EP-QC-1000), it is appropriate to delete general references to other Exelon nuclear sites since they are no longer covered by the Quad Cities specific procedure. This separation of the Quad Cities Emergency Plan allows future changes related to decommissioning to be made without affecting the other Exelon statio*ns' Emergency Plans. There is no intent to revise commitments currently maintained under the Emergency Plan with this revision and the changes do not impact compliance with EP regulations or regulatory guidance. Some of the specific changes are as follows: | |||
* Change 1 -There are a number of changes that have been implemented that are editorial in nature (i.e., they do not change intent of the document). These changes do not impact the level of commitments made in the Emergency Plan or the ability to comply with applicable regulatory guidance. These include: o Changes in step numbers as a result of information which has been relocated or deleted. o Page number changes within the Table of Contents o Correction of spelling errors o Changes in the Table of Contents which reflect changes made within the Plan o Instances where the reference to the fleet Standard Emergency Plan was changed to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan o Instances where Exelon Nuclear was replaced by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station o Instances where "respective region" (e.g., Mid Atlantic) was deleted or replaced by "MW Region" _ o References to the multiple fleet "Annexes" were revised to reference only the Quad Cities "Annex" as well as references to other station Annexes Change Summary Analysis Page 12 of 18 | |||
* Change 2 -Section 1.A, "Purpose of the emergency plan," was revised to delete a reference to the other Exelon nuclear stations. Specifically, a sentence which describes that planning efforts common to all Exelon stations are encompassed within the Standard Plan. | |||
* Changes 3 and 4 -Section 1.B, "Background," was revised to delete reference to the 12 other nuclear stations and to remove the sentence referring to "all generating stations operated by Exelon Nuclear list above." | |||
* Change 5 -Section 1.J was revised to remove a discussion regarding station specific differences. The Quad Cities stand-alone Emergency Plan will not need to differentiate between station-specific differences within the Exelon fleet. | |||
* Changes 6 and 7 -Section 11.A.1 was revised to address an editorial revision being made to the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan to remove references and discussions regarding agencies and organizations previously contained in the Standard Plan, which do not apply to Quad Cities. For Change 6, these include references to the State of Indiana (State Emergency Management Agency) and the State of Wisconsin (Department of Emergency Government), as well as references to other nuclear stations (i.e., Braidwood, Byron, and Dresden). For Change 7, these references include the State of Wisconsin, the State of Indiana, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the State of Maryland, the State of Delaware, the State of New Jersey, the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Virginia. These organizations do not have any relation to Quad Cities and can be deleted in conjunction with the development of the stand-alone Emergency Plan for Quad Cities. An additional revision is being made to change "IEMA Technical" to "IEMA" based on comments received from the State of Illinois. This revision is editorial and does not affect commitments under the Emergency Plan. | |||
* Change 8 -Figure A-2 was revised to make a change to delete reference to the State Agency Department of Safety/Radiation Protection. The change is based on comments received from Illinois Emergency Management Agency in review of the Clinton Emergency Plan. Specifically, Exelon was informed that the Department of Safety/Radiation Protection was eliminated and references in the Emergency Plans should be removed. | |||
* Changes 9 -11, 14, 29, and 45 -Table QDC B-1 was revised as part of the conversion to a Quad Cities stand-alone Emergency Plan, Table 2-1, "Minimum Staffing Tables," contained in the station Annex EP-AA-1006 was relocated to the new EP-QC-1000 Emergency Plan document. This table contains the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) position descriptions. The Minimum Staffing Tables are not being changed, but they are now incorporated in the EP-QC-1000, Section 11.B, which describes the station ERO. The change is necessary to locate the position descriptions for the Quad Cities ERO in one location. | |||
* Change 12 -In Section 11.B.7 under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, the description of the location of the Emergency News Center (ENC) functions was intentionally generic to identify that that ENC functions could be located as part of the Joint Information Center (JIG) or the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), depending on the existing station logistics. As part of the separation of the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan, it is appropriate to specify the functions of the ENC as being part of the EOF function. The statement contained in Section Change Summary Analysis Page 13 of 18 11.B.7 which states: "The ENC function may be located at either the EOF or the JIC," is being revised to delete the reference to the EOF since the ENC reports to the EOF for Quad Cities. | |||
* Change 13-Section 11.B.8 was revised to delete reference to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) sampling activities for the Exelon Mid-Atlantic stations. As a de-linked Emergency Plan for Quad Cities, the reference to the Mid-Atlantic stations is no longer appropriate in the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. * | |||
* Change 15-Section 11.C.3 was revised to make an editorial change to relocate the sentence: "The equipment and analytical capabilities for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station's laboratories are listed in the station's E-Plan Annex," elsewhere within the paragraph. The change helps readability and provides a more logical sequence of information. | |||
* Change 16-In Section 11.D.2 under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, EP requirements were sometimes written to address both single unit and multi-unit situations. Section 11.D.2 discusses EALs and states: "Classifications are based on the evaluation of each unit for multi-reactor sites." Since the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan is Quad Cities specific, the words "for multi-reactor sites," which was used to differentiate between Exelon reactor sites, is no longer required. | |||
* Change 17 -Section 11.E.1 discusses ERO notification. Under the fleet Exelon Standard Plan, there is a discussion regarding "notification/classification for dual unit emergencies." Since the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan is Quad Cities specific, the words "dual unit facility," which was used to differentiate between Exelon single-reactor sites, is no longer required. | |||
* Change 18-Step 11.E.3 was revised to delete the reference to the event logbook. The event logbook was a reference from the Exelon fleet Standard Plan and does not apply to Quad Cities. * | |||
* Changes 19 and 36 -Section 11.E.6 was revised to correct the title of the FEMA REP Manual. The title was changed from FEMA-REP-1 O to FEMA REP Manual. The comment is editorial and does not affect commitments made under the Emergency Plan. | |||
* Change 20 -Under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, Section 11.F.1 provided a general discussion on communications and notifications. The discussion summarized information applicable to the Exelon fleet leaving specific details contained in each station's Annex. With the separation of the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific statements in this section, which are not applicable to Quad Cities were removed. Specifically, for Section 11.F.1, the reference to communication systems being installed at stations other than Quad Cities is revised. The Quad Cities' communication systems are installed attheir respective Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). Additionally, the reference to microwave systems is not applicable to Quad Cities and is being removed. | |||
* Change 21 -Section 11.F.1 was revised to remove reference to other Exelon stations and the differences in NARS systems. Once the station implemented a stand-alone Emergency Plan independent of the Exelon fleet, the reference to other Exelon regions/stations is not applicable. Change Summary Analysis Page 14 of 18 | |||
* Change 22 -In Section 11.F.1 under the Exelon Standard Plan, Section 11.F.1.d provided a discussion of the Exelon Northeast sites' ERO notification systems. The discussion stated that the description of the system is contained in the station Annexes. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet Standard Plan, specific statements in this section, which are not applicable to Quad Cities are being removed. Specifically, for Section 11.F.1.e, the reference to the Northeast station's ERO notification systems was removed. | |||
* Change 23-Under Section 11.F.1, Section 11.F.1.f was revised to delete the sentence "The actual configuration of these systems may vary from station to station." The Quad Cities' Emergency Plan no longer covers other Exelon stations. This sentence no longer applies to the station-specific Emergency Plan. | |||
* Change 24-Section 11.G.3 was revised to delete reference to other station's JICs. Specifically, the statement "Each station has a designated JIG" is deleted such that the Emergency Plan only refers to Quad Cities' JIG. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific statements in this section which refer to other JICs, which are not applicable to Quad Cities are being removed. | |||
* Change 25-Section 11.G.4 was revised to remove guidance that does not apply to Quad Cities. Specifically, a change is being made to this step regarding the location of each JIG in the Exelon fleet. The locations of the JICs, other than Quad Cities, are being deleted because they are not applicable or required for the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. | |||
* Changes 26 and 34 -Section 11.H.1 refers to 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d which states licensees shall maintain: "an alternative facility (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action." A change was made to Section 11.H.1 to identify the ERO Offsite Staging Area as an "Alternative Facility" consistent with the regulation language and references in the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan implementing procedures. A similar change is being made to Section 11.J.4 to identify the Alternative Reporting Center as the Alternative Facility. In 2011, the EP rulemaking initiative added additional requirements for the facility beyond being a staging area. The Alternative Facility is discussed in further detail in Section 5.1.7 of the station's Annex EP-AA-1006. This change is administrative in nature and reflects how this facility is referenced in the Emergency Plan. There are no changes to the function of the facility implemented with this change. | |||
* Change 27 -Section 11.H.1 refers to 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(8) which requires that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. Specifically, NUREG-0654, Section 11.H.1 states: "Each licensee shall establish a Technical Support Center and an onsite operations support center (assembly area) in accordance Licensee with NUREG-0696, Revision 1." Section H.1.c was revised to recognize that the Operations Support Center (OSC) may not be activated at all times as stated. In the case of a Hostile Action Event, site access may not be possible due to safety Change Summary Analysis Page 15 of 18 concerns. In those cases, members of the OSC would be staged at the designated Alternative Facility in accordance with the regulatory guidance implemented with the 2011 EP rulemaking initiative. While the OSC would not be "activated," OSC teams could be dispatched from the Alternative Facility to address urgent plant issues. The Emergency Plan statement has been amended to clarify the OSC would be activated at all times for a General Emergency and Site Area Emergency, "except in the case of a Hostile Action Event when site access is restricted." | |||
* Change 28-Section 11.H.2 provides a description of the EOFs, including the location of the EOFs for each station in the Exelon fleet. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific statements in this section which are not applicable to Quad Cities are being removed. Specifically, the locations of the EOFs for stations other than Quad Cities are deleted from this section. | |||
* Change 30 -Section 11.H.4 refers to 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(2) which states: "timely augmentation of response capabilities is available." In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.B.5 further states: "The licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency." The Quad Cities' station Annex (EP-AA-1006) Section 2.1 states that: "The Normal Shift Organization will be augmented, in an emergency, with designated/additional Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel within 60 minutes of classification." The new Emergency Plan EP-QC-1000, Section 11.H.4 provides a description of the activation process used at Quad Cities and utilizes the word "declaration." The word "classification" has replaced the word "declaration" to maintain consistency between EP-QC-1000 and EP-AA-1006. Quad Cities' Emergency Plan implementing procedures are written to require augmentation to occur within 60 minutes of classification. The change does not revise the point at which the augmentation starts because "classification" and "declaration" refer to the same point in time. This change is being made to align the language used in the Emergency Plan and the station Annex. | |||
* Change 31 -Section 11.H.5 under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, provided a general discussion of the on-site monitoring equipment. The discussion summarized information applicable to the Exelon fleet leaving specific details contained in each station's Annex. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific descriptions in this section which are not applicable to Quad Cities were removed. Specifically, Section 11.H.5 was revised to delete reference to Oyster Creek's lack of seismic monitors. The section was also revised to delete reference to other Exelon sites since the revised Emergency Plan will apply solely to Quad Cities. Furthermore, the section was revised to recognize that the description of the some of the listed monitors may be included in the Emergency Plan rather than the Annex. | |||
* Change 32 -Section 11.H.5 was revised to remove reference to tape transports for the seismic monitors as Quad Cities' seismic monitors due not use tape transports. The reference to tape transports applied to other Exelon stations under the Standard Plan. | |||
* Change 33-Section 11.H.12 under the Exelon Standard Plan provided a general description for the onsite chemistry lab. The section is revised to provide station-specific detail for the site Chemistry lab location. Change Summary Analysis Page 16 of 18 | |||
* Changes 35 and 46 -Section 11.J.4 was revised to reflect the specific definition of a Drill Cycle for Quad Cities. The 2011 EP Rulemaking initiative revised the length of a Drill Cycle from six (6) years to eight (8) years. 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E states: "The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is conducted." Exelon's Standard Plan was written to reflect that the Drill Cycle would be six (6) years until the completion of the first evaluated Hostile Action Drill. Now that Quad Cities has completed its Hostile Action Based Exercise in 2014, it is appropriate to revise the language in the Emergency Plan to clearly state that the Drill Cycle is defined to be eight (8) years and the language explaining the start of the eight-year cycle as it relates to the Hostile Action Based Exercise can be deleted without affecting regulatory requirements or Quad Cities' commitments. An additional change was made to the Appendix 4, "Glossary of Terms and Acronyms," to revise the definition of the Drill Cycle to "an eight year perioc;:I of time." | |||
* Change 37 -Section 11.N.2 was revised to reflect that there are no local support service organizations that support more than one station. Under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, hospitals in close proximity to multiple stations such as Byron, Braidwood and Dresden would be able to take credit for Medical drills at other stations in proximity. Quad Cities' location does not allow them to take advantage of this credit, and therefore, the statement is being removed from the Emergency Plan. | |||
* Change 38-Section 11.N.4 was revised to delete a discussion regarding the implementation of revisions to the Exelon fleet Standard Plan simultaneously at each of the Exelon stations. Since the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan is being separated and de-linked from the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, this paragraph is no longer applicable to Quad Cities. Future Emergency Plan changes for Quad Cities, following this revision, will not be related and will not affect the fleet Standard Plan. | |||
* Change 39-Section 11.P.6 and Appendix 1 contain a listing of other plans and references that support the Exelon Standard Plan. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, there are some listed Emergency Response Plans, References, and Letters of Agreements (LOAs) that do not support Quad Cities. The referenced Emergency Plans that are being deleted from the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan include: o State of Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan o Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Radiological Emergency Response Plan o State of Maryland Radiological Emergency Response Plan o State of New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants -Annex B: Oyster Creek o Emergency Operations Plan for Ocean County While these Emergency Response Plans, References, and LOAs continue to support stations within the Exelon fleet, it is not correct or appropriate to list them in the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. As such, these listings were removed from the list. | |||
* Change 40 -Step 11.P.7 was revised to delete reference to Emergency Plan implementing procedures which do not apply to Quad Cities. Specifically, the reference to "MA" Atlantic) procedures were removed. It is no longer correct or appropriate to list these procedures in a Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. Change Summary Analysis Page 17 of 18 | |||
* Change 41 -Appendix 1 (Reference section) of the Emergency Plan was updated to remove outdated industry references. The references do not denote or imply commitments to the documents and were only included as a source of additional information. The references are not specifically identified within the Emergency Plan. | |||
* Change 42 -Appendix 2 (Procedure Cross Reference to NUREG-0654) was revised to delete procedures which do not apply to Quad Cities. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific procedures in this section are identified to be applicable to stations other than Quad Cities (e.g., Mid-Atlantic). As such, they are being deleted from the Quad Cities Emergency Plan. The procedures being deleted include: o EP-MA-114-100, Mid-Atlantic State/Local Notifications o EP-MA-124-1001, Facility Inventories and Equipment Tests o EP-MA-121-1002, Exelon East Alert Notification System (ANS) Program o EP-MA-121-1004, Exelon East ANS Corrective Maintenance o EP-AA-110-302, Core Damage Assessment (PWR) o EP-AA-113-F-04, MA Emergency Director -Site Assembly, Accountability | |||
* Change 43 -Appendix 3 (Letters of Agreement) was revised. Specifically, the column which designates the applicable stations for which the LOAs apply was deleted. There is no need to designate specific stations for the LOAs since the Emergency Plan only applies to Quad Cities. There were no changes to the actual LOAs and no LOAs were deleted from the Emergency Plan, so this change is considered editorial in nature. | |||
* Change 44 -Appendix 3 (Letters of Agreement) was revised. Specifically, the names of the service providers have been updated to their current firm names. The Fire Fighting Foam Supplier has been changed from Red Alert Service to National Foam, Inc. Additionally, the names of the Provena St. Joseph Medical Center and GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy were corrected. The LOA referencing Westinghouse Electric Company was removed as it applies to a PWR only. No applicable LOAs were deleted from the Emergency Plan. | |||
* Changes 47 and 48 -Appendix 4 was revised to delete acronyms which do not apply to Quad Cities. With the separation of the Quad Cities's Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific acronyms in this section are identified to be applicable to the Mid-West Exelon stations or other Exelon stations. As such, they are being deleted from the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. EP-AA-1006 Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station | |||
* Change 49 -The Quad Cities' Annex, Section 1, "Introduction," and the Section 2, "Organizational Control of Emergencies," were revised to recognize that the Exelon Standard Plan for the fleet is no longer associated with Quad Cities. The new Quad Cities Emergency Plan document EP-QC-1000 was created in its place and is specific to Quad Cities. As such, reference to the Standard Plan and other nuclear stations is no longer accurate. The paragraphs were revised to delete these references and reference to the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan was applied. Change Summary Analysis Page 18 of 18 | |||
* Change 50 -Section 2 was revised to include an additional change to recognize that the Table 2-1, "Minimum Staffing Tables" contained in the station's Annex EP-AA-1006 was relocated to the new EP-QC-1000 Emergency Plan document. The Minimum Staffing Tables are not being changed, but they are now incorporated in the EP-QC-1000, Section 11.B, which describes the station ERO. The change is necessary to locate the position descriptions for the Quad Cities' ERO in one location. | |||
* Change 51 -Section 2 refers to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) which states: "timely augmentation of response capabilities is available. 11 In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.B further states: "The licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency. 11 The Quad Cities' Annex Section 2.1 states that: "The Normal Shift Organization will be augmented, in an emergency, with designated/additional Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel within 60 minutes of notification." This is inconsistent with requirements contained in the EP-AA-1000 (EP-QC-1000), which requires augmentation within 60 minutes of classification (reference Sections D.1.a, D.1.b, H.4,). This change is to correct the inconsistency for augmentation of the ERO. The Quad Cities' Emergency Plan implementing procedures are written to require augmentation to occur within 60 minutes of classification. | |||
* Change 52 -Section 5 was updated pertaining to the description of the isotopic counting system at Quad Cities to reflect the installation of a High-Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector. The previously used Geli detector used for gamma spectroscopy has been updated at Quad Cities to a HPGe detector. The upgraded HPGe detector performs the same function as the Geli detector. Before current purification techniques were refined, germanium crystals could not be produced with purity sufficient to enable their use as spectroscopy detectors, and consequently, germanium crystals were doped with lithium ions (Geli). Improved technology now allows high-purity germanium crystals to be used in gamma spectroscopy. The revision to the Emergency Plan reflects the use of the new detector. | |||
* Change 53 -Section 5 was also updated related to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) chapter reference for the location of fixed continuous air samplers and Dosimeter of . Legal Record (DLR) locations. Description of Why the Change is Not a Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) The changes to the Quad Cities Emergency Plan were evaluated under the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(q). Existing requirements and capabilities under the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan have not been deleted or reduced as part of this revision, and therefore, the station's Emergency Plan continues to meet regulatory requirements. The changes continue to meet the applicable planning standards established in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. A review of existing regulatory commitments was made to ensure all existing commitments continue to be met. Therefore, the changes described do not constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan for Quad Cities. | |||
ATTACHMENT 2 Emergency Plan Addendum Revision EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3, Revision 5, "Emergency Action Levels for Dresden Station" 4f!J!1ffJWf | |||
* Exelon Generation,,, EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 Revision 5 EXELON NUCLEAR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR DRESDEN STATION Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear REVISION HISTORY Rev. 0 December 2014 Rev. 1 November 2015 Rev. 2 February 2016 Rev. 3 June 2016 Rev. 4 August 2016 Rev. 5 November 2016 ' November 2016 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Section 1 : Classification of Emergencies , 1.1 General Exelon Nuclear Section D of the Exelon Nuclear Standardized Emergency Plan divides the types of emergencies into four EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS (ECLs). The first four are the UNUSUAL EVENT (UE), ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE), and GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE). These ECLs are entered by satisfying the Initiating Condition (IC) through meeting an Emergency Action Level (EAL) of the IC provided in this section of the Annex. The ECLs are escalated from least severe to most severe according to relative threat to the health and safety of the public and emergency workers. Depending on the severity of an event, prior to returning to a standard day-to-day organization, a state or phase called RECOVERY may be entered to provide dedicated resources and organization in support of restoration and communication activities following the termination of the emergency. UNUSUAL EVENT (UE): Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. | |||
* ALERT: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE): Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE): Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. November 2016 DR 1-1 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOVERY: Recovery can be considered as a phase of the emergency and is entered by meeting emergency termination criteria provided in EP-AA-111 Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL (EGL): One of a set of names or titles established by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) for grouping normal events or conditions according to (1) potential or actual effects or consequences, and (2) resulting onsite and offsite response actions. The emergency classification levels, in ascending order of severity, are: | |||
* UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) | |||
* ALERT | |||
* SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) | |||
* GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) INITIATING CONDITION (IC): An event or condition that aligns with the definition of one of the four EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS by virtue of the potential or actual effects or consequences. EMERGENCY ACTION *LEVEL (EAL): A pre-determined, site-specific, . . observable threshold for an INITIATING CONDITION that, when met or exceeded, places the plant in a given EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL. An emergency is . classified by assessing plant conditions and comparing abnormal conditions to ICs and EALs. Individuals responsible for the classification of events will refer .to the Initiating Condition and EALs on the matrix of the appropriate station Standardized Emergency Plan Annex (this document). This matrix will contain ICs, EALs, Mode Applicability Designators, appropriate EAL numbering system, and additional guidance necessary to classify events. It. may be provided as a user aid. The matrix is set up in six Recognition Categories. The first is designated as "R" and relates to Abnormal Radiological Conditions I Abnormal Radiological Effluent Releases. The second is designated as "F" and relates to Fission Product Barrier Degradation. The third is designated as "M" and relates to hot condition System Malfunctions. The fourth is designated as "C" and relates to Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions. The fifth is designated as "H" and relates to Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety. The sixth is designated H" and relates to ISFSI Malfunctions. The matrix is designed to provide an evaluation of the Initiating Conditions from the worst conditions (General Emergencies) on the left to the relatively less severe conditions on the right (Unusual Events). Evaluating conditions from left to right will reduce the possibility that an event will be under classified. All Recognition Categories should be reviewed for applicability prior to classification. November 2016 DR 1-2 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear The Initiating Conditions are coded with a two letter and one number code. The first letter is the Recognition Category designator, the second letter is the Classification Level, "U" for (NOTIFICATION OF) UNUSUAL EVENT, "A" for ALERT, "S" for SITE AREA EMERGENCY and "G" for GENERAL EMERGENCY. The EAL number is a sequential number for that Recognition Category series. All ICs that are describing the severity of a common condition (series) will have the same number. The EAL number may then be used to reference a corresponding page(s), which provides the basis information pertaining to the IC: | |||
* EAL | |||
* Mode Applicability | |||
* Basis Classification is not to be made without referencing, comparing and satisfying the specified Emergency Action Levels. A list of definitions is provided as part of this document for terms having specific meaning to the EALs. Site specific definitions are provided for terms with the intent to be used for a particular IC/EAL and may not be applicable to other uses of that term at other sites, the Emergency Plan or procedures. References are also included to documents that were used _to develop the EALs. References to the Emergency Director means the person in Command and Control as defined in the Emergency Plan. Classification of emergencies is a non-delegable responsibility of Command and Control for the onsite facilities with responsibility assigned to the Shift Emergency Director (Control Room Shift Manager) or the Station Emergency Director (Technical Support Center). Classification of emergencies remains the responsibility of the applicable onsite facility even after Command and Control is transferred to the Corporate Emergency Director (Emergency Operations Facility). Although the majority of the EALs provide very specific thresholds, the Emergency Dii-ector must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL is IMMINENT. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an IMMINENT situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the EAL has been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher ECL (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all ECLs. November 2016 DR 1-3 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear 1.2 Classification, Instrumentation and Transient Events Classifications are based on evaluation of each Unit. All classifications are to be based upon valid indications, reports or conditions. Indications, reports or conditions are considered valid when they are verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indications, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indication's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this is the need for timely assessment. Indications used for monitoring and evaluation of plant conditions include the normally used instrumentation, backup or redundant instrumentation, and the use of other parameters that provide information that supports determination if an EAL has been reached. When an EAL refers to a specific instrument or indication that is determined to be inaccurate or unavailable, then alternate indications shall be used to monitor the specified condition. During an event that results in changing parameters trending towards an EAL classification, and instrumentation that was available to monitor this parameter becomes unavailable or the parameter goes off scale, the parameter should be assumed to have been exceeded consistent with the trend and the classification made if there are no other direct or indirect means available to determine if the EAL has not been exceeded. The assessment of some EALs is based on the results of analyses that are necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL has been exceedeo (e.g., dose assessments, chemistry sampling, RCS leak rate calculation, etc.); the EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis. In these cases, the 15-minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the EAL to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available). Planned evolutions involve preplanning to address' the limitations imposed by the condition, the performance of required surveillance testing, and the implementation of specific controls prior to knowingly entering the condition in accordance with the specific requirements of the site's Technical Specifications. Activities which cause the site to operate beyond that allowed by the site's Technical Specifications, planned or unplanned, may result in an EAL being met or exceeded. Planned evolutions to test, manipulate, repair, perform maintenance or modifications to systems and equipment that result in an EAL being met or exceeded are not subject to classification and activation requirements as long as the evolution proceeds as planned and is within the operational limitations imposed by the specific operating license. However, these conditions may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50. 72. November 2016 DR 1-4 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear When two or more EALs are determined, declaration will be made on the highest classification level for the Unit. When both units are affected, the highest classification for the Station will be used for notification purposes and both Units' ECLs will be noted. Concerning ECL Downgrading, Exelon Nuclear policy is that ECLs shall not be downgraded to a lower classification. Once declared, the event shall remain in effect until no Classification is warranted or until such time as conditions warrant classification to Recovery. There may be cases in which a plant condition that exceeded an EAL was not recognized at the time of occurrence but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review), and the condition no longer exists. In these cases, an emergency should not be declared. Reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 are applicable, the guidance of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 and the Reportability Reference Manual, should be applied. 1.3 Mode Applicability The plant-operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs. If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant-operating mode is reached before the emergency classification can be made, the declaration shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred. For events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refueling, escalation is via EALs that have Cold Shutdown or Refueling for mode applicability, even if Hot Shutdown (or a higher mode) is entered during any subsequent heat-up. In particular, the Fission Product Barrier Matrix EALs are applicable only to events that initiate in Hot Shutdown or higher. If there is a change in Mode following an event declaration, any subsequent events involving EALs outside of the current declaration escalation path will be evaluated on the Mode of the plant at the time the subsequent events occur. 1.4 Emergency Director Judgment Emergency Director (ED) Judgment EALs are provided in the Hazards and Other Condition Affecting Plant Safety section and on the Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Matrix. Both of the ED Judgment EALs have specific criteria for when they should be applied. The Hazards Section ED Judgment EALs are intended to address unanticipated conditions which are not addressed explicitly by other EALs but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the ED to fall under specific emergency classifications (UE, Alert, SAE or GE). November 2016 DR 1-5 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear The FPB Matrix ED Judgment EALs are intended to include unanticipated conditions, which are not addressed explicitly by any of the other FPB threshold values, but warrant determination because conditions exist that fall under the broader definition for a significant Loss or Potential Loss of the barrier (equal to or greater than the defined FPB threshold values). 1.5 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold A fission product barrier threshold is a pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold indicating the loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. FPB thresholds represent threats to the defense in depth design concept that precludes the release of radioactive fission products to the environment. This concept relies on multiple physical barriers, any one of which, if maintained intact, precludes the release of significant amounts of radioactive fission products to the environment. The primary FPBs are: | |||
* Fuel Clad (FC) | |||
* Reactor Coolant System (RCS) | |||
* Containment (CT) Upon determination that one or more FPB thresholds have been exceeded, the combination of barrier loss and/or potential loss thresholds is compared to the FPB IC/EAL criteria to determine the appropriate ECL. In some accident sequences, the ICs and EALs presented in the Abnormal Radiation Levels/ Radiological Effluent (R) Recognition Category will be exceeded at the same time, or shortly after, the loss of one or more fission product barriers. This redundancy is intentional as the former ICs address radioactivity releases that result in certain offsite doses from whatever cause, including events that might not be fully encompassed by fission product barriers (e.g., spent fuel pool accidents, design containment leakage following a LOCA, etc.). 1.6 Fission Product Barrier Restoration Fission Product Barriers are not treated the same as EAL threshold values. Conditions warranting .declaration of the loss or potential loss of a FPB may occur resulting in a specific classification. The condition that caused the loss or potential loss declaration could be rectified as the result of Operator action, automatic actions, or designed plant response. Barriers will be considered established when there are direct verifiable indications (containment penetration or open valve has been isolated, coolant sample results, etc) that the barrier has been restored and is capable of mitigating future events. November 2016 DR 1-6 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear The reestablishment of a FPB does not alter or lower the existing classification. Termination and entry into RECOVERY phase is still required for exiting the present classification. However the reestablishment of the barrier should be considered in determining future classifications should plant conditions or events change. 1.7 -Definitions CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under existing plant conditions. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fire. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) THRESHOLD: A pre-determined, specific, observable threshold indicating the loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. November 2016 DR 1-7 EP-AA.:.1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. NORMAL LEVELS: As applied to radiological IC/EALs, the highest reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding the current peak value. OPERATING MODES REACTOR MODE SWITCH POSITION (1) Power Operation: (2) Startup: (3) Hot Shutdown <a>: (4) Cold Shutdown <a>: (5) Refueling (b): Run Refuel (a) or Startup/Hot Standby Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown or Refuel TEMP N/A N/A > 212° F :::; 212° F N/A (D) Defueled: All reactor fuel removed from reactor pressure vessel (full core off load during refueling or extended outage). (a) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. (b) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned. Hot Matrix -applies in modes (1 ), (2), and (3) Cold Matrix -applies in modes (4), (5), and (D) OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station and owned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for official business. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. November 2016 DR 1-8 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION. UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visua.1 impact of the. damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure. November 2016 DR 1-9 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Level Technical Basis Page Index General Site Area Alert Unusual Event EAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg. RG1 2-25 RS1 2-27 RA1 2-29 RU1 2-32 RG2 2-35 RS2 2-36 RA2 2-37 RU2 2-40 RA3 2-43 RU3 2-47 FG1 2-48 FS1 2-49 FA1 2-50 Fuel Clad RCS Containment FC1 2-51 FC2 2-52 RC2 2-57 CT2 2-65 RC3 2-59 CT3 2-66 RC4 2-60 FC5 2-55 RCS 2-63 CT5 2-68 CT6 2-69 FC? 2-56 RC? 2-64 CT? 2-72 MG1 2-73 MS1 2-75 MA1 2-77 MU1 2-79 MG2 2-80 MS2 2-82 MS3 2-83 MA3 2-85 MU3 2-87 MA4 2-90 MU4 2-92 MA5 2-94 MU6 2-97 MU? 2-99 .. CA1 2-101 CU1 2-103 CA2 2-105 CU3 2-108 CU4 2-110 CA5 2-112 CU5 2-115 CG6 2-117 CS6 2-121 CA6 2-124 CU6 2-126 HG1 2-129 HS1 2-131 HA1 2-133 HU1 2-136 HS2 2-138 HA2 2-140 HU3 2-141 HU4 2-145 HA5 2-147 HU6 2-150 HG? 2-153 HS? 2-154 HA? 2-155 HU? 2-156 E-HU1 2-157 November 2016 DR 1-10 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5) | |||
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG1 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Notes: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+09 uCl/sec for<: 15 minutes (as determined by DDP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 1000 mRem TEOE OR b. > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continue for<: 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. | |||
* RS1 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid COE. Emergency Action Level!EAL): Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. * | |||
* 1. 2. 3. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+OB uCi/sec for<: 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 100 mRem TEOE OR b. > 500 mRem COE Thyroid OR Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continue for<: 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. ALERT RA1 Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDEor 50 mrem thyroid COE. | |||
* Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT RU1 Any rele.ase of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment greater than 2 times the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes. | |||
* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that | |||
* a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification | |||
* 1. 2. 3. 4. flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+07 uCilsec for<: 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 10 mRem TEDE OR b. > 50 mRem COE Thyroid Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary OR a. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposure OR b. 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposure Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates > 10 mR/hr are expected to continue for<: 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. 1. Reading on ANY of the following effluent monitors> 2 times alarm setpoint established by a current radioactive release discharge permit for:!:: 60 minutes. OR Radwaste Effluent Monitor 2/3-2001-948 OR Discharge Permit specified monitor 2. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.34 E+05 uCi/sec for<: 60 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates> 2 times OOCM Limit with a release duration of<: 60 minutes. Modes. 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-1 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG2 Spent fuel pool level cannot be [§ restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Levels (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Table R1 Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitors | |||
* Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2( 4) | |||
* Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor RS2 Spent fuel pool level at 0.60 ft. [§ as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) Emergency Action Level !EAL): Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Table R2 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy | |||
* Main Control Room (Unit 2 ARM Station #22) | |||
* Central Alarm Station -(by survey) Table R3 Areas with Entrv Related Mode Applicability Reactor Building 517' elevation | |||
* MCC 28-1 area | |||
* MCC 29-1 area | |||
* MCC 38-1 area | |||
* MCC 39-1 area | |||
* CRD 25 valve area 545' elevation | |||
* Bus 23-1 area | |||
* Bus 24-1 area | |||
* Bus 33-1 area | |||
* Bus 34-1 area RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 28 area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 38 area 589' elevation | |||
* Isolation Condenser Floor 2(3) Cribhouse 2&3 Turbine Building 495' elevation 2(3) CRD Pump Area 534' elevation | |||
* Bus23 area | |||
* Bus24 area 538' elevation *Bus 33 area *Bus 34 area 2 Modes 3, 4, and 5 RA2 Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level fEAU: 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. OR 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity , from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R1 Radiation *Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr. OR 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10.20 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). RAJ Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. Emergencv Action Level <EAU: Note: If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R3 was already inoperable, or out of service. before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted 1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the areas contained in Table R2. OR 2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to any of the areas contained in Table R3. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng *o -Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-2 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT RU2 Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: 1. a. UNPLANNED waler level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: | |||
* Refueling Cavity water level < 466 in. (Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrument LI 2(3)-263-114) OR Spent Fuel Pool water level < 19 ft. above the fuel (< 33 ft. 9 in. indicated level). OR | |||
* Indication cir report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. AND b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitors in Table R1. RU3 Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Emergency Action Level <EAU: 1. Offgas system radiation monitor HI-HI alarm. OR 2. Specific coolant activity> 4.0 µCi/gm Dose equivalent 1-131. HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Sub-Category 1. RCS Activity 2. RPVWater Level 3. Primary Loss Coolant activity> 300 pCilgm Dose Equivalent 1-131. 1. Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. FC -Fuel Clad Potential *Loss None 2. RPV water level 9!!!!Q! be restored and maintained> -143 Inches (TAF) OR 3. RPV water level cannot be determined. Containment None None Pressure/Conditions 4.RCS Leak Rate 5.Primary Containment Radiation 6.Primary Containment Isolation Failure 7. Emergency Director Judgment None Drywall radiation monitor reading > 6.70 E+02 R/hr (670 R/hr). None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. None None None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. RC -Reactor Coolant System CT | |||
* Containment Loss None 1. RPV water be restored and maintained> -143 Inches (TAF) OR 2. RPV water level 9!.!m..Q! be determined. 1. DryweJJ pressure >2.0 psig. AND 2. Drywell pressure rise is due to RCS leakage 1. UNISOLABLE Main Steam Line (MSL), Isolation Condenser, HPCI, Feedwater, or RWCU line break. OR 2. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required. Drywell radiation monitor reading > 100R/hr (>1.00 E+02 R/hr). None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCS Barrier. Potential Loss None None None 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following: a. Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Loss None None 1. UNPLANNED rapid drop in Drywell pressure following Drywell pressure rise. OR 2. Drywall pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions. Normal operating levels. None OR b. Secondary Containment area radiation level > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Normal operating level. None None None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. 1. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primary containment isolation signal. OR 2. Intentional Primary Containment venting/purging per EOPs or SAMGs due to accident conditions. OR 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1, Maximum Safe operating levels. ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Containment Barrier. Potential Loss None Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. 3. Drywell pressure 62 psig and rising. OR 4. a. Drywall or torus hydrogen concentration AND b. Drywall or torus oxygen concentration OR 5. Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig.M) exceeded. None Drywell radiation monitor reading > 1.60 E+03 R/hr (1600 R/hr) None ANY Condition in the Opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled November 2016 DR2-3 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY System Malfunction D. 0 c 'O Ill Ill .3 MG1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1 Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. EITHER of th.e following: a. Restoration of at least one unit ECCS bus in < 4 hours is not likely. OR b. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained: (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches MG2 Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3) and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Voltage is < 105 voe on 125 voe battery buses #2 and #3. AND 4. ALL AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost for ?_ 15 minutes. MS1 Loss of all Off-site and On-Site AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC Power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Failure to restore power to at least one ECCS bus in < 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. MS2 Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is < 105 voe on 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3 for?_ 15 minutes. MA1 ALERT Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only one of the following power sources for?_ 15 minutes. | |||
* Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32) | |||
* Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31) | |||
* Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3) | |||
* Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3 | |||
* Unit crosstie breakers AND 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-4 MU1 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to unit ECCS buses for?_ 15 minutes. I HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY System Malfunction 2! ..:! "iii IL (/) II. a: Ul c: 0 :; u '5 .E E 0 0 a: e 'E 0 u Table M1 Control Room Parameters Reactor Power RPV Water .Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Torus Level Torus Temperature Modes. 1 -Power Operalion 2-Startup HOT MATRIX November 2016 SITE AREA EMERGENCY MS3 Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or RCS heat removaL Emergency Action Level !EAL): 1. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power? 6%. AND 2. ALL manual I ARI actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful as indicated by Reactor Power > 6%. AND 3. EITHER ot'the following conditions exist: | |||
* RPV water level £l!.!!.!!.!1! be restored and maintained: (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches OR | |||
* Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig. M) exceeded. Table M2 Significant Transients Turbine Trip Reactor Scram ECCS Activation Recirc. Runback > 25% Reactor Power Change Thermal Power oscillations > 10% Reactor Power Change ALERT MA3 Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. Emergency Action Level !EAL): MU3 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core. and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. Note: A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually 1. driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. a. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. 1. Automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 6%. AND 2. Manual I ARI actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. MA4 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room for;::: 15 minutes. AND 2. ANY Table M2 transient in progress. AND b. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power OR 2. a. Manual scram did not shutdown the reactor a.s indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND b. EITHER of the following: 1. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor 6%. OR 2. Subsequent automatic scram I ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor 6%. MU4 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Emergencv Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room for;::: 15 minutes. 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX DR2-5 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT System Malfunction MAS Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. EmergencJl Action Level {EAL}: Note: If it is determined that the conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: . Seismic event (earthquake) . Internal or external flooding event E . High winds or tornado strike .2! . FIRE UI . EXPLOSION >-U) . Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager .e AND l'CI 2. EITHER of the following: U) a. Event damage has caused indications of tl degraded performance in at least one train of a £ SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical l'CI Specification for the current operating mode. 'E OR l'CI b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a N SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure l'CI ::r: required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. MUS RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. Emergencl£ Action Level {EAL}: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event l'CI promptly upon determining that the applicable time Q) has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded . ...I U) 0 1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage in the a:: Drywell > 10 gpm 15 minutes -OR 2. RCS identified leakage in the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes OR 3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-6 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT System Malfunction MU7 Loss of all On-site or Off-site l!l§rn Table M3 Communications Capability communication capabilities. System Onsite Off site NRC UI Plant Radio x Emergency Action Level (EAL): c:: .2 Plant Paoe x 1. Loss of ALL Table M3 Onsite communications 'lii All telephone Lines capability affecting the ability to perform routine (.J operations. '2 (Commercial and x x x ::J microwave) OR E E ENS x x 2. Loss of ALL Table M3 Offsite communication 0 HPN x x capability affecting the ability to perform offsite 0 notifications. Satellite Phones x x OR 3. Loss of ALL Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRG notifications. Modes. 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-7 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5} | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HG1 HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss HS1 HOSTILE ACTION within the [fil [9 HA1 HOSTILE ACTION within the [fil [9 HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION of physical control of the facility PROTECTED AREA OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack or threat. threat within 30 minutes. c: Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level IEALl: Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE 1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the u ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the 1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security <C PROTECTED AREA. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the threat < 30 minutes from the site. Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities. PROTECTED AREA. AND OR OR '1ii 2. A validated notification from the NRC providing 0 2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be 2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE :c controlled or maintained. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the information of an aircraft threat. OWNER CONTROLED AREA. OR OR 3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY b. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is CONDITION that does.!!!!! involve a HOSTILE IMMINENT ACTION. " HS2 Inability to control a key safety [fil [9 HA2 Control Room evacuation resulting function from outside the Control Room in transfer of plant control to alternate locations Table H1 Safety Functions Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Emergency Action Level (EAL}: . Reactivity Control Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control e (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it promptly upon determining that the applicable time has being transferred from the Control Room to alternate -shutdown) been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure-c: Control Room Evacuation. 0 1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control (.) . RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core) 'E being transferred from the Control Room to alternate ns . RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain a heat sink) locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -ii: Control Room Evacuation. -AND 0 .. 2. Control of ANY Table H1 key safety function is not rn reestablished in < 30 minutes. c: ns .. I-Modes. 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-8 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety Modes: 1 -Power Operatron 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-9 ALERT Table H2 Vital Areas | |||
* Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt) | |||
* Aux Electric Room | |||
* Control Room | |||
* Unit and Shared Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms | |||
* 4KV ECCS Switchgear Area (includes Bus 23, 24, 33 and 34 only) | |||
* Battery Rooms | |||
* CRD & CCSW Pump Rooms | |||
* Turbine Building Cable Tunnel | |||
* Turbine Building Safe Shutdown Areas as follows: | |||
* B-Train Control Room HVAC Room | |||
* Battery Rooms and DC Distribution Areas 1) U2 Battery Room (includes DC switchgear, 125V, and 250V battery rooms) 2) U3 Battery Room, Battery Cage area, and U3 Battery Charger Room (all on U3 TB 538) | |||
* Crib House Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU3 FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not ex1inguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications: | |||
* Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
* Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
* Field verification of a single fire alarm OR 2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE). AND b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt. -OR 3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not ex1inguished in < SO-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. OR 4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to ex1inguish. HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX I GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HU4 Seismic event greater than OBE levels EmergencJl Action Level (EAL): Note: Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS For emergency classification if EAL 2 is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is confirmed in manrier deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in =: 15 mins of the event. Seismic event as indicated by: CD 1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic .IC I'll event. ::I tr AND .c t:: 2. ANY one of the following confirmed in =: 15 mins of the I'll w event: | |||
* The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) and occurred:: 3.5 miles of the plant. | |||
* The earthquake was magnitude 6.0 | |||
* The earthquake was magnitude 5.0 and occurred =: 125 miles of the plant. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-10 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERALEMERGENeY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HA5 Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. I/) Table H3 Emergency Action Level !EAL!: ns Areas with Entrv Related Mode Applicabilitv (!) Entry Related Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was tJ Area Unit Mode already inoperable, or out of service, before the *;;: 0 Aoplicabilitv event occurred, then no emergency classification I-Reactor Building is warranted. 517' elevation 1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or *MCC 28-1 area flammable gas in a Table H3 area. *MCC 29-1 area *MCC 38-1 area AND *MCC39-1 area 2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or | |||
* CRD 25 valve area impeded 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area HUG Hazardous Event *Bus 24-1 area *Bus 33-1 area *Bus 34-1 area 2(3) Emergency Action Level (EAL): | |||
* RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation Note: EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments *250VDC MCC 2A such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or area accidents. | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2B Escalation of the emergency classification level would area Modes 3, 4, and 5 be via IC CA2 or MA5 .... *250VDC MCC 3A c: area 1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. Cl) > | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3B OR w area 2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to I/) 589' elevation require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a :::s 0 *Isolation Condenser SAFETY SYSTEM component required by Technical "C ... Floor Specifications for the current operating mode. ns N Cribhouse 2&3 OR ns :r: 3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is Turbine Building impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous 495' elevation 2(3) materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas | |||
* CRD Pump Area release). 534' elevation OR *Bus 23 area 2 4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions *Bus 24 area sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site 538' elevation via personal vehicles. *Bus 33 area 3 OR *Bus 34 area 5. Abnormal River level, as indicated by EITHER: a. High river level > 509 ft. OR b. Low river level < 501 ft. 6 i.nches. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-11 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety c: Cl) E Cl "C :::s ..., ... i5 >. 0 c: Cl) Cl) E w HG7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@]@][fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@J@][fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. ALERT HA7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@]@][fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuellng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-12 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@]@l[fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT I ISFSI Malfunction E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Emergencll Action Level {EAL}: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading: 1. EAST HI-STAR: . > 160 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR . > 250 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR iii 2. EAST HI-STORM: LL . > 20 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR . >100 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR . > 90 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts of the Overpack . OR 3. WEST HI-STORM: . > 40 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR -. >220 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack, excluding inlet and outlet ducts Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-13 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG1 Release of gaseous radioactivity 11J[gj@]l1J@][g resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+09 uCi/sec for?. 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 1000 mRem TEOE OR b. > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continue for?. 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. SITE AREA EMERGENCY RS1 Release of gaseous radioactivity 11J[gj@]l1J@][g resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. | |||
* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. | |||
* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+OB uCi/sec for?. 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 100 mRem TEOE OR b. > 500 mRem COE Thyroid OR 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continue for?. 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RA1 Release of gaseous or liquid 11J[gj@ll1J@][g radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1 O mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: * * * | |||
* 1. 2. The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+07 uCi/sec for?, 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 10 mRem TEOE OR b. > 50 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary OR a. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposure OR b. 50 mRem CDE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposure 4. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates> 10 mR/hr are expected to continue for::, 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. D-Defueled DR2-14 RU1 Any release of gaseous or liquid 11J[gj@]l1J@][g radioactivity to the environment greater than 2 times the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: * * | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. 1. Reading on ANY of the following effluent monitors > 2 times alarm setpoint established by a current radioactive release discharge permit 60 minutes. OR | |||
* Radwaste Effluent Monitor 213-2001-948 OR | |||
* Discharge Permit specified monitor 2. The sum of readings on the Unit 213 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.34 E+05 uCi/sec for?, 60 minutes (as. determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates > 2 times OOCM Limit with a release duration of?, 60 minutes. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG2 Spent fuel pool level cannot be [9 restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Levels !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Table R1 Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitors | |||
* Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2(4) | |||
* Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor SITE AREA EMERGENCY RS2 Spent fuel pool level at 0.60 ft. [9 as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) Emergency Action Level (EAL): Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Table R2 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy | |||
* Main Control Room (Unit 2 ARM Station #22) | |||
* Central Alarm Station -(by survey) Table R3 Areas with Entrv Related Mode ADplicabilitv Reactor Building 517' elevation | |||
* MCC 28-1 area | |||
* MCC 29-1 area | |||
* MCC 38-1 area | |||
* MCC 39-1 area | |||
* CRD 25 valve area 545' elev'ation | |||
* Bus 23-1 area | |||
* Bus 24-1 area | |||
* Bus 33-1 area | |||
* Bus 34-1 area | |||
* RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 28 area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3A area | |||
* 250VOC MCC 38 area 589' elevation | |||
* Isolation Condenser Floor 2(3) Crlbhouse 2&3 Turbine Building 495' elevation 2(3) | |||
* CRD Pump Area 534' elevation | |||
* Bus23 area | |||
* Bus24 area 538' elevation | |||
* Bus33 area *Bus 34 area Modes 3, 4, and 5 Modes: 1 -Power Operatron 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 ALERT RA2 Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. OR 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R1 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr. OR 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10.20 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Note: If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R3 was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted 1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the areas contained in Table R2. OR 2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to any of the areas contained in Table R3. D-Defueled DR2-15 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT RU2 Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: | |||
* Refueling Cavity water level < 466 In. (Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrument LI 2(3)-263-114) OR | |||
* Spent Fuel Pool water level < 19 ft. above the fuel (< 33 ft. 9 In. indicated level). OR | |||
* Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. AND b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitors in Table R1. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions CA1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power @1[§]19 CU1 Loss of all but one AC power source @][§J[g to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. .. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Emergency Action Level IEALl: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event 0 promptly upon determining that the applicable time promptly upon determining that the applicable time has ll.. has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 0 <( 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. 1 . AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only ... one of the following power sources for:::, 15 minutes. 0 AND UI . Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32) UI 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 213 emergency 0 . Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31) ..I diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. . Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3) AND . Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3 . Unit crosstie breakers 3. Failure to restore power to at least one unit ECCS AND bus in< 15 minutes from the time of loss of both 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a offsite and onsite AC power. loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. CA2 Hazardous event affecting SAFETY @][§ SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. Emergency Action Level {EAL}: Note: If it is determined that the conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: . Seismic event (earthquake) E . Internal or external flooding event QI . High winds or tornado strike .... UI >. . FIRE en EXPLOSION . J!! . Other events with similar hazard ca characteristics as determined by the Shift en Manager AND 2. EITHER of the following: a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. OR b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure required by Technical *specifications for the current operating mode. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR2-16 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions CU3 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes ... or longer. ; 0 Emergencl£ Action Level (EAL): II.. 0 Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event c promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is< 105 VDC on required 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3 for::_ 15 minutes. CU4 Loss of all onsite or offsite communication Table C1 Communications Capability capabilities. System On site Off site NRC Emergencl£ Action Level (EAL): U) c Plant Radio x 0 Plant PaQe x 1. Loss of ALL Table C1 Onsite communications :;::; capability affecting the ability to perform routine cu u All telephone operations. '2 Lines x x x :I (Commercial and OR E E microwave) 2. Loss of ALL Table C1 Offsite communication 0 ENS x x capability affecting the ability to perform offsite 0 notifications. HPN x x Satellite Phones x x OR 3. Loss of ALL Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications. CA5 Inability to maintain plant in cold UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature. Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds CU5 shutdown RCS Containment Heat-up Emergencl£ Action Levels (EAL!: Emergencl£ Action Levels (EAL): Status Closure Status Duration Intact Not Applicable 60 minutes* Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time promptly upon determining that the applicable time .:.: has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded . has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Established 20 minutes* c A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the c;; Not Intact Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature -cu limit when heat removal function is available does limit when heat removal function is available does Q) not warrant classification. not warrant classification. ::c Not Established O minutes 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F for 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F. | |||
* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation >Table C2 duration. OR within this time frame and RCS temperature is being OR 2. Loss of the following for::_ 15 minutes. reduced, then EAL Threshold #1 is not apolicable. 2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise> 10 psig as a . ALL RCS temperature indications result of temperature rise. AND . ALL RPV level indications Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-17 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions .9 c: Q) > .E -Q) Cl ca .II: ca Q) ...J (/J 0 0:: CG6 Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1 a. RPV Level< -143 inches (TAF) for;:: 30 minutes. AND b. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) OR 2. a. RPV level cannot be monitored for;:: 30 minutes. 3. AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: AND | |||
* Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. OR | |||
* Refuel Floor Hi Range ARM >3000 mR/hr. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications | |||
* Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration ::: 6% and Oxygen ;:: 5% | |||
* UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure | |||
* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established* | |||
* ANY Secondary Containment radiation monitor > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Safe ooeratina level *if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncovery time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 SITE AREA EMERGENCY CS6 Loss of RPV inventory affecting core d_ecay heat removal capabilities. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV level < -60 inches -OR 2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV* level < | |||
* 143 inches (TAF) OR 3. a. RPV level cannot be monitored for::: 30 minutes AND b. Core uncovery is indicated. by ANY of the following: | |||
* Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. | |||
* OR | |||
* Refuel Floor Hi Range ARM >3000 mR/hr. Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage | |||
* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED Torus level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise | |||
* Observation of leakaae or inventorv loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling ALERT CA6 Loss of RPV inventory Emergencv Action Level !EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < -54 inches. OR 2. a. RPV level cannot be monitored for::: 15 minutes. AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications D-Defueled DR2-18 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT CU6 UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintain RPV level to above the. procedurally established lower limit for;:: 15 minutes. OR 2. a. RPV level cannot be monitored AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HG1 HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ HS1 HOSTILE ACTION within the IIJ[fil@]@][fil[§ HA1 HOSTILE ACTION within the II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ of physical control of the facility PROTECTED AREA OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack or threat. threat within 30 minutes. c Emergency Action Level !EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): 0 1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE +: A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE 1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the u ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the 1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft <C PROTECTED AREA. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the attack threat < 30 minutes from the site. site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security PROTECTED AREA. Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities. +: AND OR OR UI 0 2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be 2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE 2. A validated notification from the NRC providing :r: controlled or maintained. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the information of an aircraft threat. OR OWNER CONTROLED AREA. OR b. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE IMMINENT ACTION. HS2 Inability to control a key safety IIJ[fil@]@][fil[§ HA2 Control Room evacuation resulting II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ function from outside the Control Room in transfer of plant control to alternate locations Table H1 Safety Functions Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): . Reactivity Control Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control 0 (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it promptly upon determining that the applicable time has being transferred from the Control Room to alternate ... shutdown) been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure--c Control Room Evacuation. 0 1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control CJ . RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core) being transferred from the Control Room to alternate -c locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -ta . RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain a heat sink) a: Control Room Evacuation. .... AND 0 ... .S! 2. Control of ANY Table H1 key safety function is not UI reestablished in < 30 minutes. c I-Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-19 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety Q) ... ii: Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 . . . . . . . . ALERT Table H2 Vital Areas Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt} Aux Electric Room Control Room Unit and Shared Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms 4KV ECCS Switchgear Area (includes Bus 23, 24, 33 and 34 only) C.RD & CCSW Pump Rooms Turbine Building Cable Tunnel Turbine Building Safe Shutdown Areas as follows: | |||
* B-Train Control Room HVAC Room | |||
* Battery Rooms and DC Distribution Areas 1) U2 Battery Room (includes DC switchgear, 125V, and 250V battery rooms) 2) U3 Battery Room, Battery Cage area, and U3 Battery Charger Room (all on U3 TB 538) | |||
* Crib House D-Defueled DR 2-20 -----1 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU3 FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS 1. A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not extinguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications: | |||
* Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
* Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
* Field verification of a single fire alarm OR 2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE). AND b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt. -OR 3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in < 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. OR 4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX I GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HU4 Seismic event greater than OBE levels EmergencJl Action Level (EAL}: Note: Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS For emergency classification if EAL 2 is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is ; confirmed in manner deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in !:_ 15 mins of the event. Seismic event as indicated by: Q) 1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic ""' ca event. ::I C" AND ..c: t: 2. ANY one of the following confirmed in !:_ 15 mins of the ca w event: | |||
* The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI);:: VI and occurred!:_ 3.5 miles of the plant. | |||
* The earthquake was magnitude;:: 6.0 | |||
* The earthquake was magnitude;:: 5.0 and occurred !:_ 125 miles of the plant. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-21 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HAS Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. U) Table H3 Cll Areas with Entrv Related Mode Aoolicabilitv EmergencJt: Action Level (EAL): (!) Entry Related Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was u Area Unit Mode ")( already inoperable, or out of service, before the 0 Aoolicabilitv event occurred, then* no emergency classification I-Reactor Building is warranted. 517' elevation *MCC 28-1 area 1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or *MCC 29-1 area flammable gas in a Table H3 area. *MCC 38-1 area AND oMCC 39-1 area 2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or *CRD 25 valve area impeded 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area HUS Hazardous Event *Bus 24-1 area | |||
* Bus 33-1 area *Bus 34-1 area 2(3) EmergencJt: Action Level (EAL): | |||
* RWCU Pump Room Note: EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments 570' elevation such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or *250VDC MCC 2A accidents. area . *250VDC MCC 2B Escalation of the emergency classification level would area Modes 3, 4, and* be via IC CA2 or MAS c *250VDC MCC 3A 5 QI area 1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. > *250VDC MCC 3B OR w 2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to U) area :;J 589' elevation require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a 0 SAFETY S'(STEM component required by technical "C *Isolation Condenser .. Floor Specifications for the current operating mode . Cll N OR Cll Crlbhouse 2&3 3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is :c Turbine Building impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous 495' elevation 2(3) materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas | |||
* CRD Pump Area release). 534' elevation OR *Bus 23 area 2 4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions *Bus 24 area sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site 538' elevation via personal vehicles. *Bus 33 area 3 OR *Bus* 34 area 5. Abnormal River level, as indicated by EITHER: a. High river level > 509 ft. OR b. Low river level < 501 ft. 6 inches. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR2-22 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety c GI E Cl "C :I .., .. I!! c c: GI El GI E w HG7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOST! LE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EALI: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 ALERT HA7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. D-Defueled DR2-23 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX ' GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT ISFSI Malfunction E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Emergencl£ Action Level (EAL}: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading: 1. EAST HI-STAR: . > 160 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpeck OR . > 250 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpeck OR iii 2. EAST HI-STORM: LL. !!2 . > 20 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpeck OR . >100 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpeck OR . > 90 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts of the Overpeck OR 3. WEST HI-STORM: . > 40 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpeck OR . >220 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpeck, excluding inlet and outlet ducts Modes: _ 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR2-24 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RG1 Initiating Condition: Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem thyroid COE. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. | |||
* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. | |||
* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+09 uCi/sec 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 1000 mRem TEDE OR b. > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid OR November 2016 DR 2-25 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RG1 (cont) Emergency Action Level (cont): 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: *a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continue 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. ;Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal .to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public. Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 5000 mRem thyroid COE was established in consideration of the 1 :5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid COE. !Basi_s R.:derence(s): . 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG1 2. EP-AA-112-500 Emergency Environmental Monitoring 3. ODCM Sedion 12.4 Gaseous Effluents and Total Dose 4. DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 6. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control November 2016 DR 2-26 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RS1 Initiating Conditio_n: Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid COE. *operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. | |||
* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. | |||
* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+08 uCi/sec 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 100 mRem TEDE OR b. > 500 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continue for> 60 minutes. b. OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. November 2016 DR 2-27 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RS1 (cont) :easis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public. Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. The TEDE dose is set at 10% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 500 mRem thyroid COE was established in consideration of the 1 :5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid COE. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1. Basis . .. . . . .. 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS1 2. EP-AA-112-500 Emergency Environmental Monitoring 3. ODCM Section 12.4 Gaseous Effluents and Total Dose 4. | |||
* DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 6. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release .Control November 2016 DR 2-28 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA1 Initiating Condition: Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mRem TEDE or 50 mRem thyroid COE. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. | |||
* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. | |||
* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+07 uCi/sec for?. 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 10 mRem TEDE OR b. > 50 mRem COE Thyroid OR November 2016 DR 2-29 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3. (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear* RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA1 (cont) Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont): 3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary | |||
* OR a. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposure OR b. 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposure 4. Fielc! survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: ;Basis: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates > 10 mR/hr are expected to continue 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1 % of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release). Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. The TEDE dose is set at 1 % of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 50 mRem thyroid COE was established in consideration of the 1 :5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid COE. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RS1. November 2016 DR 2-30 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA1 (cont} . . ____ . 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA1 2. ODCM Section 12.3 Liquid Effluents 3. ODCM Section 12.4 Gaseous Effluents 4. DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate, From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. UNIT 2/3 DAN 2223-6 A-12 "2/3 RADWASTE DISCHARGE HIGH RADIATION" 6. UNIT 2/3 DOP 2000-110, Radioactive Waste Discharge to River With the Stream Liquid Effluent Monitor Operable 7. UNIT 2/3 DOP 2000-109, Waste Surge Tank Batching for a Radwaste River Discharge 8. Structural Drawing B-01A Composite Site Plan Dresden Station Units 1, 2 & 3 9. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 10. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control 11. EP-EAL-:-0620, Dresden Criteria for Choosing Radiological Liquid Effluent EAL Threshold Values November 2016 DR 2-31 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU1 Condition: Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer. :Operating Mode _ 1,2,3,4,5, D *Eme_rgency Action Level (EAL): Notes: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes. | |||
* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. 1. Reading on ANY of the following effluent monitors > 2 times alarm setpoint established by a current radioactive release discharge permit for 60 minutes. OR | |||
* Radwaste Effluent Monitor 2/3-2001-948 OR | |||
* Discharge Permit specified monitor 2. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.34 E+OS uCi/sec 60 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates> 2 times ODCM Limit with a release duration of 60 minutes. November 2016 DR 2-32 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU1 (cont) Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared. Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases,, and to control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment is indicative of degradation in these features and/or controls. Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant .condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. Releases should not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL. EAL #1 Basis This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas). The effluent monitors listed are those normally used for planned discharges. If a discharge is performed using a different flowpath or effluent monitor other than those listed (e.g., a portable or temporary effluent monitor), then the declaration criteria will be based on the monitor specified in the Discharge Permit. EAL#2 Basis This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous effluent pathways. EAL#3 Basis This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.). Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA 1. November 2016 DR 2-33 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU1 (cont) .Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU1 2. ODCM Section 12.3 Liquid Effluents 3. ODCM Section 12.4 Gaseous Effluents 4. DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. UNIT 2/3 DAN 2223-6 A-12 "2/3 RADWASTE DISCHARGE HIGH RADIATION" 6. UNIT 2/3 DOP.2000-110, Radioactive Waste Discharge to River With the Stream Liquid Effluent Monitor Operable 7. UNIT 2/3 DOP 2000-109, Waste Surge Tank Batching for a Radwaste River Discharge 8. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 9. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control November 2016 DR 2-34 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level {EAL): RG2 Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. 'Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel. This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment. It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG2 2. EP-EAL-1004, Criteria for Choosing Spent Fuel Pool Level 3 and Level 2 EAL Threshold Values for Dresden Station November 2016 DR 2*35 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Spent fuel pool level at 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Basis: RS2 This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. This condition entails major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration. It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or RG2. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS2 2. EP-EAL-1004, Criteria for Choosing Spent Fuel Pool Level 3 and Level 2 EAL Threshold Values for Dresden Station November 2016 DR 2-36 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
* Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS .Initiating Condition: Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Operating Mode Applicability: . 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. OR RA2 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R1 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr. OR 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10.20 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Table R1 Fuel Handli.ng Incident Radiation Monitors | |||
* Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2(4) | |||
* Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Basis: REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange. * | |||
* IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of t.ime regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment. This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment. As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1. November 2016 DR 2-37 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA2 (cont) Initiating Condition: EAL #1 Basis This EAL escalates from RU2 in that the loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports _from personnel or camera images), as well as significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters. Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations. While an area radiation monitor could detect a rise in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered. To the degree possible, readings should be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss. A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes. EAL#2 Basis This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly. Spent fuel uncovery represents a major ALARA concern in that radiation levels could exceed 10,000 R/hr on the refuel bridge when fuel uncovery begins. The value of 1000 mR/hr was conservatively chosen for classification purposes. A rise in readings on radiation monitors should be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident). EAL #3 Basis: Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thus it is also a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored in the pool. Escalation of the emergency would be based on either Recognition Category Ror C ICs. November 2016 DR 2-38 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revis_ion 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA2 (cont) _. | |||
* 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA2 2. DAN 902(3)-3 C-16(E-16) Reactor Building Fuel Pool Hi Radiation 3. DAN 902(3)-3 B-1 Refuel Floor Hi Radiation 4. DAN 902(3)-3 A-3(F-14) Reactor building Vent Hi-Hi Radiation 5. UFSAR 9.1 6. DAN 902(3)-4 D-24 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tank Level Lo 7. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation 8. DFP 0850-01 Water Level Loss in SFP or Cavity 9. DOP 1900-03 Reactor Cavity, Dryer/Separator Storage Pit and Fuel Pool Level *control 10. EP-EAL-1004, Criteria for Choosing Spent Fuel Pool Level 3 and Level 2 EAL Threshold Values for Dresden Station November 2016 DR 2-39 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL}: RU2 1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: AND | |||
* Refueling Cavity water level< 466 in. (Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrument LI 2(3)-263-114) OR | |||
* Spent Fuel Pool water level< 19 ft. above the fuel(< 33 ft. 9 in. indicated level). OR | |||
* Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitors in Table R1. November 2016 Table R1 Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitors | |||
* Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2(4) | |||
* Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor DR 2-40 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU2 (cont) Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange. This IC addresses a loss in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is also indicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. A water level loss will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation. Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available) or from any other temporarily installed monitoring instrumentation. A significant drop in the water level may also cause a rise in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations. The effects of planned evolutions should be considered. For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may rise due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level. A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA2. November 2016 | |||
* DR 2-41 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU2 (cont} Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU2 2. RP-AA-203 Exposure Control and Authorization 3. Technical Specifications 3.7.8 4. Technical Specifications 3.9.6 5. UFSAR 9.1 6. DAN 902(3)-4 D-24 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tank Level Lo 7. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation 8. DFP 0850-01 Water Level Loss in SFP or Cavity 9. DOP 1900-03 Reactor Cavity, Dryer/Separator Storage Pit and Fuel Pool Level Control 10. DGP 02-02, Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 11. DAN 902(3)-3 C-16(E-16) Reactor Building Fuel Pool Hi Radiation 12. DAN 902(3)-3 B-1 Refuel Floor Hi Radiation 13. DAN 902(3)-3 A-3(F-14) Reactor building Vent Hi-Hi Radiation November 2016 DR 2-42 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. -Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: RA3 | |||
* If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R3 was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. 1. Dose rate> 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following Table R2 areas: Table R2 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy | |||
* Main Control Room (Unit 2 ARM Station #22) | |||
* Central Alarm Station -(by survey) OR 2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to ANY of the following Table R3 plant rooms or areas: November 2016 DR 2-43 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA3 (cont) Emergency Action Level {EAL) (cont): _ Table R3 Areas with Entry Related Mode Applicability Area Unit Entry Related Mode Applicability Reactor Building 517' elevation | |||
* MCC 28-1 area | |||
* MCC 29-1 area | |||
* MCC 38-1 area | |||
* MCC 39-1 area | |||
* CRD 25 valve area 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area | |||
* Bus 24-1 area 2(3) *Bus 33-1 area | |||
* Bus 34-1 area | |||
* RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2B area Modes 3, 4, and 5 | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3B area 589' elevation | |||
* Isolation Condenser Floor Cribhouse 2&3 Turbine Building 495' elevation 2(3) | |||
* CRD Pump Area 534' elevation *Bus 23 area 2 *Bus 24 area 538' elevation *Bus 33 area 3 | |||
* Bus 34 area | |||
* Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures. As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The Emergency Director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable. Assuming all plant equipment is operating as designed, normal operation is capable fro,m the Main Control Room (MCR). The plant is also able to transition into a hot shutdown condition from the MCR, therefore November 2016 DR 2-44 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA3 (cont) Basis (cont): Table R3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that contain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operating procedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plant would not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections). Rooms and areas listed in EAL #1 do not need to be included in EAL #2, including the Control Room. For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the elevated radiation levels preclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding beyond that required by procedure, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits). An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply. | |||
* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation rise occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4. | |||
* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.). | |||
* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections). | |||
* The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, C or F ICs. November 2016 DR 2-45 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA3 (cont) Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA3 2. DOP 1800-01 Area Radiation Monitors 3. FSAR Section 3.2 Classification of Structures, Components and Systems 4. General Arrangement Drawings M-3, M-4, M-4A, M-5 and M-10 5. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control November 2016 DR 2-46 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex | |||
* Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. Offgas system radiation monitor HI-HI alarm. OR 2. Specific coolant activity> 4.0 µCi/gm Dose equivalent 1-131. Basis: RU3 This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Conditions that cause the specified monitor to alarm that are not related to fuel clad degradation should not result in the declaration of an Unusual Event. This EAL addresses site-specific radiation monitor readings that provide indication of a degradation of fuel clad integrity. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via I Cs FA 1 or the Recognition Category R ICs. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU3 2. Technical Specifications 3.4.6, RCS Specific Activity 3. DAN 902(3)-3 C-2(D-2) Off Gas Rad Monitor Hi-Hi 4. Technical Specifications 3.7.6, Main Condenser Offgas 5. DGA 16 Coolant High Activity/Fuel Element Failure November 2016 DR 2-47 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier. Operating Mode Applice1bility: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): FG1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status. Basis: Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. At the General Emergency classification level each barrier is weighted equally. ,Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-48 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two barriers. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): FS1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status. Basis: Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. At the Site Area Emergency classification level, each barrier is weighted equally. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-49 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, Emergency Action Level (EAL): FA1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status. 'Basis: Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. At the Alert classification level, Fuel Cladding and RCS barriers are weighted more heavily than the Containment barrier. Unlike the Containment barrier, loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier may result in the relocation of radioactive materials or degradation of core cooling capability. Note that the loss or potential loss of Containment barrier in combination with loss or potential loss of either Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier results in declaration of a Site Area Emergency under EAL FS1. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-50 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: ... RCS Activity Ope_rati1J9. 1, 2, 3 Product BarrierJFPB)_Ttireshold: LOSS Coolant activity > 300 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent 1-131. Basis: FC1 This threshold indicates that RCS radioactivity concentration is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this _condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is recognized that sample collection and analysis of reactor coolant with highly elevated activity levels could require several hours to complete. Nonetheless, a sample-related threshold is included as a backup to other indications. There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity. .... :.... . ............ . 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F.:.2 2. DGA-16, Coolant High Activity I Fuel Element Failure November 2016 DR 2-51 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION 'Initiating Condition: RPV Water Level Mode Applicabmty: 1, 2, 3 ,Fission Product (FPB) Threshold: LOSS 1. Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained> -143 inches {TAF) OR 3. RPV water level cannot be determined. :Basis: FC2 RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. Compensated values may be used in accordance with the Technical Support Guidelines. Loss Threshold #1 Basis The Loss threshold represents the EOP requirement for primary containment flooding. This is identified in the BWROG EPGs/SAMGs when the phrase, "Primary Containment Flooding Is Required," appears. Since a site-specific RPV water level is not specified here, the Loss threshold phrase, "Primary containment flooding required," also accommodates the EOP need to flood the primary containment 'when RPV water level cannot be determined and core damage due to inadequate core cooling is believed to be occurring. Potential Loss Threshold #2 and #3 Basis This water level corresponds to the top of the active fuel and is used in the EOPs to indicate a challenge to core cooling. The RPV water level threshold is the same as RCS Barrier RC2 Loss threshold. Thus, this threshold indicates a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and a Loss of the RCS barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specific EOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level following depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of the RCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injection sources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization. November 2016 DR 2-52 EP-AA-.1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION FC2 {cont) Basis (cont): EOPs allow the operator a wide choice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to within prescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitate RPV water level control with pressure injection sources. In some events, elevated RPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops below the shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this Fuel Clad barrier Potential Loss is met only after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or required emergency RPV depressurization has been attempted, giving the operator an opportunity to assess the capability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPV water level or 2) no low pressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPV depressurization in an attempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory. The term "cannot be restored and maintained above" means the value of RPV water level is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). The determination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relation to the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when a threshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does not require immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of active fuel, but does not permit extended operation below the limit; the threshold must be considered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot be attained. Entry into the "Steam Cooling" leg of the EOP's would be an example of an inability to "restore and maintain" level aboveTAF resulting in this threshold being met. In high-power ATWS/failure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator to deliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although such action is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need to reduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictate the need for emergency classification. Since the loss of ability to determine if adequate core cooling is being provided presents a significant challenge to the fuel clad barrier, a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier is specified. November 2016 DR 2-53 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION FC2 (cont) Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. DEOP 100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram 4. DEOP 400-1 RPV Flooding 5. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 6. Technical Support Guidelines November 2016 DR 2-54 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION .Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Radiation *operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS FC5 Drywell radiation monitor reading> 6.70 E+02 R/hr (670 R/hr). 'Basis:* The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release. of all reactor coolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. The radiation monitor reading in this threshold is higher than that specified for RCS Barrier RC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad Barrier and the RCS Barrier. Note that a combination of the two monitor readings appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. There is no Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation. Basis 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. | |||
* Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) November 2016 DR 2-55 EP-i\A-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) . | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Emergency Director Judgment. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS FC7 1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. Basis: Loss Threshold #1 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is lost. Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-56 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION .Initiating _Condition: _ RPV Water Level 'Operating Mode Applicability:_ 1, 2, 3 _Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RC2 1. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained> -143 inches (TAF) OR 2. RPV water level cannot be determined. Basis: RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. Compensated values may be used in accordance with the Technical Support Guidelines. This water level corresponds to the Top of Active Fuel (TAF) and is used in the EOPs to indicate challenge to core cooling. The RPV water level threshold is the same as Fuel Clad Barrier FC2 Potential Loss threshold. Thus, this threshold indicates a Loss of the RCS barrier and Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specific EOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level following depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of the RCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injection sources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization EOPs allow the operator a wide choice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to within prescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitate RPV water level control with low-pressure injection sources. In some events, elevated RPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops below the shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this RCS barrier Loss is met only after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or required emergency RPV depressurization has been attempted, giving the operator an opportunity to assess the capability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPV water level or 2) no low pressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPV depressurization in an attempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-57 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION RC2 (cont) Basis (cont): The term, "cannot be restored and maintained above," means the value of RPV water level is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). The determination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relation* to the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when a threshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does not require immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of active fuel, but does not permit extended operation beyond the limit; the threshold must be considered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot be attained. Entry into the "Steam Cooling" leg of the* EOP's would be an example of an inability to "restore and maintain" level above TAF resulting in this threshold being met. In high-power ATWS/tailure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator to deliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although such action is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need to reduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictate the need for emergency classification. There is no RCS Potential Loss threshold associated with RPV Water Level. Basis 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. DEOP100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 4. Technical Support Guidelines *November 2016 DR 2-58 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Pressure Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS 1. Drywell pressure >2.0 psig. AND 2. Drywell pressure rise is due to RCS leakage. Basis: RC3 The > 2.0 psig primary containment pressure is the Drywell high pressure setpoint which indicates a LOCA by automatically initiating ECCS. The second threshold condition focuses the fission product barrier loss threshold on a failure of the RCS instead of the non-LOCA malfunctions that may adversely affect primary containment pressure. Pressures of this magnitude can be caused by LOCA events such as a loss of Drywell cooling or inability to control primary containment vent/purge. There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Pressure. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.5.1-1 3. DAN 902(3)-5 D-11 4. DEOP 100 RPV Control 5. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control November 2016 DR 2-59 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: RCS Leak Rate Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RC4 1. UNISOLABLE Main Steam Line (MSL), Isolation Condenser, HPCI, Feedwater, or RWCU line break. OR 2. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required. POTENTIAL LOSS 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following: a. Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Normal operating levels. OR b. Secondary Containment area radiation level > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Normal operating level. 'Bas-is:* UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. Failure to isolate the leak, within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes, from the start of the leak requires immediate classification. Classification of a system break over system leakage is based on information available to the Control Room from the event. Indications that should be considered are: | |||
* Reports describing magnitude of steam or water release. | |||
* Use of system high flow alarms I indications, if available, | |||
* Significant changes in niakeup requirements, | |||
* Abnormal reactor water level changes in response to the event. The use of the above indications provides the Control Room the bases to determine that the on going event is more significant than the indications that would be expected from system leakage and therefore should be considered a system break. November 2016 DR 2-60 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION RC4 (cont) Basis (cont): Loss Threshold #1 Basis Large high-energy lines that rupture outside primary containment can discharge significant amounts of inventory and jeopardize the pressure-retaining capability of the RCS until they are isolated. If it is determined that the ruptured line cannot be promptly isolated, the RCS barrier Loss threshold is met. Loss Threshold #2 Basis Emergency RPV Depressurization in accordance with the EOPs is indicative of a loss of the RCS barrier. If Emergency RPV Depressurization is performed, the plant operators are directed to open Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs)/Target Rock SRV and keep them open. Even though the RCS is being vented into the Torus, a Loss of the RCS barrier exists due to the diminished effectiveness of the RCS to retain fission products within its boundary. Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis Potential loss of RCS based on primary system leakage outside the primary containment is determined from EOP temperature or radiation Max Normal Operating values in areas such as main steam line tunnel, HPCI, etc., which indicate a direct path from the RCS to areas outside primary containment. A Max Normal Operating value is the highest value of the identified parameter expected to occur during normal plant operating conditions with all directly associated support and control systems functioning properly. The indicators reaching the threshold barriers and confirmed to be caused by RCS leakage from a primary system warrant an Alert classification. A primary system is defined to be the pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPV pressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water being discharged through an unisolated break in the system. In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system is discharging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area radiation condition does not necessarily indicate that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building since this may be caused by radiation shine from nearby steam lines or the movement of radioactive materials. Conversely, a high area radiation condition in conjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, high area temperatures, reports of steam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpected Main Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building. An UNISOLABLE leak which is indicated by Max Normal Operating values escalates to a Site Area Emergency when combined with Containment Barrier CT6 Loss Threshold * #1 (after a containment isolation) and a General Emergency when the Fuel Clad Barrier criteria is also exceeded. November 2016 DR 2-61 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION RC4 (cont) Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. M-12, M-345, Main steam piping 3. Technical Specifications 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE 4. Technical Specifications Section 3.4.5, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 5. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 DRYWELL EQUIP SUMP LVL HI-HI 6. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 DRYWELL FLOOR ORN SUMP LVL HI-HI 7. DOA 0040-01 SLOW LEAK 8. DOP 2000-24 DRYWELL SUMP OPERATION 9. DEOP 300-1, Secondary Containment Control 10. UFSAR Section 5.2.5 November 2016 DR 2-62 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER .DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment radiation Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RCS Drywell radiation monitor reading > 100 R/hr (>1.00 E+02 R/hr). Basis: The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals Technical Specification allowable limits. This value is lower than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier FC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of the RCS Barrier only. There is no RCS Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. EP-EAL-0611, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation Monitor Reading Indicative of loss of the RCS Barrier. November 2016 DR 2-63 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear. RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Emergency Director Judgment. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 _Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RC7 1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCS Barrier. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. Basis: Loss Threshold #1 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is lost. Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored. 'Basis Refere_nce(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-64 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: RPV Water Level Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: POTENTIAL LOSS CT2 Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. Basis: The Potential Loss threshold is identical to the Fuel Clad Barrier RC2 Loss threshold RPV Water Level. The Potential Loss requirement for Primary Containment Flooding indicates adequate core cooling cannot be restored and maintained and that core damage is possible. BWR EPGs/SAMGs specify the conditions that require primary containment flooding. When primary containment flooding is required, the EPGs are exited and SAMGs are entered. Entry into SAMGs is a logical escalation in response to the inability to restore and maintain adequate core cooling. PRA studies indicate that the condition of this Potential Loss threshold could be a core melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to RPV failure and increased potential for primary containment failure. In conjunction with the RPV water level Loss thresholds in the Fuel Clad and RCS barrier columns, this threshold results in the declaration of a General Emergency. There is no Loss Threshold associated with this IC. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. Severe Accident Management Guidelines 3. DEOP 0100, RPV Control 4. DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding 5. DEOP 0400-05, Failure to Scram November 2016 DR 2-65 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Conditions Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Thres.hold: LOSS 1. UNPLANNED rapid drop in Drywell pressure following Drywell pressure rise. OR 2. Drywell pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions. POTENTIAL LOSS 3. Drywell 62 psig and rising. OR 4. a. Drywell or torus hydrogen concentration 6%. AND b. Drywell or torus oxygen concentration 5%. OR 5. Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig.M) exceeded. Basis: CT3 UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended e,volution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. Loss Threshold #1 and #2 Basis Rapid UNPLANNED loss of primary containment pressure (i.e., not attributable to Drywell spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure rise indicates a loss of primary containment integrity. Primary containment pressure should rise as a result of mass and energy release into the primary containment from a LOCA. Thus, primary containment pressure not increasing under these conditions indicates a loss of primary containment integrity. These thresholds rely on operator recognition of an unexpected response* for the condition and therefore a specific value is not assigned. The unexpected (UNPLANNED) response is important because it is the indicator for a containment bypass condition. A pressure suppression bypass path would not be an indication of a containment breach. | |||
* November 2016 DR 2-66 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION CT3 (cont) 'Basis (cont): Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis The threshold pressure is t.he primary containment internal design pressure. Structural acceptance testing demonstrates the capability of the primary containment to resist pressures greater than the internal design pressure. A pressure of this magnitude is greater than those expected to result from any design basis accident and, thus, represent a Potential Loss of the Containment barrier. Potential Loss Threshold #4 Basis If hydrogen concentration reaches or exceeds the lower flammability limit, as defined in plant EOPs, in an oxygen rich environment, a potentially explosive mixture exists. If the combustible mixture ignites inside the primary containment, loss of the Containment barrier could occur. Potential Loss Threshold #5 Basis The HCTL is a function of RPV pressure, Torus temperature and Torus water level. It is utilized to preclude failure of the containment and equipment in the containment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant and therefore, the inability to maintain plant parameters below the limit constitutes a potential loss of containment. ,Basis Reference._(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. UFSAR 6.2.1.3.2.1 3. UFSAR Table 6.2-3 4. UFSAR 15.6.5 5. UFSAR 6.2.1.1 6. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control 7. DEOP 200-2 Hydrogen Control November 2016 DR 2-67 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Radiation Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: POTENTIAL LOSS Drywell radiation monitor reading > 1.60 E+03 R/hr (1600 R/hr). Basis: There is no Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation. CT5 The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that 20% of the fuel cladding has failed. This level of fuel clad failure is well above that used to determine the analogous Fuel Clad Barrier Loss and RCS Barrier Loss thresholds. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, indicates the fuel clad failure must be greater than approximately 20% in order for there to be a major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions. For this condition to exist there must already have been a loss of the RCS Barrier and the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is therefore prudent to treat this condition as a potential loss of containment which would then escalate the emergency classification level to a General Emergency. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) November 2016 DR 2-68 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
------Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION lniti_ating Condition: Primary Containment Isolation Failure Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fissh:>ri Pro.duct Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS CT6 1. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primary containment isolation signal. OR 2. Intentional Primary Containment venting/purging per EOPs or SAMGs due to accident conditions. OR 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1, Maximum Safe operating levels. 'Basis: UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. Failure to isolate the leak, within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes, from the start of the leak requires immediate classification. These thresholds address incomplete containment isolation that allows an UNISOLABLE direct release to the environment. Loss Threshold #1 Basis The use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through interfacing liquid systems or minor release pathways, such as instrument lines, not protected by the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS). Leakage into a closed system is to be considered only if the closed system is breached and thereby creates a significant pathway to. the environment. Examples include unisolable Main Steamline, HPCI steamline breaks, unisolable RWCU system breaks, and unisolable containment atmosphere vent paths. Examples of "downstream pathway to the environment" could be through the Turbine/Condenser, or direct release to the Turbine or Reactor Building. The existence of a filter is not considered in the threshold assessment. Filters do not remove fission product noble gases. In addition, a filter could become ineffective due to iodine and/or particulate loading beyond design limits (i.e., retention ability has been exceeded) or water saturation from steam/high humidity in the release stream. November 2016 DR 2-69 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION CT6 (cont) . ,Basis (cont): . Following the leakage of RCS mass into primary containment and a rise in primary | |||
* containment pressure, there may be minor radiological releases associated with allowable primary containment leakage through various penetrations or system components. Minor releases may also occur if a primary containment isolation valve(s) fails to close but the primary containment atmosphere escapes to an enclosed system. These releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of primary containment but should be evaluated using the Recognition Category R ICs. Loss Threshold #2 Basis EOPs may direct primary containment isolation valve logic(s) to be intentionally bypassed, even if offsite radioactivity release rate limits will be exceeded. Under these conditions with a valid primary containment isolation signal, the containment should also be considered lost if primary containment venting is actually performed. Intentional venting of primary containment for primary containment pressure or combustible gas control to the secondary containment and/or the environment is a Loss of the Containment. Venting for primary containment pressure control when not in an accident situation (e.g., to control pressure below the Drywell high pressure scram setpoint) does not meet the threshold condition. Loss Threshold #3 Basis The Max Safe Operating Temperature is the highest value of this parameter at which neither: (1) equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant will fail, nor (2) personnel access necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant will be precluded. EOPs utilize these temperatures to establish conditions under which RPV depressurization is required. The temperatures should be confirmed to be caused by RCS leakage from a primary system. A primary system is defined to be the pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPV pressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water being discharged through an unisolated break in the system. In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system is discharging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area temperature condition in conjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, reports of steam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpected Main Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building. In combination with RCS Barrier RC4 Potential Loss Threshold #3 this threshold would result in a Site Area Emergency. There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Isolation Failure. November 2016 DR 2-70 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control 3. DEOP 200-2 Hydrogen Control 4. DEOP 500-4 Containment Venting 5. DEOP 300-1 Secondary Containment Control November 2016 DR 2-71 CT6 (cont) EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Emergency Director Judgment. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS CT7 1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Containment Barrier. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier. Basis: Loss Threshold #1 Basis: This threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment Barrier is lost. Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis: This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-72 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG1 Prolonged loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC power to emergency buses. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. EITHER of the following: a. Restoration of at least one unit ECCS bus in < 4 hours is not likely. OR b. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained: (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A prolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of any fission product barriers. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions. RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. The EAL should require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting the thresholds for IC FG1. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsite protective actions. November 2016 DR 2-73 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG1 (cont) Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it is projected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the end of the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses and event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihood of challenges to multiple fission product barriers. The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation. Mitigation actions with a low probability of success should not be used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize the time available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public. The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC power results in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat from the core. Basis Refererice(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG1 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138-kV System and 345-kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4-KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator . Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4-KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power 10. DEOP 100 RPV Control 11. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines November 2016 DR 2-74 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MS1 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. :Operating M()de 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC Power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Failure to restore power to at least one ECCS bus in < 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. :Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions. This IC represents a condition that involves actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RG1, FG1, MG1, or MG2. November 2016 DR 2-75 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS1 2. UFSAR 8.3 RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MS1 (cont) 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138-kV System and 345-kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-76 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex ln.itiating RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA1 Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAi:.): Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded; or will likely be exceeded. 1. AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only one of the following power sources 15 minutes. | |||
* Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32) | |||
* Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31) | |||
* Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3) | |||
* Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3 | |||
* Unit crosstie breakers AND 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. ;Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. This IC provides an escalation path from IC MU1. An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition are presented below. | |||
* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator). November 2016 DR 2-77 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Bc:tsis (cont): | |||
* RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA1 (cont) | |||
* A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being fed from the unit main generator. | |||
* A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being fed from an offsite power source. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MS1. 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA1 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 KV System and 345 KV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 Station Blackout System 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-78 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex* . Exelon Nuclear Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS MU1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating APPU<:ability: _ 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAi:-): Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to unit ECCS buses 15 minutes. Ba$is: This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sources renders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency buses. This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant. For emergency classification purposes, "capability" means that an offsite AC power source(s) is available to the emergency buses, whether or not the buses are powered from it. (e.g. unit cross-tie breakers) Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of offsite power. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MA 1. 'Basis _Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU1 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 kV System and 345 kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4kV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4kV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-79 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG2 Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. ;Qperatir{g *" 1, 2, 3 Emergency Acti()n Level (EAL):. * | |||
* Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Voltage is < 105 VDC on 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3. AND 4. ALL AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost 15 minutes. 'Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and Vital DC power. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss of Vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. A sustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fission product barriers. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when all EAL conditions are met. '-November 2016 DR 2-80 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SGS 2. UFSAR 8.3 RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG2 (cont) 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138-kV System and 345-kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power 10. UFSAR 8.3.2 11. DOA 6900-02(3) Failure of Unit 2(3) 125 VDC Power Supply 12. Technical Specification 8.3.8.4, DC Power Sources -Operating November 2016 DR 2-81 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: MS2 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is< 105 VDC on 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3 15 minutes. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this condition involves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via I Cs RG1, FG1 or MG2. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SSS 2. UFSAR 8.3.2 3. DOA 6900-02(3) Failure of Unit 2(3) 125 VDC Power Supply 4. Technical Specification B.3.8.4, DC Power Sources -Operating November 2016 DR 2-82 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MS3 Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or RCS heat removal. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2 Emergency Action Level (EAL}: 1. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND 2. ALL manual I ARI actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND 3. EITHER of the following conditions exist: | |||
* RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained : (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches OR | |||
* Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig. M) exceeded. Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, all subsequent operator manual actions, both inside and outside the Control Room including driving in control rods and boron injection, are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition will lead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and thus warrants the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may be higher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptoms against the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs. This is appropriate in that the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by a failure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timely declaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown the reactor. A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria. RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or FG1. November 2016 DR 2-83 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS5 2. DEOP 100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram 4. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control 5. Technical Support Guidelines November 2016 DR 2-84 Exelon Nuclear MS3 {cont) EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA3 Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. Oper_ating Mode 1, 2 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. 1. Automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND 2. Manual I ARI actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 6%. Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful. This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor is subsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor control consoles since this event entails a significant failure of the RPS. A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor scram. This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operators would immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the reactor control consoles (e.g., locally opening breakers). Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are not considered to be "at the reactor consoles". Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scram action. November 2016 DR 2-85 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA3 (cont} The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolonged enough to cause a challenge to the RPV water level or RCS heat removal safety functions, the emergency classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency via IC MS3. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possible via IC FS1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC MS3 or FS1, an Alert declaration is appropriate for this event. It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declaration in accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL are included to ensure a timely emergency declaration. A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria. :Basis 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA5 2. DEOP 100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram 4. . DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control November 2016 DR 2-86 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
------Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor. :operating-Mode | |||
* 1, 2 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: Exelon Nuclear MU3 | |||
* A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. 1. a. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power >6%. AND b. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power :5, 6%. OR 2. a. Manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power >6%. AND b. EITHER of the following: Basi$: 1. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by ReactorPower :5. 6%. . OR 2. Subsequent automatic scram I ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power :5, 6%. This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operator manual action taken at the reactor control consoles or an automatic scram is successful in shutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition and thus represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. November 2016 DR 2-87 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): EAL #1 Basis RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU3 (cont) Following the failure on an automatic reactor scram, operators will promptly initiate manual actions at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor scram). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems. EAL#2 Basis If an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manual action at another location(s) on the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor scram I ARI using a different switch). Depending upon several factors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually scram the reactor, or a concurrent plant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor scram signal. If a subsequent manual or automatic scram I ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems. A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor scram). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are not considered to be "at the reactor consoles". Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scram action. The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then the emergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC MA3. Depending upon the plant response, escalation is also possible via IC FA 1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC MA3 or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate for this event. A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria. November 2016 DR 2-88 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU3 (cont) Should a reactor scram signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpoint testing), the following classification guidance should be applied. | |||
* If the signal generated as a result of plant work causes a plant transient that creates a real condition that should have included an automatic reactor scram and the RPS fails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable, and should be evaluated. | |||
* If the signal generated as a result of plant work does not cause a plant transient but should have generated an RPS scram signal and the scram failure is determined through other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALs are not applicable and no classification is warranted. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU5 2. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.1.1-1 3. DEOP 100 RPV Control 4. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram November 2016 DR 2-89 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear _Initiating RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. ,Operating AppliC:_CllJility: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: MA4 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room for?. 15 minutes. Table M1 Control Room Parameters | |||
* Reactor Power | |||
* RPV Water Level | |||
* RPV Pressure | |||
* Primary Containment Pressure | |||
* Torus Level | |||
* Torus Temperature AND 2. ANY Table M2 transient in progress. Table M2 Significant Transients | |||
* Turbine Trip | |||
* Reactor Scram | |||
* ECCS Activation | |||
* Recirc. Runback > 25% Reactor Power Change | |||
* Thermal Power oscillations > 10% Reactor Power Change November 2016 DR 2-90 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA4 (cont) UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fission product barrier challenge is reduced. It thus represents a potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for any of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, computer point, digital and recorder source within the Control Room. An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making. This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, RPV water level and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if all indication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for RPV water level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via I Cs FS 1 or IC RS 1 . . Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev6, SA2 November 2016 DR 2-91 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex lriitiating Condition_: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: Exelon Nuclear MU4 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room 15 minutes. Table M1 Control Room Parameters | |||
* Reactor Power | |||
* RPV Water Level | |||
* RPV Pressure | |||
* Primary Containment Pressure | |||
* Torus Level | |||
* Torus Temperature Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. November 2016 DR 2-92 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU4 (cont) As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for any of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room. An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported* if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making. This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if all indication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MA4. Reference(s):. 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2 November 2016 DR 2-93 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MAS Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. 'Operating Mode Applic_ability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* If it is determined that the conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: | |||
* Seismic event (earthquake) * * * * | |||
* AND Internal or external flooding event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager 2. EITHER of the following: a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. OR b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. is: FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. November 2016 DR 2-94 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3. (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MAS (cont) EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure. This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, required for the current operating mode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electrical isolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitute degraded performance and is classified under HU6. EAL #2.a Basis This EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train. EAL #2.b Basis This EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not in operation or readily apparent through indications alone, as well as damage to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the totality . of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FS 1 or RS 1. If the EAL conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. November 2016 DR 2-95 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 SA9 November 2016 RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS DR 2-96 Exelon Nuclear MAS (cont) EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating C_c;>_ndition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. :Operating l\'lode Applicability:_ 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: Exelon Nuclear MU6 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage in the Drywell > 10 gpm for 15 minutes. OR 2. RCS identified leakage in the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes. OR 3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes. 'Basis: UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. Failure to isolate the leak, within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes, from the start of the leak requires immediate classification. This IC addresses RCS leakage which may be a precursor to a more significant event. In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicable procedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. EAL #1 and EAL #2 Basis These EALs are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage", "pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are defined in the plant Technical Specifications). EAL#3 Basis This EAL addresses an RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through an interfacing system. | |||
* These EALs thus apply to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system or a location outside of containment. November 2016 DR 2-97 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MUG (cont) The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observable with normal Control Room indications. Lesser values typically require time-consuming calculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation). EAL #1 uses a lower value that reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of any relief valve does not warrant an emergency classification. A stuck-open Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV)/Target Rock SRV or ERV/ Target Rock SRV leakage is not considered either identified or unidentified leakage by Technical Specifications and, therefore, is not applicable to this EAL. The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to isolate the leakage, if possible. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs of Recognition Category R or F. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU4 2. Technical Specification 3.4.4, RCS Operational Leakage 3. UFSAR 5.2.5, Detection of Leakage through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 4. Technical Specifications 3.4.5 5. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 6. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 7. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 9. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation 10. DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill November 2016 DR 2-98 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications capabilities. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3 Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Exelon Nuclear MU7 1. Loss of ALL Table M3 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. OR 2. Loss of ALL Table M3 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications. OR 3. Loss of ALL Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications. Table M3 Communications Capability System On site Off site NRC Plant Radio x Plant Page x All telephone Lines (Commercial and microwave) x x x ENS x x HPN x x Satellite Phones x x Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC. This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.). November 2016 DR 2-99 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): EAL #1 Basis RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU7*(cont) Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations. EAL#2 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MW-114-100-F-01, Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Form. EAL #3 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRG of an emergency declaration. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU6 2. EP-MW-124-1001 Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests 3. UFSAR 9.5.2 4. DOA 0010-14 Loss of Off-Site Telephone Communication Systems November 2016 DR 2-100 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA1 Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Failure to restore power to at least one unit ECCS bus in< 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1. November 2016 DR 2-101 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA1 (cont} Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA2 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 KV System and 345 KV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Par1;ial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-102 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU1 Initiating Condition: Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating _Appltcability: 4,5,D Emergency Action Leve-I (EAL): Note: | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only one of the following power sources 15 minutes. | |||
* Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32) | |||
* Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31) | |||
* Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3) | |||
* Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3 | |||
* Unit crosstie breakers AND 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. November 2016 DR 2-103 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU1 (cont) *easis (cont): When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition are presented below. | |||
* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator). | |||
* A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from the unit main generator. | |||
* A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power. The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA 1. Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01Rev6 CU2 . 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 KV System and 345 KV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 Station Blackout System 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-104 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA2 Initiating Condition: Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. Operating Mode A,pplicability: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* If it is determined that the conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: AND | |||
* Seismic event (earthquake) * * * * | |||
* Internal or external flooding event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager 2. EITHER of the following: ;Basis: a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. OR b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. November 2016 DR 2-105 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA2 (cont) Basis (cont): EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure. This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode, "needed", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electrical isolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitute degraded performance and is classified under HU6. EAL#2.a Basis Addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is "needed", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train. EAL #2.b Basis Addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is "needed", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not in operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the totality of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1. If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. November 2016 DR 2-106 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 1. NEI 99:.01 Rev 6, CA6 November 2016 DR 2-107 CA2 (cont} EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Operating M()de Applicabilify: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: CU3 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is < 105 VDC on required 125 VDC battery busses #2 and #3 15 minutes. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions rise the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. As used in this EAL, * "required" means the Vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment. For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train Bis in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA6 or CA5, or an IC in Recognition Category R. November 2016 DR 2-108 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU3 (cont} Basis Reference( s ): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU4 2. UFSAR 8.3.2.2.1 Safety Related 125-V System 3. DOA 6900-02(3) Failure of Unit 2(3) 125 VDC Power Supply 4. Technical Specification Basis B.3.8.5, DC Power Sources -Shutdown 5. Technical Specification Basis B.3.8.4, DC Power Sources -Operating November 2016 DR 2-109 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. ,Operating Mode 4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): CU4 1. Loss of ALL Table C1 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. OR 2. Loss of ALL Table C1 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications. OR 3. Loss of ALL Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications. Table C1 Communications Capability System On site Off site NRC Plant Radio x Plant Page x All telephone Lines (Commercial and microwave) x x x ENS x x HPN x x Satellite Phones x x Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC. This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.). EAL#1 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations. November 2016 DR 2-110 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU4 (cont) Basis (cont): EAL#2 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MW-114-100-F-01, Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Form. EAL#3 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU5 2. EP-MW-124-1001 Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests 3. UFSAR 9.5.2 4. DOA 0010-14 Loss of Off-Site Telephone Communication Systems November 2016 DR2-111 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Operating Mode Applicability: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Note: CAS | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when heat removal function is available does not warrant classification. 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F for> Table C2 duration. Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds RCS Containment Closure Heat-up Status Status Duration Intact Not Applicable 60 minutes* Not Intact Established 20 minutes* Not Established 0 minutes | |||
* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, then EAL #1 is not applicable. OR 2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise> 10 psig as a result of temperature rise. Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. November 2016 DR 2-112 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA5 (cont) Basis (cont): CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the Cold Shutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.). This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses a rise in RCS temperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact. The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature rise. The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses a rise in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address the temperature rise without a substantial degradation in plant safety. Finally, in the case where there is a rise in RCS temperature, the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0 minutes). This is because 1) the evaporated reactor coolant may be released directly into the Containment atmosphere and subsequently to the environment, and 2) there is reduced reactor coolant inventory above the top of irradiated fuel. EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1. November 2016 DR2-113 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CAS (cont} Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA3 2. Technical Specifications 3.6.1.1 3. Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 4. OU-AA-103 Shutdown Safety Management Program 5. DGP 02-01 Unit Shutdown 6. DOA 0201-04 Loss of Vessel Flange, Shell, or Recirculation (Recirc) Loop Temperature Recorders During Heatup or Cooldown 7. DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 8. DIS 0263-19 Reactor Wide Range Pressure Transmitter Calibration Eq. Maintenance Inspection November 2016 DR 2-114 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature :operating Mode Applica_bility: 4,5 Emergency Action Level Note: CU5 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when heat removal function is available does not warrant classification. 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F. OR 2. Loss of the following 15 minutes. Basis: | |||
* ALL RCS temperature indications AND | |||
* ALL RPV water level indications UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. This IC addresses an UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established during this event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA5. RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the Cold Shutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.). November 2016 DR 2-115 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS *easis (cont): CU5 (cont) A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid rise in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown. EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA6 based on an inventory loss or IC CA5 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria. [Ba_sis Re_ference(s): _ 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU3 2. . Technical Specifications Table 1.1-1 3. DGP 02-01 UNIT SHUTDOWN 4. DOA 0201-04, Loss of Vessel Flange, Shell, or Recirculation (Recirc) Loop Temperature Recorders During Heatup or Cooldown 5. | |||
* DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 6. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 7. DEOP 100 RPV Control, Table A -s. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation November 2016 DR 2-116 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged. Applicability: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): -Note: CG6 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. a. RPV water level< -143 inches (TAF) 30 minutes. AND b. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) OR 2. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored 30 minutes. AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: | |||
* Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. OR | |||
* Refuel Floor Hi Range ARM >3000 mR/hr. AND c. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage | |||
* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED Torus level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise | |||
* Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-117 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CG6 (cont) .Emergency Action.Level (EAL) .(cont): Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications | |||
* Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration 6% and Oxygen 5% | |||
* UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure | |||
* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established* | |||
* ANY Secondary Containment radiation monitor > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Safe operating level. *if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncovery time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required. :Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required. November 2016 DR 2-118 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CG6 (cont) ,Basis (cont): The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity. In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas rnonitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment is challenged. EAL#1 Basis The 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring. The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. November 2016 DR 2-119 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 'sa.s!s. Reference(s): . CG6 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CG1 2. DEOP 0100-00 RPV Control 3. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.2 4. DOS 0700-01 SRM Functional Test 5. DAN 902(3)-5 E-4 SRM Short Period 6. DEOP 0200-01 Primary Containment Control 7. DEOP 0200-02 Hydrogen Control 8. DEOP 0300-01 Secondary Containment Control 9. USAR Table 6.2-1 10. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating Core Uncovery During Refueling November 2016 DR 2-120 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability. Mode Applicability: 4,5 Emergency Actio11 Level (EAi:-): Note: CS6 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV water level < -60 inches OR 2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV water level < -143 inches (TAF) OR 3. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored 30 minutes AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: | |||
* Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. OR | |||
* Refueling Floor Hi Range ARM >3000 mR/hr. Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage | |||
* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED Torus level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise | |||
* Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-121 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CS6 {cont) Basis: CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration. Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable. Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying CONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs 1 and 2 reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment. In EAL #3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring. The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. November 2016 DR 2-122 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CS6 (cont) Basis (cont): These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG6 or RG1. ,Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS1 2. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.5.1 1 3. UFSAR 5.2.5 4. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 5. DEOP 0100-00 RPV Control 6. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 7. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 9. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 10. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation 11. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.2 12 DOS 0700-01 SRM Functional Test 13. DAN 902(3)-5 E-4 SRM Short Period 14. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating Core Uncovery During Refueling November 2016 DR 2-123 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Loss of RPV inventory. fQRerati':lg,M(>de , 4,5 Note: CA6 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < -54 inches. OR 2. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored 15 minutes. AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications. Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage | |||
* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED Torus level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise | |||
* Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss bf RPV inventory. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety. November 2016 DR 2-124 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 * (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA6 (cont) Basis (cont): EAL #1 Basis A lowering of water level below -54.15 inches indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will rise as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing drop in water level will lead to core uncovery. Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a Residual Heat Removal suction point). A rise in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA5. EAL#2 Basis The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CS6 If the RPV water level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency would be via IC CS6. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEl99-01 Rev 6, CA1 2. USAR 5.2.5, Detection of Leakage through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 3. Technical Specification 3.3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 4. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 5. DEOP 100 RPV Control 6. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 7. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 9. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 10. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation November 2016 DR 2-125 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS tnitiating C_ondition: _ UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. :pperating 4,5 ErnEu*geiic::y {EAL): Note: CU6 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintain RPV water level above the procedurally established lower limit 15 minutes. OR 2. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications. Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage | |||
* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED Torus level rise* | |||
* UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise | |||
* Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is to a loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-126 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU6 (cont) Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPV water level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band established above the procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedural limit, but it is the procedurally established lower limit. Refueling evolutions that lower RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered. EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required RPV water level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document. The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level. EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine RPV water level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either IC CA6 or CA5. November 2016 DR 2-127 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
--------------Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU6 (cont) Reference(s): _ 1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 tu1 2. USAR 5.2.5, Detection of Leakage through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 3. Technical Specifications 3.4.4 4. Technical Specifications 3.4.5 5. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 6. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 7. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 9. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation 10. DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 11. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 12. DEOP 0100-00 RPV Control, Table A 13. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation 14. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.5.1 1 November 2016 DR 2-128 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating <:ondition: HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. ,Operating" Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D 'E_mergency Action Level (EAL): HG1 1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA. AND 2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be controlled or maintained. OR b. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT Table H1 Safety Functions | |||
* Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) | |||
* RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core) | |||
* RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink) :sasis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. November 2016 DR 2-129 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
------------------------------------Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HG1 Basis (c;:ont): IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control of the facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessary to maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to a loss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to 1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls, etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot be maintained. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. Basis 1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG1 2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C November 2016 DR 2-130 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: . HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. Operating Mode_ Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): HS1 A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA. Basis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility for damage to plant equipment. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. November 2016 DR 2-131 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HS1 (cont) Basis (cont): Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness by the plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize ORO . resources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actions in the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions. This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTED AREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should be assessed using IC HA 1. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HG1. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS1 2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C November 2016 DR 2-132 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA1 Initiating Con_diti()r1: . HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. ()perating 1,2,3,4,5,D 'Emergen,cy Actioh,,Level 1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat< 30 minutes from the site. OR 2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA. Basis:* HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air; land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station and owned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for official | |||
* business. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. November 2016 DR 2-133 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA1 (cont) 'Basis This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to the PROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraft .impact. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness by the plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness of Offsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actioris. This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience, *or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees; etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71or10 CFR § 50.72. EAL #1 Basis Addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipated arrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-related notifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in a heightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information has been validated in accordance with DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion. EAL#2 Basis Is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI that is located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC. November 2016 DR 2-134 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA1 (cont) 'Basis (cont): In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site would clarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs, should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HA 1 2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C 3. DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion November 2016 DR 2-135 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY lnmating Condition: ... Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Mode Applic;:C1biljty: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL.): HU1 1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities. OR 2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. OR 3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION. Basis: SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are | |||
* typically systems classified as safety-related. HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. November 2016 DR 2-136 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU1 (cont) Basis (cont): This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEM equipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety. Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plant personnel and OROs. Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. EAL #1 Basis Addresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat is assessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132. EAL#2 Basis Addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORAD through the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion EAL#3 Basis References Security Force because these are the individuals trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occwred. Training on security event confirmation and classification is controlled due to the nature of Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39 information. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HA 1. 1Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HU1 2. SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities 3. Station Security Plan -Appendix C 4. NRC Safeguards Advisory 10/6/01 5. Letter from Mr. B. A. Boger (NRC) to Ms. Lynette Hendricks (NEI) dated 2/4/02 6. DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion November 2016 DR 2-137 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: HS2 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to alternate locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation. AND 2. Control of ANY Table H1 key safety function is not reestablished in< 30 minutes. Table H1 Safety Functions | |||
* Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) | |||
* RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core) | |||
* RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink) Basis: The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either: a. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control Room OR b. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room. This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety function following a transfer of plant control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge to any fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time. November 2016 DR 2-138 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HS2 (cont} (cont): The determination of whether or not "control" is established at the remote safe shutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The Emergency Director is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within 30 minutes whether or not the operating staff has control of key safety functions from the remote safe shutdown location(s). Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG6. 'Basi_!; Reference(s): _ 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS6 2. DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation November 2016 DR 2-139 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA2 Initiating Condition: Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations. Operating Mode Applicab!lity:" 1,2,3,4,5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL): A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to alternate locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation. Basis: This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to control the plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradation in the level of plant safety. Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternate shutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the Control Room, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the Control Room, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel. Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding to these challenges. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS2. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA6 2. DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation November 2016 DR 2-140 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action_ Level (EAL): Note: HU3 | |||
* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. | |||
* Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 1. A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not extinguished in< 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications: | |||
* Report from the field (i.e., visual observation) | |||
* Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications | |||
* Field verification of a single fire alarm Table H2 Vital Areas | |||
* Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt) | |||
* Aux Electric Room | |||
* Control Room | |||
* Unit and Shared Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms | |||
* 4KV EGGS Switchgear Area (includes Bus 23, 24, 33 and 34 only) | |||
* CRD & CCSW Pump Rooms | |||
* Turbine Building Cable Tunnel | |||
* Turbine Building Safe Shutdown Areas as follows: | |||
* B-Train Control Room HVAC Room | |||
* Battery Rooms and DC Distribution Areas 1) U2 Battery Room (includes DC switchgear, 125V, and 250V battery rooms) 2) U3 Battery Room, Battery Cage area, and U3 Battery Charger Room(all on U3 TB 538) | |||
* Crib House OR 2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE). AND b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in< 30 minutes of alarm receipt. OR November 2016 DR 2-141 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU3 (cont) _Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont): 3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in< 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. OR 4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. 'Basis: FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. EAL #1 Basis The intent of the 15-m.inute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate against small FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). In addition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure, automatic activation of a suppression system, etc. Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial fire alarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declaration clock starts at the time that initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire duration clock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report. EAL#2 Basis This EAL addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is not verified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EAL assessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm was received, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed. November 2016 DR 2-142 EP-M-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU3 (cont) Basis (cont): A single fire a_larm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipment failure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional time is allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonable amount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, and absent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress. If an actual FIRE is verified by a report. from the field, then EAL #1 is immediately applicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within 15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to an equipment failure or a spurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutes of the receipt of the alarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergency declaration is warranted. EAL#3 Basis In addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degrade the level of plant safety EAL #4 Basis If a FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require a response by an offsite firefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then the level of plant safety is potentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Declaration is not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions. ISFSI is not specifically addressed in EAL #3 and #4 since it is within the plant PROTECTED AREA. Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix R Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part: Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. "When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boil-off. . November 2016 DR 2-143 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU3 (cont) !Basis_ (cont): Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under post-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents. In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of 1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify a single alarm is well within this. worst-case 1-hour time period. Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS. 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU4 2. UFSAR 3.2, Classification of Structures, Components, and.Systems 3. UFSAR 3.5.3 4. General Arrangement Drawings M-3, M-4, M-4A, M-5 andM-10 November 2016 DR 2-144 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY lnitia_ting Conditiol"!: . _ Seismic event greater than QBE levels. 1,2,3,4,5,D ,_Emergency Actiol"! (EAL): . Note: HU4 | |||
* Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 | |||
* For emergency classification if EAL 2 is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is confirmed in manner deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in 15 mins of the event. Seismic event as indicated by: 1 . Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event. AND 2. ANY one of the following confirmed 15 mins of the event: | |||
* The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) and occurred 3.5 miles of the plant. | |||
* The earthquake was magnitude 6.0 *The earthquake was 5.0 and 125 miles of the plant. . * -** *** *"-. '" ;_ ;-.,.. -. Th is IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greater than those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)1. An earthquake greater than an QBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)2 should have no significant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however, some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-event condition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Given the time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand any impacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. 1 An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the will remain functional. | |||
* An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related) structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional. November 2016 DR 2-145 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) -------J Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU4 (cont) Bas!s __ Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following an QBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel and recognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g). EAL #2 and the accompanying note is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrations caused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager or Emergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call to USGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude a timely emergency declaration. This EAL wording recognizes that it may cause the site to declare an Unusual Event while another site similarly affected but with readily available QBE indications in the Control Room, may not. Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5. _Basis Reference(s}: 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU2 2. DOA 0010-03, Earthquakes 3. US NRC Reg. Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Earthquake Actions. November 2016 DR 2-146 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HAS Initiating Condition: Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. 3,4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: | |||
* If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. 1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in a Table H3 area. AND 2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded November 2016 Table H3 Areas with Entry Related Mode Applicability Area Reactor Building 517' elevation | |||
* MCC 28-1 area | |||
* MCC 29-1 area | |||
* MCC 38-1 area | |||
* MCC 39-1 area | |||
* CRD 25 valve area 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area | |||
* Bus 24-1 area | |||
* Bus 33-1 area | |||
* Bus 34-1 area | |||
* RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 2B area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3A area | |||
* 250VDC MCC 3B area 589' elevation | |||
* Isolation Condenser Floor Cribhouse Turbine Building 495' elevation | |||
* CRD Pump Area 534' elevation *Bus 23 area *Bus 24 area 538' elevation *Bus 33 area *Bus 34 area Unit 2(3) 2&3 2(3) 2 3 DR 2-147 Entry Related Mode Applicability Modes 3, 4, and 5 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HAS (cont) Basis: This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes or impedes access to equipment necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures. This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Assuming all plant equipment is operating as designed, normal operation is capable from the Main Control Room (MCR). The plant is also able to transition into a hot shutdown condition from the MCR, therefore Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that contain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operating procedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plant would not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections). This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/design features are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of a hazardous gas. An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required* during the plant operating mode in effect and the gaseous release preclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the release. Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires the Emergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area is sufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. This judgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis, report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operating experience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is not routinely employed). An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply. | |||
* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseous release occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4. . November 2016 DR 2-148 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HAS (cont) Basis (cont): | |||
* The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppression system testing). | |||
* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections). | |||
* The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action. An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death. This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke, that automatically or manually activate a fire suppression system in an area, or to intentional inerting of containment. The Operating Mode Applicability of this EAL has been revised from All Modes to modes 3, 4, and 5 due to the mode applicability of the areas of concern in Table H-3. In the future should the areas of concern in Table H-3 be revised then the Operating Mode Applicability of this EAL should be reevaluated. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, C or F ICs. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA5 2. UFSAR 3.5.3 3. UFSAR 3.2 4. General Arrangement Drawings M-3, M-4, M-4A, M-5 and M-10 November 2016 DR 2-149 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: Hazardous Event ;pperating Mode Applica_bility: 1,2,3,4,5,D Action LevelJEAL): Note: HU6 | |||
* EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents. | |||
* Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. OR 2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. OR 3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release). OR 4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. OR 5. Abnormal River level, as indicated by EITHER: a. High river level > 509 ft. OR b. Low river level <501 ft. 6 inches. :Basis: PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. November 2016 DR 2-150 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Basis (cont): HUG .(cont) This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. EAL #1 Basis Addresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area. EAL#2 Basis Addresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating power to a SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns. Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automatic isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker or relay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must be required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. EAL#3 Basis Addresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and of sufficient magnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA. EAL#4 Basis Addresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movement and significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personal vehicles .. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavy rains, up-river water releases, dam failure, etc., or an on-site train derailment blocking the access road. This EAL is not intended apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as the Hurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the Cooper Station during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in 2011. November 2016 DR 2-151 EP-M-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU6 (cont) Basis (cont): EAL #5 Basis: The possible maximum flood (PMF) produces a peak flood to 528 ft el. This is significantly above the grade elevation (517 ft) and the high river water level threshold, which is the lowest opening leading to safety-related equipment (509 ft el.). When this level is reached, the reactors are shutdown, the drywells are deinerted, and the vessels are flooded and cooled to cold shutdown conditions as quickly as possible. If the water level reaches 513 ft el., reactor cooldown is transferred to the Isolation Condensers, which thereafter maintain a safe shutdown condition until the flood waters recede and plant startup can be initiated. Minimum river water levels to assure pump suction are: | |||
* Circulating Water Pumps: 490 ft el. | |||
* Service Water Pumps: 494 ft el. | |||
* CCSW Pumps: 501 ft 6 in. | |||
* Unit 2/3 Fire Pump: 498 ft 6 in. The low river water level threshold (501 ft. 6 in.) is based on the most limiting pump suction requirement (CCSW). Escalation of the emergency classification level would -be based on I Cs in Recognition Categories R, F, M, Hor C. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU3 2. DOA 0010-01 Dresden Lock and Dam Failure 3. DOA 0010-04 Floods 4. DOA 0010-02 Tornado Warning/Severe Winds 5. DOA-0010-12, Toxic Gas/Chemical Release from Nearby Chemical Facilities November 2016 DR 2-152 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HG7 Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. qperating Mode 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. Basis: IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a General Emergency. Basis Reference(s}: 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG? November 2016 DR 2-153 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HS7 Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration bf a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Mode, 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. :Basis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a_ NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause. concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a Site Area Emergency. 1. NEI 99-01, Rev6 HS? November 2016 DR 2-154 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA7 Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. Basis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used.to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an Alert. Bas,is Reference(s,): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA? November 2016 DR 2-155 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU7 lnitiati11g Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT. Opere1ting Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action_ Level (EAL}: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. '.Basis: This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an UNUSUAL EVENT. iBasis 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU? November 2016 DR 2-156 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex .lr:titleiting RECOGNITION CATEGORY ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. __ _ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emf3rgency Action-Level (EAL):* Exelon Nuclear E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading: 1. EAST HI-STAR: * > 160 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR * > 250 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR 2. EAST HI-STORM: * > 20 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR * >100 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR * > 90 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts of the Overpack OR 3. WEST HI-STORM: * > 40 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR * >220 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack, excluding inlet and outlet ducts. Basis: CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment. INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. November 2016 DR 2-157 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) | |||
Dresden Annex (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear E-HU1 (cont) This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The word cask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for dry storage of fuel. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment, degradation of any fuel assemblies due to environmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage. The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The technical specification multiple of "2 times", which is also used in Recognition Category RIC RU1, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the "on-contact" dose rate limit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate at some distance from the cask. Security-related events for ISFSls are covered under ICs HU1 and HA1 . . Basis Reference(sj: 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU1 2. Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 Appendix A, Section 5.7 (WEST HI-STORM) 3. Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 Appendix A, Section 3.2.3 (EAST HI-STORM) 4. Certificate of Compliance No. 1008 Appendix A, Amendment 2, Section 2.2.1 (EAST HI-STAR) November 2016 DR 2-158 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3. (Revision 5) | |||
ATTACHMENT 3 Emergency Plan Addendum Revision EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates" | |||
,,,,,,_,. . ..--Exelon Generation EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2 Revision 1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates KLD TR-823 ENGINEERING, P.C. Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant *-¢-' . Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF 0 ERPA \....-:.. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings February 24, 2016 )\ Development of Evacuation Time Estimates 26 / I I 0.t*:l/l9/lOU Work performed for Exelon Generation1 by: KLD Engineering, P.C. 1601 Veterans Memorial Highway, Suite 340 Islandia, NY 11749 mailto:kweinisch@kldcompanies.com Final Report r 10 KLDTR-823 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1-1 1.1 Overview of the ETE Process ...................................................................................................... 1-2 1.2 The Locations of Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick ....................................................... 1-4 1.3 Preliminary Activities .................................................................................................................. 1-6 1.4 Comparison with Prior ETE Study ............................................................................................ 1-10 2 STUDY ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................. 2-1 2.1 Data Estimates ............................................................................................................................ 2-1 2.2 Study Methodological Assumptions .......................................................................................... 2-2 2.3 Study Assumptions ..................................................................................................................... 2-5 3 DEMAND ESTIMATION ....................................................................................................................... 3-1 3.1 Permanent Residents ................................................................................................................. 3-3 3.1.1 SUNY Os\l\,/ego ..................................................................................................................... 3-5 3.1.2 Day Camp -Ontario Bible Conference .............................................................................. 3-5 3.1.3 Special Facilities ........ , ........................................................................................................ 3-5 3.2 Shadow Population .................................................................................................................. 3-12 3.3 Transient Population .. .' ................................................ : ............................................................ 3-15 3.4 Employees ................................................................................................................................ 3-19 3.5 | |||
* Special Facilities ....................................................................................................................... 3-23 3.6 Total Demand in Addition to Permanent Population .............................................................. 3-23 3.7 Special Event ............................................................................................................................ 3-24 3.8 . Summary of Demand ............................................................................................................... 3-24 4 ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY ................................................................................................. 4-1 4.1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections .............................................................. 4-2 4.2 Capacity Estimation along Sections of Highway ........................................................................ 4-4 4.3 Application to the NMP/JAF Study Area ....................... -............................................................. 4-6 4.3.1 Two-Lane Roads ................................................................................................................. 4-6 4.3.2 Multi-Lane Highway ...................................... : .................................................................... 4-6 4.3.3 Freeways .......................................................................................................................... 4-7 4.3.4 Intersections ...................................................................................................................... 4-8 4.4 Simulation and Capacity Estimation .......................................................................................... 4-8 5 ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME .......................................................................................... 5-1 5.1 Background ................................................................................................................................ 5-1 5.2 Fundamental Considerations ..................................................................................................... 5-3 5.3 Estimated Time Distributions of Activities Preceding Event 5 ................................................... 5-6 5.4 Calculation of Trip Generation Time Distribution .................................................................... 5-12 5.4.1 Statistical Outliers ............................................................................................................ 5-13 5.4.2 Staged Evacuation Trip Generation ................................................................................. 5-16 5.4.3 Trip Generation for Waterways and Recreational Areas ................................................. 5-18 6 DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS ..................................................................... 6-1 NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 7 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE) .......................................................... 7-1 7.1 Voluntary Evacuation and Shadow Evacuation ....... : ................................................................. 7-1 7.2 Staged Evacuation ....................................................................................................... , .............. 7-1 7.3 Patterns of Traffic Congestion during Evacuation ..................................................................... 7 7.4 Evacuation Rates* ..................................................................................................... .................. 7-3 7.5 Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Results .................................................................................... 7-4 7 .6 Staged Evacuation Results .......................... .' .............................................................................. 7-5 7.7 Guidance on Using*ETE Tables ................................................................................................... 7-6 8 TRANSIT-DEPENDENT AND SPECIAL FACILITY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES ................................. 8.1 . Transit Dependent People Demand Estimate ............................................................................ 8-2 8.2 School, Preschool and Day Camp Population -Transit Demand ............................................... 8-4 8.3 Medical Facility Demand ............................................................................................................ 8-4 8.4 Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Dependent People ....................................................... 8-5 8.5 Special Needs Population .......... .............................................................................................. 8-10 8.6 Correctional Facilities ............................................................................................................... 8-11 9 .TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STRAT.EGY ............................... -..................................................................... 9-1 lei EVACUATION ROUTES .................................................................................................................. 10-1 11 SURVEILLANCE OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS ........... : ............*........... : ...................................... 11-1 12 CONFIRMATION TIME ...... : ........................................................................................................... 12-1 List of Appendices A. GLOSSARY OF TRAFFIC ENGINEERING TERMS .................................................................................. A-1 B. DYNAMIC TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION MODEL .......................................................... 8-1 C. DYNEVTRAFFIC SIMULATION.MODEL .: ............................................................................................. C-1 C.1 Methodology; ..*...... :., ......... ; ..... , ...............*. ,: ..... * .. , .... : ... : ...... , .................... : ....... * ........................... C-5 C.1.1 . The Fundamental Diagram ........ \ .........*.............................. _. . .-..... * ................ _. ............. , ......... C-5 C.1.2 The Simulation Mode.1 .....*....................... , ..... .' .................. ; ...... : .................................... ;.:.* .. c-5 C.1.3 Lane Assignment . .' ........ , ........ * ................ _ ......................... : ... :*************: ....... , ........... * ............. C:-13 . . . . C:2 lmplementaUon ............... .' ...* : .......................................... ,, ............. * ......... : ....................... : ..... : .. C-13 | |||
* C.2.1... Computational Procedure: ...................... '. .... : ........... : ..... _, ................ ........................ ,-........ C-13 C.2.2 lnterfacingwith Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTRAD) ............... : .. ......... , ............... ; ..*... C-16 . D. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF STUDY PROCEDURE .... , ............. ; .. ; ... :****** .......... , .......... ,.: ...................... D-1 . . . . . E. SPECIALFAC.ILITY DATA ..*................. * ...... ................. : ............ , .......................................... : .................. ; .... E-1 F. TELEPHONE SURVEY ...................... : ....................... , ........................................*..................................... F-1 *F.1 Introduction ..................................................... : ..................................................*...................... F-1 F.2 Survey Instrument and Sampling Plan .. , ..................... ::*:*********************************************************** F-2 F3 Survey Results* ................. .' ..... : ........ : ........ :*******************************************************: ............. * ... :* ........ :; F-3 F.3;1 .* Demographic Results ............................ _ ............. : ..... : ....... , ................................... F-3 . F.3.2 Evacuation Response ............... : ....... ::: ...... :-.......................... .-............... :************* .. ********************* F:-8 NMP/JAF Evacuation Estimate ii KLD Engineering, P.L February 24, 2016 F.3.3 Time Distribution Results ..................................................................................................... F-10 F.4 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. F-13 G. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN .......................................................................................................... G-1 G.1 Traffic Control Points ................................................................................................................ G-1 G.2 Access Control Points ................................................................................................................ G-1 H EVACUATION REGIONS ..................................................................................................................... H-1 J. REPRESENTATIVE INPUTS TO AND OUTPUTS FROM THE DYNEV II SYSTEM ..................................... J-1 K. EVACUATION ROADWAY NETWORK .................................................................................................. K-1 L. ERPA BOUNDARIES ............................................................................................................................ L-1 M. EVACUATION SENSITIVITY STUDIES ............................................................................................. M-1 M.1 Effect of Changes in Trip Generation Times ............................................................................ M-1 M.2 Effect of Changes in the Number of People in the Shadow Region Who Relocate ................. M-2 M.3 Effect of Changes in EPZ Resident Population ......................................................................... M-3 M.4 Enhancements in Evacuation Time .......................................................................................... M-4 N. ETE CRITERIA CHECKLIST ................................................................................................................... N-1 Note: Appendix I intentionally skipped NMP/JAF iii KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 List of Figures Figure 1-1. Location of NMP/JAF Nuclear Power Plant ............................................................................ 1-5 Figure 1-2. NMP/JAF Link-Node Analysis Network ................................................................................... 1-8 'Figure 2-1. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology ....................................................................................... 2-4 Figure 3-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ ...................................................................................... 3-2 Figure 3-2. Census Boundaries within the NMP/JAF Study Area .............................................................. 3-7 Figure 3-3. Permanent Resident Population by Sector ........................................................................... 3-10 Figure 3-4. Permanent Resident Vehicles by Sector .................................. : ............................................ 3-11 Figure 3-5. Shadow Population by Sector ............................................................................................... 3-13 Figure 3-6. Shadow Vehicles by Sector ..................... , .............................................................................. 3-14 Figure 3-7. Transient Population by Sector ......................................................................... : ................... 3-17 Figure 3-8. Transient Vehicles by Sector ............................... : ................................................................. 3-18 Figure 3-9. Employee Population by Sector ............................................................ : ............................... 3-21 Figure 3-10. Employee Vehicles by Sector .............................................................................................. 3-22 Figure 4-1. Fundamental Diagrams .................................................................................*....................... 4-10 Figure 5-1. Events and Activities Preceding the Evacuation Trip .... ; ......................................................... 5-5 Figure Evacuation Mobilization Activities ........................................................................................ 5-11 Figure 5-3. Comparison of Data Distribution and Normal Distribution .................. , .................................. 5-15 Figure 5-4. Comparison of Trip Generation Distributions ................................................ : ...................... 5-20 Figure 5-5. Comparison of Staged and Un-staged Trip Generation Distributions in the 2 to 5 Mile Region .......................................................................................................................... 5-22 Figure 6-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ ...................................................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-2. Example of an ERPA "Sliver" when Defining Evacuation Regions .......................................... 6-7 Figure 7-1. Voluntary Methodology ............ , ........................... ; ...................................... : ..... 7-15 Figure 7-2. NMP/JA.F Shadow Region .................................................................... * .................................. 7-16 Figure 7-3. Congestion Patterns at 40 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate .................................... 7-17 Figure 7-4. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour, 30 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ........................ 7-18 Figure 7-5. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours afterthe Advisory to Evacuate .......................................... 7-19 Figure 7-6. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, 30 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ...................... 7-20 Figure 7-7. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, 50 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ...................... 7-21 Figure 7-8. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 1 for Region R03 ............................ : ... : ..................... 7-22 Figure 7-9. Evacuation Time Scenario 2 for Region R03 ............ , ......................................... 7-22 Figure 7-10. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 3 for Region R03 .................................................... Figure 7-11. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 4 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-23 Figure 7-12. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 5 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-24 Figure 7-13. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 6 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-24 Figure Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 7 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-25 Figure 7-15. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 8 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-25 Figure 7-16. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 9 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-26 Figure 7-17. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 10 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-26 Figure Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 11 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-27 Figure 7-19. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 12 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-27 Figure 7-20. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 13 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-28 Figure 7-21. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 14 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-28 Figure 8-1. Chronology of Transit Evacuation Operations ...... , ............................................................... 8-12 Figure 10-1. General Reception Cen,ter and Medical Host Facilities ....................................................... 10-2 . NMP/JAF. iv | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Figure 10-2. Evacuation Route Map ................................................................... , .................................... 10-3 Figure B-1. Flow Diagram of Simulation-DTRAD lnterface ........................................................................ 8-5 Figure C-1. Representative Analysis Network .............................................. ............................................ C-4 . Figure C-2. *Fundamental Diagrams ........................................................................................................... Figure C-3. A UNIT Problem Configuration with ti> O .............................................................................. C-7 Figure C-4. Flow of Simulation Processing (See Glossary: Table C-3) .................................................... C-15 Figure D-1. Flow Diagram ofActivities ..................................................................................................... D-5 Figure E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ ................................................................ E-7 Figure E-2. Schools and Preschools within the City of Oswego ................................................................ E-8 Figure E-3. Medical Facilities within the EPZ ............................................................................................ E-9 . Figure E-4. Major Employers within the EPZ ........................................................................................... E-10 Figure Recreational. Facilities and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ .................................. , ........ E-11 Figure E-6. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ ........................................................................................... E-12 Figure E-7. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ ................................................................................... E-13 Figure F-1. Household Size in the EPZ ......................................... ; ............................................................. F-3 Figure F-2. Household Vehicle Availability ................................................................................................ F-4. Figure F-3. Vehicle Availability-1 to 5 Person Households .......... : ................................ ; .................. ....... F-5 Figure F-4. Vehicle Availability -6 to 9+ Person Households .................................................................... F-5 Figure F-5. Household Ridesharing Preference ......................................................................................... F-6 Figure F-6. Commuters in Households in the EPZ ... .-................................................................................. F-7 Figure F-7. Modes of Travel in the EPZ ....................................................................... : ............................. F-8 Figure F-8. Evacuating Vehicles per Household .......................................................... , ............................. F-9 Figure F-9. Households Evacuating with Pets ........................................................................................... F-9 Figure F-10. Time Required to Prepare to leave Work/School .............................................................. F-11 Figure F-11. Work to Home Travel Time*********************************************************************************.-******:********* F-11 Figure F-12. Time to Prepare Home for Evacuation .............................................. ............... , ................. F-12 Figure Time to Clear Driveway of 6"-8" of Snow ........................................................................... F-13 Figure G-L and Access Control Points for NMP/JAF ., ......................................... ........................ G-2 'Figure H-1. Region ROl ......................................... * .. , ................................................................................... l-i-3 Figure H-2. Region Ro2* ................................... , ..................................................... * .................................... : .. H-4 | |||
* Figure H-3. Region R03 . .-................................ : ..... * ..................*.................................................................. H-5 Figure H-4. Region R04 .............. ; *....... : ............. : ...... ; ................................................................................ H-6 Figure H-5. Region ROS .......... , ... , ..................... ; ......................*................................................. : ............... .' H.-7. Figure H-6. Region ROG .. : ......*................... , .... : .......................................................................................... H-8 Figure H-7.-Region R07 ***:: ....... .. ; ........... ; ..................... ............................ : .................................... , .......... H-9 Figure H-8. Region ROS .................................... , ...................................... ,. ................................................. H-10 Figure H-9: R.egion R09.,. ................. '************************'*******************************:************************************************ H-11 . Figure H-10. Region RlO ............*....... , ...... , ........................................... '. .......................... ......................... H-12 Figure H-11 Region Rll .............................................. * *.........*..................................... , ...................... .-..... H-13 .Figure H-12 Region R12 ............ : ........................ _ ...................................................................................... H-14 Figure H-13 .Region R13 ................................................... ; ....... : ..... _ ........................................................... H-15 FigureH-14 Region R14 .......................................... , ........... : ............................................................... , ... H-16 Figure H-15. Region RlS ....... _ *.. ,* .................................................. ' ............................................................... H-17 Region R16 ..... ; ......... * ................. * ..... ,. ..................................................................................... H-18 Figure Region* R17 ............ : ..... -......... : .............................................................................................. H-19 *Figure H-18 Region RlS ... .': .............. ,. ......... .' ............ : ...................... ; ..... _ .................. ................................. H-20 Figure*H-19 Region.R19 ...... , ....... .-....................................................... * ........................................................ H-2i NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate v KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Figure H-20 Region R20 .......... : ................................................................................ '. .............................. H-22 Figure H-21 Region R2l .......................................................................................................................... H-23 Figure H-22 Regio.n R22 .. : .......................................................... ; ............................................................ H-24 Figure H-23 Region R23 ........*................................................................................................................. H-25 Figure H-24 Region R24 ... ;*.* ........................................................ .' ............................................................ H-26 Figure H-25 Region R25 ...... : ................................................................................ ;*********************************** H-27 Figure H-26 R,egion R26 ........................................................................................................................... H-28 Figure H-27 Region R27 : ..... , .................................................................................................. , ................ H-29 Figure H-28 Region R28 .. : ............................................................. * .................................. * ......................... H-30 Figure H-29 Region R29 .......................................................................................................................... H-31 Figure J-1. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 1) .............. J-7 Figure ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek,' Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) ......................... , ..... J-7 Figure J-3. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 3) .............. J-8 Figure J-4 .. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) .............................. J-8 Figure J-5. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, *Good Weather (Scenario 5) ........................................................................................................................ J-9 Figure J-6. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter; Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 6) ................ J-9 Figure J-7. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) ............................... J-10 Figure J-8. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) ............................. J-10 Figure J-9. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 9) .............. J-11 Figure J-10. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) ........................... J-11 Figure J-11. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) ......................... J-12 Figure J-12. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 12) .. , ......... ,. .......*............................................................................................ ,. J-12 Figure J-13. ETE and Trip Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather, Special* Event (Seen.aria 13) .................................................................................................................. : ... J-13 Figure J-14. ETE.and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) ********'*************************************************************************'***************************** J-13 Figure K-l. Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick Link-Node Analysis Network ........................................ K-2 *Figure K-2. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 1 ........................... , ......................................................... K-3 Figure K-3. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 2 ...................................................................................... K-4 Figure K-4. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 3 ........................................................... ; ......................... K-5 Figure link-Node Analysis Network.:... Grid 4 .... , ................................................................................ K-6 Figure K-6. Link-Node. Analysis Network-G.rid 5 ..................................................................................... K-7 Figure K-7. Analysis Network-Grid 6 ..................................................................................... K-8 Figure K-K Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 7 ..................................................................................... K-9 Figure K-9. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 8 ............................................................. : ..................... K-10 Figure K-10: Analysis Network-Grid 9 ...........................................**.................................... K-11 Figure K-11. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 10 ............................................................................... K-12. Figure K-12. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 11 ............................................................................... K-13 Figure K-13. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 12 ............................................................................... K-14 Figure Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 13 ............................................................... , ............... K-15 Figure K-15. Link-Node Analysis Network...:.. Grid 14 ............................................................................... K-16 Figure K-16. Link-Node .Analysis Network-Grid 15 ............................................................................... K-17 Figure K-17. Analysis Network-Grid 16 ............................................................................... K-18 Figure K-18. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 17 ............................................................... , ............... K-19 | |||
* Figure K-19. Link-.NodeAnalysis Network-Grid 18 ...... '. ......*........................................ : .... : ................... K-20 NMP/JAF vi KLD Engineering, P.C. . . . . . Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Figure K-20. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 19 ............................. , ................................................. K-21 Figure K-21. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 20 ...... ........................................................................ K-22 Figure K-22. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 21 ............................................................................... K-23 Figure K-23. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 22 ........................... : ..................................... .' .......... , .. K-24 Figure K-24. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 23 ............................................................................... K-25 Figure K-25. Link-Node Analysis Network:.... Grid 24 ....................... : ....................................................... K-26 Figure K-26. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 25 ............................................................................... K-27 Figure K-27. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 26 ............................................................................... K-28 Figure K-28. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 27 ............................................................................... K-29 Figure K-29. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 28 ............................................................................... K-30 Figure K-30. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 29 .................................... : .......................................... K-31 Figure K-31. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 30 ................................................. ." ............................. K-32 Figure K-32. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 31 ............................................................................... K-33 Figure K-33. Link-Node Analysis Network.-Grid 32 ............................................................................... K-34 NMP/JAF vii -KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Tim.e Estimate February 24, 2016 List of Tables Table 1-1. Stakeholder lnteraction. ............................................................................................................ 1-2 Table 1-2. Highway Characteristics ........................................................................................................... 1-6 Table 1-3. *ETE Study Comparisons .......................................................................................................... Table 2-1. Evacuation Scenario .Definitions ............................................................................................... 2-3 Table 2-2. Model Adjustment for Adverse Weather ................................................................................. 2-7 Table 3-1. Town Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 ........... 3-6 Table 3-2. Municipality Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 ............... : ........................................................................................................ 3-6 Table 3-3. EPZ Permanent Resident Population ....................................................................................... 3-8 Table 3-4. Permanent Resident Population and Vehicles by ERPA ........................................................... 3-9 Table 3-5. Shadow Population and Vehicles by Sector ........................................... : ............................... 3-12 Table 3-6. Summary of Transients and Transient Vehicles ..................................................................... 3-16 Table 3-7. Summary of Non-EPZ Resident Employees and Employee Vehicles ...................................... 3-20 Table 3-8. NMP/JAF EPZ External Traffic ................................................................................................ 3-24 Table 3-9. Summary of Population Demand ........................................................................................... 3-25 Table 3-10. Summary. of Vehicle Demand ................................................................... : ........................... 3-26 Table 5-1. Event Sequence for Evacuation Activities ................................................................................ 5-3 Table 5-2. Time Distribution for Notifying the Public ............................................................................... 5-6 Table 5-3. Time Distribution for Employees to Prepare to Leave Work ................................................... 5-7 Table 5-4. Time Distribution for Commuters to Travel_Home .................................................................. 5-8 Table 5-5. Time Distribution for Population to Prepare to E.vacuate **********************:********************************5-9 Table 5-6. Time Distribution for Population to Clear 611-811 of Snow ....................................... : .............. 5-10 Table 5-7. Mapping Distributions to Events ............................................................................................. 5-12 Table 5-8. Description of the Distributions ............................................................................................. 5-13 Table 5-9. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Un-staged Evacuation .................... 5-19 Table 5-10. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Staged Evacuation ....................... 5-21 Table 6-1. Description of Evacuation Regions ...............................................................*........................... 6-4 Table 6-2. Evacuation* scenario Definitions ............................................................................................... 6-8 Table 6-3. PercE;?nt of Population Groups Evacuating for Various Scenarios ............... : ............................ 6-9 Table 6-4. by Scenario ........................... .................................................................... 6-10 Table 7-1. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population ........................... 7-9 Table 7-2. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population .....................** 7-10 Table Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region ............................ 7-11 Table 7-4. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region .......................... 7-12 Table 7-5. Description of Evacuation Regions ................ , .............................................................. : ......... 7-13 Table 8-1. Transit-Dependent Population Estimates ; ...... : .................. .................................................. ,.8-13 Table 8-2. School, Preschool, and .Day Camp Population Demand Estimates ........................................ 8-14 Table 8-3. School; Preschool, and Day Camp Reception Centers .......................................*................... 8-15 Table 8-4. Medical Facility Transit Demand ........................................................... :: .... : .......................... 8-16 Tabl.e 8-5.* Summary of Transportation Resources ............. ; ............................... , ... : .......... : .......... .......... 8-17 Table 8-6.* :Bu_s RoutE! Descriptions .......................... : ..*.................. , ............................................................ 8-18 Table School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather .............. : .. ;8-23 Table 8-8, School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates-Rain ... , .....*. ; ....................... 8-24 Table 8-9. *School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow .... ... * ......................... 8-25 Table 8-10. Summary of Transit-Dependent BusRoutes; ............................................ :: ..... , ................ , .. 8-26 . . . . . . . . NMP/JAF viii KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation, Time Estimate February 241 2016 | |||
'Table 8-11. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather ........................................ 8-28 Table 8-12. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain ......................................................... 8-31 Table 8-13. Transit Dependent Evacuation Time* Estimates -Snow ....................................................... 8-34 Table 8-14. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather ............................................. 8-37 Table 8-15. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain ............................................................. 8-39 Table 8-16. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow ..................................................... ; ...... 8-41 Table 8-17. Homebound Special Needs Population Evacuation Time Estimates ................................... 8-43 Table 8-18. Correctional Facilities Evacuation Time Estimates ............................................................... Table 12-1. Estimated Number of Telephone Calls Required for Confirmation of Evacuation .............. 12-2 Table A-1. Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms .................................................................................... A-1 Table C-1. Selected Measures of Effectiveness Output by DYNEV II ......................... : ... : .......................... C-2 Table C-2. Input Requirements for the DYNEV II Model ........................................................................... C-3 Table C-3. Glossary ........... * ......................................................................................................................... C-8 Table E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ .................................................................. E-2 Table E-2. Medical Facilities within the EPZ.; ............................................................................................ E-3 Table E-3. Major Employers within the EPZ ...................................................... , ....................................... E-4 Table E-4. Recreational Attractions and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ ........................................... E-5 Table E-5. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ ......................................... : .................................................... E-6 Table E-6. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ ....................................................................................... E-6 Table F-'l. NMP/JAF Telephone Survey Sampling Plan ............................................................................. F-2 Table H-1. Percent of Sub-Area Population Evacuating for Each Region ... ; ............................................. H-2 Table J-1. Characteristics of the Ten Highest Volume Signalized Intersections, .......... ; ............................ J-2 Table J-2. Samp'le Simulation Model Input ............................................................................................... J-3 Table J-3. Selected Model Outputs for the Evacuation of the Entire EPZ (Region R03) ........................... J-4 Table J-4. Average Speed (mph) and Travel Time (min) for Major Evacuation Routes (Region R03', Scenario 1) .......... ; .................................................................................................... ; J-5 Table Simulation Model Outputs at Network Exit Links for Region R03, Scenario 1 ....... , ................. J-6 Table Evacuation Roadway Network Characteristics ................................. .................................... K-35. Table.k-2. Nodes in the Link-Node Analysis Network which are Controlled .......................................... K-83 Table M-1. Evacuation Time Estimates for Trip Generation Sensitivity Study, ............... : ...................... M-1 Table M-2. Evacuation Time Estimates for Shadow Sensitivity Study .............................. '. ..................... M-2 Table M-3. ETE Variation with Population Change""'.""""""""''."'"""""""""""""""'""""""""""""" M-4 Table N-1. ETE Review Criteria Checklist ................................................................................................. N-1 *. NMP/JAF. Evacuation Time Estimate i.x KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 i I I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to update the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP) and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF). NMP and JAF are located on adjacent parcels of land in Oswego County, New York. ETE are part of the required planning basis and provide Exelon Generation (Exelon) and Entergy, along with state and local governments with site-specific information needed for Protective Action decision-making. In the performance of this effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are: | |||
* NUREG/CR-7002, SAND 2010-0061P, "Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies," November 2011. (NRC, 2011a). | |||
* NUREG/CR-1745, "Analysis *of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times Emergency Planning Zones," November 1980. (NRC, 1980a). | |||
* NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980. (NRC, 1980b). | |||
* NUREG/CR-6863, SAND2004-5900, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants," January 2005. (NRC, 2005). | |||
* Title 10, Code of .Federal Regulations, Appendix E to Part 50 (10CFR50) -Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 2011. (NRC, 2011b) .. Overview of Project Activities This study was adapted from the previous ETE study (KLD TR-521 dated November 2012) with * . the exception that potential evacuation areas were defined using the sixteen cardinal wind directions (in accordance with federal guidance) based on consultation with Exelon and Entergy in November 2015. The previous ETE study began in March 2012 and extended over a period of 8 months. The major activities performed as part of this updated study are briefly described | |||
* below in chronological sequence: | |||
* Held conference calls with personnel from Exelon and Entergy to discuss the updated regions and scope of work. * . Accessed U.S. Census Bureau data files for the year 2010 and projected it to 2015. Studied Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps of the area in the vicinity of the . NMP/JAF, then conducted a detailed field survey of the highway network. * *'synthesized this information to create an analysis network representing the highway system topology and capacities within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), plus a Shadow Region covering the region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 | |||
* miles radially from the plants .. NMP/JAF ES-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016. | |||
* Utilized the results of a telephone survey conducted in 2012 of residents within the EPZ to gather focused data needed for this ETE study that were not contained within the census database. The survey instrument was reviewed and modified by the licensees and offsite response organization (ORO) personnel prior to conducting the survey in 2012. | |||
* Data pertaining to employment, transients, and special facilities in Oswego County that was collected in 2012 was reviewed and utilized. * | |||
* The traffic demand and trip-generation rates of evacuating vehicles were estimated from the gathered data. The trip generation rates reflected the estimated mobilization time (Le., the time required by evacuees to prepare for the evacuation trip) computed using the results of the 2012 telephone survey of EPZ residents. | |||
* The EPZ is subdivided into 29 ERPAs. Following federal guidelines, these ERPAs are then grouped within circular areas or "keyhole" configurations (circles plus radial sectors and site specific adjustments) that define a total of 29 Evacuation Regions. | |||
* The external circumstances are represented as Evacuation Scenarios, each described in terms of the following factors: (1) Season (Summer, Winter); (2) Day of Week (Midweek, Weekend); (3) Time of Day (Midday, Evening); and (4) Weather (Good, Rain, Snow). One special event scenario involving the Harborfest fireworks display was considered. One roadway impact scenario was considered wherein a single lane was dosed on SR 481 southbound for the duration of the evacuation. | |||
* Staged evacuation was considered for those regions wherein the 2 mile radius and sectors downwind to 5 miles were evacuated. | |||
* As per NUREG/.CR-70,02, the Planning Basis for the calculation of ETE is: | |||
* A rapidly escalating accident at the NMP/JAF that quickly assumes the status of General Emergency such that the Advisory to Evacuate is virtually coincident with the siren alert, and no early protective actions have been implemented. | |||
* While an unlikely accident scenario, this planning basis will yield ETE, measured as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the stated percentage of the population exits the impacted Region, that represent "upper bound" estimates.* This conservative Planning Basis is applicable for all initiating events. | |||
* If the emergency occurs while schools and day camps are in session, the ETE study assumes that the children will be evacuated by bus directly to reception centers' located at the New York State Fairgrounds, outside the EPZ. Parents, relatives, and neighbors are advised to not pick up their children at schools and day camps prior to the arrival of the buses dispatched for that purpose. The ETE for children at these facilities are calculated separately. | |||
* Evacuees who do not have access to a private vehicle will either ride-share with relatives, friends or neighbors, or be evacuated by buses provided as specified in the NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate ES-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016 county evacuation plans. Those in special facilities will likewise be evacuated with public transit, as needed: bus or van, wheelchair bus or van, or ambulance, as required. Separate ETE are calculated for the transit-dependent evacuees, for homebound special needs population, and for those evacuated from special facilities. Computation of ETE A total of 406 ETE were computed for the evacuation of the general public. Each ETE quantifies the aggregate evacuation time estimated for the population within one of the 29 Evacuation Regions to evacuate from that Region, under the circumstances defined for one of the 14 Evacuation Scenarios (29 x 14 = 406). Separate ETE are calculated for transit-dependent evacuees, including children, for applicable scenarios. Except for Region R03, which is the evacuation of the entire EPZ, only a portion of the people within the EPZ would be advised to evacuate. That is, the Advisory to Evacuate applies only to those people occupying the specified impacted region. It is assumed that 100 percent of the people within the impacted region will evacuate in response to this Advisory. The people occupying the remainder of the EPZ outside the impacted region may be advised to take shelter. The computation of ETE assumes that 20% of the population within the EPZ but outside the impacted region, will elect to "voluntarily" evacuate. In addition, 20% of the population in the Shadow Region will also elect to evac.uate. These voluntary evacuees could impede those who are evacuating from within the impacted region .. The impedance that could be caused by voluntary evacuees is considered in the computation of ETE for the impacted region. Staged evacuation is considered wherein those_ people within the 2-mile region evacuate immediately, while those beyond 2 miles, but within the EPZ, shelter-in-place. Once 90% of the 2-mile region is evacuated; those. people beyond 2 miles begin to evacuate. As per federal -guidance, 20% of people beyond 2 miles will evacuate (hon-compliance) .even though they are advised to shelter-in-place. The computational procedure is outlined as follows: | |||
* A link-node representation of the highway network is coded. Each *link represents a unidirectional length of highway; each node usually represents an intersection or merge point. *The capacity of each link is estimated based on the field survey observations and on established traffic-engineering procedt.ires. -* The evacuation trips are generat_ed'.af locations called. "zonal centroids" located within the EPZ and Shadow Region. The trip generation rates vary over time reflecting the --mobilization process, and from one location (centroid) to another depending on population density and on whether a centroid is within, or outside, the impacted area. *. The evacuation model computes the routing patterns for evacuating vehicles that are -compliant with federal guidelines (outbound relative to the location of the plants), and simulates the traffic flow movements over space and time. This simulation process . estimates the rate that traffic flow exits the impacted region. NMP/JAF ES-3 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 The ETE statistics provide the elapsed times for go percent and 100 percent, respectively, of the population within the impacted region, to evacuate from within the impacted region. These statistics are presented in tabular and graphical formats. The goth percentile ETE have been identified as the values that should be considered when making protective action decisions because the 1ooth percentile ETE are prolonged by those relatively few people who take longer to mobilize. This is referred to as the "evacuation tail" in Section 4.0 of NUREG/CR-7002. The use of a public outreach (information) program to emphasize the need for evacuees to minimize the time needed to prepare to evacuate (secure the home, assemble needed clothes, medicines, etc.) should also be considered. Traffic Management This study references the comprehensive traffic management plans provided by Oswego County; no additional traffic or access control measures have been identified as a result of this study. Selected Results A compilation of selected information is presented on the following pages in the form of figures and tables extracted from the body of the report; these are described below. * . Figure 6-1 displays a map of the NMP/JAF EPZ showing the layout of the 2g ERPAs that *comprise, in aggregate, the EPZ. | |||
* Table 3-3 presents the estimates of permanent resident population in each ERPA based on the 2010 Census and used 2014 growth rates tb project out to 2015. | |||
* Table 6-1 defines each of the 2g Evacuation Regions in terms of their respective groups of ERPAs. * | |||
* Table 6-2 defines the Evacuation Scenarios. | |||
* Tables 7-1 and 7-2 are compilations of ETE. These data are the times needed to clear the indicated regions of go and 100 percent of the population occupying these regions, . respectively. These computed ETE include consideration of mobiliza.tion time and of estimated voluntary evacuations from other regions within the EPZ and from the Shadow Region. * .* Tables 7-3 and 7-4 present ETE for the :2-mile region for Lin-staged and staged for the goth and 1ooth percentiles, respectively. . | |||
* Table 8-7 presents ETE for the children at schools and day camp in good weather. | |||
* Table 8-11 presents ETE forthe transit-dependent population in good weather. | |||
* Figure H-8 presents an example of an Evacuation Region (Region ROS) to be evacuated under the circumstances defined in Table 6-1. | |||
* Maps of all regions are provided in Appendix H. | |||
* Conclusions | |||
* General population ETE were computed for 406 unique cases ...:. a* combination of 2g unique Evacuation Regions and 14 unique Evacuation Scenarios. Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 NMP/JAF * ,ES-4 * .. KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 document these ETE for the goth and 1ooth percentiles. These ETE range from 1:30 (hr: min) to 5:20 at the goth percentile. | |||
* Inspection of Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 indicates that the ETE for the 10oth percentile are significantly longer than those for the goth. percentile. These ETE range from 3:30 (hr:min) to 7:20 at the 1ooth percentile. This is the result of the congestion within the EPZ. When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the EPZ cit rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ. Towards the end of the process, relatively few evacuation routes service the remaining demand. See Figures 7-8 through 7-21. | |||
* Inspection of Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 indicates that a staged evacuation provides no benefits to evacuees from within the 2 mile region and unnecessarily delays the evacuation of those beyond 2 miles (compare Regions R04 through RlO with R22 through R28 respectively and R02 with R2g, in Tables 7-1 and 7-2). See Section 7.6 for additional discussion. | |||
* Comparison of Scenarios 5 (summer, midweek/weekend, evening) and 13 (summer, weekend, evening) in Table 7-2 .indicates that the special event raises the goth and 10oth percentile ETE by 2:55 and 3:40, respectively. See Section 7.5 for additional discussion. | |||
* Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 7-1 indicates that the roadway closure -one lane southbound on SR* 481 increases the goth percentile ETE by 5 minutes -not a material impact on ETE -and has no impact on the 1ooth percentile ETE. See Section 7.5 fo(additional discussion. | |||
* The Cities of Oswego is the most congested area in the EPZ during an evacuation. The . last locations in the EPZ to exhibit traffic congestion are SR 104 west of the City of Oswego CR 7, Rathburn Rd and Ridge Rd. All congestion within the EPZ clears by 3 hours * .. and 50 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate. See Section 7.3 and Figures 7-3 through 7-8. | |||
* Separate ETE were computed for schools, day camp, medical facilities, correctional facilities, transit-dependent persons, and homebound special needs persons. The average single-wave ETE for schools, day medical facilities, transit dependents and correctional facilities are within a similar range as the general population ETE at the goth percentile. ETE for homebound special needs persons exceeds the goth percentile ETE for the general population. See Section 8. | |||
* Table 8-5 indicates that there are scarcely enough buses, wheelchair buses and ambulances available to evacuate the transit-dependent population within the EPZ in a *single wave. However, mutual aid agreements would be invoked to address any potential shortfalls. See Sections 8.4 and 8.5. | |||
* The ETE for the full EPZ general population are insensitive to reductions in the base trip generation time of 3Yz hours due to the traffic congestion within the EPZ. See Table M-1. * | |||
* The general population ETE is relatively insensitive fo the voluntary evacuation of vehicles in the Shadow Region (a full shadow evacuation percentage increases the goth *percentile ETE by 5 minutes and increases lOOth percentile ETE by 25 minutes). See .Table M-2. NMP/JAF ES-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuatiori Time Estimate February 24, 2016 J | |||
* A Population increase of 22% or more results in ETE changes which meet the criteria for updating ETE between decennial Censuses. See Section M.3. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate ES-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016. | |||
NMP/JAF Lake Ontario Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF GJ ERPA '--:::.. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Evacuation Time Estimate Figure 6-1. NMP/JAF EPZ ERPAs ES-7 nc:'.u'"n'ryUy * £.l.-'( " c-'-...._ V North ' Pond / j\ -* -i iV) r:D 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 3-3. EPZ Permanent Resident Population : * , *... * *.E:RPA _,, **.*i. ***. * *2o*i:o'Po Uiiiflen .. * *:f ,:;P:firlis:Po ulatian ' ! '" * < * * | |||
* nc, | |||
* o.* * '*** o | |||
* p * *'<* -** .* '*"* .J? ,** | |||
* 1 173 172 2 469 465 3 343 337 4 687 690 5 804 786 6 915 896 7 699 700 8 718 720 9 597 599 10 1,023 1,002 11 1,916 1,875 12 7,960 7,894 13 10,223 10,121 14 193 193 15 1,105 1,104 16 1,624 1,585 17 587 587 18 1,030 1,021 19 1,316 1,295 20 1,783 1,756 21 1,782 1,741 22 5,940' 5,884 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0 ; *. .;i il1 .,,e w * . .*.. *.. fllii :tl1 | |||
* 8.87-f .. 1 + ** I | |||
* EPZ Population Growth: -1.11% NMP/JAF ES-8 KLD Engineering,.P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 6-1. Description of Evacuation Regions Region* Description ERPA '13 14 15 16 .17 18 19 20 21 '22 23 24 29 ROl | |||
* Radius ROZ 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction ERPA From 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 E, ESE, SE, SSE, N/A s;ssw,.sw, Refer to ROl WSW R04 w .ROS WNW | |||
* R06 NW, NNW R07 N ROS NNE R09 NE RlO ENE Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to EPZ Boundary Region Wind Direction ERPA From 5 6 7 *8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Rll E, ESE, SE R12 SSE, S, SSW R13 SW R14 WSW RlS w R16 WNW R17 NW R18 NNW R19 N R20 .NNE, l\IE R21 ENE NMP/JAF ES-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* Staged -Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction From ERPA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 . 29 N/A E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW Reflirto ROl R22 w R23 WNW R24 NW,NNW R25 N R26 NNE R27. NE R28 ENE R29 5-Mile Radius . NMP/JAF ES-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 6-2. Evacuation Scenario Definitions ' *' .. Day of Time of Scenario season1 Week . Di;iy W¢ather :; Special **' . ' ' .. . ,*. -* . 1 Summer Midweek *Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None 5 Summer Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None 12 Winter Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 13 Summer Weekend Evening Good Harborfest Fireworks 14 Sum.mer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Impact -Lane Closure on SR 481 SB 1 Winter assumes that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer assumes that school is not in session. NMP/JAF ES-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-1. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday *Region Good Rain Good Rain Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ R01 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 '1:30 1:30. 2:00 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 R02 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 .1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 R03 2:35. . 2:40 2:30 2:45 *2:25 2:55 3:00 3:15. 2:20 . 2:50 i:25 5:15 2:30 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 | |||
* 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:35 1:35 ROS 1:40 1:40 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05. 1:35 1:35 1:40 ROG .. 1:45 1:45 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:45 1:45 2:10 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:30 1:45 R07 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45. . 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 ROS 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 . 1:40 1:50 R09 1:45 1:45 . 1:40 1:40 1:40 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 RlO 1:35 1:35 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:35 1:35 1:55 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary RU 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30* 1:30 .2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R12 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30' 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R13 1:40 1:40 1:30 1:30 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:35 1:40 R14 1:45 1:45 1:40 1:50 1:35 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 R15 1:50 1:50 1:45 2:00 1:35 1:50 1:55 2:15 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:50 R16 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:50 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:35 1:50 R17 1:50 1:50 1:35 1:40 1:40 1:50 1:55 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R18 1:50 1:50 1:40 1:40 1:40 1:50 1:50 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R19 *2:35 2:50 2:35 2:50 2:25 2:55 3:05 3:15 2:25 2:35 2:45 2:20 5:20 2:40 R20 2:40 2:45 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:50 ' 3:05 3:20 2:30 2:35 2:50 2:25 5:15 2:35 R21 2:30 2:45 . 2:30 2:40 2:25 2:50 3:00 3:15 2:20 2:30 2:40 2:20 5:10. 2:35 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:55 1:55 1:55 1,:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 2:25 1:55 1:55 2:30 1:55 1:55 1:55 R23 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:00 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R24 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:35 2:05 2:05 . 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:05 R25 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:20 2:20 2:15 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:15 R26 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:20 R27 2:15 2:15 . 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 . 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:10 2:15 R28 1:55 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:55 1:55 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R29 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:20 2:15 2:15 NMP/JAF ES-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
! Table 7-2. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population | |||
* Region R01 .**.ROZ R03 R04 ROS R06. R07 ROS RO!i RlO Rll R12 R13 R14 RlS R16 R17 R18 Rl!i RZO R21 R22 R23 .R24 R25 R26 . R27 R28 R29 | |||
* NMP/JAF Summer Summer Midweek .Weekend Midday .. Midday Good Weather 3:30 3:35 *******3:40' 3:35 3js. . 3:35 ':3:35 3:35 . 3;35* 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 . 3:4o | |||
* 3:40 3.:40 3:40 . 3:40' 3:40 3:35' 3:35 3:35 :fas 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 'Rain Good* Rain 3:30 '3:30 ,3:30 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:40 3:40 . 3:40. 3:35 . 3:35. 3:35 3:35 3:35 ,3:35 .* 3:35. ' 3:35 . 3:35' . 3:35 *.. 3;35 ' .. 3:35 3:35 ... 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:3s*.* 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:30' 3:30 .3:3o . 3:30 | |||
* 3:40 '3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40, 3:40 3:40 ... 3:40 .3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 ' 3:40, 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40' 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 *. 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3.:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Evacuation Time Estimate Summer M.id.week Weekend Evening Winter Midweek Midday .Winter Weekend Midday Good. Weather *Good *Rain* Weather* Good Snow | |||
* Rain | |||
* Snow *weather Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ',3:30' . 3:30 3:30' 4:15 . . 3:30 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:4o 3:so 3*:ss 4:25 3:4o ... 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 4!20 3:35 3:35 3:3,5 3.:35 . . 3:35 4:20 4:20 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:15 4:20 4:25 4:20 4:20. . 4:20 .4:20' 3:35 . 3;35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 .* 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 ' .. 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 4:20 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary 3:30. 3:30 | |||
* 3:30 4:is 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30* 3:40. 3:40 . 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 ' 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 '3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40 3.:40 3:40 3:55 '3:55 3:45 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:2s 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 3:40 ' 3:40 ,* .. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40.' 3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 1' 3:35* . 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 4:20 3:35 4:20 3:35'. 4:20 3:35 4:20 ES-13 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:15 4:15 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25. 4:25 4:25' 4:25 4:25 '4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Winter Midweek Weekend Evening Good Weather *. 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 .. 3:30. 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 .. 3:,40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Weekend Evening Special Event 3:30 3:35 7:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30' 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40. 7:20 7:10 7:10 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Midweek Midday Roadway Impact 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35. 3:35 3:30 3:36 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3':40 3:40 3:35. 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35, 3:35 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 7-3. Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2-Mile Region Summer. Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter | |||
* Summer* Summer Midweek Weekend .Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain *Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather . Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ROl **.1:30 .. 1:30. 1:30 1:30' | |||
* 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R02 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 . | |||
* 1:30 _1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30. 1:30 i:30 2-MHe Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 | |||
* 1:30 1:30 1:30 l:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30 *1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .. 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROG 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R07 1:30 :1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:05 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R09 1:30 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30. 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R10 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:30 1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R23 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R24 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R25 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R26 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R27 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R28 1:30 1:30 i:30 1:30 1:30 . 1:30. 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R29 1:30 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 NMP/JAF . ES-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time* Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-4. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2-Mile Region Summer Summer -Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) '* (4) (5) (I;) . . , (7) *(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . (i3)' (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ R01 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30. 3:30 3:30 R02 3:30 3:30 3;30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROG 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R07 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R09 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 -3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R10 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R23 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R24 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R25 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R26 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R27 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R28 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R29 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 NMP/JAF ES-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-7. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Time Estimates -Good Weather Dist. To Travel Dist. EPZ Travel Time Driver Loading EPZ Average Time to Bdryto from EPZ ETEto Mobilization Time Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE R.C. Bdryto H.S. H.S. School, Preschool, or Day Camp Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min) Ontario Bible Conference2 90 15 13.0 14.7 53 2:40 26.9 30 ):10, New Haven Elementary School 90. 15 7.4 47.0 10 1:55 28.9 32 2:30 School Age Children Care Program 90 15 11.7 13.8 51 2:401 26.9 30 ... 3:10 Charles E. Riley Elementary 90 15 6.8 . 9.4 44 2:30 26.9 30 3:00 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 90 15 7.9 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Headstart of Oswego 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Little Luke's Childcare Center 90 15 7.3 9.4 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Oswego Community Christian School 90 15 9.2 11.1 50 2:35 26.9 30 .3:05 Trinity Catholic School 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 90 15 9.7 10.3 57 2:45 26.9 30 . 3:15 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 90 15 9.1 9.8 57 , .. | |||
* 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Kingsford Park Elementary 90 15 6.7 23.4 18 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Oswego High School 90 15 8.6 10.0 52 2:40* 26.9 30 3:10 Oswego Mi.ddle School 90 15 5.2 23.6 14 2:00 26.8 30 .. Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 90 15 6.7 22.1 19 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Mexico Elementary School 90 15 4.5 48.9 6 1:55 30.4 34 . 2:25 Mexico High School 90 15 4.8 47.3 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 .. Mexico Middle School 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 Center for Instructional Technology a.nd 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 31.4 35 2:30 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES)3 Minetto Elementary School 90 15 2.2 45.6 3 1:50 26.8 30 2:20 SUNYOswego 90 15 9.9 10.1 59 2:45 26.9 30 *3:15 | |||
* Palermo Elementary School 90 15 Located outside the EPZ 27.8 31 2:20 Maximum for EPZ: 1.: .. < Maximum: 3:15 Average for EPZ: ** Average: .. 2:55 , .. 2 According to Oswego County officials, Ontario Bible Conference, included in this table, is a summer camp program that requires 2 buses from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The rest of the year, the camp is open to retreats for family events for which they can furnish their own transportation. 3 Oswego County BOCES is now known as the Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Citi). NMP/JAF ES-16 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 Table 8-11. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 1 1 90 18.5. | |||
* 13.9 80 30 *3:20 26.9 29 5 10 70 30 5:45 2 1 90 16.6 14.0 71 30 3:15 26.9 29 5 10 66 30 5;35 3 1 90 16.2 45.9 21 30 2:25 28.9 32 5 10 . 69 30 4:55 4 1 90 9.7 46.4 13 30 2!15 . 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30 5 1 90 8.7 44.6 12 30 2:15 28.9 32 5 10 51 30 4:25 6 1 90 . 9.9 47.3 13 30 2:15 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30 . 7 1 90 10.2 4q.7 13 30 2:15 30.4 33 5 10 56 30 4:30 *8 1 90 9.2 47.3 12 30 2:15. 30.4 33 5 10 54 30 4:30 9. 1 90 10.4 43.2 14 30 . 2:15 30.4 33 5 10 57 30 4:35 10 1 90 8.3 45.6 11 30 2:15 30.4 33 5 10 51 30 4:25 11 1 90 10.3 52.2 12 30 2:15. 30.4 33 5 10 55 30 4:30 12 1 90 11.1 9.0 74 30 3:15 26.9 29 5 10' 54 30 5:25 13 1 90 12.5 10.1 75 30 .' 3:15* 26.9 29 5 10 57 30 5:30 14 1 90 17.1 10.8 95 30 3:35 26.9 29 5 10 68 30 6:00 15 1 90 17.7 12.2 87 30 3:30 26.9 29 5 10 69 30 . 5:55 16 1 90 19.0 13.4 85 30 .3:30 26.9 29 5 10 72 30 '6:00 17 1 90 7.1 47.4 9 30 2:10 28.9 32 5 10 48 30 4:15 18 1 90 10.4 47.4 13 30 28.9 32 5 10 55 30 4:30 19 1 . 90 9.8 46.6 13 30 2:15 35.4 39 5 10 62 30 4:45 20 1 90 8.9 48.4 11 30 2:15 35.4 39 5 . 10 59 30 4;40 21 1 90 16.3 36.6* 27 30 2:30 35.4 39 5 10 80 30 5:15 22 1 90 12.1 45.0 16 30 2:20 30.4 33 5 10 60 30 4:40. 23 1 90 8.3 45.0 11 30 2:15. 30.4 33 5 10 52 30 4:25 24 . 1 90 6.9 48.4 9 30 2:10 35.4 39 5 10 54 30 4:30 25 1 90 10.5 11.1 57 30 3:00 26.9 29 5 10 53 30 5:10 26 1 90 11.2 .11.2 60 30 3:00. 26.9 29 5 10 54 30 5:10 27 1 90 9.9 8.0 74 30 3::!-5 26.9 29 5 10 52 30 5:25 28 1 90 8.2 14.2 35 30 2:35 26.9 29 5 10 47 30 4:40 29 1 90 9.8 7.7 76 30 3:20 26.9 29 5 10 51 30 5:30 NMP/JAF ES-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Route Bus Mobilization Number Number (min) 31. 1 .90. *. 32 1 90 33 1 90 1 | |||
* 34 1. 90 35 1 90 36 1 90 37 1 90 38 1 90 39. 1 90 40 1 90 * .. '*41 1 90 42 1 90 43 1 90 44 1. 90 45 1 90 46 1 90 47 1 90 48 1 90 49 1 90 50 1 90 51 1 90 5? 1 . 90 53 1 90 54 1 90 55. 1 90 56 1 90 57 1 90 58 1 90 59* 1 90 60 1 90 61 1* 90 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Route Length (miles) 8.8 3.4 7.9 8.0 8.6 . 6.S 9.2 6.S 7.6 6.6 8.3 8.7 10.0 9.9 Q.8 9.2 8.4 8.6 10.7 10.0 . 10.6 9.6 17.9 4.1 9.2 9.2 S.3 8.S 6.S 7.0 7.4 One-Wave Route Travel Speed Time (mph) (min) 73 8.4 24. 8.4 S6 8.4 S7 7.9 6S 20.6 I 19 11:s I _ 32 17.S I 22 4.S I . 102 19.0 I . 21 4.6 I 107 s.o I 10s. 8.3 72 20.1 I 29 10.6 I SS 20.1 I 27 46.4 I . 11 46.4 I 11 12.1 I S3* 12.0 I so 8.0. I 79 8.3 I 69 4S.1 I 24 44.9 I s 47.7 | |||
* I 12 | |||
* 47.7 I .12 47.7 I 7 39.0 I 13 39.9 I 10 39.0 I 11 39.0 I . 11 Travel Pickup Distance Time to Time ETE to R. C. R. C. (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) 30 26.9 29 30 2:25* 26.9 29 30 I*. 3:00\* 26.9 29 30 I | |||
* 3:00 26.9 29 30 I 3:10 26.9 29 30 I '2:20 26.8 29' 30 I 2:35 26.8 29 30 I 2:25 26.8 29 .30 I 3:45 26.8 29 30 I .2:25 26.8 29 . 30 I 3:50 | |||
* 26.8 29 30 I -3:45 26.8 29 30 I | |||
* 3:15 26.8 29 30 I 2:30 . 26.8 29 30 I 3:00 26.8 29 30 I 2:30. 26.8 29 30 I 2:15 28.9 32 30 I .2:15 28.9 32 30 I . 2:55. 26.9 29 3o I 2:56 26.9 29 30 I 3:20 26.9 29 30 I 3:10 26.9 29 30 I | |||
* 2:25 30.4 33 30 I 2:10 28.9 32 30 I 2:15 28.9 32 30 I | |||
* 2:15 | |||
* 28.9 32 30 I 2:10** 28.9 32 30 I 2:15 26.9 29 30 I 2:10. 26.9 29 30 I . 2:15 26.9 29 30 I. 2:15 26.9 29 ES-18 Unload (min) *S s s s s s s s s s 5 s s s s 5 s s s s s s s s s | |||
s s s s s s Two-Wave . 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 .10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 . 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Route Travel Time (min) 48 36 46 46 48 44 so 44 46 44 49 49 S3 S2 S2 50 S1 S1 S3 S1 S2 S1 73 42 S2 S2 44 49 4S 46 4S Pie up Time ETE (min) (hr:min) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 5:20 :20. 5:05,, 5:05. *5!15 4:20 4:40 **4:25 ' .. 5:50 *4:25 5:55. 5:50. 5:25 4:40 5:10 4:25 4:25 5:05 4:55 5:30 5:15 5:00 4:10 4:25 4:25 4:15' '4:20 4:10 4:15 4:15 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Route | |||
* Number 63 --64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 -73 74 75 76. NMP/JAF Blls Number -1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l\(lobilization (min) "0 90 90 90 90 90 _90 90 90 --90 90 90 90 90 -_ 90 Evacuation Time Estimate 5.2 46.3 -7 30 5.2 -45.8 7 30 7.6 40.3 11 30 4.4 40.3 7 30 4.6 40.3-7 30 -6.1 40.3 9 30 -5.6. 46.3 -7 30 9_.7 4.9 119-30 8.4 5.0 ioo 30 -5.8 3.0 117 30 3.9 6.7 35 30 4.2 6.3 40 30 11.1 8.0 83 30 4.7 48.4 6 30 -Travel t' " '"' * | |||
* Qistance Time to ETE .'. C. (hr:min)':_:; (miles).'* (min) . . . 26.8 29 :2:10;*--*-26.8 29 2!15 ' 26.8 29 *' 2:10;;:* 26.8 29 ::;;"2:10;-.-; -26.8 -29 *** *2:1cf> 26.8 29 ;* '-2.:10: --* 26._8 29 ,: 4:op*--*--26.8 29 1:2; 3!45;;;. 26.8 29 .;; ... 4:00 .---37.7 41 ;*2:35* 37.7 41 *.. ; 37.7 41 ,'.. __ 26.9 29 35.4 39 ES-19 Unload (min) 5 5 5 5-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 _5 5 two-Wave Route Driver Travel Pickup Rest Time Time ETE (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) I 10 41 10 42 10 51 10 54 10 56 10 55 10 42 10 51 -10 48 10 54 10 50 10 51 10 53 10 49 30 30 30 30 30 .30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 ' , I , I 4:20_ 4:20.-4:10 .6:10: ---5:50 ---6:20 4:'55_ ---5:00 ; 5:35 -;_ 4:25 :lill't55';;4$W\ lk ,,,,, ",'''' c KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate .. 1 ICLO Enclneerlnc, helon Generatlon, Entersv 10 Figure H-8. Region ROS ES-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 1 INTRODUCTION This report describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to develop updated Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (NMP/JAF), located in Oswego County, NY. ETE provide Exelon Generation {Exelon) and Entergy, along with state and local governments with site-specific information needed for Protective Action decision-making. In 2012, an ETE was developed for the NMP/JAF site {KLD TR-521). Regions, grouping of contiguous evacuating ERPAs that forms either a "keyhole" sector-based area, or a circular area within the EPZ, that must be evacuated in response to a radiological emergency, were developed for the 2012 study using specific degree measures. This study has redefined the regions for NMP/JAF site to conform to the 16 cardinal wind directions, as per federal guidance discussed in NUREG/CR-7002. In the performance of this effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are: | |||
* NUREG/CR-7002, SAND 2010-0061P, "Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies," November 2011. (NRC, 2011a). | |||
* NUREG/CR-1745, "Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones," November, 1980. (NRC, 1980a). | |||
* NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980. (NRC, 1980b). | |||
* NUREG/CR-6863, SAND2001-5900, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants," January 2005. (NRC, 2005). | |||
* Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix E to Part SO {lOCFRSO) -Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 2011. (NRC, 2011b). The work effort reported herein was supported and guided by local stakeholders who contributed suggestions, critiques, and the local knowledge base required. Table 1-lpresents a summary of stakeholders and interactions. NMP/JAF 1-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 1-1. Stakeholder Interaction Stakeholder Nature of Stakeholder Interaction Exelon emergency planning personnel Conference calls to define data requirements and revised regions, as well as set up contacts with local Reviewed and government agencies. Entergy Emergency planning personnel approved all project assumptions. Reviewed and commented on draft ETE report. Provided local emergency plans. Reviewed and Oswego County Emergency Management Office approved all project assumptions. Reviewed and commented on draft ETE report. Provided state emergency plan. Reviewed and New York State Office of Emergency Management approved all project assumptions. Reviewed draft ETE report. Local and State Police Agencies Provided existing traffic management plans. Reviewed draft ETE report. 1.1 Overview of the ETE Process The following outline presents a brief description of the work effort in chronological sequence: 1. Information Gathering: a. Defined the revised regions and scope of work in discussions with representatives from Exelon/Entergy. b. Attended meetings in 2012 with emergency planners from the New York State Office of Emergency Management and Oswego County Emergency Management and local law enforcement to identify issues to be addressed and resources available. c. Conducted a detailed field survey in 2012 of the highway system and of area traffic conditions within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ} and Shadow Region. d. Obtained demographic data from the 2010 Census and state and local agencies. Projected 2010 Census data to the year 2015 (see Section 3.1}. e. Utilized data from 2012 random sample telephone survey of EPZ residents. f. Utilized data from 2012 and updated accordingly to identify and describe schools, special facilities, major employers, transient attractions, transportation providers, and other important information. 2. Estimated distributions of Trip Generation times representing the time required by various population groups (permanent residents, employees, and transients} to prepare (mobilize} for the evacuation trip. These estimates are primarily based upon the random sample telephone survey. 3. Defined Evacuation Scenarios. These scenarios reflect the variation in demand, in trip NMP/JAF 1-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 generation distribution and in highway capacities, associated with different seasons, day of week, time of day and weather conditions. 4. Reviewed the existing traffic management plan to be implemented by local and state police in the event of an incident at NMP/JAF. Traffic control is applied at specified Traffic Control Points (TCP) located throughout the study area. 5. Used existing ERPAs to define Evacuation Regions. The EPZ is partitioned into 29 ERPAs along jurisdictional and geographic boundaries. "Regions" are groups of contiguous ERPAs for which ETE are calculated. The configurations of these Regions reflect wind direction and the radial extent of the impacted area. Each Region, other than those that approximate circular areas, approximates a "key-hole section" within the EPZ as recommended by NUREG/CR-7002. 6. Estimated demand for transit services for persons at special facilities and for dependent persons at home. 7. Prepared the input streams for the DYNEV II system. a. Estimated the evacuation traffic demand, based on the available information derived from Census data, and from data provided by local and state agencies, Exelon, Entergy and from the telephone survey. b. Applied the procedures specified in the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM1) to the data acquired during the field survey, to estimate the capacity of all highway segments comprising the evacuation routes. (TRB, 2010). c. Developed the link-node representation of the evacuation network, which is used as the basis for the computer analysis that calculates the ETE. d. Calculated the evacuating traffic demand for each Region and for each Scenario. e. Specified selected candidate destinations for each "origin" (location of each "source" where evacuation trips are generated over the mobilization time) to support evacuation travel consistent with outbound movement relative to the location of NMP/JAF. 8. Executed the DYNEV II model to determine optimal evacuation routing and compute ETE for all residents, transients and employees ("general population") with access to private vehicles. Generated a complete set of ETE for all specified Regions and Scenarios. 9. Documented ETE in formats in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002. 10. Calculated the ETE for all transit activities including those for special facilities (schools, medical facilities, and correctional facilities), for the transit-dependent population and for homebound special needs population. 1 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM 2010), Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 2010. NMP/JAF 1-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 1.2 The Locations of Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick NMP/JAF are on adjacent parcels of land which border the southeast shore of Lake Ontario in the Town of Scriba in Oswego County, New York. The site is approximately 35 miles northwest of Syracuse, NY. The EPZ consists of parts of Oswego County and Lake Ontario. Figure 1-1 displays the area surrounding NMP/JAF. This map identifies the communities in the area and the major roads. NMP/JAF 1-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I L Legend Lake Ontario / / / I I I I I .. ,, -./:{ NMP/JAF o ... 8/29/2012 \ l '-_, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings / / I ,/ Copyright: ESRI lr::LO Englnl!1!1lng, Constl!llatlon Energy, Entl!rgy ----...... ' Lacona ' --..... / ' \ Altmar / -\ \ /1 *--, I ,/' / I Figure 1-1. Location of NMP/JAF Nuclear Power Plant NMP/JAF 1-5 Evacuation Time Estimate 20 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 1.3 Preliminary Activities These activities are described below. Field Surveys of the Highway Network KLD personnel drove the entire highway system within in 2012 the EPZ and the Shadow Region which consists of the area between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles radially from NMP/JAF. The characteristics of each section of highway were recorded. These characteristics are shown in Table 1-2: Table 1-2. Highway Characteristics | |||
* Number of lanes | |||
* Posted speed | |||
* Lane width | |||
* Actual free speed | |||
* Shoulder type & width | |||
* Abutting land use | |||
* Interchange geometries | |||
* Control devices | |||
* Lane channelization & queuing | |||
* Intersection configuration (including capacity (including turn bays/lanes) roundabouts where applicable) | |||
* Geometrics: curves, grades (>4%) | |||
* Traffic signal type | |||
* Unusual characteristics: Narrow bridges, sharp curves, poor pavement, flood warning signs, inadequate delineations, toll booths, etc. Video and audio recording equipment were used to capture a permanent record of the highway infrastructure. No attempt was made to meticulously measure such attributes as lane width and shoulder width; estimates of these measures based on visual observation and recorded images were considered appropriate for the purpose of estimating the capacity of highway sections. For example, Exhibit 15-7 in the HCM 2010 indicates that a reduction in lane width from 12 feet (the "base" value) to 10 feet can reduce free flow speed (FFS) by 1.1 mph -not a material difference -for two-lane highways. Exhibit 15-30 in the HCM 2010 shows little sensitivity for the estimates of Service Volumes at Level of Service (LOS) E (near capacity), with respect to FFS, for two-lane highways. The data from the audio and video recordings were used to create detailed geographic information systems (GIS) shapefiles and databases of the roadway characteristics and of the traffic control devices observed during the road survey; this information was referenced while preparing the input stream for the DYNEV II System. As documented on page 15-5 of the HCM 2010, the capacity of a two-lane highway is 1, 700 passenger cars per hour in one direction. For freeway sections, a value of 2,250 vehicles per hour per lane is assigned, as per Exhibit 11-17 of the HCM 2010. The road survey has identified several segments which are characterized by adverse geometrics on two-lane highways which are reflected in reduced values for both capacity and speed. These estimates are consistent with the service volumes for LOS E presented in HCM 2010 Exhibit 15-30. These links may be NMP/JAF 1-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 identified by reviewing Appendix K. Link capacity is an input to DYNEV II which computes the ETE. Further discussion of roadway capacity is provided in Section 4 of this report. Traffic signals are either pre-timed (signal timings are fixed over time and do not change with the traffic volume on competing approaches), or are actuated (signal timings vary over time based on the changing traffic volumes on competing approaches). Actuated signals require detectors to provide the traffic data used by the signal controller to adjust the signal timings. These detectors are typically magnetic loops in the roadway, or video cameras mounted on the signal masts and pointed toward the intersection approaches. If detectors were observed on the approaches to a signalized intersection during the road survey, detailed signal timings were not collected as the timings vary with traffic volume. TCPs at locations which have control devices are represented as actuated signals in the DYNEV II system. If no detectors were observed, the signal control at the intersection was considered pre-timed, and detailed signal timings were gathered for several signal cycles. These signal timings were input to the DYNEV II system used to compute ETE, as per NUREG/CR-7002 guidance. Figure 1-2 presents the link-node analysis network that was constructed to model the evacuation roadway network in the EPZ and Shadow Region. The directional arrows on the links and the node numbers have been removed from Figure 1-2 to clarify the figure. The detailed figures provided in Appendix K depict the analysis network with directional arrows shown and node numbers provided. The observations made during the field survey were used to calibrate the analysis network. Telephone Survey A telephone survey was undertaken in 2012 to gather information needed for the evacuation study. Appendix F presents the survey instrument, the procedures used and tabulations of data compiled from the survey returns. These data were utilized to develop estimates of vehicle occupancy to estimate the number of evacuating vehicles during an evacuation and to estimate elements of the mobilization process. This database was also referenced to estimate the number of transit-dependent residents. Computing the Evacuation Time Estimates The overall study procedure is outlined in Appendix D. Demographic data were obtained from several sources, as detailed later in this report. These data were analyzed and converted into vehicle demand data. The vehicle demand was loaded onto appropriate "source" links of the analysis network using GIS mapping software. The DYNEV II system was then used to compute ETE for all Regions and Scenarios. Analytical Tools The DYNEV II System that was employed for this study is comprised of several integrated computer models. One of these is the DYNEV (DYnamic Network Evacuation) macroscopic simulation model, a new version of the IDYNEV model that was developed by KLD under contract with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). NMP/JAF 1-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF " Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF O Node --Link Gl ERPA \....-:. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate "' O.te-:9/6/2012 ' Copyrlght:ESRIBasemapDilla ICtOEng!nttrlng,CbniteH.ilonEntr(IY.Entergy Figure 1-2. NMP/JAF Link-Node Analysis Network 1-8 Lacona Reservoir Altmar *@.*,* Constantia 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 DYNEV II consists of four sub-models: | |||
* A macroscopic traffic simulation model (for details, see Appendix C). | |||
* A Trip Distribution (TD), model that assigns a set of candidate destination (D) nodes for each "origin" (O) located within the analysis network, where evacuation trips are "generated" over time. This establishes a set of 0-D tables. | |||
* A Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA), model Which assigns trips to paths of travel (routes) which satisfy the 0-D tables, over time. The TD and DTA models are integrated to form.the DTRAD (Dynamic Traffic Assignment and Distribution) model, as described in Appendix B. | |||
* A Myopic Traffic Diversion model which diverts traffic to avoid intense, local congestion, if possible. Another software product developed by KLD, named UNITES (UNlfied Iransportation £ngineering was used to expedite data entry and to automate the production of output tables. The dynamics of traffic flow over the network are graphically animated using the software product, EVAN (Evacuation ANimator), developed by KLD. EVAN is GIS based, and displays stc;itistics such as LOS, vehicles discharged, average speed, and percent of vehicles evacuated, output by the DYNEV II System. The use of a GIS framework enables the user to zoom in on areas of congestion and query road name, town name and other geographical information. The procedure for applying the DYNEV II System within the framework of developing ETE is outlined in Appendix D. Appendix A is a glossary of terms. For the reader interested in an evaluation of the original model, 1-DYNEV, the following references are suggested: | |||
* NUREG/CR-4873, PNL-:-6171, "Benchmark Study of the 1-DYNEV. Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code," (NRC, 1988a). | |||
* NUREG/CR-4874, PNL-6172, "The Sensitivity of Evacuation Time Estimates to Changes in Input for the 1-:0YNEV Computer Code," (NRC, 1988b). The evacuation analysis procedures based upon theneed to: | |||
* Route traffic along paths of travel that will expedite their travel from their respective points of origin to points put.side the EPZ. | |||
* Restrict movement toward NMP/JAF to the extent practicable, and disperse traffic demand so as to avoid focusing demand on a limited number of highways .. ' ' | |||
* Move traffic in directions that are generally outbound, relative to the lo.cation of NMP/JAF. ' ' DYNEV II provides a detailecj description of traffic operations on the evacuation network. This description enables the analyst to identify bottlenecks and' to develop countermeasures that NMP/JAi= | |||
* Evacuation* Time Estimate 1-9 Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 are designed to represent the behavioral responses of evacuees. The effects of these countermeasures may then be tested with th*e model. 1.4 Comparison with Prior ETE Study Table 1-3 presents a comparison of the present ETE study with the 2012 study. The major factors contributing to the differences between the ETE values obtained in this study and those of the previous study can be summarized as follows: | |||
* The population has been updated using the 2010 US Census and projected out to 2015 using 2014 growth rates. EPZ population decreased by 1.11% since the last study, which contributes to the slightly shorter ETE. | |||
* The number of regions considered was significantly reduced (54 in the previous study versus 29 in this study) due to the omission of slivers (sniall pieces of an ERPA within the keyhole that have little or no population -See Figure 6-2) and the use of the sixteen cardinal wind directions (22.5° sectors in accordance with federal guidelines, rather than the narrow sectors -as little as 4° -used in legacy PAR for the sites). Table 1-3. ETE Study Comparisons *" , . ' Topic Previous ETE Study **Current.J:JE *Study ArcGIS software using 2010 US ArcGIS Software using 2010 US Census Census blocks and projecting out Resident Population blocks; area ratio method used. to 2015 using 2014 population Basis changes published by the US Population= 41,887 Census; area ratio method used. Population= 41,423 Resident Population 2.39 persons/household, 1.24 evacuating 2.39 persons/household, 1.24 Vehicle Occupancy vehicles/household yielding: 1.93 evacuating vehicles/household persons/vehicle. yielding: 1.93 persons/vehicle. Employee estimates based on . Employee estimates based .on information information provided by Oswego Employee provided by Oswego County about major County about major employers employers in EPZ. 1.09 employees per in EPZ. 1.09 employees per Population vehicle based on telephone survey results. vehicle based on telephone Employees = 1; 714 survey results. Employees= 1,714 . NMP/JAF 1-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Topic Previous EJE Study Current EJE Study Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the telephone survey. the results of the telephone survey. A total Dispatching a total of 76 buses of 1,881 people who do not have access to a to provide transit for 1,860 Transit-Dependent vehicle, requiring at least 63 buses to people who do not have access evacuate. An additional 208 homebound to a vehicle. An additional 208 Population . special needs persons require transportation homebound special needs to evacuate (151 ambulatory and 57 persons require transportation wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 to evacuate (151 ambulatory and wheelchair vans). 57 wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 wheelchair vans). Transient estimates based upon . Transient estimates based upon information information provided about provided about transient attractions in EPZ, transient attractions in EPZ, Transient supplemented by observations of the supplemented by phone calls facilities during the road survey, internet made to facilities from the Population searches and from phone calls to facilities. previous 2012 ETE were Transients= 8,315 (including 2,349 reviewed. Transients= 8,495 commuting SUNY students). (including 2,349 commuting SUNY Oswego students). Medical facility population based Medical facility population based on on information provided by . information provided by, Oswego County. Oswego County. Current census= 1,080 Current census= 1,080 Special Facilities Wheelchair and regular buses Required= 223 Wheelchair and regular buses Population Ambulances*Required = 14 Required = 223 Correctional facility census = 160; 6 buses Ambulances Required = 14 required. Correctional facility census = 160; 6 buses required. School, Preschool, and Day Camp School population based on information population based on information provided by Oswego County Emergency provided by Oswego County. School, Preschool, | |||
* Management. Emergency Management. and Day Camp School enrollment= 15,377 (including SUNY Total enrollment= 15,735 Population commuter students) (including SUNY Oswego commuter students and Ontario Buses required = 160 Bible Conference) Buses required = 156 NMP/JAF 1-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Tir;ne Estimate February 24, 2016 . | |||
Topic Previous ETE Study Voluntary evacuation from 20 percent of the population within the EPZ, within EPZ in areas but not within the Evacuation Region (see outside region to be Figure 2-1) evacuated 20% of people outside of the EPZ within the Shadow Evacuation Shadow Region (see Figure 7-2) Network Size 1,0S7 links; 716 nodes Field surveys conducted in March 20l2. Roadway Geometric Roads and intersections were video archived. Data Road capacities based on 2010 HCM. School Evacuation Direct evacuation to designated reception center. SO percent of transit-dependent persons will Ridesharing evacuate with a neighbor or friend. '> Based on residential telephone survey of specific pre-trip mobilization activities: Residents with commuters returning leave between lS and 210 minutes. Trip Generation for. Residents without commuters returning Evacuation | |||
* leave between Sand 16S minutes. Employees and transients leave between S and 120 minutes. All times measured from the Advisory to Evacuate. Normal, Rain, or Snow. The capacity and free flow speed of ail links in the network are Weather reduced by 10% in the event of rain and 20% for snow. Modeling . ' DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.8.0 NMP/JAF 1-12 Evacuation Time Estimate | |||
* Current ETE Study 20 *percent of the population within the EPZ, but not within the Evacuation Region (see Figure 2-1) 20% of people outs.ide of the EPZ within the Shadow Region (see Figure 7-2) 1,07S links; 729 nodes Field surveys conducted in March 2012. Roads and intersections were video archived. Road capacities based on 2010 HCM. Direct evacuation to designated reception center. SO percent of transit-dependent persons will evacuate with a neighbor or friend. Based on residential telephone survey of specific pre-trip mobilization activities: Residents with commuters returning leave between lS and 210 minutes. Residents without commuters returning leave between S and 16S minutes. Employees and transients leave between S and 120 minutes. All times measured from the Advisory to Evacuate. Normal, Rain, or Snow. The capacity and free flow speed of all links in the network are reduced by 10% in the event of rain and 20% for snow. DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.19.2 KLD Engineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016 Topic Previous ETE Study Harborfest Fireworks Special Events Special Event Population = 54,900 additional transients Evacuation Cases 54 Regions and 14 Scenarios producing 756 unique cases. ETE reported for90th and moth percentile Evacuation Time population. Results presented by Region and Estimates Reporting Scenario. Winter Midweek Midday, Evacuation Time Good Weather: 2:55 and 4:00 Estimates for the entire EPZ, goth and 10oth percentile Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:35 and 3:40 NMP/JAF 1-13 Evacuation Time Estimate Current ETE Study Harborfest Fireworks Special Event Population = 54,900 additional transients 29 Regions and 14 Scenarios producing 406 unique cases. ETE reported for9oth and moth percentile population. Results presented by Region and Scenario. Winter Midweek Midday, Good Weather: 2:55 and 3:50 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:30 and 3:40 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 2 STUDY ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS This section presents the estimates and assumptions utilized in the development of the evacuation time estimates. 2.1 Data Estimates 1. Population estimates are based upon Census 2010 data and are projected to 2015 using annual growth rates computed by comparing 2010 data with 20141 population estimation published by the US Census (see Section 3). 2. Estimates of employees who reside outside the EPZ and commute to work within the EPZ are based upon data obtained from Oswego County Emergency Management in 2012. 3. | |||
* Population estimates at special and transient facilities are based on available data from the county emergency management offices and from phone calls to specific facilities. This data was collected in 2012. | |||
* 4. Roadway capacity estimates are based on field surveys and the application of the Highway Capacity Manual 2010. 5. Population mobilization times are based on a statistical analysis of data acquired from a random sample telephone survey of EPZ residents (see Section 5 and Appendix F). 6 .. The relationship between resident population and evacuating vehicles is developed from the telephone survey. Average values of 2.39 .persons per household (see Appendix F, Figure F-1) and 1.24 evacuating vehicles per: household (Figure F-8) are used. The relationship between persons and vehicles for employees; transients, and the special event is as follows: a. Employees and Commuter Schools: 1.09 employees per vehicle (telephone . surVE!Y results) for all major employers. b. Transient Attractions: Vehicle occupancy varies from 1.2 people per vehicle to 3 . people per vehicle, depending on the type of facility. See Section 3.3 and Appendix E for data gathered from local facilities. c. Special Events: Assumed transients attending the Harborfest firework fravel as families/households iri a single and used the average household | |||
* size of 2:39 persons to estimatethe number of vehicles. 1 The annual po*pulation estimates prepared by the Census Bureau for the entire U.S. involyes an extensive data gathering process .. As such, population estimates are a year behind -2014 data are released in 2015. The .schedule for release of .Census . data is provided on. the Census website: http://www.census.gov/popest/schedu le.htm.1 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 2-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 2.2 Study Methodological Assumptions 1. ETE are presented for the evacuation of the goth and 1ooth percentiles of population for each Region and for each Scenario. The percentile ETE is defined as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate issued to a specific Region of the EPZ, to the time that Region is clear of the indicated percentile of evacuees. A Region is defined as a group of ERPAs that is issued an Advisory to Evacuate. A scenario is a combination of circumstances, including time of day, day of week, season, a'nd weather conditions. 2. The. ETE are computed and presented in tabular format and graphically, in a format compliant with NUREG/CR-7002. 3. Evacuation movements (paths of travel) are generally outbound relative to NMP/JAF to the extent permitted by the highway network. All major evacuation routes are used in the analysis. 4. Regions are defined by the underlying "keyhole" or circular configurations as specified in Section 1.4 of NUREG/CR-7002 as well as those which result from the plant specific PARs which may be issued at either NMP or JAF. These Regions, as defined, display irregular boundaries reflecting the geography of the ERPAs included within these underlying configurations. . | |||
* 5 .. As indicated in Figure 2-2 of NUREG/CR-7002, 100% of people within the impacted "keyhole" evacuate. 20% of those people within the EPZ, not within the impacted keyhole, will voluntarily evacuate. 20% of those people within the Shadow Region will voluntarily evacuate. See Figure 2-1 for a graphical representation of these evacuation percentages. Sensitivity studies explore the effect ori ETE of increasing the percentage of voluntary evacuees in the Shadow Region (see. Appendix M). 6. A total of 14 "Scenarios" representing different temporal variations (season, time of day, day of week) and weather conditions are considered. These Scenarios are outlined in Table 2-1. 7. Scenario 14 considers the closure of a single lane southbound on SR 481, for the length . | |||
* of the two lane section of this roadway which is about 4/loths of a mile south of Churchill Road to 1;4th mile north of Van Buren DL 8. The models of the 1-DYNEV System were recognized as state of the art by the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board (ASLB) in past hearings. (Sources: Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Hearings on Seabrook and Shoreham; Urbanik2 and NRC, 1988a). The models have continuously been refined and extended since those hearings and were independently validated by a consultant retained by the NRC. The new DYNEV 11 model incorporates the latest technology in traffic simulation and in dynamic traffic assignment. The DYNEV II System is used to compute ETE in this study. 2 Urbanik; T;, et. al. Berichmark Study of the 1-DYNEV Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code, NUREG/CR-4873, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June, 1988. NMP/JAF 2-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 . * . . | |||
Table 2-1. Evacuation Scenario Definitions I Day of Time of Scenario Season3 Week Day Weather Special 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None 5 Summer Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 *Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None 12 Winter Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 13 Summer Weekend Evening Good Special Event -Harborfest Fireworks 14 Summer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Impact -SB Lane Closure on SR 481 3 Winter assumes that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer assumes that school is not in session. NMP/JAF 2-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 10 Miles Downwind Staged Evacuation: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind | |||
* Plant Location | |||
* Region to be Evacuated: 100% Evacuation 0 20% Shadow Evacuation 0 Shelter, then Evacuate Figure 2-1. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology NMP/JAF 2-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 2.3 Study Assumptions 1. The Planning Basis Assumption for the calculation of ETE is a rapidly escalating accident that requires evacuation, and includes the following: a. Advisory to Evacuate is announced coincident with the siren notification. b. Mobilization of the general population will commence within 15 minutes after siren notification. c. ETE are measured relative to the Advisory to Evacuate. 2. It is assumed that everyone within the group of ERPAs forming a Region that is issued an Advisory to Evacuate will, in fact, respond and evacuate in general accord with the planned routes. 3. 56 percent of the households in the EPZ have at least 1 commuter; 45 percent of those households with commuters will await the return of a commuter before beginning their evacuation trip (see Figure F-6), based on the telephone survey results. Therefore 25 percent (56% x 45% = 25%) of EPZ households will await the return of a commuter, prior to beginning their evacuation trip. 4. The ETE will also include consideration of "through" (External-External) trips during the time that such traffic is permitted to enter the evacuated Region. "Normal" traffic flow is assumed to be present within the EPZ at the start of the emergency. 5. Access Control Points (ACP) will be staffed within approximately 120 minutes following the siren notifications, to divert traffic attempting to enter the EPZ. Earlier activation of ACP locations could delay returning commuters. It is assumed that no through traffic will enter the EPZ after this 120 minute time period. 6. Traffic Control Points (TCP) within the EPZ will be staffed over time, beginning at the Advisory to Evacuate. Their number and location will depend on the Region to be evacuated and resources available. The objectives of these TCP are: a. Facilitate the movements of all (mostly evacuating) vehicles at the location. b. Discourage inadvertent vehicle movements towards NMP/JAF. c. Provide assurance and guidance to any traveler who is unsure of the appropriate actions or routing. d. Act as local surveillance and communications center. e. Provide information to the emergency operations center (EOC) as needed, based on direct observation or on information provided by travelers. In calculating ETE, it is assumed that evacuees will drive safely, travel in directions identified in the plan, and obey all control devices and traffic guides. NMP/JAF 2-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: 7. Buses will be used to transport those without access to private vehicles: a. If schools/day camps are in session, transport (buses) will evacuate students directly to the designated reception center. b. It is assumed parents will pick up children at small day care centers (enrollments of 30 students or less) prior to evacuation. c. Buses, wheelchair vans and ambulances will evacuate patients at medical facilities and at any senior facilities within the EPZ, as needed. d. Transit-dependent general population will be evacuated to reception centers. e. Schoolchildren, if school is in session, are given priority in assigning transit vehicles. f. Bus mobilization time is considered in ETE calculations. g. Analysis of the number of required round-trips ("waves") of evacuating transit vehicles is presented. h. Transport of transit-dependent evacuees from reception centers to congregate care centers is not considered in this study. 8. Provisions are made for evacuating the transit-dependent portion of the general population to reception centers by bus, based on the assumption that some of these people will ride-share with family, neighbors, and friends, thus reducing the demand for buses. We assume that the percentage of people who rideshare is 50 percent. This assumption is based upon reported experience for other emergencies4, and on guidance in Section 2.2 of NUREG/CR-7002. (IES, 1981). 9. Two types of adverse weather scenarios are considered. Rain may occur for either winter or summer scenarios; snow occurs in winter scenarios only. It is assumed that the rain or snow begins earlier or at about the same time the evacuation advisory is issued. No weather-related reduction in the number of transients who may be present in the EPZ is assumed. It is assumed that roads are passable and that the appropriate agencies are plowing the roads as they would normally when snowing. Adverse weather scenarios affect roadway capacity and the free flow highway speeds. The factors applied for the ETE study are based on recent research on the effects of weather on roadway operations5; the factors are shown in Table 2-2. (Agarwal, 2005). 4 Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto, THE MISSISSAUGA EVACUATION FINAL REPORT, June 1981. The report indicates that 6,600 people of a transit-dependent population of 8,600 people shared rides with other residents; a ride share rate of 76% (Page 5-10). 5 Agarwal, M. et. Al. Impacts of Weather on Urban Freeway Traffic Flow Characteristics and Facility Capacity, Proceedings of the 2005 Mid-Continent Transportation Research Symposium, August, 2005. The results of this paper are included as Exhibit 10-15 in the HCM 2010. NMP/JAF 2-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: 10. School buses used to transport students are assumed to transport 70 students per bus for elementary schools, and 50 students per bus for middle and high schools, based on information provided in the local emergency plans. Transit buses used to transport the transit-dependent general population are assumed to transport 30 people per bus. Wheelchair equipped buses are assumed to carry 20 ambulatory and 2 wheelchair bound individuals and wheelchair vans can accommodate 7 ambulatory and 3 wheelchair bound persons. The capacities of wheelchair-carrying vehicles are based on information provided in the local emergency plans. Ambulances are assumed to carry 2 bedridden occupants. Table 2-2. Model Adjustment for Adverse Weather Highway Free Flow Scenario Capacity* Speed* Mobilization Time for General Population Rain 90% 90% No Effect Snow 80% 80% Clear driveway before leaving home (See Figure F-13) *Adverse weather capacity and speed values are given as a percentage of good weather conditions. Roads are assumed to be passable. NMP/JAF 2-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 3 DEMAND ESTIMATION The estimates of demand, expressed in terms of people and vehicles, constitute a critical element in developing an evacuation plan. These estimates consist of three components: 1. An estimate of population within the EPZ, stratified into groups (resident, employee, transient). 2. An estimate, for each population group, of mean occupancy per evacuating vehicle. This estimate is used to determine the number of evacuating vehicles. 3. An estimate of potential double-counting of vehicles. Appendix E presents much of the source material for the population estimates. Our primary source of population data, the 2010 Census, however, is not adequate for directly estimating some transient groups. Throughout the year, vacationers and tourists enter the EPZ. These non-residents may dwell within the EPZ for a short period (e.g. a few days or one or two weeks), or may enter and leave within one day. Estimates of the size of these population components must be obtained, so that the associated number of evacuating vehicles can be ascertained. The potential for double-counting people and vehicles must be addressed. For example: | |||
* A resident who works and shops within the EPZ could be counted as a resident, again as an employee and once again as a shopper. | |||
* A visitor who stays at a hotel and spends time at a park, then goes shopping could be counted three times. Furthermore, the number of vehicles at a location depends on time of day. For example, motel parking lots may be full at dawn and empty at noon. Similarly, parking lots at area parks, which are full at noon, may be almost empty at dawn. Estimating counts of vehicles by simply adding up the capacities of different types of parking facilities will tend to overestimate the number of transients and can lead to ETE that are too conservative. Analysis of the population characteristics of the NMP/JAF EPZ indicates the need to identify three distinct groups: | |||
* Permanent residents -people who are year round residents of the EPZ. | |||
* Transients -people who reside outside of the EPZ who enter the area for a specific purpose (shopping, recreation, visiting a park, camping) and then leave the area. | |||
* Employees -people who reside outside of the EPZ and commute to businesses within the EPZ on a daily basis. Estimates of the population and number of evacuating vehicles for each of the population groups are presented for each ERPA and by polar coordinate representation (population rose). The NMP/JAF EPZ is subdivided into 29 ERPAs, as shown in Figure 3-1. NMP/JAF 3-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF . *-<r* . Lake Ont a no Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF 0 ERPA \..-.:. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Evacuation Time Estimate /l Oue:8/29/2012 BRI Basem1p Data KlDEng!fieerlng.Constelt1tionEnerav,Entergy Figure 3-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ 3-2 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 3.1 Permanent Residents The U.S. Census Bureau conducts a physical census of the permanent resident population in the U.S. every ten years. The last census began on April 1, 2010 with data from the census being published on April 1, 2011. In the years between the decennial censuses, the Census Bureau works with state and local agencies to provide annual population estimates at the state and local levels. These estimates are done using data on deaths, births and migration. This annual data gathering process and analysis is extensive. As such, population estimates are a year behind -2014 data are released in 2015. This study is based on 2010 Census population data from the Census Bureau website1 extrapolated to 2015 using annual growth rates computed from the 2014 Census population estimates as outlined in the methodology below. The Census Bureau QuickFacts2 website provides annual population estimates for each state, county, town3 and municipality4 in the United States. As discussed above, Census population estimates are a year behind. Thus, the most recent population estimates available for the towns and municipalities are for the time period from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 20145. The population change and annual growth rate for each town and municipality in the study area (EPZ plus Shadow Region) are provided in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, respectively. Figure 3-2 shows the town and municipality boundaries identified by the Census Bureau. The permanent resident population, as per the 2010 Census, for the EPZ and the Shadow Region was projected to 2015 using the compound growth formula (Equation 1). In the compound growth formula, g is the annual growth rate and X is the number of years projected forward from Year 2010. The compound growth formula can be solved for g as shown in Equation 2. Equation 1 (Compound Growth for X years): Population 201X Population 2010 (1 + g) x Equation 2 (Solving for the annual growth rate): g = (Population 201X -;-Population 2010)1/x -1 The 2010 and 2014 population data provided in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 were used in Equation 2 to compute the annual growth rate for each town and municipality in the study area using X = 4.25 (4 years and 3 months from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014). The computed annual growth rate for each town and municipality is summarized in the final column of Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, respectively. 1 www.census.gov 2 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html 3 http://www. census. gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2014/S UB-EST2014-4.html 4 http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2014/S UB-EST2014-3.html 5 The schedule for release of Census data is provided on the Census website: http://www.census.gov/popest/schedule.html NMP/JAF 3-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 The most detailed data should always be used when forecasting population. In terms of detailed data, municipal data is the finest level of detail, then town data, county data, and state data. The municipality growth rate was used first and if that was not available or applicable within the study area, then the town growth rate was used. Town growth rates are available for the entire study area and were used {in the absence of municipal data) as they are the finest level of detail available for the entire study area. Thus, county and state data were not used. The Census Bureau does not provide population data specific to the boundaries of the study area. As such, the entire town or municipality population was used to compute the annual growth rate. Then, the appropriate municipality or town growth rate was applied only to those Census blocks located within the study area. All other blocks outside of the study area were not considered as part of the EPZ or Shadow Region population, even if they are located within one of the municipalities or towns that intersect the study area. The appropriate annual growth rate was applied to each Census block in the study area depending on which town or municipality the block is located within. The population was extrapolated, using Equation 2, to September 1, 2015 as the base year for this ETE study. Population estimates are based upon Census 2010 data. The estimates are created by cutting the census block polygons by the ERPA and EPZ boundaries. A ratio of the original area of each census block and the updated area {after cutting) is multiplied by the total block population to estimate what the population is within the EPZ. This methodology assumes that the population is evenly distributed across a census block. Table 3-3 provides the permanent resident population within the EPZ, by ERPA, for 2010 {based on the most recent U.S. Census) and for 2015 {based on the methodology above). As indicated, the permanent resident population within the EPZ has decreased by 1.11% since the 2010 Census. The average household size {2.39 persons/household -See Appendix F, sub-section F.3.1} and the number of evacuating vehicles per household {1.24 vehicles/household -See Appendix F, sub-section F.3.2} were adapted from the telephone survey results. The year 2015 permanent resident population is divided by the average household size and then multiplied by the average number of evacuating vehicles per household in order to estimate number of vehicles. Permanent resident population and vehicle estimates are presented in Table 3-4. Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 present the permanent resident population and permanent resident vehicle estimates by sector and distance from NMP/JAF. This "rose" was constructed using GIS software. It can be argued that this estimate of permanent residents overstates, somewhat, the number of evacuating vehicles, especially during the summer. It is certainly reasonable to assert that some portion of the population would be on vacation during the summer and would travel elsewhere. A rough estimate of this reduction can be obtained as follows: | |||
* Assume 50 percent of all households vacation for a two-week period over the summer. | |||
* Assume these vacations, in aggregate, are uniformly dispersed over 10 weeks, i.e. 10 percent of the population is on vacation during each two-week interval. | |||
* Assume half of these vacationers leave the area. NMP/JAF 3-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 On this basis, the permanent resident population would be reduced by 5 percent in the summer and by a lesser amount in the off-season. Given the uncertainty in this estimate, we elected to apply no reductions in permanent resident population for the summer scenarios to account for residents who may be out of the area. 3.1.1 SUNY Oswego One higher education facility, the State University of New York at Oswego (SUNY Oswego), is located within the EPZ. SUNY Oswego (located in Oswego, 8.0 miles southwest of NMP/JAF) has 8,300 enrolled students with 4,300 of those students considered on-campus residents. Based on data provided by Oswego County Emergency Management, students will be evacuated by bus and private vehicles. There will be 18 buses dispatched to the university with a capacity of 40 students per bus, thereby evacuating a total of 720 students by bus. The plans assume ridesharing amongst students will occur such that all remaining on-campus students will have a ride out of the EPZ. For students evacuating in private vehicles, the same trip mobilization distribution (See Section 5) as transients was used as their commuting patterns are similar. Demographic Census data for cities neighboring SUNY Oswego were used to compute a baseline percentage of college age residents. This baseline percentage was removed from the percentage of 20-24 year olds within the City of Oswego to determine the additional 20-24 year olds present within the city due to its proximity of SUNY Oswego. The remaining percentage of 20-24 year olds was multiplied by the total city population which resulted in 1,651 student commuters within the EPZ. According to school officials, a total of 4,000 students (8,300 -4,000) commute minus the 1,651 EPZ residents (to avoid double counting) results in 2,349 student commuters from outside the EPZ. A vehicle occupancy of 1.09 commuters per vehicle obtained from the telephone survey question relating to commuting employees (See Section 3.4) was used to determine the number of evacuating vehicles for student commuters as their travel patterns are similar. As such, 2,155 vehicles for students commuting to SUNY Oswego have been considered in this study. 3.1.2 Day Camp -Ontario Bible Conference The Ontario Bible Conference (located in 1.1 miles west-southwest from NMP/JAF) is located within the EPZ. This is a summer children's day camp and retreat center (See Table E-1). Based on discussions with Oswego County officials, there are 91 children that attend in the month of July. The day camp will evacuate to the New York State Fairgrounds Reception Center, identical to those of their school counterparts. A total of 2 buses or 4 vehicles (1 bus is equivalent to 2 passenger vehicles -see Section 8) have been incorporated for the Ontario Bible Conference. The evacuation of this facility is modelled the same as schools and is discussed in Section 8. 3.1.3 Special Facilities One correctional facility, Oswego County Correctional Facility (located in Oswego, 7.2 miles south-southwest from NMP/JAF) and several large medical facilities (see Table E-2) are located within the EPZ. This study considers the people residing at these facilities as transit-dependent population, which is addressed in Section 8, including the number and type (bus, wheelchair bus, ambulance) of vehicles needed to evacuate. NMP/JAF 3-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 3-1. Town Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 T 2010 2014 Percent Annual own Population Population Change Growth Rate ., Cayuga County, NY * **. ,,.,, * .. . :; t.:;*"'.;}..; . EPZ Mexico 5,197 5,177 -0.38% -0.09% Minetto 1,659 1,627 -1.93% -0.46% New Haven 2,856 2,873 0.60% 0.14% Oswego 7,984 7,920 -0.80% -0.19% Palermo 3,664 3,651 -0.35% -0.08% Richland 5,718 5,686 -0.56% -0.13% Scriba 6,840 6,726 -1.67% -0.39% Volney 5,926 5,843 -1.40% -0.33% Shadow Region Granby 6,821 6,699 -1.79% -0.42% Hannibal 4,854 4,732 -2.51% -0.60% Hastings 9,469 9,401 -0.72% -0.17% Sandy Creek 3,939 3,872 -1.70% -0.40% Schroeppel 8,482 8,371 -1.31% -0.31% Table 3-2. Municipality Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 Municipality 2010 2014 Percent Annual Population Population Change Growth Rate 'Ž'"''"' . ,.<;:;--., ; | |||
* y -'..!i:i*F:1 i *qswego * "'"' EPZ Mexico I 1,624 I 1,592 I -1.97% I -0.47% Oswego I 18,142 I 17,988 I -0.85% I -0.20% Shadow Region Fulton I 11,896 I 11,648 I -2.08% I -0.49% Pulaski I 2,365 I 2,329 I -1.52% I -0.36% NMP/JAF 3-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Cl EPZ c:::J County Boundary Town Boundary 12.22 Shadow Region Census Places GJ Municipalities with Data Census Designated Places (No Data) Evacuation Time Estimate Figure 3-2. Census Boundaries within the NMP/JAF Study Area 3-7 v Ellisburg r*'!nor J !!ff/r_.11 o n Cu 1111 ty Lorraine Orwell 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 3,3, EPZ Permanent Resident Population ERPA 2010 Population 1 173 2 469 3 343 4 687 5 804 6 915 7 699 8 718 9 597 10 1,023 11 1,916 12 7,960 13 10,223 14 193 15 1,105 16 1,624 17 587, 18 1,030 19 1,316 20 1,783 21 ,1,782 ; 22 5,940 23 0 24 0 25 0 26 O* 27 ' 0 28 .* 0 29. 0 "J 11&; tPTAl-:'f -> ,<<<;; '" < , EPZ Population Growth: . NMP/JAF 3-8 Evacuation Time Estimate 2015 Population 172 465 337 690 786 896 700 720 ' 599 1,002 1,875 7,894 10,121 '193 1,104 1,585 587 1,021 1,295 1,756 1,741 5,884 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.11% '.!jl: KLD Engineering, P.C. * . February 24, 2016 Table 3-4. Permanent Resident Population and Vehicles by ERPA ERPA 2015 Resident Population 1 172 2 465 3 337 4 690 5 786 6 896 7 700 8 720 9 599 10 1,002 11 1,875 12 7,894 13 10,121 14 193 15 1,104 16 1,585 17 587 18 1,021 19 1;295 20 1,756 21 1,741 22 5,884 23 0 24 '0 25 0 26 0 27 0 28 0 29 .. 0 , ,fil?i. 'rOT:it'. * . . . NMP/JAF *Evacuation Time Estimate Resident Vehicles 91 243 175 361 407 464 365 374 311 522 973 4,098 5,253 104 570 820 307 528 672 916 905 3,053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 / o, _, ::.:?'::. | |||
* KLD Erigineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 WNW ITJ *-w CT:] I 0 WSW [ill] NW CD ' SW ' 124,0861 Resident Population ' N NNW ITJ NNE 1-.... ' ' SSW 392 ;... _, SSE I S,477 I I 1,848 I Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 0 1-2 448 448 2-3 752 1,200 3-4 1,551 2,751 w 4-5 1,423 4,174 5-6 3,465 7,639 6-7 9,178 16,817 7-8 9,975 26,792 8-9 7,088 33,880 9-10 4,685 38,565 10 -EPZ 2,858 41,423 -.Total: 41,423 Figure 3-3. Permanent Resident Population by S.ector NMP/JAF 3-10 Evacuation Time Estimate ' NE ITJ ' SE ENE OQ:J --' I. E --f ESE I 3,963 I I 1,947 I 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary N E KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 N NNW CD NNE ITJ ITJ -\ 7 -0 NW NE LO " " CD " ' " ' "' ,, ' ' WNW ,) ' ENE [IJ OU ., . I I ,-w I E [IJI 0 36 I [ill] *-I "f WSW ESE [ill] [L060J ' ,, ' ,, SW ' "' SE ' "' 112,4991 ' "' 11,013 I -' -_, 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary SSW 205 SSE ----'I 2,844 I s [ill] N I 1,163 I Resident Vehicles Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 0 1-2 234 234 2-3 392 626 3-4 806 1,432 w .4-5 738 2,170 5-6 1,802 3,972 6-7 4,762 8,734 7-8 5,179 13,913 8-9 3,677 17,590 9-10 2,430 20,020 10 -EPZ 1,492 21,512 Inset Total: 21,512 0-2 Miles S . Figure 3-4. Permanent Resident Vehicles by Sector NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 3-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 Shadow Population A portion of the population living outside the evacuation area extending to 15 miles radially from the NMP/JAF (in the Shadow Region) may elect to evacuate without having been instructed to do so. Based upon NUREG/CR-7002 guidance, it is assumed that 20 percent of the permanent resident population, based on U.S. Census Bureau data, in this Shadow Region will elect to evacuate. Shadow population characteristics (household size, evacuating vehicles per household, mobilization time) are assumed to be the same as that for the EPZ permanent resident population. Table 3-5, Figure 3-5, and Figure 3-6 present estimates of the shadow population and vehicles, by sector. The 2010 Census permanent resident population *within the Shadow Region was also extrapolated to September 1, 2015 using the methodology discussed in Section 3.1 for the permanent resident population within the EPZ. Table 3-S. Shadow Population and Vehicles by Sector Sector 2015 Evacuating Population Vehicles N 0 0 NNE 0 0 NE 169 92 ENE 2,902 1,507 E 1,683 876 ESE 1,437 749 SE 1,665 866 SSE 2,372 1,233 s 14,199 7,376 SSW 2,937 1,525 SW 1,981 1,030 WSW 0 0 w 0 0 WNW 0 0 NW 0 0 NNW 0 0 ::fi* .. *,[;: J .. *. . 0001 ; . NMP/JAF 3-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 WNW 0 w 0 WSW 0 NW 0 SW 1,981 Shadow Population NNW 0 SSW 2,937 / ' ' N 0 EPZ Resident Population See Figure 3-3 s j 14,1991 NNE 0 ' / / 2,372 Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total EPZ-11 842 842 11-12 3,544 4,386 12-13 4,516 8,902 13-14 10,581 19,483 14-15 9,862 29,345 Total: 29,345 Figure 3-5. Shadow Population by Sector NMP/JAF 3-13 Evacuation Time Estimate NE 169 ENE 2,902 E 1,683 ESE 1,437 SE 1,665 : EPZ Boundary to 11 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 WNW 0 w 0 WSW 0 NW 0 SW 1,030 Shadow Vehicles Miles Subtotal by Ring EPZ -11 442 11-12 1,843 12 -13 2,340 13-14 5,497 14-15 5,132 Total: NMP/JAF NNW 0 SSW 1,525 Cumulative Total 442 2,285 4,625 10,.122 15,254 15,254 N 0 EPZ Resident Vehicles See Figure 3-4 s 7,376 NNE 0 1,233 Figure 3"6. Shadow Vehicles by Sector 3-14 Evacuation Time Estimate NE 92 ENE 1,507 E 876 ESE 749 SE 866 ' _, EPZ Boundary to 11 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 I 3.3 Transient Population Based on discussions with Exelon, Entergy, and Oswego County, the transient facilities within the EPZ have not changed considerably from the 2012 study. Thus, all transient data from the 2012 study was maintained. Transient population groups are defined as those people (who are not permanent residents, nor commuting employees) who enter the EPZ for a specific purpose (shopping, recreation, visit a park, Transients may spend less than one day or stay overnight at a campground or lodging facility. The NMP/JAF EPZ has a number of areas and facilities that attract transients, including: | |||
* Lodging Facilities * | |||
* Marinas | |||
* Campgrounds | |||
* GolfCourses | |||
* Oswego Speedway | |||
* SUNY Oswego (large c.ommuter school) Data was provided by Oswego County on the number of rooms, percentage of occupied rooms at peak times, and the number of people and vehicles per room for each lodging facility. These data were used to estimate the number of transients and evacuating vehicles at each of these facilities. Oswego County Emergency Management has requested the Holiday Inn Express, opening in mid-2016 in Oswego, be included within the study. The average number of transien.ts (2.22 people) and evacuating vehicles (1.09 per room) from lodging facilities within the EPZ were used to estimate the number of transients and evacuating vehides at this facility. A total of 81 rooms with 180 transients and 88 evacuating vehicles have been assigned to this facility: A total of 1,104 transients in 541 vehicles are assigned to lodging facilities in. the EPZ. Data was provided by Oswego County on average daily attendance, nuinber of slips and peak season of the marinas in the EPZ. These data were used to estimate the number of transients * .. and eva.cuating vehicles at each of these A total of 770 transients and 643 vehicles are assigned to marinas in the EPZ. Oswego County provided the number of campsites, peak occupancy, and the number of vehicles and people per campsite for each facility. These data were used to estimate the number of evacuating vehicles for transients at each of these facilities. A total of 1,773 transients and 653 vehicles are assigned to campgrounds in the EPZ. There are two golf courses within the EPZ. Surveys of golf courses were conducted to determine the number of golfers and vehicles at each facility on a typical peak day, and the numb.er of golfers that travels from outside the area. A total of 59 transients and 39 vehicles are assigned to golf courses within the EPZ . . Data provided by Oswego County, supplemented with internet based searches, supplied the peak season and attendance at Oswego Speedway and was used to determine the number of transients visiting the race track on a typical summer weekend. A total of 2,440 transients and * . NMP/JAF 3-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate . February 24, 2016. | |||
1,021 vehicles (average household size of 2.39 persons used to compute the number of vehicles) have been assigned to Oswego Speedway. As detailed in Section 3.1.1 above, there are 2,349 transients (commuting students) and 2,155 vehicles assigned to SUNY Oswego. Appendix E summarizes the transient data that was estimated for the EPZ. Table E-4 presents the number of transients visiting recreational areas, while Table E-5 presents the number of transients at lodging facilities within the EPZ. In total, there are 8,495 transients evacuating in 5,052 vehicles, an average of 1.68 transients per vehicle. Table 3-6 presents transient population and transient vehicle estimates by ERPA. Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 present these data by sector and distance from NMP/JAF. Table 3-6. Summary of Transients and Transient Vehicles J.ransients Transient Vehicles *: *-* 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 90 42 5 54 21 6 266 85 7 784 354 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 32 24 11 0 0 12 3,256 1,426 13 452 338 14 434 174 15 778 433 16 0 0 17 0 0 18 0 0 19 0 0 20 0 0 21 0 0 22 2,349 2,155 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0 TOTAL 8,495 .. 5,052 . NMP/JAF 3-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 WNW c::::o WSW I ,-c::::o Transients NW 0 , ' ' ' SW *' I 6,323 I N NNW ITJ 0=1 NNE c::::o 7 -. ., ' ' SSW SSE .o::J DI] . Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 0 1-2 0 0 2-3 0 0 3-4 352 352 w 4-5 90 442 5-6 2,795 3,237 6-7 1,520 4,757 7-8 633 5,390 8-9 2,671 8,061 9-10 0 8,061 10 -EPZ 434 8,495 Total: 8,495 Figure 3-7. Transient Population by Sector NMP/JAF 3-17 Evacuation Time Estimate ' ' ., ., -' -_, NE 0 ' ' ' ,, ,, ., SE 0 ENE DIJ -' I E 343 I I 1,633 I ESE [ill] 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary N E KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
* WNW ITJ *-w u:J.1*0 WSW I -I ITJ NW c:::o. ; , , . \ ., ' ' ' SW ' 14,004 I Transient Vehicles NNW ITJ ; ' *' SSW ITJ N ITJ 7-s OIJ NNE 0 SSE 24 ' Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 1-2 0 2-3 0 3-4 130 4-5 42 5-6 1,173 6-7 837 7-8 418 8-9 2,278 9-10 0 10 -EPZ 174 *Total: NMP/JAF EvacuationTime Estimate 0 0 0 130 172 1,345 2,182 2,600 4,878 4;878 5,052 5,052 w Inset 0-2 Miles | |||
* Figure 3-8. Transient Vehicles by Sector 3-18 ' ' ; ; ... -"'\ -. .;_, ' ; NE ITJ ' ENE OD -..... , , SE ITJ I E i ESE [}}I] 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary N s E | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016. .__J ... ** | |||
I I I 3.4 Employees Employees who work within the EPZ fall into two categories: | |||
* Those who live and work in the EPZ 9 Those who live outside of the EPZ and commute to jobs within the EPZ. Those of the first category are already counted as part of the permanent resident population. To avoid double counting, we focus only on those employees commuting from outside the EPZ who will evacuate along with the permanent resident population. The number of employees working at major employers as well as the percentage of staff commuting to work from outside of the EPZ was provided by Oswego County. In Table E-3, the Employees (Max Shift) is multiplied by the percent Non-EPZ factor to determine the number of employees who are not residents of the EPZ. A vehicle occupancy of 1.09 employees per vehicle obtained from the telephone survey (See Figure F-7) was used to . determine the number of evacuating employee vehicles for all major employers. Table 3-7 presents non-EPZ Resident employee and vehicle estimates by ERPA. Figure 3-9 and | |||
* Figure 3-10 present these data by sector. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 3-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 201q Table 3-7. Summary of Non-EPZ Resident Employees and Employee Vehicles ERPA Employees Employee Vehicles 1 691 634 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 193 177 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 11 0 0 12 139 127 13 74 68 14 0 0 15 0 0 16 0 0 17 0 0 18 0 0 19 0 0 20 0 0 21 0 0 22 617 566 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0 | |||
* TOTAL , .. 1,714 : 1,572 *. NMP/JAF 3-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 WNW ITJ w CD I WSW I ,-' ITJ Employees NW o::::J , '. ' ' SW I 1,023 I Miles Subtotal by Ring 0-1 691 1.-2 0 2-3 0 3-4 159 4-5 58 5-6 47 6-7 68 7-8 28 8-9 663 9 c 10 0 lO -EPZ 0 Total: NMP/JAF N NNW CD o::::J NNE CD ". ' *' ' SSW SSE CD s o::::J Cumulative Total 691 i;91 691 850 w 908 955 1,023 1,051 1,714* 1,714 1,714 1,714 Figure Employee Population by Sector 3-21. Evacuation Time Estimate NE ' o::::J ' ' ' , , " SE ,,. o::::J .-'\. ENE o::::J -' I E 0 I o=J ESE o::::J -_, 10 Miles to EPZ Bound1!ry E .s KLD Engineering, P .C. *. February 24, 2016 N NNW ITJ NNE CTJ 7-NW NE ITJ ' CTJ ' ' , ' , WNW ENE [TI ITJ .. -E 0 I I 0 -"f WSW ESE [TI\ ITJ , ' , ' SW ' ' , SE [ill] ' [TI SSW I -' -_, 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary SSE [TI s [TI . I 634 N Employee Vehicles Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 634 634 1-2 0 .634 2-3 0 634 3-4 146 78,0 w .E 4-5 53 833 5-6 43 876 6-7 62 938 7-8 26 964 8-9 608 1,572 9-10 0 l,572 10 -EPZ 0 1,572 Total: 1,572 ' Figure 3-10. Employee Vehicles by Sector NMP/JAF 3-22 .KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 241 2016 I 3.5 Special Facilities Data were provided by Oswego County for each of the medical facilities within the EPZ. Table E-2 in Appendix E summarizes the data gathered. Section 8 details the evacuation of medical facilities and their patients. The number and type of evacuating vehicles that need to be provided depend on the p!=!tients' state of health. It is estimated that buses can transport up to 30 ambulatory people; wheelchair buses up to 22 people (20 ambulatory, 2 wheelchair bound), wheelchair vans up to 10 people (7 ambulatory, 3 wheelchair bound); and ambulances, up to 2 bedridden people. Data was provided by Oswego County for the one correctional facility (Oswego County Correctional Facility) within the EPZ. Table E-6 in Appendix E summarizes the data gathered. Section 8.6 discusses the evacuation of these prisoners. It is estimated that buses can transport up to 30 passengers (inmates and correctional officers). 3.6 Total Demand in Addition to Permanent Population Vehicles will be traveling through the EPZ (external-external trips) at the time of an accident. After the Advisory to Evacuate is announced, these through-travelers will also evacuate. These through vehicles are assumed to travel on the major route traversing the region -Interstate 81 (1-81). It is assumed that this traffic will continue to enter the EPZ during the first 120 minutes following the Advisory to Evacuate. Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) data was obtained from Federal Highway Administration . (HPMS, 2013) to estimate the number of vehicles per hour on the aforementioned route. The AADT was multiplied by the K-Factor, (TRB, 2010)1 which is the proportion of the AADT on a roadway segment or link during the design hour, resulting in the design hour volume (DHV). The design hour is usually the 30th highest hourly traffic volume of the year, measured in vehicles per hour (vpb) .. The DHV is then multiplied by the D-Factor, (TRB, 2010), whi.ch is the proportion. of the DHV occurring in the peak direction of travel (also known as the directional split).* The resulting values are the directional design hourly volumes (DDHV), and are presented .in Table The DDHV is then multiplied by 2 hours (access control points -are assumed to be activated at 120 minutes after the advisory to evacuate) to estimate the total number of external vehicles loaded on the analysis network. As inqicated, there are 5,036 vehicles entering the EPZ as external-external trips prior to the activation of the ACP and the diversion of this traffic. This number is reduced by 60% for evening scenarios (Scenarios 5, 12 and 13) as discussed in Section 6. .* NMP/JAF EvacuationTime Estimate 3-23 KLD Engineering, P.C . February 24, 2016. | |||
Table 3-8. NMP/JAF EPZ External Traffic Upstream Downstream Road Direction HPMS1 K-D-Hourly Node Node Name AADT Factor2 Factor2 Volume Traffic 8043 43 1-81 Southbound 23,537 0.107 0.5 1,259 2,518 8298 298 1-81 Northbound 23,537 0.107 0.5 1,259 2,518 ''. . '.*.*, . *f .. :;;, . *' *.c: ,, *TOTAL: 1Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Washington, D.C., 2012 2HCM 2010 3.7 Special Event One special event scenario (Scenario 13) is considered for the ETE study -Several special event candidates were considered for this scenario including the workforce influx induced by an outage at either NMP or JAF. Of the events considered, Harborfest fireworks draws in the greatest number of transients by far. Harborfest is a momentous occasion which attracts a considerable number of transients from the greater Central New York region. The capstone of the four-day festival is a Saturday night fireworks display. This event draws 90,000 people, 61% of whom are from outside of the EPZ. It was assumed that families travel to the event as a household unit in a single vehicle; therefore, the average household size of 2.39 was used for vehicle occupancy. A total of 22,971 vehicles were incorporated at various parking locations for this special event. The special event vehicle trips were generated utilizing the same mobilization distributions as transients. Public transportation is not provided for this event and was not considered in the special event analysis. (A shuttle bus is provided from the parking areas, however the total time allocated for transient mobilization -2 hours, see Figure 5 is sufficient to include travel from the main event area to the parking areas, whether on the shuttle bus or by foot.) 3.8 Summary of Demand A summary of population and vehicle demand is provided in Table 3-9 and Table 3-10, respectively. This summary includes all population groups described in this section. Additional population groups -transit-dependent, special facility, and school population -are described in greater detail in Section 8. A total of 73,987 people and 37,159 vehicles are considered in this study. NMP/JAF 3-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 20lq Table 3-9. Summary of Population Demand 1 172 8 0 .691 0 91 0 0 *o 962 2 465 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 486 3 337 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 352 4 690 31 90 0 0 238 0 0 0 1,049 5 786 35 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 875 6. 896 40 266 193 0 0 0 0 0 1,395 7 700 31 784 .0 0 0 0 0 0 1,515 8 720 32 0 O* .. 0 0 0 0 0 752 9 599 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 626 10 1,002 45 32 0 0 33 0 0 0 1,112 11 1,875 84 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,959 12 7,894 354 3,256 139 710 1,342 0 0 0 13,695 13 10,121 456 452 74. 262 2,904 0 0 0 14,269 14 193 9 434 0 0 0 0 0 0 636 15 1,104 50 778 0 9 0 0 0 0 1,941 16 1,585 71 0 0 24 1,759 0 0 0 3,439 17 587 26 0 0 6 446 0 0 0 1,065 18 1,021 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,067 i9 1,295 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,353 20 1,756 79 0 0 191 0 0 0 0 2,026 21 1,741 78 0 0 38 367 0 0 0 2,224 22 5,884 264 0 617 0 5,951 2,349 0 0 15,065 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shadow 0 0 0 0 0 255 0 5,869 0 6,124 ifilllM>il§" '''""' .. ..*.*. ' '72 ft0'7.:,;?f I '" , 'j<: . ''Ji . *u* .. NOTE: Shadow Region has been reduced to 20%. Refer to Figure 2-1 for additional information. NOTE: Special Facilities include medical facilities and correctional facilities. NOTE: The Schools and Day Camp column includes 91 students for the Ontario Bible Conference. NMP/JAF 3-25 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 3-10. Summary of Vehicle Demand Schools Transit-Special and Day SUNY *Shadow External ERPA Residents Dependent Transients Employees Facilities Camp Oswego Region Traffic Total .1 91 2 0 634 0 4 0 0 0 731 2 243 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 245 3 175 2 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 177 4 361 2 42 0 ,, 0 8 0 0 0 413 5 407 2 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 430 6 464 4 85 177 0 0 0 0 0 730 *7 365 2 354 0 0 0 0 0 0 721 8 374 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 376 9 311 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 313 10 522 '*, 4 '24 0 0 2 0 0 0 552 il 973 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 979 12 4,098 28 1,426 ,' 127 222 46 0 0 0 5,947 13 5,253 38 338 68 116 108 0 0 0 5,921 14 104 2 174 0 0 0 0 0 0 280 15 570 4 433 0 2. 0 0 0 0 1,009 16 820 6 0 0 4 66 0 ,0 0 896 17 307 2 0 0 2 18 0 0 0 329 '' 18 528 *.' 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 532 19 672 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 676 20 916 6 0 0 122 0 0 0 0 1,044 21 905 6. 0 0 4 16 0 0 0 931 22 3,053' 22 0 566 0 36 2,155 0 0 5,832 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 ' ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shadow 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 3,051 5,036 8,095 ""''21;Si2sv !,!T#,0"''2;897 ' .. ;-/: .,. "', ii * ;;;o """' ,,, , I , , oLiffl\(t 1 ,,,, .. NOTE: Shadow Region has been reduced to 20%. Refer to Figure 2-1 for additional information. NOTE: Buses for schools and special facilities represented as two passenger vehicles. Refer to Section 8 for additional information. NOTE: The Schools and Day Camp column includes 2 buses (4 vehicles) for the Ontario Bible Conference. NMP/JAF 3-26 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 4 ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY The ability of the road network to service vehicle demand is a major factor in determining how rapidly an evacuation can be completed. The capacity of a road is defined as the maximum hourly rate at which persons or vehicles can reasonably be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a lane of roadway during a given time period under prevailing roadway, traffic and control conditions, as stated in the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM, 2010). In discussing capacity,. different operating conditions have been assigned alphabetical designations, A through F, to reflect the range of traffic operational characteristics. These designations have been termed . "Levels of Service'' (LOS). For example, LOS A connotes free-flow and high-speed operatingconditions; LOS F represents a forced flow condition. LOS E describes traffic operating at or near capacity. Another concept, closely associated with capacity, is "Service Volume" (SV). Service volume is defined as "The maximum hourly rate at which vehicles, bicycles or persons reasonably can .be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a roadway during an hour under specific assumed conditions while maintaining a designated level of service." This definition is similar to that for capacity. The major distinction is that values of SV vary from one LOS to another, while capacity is the service volume at the upper bound of LOS E, only. This distinction is illustrated in Exhibit 11-17 of the HCM 2010: As indicated there, the SV varies with Free Flow Speed (FFS), and LOS. The SV is by the DYNEV II simulation model, based on the specified link attribl:ltes, FFS, capacity, control device and traffic demand. Other factors also influence capacity.These include, butare not limited to: | |||
* Lane width | |||
* Shoulder width | |||
* Pavement condition | |||
* Horizontal and vertical alignment (curvature arid grade) | |||
* Percent truck traffic | |||
* Control device (and timing, ifit is a signal) | |||
* Weather conditions (rain, snow, fog, wind ke) * ' ' These fact.ors are* during the road survey .and in the capacity estimation. process; . some factors have greater influence on capaC:ity than others. For example, Jane and shoulder width have only a limited influence on Base Free Flow Speed (BFFS1) according to Exhibit 15-7 of the HCM. Consequently, lane and shoulder widths at the narrowest points* were observed during the road survey and these.observations were recorded, but no detailed meas_urements of lane or.shoulderwidth were taken. Horizontal and vertical alignment can influence both FFS and The* estimated FFS were measured using the survey vehitle's speedometer and observing local traffic, under free flow conditions. Capacity is estimated from the procedures of 1 A very rough estimate of BFFS might.be taken as the. posted speed limit plus 10 mph (HCl\/l 2010 Page 15-15) NMP/JAF Evacuation Tirne Estimate 4-:\: km Erigineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 the 2010 HCM. For example, HCM Exhibit 7-l(b) shows the sensitivity of Service Volume at the upper bound of LOS D to grade (capacity is the Service Volume at the upper bound of LOS E). As discussed in Section 2.3, it is necessary to adjust capacity figures to represent the prevailing conditions during inclement weather. Based on limited empirical data, weather conditions such as rain reduce the values of free speed and of highway capacity by approximately 10 percent. Over the last decade new studies have been made on the effects of rain on traffic *. capacity. These studies indicate a range of effects between 5 an.d 20 percent depending on wind speed and precipitation rates. As indicated in Section 2.3, we employ a reduction in free speed and in.highway capacity of 10 percent and 20 percent for rain and snow, respectively. Since congestion arising from evacuation may be significant, estimates of roadway capacity must be determined with great care. Because of its importance, a brief discussion of the major *factors that influence highway capacity is presented in this section. Rural highways generally consist of: (1) one or more uniform sections with limited access (driveways, parking areas) characterized by "uninterrupted" flow; and (2) approaches to grade intersections where flow can be "interrupted" by a control device or by turning or crossing traffic at the intersection. Due to these differences, separate estimates of capacity must be made for each section. Often, the approach to t.he intersection is widened by the addition of one or more lanes (turn pockets or turn bays), to compensate for the lower capacity of the approach due to the factors there that can interrupt the flow of traffic. These additional lanes are recorded during the field survey and later entered as input to the DYNEV II system. 4.1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections At-grade intersections are apt to become the first bottleneck locations under local heavy traffic volume conditions. This characteristic reflects the need to allocate access time to the respective | |||
* competing traffic streams by exerting some form of control. During evacuation, control at critical intersections will often be provided by traffic control personnel assigned for that purpose, whose directions may supersede traffic control devices. The existing traffic management plans documented in the county emergency plans are extensive and were adopted without .change. *. The per-lane capacity of an approach to a signalized intersection can be expressed (simplistically) iri the following form: _ (3600) (G -L) _ (3600) . Qcap,m -h X C -h X Pm m m | |||
* m where: Ocap,m Capacity of a single lane of traffic on an approach, whkh executes NMP/JAF 4-2 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016. | |||
* hm = G = L = c = Pm = m = movement, m, upon entering the intersection; vehicles per hour (vph) Mean queue discharge headway of vehicles on this lane that are executing movement, m; seconds per vehicle Mean duration of GREEN time servicing vehicles that are executing movement, m, for each signal cycle; seconds Mean "lost time" for each signal phase servicing movement, m; seconds Duration of each signal cycle; seconds Proportion of GREEN time allocated for vehicles executing movement, m, from this lane. This value is specified as part of the control treatment. The movement executed by vehicles after they enter | |||
* the intersection: through, left-turn, right-turn, and diagonal. The turn-movement-specific mean discharge headway, hm, depends in a complex way upon many factors: roadway geometrics, turn percentages, the extent of conflicting traffic streams, the control treatment, and others. A primary factor is the value of "saturation queue discharge headway", h50t, which applies to through vehicles that are not impeded by other conflicting traffic streams. This value, itself, depends upon many factors including motorist behavior. Formally, we can write, where: hsat F1,F2 fm(} = *---Saturation discharge headway for through vehicles; seconds per vehicle The various known factors influencing hm Complex function relating hm to the known (or estimated) values of h50t, F1, F2, ... The estimation of hm for specified values of hsat1 F11 F2t ... is undertaken within the DYNEV II simulation model by a mathernatical model2. The resulting values for hm always satisfy the condition: 2Lieberman, E.,. Lateral Deployment of Traffic oil. an Approach to an Intersection", McShane, W. & Lieberman, E., "Service Rates of Mixe.d Traffic .on the far Left Lane of an Approach"; Both papers appear in Transportation Research Record 772, 1980. Lieberman, E., Xin, W., "Macroscopic Traffic Modeling For Large-Scale Evacuation Planning'\ presented at the TRB 2012 Annual Meeting, January 22-26, 2012 NMP/JAF 4-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 201q .* | |||
That is, the turn-movement-specific discharge headways are always greater than, or equal to the saturation discharge headway for through vehicles. These headways (or its inverse equivalent, "saturation flow rate"), may be determined by observation or using the procedures of the HCM 2010. The above discussion is necessarily brief given the scope of this ETE report and the complexity of the subject of intersection capacity. In fact, Chapters 18, 19 and 20 in the HCM 2010 address this topic. The factors, Fl, F2, ... , influencing saturation flow rate are identified in equation {18-5) of the HCM 2010. The traffic signals within the EPZ and Shadow Region are modeled using representative phasing plans and phase durations obtained as part of the field data collection. Traffic responsive signal installations allow the proportion of green time allocated (Pm) for each approach to each intersection to be determined by the expected traffic volumes on each approach during evacuation circumstances. The amount of green time (G) allocated is subject to maximum and minimum phase duration constraints; 2 seconds of yellow time are indi.cated for each signal phase and 1 second of all-red time is assigned between signal phases, typically. If a signal is timed, the yellow and all-red times observed during the road survey are used. A lost time (L) of 2.0 seconds is used for each signal phase in the analysis. 4.2 Capacity Estimatfon along Sections of Highway The capacity of highway sections --as distinct from approaches to intersections --is a function of roadway geometrics, traffic composition (e.g. percent heavy trucks and buses* in the traffic stream) and, of course, motorist behavior. There is a fundamental relationship which relates service volume (i.e. the number of vehicles serviced within a uniform highway section in a given time period) to traffic density. The top curve in Figure 4-1 illustrates this relationship. As indicated, there are two flow regimes: (1) Free Flow (left side of curve); and (2) Forced Flow (right side). In the Free Flow regime, the traffic demand is fully serviced; the service volume increases as demand volume and density increase, until the service volume attains its maximum value, which is ttie capacity of the highway section. As traffic demand and the resulting highway density increase beyond this "critical" value, the rate. at which traffic can be serviced (i.e. the service volume) can actually decline below capacity ("capacity drop"). Therefore, in order to realistically represent traffic performance during congested conditions (i.e. when demand exceeds capacity), it is necessary to estimate the service volume, VF, under congested conditions. The value of VF can be expressed as: VF = R x Capacity where: R = Reduction factor which is less than unity NMP/JAF 4-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* We have employed a value of R=0.90. The advisability of such a capacity reduction factor is based upon empirical studies that identified a fall-off in the service flow rate when congestion occurs at "bottlenecks" or "choke points" on a freeway system. Zhang and Levinson3 describe a research program that collected data from a computer-based surveillance system (loop detectors) installed on the Interstate Highway System, at 27 active bottlenecks in the twin cities metro area in Minnesota over a 7-week period. When flow breakdown occurs, queues are formed which discharge at lower flow rates than the maximum capacity prior to observed breakdown. These queue discharge flow (QDF) rates vary from one location to the next and also vary by day of week and time.of day based upon local circumstances. The cited reference presents a mean QDF of 2,016 passenger cars per hour per lane (pcphpl). This figure compares with the nominal capacity estimate of 2,250 pcphpl estimated for the ETE and indicated in Appendix K for freeway links. The ratio of these two numbers is 0.896 which translates into a capacity reduction factor of 0.90. Since the principal objective of evacuation time estimate analyses is to develop a "realistic" estimate of evacuation times, use of the representative value for this capacity reduction factor (R=0.90) is justified. This factor is applied only when flow breaks down, as determined by the simulation* model. Rural roads, like freeways, are classified as "uninterrupted flow" facilities. (This is in contrast with urban street systems which have closely spaced signalized intersections and are classified as "interrupted flow" facilities.) As such, traffic flow along rural roads is subject to the same effects as freeways in the event traffic demand exceeds the nominal capacity, resulting in queuing and lower QDF rates. As a practical matter, rural roads rarely break down at locations away from intersections. Any breakdowns on . rural roads are generally experienced at intersections where other model logic applies, or at lane drops which reduce capacity there. Therefore, the application of a factor of 0.90 is appropriate on rural roads, but rarely, if ever, activated. The estimated value of capacity is based primarily upon the type of facility and on roadway geometrics. Sections of roadway with adverse geometrics are characterize.d by lo.wer free-flow. speeds and. lane capacity. Exhibit 15-30 in the Highway Capacity Manual was referenced to estimate saturation flow rates. The* impact of narrow lanes and shoulders on free-flow speed and on capacity is not material, particularly when flow is predominantly in one direction as is . the case during an evacuation. . . . The procedure used here was to estimate "sectio11" capacity, VE, based on ob_servations made traveling over each section of the evacuation network, based on the posted speed limits and travel behavior of other motorists and by reference to the 2010 HCM. The bYNEV II simulation | |||
* model determines for each highway section, represented as *a network link, whether its capacity w.ould be limited by the "section-specific" service volume, VE, or by the intersection-spedfic capacity. For each link, the mode.I selects the lower value of capacity. 3Lei Zhang and .David Levinson, "Some Properties of Flows at Freeway Bottlenecks/' Transportation Research Record 1883, 2004. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 4-5 . KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 4.3 Study Area As part of the development of the link-node analysis network for the study area, an estimate of roadway capacity is required. The source material for the capacity estimates presented herein is contained in: 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) Transportation Research Board National Research Council Washington, D.C. The highway system in the study area consists primarily of three categories of roads and, of course, intersections: | |||
* Two-Lane roads: Local, State | |||
* Multi-Lane Highways (at-grade) | |||
* Freeways Each of these classifications will be discussed. 4.3.1 Two-Lane Roads Ref: HCM Chapter 15 Two lane roads comprise the majority of highways within the EPZ. The per-lane capacity of a two-lane highway is estimated at 1, 700 passenger cars per hour (pc/h). This estimate is essentiafly independent of the directional distribution of traffic volume except that, for extended distances, the two-way capacity will not exceed 3,200 pc/h. The HCM procedures then estimate Level of Service (LOS) and Average Travel Speed. The DYNEV II simulation model accepts the specified value of capacity as input and computes average speed based on the time-varying demand: capacity relations. Based on the field survey and on expected traffic operations associated with evacuation scenarios: | |||
* Most sections of two-lane roads within the EPZ are classified as "Class I", with "level | |||
* terrain"; some are "rolling terrain". * "Class II" highways are mostly those within urban and suburban centers. 4.3.2 Multi-Lane Highway Ref: HCM Chapter 14 Exhibit 14-2 of the HCM 2010 presents a set of curves that indicate a per-lane capacity ranging from approximately 1,900 to 2;200 pc/h, for free-speeds of 45 to 60 mph, respectively. Based on observation, the multi-lane highways, outside of urban areas within the EPZ, service traffic with free-speeds in this range. The actual time-varying speeds computed by the simulation model reflect the demand: capacity relationship and the impact of control at intersections. A NMP/JAF 4-6 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 conservative estimate of per-lane capacity of 1,900 pc/h is adopted for this study for multi-lane highways outside of urban areas, as shown in Appendix K. 4.3.3 Freeways Ref: HCM Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 (TRB, 2010) Chapter 10 of the HCM 2010 describes a procedure for integrating the results obtained in Chapters 11, 12 and 13, which compute capacity and LOS for freeway components. Chapter 10 also presents a discussion of simulation models. The DYNEV II simulation model automatically performs this integration process. Chapter 11 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacity and LOS for "Basic Freeway Exhibit 11-17 of the HCM 2010 presents capacity vs. free speed estimates, which are provided below. Free Speed (mph): 55 60 65 70+ Per-Lane Capacity (pc/h): 2,250 2,300 2,350 2,400 The inputs to the simulation model are highway geometrics, free-speeds and capacity based on field observations. The simulation logic calculates actual time-varying speeds based on demand: capacity relationships. A conservative estimate of per-lane capacity of 2,250 pc/h is adopted for this study for freeways, as shown in Appendix K. Chapter 12 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacity, speed, density and LOS for freeway weaving sections. The simulation model contains logic that relates speed to demand volume: capacity ratio. The value of. capacity obtained from the computational procedures detailed in Chapter 12 depends on the "Type" and geometrics of the weaving segment and on the "Volume Ratio" (ratio of weaving volume to total volume). Chapter 13 of the HCM 2010 _presents procedures for estimating capacities of ramps and of "merge" areas. There are three significant factors to the determination of capacity of a freeway junction: The capacity of the freeway immediately downstream of an on-ramp or immediately upstream of an off-ramp; the capacity of the ramp roadway; and the maximum flow rate entering the ramp influence area. In most cases, the freeway capacity is the controlling factor. Values of this merge area capacity are presented in Exhibit 13-8 of the HCM 2010, and depend on the number of freeway lanes and on the freeway free speed. Ramp capacity is presented in Exhibit 13-10 and is a function of the ramp free flow speed. The DYNEV II simulation model logic simulates the merging operations of the ramp and freeway traffic in accord with the procedures in Chapter 13 of the HCM 2010. If congestion results from an excess of demand relative to capacity, then the model allocates service appropriately to the . two entering traffic streams and produces LOS F conditions (The HCM does not address LOS F explic:itly). NMP/JAF 4-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate . February 24, 201.6. * | |||
------------------------4.3.4 Intersections Ref: HCM Chapters 18, 19, 20, 21 (TRB, 2010) Procedures for estimating capacity and LOS for approaches to intersections are presented in Chapter 18 (signalized intersections), Chapters 19, 20 (un-signalized intersections) and Chapter 21 (roundabouts). The complexity of these computations is indicated by the aggregate length of these chapters. The DYNEV II simulation logic is likewise complex. The simulation model explicitly models intersections: Stop/yield controlled intersections (both 2-way and all-way) and traffic signal controlled intersections. Where intersections are controlled by fixed time controllers, traffic signal timings are set to reflect average evacuation) traffic conditions. Actuated traffic signal settings respond to the time-varying demands *of evacuation traffic to adjust the relative capacities of the competing intersection approaches. The model is also* capable of modeling the presence of manned traffic control. At specific locations where it is advisable or where existing plans call for overriding existing traffic control to implement manned control, the model will use actuated signal timings that reflect the . presence of traffic guides. At locations where a special traffic control strategy (continuous turns, contra-flow lanes) is used, the strategy is modeled explicitly. Where applicable, the location and type of traffic control for nodes in the evacuation network are noted in Appendix K. The characteristics of the ten highest volume signalized intersections are detailed in Appendix J. 4.4 Simulation and Capacity Estimation Chapter 6. of the HCM is entitled, "HCM and Alternative Analysis Tools." The. chapter discusses the use of alternative. tools such as simulation modeling to evaluate the operational performance of highway networks. Among the reasons cited in Chapter 6 to consider using. simulation as an alternative analysis tool is: "The system under study involves a group of different facilities or travel *modes with mutual interactions invoking several procedura/chapters of the HCM. Alternative tools are able to analyze these facilities as a single system. n This statement succinctly describes the analyses required to determine traffic operations across . *an area encompassing an. EPZ operating under evacuation conditions. The model utilized .for this study, DYNEV II, is further described in Appendix C. It is essential to recognize that simulation models do not replicate the methodology and procedures of the HCM -they replace these procedures by describing the complex interactions of traffic flow and computing Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) detailing the operational performance of traffic over time and by The DYNEV II simulation model includes some HCM 2010 procedures only for the purpose of estimating capacity.** All simulation models must be calibrated properly with field observations that quantify the performance parameters applicable to the analysis network. Two of the most important of NMP/JAF 4-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 these are: (1) Free flow speed (FFS); and (2) saturation headway, hsat. The first of these is estimated by direct observation during the road survey; the second is estimated using the concepts of the HCM 2010, as described earlier. These parameters are listed in Appendix K, for each network link. NMP/JAF 4-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Volume, vph Qmax -R Qmax-Drop .___--r---------r----------'------Density, vpm Flow ,Regimes Speed, mph I 1111 Free : Vf R Ve -kopt Figure 4-1. Fundame.ntal Diagrams NMP/JAF 4-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 5 ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME Federal Government guidelines (see NUREG CR-7002) specify that the planner estimate the distributions of elapsed times associated with mobilization activities undertaken by the public to prepare for the evacuation trip. The elapsed time associated with each activity is represented as a statistical distribution reflecting differences between members of the public. The quantification of these activity-based distributions relies largely on the results of the telephone survey. We define the sum of these distributions of elapsed times as the Trip Generation Time Distribution. 5.1 Background In general, an accident at a nuclear power plant is characterized by the following Emergency Classification Levels (see Appendix 1-of NU REG 0654 for details): 1. Unusual Event 2. Alert 3. Site Area Emergency 4. General Emergency At each level, the Federal guidelines specify a set of Actions to be undertaken by the Licensee, and by State and Local offsite authorities. As a Planning Basis, we will adopt a conservative posture, in accordance with Section 1.2 of NUREG/CR-7002, that a rapidly escalating accident will be considered in calculating the Trip Generation Time .. We will assume: l. The Advisory to Evacuate will be announced coincident with the siren notification. *Mobilization of the general population will commence within 15 minutes after the siren notification. 3. ETE are measured relative to the Advisory to Evacuate. We emphasize thatthe adoption of this planning basis is not a representation that these events will occur within the indicated time frame. Rather, these assumptions are necessary in order to: 1. Establish a temporal framework for estimating the Trip Generation distribution in the format recommended in Section 2.13 of NUREG/CR-6863. (NRC, 2005). 2. Identify temporal points of reference that uniquely define "Clear Time" and ETE. It is likely that a longer time will elapse between the various classes of an emergency. ' . . . For example, suppose one hour elapses from the siren alert to the Advisory to Evacuate. In this* case, it is reasonable to expect sonie degree of spontaneous evacuation by the public during this one-hour period. As a result, the population within the EPZ will be lower when the Advisory to Evacuate is announced, than at the time of the siren alert .. In addition, mariy will engage in preparation activities to evacuate, in anticipation that an Advisory will be broadcast. Thus, the time needed to complete the mobilization activities and the number of people remaining to evacuate the EPZ after the Advisory to Evacuate, will both be somewhat less than NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 5-1 *. _KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 the estimates presented in this report. Consequently, the ETE presented in this report are higher than the actual evacuation time, if this hypothetical situation were to take place. "f:he notification process consists of two events: .. 1. Transmitting information using the alert notification systems available within the EPZ (e.g. sirens, EAS broadcasts, loud speakers). 2. Receiving and correctly interpreting the information that is transmitted. The population within the EPZ is dispersed over an area of approximately 160 square miles and is engaged in a wide variety of activities. It must be anticipated that some time will elapse between the transmission and receipt of the information advising the public of an accident. The amount of elapsed time will vary from one individual to the next depending on where that person is, what that person is doing, and related factors. Furthermore, some persons who will be directly involved with the evacuation process may be outside the EPZ at the time the emergency is declared. These people may be commuters, shoppers and other travelers who* reside within the EPZ and who will return to join the other household members upon receiving notification of an emergency. As indicated in Section 2.13 of NUREG/CR-6863, the estimated elapsed times for the receipt of notification can be expressed as a distribution reflecting the different notification times for different people within, and outside; the EPZ. By using time distributions, it is also possible to distinguish between different population groups and different day-of-week and time-of-day scenarios, so that accurate ETE may be computed: For example, people at home or at.work within the EPZ will be notified by siren . Those well the EPZ will be notified by telephone, radio, TV and word-of-mouth, with potentially longer time lags. Furthermore, the spatial distribution of the EPZ population will differ with . time of day -families will be united in the evenings, but dispersed during the day. In this respect, weekends will differ from weekdays. As indicated in Section 4.1 of NUREG/CR-7002, the information required to compute trip* | |||
* generation times is typically obtained from a telephone survey of EPZ residents. Such a survey was conducted in 2012 in support of a pervious ETE study for this site. Appendix F discusses the survey sampling plan and documents the survey instrument and survey results. It is important to note that the shape and duration of the evacuation trip mobilization distribution is important for regions where traffic congestion is not expected to cause the evacuation time estimate to extend in time well beyond the trip generation period. The remaining discussion will focus on the application of the trip generation data obtained from the telephone survey to the development of the ETE documented in this report. NMP/JAF 5-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016. | |||
5.2 Fundamental Considerations The environment leading up to the time that people begin their evacuation trips consists of a sequence of events and activities. Each event (other than the first) occurs at an instant in time and is the outcome of an activity. Activities are undertake.n over a period of time. Activities may be in "series" (i.e. to undertake an activity implies the completion of all preceding events) or may be in parallel (two or more activities may take place over the same period of time). Activities conducted in series are functionally dependent on the completion of prior activities; activities conducted in parallel are functionally independent of one another. The relevant events associated with the public's preparation for evacuation are: Event Number 1 2 3 4 5 Event Description Notification . Awareness of Situation* Depart Work Arrive Home Depart on Evacuation Trip Associated with each sequence of events are one or more activities, as outlined below: Table 5-1. Event Sequence for Evacuation Activities i!."',, 'cl ** ,_,, " ' . . Event Sequence Activity Distribution 1-7 2 Receive Notification 1 2 -7 3 Prepare to Leave Work 2 2,3 -7 4 Travel Home 3 2,4 -7 5 Prepare to Leave to Evacuate 4 N/A Snow Clearance 5 These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 5-1. | |||
* An Event is a 'state' that exists at a point in time (e;g., depart work, arrive home) | |||
* An Activity is a 'process' that takes place over some elapsed time (e.g., prepare to leave work, travel home) | |||
* As such, a completed Activity changes the 'state' of an individual (e.g. the activity, 'travel home' changes the state from 'depart work' to 'arrive home'). Therefore, an Activity can be described as an 'Event Sequence';the elapsed times to perform an event sequence vary from one person to the next and are described as statistical distributions on the following pages. An employee who lives. outside the EPZ will follow sequence (c) of Figure 5-1. A household | |||
* NMP/JAF 5-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 . | |||
within the EPZ that has one or more commuters at work, and will await their return before beginning the evacuation trip will follow the first sequence of Figure 5-l(a). A household within the EPZ that has no commuters at work, or that will not await the return of any commuters, will follow the second sequence of Figure 5-l(a), regardless of day of week or time of day. Households with no commuters on weekends or in the evening/night-time, will follow the applicable sequence in Figure 5-l(b). Transients will always follow one of the sequences of Figure 5-l(b). Some transients away from their residence could elect to evacuate immediately without returning to the residence, as indicated in th.e second sequence. It is seen from Figure 5-1, that the Trip Generation time (i.e. the total elapsed time from Event 1 to Event 5) depends on the scenario and. will vary from one household to the next. Furthermore, Event 5 depends, in a complicated way, on the time distributions of all activities preceding that event. That is, to estimate the time distribution of Event 5, we must obtain estimates of the time distributions of all preceding events. For this study, we adopt the conservative posture that all activities will occur in sequence. In some cases, assuming certain events occur strictly sequential (for instance, a commuter returning home before beginning preparation to leave, or removing snow only after the preparation to leave) can result in rather conservative (that is, longer) estimates of mobilization times. It is reasonable to expect that at least some parts of these events wil.1 overlap for many households, but that assumption is not made in this study. NMP/JAF 5-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Residents Residents Residents, Transients away from Residence Residents, Transients at Residence 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ACTIVITIES 1 ---+ 2 Receive Notification 2 ---+ 3 Prepare to Leave Work | |||
* 2, 3 ---+ 4 Travel Home 3 5 4 3, 5 2, 4 ---+ 5 Prepare to Leave to Evacuate Activities Consume Time 5 4 5 EVENTS 1. Notification .2. Aware of situation 3. Depart work 4. Arrive home Households wait for Commuters 1 Households without Commuters and households who do not wait for Commuters Return to residence, then evacuate Residents at home; transients evacuate directly 5. Depart on evacuation trip # 1 Applies for evening and weekends also if commuters are at work. 2 Applies throughout the year for transients. . Figure 5-1. Events and Activities Preceding the Evacuation Trip NMP/JAF 5-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 5.3 Estimated Time Distributions of Preceding Event 5 The time distribution of an event is obtained by "summing" the time distributions of all prior contributing activities. (This "summing" process is quite different than an algebraic sum since it is performed on distributions -not scalar numbers). Time Distribution No. 1, Notification Process: Activity 1 2 Federal regulations (lOCFR 50 Appendix E, Item IV.D.3) stipulate, "[t]he design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes" (NRC, 2011b). Furthermore, Item 2 of Section B in Appendix 3 of NUREG/CR-0654/FEMA-REP-1 states that "special arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ" (NRC, 1980b). Given the federal regulations and guidance, and the presence of sirens within the EPZ, it is assumed that 100% of the population in the EPZ can be notified within 45 minutes. The assumed distribution for notifying the EPZ population is provided in Table 5-2: NMP/JAF Evacuation nrrie Estimate Table 5-2. Time Distribution.for Notifying the Public Elapsed Time Percent of (Minutes) | |||
* Population Notified 0 0% 5 7% 10 13% 15 27% 20 47% 25 66% 30 87% 35 -* -92% 40 97% 45 100% 5-6 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. _ February 24, 2016 Distribution No. 2, Prepare to Leave Work: Activity 2 3 It is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of business enterprises within the EPZ will elect to shut down following notification and most employees would leave work quickly. Commuters, who work outside the EPZ could, in all probability, also leave quickly since facilities outside the EPZ would remain open and other personnel would remain. Personnel or farmers responsible for equipment/livestock would require additional time to secure their facility. The distribution of Activity 2 3 shown in Table 5-3 reflects data obtained by the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure Table 5-3. Time Distribution for Employees to Prepare to Leave Work t ***'* ;z-* !f 4---,,, "''" * .. --. 0 --*t('.""'" 00 *_,-*-1 !<;" * ,,, * ** 'i. ">Gumulat1ve* . ,, * .. , , it t':umulative ' 1 Elapsed Time *, ' ' ., | |||
* I d * * ,. . t' *-.*. Per.cpnt ;;; . T1m¥ _ __ .. L. . Leavintwork 0 0% 3S 94.50% s 51.10% 40 95.90% 10 70.60% 4S 96.20% lS 80.70% so 96.20% 20 85.90% SS 96.20% 2S 86.40% 60 100.00% 30 94.00% NOTE: The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response. that is, the sample was reduced in size to include only those households who responded to this question. The underlying assumption is that the distribution of this activity for the. "Don't know" responders, if the event takes plate, would be the same as those responders who provided estimates. NMP/JAF 5-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
--------------------------Distribution No. 3, Travel Home: Activity 3 ---+ 4 These data are provided directly by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 5-2 and listed in Table 5-4. Table 5-4. Time Distribution for Commuters to Travel Home --Cumulative Cumulative | |||
* Elapsed Time Percent Elapsed Time Percent* Returning Home (Minutes) Returning Home 0 0 40 89.6% 5 19.6% 45 94.3% 10 47.7% so 95.1% 15 63.2% 55 95.1% 20 75.5% 60 98.3% 25 77.4% 75 99.4% 30 85.1% 90 100.0% 35 87.0% NOTE: The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response NMP/JAF 5-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Distribution No. 4, Prepare to Leave Home: Activity 2, 4 5 These data are -provided directly by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 5-2 and listed in Table 5-5. Table 5-5. Time Distribution for Population to Prepare to Evacuate Cumulative Elapsed Time Percent Ready to (Minutes) Evacuate 0 0% 15 18.2% 30 68.9% 45 75.5% 60 89.6% 75 93.9% 90 95.0% 105 95.0% 120 98.6% 135 100.0% NOTE:The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Dori't know" response*-NMP/JAF 5-9 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. -February 24, 2016 Distribution No. 5, Snow Clearance Time Distribution Inclement weather scenarios involving snowfall must address the time lags associated with snow clearance. It is assumed that snow equipment is mobilized and deployed during the snowfall to maintain passable roads. The general consensus is that the snow-plowing efforts are generally successful for all but the most extreme blizzards when the rate of snow accumulation exceeds that of snow clearance over a period of many hours. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the highway system will remain passable -albeit at a lower capacity -under the vast majority of snow conditions. Nevertheless, for the vehicles to gain access to the highway system, it may be necessary for driveways and employee parking lots to be cleared to the extent needed to permit vehicles to gain access to the roadways. These clearance activities take time; this time must be incorporated into the trip generation time distributions. These data are provided by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 5-2 and listed in Table 5-6 . . Note that those respondents (53.0%) who answered that they would not take time to clear their driveway were assumed to be ready immediately at the start of this activity. Essentially they would drive through the snow on the driveway to access the roadway and begin their evacuation trip: Table 5-6. Time Distribution for Population to Clear 611-811 of Snow Cumulative Percent Elapsed Time Completing (Minutes) Snow*Removal 0 53.0% 15 . 65.5% 30 88.1% 45 *9i.1% 60 94.2% 75 97.4% 90 97.9% 105 .. 98.1% 120 98;9% 135 99.8% 150 100.0% NOTE: The survey data normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response* NMP/JAF 5-10 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD EJ"lgineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016 Mobilization Activities 100% 90% > .... *:;; *.;; 80% u ct c 0 +; "' 70% .!::! 1i 0 60% "° c +; -Notification QI a. 50% E -Prepare to Leave Work 0 u -Travel Home c 40% 0 *.;; -Prepare Home "' :I Q. 30% 0 -Time to Clear Snow a. -0 .... c 20% QI u ... QI a. 10% 0% 0 30 60 90 120 150 Elapsed Time from Start of Mobilization Activity (min) Figure 5-2. Evacuation Mobilization Activities NMP/JAF 5-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 5.4 Calculation of Trip Generation Time Distribution The time distributions for each of the mobilization activities presented herein must be combined to form the appropriate Trip Generation Distributions. As discussed above, this study assumes that the stated events take place in sequence such that all preceding events must be completed before the current event can occur. For example, if a household awaits the return of a commuter, the work-to-home trip (Activity 3 4) must precede Activity 4 5. To calculate the time distribution of an event that is dependent on two sequential activities, it is necessary to "sum" the distributions associated with these prior activities. The distribution summing algorithm is applied repeatedly as shown to form the required distribution. As an outcome of this procedure, new time distributions are formed; we assign "letter" designations to these intermediate distributions to describe the procedure. Table 5-7 presents the summing procedure to arrive at each designated distribution. Table 5-7. Mapping Distributions to Events Apply "Summing" Algorithm To: Distribution Obtained Event Defined Distributions 1 and 2 Distribution A Event 3 Distributions A and 3 Distribution B Event 4 Distributions Band 4 Distribution C Event 5 Distributions 1 and 4 Distribution D Event 5 Distributions C and 5 Distribution E Event 5 Distributions D and 5 Distribution F Event 5 Table 5-8 presents a description of each of the final trip generation distributions achieved after the summing process is completed. NMP/JAF 5-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 5-8. Description of the Distributions Distribution Description A B c D E F Time distribution of commuters departing place of work (Event 3). Also applies to employees who work within the EPZ who live outside, and to Transients within the EPZ. Time distribution of commuters arriving home (Event 4). Time distribution of residents with commuters who return home, leaving home to begin the evacuation trip (Event 5). Time distribution of residents without commuters returning home, leaving home to begin the evacuation trip (Event 5). Time distribution of residents with commuters who return home, leaving home to begin the evacuation trip, after snow clearance activities (Event 5). Time distribution of residents with no commuters returning home, leaving to begin the evacuation trip, after snow clearance activities (Event 5). 5.4.1 Statistical Outliers As already mentioned, some portion of the survey respondents answer "don't know" to some questions or choose to not respond to a question. The mobilization activity distributions are based upon actual responses. But, it is the nature of surveys that a few numeric responses are inconsistent with the overall pattern of results. An example would be a case in which for 500 responses, almost all of them estimate less than two hours for a given answer, but 3 say "four hours" and 4 say "six or more hours". These "outliers" must be considered: are they valid responses, or so atypical that they should be dropped from the sample? In assessing outliers, there are three alternates to consider: 1) Some responses with very long times may be valid, but reflect the reality that the respondent really needs to be classified in a different population subgroup, based upon special needs; 2) Other responses may be unrealistic (6 hours to return home from commuting distance, or 2 days to prepare the home for departure); 3) Some high values are representative and plausible, and one must not cut them as part of the consideration of outliers. The issue of course is how to make the decision that a given response or set of responses are to be considered "outliers" for the component mobilization activities, using a method that objectively quantifies the process. There is considerable statistical literature on the identification and treatment of outliers singly or in groups, much of which assumes the data is normally distributed and some of which uses non-NMP/JAF 5-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 parametric methods to avoid that assumption. The literature cites that limited work has been done directly on outliers in sample survey responses. In establishing the overall mobilization time/trip generation distributions, the following principles are used: 1) It is recognized that the overall trip generation distributions are conservative estimates, because they assume a household will do the mobilization activities sequentially, with no overlap of activities; 2) The individual mobilization activities (prepare to leave work, travel home, prepare home, clear snow) are reviewed for outliers, and then the overall trip generation distributions are created (see Figure 5-1, Table 5-7, Table 5-8); 3) Outliers can be eliminated either because the response reflects a special population (e.g. special needs, transit dependent) or lack of realism, because the purpose is to estimate trip generation patterns for personal vehicles; 4) To eliminate outliers, a) the mean and standard deviation of the specific activity are estimated from the responses, b) the median of the same data is estimated, with its position relative to the mean noted, c) the histogram of the data is inspected, and d) all values greater than 3.5 standard deviations are flagged for attention, taking special note of whether there are gaps (categories with zero entries) in the histogram display. In general, only flagged values more than 4 standard deviations from the mean are allowed to be considered outliers, with gaps in the histogram expected. When flagged values are classified as outliers and dropped, steps "a" to "d" are repeated. NMP/JAF 5-14 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: 5) As a practical matter, even with outliers eliminated by the above, the resultant histogram, viewed as a cumulative distribution, is not a normal distribution. A typical situation that results is shown below in Figure 5-3. 100.0% 90.0% -80.0% 70.0% RI ... 60.0% u ... 50.0% C1I 40.0% RI e 30.0% a 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% --LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ Lil LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... ,..... N ,..... ..-i ..-i N N ("() l"f1 <:t" <:t" LI'\ LI'\ l.O 00 CJ') Center of Interval (minutes) -Cumulative Data --Cumulative Normal Figure 5-3. Comparison of Data Distribution and Normal Distribution LI'\ N ..-i ..-i 6) In particular, the cumulative distribution differs from the normal distribution in two key aspects, both very important in loading a network to estimate evacuation times: Most of the real data is to the left of the "normal" curve above, indicating that the network loads faster for the first 80-85% of the vehicles, potentially causing more (and earlier) congestion than otherwise modeled; The last 10-15% of the real data "tails off'' slower than the comparable "normal" curve, indicating that there is significant traffic still loading at later times. Because these two features are important to preserve, it is the histogram of the data that is used to describe the mobilization activities, not a "normal" curve fit to the data. One could consider other distributions, but using the shape of the actual data curve is unambiguous and preserves these important features; 7) With the mobilization activities each modeled according to Steps 1-6, including preserving the features cited in Step 6, the overall (or total) mobilization times are constructed. This is done by using the data sets and distributions under different scenarios (e.g. commuter returning, no commuter returning, no snow or snow in each). In general, these are additive, using NMP/JAF 5-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 weighting based upon the probability distributions of each element; Figure 5-4 presents the combined trip generation distributions designated A, C, D, E and F. These distributions are presented on the same time scale. (As discussed earlier, the use of strictly additive activities is a conservative approach, because it makes all activities sequential -preparation for departure follows the return of the commuter; snow clearance follows the preparation for departure, and so forth. In practice, it is reasonable that some of these activities are done in parallel, at least to some extent -for instance, preparation to depart begins by a household member at home while the commuter is still on the road.) The mobilization distributions that result are used in their tabular/graphical form as direct inputs to later computations that lead to the ETE. The DYNEV II simulation model is designed to accept varying rates of vehicle trip generation for each origin centroid, expressed in the form of histograms. These histograms, which represent Distributions A, C, D, E and F, properly displaced with respect to one another, are tabulated in Table 5-9 (Distribution B, Arrive Home, omitted for clarity). The final time period (15) is 600 minutes long. This time period is added to allow the analysis network to clear, in the event congestion persists beyond the trip generation period. Note that there are no trips generated during this final time period. 5.4.2 Staged Evacuation Trip Generation As defined in NUREG/CR-7002, staged evacuation consists of the following: 1. ERPAs comprising the 2 mile region are advised to evacuate immediately 2. ERPAs comprising regions extending from 2 to 5 miles downwind are advised to shelter in-place while the two mile region is cleared 3. As vehicles evacuate the 2 mile region, sheltered people from 2 to 5 miles downwind continue preparation for evacuation 4. The population sheltering in the 2 to 5 mile region are advised to begin evacuating when approximately 90% of those originally within the 2 mile region evacuate across the 2 mile region boundary 5. Non-compliance with the shelter recommendation is the same as the shadow evacuation percentage of 20% Assumptions 1. The EPZ population in ERPAs beyond 5 miles will shelter in place, with the exception of the 20% non-compliance. 2. The population in the Shadow Region beyond the EPZ boundary, extending to approximately 15 miles radially from NMP/JAF, will react as they do for all non-staged evacuation scenarios. That is 20% of these households will elect to evacuate with no shelter delay. NMP/JAF 5-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: 3. The transient population will not be expected to stage their evacuation because of the limited sheltering options available to people who may be at parks, on a beach, or at other venues. Also, notifying the transient population of a staged evacuation would prove difficult. 4. Employees will also be assumed to evacuate without first sheltering. Procedure 1. Trip generation for population groups in the 2 mile region will be as computed based upon the results of the telephone survey and analysis. 2. Trip generation for the population subject to staged evacuation will be formulated as follows: a. Identify the goth percentile evacuation time for the ERPAs comprising the 2 mile region. This value, Tscen *, is obtained from simulation results. It will become the time at which the region being sheltered will be told to evacuate for each scenario. b. The resultant trip generation curves for staging are then formed as follows: i. The non-shelter trip generation curve is followed until a maximum of 20% of the total trips are generated (to account for shelter non-compliance). ii. No additional trips are generated until time Tscen | |||
* iii. Following time Tscen *,the balance of trips are generated: 1. by stepping up and then following the non-shelter trip generation curve (if Tscen | |||
* max trip generation time) or 2. by stepping up to 100% (if Tscen *is> max trip generation time) c. Note: This procedure implies that there may be different staged trip generation distributions for different scenarios. NUREG/CR-7002 uses the statement "approximately goth percentile" as the time to end staging and begin evacuating. The value of Tscen *is 1:30 for non-snow scenarios and 2:00 for snow scenarios. 3. Staged trip generation distributions are created for the following population groups: a. Residents with returning commuters b. Residents without returning commuters c. Residents with returning commuters and snow conditions d. Residents without returning commuters and snow conditions Figure 5-5 presents the staged trip generation distributions for both residents with and without returning commuters; the goth percentile two-mile evacuation time is go minutes for good weather and between 110 and 120 minutes for snow scenarios. At the goth percentile evacuation time, 20% of the population (who normally would have completed their mobilization activities for an un-staged evacuation) advised to shelter has nevertheless departed the area. These people do not comply with the shelter advisory. Also included on the plot are the trip generation distributions for these groups as applied to the regions advised to evacuate immediately. Since the goth percentile evacuation time occurs before the end of the trip generation time, after the sheltered region is advised to evacuate, the shelter trip generation distribution rises to NMP/JAF 5-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 meet the balance of the non-staged trip generation distribution. Following time Tscen *, the balance of staged evacuation trips that are ready to depart are released within 15 minutes. After Tscen * + 15, the remainder of evacuation trips are generated in accordance with the un-staged trip generation distribution. Table 5-10 provides the trip generation histograms for staged evacuation. 5.4.3 Trip Generation for Waterways and Recreational Areas Procedure A Section 4.9 of the Oswego County Radiological Emergency Response Plan lists the clearing of water ERPAs as one component of Initial Precautionary Operations. In order to accomplish this, the County Director of Emergency Management (CDEM), in consultation with the Chairman of the Legislature, shall coordinate the activities of supporting County agencies. As indicated in Table 5-2, this study assumes 100% notification in 45 minutes. Table 5-9 indicates that all transients will have mobilized within 2 hours. It is assumed that this 2 hour timeframe is sufficient time for boaters, campers and other transients to return to their vehicles and begin their evacuation trip. NMP/JAF 5-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 5-9. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Un-staged Evacuation Percent of Total Trips Generated Within Indicated Time Period Residents Residents With Residents Residents with Without Commuters Without Time Duration Employees Transients Commuters Commuters Snow Commuters Snow Period (Min) (Distribution A) (Distribution A) (Distribution C) (Distribution D) (Distribution E) (Distribution F) 1 15 8% 8% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2 30 74% 74% 6% 40% 3% 24% 3 15 12% 12% 15% 28% 10% 23% 4 15 3% 3% 22% 13% 16% 17% 5 15 2% 2% 19% 9% 17% 13% 6 30 1% 1% 23% 4% 27% 12% 7 30 0% 0% 9% 4% 14% 5% 8 15 0% 0% 3% 1% 4% 2% 9 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 2% 10 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 0% 11 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 12 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 13 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 15 600 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% NOTE: | |||
* Shadow vehicles are loaded onto the analysis network (Figure 1-2) using Distributions C and E for good weather and snow, respectively . | |||
* Special event vehicles are loaded using Distribution A . NMP/JAF 5-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF 100 Q. *;: C 0 .. "' 80 ::I u "' > w b.O c 60 c c '60 Cll a::I c 0 40 +; ..!!! ::I Q. 0 Cl. 0 20 .... c Cll u ... Cll Cl. 0 Evacuation Time Estimate Trip Generation Distributions -Employees/Transients -Residents with Commuters -Residents with no Commuters -Res with Comm and Snow -Res no Comm with Snow 0 60 120 180 240 Elapsed Time from Evacuation Advisory (min) Figure 5-4. Comparison of Trip Generation Distributions 5-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 5-10. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Staged Evacuation Percent of Total Trips Generated Within Indicated Time Period* Residents Residents Residents with Without Residents With Without Time Duration Commuters Commuters Commuters Snow Commuters Snow Period (Min) (Distribution C) (Distribution D) (Distribution E) (Distribution F) 1 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 2 30 1% 8% 1% 5% 3 15 3% 6% 2% 5% 4 15 5% 2% 3% 3% 5 15 3% 2% 3% 3% 6 30 73% 77% 6% 2% 7 30 9% 4% 72% 77% 8 15 3% 1% 4% 2% 9 15 1% 0% 3% 2% 10 15 1% 0% 3% 0% 11 15 1% 0% 1% 1% 12 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 13 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 14 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 15 600 0% 0% 0% 0% *Trip Generation for Employees and Transients (see Table 5-9) is the same for Unstaged and Staged Evacuation. NMP/JAF 5-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Staged and Unstaged Evacuation Trip Generation -Employees I Transients -Residents with Commuters -Residents with no Commuters -Res with Comm and Snow -Res no Comm with Snow -staged Residents with Commuters -Staged Residents with no Commuters -Staged Residents with Commuters (Snow) Staged Residents with no Commuters (Snow) 100 c. 90 *;: I-c 0 80 +: IV :::J u 70 IV > w ti,() c 60 c c *;, Cl.I 50 a:i c 0 *z; .!!! 40 :::J c. 0 30 Q. .... 0 .... 20 c Cl.I u ... Cl.I 10 Q. 0 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180 195 210 225 240 255 Elapsed Time from Evacuating Advisory (min) Figure 5-5. Comparison of Staged and Un-staged Trip Generation Distributions in the 2 to 5 Mile Region NMP/JAF 5-22 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 6 DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS An evacuation "case" defines a combination of Evacuation Region and Evacuation Scenario. The definitions of "Region" and "Scenario" are as follows: Region Scenario A grouping of contiguous evacuating ERPAs that forms either a "keyhole" sector-based area, or a circular area within the EPZ, that must be evacuated in response to a radiological emergency. A combination of circumstances, including time of day, day of week, season, and weather conditions. Scenarios define the number of people in each of the affected population groups and their respective mobilization time distributions. A total of 29 Regions were defined which encompass all the groupings of ERPAs considered. These Regions are defined in Table 6-1. The ERPA configurations are identified in Figure 6-1. .Ea.ch keyhole sector-based area consists of a central circle centered at NMP/JAF, and three adjoining sectors, each with a central angle of 22.5 degrees, as per NUREG/CR-7002 guidance. The central sector coincides with the wind direction. These sectors extend to 5 miles from NMP/JAF (Regions R04 through RlO) or to the EPZ boundary (Regions Rll through R21). Regions ROl, R02 and R03 represent evacuations of circular areas with radii of 2, 5 and 10 miles, respectively; Regions R2.2 through R29 are identical to Regions R04 through RlO, and R02, respectively; however, those ERPAs between 2 miles and 5 miles are staged until 90% of the 2 | |||
* mile region (Region ROl) has evacuated. A total .of 14 Scenarios were evaluated for all Regions. Thus, there are a total of 29x14=406 evacuation q:ises. Table 6-2 is a description of all Scenarios. There are some instances when defining an Evacuation Region wherein a small "sliver" of an ERPA may be within the radial or keyhole Region. Figure 6-2 illustrates that a small portion of | |||
* ERPAs 7 and 12 are within the 5-mile radius of NMP/JAF. Generally speaking, for a low population density site, a sliver ERPA is not included in the Region unless more than 10% of the ERPA population or 100 people (whichever is less) live* within the sliver. All potential ERPA slivers were discussed with Entergy, Exelon and Oswego County. The stakeholders decided to not include the sliver ERPAs, thereby explaining why ERPAs 7 and 12 are not included in any of the Evacuation Regions extending to 5 miles in Table 6-1. Note that 2010 Census data was used for the computations shown in Figure 6-2. Each combination of region and scenario implies a specific population to be evacuated. Table 6-3 presents the percentage of each population group estimated to evacuate for each Scenario. Table 6-4 presents the vehicle counts for each scenario for an evacuation of Region R03 -the entire EPZ. The vehicle estimates presented in Section 3 are peak values. These peak values are adjusted depending on the Scenario and Region being considered, using Scenario and Region specific | |||
* percentages; such th.at the average population is considered for each evacuation case. The average Scenario percentages are presented in Table 6-3, while the regional percentages are NMP/JAF 6-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 20lf1 provided in Table H-1. The percentages presented in Table 6-3 were determined as follows: The number of residents with commuters during the week (when workforce is at its peak) is equal to the product of 56% (the percent of households with at least one commuter see Figure F-6) and 45% (the percent of households with a commuter that would await the return of the commuter prior to evacuating-see Section F.3.2) which equals 25% (the percent of households with returning commuters). See assumption 3 in Section 2.3. It is estimated for weekend and evening scenarios that 10 percent of households with returning commuters will have a commuter at work during those times. Employment is assumed to be at its peak (100%) during the winter, midweek, midday scenarios. Employment is reduced slightly {96%) for summer, midweek, midday scenarios. This is based on the estimation that 50% of the employees commuting into the EPZ will be on vacation for a week during the approximate 12 weeks of summer. It is further estimated that those taking vacation will be uniformly dispersed throughout the summer with approximately 4% of employees vacationing each week. It is further estimated that only 10% of the employees are working in the evenings and during the weekends. Transient activity is estimated to be at its peak {100%) during summer weekends and less (36%) during the week. As shown in Appendix E, there is a significant amount of lodging and campgrounds offering overnight accommodations in the EPZ; thus, transient activity is estimated to be higher during evening hours -39% for summer. Transient activity is less during the winter13% during the week, 31% on weekends and 14% during the evening. As noted in the shadow footnote to Table 6-4, the shadow percentages are computed using a base of 20% (see assumption 5 in Section 2.2); to include the employees within the Shadow Region who may choose to evacuate, the voluntary evacuation is multiplied by a specific proportion of employees to permanent residents in the Shadow Region. For example, using the values provided in Table 6-4 for Scenario 1, the shadow percentage is computed as follows: ( 1,509 ) 20% x 1+5,378+16,134 = 21 % One special event -Harborfest Fireworks -was considered as Scenario 13. Thus, the special event traffic is 100% evacuated for Scenario 13, and 0% for all other scenarios. As discussed in Section 7, schools are in session during the winter season, midweek, midday and 100% of buses will be needed under those circumstances. Considering the presence of day camps in the EPZ, it is estimated that summer school/day camp enrollment is approximately 10% of enrollment during the regular school year for summer, midweek, midday scenarios. Schools or day camps are not in session during weekends and evenings, thus no buses for school children are needed under those circumstances. The evacuation percentages for students commuting from outside the EPZ to SUNY Oswego are the same as the school evacuation percentages. NMP/JAF 6-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Transit buses for the transit-dependent population are set to 100% for all scenarios as it is assumed that the transit-dependent population is present in the EPZ for all scenarios. External traffic is estimated to be reduced by 60% ,during evening scenarios and is 100% for all *other scenarios . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 6-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 | |||
. Table 6-1. Description of Evacuation Regions | |||
* Region Description. ERPA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 29 R01 2-Mile Radius ROZ 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction ERPA Fro in 1 5 .6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 Ni A E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, | |||
* Refer to R01 SSW, SW, WSW R04 w ROS WNW R06. NW, NNW R07 N ROS NNE R09 NE R10 ENE Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to EPZ Boundary Region Wind Direction ERPA From 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 '18 19 20 21 22 23 'R11 E, ESE, SE R12 SSE, S, SSW R13 SW R14 WSW R15 | |||
* w Ri.6 WNW R17 NW R18 NNW R19 N R20 NNE, NE R21 ENE NMP/JAF 6-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Staged -Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction From 3 4 5 6 1 2 ERPA 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 11 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 21 28 29 E, ESE,SE,SSE,S,SS\N,S\N, \NSW Refer to ROl | |||
* R22 \N R23 \NN\llJ R24 NIN, NN\N R25 N R26 NNE R27 NE R28 ENE R29 5-Mile Radius ERPA Shelter-in-Place . NMP/JAF 6-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF GJ ERPA '--::::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Evacuation Time Estimate ;\ Oate:8/f9/2012 KlO Conndation Energy. Entersv Figure 6-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ 6-6 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 I Region Ro2 I No. of People within ERPA 7 = 699 No. of People within Sliver= 48 Percent of Population within Sliver= 6.9% No. of People within ERPA 12 = 7960 No. of People within Sliver= 49 Percent of Population within Sliver= 0.6% Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF (iJ ERPA .. Sliver Evacuate C.... -:. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundaries Figure 6-2. Example of an ERPA "Sliver" when Defining Evacuation Regions NMP/JAF 6-7 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 6-2. Evacuation Scenario Definitions 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None Summer Midweek, Evening Good None 5 Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter . Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None Winter Midweek, Evening Good None 12 Weekend Summer Weekend Evening Good Special Event-Harborfest 13 Fireworks Summer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Impact -Lane 14 Closure on SR 481 SB 1 Winter means that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer means that school is not in session. NMP/JAF 6-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Table 6-3. Percent of Population Groups Evacuating for Various Scenarios 25% 75% 96% 36% 21% 0% 10% 10% 100% 100% 25% 75% 96% 36% 21% 0% 10% 10% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 100% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 100% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 39% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 40% 25% 75% 100% 13% 21% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 2.5% 75% 100% 13% 21% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 25% 75% 100% 13% 21% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 31% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 31% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 31% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 14% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 40% 3% 97% 10% 39% 20% 100% 0% 0% 100% 40% 25% 75% 96% 36% 21% 0% 10% 10% 100% 100% Resident Households with Commuters ......* Households of EPZ residents who await the return of commuters prior to beginning the evacuation trip. Resident Households with No Commuters .. Households of EPZ residents who do not have commuters or will not await the return of commuters prior to beginning the evacuation trip. Employees ********.****.*........* ******************...... EPZ employees who live outside the EPZ Transients ......**.**************...........*.*.************ People who are in the EPZ at the time of an accident for recreational or other (non-employment) purposes. Shadow .**.***.*****************....****.******************. Residents and employees in the Shadow Region (outside of the EPZ) who will spontaneously decide to relocate during the evacuation. The basis for the values shown is a 20% relocation of shadow residents along with a proportional percentage of shadow employees. Special Events *...******************.........* ; *.*.******* Additional vehicles in the EPZ due to the identified special event. School, Day Camp and Transit Buses .......... Vehicle-equivalents present on the road during evacuation servicing schools, day camp and transit-dependent people (1 bus is equivalent to 2 passenger vehicles). External Through Traffic ............................. Traffic on interstates/freeways and major arterial roads at the start of the evacuation. This traffic is stopped by access control approximately 2 hours after the evacuation begins. NMP/JAF 6-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 6-4. Vehicle Estimates by Scenario 1 5,378 16,134 1,509 1,043 3,203 0 216 31 152 5,036 32,702 2 5,378 16,134 1,509 1,043 3,203 0 216 31 152 5,036 32,702 3 645 20,867 157 2,897 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 32,805 4 645 20,867 157 2,897 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 32,805 s. 645 20,867 157 1,130 3,051 0 0 0 152 2,014 28,016 6* 5,378 16,134 1,572 377 3,203 0 2,155 312 152 5,036 34,319 7 5,378 16,134 1,572 377 3,203 0 2,155 312 152 5,036 34,319 8 5,378 16,134 1,572 377 3,203 0 2,155 312 152 5,036 34,319 9 645 20,867 157 898 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 30,806 10 645 20,867 157 898 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 30,806 11 645 20,867. 157 898 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 30,806 12 645 20,867 157 406 3,051 0 0 0 152 2,014 27,292 13 645 20,867 157 1,130 3,051 22,971 0 0 152 2,014 50,987 14 5,378 16,134 1,509 1,043 . 3,203 0 216 31 152 5,036 32,702 Note: Vehicle estimates are for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) NMP/JAF 6-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 7 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE) This section presents the ETE results of the computer analyses using the DYNEV II System described in Appendices B, C and D. These results cover 29 regions within the NMP/JAF EPZ and the 14 Evacuation Scenarios discussed in Section 6. The ETE for all Evacuation Cases are presented in Table 7-1 and Table 1-2. These tables present the estimated times to clear the indicated population percentages from the Evacuation Regions for all Evacuation Scenarios. The ETE for the 2-mile region in both staged and un-staged regions are presented in Table 7-3 and Table 7-4. Table 7-5 defines the Evacuation Regions considered. The tabulated values of ETE are obtained from the DVNEV II System outputs which are generated at 5-minute intervals. 7.1 Voh.mfary Evacuation and Shadow Evacuation "Voluntary evacuees" are people within the EPZ in ERPA for which an Advisory to Evacuate has not been issued, yet who elect to evacuate. "Shadow evacuation" is the voluntary outward movement of some people from the Shadow Region (outside the EPZ) for whom no protective action recommendation has bee_n issued. Both voluntary and shadow evacuations are assumed to take place over the same time frame as the evacuation from within the impacted Evacuation Region . . The ETE for the NMP/JAF EPZ addresses the issue of voluntary evacuees in the manner shown in Figure 7-1. . Within the EPZ, 20 percent of people located in ERPA outside of the evacuation region who are not advised to evacuate, are assumed to elect to evacuate. Similarly, it is * | |||
* assumed that 20 percent of those people in the Shadow Region will choose to leave the area. Figure 7-2presents the. area identified as the Shadow Region. This region extends radially from NMP/JAF to cover a region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles .. The population and number of evacuating vehicles in the Shadow Region were estimated using the same methodology that was used for permanent residents within the EPZ (see Section 3.1). As discussed in Section 3.2,* it is estimated thi;it a total of 29,345 people reside in the Shadow Region; 20 percent of them would evacuate. *See. Table 6-4 for the number of evacuating vehicles from the Shadow Region. Traffic generated within this Shadow Region, traveling* away from the NMP/JAF site, has the potential for impeding evacuating vehicles from within the Evacuation Region. All ETE calculations include this shadow traffic movement. * * . 7 .2 Staged Evacuation | |||
* As defined in NU REG/CR-7002, staged evacuation consists of the following: 1. ERPAs comprising the 2 mile region are advised to evacuate immediately. 2. ERPAs comprising regions exten.ding from 2 to 5 miles downwind are advised to shelter in-placewhile the 2-mile region is cleare,d. l'JMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 7-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016. | |||
: 3. As vehicles evacuate the 2 mile region, people from 2 to 5 miles downwind continue preparation for evacuation while they shelter. 4. The pqpulation sheltering in the 2 to 5 mile region is advised to begin evacuating when approximately 90% of those originally within the 2 mile region evacuate across the 2 mile region boundary. 5. Non-compliance with the shelter recommendation is the same as the shadow evacuation percentage of 20%. See Section 5.4.2 for additional information on staged evacuation. 7 .3 Patterns Traffic Congestion during Evacuation Figure 7-3 through Figure 7-7 illustrate the patterns of traffic congestion that arise for the case when the entire EPZ (Region R03) is advised to evacuate during the winter, midweek, midday period under good weather conditions (Scenario 6). . . Traffic congestion, as the term is used here, is defined as Level of Servke (LOS) F. LOS F is defined as follows (HCM page 5-5): The HCM uses LOS F to define operations that have either broken down (i.e., demand exceeds capacity) or have exceeded a specified service measure value, or combination of service measure values, that most users would consider unsatisfactory. However, particularly for planning applications where different alternatives may be compared, analysts may be interested in knowing just how bad the LOS F condition is. Several are available to describe individually, or in combination, the severity of a LOS F condition: -* Demand-'to-capacity.ratios describe the extent to which capacity is exceeded during the analysis period (e.g., by 1%, 15%; etc.); | |||
* Duration of LOS F describ_es how long the condition persists (e.g., 15 min, 1 h, 3 h); and *Spatio/extent measures describe the areas affected by LOS F conditions. These include measures such as the back of queue, and the identification of the specific intersection approaches or system elements experiencing LOS F conditions. All highway "links" which experience LOS F are delineated in these figures by a thick red line; all others are .lightly indicated. Congestion develops rapidly around concentrations of population -and traffic bottlenecks .. Figure 7-3 displays the developing congestion within the City of Oswego, which is southwest of NMP/JAF, just 40 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate (ATE). At this time, a majority of transients and employees have now begun their evacuation trips, as well as many residents and commuters. SR 48, SR 481, and CR 7 southbound, as well as SR 104 WB, which are servicing the City of Oswego, are displaying congested traffic conditions (LOS F) on roadway sections exiting the City of Oswego. Some congestion exists in Fulton due to the voluntary evacuation of vehicles _outside of the EPZ. NMP/JAF 7-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 At 1 hour, 30 minutes after the ATE, Figure 7-4 displays fully-developed congestion within the City of Oswego with LOS F along the major evacuating routes of CR 7, SR 104, SR 481, and SR 48 exiting the City of Oswego. At this time, over three-quarters of vehicles have begun their evacuating trips and just over 50% of vehicles have successfully evacuated the EPZ. The evacuation of vehicles within the southwestern portion of the EPZ traveling southbound is now being hindered voluntary evacuees from the shadow region. The two mile region is clear of congestion at this time. At 3 hours after the ATE, as shown in Figure 7-5, congestion is dissipating within the 5-mile area. At this time, 99% of vehicles have begun their evacuation trips and approximately 93% of vehicles have successfully evacuated the EPZ. Congestion in the heart of the City of Oswego has begun to clear as evacuees continue to vacate the area. The main exit routes of evacuation from within the EPZ (SR 104, SR 481, Rathburn Rd, Ridge Rd, and CR 7) remain fully congested (LOS F) as vehicles continue to evacuate. Vehicles evacuating from the SUNY Oswego campus and the western portion of the City of Oswego are constrained by the presence of heavy congestion along SR 104 westbound and CR 7 southbound. The 5-mile region is clear of congestion at this time. Congested ccmditions remain on SR 481, CR 7, SR 104, Rathburn Rd and Ridge Rd leaving the EPZ at 3 hours 30 minutes after the ATE (Figure 7-6). At this time, 100% of vehicles have begun their evacuation trips and nearly 99% of evacuating vehicles have successfully evacuated the EPZ. Congestion within the EPZ has almost. completely dissipated and the extent of the congestion has been reduced as seen by comparing Figure 7-6 with Figure 7-5. The main exit from the SUNY Oswego Campus is now clear and egress is unrestricted as congestion on SR 104 migrates further west. Over the next 20 minutes, at 3 hour and 50 minutes after the ATE, the EPZ is completely clear of *congestion as shown 'in Figure *.At this time, 100% of vehicles have successfully mobilized and evacuated from within the EPZ. Light traffic remains from within the shadow region while all areas within the EPZ are. free of congested conditions. All congestion inside the shadow region is cleared by 4 hours and 15 minutes after the ATE. 7 .4 Evacuation Rates Evacuation is a continuous process, as implied by Figure 7-8 through Figure 7-21. These figures indicate the rate at which traffic.fiows out of the indicated for the case of an evacuation of the full EPZ (Region. R03) under ttie indicated conditi.ons. One figure is presented for each scenario considered. As indicated in these figures, there is typically a long "tail" to these distributions for Regions ROl a.nd R02 caused by mobilization time. Vehicles begin to evacuate an area slowly at first, as people respond to. the ATE at different rates. Then traffic demand builds rapidly (slopes of curves increase). When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the EPZ at rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ. Towards the end of the | |||
* process, relatively few evacuation routes service the remaining demand . . NMP/JAF 7-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 This decline in aggregate flow rate, towards the end of the process, is characterized by these curves flattening and gradually becoming horizontal. Ideally, it would be desirable to fully saturate all evacuation routes equally so that all will service traffic near capacity levels and all will clear at the same time. For this ideal situation, all. curves would retain the same slope until the end -thus minimizing evacuation time. In reality, this ideal is generally unattainable reflecting the spatial variation in population density, mobilization rates and in highway capacity | |||
* over the EPZ. 7.5 Results Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 *present the ETE values for all 29 Evacuation Regions and all 14 Evacuation Scenarios. Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 present the ETE values for the 2-Mile Region for both staged and un-staged keyhole regions downwind to 5 miles. The tables are organized as follows: | |||
* Jable' Contents ' . ETE represents the elapsed time required for 90 percent .of the 7-1 population within a Region, to evacuate from that Region. All Scenarios are considered, as well as Staged Evacuation scenarios. . . ETE represents the elapsed time required for 100 percent of the 7-2 population within a Region, to evacuate from that Region. All Scenarios are considered, as well as Staged Evacuation scenarios. ETE represents the elapsed time required for 90 percent of the 7-3 population within the 2-mile Region, to evacuate from the 2-mile Region with both Concurrent and Staged Evacu*ations of additional ERPA downwind in the keyhole Region. ETE represents the elapsed time required for 100 percent of the 7-4 population within the 2-mile Region, to evacuate from the 2"mile Region with both Concurrent and Staged Evacuations of additional ERPA downwind in the keyhole Region. ., The animation snapshots described above reflect ETE statistics for the staged) evacuation scenarios and regions, which are displayed in Figure 7-3 through Figure 7-7. Most of the congestion is located in ERPAs 12and13.which are comprised of the eastern and . . western halves of the city of Oswego, respectively, and lie beyond the 5-mile area. This fact is reflected in the ETE statistics: | |||
* The goth percentile ETE for: Region ROl (2-mile 'area) is 1:30 for good weather and rain andup to 3b minutes higher for snow cases. . | |||
* The9Qth percentile ETE for Region R02 area) is. between 1:45 and 1:50 for good . . and rain weather (non-special event) scenarios. Sri ow conditions incre:ase the ETE by as much as 25 minutes. NMP/JAF . 7-4 . kLD Engineering, P.C. . **Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 * | |||
* The goth percentile ETE for Region R03 (full EPZ) is between 2:20 and 2:55 for good weather (non-special event) scenarios. Rain increases the ETE by up to 15minutes. Snow has a larger impact and increases ETE by as much as 30 minutes. | |||
* Generally, populous regions (which contain ERPA 12 and ERPA 13) resemble the pattern exhibited by R03. Rural regions which no not include either ERPA 12 or ERPA 13 more closely resemble ROl. | |||
* The 10oth percentile ETE for all rural regions are governed by the mobilization times. This fact implies that the congestion within the EPZ dissipates prior to the end of | |||
* mobilization. | |||
* The 10oth percentile ETE for populous regions can exceed the mobilization times by as much as 15 minutes for non-special event scenarios. | |||
* Comparison of Scenarios 5 and 13 in Table 7-1 indicates that the Special Event -Harborfest Fireworks-has a substantial impact on the ETE. for the goth and 10oth percentiles. Harborfest attracts a considerable number of transients from the greater Central New York region. The capstone of the Harborfest weekend celebration is a Saturday night fireworks display. This event is expected to draw go,ooo people, 61% of whom are from outside of the EPZ. The additional 22,g71 vehicles significantly increase congestion on all major evacuation routes exiting the city of Oswego. The goth and 10oth percentile ETE for regions containing the City of Oswego increase by as much as 2 hours and 55 minutes and 3 hours and 40 minutes, respectively. The impact on the 2-Mile and 5-Mile Region ETE is far less severe because the event is situated in the shadow. The special event does not impact these regions, as they are spatially removed from the event to the extent that no peripheral effects are experienced. Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 7-1 indicates that the roadway closure -one southbound lane closed on SR 481-does not have a material impact on goth percentile ETE due to the fact that the 1 lane section of SR 481 to the north of the lane closure forms a bottleneck upstream of the lane closure. 7 .6 Staged Evacuation Results To determine wheth.er the staged evacuation strategy is worthy of consideration, one must show that the ETE for the 2 Mile region can be reduced without significantly affecting the region between 2 miles and 5 miles. Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 present a comparison of the ETE compiled for the concurrent (un-staged) and staged evacuation studies. Note that Regions R22 through R28, and R2g are the same geographic areas as Regions R04 through 10, and R02, respectively. The times shown in Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 are when the 2 mile region is go% clear and 100% clear, respectively. As shown in these tables, the ETE for the 2-mile region is unchanged when a staged evacuation is implemented. The. reason for this is that the congestion within the 5-mile area does not extend upstream to the extent that it penetrates to within 2 miles of NMP/JAF. Consequently, the impedance, due to this congestion within the 5-mile area, to evacuees from within the 2-mile area is not suffieient to materially influence the goth or 1ooth percentile ETE for the 2:..mile NMP/JAF 7-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ; . | |||
area. While failing to provide assistance to evacuees from within 2 miles of NMP/JAF, staging produces a negative impact on the goth percentile ETE for those evacuating from within the 2-to 5-mile area. A comparison of ETE between regions R22 through R28 with R04 through RlO and R02 with R2g, respectively, reveals that staging retards the goth percentile ETE for those in the 2 to 5-mile area by up to 40 minutes (see Table 7-1) and does not significantly impact the 10oth percentile ETE (see Table This extending of ETE is due to the delay in beginning the evacuation trip, experienced by those who shelter, plus the effect of the trip-generation "spike" (approximately 70 percent of the evacuating vehicles between 2 miles and 5 miles who have sheltered in place while residents within 2 miles evacuated, begin their evacuation trip over a 15 minute timeframe, shown in Figure 5-5) that follows their eventual ATE, in creating* congestion within the EPZ area beyond 2 miles. In summary, the staged evacuation protective action strategy provides no benefits and adversely impacts many evacuees located beyond 2 miles from NMP/JAF. 1.1 | |||
* Guidanc.e on Using ETE Tables The user first determines the percentile of population for which the ETE is sought (The NRC guidance calls for the goth percentile). The applicable value of ETE within the chosen table may then be identified using the following procedure: 1. Identify the applicable Scenario: | |||
* Season | |||
* Summer * . Winter (also Autumn and Spring) | |||
* Day of Week | |||
* Midweek | |||
* Weekend | |||
* Time of Day | |||
* Midday | |||
* Evening | |||
* Weather Condition | |||
* Good Weather. | |||
* Rain | |||
* Snow | |||
* Special Event | |||
* Harborfest Fireworks . . *. Road Closure (1 southbound lane on SR 481 from Churchill Rd to Cha lone Dr W) | |||
* Evacuation Staging | |||
* No, Staged *Evacuation is not considered | |||
* Yes, Staged Evacuation is considered . ' . . . . . . . . While these.Scenarios are designed, in aggregate, to represent conditions throughout the year, some further clarification is warranted: NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 .. * | |||
* The conditions of a summer evening (either midweek or weekend) and rain are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (2) and (4) apply. | |||
* The conditions of a winter evening (either midweek or weekend) and rain are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (7) and (10) for rain apply, | |||
* The conditions of a wintE:'.r evening (either midweek or weekend) and snow are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (8) and (11) for snow apply. | |||
* The seasons are defined as follows: | |||
* Summer assumes that public schools are not in session. | |||
* Winter (includes Spring and Autumn) considers that public schools are in session. | |||
* Time of Day: Midday implies the time over which most commuters are at work or are travelling to/from work. 2. With the desired percentile ETE and Scenario identified, now identify the Evacuation Region: | |||
* Determine the projected azimuth direction of the plume (coincident with the wind direction). | |||
* Determine the distance that the Evacuation Region will extend from the nuclear power plants. The applicable distances and their associated candidate Regions are | |||
* given below: | |||
* 2 Miles (Region ROl) | |||
* To 5 Miles (Regions R02, R04 through RlO) | |||
* To EPZ Boundary (Regions R03, Rll through* R21} | |||
* Enter Table and identify the applicable group of candidate Regions based on the distance that the selected Region extends from the NMP/JAF. Select the Evacuation . Region identifier in that row, based on the azimuth direction of the plume, from the first column of the Table. 3. Determine the ETE Table based on the percentile selected. Then, for the Scenario identified in Step 1 and the Region identified in Step 2, proceed as follows: | |||
* The columns of Table 7-1 through Table 7-4 are labeled with the Scenario numbers. Identify the proper column in the selected Table using the Scenario number defined in Step 1. | |||
* Identify the row in the table that provides ETE values for the Region identified in Step 2. | |||
* The unique data cell defined by the column and row so determined contains the desired value of ETE expressed in Hours:Minutes. Example It is desired to identify the ETE for the following conditions: | |||
* Sunday, January 24th at 9:00 PM. | |||
* It is raining. | |||
* Wind direction is from ENE. | |||
* Wind speed is such that the distance to be evacuated is judged to be a 2-mile radius NMP/JAF 7-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
---------------------------------------------and downwind to 5 miles. | |||
* The desired ETE is that value needed to evacuate 90 percent of the population from within the impacted Region. | |||
* A staged evacuation is not desired. Table 7-1 is applicable because the goth percentile ETE is desired. Proceed as follows: 1. Identify the Scenario as winter, weekend, evening and raining. Entering Table 7-1, it is seen that there is no match for these descriptors. However, the clarification given above assigns this combination of circumstances to Scenario 10. 2. Enter Table 7-5 and locate the Region described as "Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to the 5 Miles" for wind direction from ENE and read Region RlO in the first column of that row. 3. Enter Table 7-1 to locate the data cell containing the value of ETE for Scenario 10 and Region RlO. This data cell is in column (10) and in the row for Region RlO; it contains the ETE value of 1:30. NMP/JAF 7-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ----------------------- | |||
Table 7-1. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (S} (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good* Good Rain Snow Good Rain Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Snow Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ROl 1:30 1:30 1:3Q 1:30 1:30 ' . 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00. 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROZ 1:50'' 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 R03 2:35 2:40 2:30 2:45 2:25 2:55 3:00 3:15 2:20 2:35 2:50 2:25 5:15 2:30 Z-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:35 1:35 ROS 1:40 '1:40 ' **, . 1:35 '1;35 .1:35 1:40. 1:40 . 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 i:35 1:40 ROG 1:45 1.:45 1:35 1:35 1:35. 1:45 1:45 . 2:10 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:30 1:45 R07 .. * .. '1:50 1:50 1::45' 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10' 1:45 1:45 ,. 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 ROS l:SO 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 R09 1:45 1:45 1:40 1:4o.** 1:40 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 R10 1:35. 1:35 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:35 1:35 1:55 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary R11 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .** 1:30 1:30 | |||
* 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R12 '1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R13 1:40 1:40. 1:30 1:30 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:35 1:35 '2:05 1:35 1:35 1:40 R14 1:45 1:45 1:40 ,1:50 1:35 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 '' RlS 1:50 1:50 1:45 2:00 1:35 1:50 1:55 2:15 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:50 R16 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:50 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 '1:35 1:50 R17 | |||
* l:SO " '1:40 1:55 | |||
* 1:50 1:35 1:40 1:50 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R18 1:50 1:50 1:40 1:40 1:40 1:50 1:50 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R19 2:35 2:50 2:35 2:50 2:25 2:55 3:05 3:15 2:25 2:35 2:45 2:20 5:20 2:40 R20 2:40 2:45 . 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:50 3:05 3:20 2:30 2:35 2:50 2:25 5:15 2:35 R21 2:30 2:45 2:30 2:40 2:25 2:50 3:00 3:15 2:20 2:30 2:40 2:20 5:10 2:35 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:55' ' 1:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 2:25 1:55 1:55 2:30 1:55 1:55 1:55 R23. 1:55 2:00 2:00 . 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:00 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R24 :z:05 2:05 .* 2:05* '2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:05 R25 2:15 2:20 2:15. 2:20 2:20 2:15 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:15 . R26 2:20 2:20' 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:20 '' RZ7 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:10 2:15 R28 | |||
* 1:55 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:55 1:55 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R29 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:20 2:15 2:15 NMP/JAF 7-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Region R01 R02 R03 R04 ROS R06 ***R07. ROS R09 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15. R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 'R24 R25 R26 R27 R28 R29 NMP/JAF Summer Midweek Good Weather 3:30 3:35 3:40 .3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:4.0 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35. Rain 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 .3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Evacuation Time Estimate Table 7-2. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer | |||
* Winter Winter Weekend Midweek *Midweek Weekend Good Weather 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 .3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Rain 3:30 3:35 . 3:40 3:35 .Weather Good Weather* Rain Snow Good Weather Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:40 3:50 3:55 4:25 3:40 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 3:35 3:35' 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 . ' 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35* 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35. 3:35 3:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary 3:30. 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 4:25 3:40 4:25 3:40 . 4:25 3:40 4:25 3:40 4:25 3:40 3:55 3:55 3:45 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 *3:40 Rain 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 ' 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35. 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 7-10 4:20 4:20 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Snow 4:15 4:20 4:25 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20. 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:15 4:15 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Winter Midweek Weather 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 '3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Weekend Event 3:30 3:35 7:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 7:20 7:10 . 7:10 3:35 3:35 3:35' 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Midweek Roadway Impact 3:30 3:35. 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 '3:35 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 7-3. Time to Clear 90.Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek .weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region and 5-Mile Region R01 *1:30 ** 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R02 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 Un-Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles | |||
* R04 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30* 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R06 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ** R07 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 i:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:05 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R10 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R23 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R24 1:30 i:30 *.1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R25 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R26 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R27 1:30 1:30 1:30 *1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R28 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R29 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 NMP/JAF . 7-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-4. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) {9) {10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening | |||
* Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good *Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region and 5-Mile Region R01 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15. 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3;30 -3:30 R02 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4.:15. 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 Un-Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:36 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3;30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 *ROG 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R07 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R09 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15. 3:30 3:30 3:30 R10 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R23 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R24 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R25 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R26 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R27 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R28 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R29 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 NMP/JAF 7-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-5. Description of Evacuation Regions Region Description R01 2-Mile Radius R02 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction ERPA From .1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 N/A E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, Refer to R01 SSW, SW, WSW R04 w ROS WNW ROG NW, NNW R07 N ROS NNE R09 NE .R10 ENE Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to EPZ Boundary Region Wind Direction ERPA From 5 6 7 8 9 10. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 R11 E,ESE,SE R12 SSE,S,SSW R13 SW R14 WSW R15 w R16 .WNW R17 NW R18 NNW R19 N R20 NNE, NE R21 ENE NMP/JAF 7-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Staged -Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles 7 . 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Region Wind Direction From 2 1 3 4 5 6 ERPA N/A E, ESE, .sE; SSE, S, SSW, SW,: WSW Refer to ROl I. R22 w. I .R23 'WNW R24 NW,NNW R25 N R26 NNE R27 NE R28 ENE R29 NMP/JAF 7-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 15 Miles I 2-Mile Region I Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 10 Miles Downwind Staged Evacuation: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind | |||
* Plant Location | |||
* Region to be Evacuated: 100% Evacuation D 20% Shadow Evacuation D Shelter. then Evacuate Figure 7-1. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology NMP/JAF 7-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF (} ERPA l I 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate / /, :w IHS:"/*P O*t* I KLDEngineering,Constell11tlonErmgy,Entergy Figure 7-2. NMP/JAF Shadow Region 7-16 / ,**,/ '*,/' ,,/ .. / Lacona @ mar 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -s c D -E -F Legend NMP/JAF ERPA \ \ \ \ \ \ \..-:::, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate / ' 26 I I Figure 7-3. Congestion Patterns at 40 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-17 49' KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -B c D -E -F Legend NMP/JAF ERPA I I \ \ \ \.. _., 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate / ' 26 I I Figure 7-4. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour, 30 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -a c D -E \ \ -F ,/r:i Legend NMP/JAF ERPA \ 1... _, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Figure 7-5. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-19 Square \ ;Copyright: ESRl Data and Maps 2014 ICLD Englneerlng, Exelon Enter&v KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -s c D -E -F Legend I I NMP/JAF ERPA fJ 1... _,. 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate lokt: ( Jmario Figure 7-6. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, 30 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-20 Lacona Square \ ;Copyricht ESRI Data ind MISH 2'014 ICLD Enclneerinc, Ealon Gener.i:lon, KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 10 Mites I NMP/JAF I I I LOS --A -s c D -E -F Legend NMP/JAF ERPA I \ I I I I I I \ \ \ \ \ \..-:::. 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate L.1k,*t>111al'io 28 /' 26 I I Figure 7-7. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, SO Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-21 Lacona 49' Square '!:o.1e1119/20t6 \ lOPYl"i(hl; £SRI 0.UI Ind M*ps 2014 ICLD Enclneerlng, Eielon Gener1tlon, Entugy KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 tl.O c 30 25 "fil -;;; 20 :::J "'C :;: c 15 :::J Ill 0 ..c !::. 10 ..c QI > 5 0 30 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 1) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-8. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 1 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 240 270 | |||
* 100% tl.O c 25 "fil -;;; 20 :::J "'C :;: c 15 :::J Ill 0 ..c !::. 10 ..c QI > 5 0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-9. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 2 for Region R03 NMP/JAF 7-22 Evacuation Time Estimate 240 270 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 bl) c 30 25 Vi 20 :::J ,, c 15 :::J "' 0 ..c .!!! .t:. 10 ..c QI > bl) c 5 0 30 25 -20 :::J "' u ,, "' c 15 :::J "' 0 ..c .!!! .t:. 10 ..c QI > 5 0 NMP/JAF --------------------Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good {Scenario 3) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-10. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 3 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-11. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 4 for Region R03 7-23 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 QI) c 30 25 Vi' 20 ::s "C :;; c 15 ::s "' 0 .!! ..c .!::! !=. 10 ..c cu > 5 0 35 30 QI) c 25 Cit ::s "C :;: :; 20 > "' w ::s j! _g 15 u I--10 > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 5) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-12. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 5 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good {Scenario 6) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-13. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 6 for Region R03 7-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 35 30 11.D c 25 +:; RI -:I Ill u "'C 20 RI C > RI w Ill :I ] _g 15 u I-:c -10 Qj > 5 0 35 30 11.D c 25 RI Ill :I "'C :;: i; 20 > Ill w :I ] _g 15 u I--10 > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-14. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 7 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-15. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 8 for Region R03 7-25 Evacuation Time Estimate | |||
* 100% 240 270 | |||
* 100% 240 270 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 a.o c 30 25 Vi 20 ::J "C c 15 ::J Ill 0 .!:! c. 10 > a.o c 5 0 30 25 20 ::J Ill u "C n:I c 15 ::J Ill 0 .!:! c. 10 > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 9) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-16. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 9 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-17. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 10 for Region R03 7-26 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 b.D c 30 25 iii 20 ::i 'tJ c 15 ::i "' 0 ..!!! ..c .!:! t:. 10 ..c (IJ > b.D c 5 0 30 25 iii 20 ::i 'tJ c 15 ::i "' 0 ..!!! ..c .!:! t:. 10 ..c (IJ > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow {Scenario 11) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-18. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 11 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good {Scenario 12) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-19. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 12 for Region R03 7-27 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 t>O c 60 50 40 ::I "'C c 30 ::I "' 0 ..r. .!::! !::. 20 ..r. cu > t>O c 10 0 30 25 -20 ::I "' u "'C "' c 15 ::I "' 0 ..r. .!::! !::. 10 ..r. cu > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good, Special Event (Scenario 13) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% | |||
* 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 390 420 450 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-20. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 13 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ | |||
* 90% | |||
* 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-21. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 14 for Region R03 7-28 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 8 TRANSIT-DEPENDENT AND SPECIAL FACILITY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES This section details the analyses applied and the results obtained in the form of evacuation time estimates for transit vehicles. The demand for transit service reflects the needs of three . population groups: (1) residents with no vehicles available; (2) residents of special facilities such as scho"ols, -preschools, day camps, medical facilities, and correctional facilities; and (3) homebound special needs population. These transit vehicles mix with the general evacuation traffic that is comprised mostly of "passenger cars" (pc's). The presence of each transit vehicle in the evacuating traffic stream is represented within the modeling paradigm _described in Appendix D as equivalent to two pc's. This equivalence factor represents the longer size and more sluggish operating characteristics of a transit vehicle, relative to those of a pc. Transit vehicles must be mobilized in preparation for their respective evacuation missions. Specifically: | |||
* Bus drivers must be alerted | |||
* They must travel to the bus depot | |||
* They must be briefed there and assigned to a route or facility _These activities consume time. | |||
* Based on discussion with the offsite agencies, it is estimated that bus mobilization time will average approximately 90 minutes extending from the Advisory to Evacuate, to the time when buses first arrive at the facility to be evacuated. During this mobilization period; other mobilization activities are taking place. One of these is* the action taken by parents, neighbors, relatives and friends to pick up children from school prior to the arrival of buses, so that they may join their families. Virtually all studies of evacuations_ have concluded that this "bonding" process of uniting families is universally prevalent during emergencies and should be anticipated in the planning process. -The current public information disseminated to residents of the NMP/JAF EPZ indicates that schoolchildren and chHdren at daycares with an enrollment of 30 or larger may be evacuated to the reception center at the New York State Fairgrounds in Syracuse at emergency action levels of Alert or_ higher. As in Section 2, this study assumes a fast breaking general emergency." Therefore, children_ are evacuated to the reception center. Picking up children at school could add* to traffic congestion at the schools, delaying the departure of the buses evacuating schoolchildren, which may have-to return ina subsequent "wave" to the EPZ to evacuat_e the transit-dependent population. This report p_rovides estimates of buses under the assumption that no children will be picked up by their parents (in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002), to present an upper bound estim,ate of buses required. This study assumes that children at care centers with an enrollment of less than 30_ children are picked up by parents or guardians and thatthe time to perform this activity is included in the trip generation times discussed in Sections. NMP/JAF EvacuationTinie Estimate 8-l. -* _KLD Engineering, P.C. _ February 24, 2016 The procedure for computing transit-dependent ETE is to: | |||
* Estimate demand for transit service | |||
* Estimate time to perform all transit functions | |||
* Estimate route travel times to the EPZ boundary and to the reception center 8.1 Transit Dependent People Demand Estimate The telephone survey (see Appendix F) results were used to estimate the portion of the population requiring transit service based on the percentage of households with no vehicles available. Table 8-1 presents estimates of transit-dependent people. Note: | |||
* Estimates of persons requiring transit vehicles include schoolchildren. For those evacuation scenarios where children are at school when an evacuation is ordered, separate transportation is provided for the schoolchildren. The actual need for transit vehicles by residents is thereby less than the given estimates. However, estimates of transit vehicles are not reduced when schools are in session. | |||
* It is reasonable and appropriate to consider that many transit-dependent persons will evacuate by ride-sharing with neighbors, friends or family. For example, nearly 80 percent of those who evacuated from Mississauga, Ontario who did not use their own cars, shared a ride with neighbors or friends (IES, 1981). Other documents report that approximately 70 percent of transit dependent persons were evacuated via ride sharing. We will adopt a conservative estimate that SO percent of transit dependent persons will ride share, in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002. The estimated number of bus trips needed to service transit-dependent persons is based on an estimate of average bus occupancy of 30 persons at the conclusion of the bus run. Transit vehicle seating capacities typically equal or exceed 60 children on average (roughly equivalent to 40 .adults). If transit vehicle evacuees are two thirds adults and one third children, then the number of "adult seats'' taken by 30. persons is 20 + (2/3 xlO) = 27. On this basis, the average load factor anticipated is (27 /40) x 100 = 68 percent. Thus, if the actual demand for service exceeds the estimates of Table 8-1 by 50 percent, the demand for service can still be accommodated by the available bus seating capacity. [20 + x 10 )]-:-40 x 1.5 = 1.00 Table 8-1 indicates that transportation must be provided for 1,860 people. Therefore, a total of 62 bus runs are required to transport this population to the reception center. This study will | |||
* consider 76 buses to provide a minimum of one bus for each route specified in the county emergency plans, see section 8.4 for additional details. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 8-2 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 To illustrate this estimation procedure, we calculate the number of persons, P, requiring public transit or ride-share, and the number of buses, B, required for the NMP/JAF EPZ: n P = No.ofHH x L{(o/o HH with i vehicles) x [(Average HH Size) -i]} x Aici i=O Where, A= Percent of households with commuters C = Percent of households who will not await the return of a commuter p = 17,332 x [0.0646 x 1.75 + 0.297 x (1.83-1) x 0.56 x 0.55 +0.4747 x (2.57-2) x (0.56 x 0.55)2] = 17,332 x 0.21464 = 3,720 B = (0.5 x P) -:-30 = 62 These calculations are explained as follows: * * **. | |||
* All members (1.75 avg.) of households (HH) with no vehicles (6.46%) will evacuate by public transit or ride-share. The term 17,332 (number of households) x 0.0646 x 1.75, accounts for these people. The members of HH with 1 vehicle away (29.7%), who are at home, equal (1.83-1) . The number of HH where the commuter will not return home is equal to (17,332 x 0.297 x 0.83 x 0.56 x 0.55), as 56% of EPZ households have a commuter, 55% of which would not .return home in the event of an emergency. The number of persons who will evacuate by public transit or ride-share is equal to the product of these two terms. The members of HH with 2 vehicles that are away (47.47%), *who are at home, equal (2.57 -2). The number of HH where neither commuter will return home is equal t<;> . 11;332 x 0.4747x 0.57 x (0.56 x 0.55)2* Thenumber of persons who will evacucite by public transit or ride-share is equal to the product of these two terms (the last term is squared tbrepresent the probability that neither commuter will return). Households with 3 or more vehicles are assumed to have no need for transit vehicles. | |||
* The total number of persons requiring public transit is the sum of such people inHH with no vehicles, or with 1 or 2 vehicles that are away from home. . . The estimate of transit-dependent population in Table 8-1 far exceeds the number of registered transit-dependent persons in the EPZ as provided by the county (discussed below in Section 8.5). This is consistent with the findings of NUREG/CR-6953, Volume 2, in that a large majority of the population within the EPZs of U.S. nu dear plants does not register .* ., . . *. . .. . . with their local response agency. NMP/JAF 8-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Ti,me Estimate February 24, 2016 8.2. School, and Camp Population -Table 8-2 presents the school, preschool, and day cainp population and transportation requirements for the direct evacuation of all schools, preschools and day camps within the EPZ for the 2011-2012 school year. This information was provided by Oswego County Emergency Management. The column in Table 8-'2 entitled "Buses Required" specifies the number of buses required for each school1. preschool, or day camp under the following set of assumptions and estimates: | |||
* No students will be picked up by their parents prior to the arrival of the buses. * | |||
* While many high school students commute to school using private automobiles (as discussed in Section 2.4 of NUREG/CR-7002), the estimate of buses required for school evacuation do not consider the use of these private vehicles. | |||
* Bus capacity, expressed in students per bus, is set to 70 for primary schools and 50 for middle and high schools. | |||
* According to the county emergency plans, 18 buses will be dispatched to SUl\IV Oswego, each with a capacity of 40 students per bus, to evacuate the transit dependent population at the school. | |||
* Those staff members who do not accompany the students will evacuate in their private vehicles. | |||
* Children at day-care centers with an enrollment of less than 30 children are picked *up by parents or guardians | |||
* No allowance is made for student absenteeism, typically 3 percent daily. It is recommended that Oswego County introduces procedures whereby the schools, preschools, and day camp are contacted prior to the dispatch of buses from the depot, to ascertain the current estimate of students to be evacuated. In this way, the number of buses dispatched tbthe schools, preschools, or day camps will reflect the actual number needed. The need for buses would be reduced by any high school students who have evacuated using private aut9mobiles (if permitted by school authorities). Those buses originally allocated to evacuate schoolchildren that are not needed due to children being picked up by their parents, can be gainfully assigned to service other facilities or those persons who do not have access to private vehicles or to ride-sharing. Table 8-3 presents a list of the reception centers for each school, preschool, and day camp in the EPZ. Children be transported to the reception center located at the *New York State Fairgrounds in Syracuse where they will be subsequently retrieved by their respective families. Demand Table 8-4 presents the census of medical facilities in the EPZ. A total of 1,080 people have been identified as living in, or being treated in, these The capacity and current census for each facility was provided by the county emergency management personnel. This data is presented in Table 8-4 .. The transportation requirements for the medical facility population are also presented in Table . NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 8-4. The number of ambulance runs is determined by assuming that 2 patients can be accommodated per ambulance The capacities of other vehicle classes were reduced to allow for medical staff, equipment and for other contingencies. It was assumed a bus can accommodate 30 persons, a wheelchair buses may transport 20 ambulatory and 2 wheelchair bound individuals and wheelchair vans can accommodate 7 ambulatory and 3 wheelchair bound persons. 8.4 Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Dependent People EPZ bus resources are assigned to evacuating children (if school is in session at the time of the ATE) as the first priority in the event of an emergency. In the event that the allocation of buses dispatched from the depots to the various facilities and to the bus routes is somewhat "inefficient", or if there is a shortfall of available drivers, then there may be a need for some buses to return to the EPZ from the reception center after completing their first evacuation trip, to complete a "second wave" of providing transport service to evacuees. For this reason, the ETE -for the transit-dependent population will be calculated for both a one wave transit evacuation and for two waves. Of course, if the impacted Evacuation Region is other than R03 (the entire EPZ), then there vitill likely be ample transit resources relative to demand in the impacted Region and this discussion of a second wave would likely not apply. When school evacuation needs are satisfied, subsequent assignments of buses to service the transit-dependent should be sensitive to their mobilization time. Clearly, the buses should be dispatched after people have completed their mobilization activities and are in a position to board the buses when they arrive at the pick-up points. Evacuation Time Estimates for transit trips were developed using both good weather and adverse weather conditions. Figure 8-1 presents the chronology of events relevant t.o transit operations. The elapsed time for each activity will now be discussed with reference to Figure 8-1. Activity: Mobilize Drivers (A-7B-7C) Mobilization is the eiapsed time from the :Advisory to Evacuate until the time the buses arrive at the facility to be evacuated. | |||
* 1t is assumed that for a rapidly escalating radiological emergency with no observable indication before the fact, school bus drivers would likely require 90 minutes tc:i be contacted, to travel fo the depot, be briefed, and to* travel to the transit-. dependent facilities. Mobilization time is-slightly longer in adverse weather-100 minutes when raining, 110 minutes when snowing ... | |||
* Activity: Board Passengers (C-7D) . .*-. . . . Based on discussions with offsite agencies, a loading time of 15 minutes (20 minutes for rain and 2.5 minutes for snow) for schoOI buses is used .. For multiple stops. along a pick-up route (transit-dependent bus routes) estimation of travel time must allow forthe delay associated with stopping and starting at each pick-up point. The time, t, required for a bus to decelerate at a rate, "a", in ft/sec/sec, from a spee.d, NMP/JAF 8-5 KLD Engineering, P.c: Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 "v", expressed in ft/sec, to a stop, is t = v/a. Assuming the same acceleration rate and final speed following the stop yields a total time, T, to service boarding passengers: T = t+ B + t = B + 2t = B + Zv, a Where B = Dwell time to service passengers. The total distance, "s" in feet, travelled during the deceleration and acceleration activities is: s = v2/a. If the bus had not stopped to service passengers, but had continued to travel at speed, v, then its travel time over the distance, s, would be: s/v = v/a. Then the total delay (i.e. pickup time, P) to service passengers is: v v P=T--=B+-a a Assigning reasonable estimates: | |||
* B = SO seconds: a generous value for a single passenger, carrying personal items, to board per stop | |||
* v = 2S mph = .37 ft/sec | |||
* a = 4 ft/sec/sec, a moderate average rate Then, P ::: 1 minute per stop. Allowing 30 minutes pick-up time per bus run implies 30 stops per run, for good weather. It is assumed that bus acceleration and speed will be less in rain; total loading time is 40 minutes per bus in rain, SO minutes in snow. Activity: Travel to EPZ Boundary (D-7E) School, Preschool, and Dav Camp Evacuation Transportation resources available were provided by the EPZ county emergency management agencies and are summarized in Table 8-S. Also included in the table are the number of buses needed* to evacuate schools, preschools, day camp, medical facilities, transit-dependent population, homebound special needs population (discussed below in Section 8.5) and correctional. facilities (discussed below in Section 8;6). These numbers indicate there are sufficient resources available to evacuate everyone in a single wave. Given the safety factors employed, it is likely that only a single wave is. required so long as resources are deployed systematically. Should the need arise, mutual aid agreements would supply the necessary resources to address any shortfalls. The bus.es seniicing the schools, preschools, and day camp are ready to begin their evacuation trips at 10S minutes after the -advisory to evacuate """" 90 minutes mobilization time plus lS minutes loading time -in good we*ather. The UNITES software discussed-in Section 1.3 was used to define bus routes along the most likely path from a .school being evacuated to the EPZ | |||
* boundary, traveling toward the appropriate reception center; This is done in UNITES by interactively selectingthe series of nodes.from the .school to the EPZ boundary. Each bus route is given an identification number and is written to the DYNEV II input stream. DYNEV computes the route length and outputs the average speed each S minute _interval, for each bus route.* The specified bus routes are documented in Table 8-6 (refer to the maps of the link-node . analysis network .in Appendix K for node locations). Data provided by DYNEV during the appropriate timeframe depending on the mobilization and loading times (i.e., 100 to lOS NMP/JAF 8-6 _ KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 minutes after the advisory to evacuate for good weather) were used to compute the average speed for each route, as follows:* * . (mi.) Average Speed hr Lf=1 length of link i (mi) '\'n {v l . z* k **c ** ) + length of link i (mi.) . 60 min.} .l..i=l . e ay on m i mm. . . mi x 1 h . current speed on link i (hr J r. 60min. x 1 hr. The average speed computed (using this methodology) for the buses servicing each of the schools, preschools, and day camp in the EPZ is shown in Table 8-7 through Table 8-9 for school, . . . preschool, and day camp evacuation, and in Table 8-11 through Table 8-13 for the transit vehicles evacuating transit-dependent persons, which are discussed later. The travel time to | |||
* the. EPZ. boundary was computed for each bus using the computed average speed and the distance to the EPZ boundary along the most likely route out of the EPZ. Speeds were reduced in Table 8-7 through Table 8-9 and in Table 8-11 through Table 8-13 to SS mph (SO mph for rain -10% decrease, rounded to the nearest S mph -and 4S mph for snow -20% decrease, rounded to the nearest Smph) for those calculated. bus speeds which exceed SS mph, as the school .bus speed limit for state routes in New York is SS mph. The travel time from the EPZ boundary to the reception center was computed assuming an average speed of SS mph, SO mph, and 4S mph for good weather, rain, and snow, respectively. Table 8-7(good weather), Table 8-8(rain) and Table 8-9 (snow) present the following evacuation time estimates (rounded .. up tothe n.earest S minutes) for schools, preschool, and day camp in the EPz: (1) The elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the bu.s exits the EPZ; and (2) The elapsed time until the blls reaches the Reception Center (R.C.). The evacuation time out of the EPZ can be. computed as .the sum of associated with Activities A-7B-7C, C-7D, and D-7E (For | |||
* example: 90 min. + 15 + S3.= 2:40 for Oswego High School, with good weather). The evacuation time to the reception center is determ.ined by adding the time associated with Activity E-7F (discussed below), to this EPZ evacuation time. Evacuation of Transit-Dependent Population The buses dispatched from the depots to service the transit-dependent evacuees will be scheduled so that they arrive at their respective routes after their passengers have completed their mobilization. As shown in Figure S-4 (Residents with no Commuters), approximately 90 percent of the evacuees will complete their mobilization when the buses. will begin their routes, approximately 90 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate. Those buses servicing the transit-dependent evacuees will firsttravel along their pick-up routes, and then proceed out of the EPZ. pick-up locations are provided annually to EPZ residents* in the emergency preparedness brochure. The county emergency plans define . . NMP/JAF * . Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. .. February 24, 2016 bus routes to service these pick-up locations. Table 8-10 outlines the 76 General population bus routes outlined in the Oswego County Emergency Plans. It is assumed that residents will walk to and congregate at pre-designated pick-up locations, and that they can arrive at the stops within the 90 minute bus mobilization time (good weather). Detailed descriptions of each bus route are available in Procedure E of the Oswego County radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan, Table 2; maps of the pick-up points in each ERPA are contained in the EMO calendar. As previously discussed, a pickup time of 30 minutes (good weather) is estimated for 30 individual stops to pick up passengers, with an average of one minute of delay associated with each stop. Longer pickup times of 40 minutes and SO minutes are used for rain and snow, respectively. The travel distance along the respective pick-up routes within the EPZ is estimated using the UNITES software as well as the route lengths given in the County Emergency Plans. Bus travel | |||
* times within the EPZ are computed using average speeds computed by DYNEV, using the*. aforementioned methodology that was used for school, preschool, and day camp evacuation. Table 8-11 through Table 8-13 present the transit-dependent population evacuation time estimates for each bus route calculated using the above procedures for good weather, rain and snow, respectively . . For example, the ETE for the bus route servicing Route 1 is computed as 90 + 80 + 30 = 3:20 for good weather (rounded up to nearest S minutes). Here, 80 minutes is the time to travel 18.S miles at 13.9 mph, the average speed output by the model for this route starting at 90 minutes. The ETE for a second wave (discussed below) is presented in the event there is a shortfall of available buses or bus drivers, as previously discussed. | |||
* Activity: Travel to Reception Centers (E-Hl | |||
* The distances from the EPZ boundary to the reception centers are measured using GIS software along the most likely route from the EPZ exit point to the reception center. The reception centers are mapped in Figure 10-1. For a one-wave evacuation, this travel time outside the EPZ does not contribute. to the | |||
* ETE. For a two,-wave evacuation, the ETE for buses must be considered separately, since it could exceed the ETE for the general population. Assumed bus speeds of SS mph, SO mph, and 4S mph for good weather, rain, and snow, respectively, will be applied for this activity for buses servicing the transit-dependen.t population. . . Activity: Passengers Leave Bus (F-7G) | |||
* A bus can empty within S minutes. The driver takes a 10 minute break. | |||
* Activity: Bus Returns to Route for Seeond Wave Evacuation (G-7C) The buses assigned to return to the EPZ to perform a "second wave" evacuation of dependent evacuees will be those that have already evacuated transit-dependent people who mobilized more quickly. The first wave of transit-dependent people depart the bus, and the bus then. returns to the | |||
* EPZ, travels to its route and* proceeds *to pick up more transit-.NMP/JAF 8-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016. | |||
dependent evacuees along the route. The travel time back to the EPZ is equal to the travel time to the reception center. The second-wave ETE for Route 1 is computed as follows for good weather: | |||
* Bus arrives at reception center at 3:49 in good weather (3:20 to exit EPZ + 29 minute travel time to reception center). | |||
* Bus discharges passengers (5 minutes) and driver takes a 10-minute rest: 15 minutes. | |||
* Bus returns to EPZ and completes second wave service along the route: 49.2 minutes (equal to travel time to reception center+ travel time to return to the beginning of the route)+ 21.0 minutes (18.5 miles @ 52.9 mph to traverse the route providing second wave bus service) = 70 minutes | |||
* Bus completes pick-ups along route: 30 minutes. | |||
* Bus exits EPZ at time 3:20 + 0:29 + 0:15 + 0:70 + 0:30 = 5:45 (rounded to nearest 5 minutes) after the Advisory to Evacuate. The ETE for the completion of the second wave for all transit-dependent bus routes are provided in Table 8-11 through Table 8-13. The average ETE for a two-wave evacuation of transit-dependent people exceeds the ETE for the general population at the goth percentile. The relocation of transit-dependent evacuees from the reception centers to congregate care centers, if the county decides to do so, is not considered in this study. Evacuation of Medical Facilities The evacuation of these facilities is similar to a school evacuation except: | |||
* Buses are assigned on the basis of 30 patients to allow for staff to accompany the patien.ts. | |||
* Wheelchair Buses are assigned on the basis of 20 ambulatory patients and 2 wheelchair bound patients. Again, this number is reduced from the average fleet capacity to allow for staff accompaniment. | |||
* Wheelch.air vans are assigned on the basis of 7 ambulatory patients and 3 wheelchair bound patients | |||
* Ambulances are assigned on the basis of 2 bedridden patients per ambulance. | |||
* The passenger loading time will be longer at approximately one minute, 5 minutes, and 15 minutes per ambulatory, wheelchair bound, and bedridden patient, respectively, to account for the time to move patients from inside the facility to the vehicles. Table 8-4 indicates that 7 bus runs, 216 wheelchair bus runs and 14 ambulance runs are needed to service all of the medical facilities in the EPZ. According to Table 8-5, the county can provide 249 buses, 8 vans, 220 wheel-chair accessible buses, 21 wheelchair accessible vans and 30 ambulances. Thus, there are sufficient resources to evacuate the ambulatory, wheelchair .bound and bedridden persons from the medical facilities in a single wave. NMP/JAF. 8-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 As is done for the schools, it is estimated that mobilization time averages 90 minutes (100 in rain and 110 in snow). Specially trained medical support staff (working their regular shift) will be on site to in the evacuation of patients. Additional staff (if needed) could be mobilized over this same 90-minute timeframe. Table 8-14 through Table 8-16 summarize the ETE for medical facilities within the EPZ for good weather, rain, and snow. Average speeds output by the model for Scenario 6 (Scenario 7 for rain and Scenario 8 for snow) Region 3, capped at SS mph (SO mph for rain and 4S mph for snow), are used to compute travel time to EPZ boundary. The travel time to the EPZ boundary is computed by dividing the distance to the .EPZ boundary by the average travel speed. The ETE is the sum of the mobilization time, total passenger loading time, and travel time out of the EPZ. It is assumed that wheelchair capable vehicles are used to evacuate the ambulatory population at the med.ical facilities within the EPZ. This will allow the wheelchair bound patients to evacuate with the ambulatory patients and requires less transportation resources. Concurrent loading on multiple wheelchair buses/vans, and ambulances at capacity is assumed. All ETE are rounded to the nearest S minutes. For example, the calculation of ETE for Bishop Commons at St. Luke's .with 66 ambulatory residents during good weather is: ETE: 90 + 20 + 44 = 2:3S It is assumed that the medical facility population is directly evacuated to appropriate host medical facilities outside of the EPZ. Relocation of this population to permanent facilities and/or passing through the reception center before arriving at the host facility is not considered in this analysis. 8.5 Special Needs Population .. Oswego County Emergency has a combined registration for transit-dependent *and homebound special needs .persons. Based on dat.a provided by the county in 2012,. there are an estimated 208 . homebound special . needs people within the EPZ | |||
* who require transportation assista*nce to.evacuate. There are lSl S7 wheelchair bound and no*. bedridden people which constitute this group. . ETE for Homebound Special Needs Persdns . *. . . -. . . . -. ' . Table 8-17summarizes the ETE for homebound special needs people .. The table is categorized by type of vehicle required and then broken down. by weather condition. The table takes into consideration the deployment of multi pie vehieles to .reduce the number of stops per vehicle . . It is assumed that ambulatory and wheelchair bound special needs households . ,. . are spaced 3)niles apart and bedridden households are spaced S miles apart. It is also assumed wheelchair vans will pick up both ambulatory and wheelchair bound people. Van speeds approximate . io mph between households (10% slower in rain, 20% slower in snow). | |||
* Mobilization times of 90 minutes were used (100 minutes for rain, and l.10 minutes for snow). The last HH is to be s miles from the EPZ boundary, and the network-wide average * | |||
* speed, capped at SS mph (SO mph for rain and 4S mph for snow), after the last pickup is used to * . compute travel time., ETE is by summing .mobilization time, loading* time at: fir:st NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate . 8-10 KLD Engineering; P.C February 24, .2016 household, travel to subsequent households, loading time at subsequent households, and travel time to EPZ boundary. All ETE are rounded to the nearest 5 minutes. Loading time is conservatively estimated as 5 minutes per stop. For example, assuming no more than one special needs person per HH implies that 208 households need to be serviced. If 19 wheelchair equipped vans are deployed to service these special needs HH, then each would require about 11 stops. The following outlines the ETE calculations: 1. Assume 19 wheelchair vans are deployed, each with about 11 stops, to service a total of 208 HH, 2. The ETE is calculated as follows: a. Buses arrive at the first pickup location: 90 minutes b. Load HH members at first pickup: 5 minutes c. Travel to subsequent pickup locations: 10 @ 9 minutes= 90 minutes d. Load HH. members at subsequent pickup locations: 10 @ 5 minutes = 50 minutes e. Travel to EPZ boundary: 15 minutes (5 miles@ 20.4 mph, rounded). ETE: 90 + 5 + 90 + 50 + 15 = 4:10 rounded to the nearest 5 minutes 8.6 Correctional Facilities As detailed in Table E-6, there is one correctional facility within the EPZ -Oswego County Correction Facility. The total inmate population at this facility is 160 persons. A total of 6 buses are needed to evacuate this facility, based on a capacity of 30 inmates per bus. Mobilization time is assumed to be 90 minutes (100 minutes in rain and 110 minutes in snow). The detailed evacuation plans for these facilities are confidential. So, it is assumed that it takes 60 minutes to load the inmates onto a bus, and that 6 buses can be loaded in parallel. Thus, total loading time is estimated at approximately 60 minutes. Using GIS software, the shortest route from the facility to the EPZ boundary, traveling away from NMP/JAF, is 5.5 miles. The travel time to traverse 5.5 is 23 minutes (14.68.mph at 2:30) in good weather, 20 minutes (16.65 mph at 2:40) in rain and 17 minutes (19.98 mph at 2:50) in snow. All ETE are rounded to the nearest 5 minutes. ETE: 90 + 60 + 23 = 2:55 RainETE: 100+60+ 20 =3:00 . . . sn*ow ETE: 110 + 60 + 17 = 3:10 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate . KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 (Subsequent Wave) * * ** Time Event A Advisory to Evacuate B Bus Dispatched from Depot C Bus Arrives at Facility/Pick-up Route D Bus Departs for Reception Center E Bus Exits Region F Bus Arrives at Reception Center/Host Facility G Bus Available for "Second Wave" Evacuation Service Activity Driver Mobilization Travel to Facility or to Pick-up Route Passengers Board the Bus Bus Travels Towards Region Boundary Bus Travels Towards Reception Center Outside the EPZ Passengers Leave Bus; Driver Takes a Break Figure 8-1. Chronology of Transit Evacuation Operations NMP/JAF 8-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 2015 EPZ Population 41,423 Survey Average HH Size with lndjcated No. o.f Vehicles 0 1 2 1.75 1.83 2.57 NMP/JAF EvacuationTirrie Estimate Estimated No. of !iouseholds 17,332 Table 8-1. Transit-Dependent Population Estimates Sur'vey Survey Percent"HH Survey Percent HH with Indicated No. of PercehtHH with Non* Vehicles W.ith Returning 0 1 2 *commuters ., -Commuters 6.46% .. 29.70% 47.47%. . 56% 55% 8-13 Percent Total People Population People Estimated Requiring Requiring Requiring Ridesharihg Public Public Transport Percentage Transit Transit . 3,720 50% 1,860 4.5% KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 8-2. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Population Demand Estimates Local Buses ERPA School, Preschool, or Day Camp Name Enrollment Required 1 Ontario Bible Conference1 91 2 4 New Haveri Elementary School 238 4 10 School Age Children Care Program 33 1 12 Charles E. Riley Elementary 497 8 12 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 416 6 12 Headstart of Oswego 80 2 12 Little Luke's Childcare Center 100 2 12 Oswego Community Christian School 76 2 12 Trinity Catholic School 173 3 13 Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 100 2 13 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 485 7 13 Kingsford Park Elementary 381 6 13 Oswego High School 1,281 26 13 Oswego Middle School 597 12 13 Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 60 1 16 Mexico Elementary School 358 4 16 Mexico High School 700 14 16 Mexico Middle School 701 15 Center for Instructional Technology and 17 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES)2 446 9 21 Minetto Elementary School 367 8 22 | |||
* SUNY Oswego3 8,300 18 *s.R. Palermo Elementary School4 255 4 . < *.. .; ; ,, p; .* > <<* . ;; *. &/f $.?ri3s, , ;, .... *. 1 According to Oswego County officials, Ontario Bible Conference, included in this table, is a summer camp program that requires 2 buses from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The rest of the year, the camp is open to retreats for family events for which they can furnish their own transportation. 2 Oswego County BOCES is now known as the Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Citi). 3 According to the county emergency plans, 18 buses will be dispatched to SUNY Oswego, each with a capacity of 40 students per bus, to evacuate the transit dependent population at the school. 4 Palermo Elemer]tary School is located in the Shadow Region, but will evacuate according to Oswego County emergency plans. NMP/JAF . 8-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-3. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Reception Centers School/Day Camp Reception Center Ontario Bible Conference New Haven Elementary School School Age Chil.dren Care Program Charles E. Riley Elementary Fitzhugh Park Elementary School Headstart of Oswego Little Luke's Childcare Center Oswego Community Christian School Trinity Catholic School Children's Center of SUNY Oswego Frederick Leighton Elementary School New York State Fairgrounds, Kingsford Park Elementary Syracuse, NY Oswego High School Oswego Middle School Oswego YMCA School's Out Program . Mexico Elementary School Mexico High School Mexico Middle School Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Minetto Element'ary School SUNYOswego Palermo Elementary School NMP/JAF 8-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table *Medical Facility Transit Demand I Wheel-Ca pa-2012 Ambul-chair Bed-WC Bus Bus Ambulance ERPA Facility Name Municipality city Census atory Bound ridden Runs Runs Runs 12 Bishop Commons at St Luke's Oswego 68 68 66 2 0 1 2 0 12 Ladies Home of Oswego Oswego . 21 ls lS 0 0 1 0 0 12. Oswego Hosptial Behavioral Health Services Oswego 28 17 lS 2 0 1 0 0 12 | |||
* Pontiac Nursing Home Oswego 80 80 2S SS 0 28 0 0 12 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Oswego 150 lSO lSO 0 0 8 0 0 12. * . S.t Health *services .* Oswego 200 192 S7 115 20 58 0 10 12 ... Valehaven Home. for Adults Oswego 35 28 28 0 0 0 1 0 <13 Morning Star Nursing Home Oswego 120 117 17 96 4 48 0 2 13 Oswego Hospital Oswego 100 6S 55 7 3 4 0 2 13 Pontiac Terrace Apts Oswego 80 80 72 8 0 4 0 0 | |||
* is. . Fravor Rd IRA Mexico 10 9 7 2 0 1 0 0 | |||
* 16. Parkview Manor Apts Mexico 24 24 23 1 0 1 1 0 . '*i7 | |||
* s*abill Drive IRA *Mexico 6 6 s 1 0 1 0 0 20 Springside atSeneca Hill Oswego 7S 7S 74 1 0 1 2 0 20 The Manor at Seneca Hill Oswego 120 116 0 116 0 S8 0 0 21 Minetto Senior Housing Oswego 38 38 37 1 0 1 1 0 .* * .. Totals 1,155 .. 1,080 '646 407 27 216 7 14 NMP/JAF 8-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-5. Summary of Transportation Resources Durham Transportation 0 13 3 0 0 Central Square Central School District 4 80 2 0 0 Central Square School District 0 48 2 0 0 City School District of Oswego 0 56 4 3 0 CNY CENTRO, Inc. 0 10 158 18 0 Center for Instructional Technology and 0 2 15 0 0 Innovation {Oswego County BOCES) Oswego County Opportunities 0 11 33 0 0 Phoenix Central School District 4 29 3 0 0 Oswego County Fire & Rescue 0 0 0 0 4 Oswego County EMS 0 ' Schools, Preschools, and Day Camp (Table 8-2): 156 0 0 0 Medical Facilities (Table 8-4): 7 216 0 14 Transit-Dependent Population (Table 8-10): 76 0 0 0 Correctional Facilities (Table 8-18) 6 0 0 0 Homebound Special Needs (Section 8.5): 0 0 19 0 NMP/JAF 8-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-6. Bus Route Descriptions Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 1 Transit Dependent Bus Route 1 181,203,202,191,604, 188,189,306,305,308,310, 309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,635 2 Transit Dependent Bus Route 2 205,181,203,202, 191,604,188, 189,306,305,308, 310,309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,635 3 Transit Dependent Bus Route 3 178,172, 154,149, 148, 199, 147, 146, 145, 183, 143, 628,238,236 4 Transit Dependent Bus Route 4 154,149, 148, 199, 147, 146,145, 183, 143, 628,238, 236 5 Transit Dependent Bus Route 5 190,145,183, 143,628,238,236 6 Transit Dependent Bus Route 6 149,148,199, 147,146, 145,183, 143,628,238,236 7 Transit Dependent Bus Route 7 152,153,89, 78; 79,80,200,81,82,83 8 Transit Dependent Bus Route 8 151,152,153,89, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 9 Transit Dependent Bus Route 9 355,627,144,698,83 10 Transit Dependent Bus Route 10 82,83, 129 11 Transit Dependent Bus Route 11 144,698,83 12 Transit Dependent Bus Route 12 138,632,215,221,213,212,211,637,214,243,219, 635 333,334,304,687,347,338,342,656,314,657,560, 13 Transit Dependent Bus Route 13 568, 567, 566, 525, 661, 346, 662, 549, 480, 479, 481, 482,214,243,219,635 305,308,334,304,687,347;338,342,656,314,657, 14 Transit Dependent Bus Route 14 560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479, 481,482,214,243,219,635 325,307, 705,305,308,334,304,687,347,338,342, 15 Transit Dependent Bus Route 15 656,314,657,560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662, 549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 202, 191,604,188, 189,306,305,308,334,304,687, 16 Transit Dependent Bus Route 16 347,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567,566,525, 661, 346, 662, 549, 480, 479, 481, 482, 214, 243, 219, 635. 17 Transit Dependent Bus Route 17 145, 183, 143,628,238,236 18 Transit Dependent Bus Route 18 145,183, 143,628,238,236 19 Transit Depe11dent Bus Route 19 101, 12, 13 *20 Transit Dependent Bus Route 20 607,85,86 21 Transit Dependent Bus Route 21 605,157,86 22 Transit Dependent Bu.s Route 22 . 89, 78, 79, 80, 200, 81, 82, 83 23 Transit Dependent Bus. Route 23 89, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 .. NMP/JAF 8-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. .Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 24 Transit Dependent Bus Route 24 607,85,86 336,337,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567,566, 25 Transit Dependent Bus Route 25 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, 219,635 304,687,347,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567, 26 Transit Dependent Bus Route 26 566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482, 214, 243,219,635 27 Transit Dependent Bus Route 27 550,303,553,313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482, 214,243,219,635 28 Transit Dependent Bus Route 28 314,657,560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549, 480,479,481,482,214,243,219 29 Transit Dependent Bus Route 29 303,553,313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214, 243,219,635 30 Transit Dependent Bus Route 30 313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 31 Transit Dependent Bus Route 31 313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 32 Transit Dependent Bus Route 32 219,635,699 33 Transit Dependent Bus Route 33 547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 34 Transit Dependent Bus Route 34 547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 35 Transit Dependent Bus Route 35 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, 219,635 36 Transit Dependent Bus Route 36 692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 37 Transit Dependent Bus Route 37 518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 38 Transit Dependent Bus Route 38 . 518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 39 . Transit Dependent Bus Route 39 519,502,468,469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 40 Transit Dependent Bus Route 40 513,517,518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 41 Transit Dependent Bus Route 41 541,543,504,512,505, 710,436,466,498;467,468, 469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473 42 Transit Dependent Bus Route 42 512, 505, 710, 436, 466, 498, '467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 483,484,485,474,473,701 532,529,521,511,533,544,512,505, 710,436,466, 43 Transit Dependent Bus Route 43 498,467,468,469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 44 Transit Dependent Bus Route 44 507,506,505, 710,436,466,498,467,468,469,470, 471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 45 Transit Dependent Bus Route 45 530,511,533,544,512,505, 710,436,466,498,467, 468,469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 NMP/JAF 8-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Bus -' Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 46 Transit Dependent Bus Route 46 S07,S06,SOS, 710,436,466,498,467,468,469,470, 471,483,484,48S,474,473, 701 47 Transit Dependent Bus Route 47 190,14S,183,143,628,238,236 48 Transit Dependent Bus Route 48 141, 194, 142, 143,628,238,236 49 Transit Dependent Bus Route 49 138,632,21S,221,213,212,211,637,214,243,219, 63S so Transit Dependent Bus Route SO 138,309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,63S Sl Transit Dependent Bus Route Sl 309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,63S S2 Transit Dependent Bus Route S2 303,SS3,313,SS4,S47,664,480,479,481,482,214, 243,219,63S S3 Transit Dependent Bus Route S3 299,82,83, 129,2S9,3S9,130, 131,2S0,2S2 S4 Transit Dependent Bus Route S4 628,238,236 SS Transit Dependent Bus Route SS 631,23S,236 S6 Transit Dependent Bus Route S6 631,23S,236 S7 Transit Dependent Bus Route S7 631, 23S, 236 S8 Transit Dependent Bus Route S8 217,218, 700 S9 Transit Dependent Bus Route S9 216,217,218 60 Transit Dependent Bus Route 60 217,218, 700 61 Transit Dependent Bus Route 61 219,63S, 699 62 Transit Dependent Bus Route 62 217,218, 700 63 Transit Dependent Bus Route 63 484,48S,474,473, 701 64 Transit Dependent Bus Route 64 473, 701,42S 6S Transit Dependent Bus Route 6S 48S,426,42S 66 Transit Dependent Bus Route 66 469,499,SOO 67 Transit Dependent Bus Route 67 469,499,SOO 68 Transit Dependent Bus Route 68 469,499,SOO 69 Transit Dependent Bus Route 69 484,48S,474,473, 701 70 Transit Dependent Bus Route 70 436,466,498,467,468,469,470,471,483,484,48S, .474,473, 701 71 Transit Dependent Bus Route 71 .sos, 710,436,466,498,467,468,469,470,471,483, 484,48S,474,473, 701 72 Transit Dependent Bus Route 72 sos, 710,436,46S,464 73 Transit Dependent Bus Route 13 S08,679,463 74 Transit Dependent Bus Route 74 S09, 708,S08,679 7S Transit Dependent Bus Route 7S 309,311,312,212,211, 637,214,243,219,63S 76 Transit Dependent Bus Route 76 607,8S,86 NMP/JAF 8-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: Sus -Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPl Boundary 705,305,308,334,304,687,347,338,342,656,314, 77 657,560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480, Ontario Bible Conference 479,481,482,214,243,219,635 78 New Haven Elementary School 609, 198,190, 145, 183, 143,628,238,236 305,308,334,304,687,347,338,342,656,314, 657, 79 560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479, School Age Children Care Program 481,482,214,243,219,635 80 Charles E. Riley Elementary 664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 81 567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482, Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 214,243,219,635 82 566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, Headstart of Oswego 243,219,635 83 Little Luke's Childcare Center 554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243, 219, 635 687,347,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567,566, 84 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, 243, Oswego Community Christian School 219,635 85 566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, Trinity Catholic School 243,219,635 509,678,507,680,511,530,520,527,526,523, 707, 86 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 219,635 87 533,511,530,520,527,526,523, 707,525,661,346, Frederick Leighton Elementary School 662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 88 540,539,670,513,517,518,692,516,515,484,485, Kingsford Park Elementary 474,473, 701 89 530,520,527,526,523, 707,525,661,346, 662,549, Oswego High School .480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 90 Oswego Middle School 518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 91 669,524,539,670,513,517,518,692,516,515,484, Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 485,474,473, 701 92 Mexico Elementary School 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 93 Mexii::o High School 77, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 94 Mexico Middle School 89, 78,79,80,200,81,82,83 95 Center for Instructional Technology and 89, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES} 96 Minetto Elementary School 485,474,473, 701 510,509,678,507,680,511,530,520,527,526,523, 97 707,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, SUNY Oswego 243,219,635 NMP/JAF 8-21 . KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 98 Bishop Commons at St Luke's 480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 99 548,566,525, 707,523,526,527,520,530,511,680, Ladies Home of Oswego 507,678,509, 708,508,679 100 313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services 635 101 Pontiac Nursing Home 480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 102 661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, Simeon-Dewitt Apts. 635 103 St Luke Health Services 480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 104 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, Valehaven Home for Adults 219,635 105 511,530,520,527,526,523, 707,525, 661,346, 662, Morning Star Nursing Home 549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 106 Oswego Hospital 527,520, 530,511,680,507,678,509, 708,508, 679 107 669,523, 707,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481, Pontiac Terrace Apts 482,214,243,219,635 108 Fravor Rd IRA 89, 78, 77, 76,84,607,85,86 109 Parkview Manor Apts 78, 77, 76,610, 75, 74 110 Sabill Drive IRA 153,89, 78, 77, 76,610, 75, 74 111 Springside at Seneca Hill 479,481,482,214,243,219,635 112 The Manor at Seneca Hill 214,243,219,635 113 Minetto Senior Housing 692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 114 Oswego County Jail 479,481,482,214,243,219,635 NMP/JAF 8-22 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-7. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather .. Dist. *.* .. Travel ' Driver Loading To EPZ | |||
* Average Time to Dist. EPZ Travel Time Mobilization Time Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE Bdryto from EPZ Bdry ETEto H.S | |||
* School, Pr.eschool, and Day Camp Time (min) (min*) . (mi) (mph) (tnin) , (hr:min) R.C: (mi.) to H.S. fmin) (hr: min) Ontario Bible Conference 90 15 13.0 14.7 53 2:40 26.9 30 3:10 New Haven Elementary School 90 15 7.4 47.0 10 1:55 28.9 32 2:30 School Age Children Care Program 90 15 11.7 13.8 51 2:40 26.9 30 3:10 Charles E. Riley Elementary 90 15 6.8 9.4 44 2:30 26.9 30 3:00 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 90 15 7.9 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Headstart of Oswego 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Little Luke's Childcare Center 90 15 7.3 9.4 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Oswego Community Christian School 90 15 9.2 11.1 so 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Trinity Catholic School 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Children's Center of SUNV Oswego 90 15 9.7 10.3 57 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 90 15 9.1 9.8 57 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Kingsford Park Elementary 90 15 6.7 23.4 18 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Oswego High School 90 15 8.6 10.0 52 2:40 26.9 30 3:10 Oswego Middle School 90 15 5.2 23.6 14 2:00 26.8 30 2:30 Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 90 15 6.7 22.1 19 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Mexico Elementary School 90 15 4.5 48.9 6 1:55 30.4 34 2:25 Mexico High School 90 15 4.8 47.3 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 Mexico Middle School 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 Center for Instructional Technology and 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 35 2:30 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) 31.4 Minetto Elementary School 90 15 2.2 45.6 3 1:50 26.8 30 2:20 SUNY Oswego 90 15 9.9 10.1 59 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Palermo Elementary School 90 15 Located outside the EPZ 27.8 31 2:20 Maximum for EPZ: 2:45' Maximum: 3:15 Average for EPZ: IMw:, 2:20 Average: 2:55 .. : NMP/JAF 8-23 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-8. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain | |||
* School, Preschool, and Day Camp Ontario Bible Conference Nevv Haven Elementary School Sch.ool Age Children Care Program Charles E. Riley Elementary Fitzhugh Park Elementary School Headstart of Oswego Uttle Luke's Childcare Center Oswego Community Christian School Trinity Catholic School Children's Center of SUNY Oswego Frederick Leighton Elementary School Kingsford Park Elementary Oswego High School Oswego Middle School Oswego YMCA School's Out Program Mexico Elementary School Mexico High School Mexico Middle School Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Minetto Elementary School SUNYOswego Palermo Elementary School NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate D.river Mobiliza.tion Time {min) II 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 '100 Dist. Loading to Ef>Z Time Btfry (min) (mi) 1111!11 7.4 11.7 20 6.8 20 7.9 20 7.8 20 7.3 20 9.2 20 7.8 20 9.7 20 9.1 20 6.7 20 8.6 20 5.2 20 6.7 20 4.5 20 4.8 20 5.0 20 5.0 20 5.0 20 2.2 20 8-24 Travel Average Time to Speed Ef>Z Bdry EtE (mph) (min) (hr:!llirl) 11 70 7.1 58 7.7 62 7.7 62 7.2 62 8.6 65 ., 1.,jJ 7.7 62 8.6 68 8.2 68 11.7 35 7.4 70 3.:iO.*. 10.9 29 *:2;30 12.1 34 ... 41.5 7 ".'.'.<:2:10 40.3 8 fr*1*2:10 40.0 8 '2:10 40.0 8 .*2:10 42.6 .8 2:10 6.3 21 2:2s Located outside the EPZ Maximum for EPZ: Average for EPZ: Dist. EPZ Travel Time Bdryto from EPZ Bdry ETE to H.S. R.C..(mi.) to H.S. (min) (hr:min) , I -' I 26.9 26.9 33 26.9 33 26.9 33' *. 3:35 26.9 33 .. 3:35 26.9 33 3,:40 26.9 33 3;35, 26.9 33 3+/-45 26.9 33 26.8 33 :*3:10 26.9 33 .. 3:45 26.8 33 '3:05 . ' 26.8 33 '3:10' 30.4 37 '.*2:45 30.4 37 **2:45 30.4 37 2:45 ,i" , 'r 31.4 38 *2:50 31.4 38 2:50 26.8 33 .i:55 27.8 34 Maximum: Average:. KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
*Table 8-9. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Tirne Estimates -Snow Ontario Bible Conference 110 25 13.0 9.9 79 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 New Haven Elementary School 110 25 7.4 37.7 12 2:30 28.9 39 3:10 School Age Children Care Program 110 25 11.7 9.3 76 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 Charles E. Riley Elementary 110 25 6.8 6.4 64 3:20 26.9 36 3:55 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 110 25 7.9 7.1 67 3:25 26.9 36 4:00 f:jeadstart of Oswego | |||
* 110 25 7.8 7.1 67 . 3i25 26.9 36 4:00 Little Luke's Childcare Center 110 25 7.3 6.7 66 3:25 26.9 36 4:00 Oswego Community Christian School 110 25 9.2 7.8 71 3:30 26.9 36 4:05 Trinity Catholic School 110 25 7.8 7.1 67 3:25 26.9 36 4:00 Children's Center of SU NY Oswego 110 25 9.7 7.6 77 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 110 25 9.1 7.3 76 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 Kingsford Park Elementary 110 . 25 6.7 20.0 21 2:40 26.8 36 3:15 Oswego High School 110 25 8.6 7.1 74 3:30 26.9 36 4:05 Oswego Middle School 110 25 5.2 18.7 17 2:35 26.8 36 3:10 Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 110 25 6.7 18.8 22 2:40 26.8 36 3:15 Mexico Elementary School 110 25 4.5 39.8 7 2:25 30.4 41 3:05* Mexico High School 110 25 4.8 38.4 8 2:25 30.4 41 3:05 Mexico Middle School 110 25 5.0 38.1 8 2:25 30.4 41 3:05 Center for Instructional Technology and 110 25 5.0 38.1 8 2:25 31.4 42 3:05 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Minetto Elementary School 110 25 2.2 13.2 10 2:25 26.8 36 3:05 SUNYOswego 110 25 9.9 7.5 80 3:35 26.9 36 4:15 Palermo Elementary School 110 25 Located outside the EPZ 27.8 38 2:55 Maximum for EPZ: 3;3511.vn Maximum: I 4:1511**1 Average for EPZ: Average: ... 3.:4.9. NMP/JAF 8-25 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-10. Summary of Transit-Dependent Bus Routes 1 1 1,2,5 9 4.2 2 1 2,4,5 5 2.2 3 1 2,4,7 12 6.75 4 1 4 4 1.4 5 1 4,7,8,9 7 2.9 6 1 . 4,9 6 2.1 7 1 7,8 8 4 8 1 7 6 2.4 9 1 7,8,9 17 8.1 . 10 1 8,18 13 6.1 11 1 8,18 17 9.2 12 1 5,6,10,11 7 3 13 1 6 4 1.9 14 1 3,5,6,10,11 12 5.4 15 1 1,3,6 10 3.7 16 1 . 4,5,9,10 10 3.4 17 1 9 7 2.8 18 1 4,9 11 6.1 19 1 14 13 7.5 20 1 14,15 16 7.5 21 1 14,15,16 28 14.4 22 1 7,15,16 15 7.1 23 1 7,8,15,16,17 8 3.3 24 1 15,16,17 14 5.5 25 1. 12 6 0.8 26 1 12 10 1.5 27 1 12 13 1.1 28 1 12 11 0.8 29 1 12 15 1.5 30 1 12 8 0.6 . 31 1* 12 13 1.2 32. 1 12 11 2.2 33 .. | |||
* 1 12 10 0.8 .*34 1 12 13 0.9 35 1 . 12 12 0.8 *. 36 1 13 13 1.8 37 1 .13 22 4 38 1 13 16 1.25 NMP/JAF 8-26 .* . KLD Engineering; P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate *. February 24, 2016 39 1 13 16 1.75 40 1 13 7 0.6 41 1 13 15 0.4 42 1 13,22 9 1.3 43 1 13 9 0.5 44 1 13 22 1.35 45 1 13 13 0.7 46 1 22 3 0.7 47 1 9,10 7 2.6 48 1 10 8 3.9 49 1 10 6 2.6 so 1 10,11 4. 1.9 51 1 6,11 11 3.8 52 1 11,12 11 1.3 53 1 8,16,17 23 9.8 54 1 18 8 3.4 55 1 .18,20 15 7.3 56 1 10,19,20 15 7.3 57 1 20 8 3.4 58 1 10,11,19,20 15 7.2 59 1 19,20 10 4.6 60 1 19,20 12 5.7 61 1 12,19,20 11 6.2 62 1 12,19,20 14 5.4 63 1 13,21 8 2.8 64 1 21 10 4.2 65 1 21 9 4.1 66 1 21 5 2 67 1 21,22 10 2.2 68 1 13,22 8 3.7 69 1 2i,22 9 3.2 70 1 13,22 8 3.6 71 1 22 5 1.9 72 1 22 9 3.7 73 1 22 7 2.2 74 1 22 5 2 75 1 11,15,19 13 4.25 76 1 15,16,17 11 3.3 Total: . 7Q NMP/JAF. .* 8"27 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* I I . Ta.hie 8-11. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R.C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 1 1. 90 18.5 I 13.9 80 30 3:20 I 26.9 29 5 10 70 30 5:45 2 1 90 16.6 I 14.0 71 30 3:15 I 26.9 29 5 10 66 30 5:35 3 .1 90 16.2 I 45.9 21 30 2:25 .. *) 28.9 32 5 10 69 30 4:55 4 1 90 9.7. I 46.4 13 30 2:15 'I 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30. 5 1 90 8.7 I 44.6 12 30 2:15 I 28.9 32 5 10 51 30 4:25 6 1 90 9.9 I 47.3 13 30 2:15 I 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30 7. l 90 10.2 I 46.7 13 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 56 30 . 4:30 8 1 90 9.2 I 47.3 12* 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 54 30 4:30 g* 1 90 10.4 I 43.2 14 30 .2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 57 30 4:35 10 1 90 8.3 I 45.6 11 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 51 30 4:25 11 1 90 10.3 I 52.2 12 30 2:15. I 30.4 33 5 10 55 30 4:30 12 1. 90 11.1 I . 9.0. 74 30 3:15 I 26.9 29 5 10 54 30 5:25 i3 1 90 12.5 I 10.1 75 30 3:15 I 26.9 29 5 10 57 30 5:30 14 1 90 17.1 I 10.8 95 30 3:35 I 26.9 29 5 . 10 68 30 6:00 15 1 90 17.7 I 12.2 87 30 3:30 I 26.9 29 5 10 69 30 5:55 16 1 90 19.0 I 13.4 85 30 3':30 I 26.9 29 5 10 72 30 *6:00 17 1 90 7.1 I 47.4 9 30 28.9 32 5 10 48 30 '4:15 18 1 90 10.4 I 47.4 13 30 2:15 I 28.9 32 5 10 55 30 4:30 19 1 90 9.8 I 46.6 13 30 2:15 I 35.4 39 5 10 62 30 4:45 20 1 90 8.9 . I 48.4 11 30 2:15 I 35.4 39 5 10 59 30 4:40 21 1 90 16.3. I 36.6 27 30 2:30 I 35.4 39 5 10 80 30 5i15 22 1 90 12.1 I 45.0 16 30 2:20 . I 30.4 33 5 10 60 30 4:40 23 1 90 8.3 I 45.0 11 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 52 30 4:25 24 1 90 6.9 I 48.4 9 30 2:10 I 35.4 39 5 10 54 30 4:30 25 1 90 10.5 I 11.1 57 30 3:00 | |||
* I 26.9 29 5 10 53 30 5:10 NMP/JAF 8-28 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Tirrie Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
-27 I 1 I 90 I 9.9 I 8.0 -I 74 28 I 1 I 90 I 8.2 I 14.2 I 3S -I -30 | |||
* I" 2:35 '.I 26.9 29 I 1 -I . 90 I .9.8 I 7.7 I -76 _ I -30 I -3:20 -. I 26.9 --30_---1 .1 I 90 I -8.2 -I 1.2 | |||
* 1 68-I 30 I 26.9 31 I 1 I 90 I 8.8 1-1.2 I 13 I 30 I> 26.9 32 I 1 I 90 I 3.4 I 8.4 I 24 I 30 111 -2:25!''rl 26.9 33 1 -90 7.9 8.4 _S6 30 -26.9 34 1 90 8.0 8.4 S7 30 26.9 35 I 1 I 90 I 8.6 I 7.9 I 6S I 30 I .3:10. I 26.9 --36 I 1 I 90 I 6.S I 20.6 I 19 I 30 I 2:20 I 26.8 --37 I 1 -, 90 I 9.2 I 17.S I 32 30 I> 2:35. >.I 26.8 38 I 1 I 90 I 6.S I | |||
* 11.s I 22 I 30 I 2:25 I 26.8 39 1 I 90 7.6 4.S I 102 I 30 I -,3:45-.. , .. I 26.8 40 I 1 I 90 6.6 I 19.0 I 21 I 30 2:25"-' I 26.8 41 I 1 I 90 I 8.3 I 4.6 I : 107 I 30 I .: 3:50 I 26.8 42 I 1 I 90 I 8.7 I 5.0 I 10S I 30 F' -3:45:ii;!Fi 26.8 -43 I 1 I 90 I 10.0 I 8.3 I 72 . I 30 1 .*. 26.8 44 I 1 I 90 I 9.9 I 20.1 I 29 I 30 26.8 45 I 1 90 9.8 I 10.6 I SS 30 26.8 46 I 1 90 I 9.2 I 20.1 | |||
* I 27 I 30 26.8 47 I 1 I 90 8.4 I 46.4 I 11 I 30 2:15 28.9 48 I 1 I 90 I 8.6 I 46.4 I 11 I 30 28.9 49 I 1 I 90 I 10.7 I 12.1 I S3 I 30 26.9 50 I 1 I 90 I 10.0 I 12.0 I so I 30 26.9 51 I 1 I 90 I 10.6 I 8.0 I 79 I 30 26.9 52 I 1 I 90 9.6 I 8.3 I 69 30 26.9 53 I 1 I 90 I 17.9 I 4S.1 I 24 30 ,:; \ *2:25;-30.4 NMP/JAF 29 Evacuation Time Estimate 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 -29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 -29 29 29 32 32 29 29 29 29 33 5 s s 5 s s s 5 s s s s s s s s s 5 5 s s s s 5 s s s 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 S2 47 Sl 47 48 36 46 46 48 44 so 44 46 44 49 49 S3 S2 S2 so Sl Sl S3 Sl S2 Sl 73 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 4:25 5:55 --*5:50 5:25 4:40 >5:i0 4:35,;:,* 4:25* 4:25 5:05 5:30 5:15 __ 5:00 --KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 I I Route Number 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 '63 .. 64'*' 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 ---i NMP/JAF Bus Number 1 1 1 -1 i-** 1 -i ,1 .1 1 1 l 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mobilization (min) "0 90_ 90 '*. *' .. 90 90 90 90 90 _90 90 90 90 90 90 90 i -90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 --Evacuation Time Estimate Route Length fmiles) 9.2 9.2 .** 5.31 8:5 6.5 7.0 7.4 6.7 5.2 5.2 7.6 "4.4 4.6 .6.1' 5.6 9.7 8.4 5.8 3.9 4.2 11.1-4.7 * . 1111 r:;i 47.7 -12 30 < '2:is 47.7 12. 30 .. -47J. 7 30 ,,.;' *2:10*Y';1' 39.0 13 30 l :Z:i,5 -39.9. 10 30 .:r2:_1Q,,,F1 39.0 11 30 <'''-'* ---. _,2:15 39.0 11 30 __ -.,2d51:c .. 39.0 10 30 < 2:'15 ,, .. , '*46.3 7 30 --'2:10:;;:) 45.'8 7 -. 30 i 40.3 11 30 *_2:15-. 40.3 7 . 30 ,_ 2:10::.r 40.3 7 30 1'. 2:l0 -:* .. _ ' ,, f\' *. 40.3 9 30 . 2:11'.f ... i* 46.3 .. 7 30 2:io --** ;;, y, 4.9 119 30 k'.4:00 -5.0 100 30 ,,, ,*. . '_3:45 3.0 117 30 .--_ 4:oo\i"; '. *'* / 6.7 35 30 6.3 40 30 r .. _2:40, 8.0 . 83 30 3:25 ,i 48.4. 6 30 | |||
* 2:1<i<v1* _,_:. -,. --Average ETE: 8-30 Two-Wave navel Route Time to Driver Travel Pickup R.C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE (min) (min) (min) (min) (rnin) (hr:min) .. , .. ' I 28.9 32 5 10 52 30 28.9 32 5 10 52 30 '28.9 32 5 10 44 30 26.9 29 .. 5 10 49 30 26.9 29 5 10 45 30 26:9 29 5 10 46 30 26.9 29 5 10 45 30 26.9 29 5 10 45 30 26.8 29 5 10 41 30 26.8 29 5 10 42 30 4:10; 26.8 29 5 10 51 30 * .. 4:2q 26.8 29 5 10 54 30 4:20-. '* 26.8 29 5 10 56 30 -4:20 26.8 29 5 10 55 30 --4!20 26.8 29 5 10 42 30 26.8 29 5 10 51 30 26.8 29 5 10 48 30 37.7 41 5 10 54 30 37.7 41 5 . 10 50 30 37.7 41 5 10 51 30 26.9 29 5 10 53 30 35.4 39 5 10 49 30 ---. --:: . *-*,,,., "*+"'"''* '1 -( | |||
* __ . --*. --.,_.:::-,:. * .... , ' ''"'II'' ---*:.*:, ** .. ** i .-Average:de: I:> -,,,,,\,,,.,,, ' *i '. KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 8-12. Transit-Depe!'ldent Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr: min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) II : ----, I . . .. .. . 1 . 100 16.6 10.4 96 40 .. 4:00 26.9 32 5* 10 40 6:4Q 3 1 100 16.2** 42.4 23 40 2i45 28.9 35 5 -10 75 40 5:35 4 1 100 9.7 42.9 14 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 .5:05 5 l 100 8.7 42.1 12 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 5:05 6 1 100 . 9.9 43.1 14 40 2:35 28.9 35 . 5 10 60 40 5:o5* 7 .*. 1 100 '10.2 43.1 . 14 40 2!35 . 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:10 .8 1 100. *. 9.2 43.5 13 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 58 40 . 5:05 9 1 ***ioo 10.4 . 38.9 16 40 '2:4Q 28.9 35 5 10 62 40 5:15 10. 1 100 8.3 . 42.4 12 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 55 40 5:00 11 1 100 10.3 46.9 13 . 40 .2:35 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:05 12 1 100 11.1 6.7 100 40 4:00 28.9 35 5 10 63 40 6:35 13 1 100 12.5 I 7.5 100 40 4:00 | |||
* I | |||
* 28.9 35 5 10 66 40 6:40 14 1* 100 17.1 I 8.7 118 40 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 78 40 7:10 '. 15 1 100 17.7 I 10.0 107 40 4:.10 I 28.9 35 5 10 80 40 7:0Q 16 1 100 19.0 I .. 10.8 105 40 4:10* I 28.9 35 5 10 82 40 7:05 17 1 100 7.1 I 42.8 10 40 2:30 | |||
* I 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 4:55 18. 1 100 10.4 I 42.8 15 40 2:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:10. 19 1 100 9.8 I* 39.9 15 40 2:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:10 20 1 100 8.9 I 43.9 12 40 2:35 . I 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 5:05 21 1* 100 16.3 I 33.4 29 40 2:50 I 28.9 35 5 :lo 80 40 5:45 22' 1 100 12.1 I 41.4 18 40 2!40 28.9 35 5 10 65 40 5:20 23 1 100 I 41.4 12 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 40 5:05 24 1 100 6.9 I | |||
* 43.9 9 40 2:30 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 4:55 25 1 '100 10.5 | |||
* I 7.0 90 40 '3:55 28.9 35 5 10 61 40 6:30 26 1 100 11.2 I 6.8 98 40 4:00 28.9 35 5 10 63 40 6:35 27. 1 100 9.9 I 4.5 132 40 4:35 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 7:05 NMP/JAF 8-31 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 28 1 100 8.2 8.4 I .. 59 40 I 3:20 ** I 28.9 35 5 10 55 40 5:50' 29. 1 100 9.8 4.4 I 134 . AO . I .4:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 7:05 30 1 100 8.2 4.1 I 120 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 55 40 6:50 31 1 100 8.8 4.1 I 129 40 I 4:30 I 28.9 35 5 10 '57 40 7:00 32 1 100 3.4 4.0 I 51 40 I .. 3:15 I 28.9 35 5 10 43 40 5:30 33 1 100 7.9 4.0 I 119 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 54 40 6:45 34 1 100 8.0 4.0 I 120 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 54 40 6:45 35 1 100 8.6 4.2 I 123 40 I 4:25 I 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 . 6:55. 36 1 100 6.5 21.2 I 18 40 I 2:40 I 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 *37 1 100 9.2 19.1 I 29 40 r .2:50 *** 1 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 5:20 38 1 100 6.5 19.1 I 20 40 1* 2:45 I | |||
* 28.9 35 5 10 51 40 5:10'' 39 1 100 7.6 3.8 I 119 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 54 40 6:45 40 1 100 6.6 16.8 I . 24 40 I 2:45 I 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 5:10 41 1 100 8.3 3.7 135 40 I 4:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 7:05 42 1 100 8.7 4.1 127 . 40 I 4:3ll : I 28.9 35 5 10 58 40 1:00 43 1 100 10.0 4.1 .. I 146 40 I 4:50 I 28.9 35 5 10 61 40 7:25 44 1 100 9.9 5.3 I 112 40 I 4:15 I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 6:50 45 1 100 9.8 4.5 I 131 . 40 I , 4:35 ... I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 7:10 46 1 100 9.2 5.3 I 104 40 I 4:05, >:I 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 47 1 100 8.4 40.7 I 12 40 I 2:35 . I 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 5:05 48 1 100 8.6 40.2 I 13 40 I . 2:35. I 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 5:05' 49 1 100 10.7 5.5 117 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 62 40 6:55 50 1 100 10.0 5.4 I 111 40 I *4:15 . I 26.9 32 5 .10 . 56 40 6:40 51 1 100 10.6 4.8 I 133 40 . I | |||
* 4:35 | |||
* I 26.9 32 5 10 57 40 7:00 52 1 100 9.6 4.4 I 131 40 I 4:35 I 26.9 32 5 10 56 40 7:00 53 1 100 17.9 41.0 I 26 40 I 2:50 I 30.4 36 5 10 81 40 5:45 54 1 100 4.1 40.3 I . 6 40 I . 2:30 I 28.9 35 5 10 46 40 4:50 55 1 100 9.2 44.5 I 12 40 I .. 2:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 5:05 NMP/JAF 8-32 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 56 1 100 9.2 44.5 12 40 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 5:()5 57 1 100 5.3 44.5 7 40 2:30 28.9 35 5 10 48 40 4:50 58 . 1 100 . 8.5 34.2 15 4Q. 2:35 26.9 32 5 10 54 40 *5:00 59 1* 100 6.5 33.5 12 40 '2:35 26.9. 32 5 10 49 40 4:55 . 60 . 1 100 7.0 34.2 12 40 . 2.:35 26.9 32 5 10 50 40 4:55 61 *1 100 7.4 34.2 13 40 2;35< 26.9 32 5 10 50 40 4:55 62 .1 100 6.7 . 34.2 12 *. 40 2:35 26.9 32 5 10 50 40 4:55 63 1 100 5.2 40.0 8 40 2!30*'* 26.8 32 5 10 45 40 4:45. 64 1 100 5.2 37.7 . 8 40 2:30 26.8 32 5 10 45 40 4:45 65 1 100 7.6 44.4 10 40 2:35 26.8 32. 5 10 53 40 4:55 66 1 100 4.4 44.4 6 40 2:30 26.8 32 5 10 43 40 4:45 67 1 100 4.6 44.4 . 6 40 2:30 . 26.8 32 5 10 44 40 4:45 68 1 100 6.1 44.4 8 40 2:30 26.8 32 5 10 48 40 4:45 69 1 100 5.6 40.0 8 40 2:30, 26.8 32 5 10 46 40 4:45 70 1 100 9.7 4.0 146 40 4:50 26.8 32 5 10 57 40 7:15 71 1 100 8.4 4.2 120 40 '4:20 26.8 32 5 10 53 40 6:45 72 1 100 5.8 4.2 83 40 3':45 37.7 45 5 10 59 40 6:25 73 1 100 3.9 6.8 34 40 .2:55 37.7 45 5 10 55 40 5:35 74 1 100 4.2 4.7 54 40 3:15 37.7 45 5 10 56 40 5:55 75 1 100 11.1 4.8 138 40 4i40 26.9 32 5 10 59 40 . 7:10 76 1 100 4.7 43.9 6 40 2:30 35.4 42 5 10 54 40 *5:05 Maximum ETE: | |||
* 4:so***:; Maximum ETE: 7:25 . Average ETE: 3:20 ; , ,,.,,>;WO-\ Average ETE: NMP/JAF 8-33 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ---- | |||
Table 8-13. Transit Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min.) (hr:min) (miles) (min') (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 1 1 110 18.S 8.7 I 128 so I 4:5.0 *1 26.9 36 5 10 87 50 8:00 2 1 110 16.6 8.7 I 114 50 I 4:35. I 26.9 36 s 10 82 50 7:40 3 1 . 110 16.2 38.6 I 2S 50 I 3:10 | |||
* I 28.9 39 5 10 84 50 6:20 4* 1 110 9.7 39.0 I 15 50 I 2:55 I 28.9 39 5 10 66 50 5:50 5 1 110 . 8.7 38.1 I 14 50 I 2:55' | |||
* I 28.9 39 5 10 63 50 ;5:45 6 1 110 9.9 39.3 .* 1 15 50 | |||
* I 3:00 I 28.9 39 5 10 67 50 . 5:55 7 1 110 10.2 38.3 I. 16 50 I 3:00 I | |||
* 30.4 41 5 10 69 50 6:00. 8 1 110 9.2 38.7 I 14 50 I 2:55 30.4 41 s 10 67 50 .5:50 9 1 110 10.4 3S.O I 18 50 I 3:00 .I 30.4 41 s 10 71 50 6:.00 10 1 110 8.3 37.7 I 13 50 I ** 2:55 .* | |||
* 1 30.4 41 5 10 63 50 5:45 . 11 1 110 10.3 41.6 I 15 50 I 2:55 I 30.4 41 s 10 69 so 5:50 12 1 110 11.1 5.2 I 129 50 I 4:50 I 26.9 36 5 10 67 so 7:40 13 1 110 12.S 6.4 I 118 50 I 4:40 I 26.9 36 s 10 71 50 7:35 14 1 110 17.1 7.3 I 141 so I 5:05 I 26.9 36 s 10 84 50 8:15 15 1 110 17.7 8.3 I 127 50 I**. 4:50 | |||
* I 26.9 36 5 10 86 50 8:00 16 1 110 19.0 9.1 I 12S 50 I 4:50 I 26.9 36 5 10 89 50 8:05 17 1 110 7.1 38.8 I 11 50 I 2:55 I 28.9 39 5 10 59 so 18 1 110 10.4 38.8 I 16 50 I 3:00 I 28.9 39 5 10 68 50 5:55 19 1 110 9.8 37.1 I 16 50 I 3:00 I 35.4 47 5 10 75 50 6:10 20 1 110 8.9 39.3 I 14 so I 2:55 I 35.4 47 5 10 71 50 6:00 21 1 110 16.3 30.0 I 33 50 I 3:15 I 35.4 47. 5 10 98 50 6:45 22 1 110 12.1 37.2 I 20 50 1. 3:00.. I 30.4 41 5 10 75 50 6:05 23 1 110 8.3 37.2 I 13 50 I 2:55 | |||
* I 30.4 | |||
* 41 s 10 64 50 5:.50 24 1 110 6.9 39.3 I 11 50 I 2:55 | |||
* I 35.4 47 5 10 66 so 5:55 25 1 110 10.5 S.9 I 107 50 I 4:30 I 26.9 36 s 10 65 50 7:20 26 1 110 11.2 5.9 I 114 50 I 4:35 I 26.9 36 s 10 67 50 7:25. 27 1 110 9.9 5.6 I 106 50 I 4:30 | |||
* I 26.9 36 5 10 64 50 7:15 NMP/JAF 8-34 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 29 1 109 26.9 10 30 i: 110 s.o 98 I so 26.9 36 s 10 S8 so 31 1 110 8.8 s.o' 10s ** I so 26.9 36 s 10 60 50 32 ' *1 110 .* 3.4 4.8 43 I SO 26.9 36 s 10 4S so 33 1 110 7.9 *4.8* .99. I so 26.9 36 s 10 S7 so 34 1 110 8.0 4.8 100 I so 26.9 36 S. 10 S7 so 35 1 110 8.6 s.o 103 so ; 26.9 36 s 10 S9 so 7:10* .. >;'. 36 1 110 ' '6.S 11.9. 33 so 26.8 36 s 10 SS so s:ss 37 i ' 110 | |||
* 9.2 10.S S3 ' 'so' 26.8 36 s 10 62 so 6:20 38: ' 1 110 6:5 10.S 37 *so 26.8 36 s 10 S4 so 6:00 39 1 110 7.6 .7;0 6S so 26.8 36 s 10 S7 so 6:i'S . 40 1 110 6.6 10.7 37 so 26.8 36 s 10 SS so 6:00 1 110 .8.3 4.3 *' 117 so 26.8 36 s 10 60 so 7:25/ 42 1 110 8.7 S;O 104 so 26.8 36 s 10 61 so 1:i.tjr 43 1 110 10*.o S.3 ' 112 so 26.8 36 s 10 66 so I 7:25. 44 1 110 '' 9.9 . 7.9' 7S so 26.8 36 s 10 64 so I: 6:45. 45 1 **110 9.8 S.2 112 so 26.8 36 s 10 64 so I. 46 1 110 9.2 ' 7.9 70 so 26.8 36 s 10 62 so I *6:4Q. 47 1 110 8.4 38.1 13 'so 28.9 39 s '10 62 so 48 1 110 8.6 '38.2 14 so 28.9 39 s 10 63 so 49 1 110 10;7 S.2. 124 so 26.9 36 s 10 66 so* so* 1 110 *10.0 S.3'' 114 so 26.9 36 s 10 63 so 51 1 110 10.6 4.6 139 so 26.9 36 s 10 6S so 52 1 110 '9.6 S.4 107 so 26.9 36 s 10 63 so 53. 1 110 17.9 37.1 29 so 30.4 41 s 10 91 so 54 1 110 4.1' 3S.9' 7 so I* : .. 2:50 ,,,',-'.' 28.9 39 s 10 S1 so 55 1 ' 110 9;2 ' 39.3 14 so | |||
* I : .. 2*:55 *)) * < ' 28.9 39 s 10 64 so .*I. *5:45> NMP/JAF 8-3S KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Route Number Bus Number (min) Route One-Wave Route Travel Length Speed Time (min) (miles) (mph) . . Pickup Time (min) ... Travel Distance Time to ETE to .R. t. R. C . (lir:mi.h) (miles) (min) : . . | |||
* 57 *. . .1 110 . . 39.3 8 50 .. 2.:5():,.:*'.. 28.9 39' 5 10 53 58 1 110 ' 8.5 17.7 29 50 ... 3:l;q\;f 26.9 36 5 10 61 . 50 59 1 110 6:5 ' 21.3 18 50 26.9 . 36 5 10 56 50 60 1 110 1.0 11.7 24 so 3:o5S:i 26.9 36 s 10 57 so .. 5:45 61 1 110 ' 7.4 . 17.7 25 50 i 3:10 . 26.9 36 5 10 56 50 5:50 ' 62 1 110 6.1 11.1 23 so , ** 26.9 36 s 10 s6 so . | |||
* 5:45 J 63 1 ilO 5.2 36.2 9 50 ' 2:50.. ... .* 26.8 36 5 10 51 50 5:25 ' ' '""'' ' ' 64 1 110 5.2 35.1 9 50 ' ' 'f'. 26.8 36 5 10 51 50 5:25: 65 1 110 , 7.6 38:5 12 so ' 2:55 ; 26.8 36 s 10 60 so ... *5:4.o ' . . . . . . . . . .. '*, ... , '66. 1 110 4.4 . 38.5 . 7 50 2:50 ;;,.. 26.8 36 5 ' 10 49 50 . 5:20 67 1 110 4.6 | |||
* 38:s 1 sb ... * )!5j};:"'r 26.8 36 s 10 49 so ' * *5:25 .. 68 1 110 6.1 38.s 10 so ' 'fi:59:*'. 26.8 36 s 10 53 so . | |||
* 69 1 110 . 5.6 36.2 9 50 . 2:59.:.i::.J 26.8 36 5 10 52 50 10 . 1 1io 9. 1 6.9 8s so *:: ''":C>s. * .* 26.8 36 s 10 64 so '," ',l"'>>li' : 71 1 .. 110 8o4 7.1 71 50 : .3:55 ;< 26.8 36 5 10 60 50 12 1 110 s:8 4.7 74 so . | |||
* 37.7 so s 10 6S so 13 1 110 3.9 4.o s9 so * .. 3:4of:::i 37.7 so s 10 61 so I 6:40 * * ,, ,,,,' "l 74 1 110 4.2 . 4.4 57 so 3!40 37.7 so s 10 62 so 75 1 110 1i.1 4.6 14s so * . s:10 26.9 36 s 10 66 76 1 110 4.7 39.3 7. . . so ' 11i!;*t* 3S.4 47 5 10 60 . so 1V1ax1mum ETE: | |||
* Maximum ETE: ! . I * * . , Average El;E: j'"''):!C>ff . , Average ETE: I I. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 8.-36 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 8-14. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather Ambulatory 90 1 66 20 6.8 44 2:35 Bishop Commons at St Luke's Wheelchair bound 90 5 2 10 6.8 40 2:20 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 6.8 38 2:10 Ambulatory 90 1 15 15 4.5 66 2:55 Ladies Home of Oswego Wheelchair bound 90 5 0 0 4.5 75 2:45 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 4.5 75 2:45 Ambulatory 90 1 15 15 7.6 47 2:35 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services Wheelchair bound 90 5 2 10 7.6 48 2:30 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 7.6 46 2:20 Ambulatory 90 1 25 20 6.8 44 2:35 Pontiac Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 90 5 55 10 6.8 40 2:20 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 6.8 38 2:10 Ambulatory 90 1 150 20 7.7 43 2:35 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Wheelchair bound 90 5 0 0 7.7 43 2:15 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 7.7 43 2:15 Ambulatory 90 1 57 20 6.8 44 2:35 St Luke Health Services Wheelchair bound 90 5 115 10 6.8 40 2:20 Bedridden 90 15 20 30 6.8 38 2:40 Ambulatory 90 1 28 20 7.8 43 2:35 Valehaven Home for Adults Wheelchair bound 90 5 0 0 7.8 43 2:15 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 7.8 43 2:15 Ambulatory 90 1 17 17 8.9 53 2:40 Morning Star Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 90 5 96 10 8.9 59 2:40 Bedridden 90 15 4 30 8.9 48 2:50 Ambulatory 90 1 55 20 3.7 62 2:55 Oswego Hospital Wheelchair bound 90 5 7 10 3.7 64 2:45 Bedridden 90 15 3 30 3.7 58 3:00 Ambulatory 90 1 72 20 8.2 47 2:40 Pontiac Terrace Apts Wheelchair bound 90 5 8 10 8.2 51 2:35 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 8.2 50 2:20 NMP/JAF 8-37 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Ambulatory 90 1 7 7 2.9 4 1:45 Fravor Rd IRA Wheelchair bound 90 5 2 10 2.9 4 1:45 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 2.9 4 1:35 Ambulatory 90 1 23 20 2.3 3 1:55 Parkview Manor Apts Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 2.3 3 1:40 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 2.3 3 1:35 Ambulatory 90 1 5 5 3.4 5 1:40 Sabill Drive IRA Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 3.4 5 1:40 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 3.4 5 1:35 Ambulatory 90 1 74 20 5.5 39 2:30* Springside at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 5.5 33 2:10 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 5.5 28 2:00 Ambulatory 90 1 0 0 3.1 24 1:55 The Manor at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 90 5 116 10 3.1 29 2:10 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 3.1 24 1:55 Ambulatory 90 1 37 20 4.7 13 2:05 Minetto Senior Housing Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 4.7 12 1:50 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 4.7 11 1:45 Maximum ETE: 3:00 Average ETE: 2:20 NMP/JAF 8-38 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* Table Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain Travel Loading Time to Rate Total EPZ Mobilization (min per Loading Dist. To EPZ Boundary ETE Medical Facility Patient (min) person) People Time (min) Bdry (mi) (min) (hr:min) Ambulatory 100 1 66 20 6.8 58 3:00 Bishop Commons at St Luke's Wheelchair bound 100 5 2 10 6.8 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 6.8 58 2:40 Ambulatory 100 1 15 15 4.5 59 2:55 Ladies Home of Oswego Wheelchair bound 100 5 0 0 4.5 67 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 4.5 67 2:50 Ambulatory 100 1 15 15 7.6 62 3:00 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services Wheelchair bound 100 5 2 10 7.6 62 2:55 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 7.6 64 2:45 Ambulatory 100 1 25 20 6.8 58 3:00 Pontiac Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 100 5 55 10 6.8 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 6.8 58 2:40 Ambulatory 100. 1 150 20 7.7 60 3:00 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Wheelchair bound 100 5 0 0 7.7 62 2:45 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 7.7 62 2:45 Ambulatory 100 1 57 20 6.8 58 3:00 St Luke Health Services Wheelchair bound 100 5 115 10 6.8 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 20 30 6.8 59 3:10 Ambulatory 100 1 28 20 7.8 61 3:05 Va.lehaven Home for Adults Wheelchair bound 100 5 0 0 7.8 62 2:45 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 7.8 62 2:45 Ambulatory 100 1 17 17 8.9 65 3:05 Morning Star Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 100 5 96 10 8.9 73 3:05 Bedridden 100 15 4 30 8.9 63 3:15 Ambulatory 100 1 55 20 3.7 54 2:55 Oswego Hospital Wheelchair bound 100 5 7 10 3.7 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 3 30 3.7 53 3:05 Ambulatory 100 1 72 20 8.2 63 3:05 Pontiac Terrace Apts Wheelchair bound 100 5 8 10 8.2 64 2:55 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 8.2 67 2:50 Ambulatory 100 1 7 7 2.9 5 1:55 Fravor Rd IRA Wheelchair bound 100 5 2 10 2.9 5 1:55 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 2.9 5 1:45 NMP/JAF 8-39 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Ambulatory 100 1 23 20 2.3 4 2:05 Parkview Manor Apts Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 2.3 4 1:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 2.3 4 1:45 Ambulatory 100 1 5 5 3.4 5 1:50 Sabill Drive IRA Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 3.4 5 1:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 3.4 5 1:45 Ambulatory 100 1 74 20 5.5 49 2:50 Springside at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 5.5 47 2:35 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 5.5 47 2:30 Ambulatory 100 1 0 0 3.1 44 2:25 The Manor at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 100 5 116 10 3.1 45 2:35 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 3.1 44 2:25 Am.bulatory 100 1 37 20 4.7 25 2:25 Minetto Senior Housing Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 4.7 29 2:15 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 4.7 30 2:10 Maximum ETE: 3:15 Average ETE: 2:40 NMP/JAF 8-40 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-16. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow Ambulatory 110 1 66 20 6.8 69 3:20 Bishop Cor:nmons at St Luke's Wheelchair bound 110 5 2 10 6.8 70 3:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 6.8 68 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 15 15 4.5 63 3:10 Ladies Home of Oswego Wheelchair bound 110 5 0 0 4.5 67 3:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 4.5 67 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 15 15 7.6 74 3:20 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services Wheelchair bound 110 5 2 10 7.6 74 3:15 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 7.6 72 3:05 Ambulatory 110 1 25 20 6.8 69 3:20 Pontiac Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 110 5 55 10 6.8 70 3:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 6.8 68 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 150 20 7.7 73 3:25 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Wheelchair bound 110 5 0 0 7.7 71 3:05 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 7.7 71 3:05 Ambulatory 110 1 57 20 6.8 69 3:20 St Luke Healt.h Services Wheelchair bound 110 5 115 10 6.8 70 3:10 Bedridden 110 15 20 30 6.8 65 3:25 Ambulatory 110 1 28 20 7.8 73 3:25 Valehaven Home for Adults Wheelchair bound 110 5 0 0 7.8 71 3:05 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 7.8 71 3:05 Ambulatory 110 1 17 17 8.9 75 3:25 Morning Star Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 110 5 96 10 8.9 79 3:20 Bedridden 110 15 4 30 8.9 75 3:35 Ambulatory 110 1 55 20 3.7 59 3:10 Oswego Hospital Wheelchair bound 110 5 7 10 3.7 65 3:05 Bedridden 110 15 3 30 3.7 54 3:15 Ambulatory 110 1 72 20 8.2 70 3:20 Pontiac Terrace Apts Wheelchair bound 110 5 8 10 8.2 79 3:20 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 8.2 77 3:10 Ambulatory 110 1 7 7 2.9 6 2:05 Fravor Rd IRA Wheelchair bound 110 5 2 10 2.9 6 2:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 2.9 5 1:55 NMP/JAF 8-41 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Ambulatory 110 1 23 20 2.3 4 2:15 Parkview Manor Apts Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 2.3 4 2:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 2.3 4 1:55 Ambulatory 110 1 5 5 3.4 6 2:05 Sabill Drive IRA Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 3.4 6 2:05 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 3.4 6 2:00 Ambulatory 110 1 74 20 5.5 62 3:15 Springside at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 5.5 63 3:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 5.5 68 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 0 0 3.1 64 2:55 The Manor at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 110 5 116 10 3.1 58 3:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 3.1 64 2:55 Ambulatory 110 1 37 20 4.7 14 2:25 Minetto Senior Housing Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 4.7 13 2:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 4.7 12 2:05 Maximum ETE: 3:35 Average ETE: 2:55 NMP/JAF 8-42 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-17. Homebound Special Needs Population Evacuation Time Estimates .. : , .. ". . : . . * .. """: ' . . " . 3:*"''***** People 'time at Travei"to | |||
* Total Time Travel Time to Requiring Vehicles Weather Mobilization 1st Stop Subsequent at Subsequent EPZ Boundary ETE Vehicle Type Vehfcle deployed Stops Conditions Time (min) (min) Stops (min) Stops (min) (min) (hr:min) Normal 90 90 15 4:10 Wheelchair Vans 208 19 11 Rain 100 5 100 50 15 4:30 Snow 110 110 16 4:55 Maximum ETE: 4:55 Average ETE: 4:35 Table 8-18. Correctional Facilities Evacuation Time Estimates Normal 90 23 2:55 Oswego County Correctional Facility Rain 100 6 2 160 60 5.5 20 3:00 Snow 110 17 3:10 Maximum ETE: 3:10 Average ETE: 3:05 NMP/JAF 8-43 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 9 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STRATEGY This section discusses the suggested traffic control and management strategy that is designed to expedite the movement of evacuating traffic. The resources required to implement this strategy include: | |||
* Personnel with the capabilities of performing the planned control functions of traffic guides (preferably, not necessarily, law enforcement officers). | |||
* Traffic Control Devices to assist these personnel in the performance of their tasks. These devices should comply with the guidance of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) published by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of the U.S.D.O.T. All state and most county transportation agencies have access to the MUTCD, which is available on-line: http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov which provides access to the official PDF version. | |||
* A plan t_hat defines all locations, provides necessary details and is documented in a format that is readily understood by those assigned to perform traffic control. The functions to be performed iri the field are: 1. Facilitate evacuating traffic movements that safely expedite travel out of the EPZ. 2. Discourage traffic movements that move evacuating vehicles in a direction which takes them significantly closer to .the power plant, or which interferes with the efficient flow of other evacuees. & We employ the terms "facilitate" and "discourage" rather than "enforce" and "prohibit" to indicate the need for flexibility in performing the traffic control function. There are always legitimate reasons for a driver to prefer a direction other than that indicated. For example: | |||
* A driver may be traveling home from work or from another location, to join other family members prior to evacuating. | |||
* An evacuating driver may be travelling to pick up a relative, or other evacuees. | |||
* The drive*r may be an emergency worker en route to perform an important activity. The implementation of a plan must also be flexible enough for the application of sound judgment by the traffic guide. The traffic management plan is the outcome of the following process: 1. The existing TCPs and ACPs by the offsite agencies in their existing emergency plans serve as the basis of the traffic management plan, as per NUREG/CR-7002. 2. The existing TCPs and ACPs and how they were applied in this study are discussed in Appendix G. 3. Computer analysis. of the evacuation traffic flow environment (see Figures 7-3 through 7-7). As. discuss.ed in Section 7.3, congestion within the EPZ is clear by 4 hours after the ATE. The existing traffic management plans place emphasis on appropriate intersections and are adequate. No additional TCPs or ACPs are identified as a result of this study. 4. Prioritization ofTCPs and ACPs. NMP/JAF 9-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time EStimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* Application of traffic arid access control at some TCPs and ACPs will have a more pronounced influence on expediting traffic movements than at other TCPs and ACPs. For example, TCPs controlling traffic originating from areas in close proximity to the power plant could have a more beneficial effect on minimizing potential exposure to radioactivity than those TCPs located far from the power plant. These priorities should be assigned by state/local emergency management representatives and by law enforcement personnel. The use of Intelligent Transportation Systems {ITS) technologies can reduce manpower and equipment needs, while still facilitatingthe evacuation process. Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) can be placed within the EPZ to provide information to travelers regarding traffic conditions, route selection, and reception center information. DMS can also be placed outside of the EPZ to warn motorists to avoid using routes that may conflict with the flow of evacuees away from the power plants. Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) can be used to broadcast information to evacuees en route through their vehicle stereo systems. Automated Traveler Information Systems (ATIS) can also be used to provide evacuees with information. Internet websites can provide traffic and evacuation route information before the evacuee begins their trip, while on board navigation systems (GPS units), cell phones, and pagers can be used to provide information en route. These are only several examples of how ITS technologies can benefit the evacuation process.' Considerat . ion should be given that ITS technologies be used to facilitate the evacuation process, and any additional signage placed should consider evacuation needs. The ETE analysis treatedall controlled intersections that are existing TCP and ACP locations in the offsite agency plans as being controlled by actuated. signals. Appendix K, Table K-2 identifies those intersections that were modeled as TCPs. Chapters 2N and SG, and Part 6 of the 2009 MUTCD are particularly relevant and should be reviewed during emergency response training. The ETE calculations reflect the assumption that all "external-external" trips are interdicted and diverted after 2 hours have elapsed from the ATE. *All transit Vehi.cles and other responders entering the EPZ to support. the are assumed to be unhindered by personnel manning ACPs and TCPs. Study Assumptions 5 . and 6 in Section 2.3 discuss *ACP and TCP staffing schedules .and operations. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 9-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 10 . EVACUATION ROUTES Evacuation routes are comprised of two distinct components: | |||
* Routing from an ERPA being evacuated to the boundary of the Evacuation Region and thence out of the EPZ. | |||
* Routing of transit-dependent evacuees from the EPZ boundary to the reception center. Evacuees will select routes within the EPZ in such a way as to minimize their exposure to risk. This expectation is met by the DYNEV II model routing traffic away from the location of NMP/JAF, to the extent practicable. The DTRAD model satisfies this behavior by routing traffic so as to balance traffic demand relative to the available highway capacity to the extent possible. See Appendices B through D for further discussion. The routing of transit-dependent evacuees from the EPZ boundary to the general reception center or to medical host facilities is designed to minimize the amount of travel outside the EPZ from the points where these routes cross the EPZ boundary. The Oswego County radiological emergency plans identify the New York State Fairgrounds as the reception center for school and day camp children as well as the general population. Several host facilities are identified throughouJ the region to house those living or receiving treatment at various medical facilities and nursing homes within the EPZ. Figure 10-1 presents a map showing the general reception center as well as the medical host facilities for evacuees. The major evacuation routes for the EPZ are presented in Figure 10-2. It is assumed that .all school and day camp. evacuees will be taken to the New York. State Fairgrounds and subsequently picked up by parents or guardians. Transit-dependent evacuees are transported to the main Fairground location as well. This study does. not consider the transport of evacuees from reception centers to congregate care centers, if the county does make the decision to relocate NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 10-1 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 General Reception Center and Medical Host Facilities Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* General Reception Center D Medical Host Facility GJ ERPA \.. __, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region I / I Figure 10-1. General Reception Center and Medical Host Facilities NMP/JAF 10-2 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Major Evacuation Routes within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF GJ ERPA 28 > Evacuation Route \. _.,, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Lako / 26 I I I 27 '\ \ Figure 10-2. Evacuation Route Map NMP/JAF 10-3 Evacuation Time Estimate Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 11 SURVEILLANCE OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS There is a need for surveillance of traffic operations during the evacuation. There is also a need to clear any blockage of roadways arising from accidents or vehicle disablement. Surveillance can take several forms. | |||
* 1. Traffic control personnel, located at Traffic and Access Control points, provide fixed-point surveillance. 2. Ground patrols may be undertaken along well-defined paths to ensure coverage of those highways that serve as major evacuation routes. 3. Aerial surveillance of evacuation. operations may also be conducted using helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft, if available. 4. Cellular phone calls (if cellular coverage exists) from motorists may also provide direct field reports of road blockages. These concurrent surveillance *procedures are designed to provide coverage of the entire EPZ as well as the area around its periphery. It is the responsibility of the county to support an emergency response system that can receive messages from the field and be in a position to respond to any reported problems in a timely manner. This coverage should quickly identify, and expedite the response to any blockage caused by a disabled vehicle. Tow Vehicles In a low-speed traffic environment, any vehicle disablement is likely to arise due to a low-speed collision, mechanical failure or the exhaustion of its fuel supply. In any case, the disabled vehicle can be pushed onto the shoulder, thereby restoring traffic flow. Past experience in other emergencies indicates that evacuees who are leaving an area often perform activities such as pushing a disabled vehicle to the side of the road without prompting. While the need for tow vehicles is expected to be low under the circumstances described above, it is still prudent to be prepared for such a need. Consideration should be given that tow trucks With a supply of gasoline be deployed at strategic locations within, or just outside, the EPZ. These locations should be selected so that: | |||
* They permit access to key, heavily loaded, evacuation routes. | |||
* Responding tow trucks would most likely travel counter-flow relative to evacuating traffic. Consideration should also be given that the state and local emergency management agencies encourage gas stations to remain open during the evacuation. NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 12 CONFIRMATION TIME It is necessary to confirm that the evacuation process is effective in the sense that the public is complying with the Advisory to Evacuate. The Oswego County radiological emergency plans state that the County Sheriff is assigned the responsibility of traffic control and is tasked with patrolling the plume exposure EPZ for confirmation of evacuation and the provision of security in the evacuated area. This process takes place during the maintenance phase of the evacuation. In addition to this activity, the following complementary approach is suggested. The suggested procedure employs a stratified random sample and a telephone survey. The size of the sample is dependent on the expected number of households that do not comply with the Advisory to Evacuate. It is reasonable to assume, for the purpose of estimating sample size that at least 80 percent of the population within the EPZ will comply with the Advisory to Evacuate. On this basis, an analysis could be undertaken (see Table 12-1) to yield an estimated sample size of approximately 300. The confirmation process should start at about 2 hours after the Advisory to Evacuate, which is when approximately 90 percent of evacuees have completed their mobilization activities (see Figure 5-4). At fhis time, virtually all evacuees will have departed on their respective trips and the lqcal telephone system will be largely free of traffic. As indicated in Table 12-1, approximately 7Yz person hours are needed to complete the telephone survey. If six people are assigned to this task, each dialing a different set of telephone exchanges. (e.g., each person can be assigned a different set of ERPAs), then the confirmation process will extend over a timeframe of about 75 minutes. Thus, the confirmation should be completed before the evacuated area is cleared. Of course, fewer people would be needed for this survey if the Evacuation Region were only a portion' of the EPZ. Use of modern automated CO!TlpUter controlled dialing equipment or Other technologies (e.g., emergency . . . . notification system or equivalent if available) can significantly reduce the manpower requirements _and the t.ime required to undertake this type of confirmation survey. If this method is indeed used by the offsite agencies, consideration should be given to maintain * .a list of telephone. numbers within the EPZ in ttie EOC at all times. Such a list be purchased from vendors *and should b.e periodically updated. As indicated *above,. the confirmation process should. not begin until 2 hours after the Advisory to Evacuate, to ensure that households have had enough tfme to mobilize. This 2-hour timeframe will enable telephone operators to arrive attheir workplace, obtain a call list and prepare to make the necessary phone calls. Should the number of telephone responses (Le., people still at home) exceed 20 percent, then the telephone.survey should be repeated after an hour's interval until the confirmation process is completed. | |||
* Other techniques could also be. considered. After traffic volumes decline, the personnel manning TCPs can be redeployed t.o travel through residential areas to observe and to confirm . evacuation activities. , NMP/JAF 12-1 . KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 12-1. Estimated Number of Telephone Calls Required for Confirmation of Evacuation Problem Definition Estimate number of phone calls, n, needed to ascertain the proportion, F of households that have not evacuated. | |||
==Reference:== | |||
Burstein, H., Attribute Sampling, McGraw Hill, 1971 Given: | |||
* No. of households plus other facilities, N, within the EPZ (est.)= 17,500 | |||
* Est. proportion, F, of households that will not evacuate = 0.20 | |||
* Allowable error margin, e: 0.05 | |||
* Confidence level, a: 0.95 (implies A= 1.96) Applying Table 10 of cited reference, Finite population correction: p = F + e = 0.25; q = 1 -p = 0.75 A2pq + e n = = 308 ez nN nF = = 303 n+N-1 Thus, some 300 telephone calls will confirm that approximately 20 percent of the population has not evacuated. If only 10 percent of the population does not comply with the Advisory to Evacuate, then the required sample size, nF = 213. Est. Person Hours to complete 300 telephone calls . Assume: | |||
* Time to dial using touch tone (random selection of listed numbers): 3o seconds | |||
* Time for 6 rings (no answer): 36 seconds | |||
* Time for 4 rings plus short conversation: 60 sec. | |||
* Interval between calls: 20 sec. Person Hours: . . . . . . 300[30 + 0.8(36) +*0.2(60) + 20] **. .* . . . . *= 7.6 -. . . 3600-. -' NMP/JAF 12-2 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 APPENDIX A Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms A. GLOSSARY OF TRAFFIC ENGINEERING TERMS Table A-1. Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms Term Definition '-*:,, *. . . * "" | |||
* Ille. 'i.\ Analysis Network Link Measures of Effectiveness Node Origin Prevailing Roadway and Traffic Conditions Service Rate Service Volume Signal Cycle Length Signal Interval NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate A graphical representation of the geometric topology of a physical roadway system, which is comprised of directional links and nodes. A network link represents a specific, one-directional section of roadway. A link has both physical (length, number of lanes, topology, etc.) and operational (turn movement percentages, service rate, free-flow speed) characteristics. Statistics describing traffic operations on a roadway network. A network node generally represents an intersection of network links. A node has control characteristics, i.e., the allocation of service time to each approach link. A location attached to a network link, within the EPZ or Shadow Region, where trips are generated at a specified rate in vehicles per hour (vph). These trips enter the roadway system to travel to their respective destinations. Relates to the physical features of the roadway, the nature (e.g., composition) of traffic on the roadway and the ambient conditions (weather, visibility, pavement conditions, etc.). Maximum rate at which vehicles, executing a specific turn maneuver, can be discharged from a section of roadway at the prevailing conditions, expressed in vehicles per second (vps) or vehicles per hour (vph). Maximum number of vehicles which can pass over a section of roadway in one direction during a specified time period with operating conditions at a specified Level of Service (The Service Volume at the upper bound of Level of Service, E, equals Capacity). Service Volume is usually expressed as vehicles per hour (vph). The total elapsed time to display all signal indications, in sequence. The cycle length is expressed in seconds. A single combination of signal indications. The interval duration is expressed in seconds. A signal phase is comprised of a sequence of signal intervals, usually green, yellow, red. A-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016. | |||
Term Definition Signal Phase Traffic (Trip) Assignment Traffic Density Traffic (Trip) Distribution Traffic Simulation Traffic Volume Travel Mode Trip Table or Origin-* Destination Matrix Turning Capacity NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate A set of signal indications (and intervals) which services a particular combination of traffic movements on selected approaches to the intersection. The phase duration is expressed *in seconds. A process of assigning traffic to paths of travel in such a way as to satisfy all trip objectives (i.e., the desire of each vehicle to travel from a specified origin in the network to a specified destination) and to optimize some stated objective or combination of objectives. In general, the objective is stated in terms of minimizing a generalized "cost". For example, "cost" may be expressed in terms of travel time. The number of vehicles that occupy one lane of a roadway section *of specified length at a point in time, expressed vehicles per mile (vpm). A process for determining the destinations of all traffic generated at the origins. The result often takes the form of a Trip Table, which is a matrix of origin-destination traffic volumes. A computer model designed to replicate the real-world operation of vehicles on a roadway network, so as to provide statistics describing traffic performance. These statistics are c.alled Measures of Effectiveness. The number of vehicles that pass over a section of roadway in one direction, expressed in vehicles per hour (vph). Where applicable, traffic volume may be stratified by turn movement. Distinguishes between private auto, bus, rail, pedestrian and air travel modes. A rectangular matrix or table, whose entries contain the number of trips generated at each specified origin, during a specified time period, that are attracted to (and travel toward) each of its specified destinations. These values are expressed in vehicles per hour (vph) or in vehicles. The capacity associated with that component of the traffic stream which executes a specified turn maneuver from an approach at an intersection. A-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
* APPENDIX B DTRAD: Dynamic Traffic Assignment and Distribution Model B. DYNAMIC TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION MODEL This section describes the integrated dynamic trip assignment and distribution model named DTRAD (Qyna*mic Iraffic 8ssignment and .Qistribution) that is expressly designed for use in analyzing evacuation scenarios. DTRAD employs logit-based path-choice principles and is one of the models of the DYNEV II System. The DTRAD module implements path-based Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) so that time dependent Origin-Destination (OD) trips are "assigned" to routes over the network based on prevailing traffic conditions. To apply the DYNEV II System, .the analyst must specify the highway network, link capacity information, the time-varying volume of traffic generated at all origin centroids and, optionally, a set of accessible candidate destination nodes on the periphery of the EPZ for selected origins. DTRAD calculates the optimal dynamic trip distribution (i.e., trip destinations) and the optimal dynamic trip assignment (i.e., trip routing) of the traffic generated at each origin node traveling to its set of candidate destination nodes, so as to minimize evacuee travel "cost." Overview oflntegrated Distribution and Assignment Model .The underlying premise is that the selection of destinations and routes is intrinsically coupled in an evacuation scenario. That is, people in vehicles seek to travel out of an area of potential risk as rapidly as possible by selecting the "best" routes. The model is designed to identify these "best" routes in a manner. that realistically distributes vehicles from origins to destinations and routes them .over the highway network, in a consistent and optimal manner, reflecting evacuee behavior. | |||
* For each origin, a set of "candidate .destination nodes;' is selected by the software logic and by the analyst to reflect the desire by evacuees to travel away from th.e power plant and to.access major highways. The specific destination nodes within this set that are selected by travelers and the selection of the connecting paths of travel are both determined by DTRAD. This determination is made by a legit-based path choice model in DTRAD, so as to minimize the trip *"cost", as discussed later. * . . : . ' . . " . . ' . . --. . The traffic *loading on the network and* the consequent operational traffic of the network (density, speed,. throughput on each link) vary over time as the evacuation takes | |||
* The DTRAD model, which is iQterfaced*with the DYNEV simulation model, executes a succession of "sessions" wherein it computes the optimal routing and selection of destination nodes for the conditions *that exist at that time .. Interfacing the DYNEV Simulation Model with DTRAD . . -. The DYNEV II system reflects' guidance that evacuees will seek to travel in a general direction away from the location of tlie hazardous event. An algorithm was developed to support the DTRAD model in dynamically varying the Trip Table (0-0 matrix) over time from one DTRAD' session to the next. Another algorithm executes a "mapping'' from the specified "geometric". network analysis network) that represents the physical system, to a "path" network that represents the vehicle [turn] movements. DTRAD computations are performed oh the "path" net"lfbrk: DYNEV simulation mo,del, on*the "geometric" network. NMP/JAF ' . Evacuation Time Estimate B-1 KlD Engineering, P.C. .*.February 24, 2016 DTRAD Description DTRAD is the DTA module for the DYNEV II System. When the road network under study is large, multiple routing options are usually available between trip origins and destinations. The problem of loading traffic demands and propagating them over the network links is called Network Loading and is addressed by DYNEV II using macroscopic traffic simulation modeling. Traffic assignment deals with computing the distribution of the traffic over the road network for given 0-D demands and is a model of the route choice of the drivers. Travel demand changes significantly over time, and the road network may have time dependent characteristics, e.g., time-varying signal timing or reduced* road capacity because of lane closure, or traffic congestion. To consider | |||
* these time dependencies, DTA procedures are required. The DTRAD DTA module represents the dynamic route choice behavior of drivers, using the specification of dynamic origin-destination matrices as flow input. Drivers choose their .routes through the network based on the travel cost they experience (as determined by the simulation model). This allows traffic to be distributed over the network according to the time-dependent conditions. The modeling principles of DTRAD include: | |||
* It is assumed that drivers not only select the best route (i.e., lowest cost path) but some *also select less attractive routes. The algorithm implemented by DTRAD archives several "efficient" routes for each 0-D pair from which the drivers choose. | |||
* The choice of one route out of a set of possible routes is an outcome of "discrete choice modeling". Given a set of routes and their generalized costs, the percentages of drivers that choose each route is computed. The most prevalent model for discrete choice modeling is the logit' model. DTRAD uses a variant of Path-Size-Logit model (PSL). PSL overcomes the drawback of the traditional multinomial logit model by incorporating an .*additional deterministic path size correction term to address path overlapping in the random utility expression. | |||
* DTRAD executes the traffic assignment algorithm on an abstract network representation called "the path network" which is built from the actual physical link-node analysis network. This execution continues until a stable situation is reached: the volumes and travel times on the edges of the path network do not change significantly from one iteration to the next. The criteria for this convergence are defined by the user. | |||
* Travel "cost" plays a crucial role in route choice. In DTRAD, path cost is a linear summation of the generalized cost of each link that comprises the The generalized cost for a link, a, is expressed as where ca is the generalized cost for link a, and a, fl, and ya re cost coefficients for link travel time, dista'nce, and supplemental cost, respectively. Distance and supplemental costs are defined as invariant properties of the* network model; while travel time is a . dynamic property dictated *by prevailing traffic conditions. The DYNEV simulation model .* NMP/JAF B-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 computes travel times on all edges in the network and DTRAD uses that information to constantly update the costs of paths. The route choice decision model in the next simulation iteration uses these updated values to adjust the route choice behavior. This way; traffic demands are dynamically re-assigned based on time dependent conditions. The interaction between the DTRAD traffic assignment and DYNEV II simulation models is depicted in Figure B-1. Each round of interaction is called a Traffic Assignment Session (TA session). A TA session is composed of multiple iterations, marked as loop B in the figure .. | |||
* The supplemental cost is based on the "survival distribution" (a variation of the exponential distribution).The Inverse Survival Function is a "cost" term in DTRAD to represent the potential risk of travel toward the plant: Sa= -In (p), 0 p I ; >O dn p=-. do dn = Distance of node, n, from the plant do from the plant where there is zero risk factor The value of do 15 miles, the outer distance of the Shadow Region. Note that the supplemental cost, Sa, of link, a, is (high, low), if its downstream node, n, is (near, far from). the power plant . . NMP/JAF B-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Estimate . February 24, 2016, .. | |||
Network Equilibrium In 1952, John Wardrop wrote: . Under equilibrium conditions traffic arranges itself in congested networks in such a way that no individual trip-maker can reduce his path costs by switching routes. The above statement describes the "User Equilibrium" definition, also called the "Selfish Driver Equilibrium". It is a hypothesis that represents a [hopeful] condition that evolves over time as drivers search out alternative routes to identify those routes that minimize their respective "costs". It has been found that this "equilibrium" objective to minimize costs is largely realized by most drivers who routinely take the same trip over the same network at the same time (i.e., commuters). Effectively, such drivers "learn" which routes are best for them over time. Thus, the traffic environment "settles down" to a near-equilibrium state. Clearly, since an emergency evacuation is a sudden, unique event, it does not constitute a term learning experience which can achieve an equilibrium state. Consequently, DTRAD was not designed as an equilibrium solution, but to represent drivers in a new and unfamiliar* situation, who respond in a flexible manner to real-time information (either broadcast or observed) in such a way as to minimize their respective costs of travel. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 B . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Start of next DTRAD Session Set T0 = Clock time. Archive System State at T0 Define latest Link Turn Percentages Execute Simulation Model from time, T0 to T1 (burn time) Provide DTRAD with link MOE at time, T1 Execute DTRAD iteration; Get new Turn Percentages Retrieve System State at T0 ; . Apply new Link Turn Percents DTRAD i.teration converges? No Yes Next iteration Simulate from T0 to T2 (DTA session duration)* Set Clock to Figure B-1. Flow Diagram of Simulation-DTRAD Interface* B-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 J APPENDIX C DYNEV Traffic Simulation Model C. DVNEV TRAFFIC SIMULATION MODEL The DYNEV traffic simulation model is a macroscopic model that describes the operations of traffic flow in terms of aggregate variables: vehicles, flow rate, mean speed, volume, density, queue length, on each link, for each turn movement, during each Time Interval (simulation time step). The model generates trips from "sources" and from Entry Links and introduces them onto the analysis network at rates specified by the analyst based on the mobilization time distributions. The model simulates the movements of all vehicles on all network links over time until the network is empty. At intervals, the model outputs Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) such as those listed in Table C-1. Model Features Include: | |||
* Explicit consideration is taken of the variation in density over the time step; an iterative procedure is employed to calculate an average density over the simulation time step for the purpose of computing a mean speed for moving vehicles. | |||
* Multiple turn movements can .be serviced on one link; a separate algorithm is used to estimate the number of (fractional) lanes assigned to the vehicles performing each turn movement, based, in part, on the turn percentages provided by the DTRAD model. | |||
* At any point in time, traffic flow on a link is subdivided into twodassifications: queued and moving vehicles. The number of vehicles in each classification is computed. Vehicle spillback, stratified by turn movement for each network link, is explicitly considered and | |||
* quantified. The propagation ofstopping waves from link to link is computed within each time step of the simulation. There is no ''vertical stacking" of queues on a link. | |||
* Any link can accommodate "source flow" from zones via side streets and parking facilities that are not explicitly represented. This flow represents the evacuating trips that are generated at the source. | |||
* The relation between the number of vehicles occupying the link and its storage capacity >is monitored every time step for every link and. for every turn movement. If the . **available storage capacity on a link is exceeded by the demand for service, then the simulator applies a "metering" rate to the entering traffic from .both the upstream .. feeders and source n.ode to ensure that the available storage capacity is not exceeded. | |||
* A "path network" that represents the specified traffic movements from each network | |||
* link is constructed by the model; this path network is utilized by the DTRAD model. | |||
* A two-way interface with DTRAD: (1) provides link travel times; (2) receives data that translates into link turn percentages. | |||
* Provides MOE to animation software, EVAN | |||
* Calculates ETE statistics NMP/JAF C-1 KLD Engineeririg, P.C. Evacuation nme Estimate February 24( 2016. *.* | |||
All traffic simulation models are data-intensive. Table C-2 outlines the necessary input data elements. To provide an efficient framework for defining these specifications, the physical highway environment is represented as a network. The unidirectional links of the network represent roadway sections: rural, multi-lane, urban streets or freeways. The nodes of the network generally represent intersections or points along a section where a geometric property changes (e.g. a lane drop, change in grade or free flow speed). Figure C-1 is an example of a small network representation. The freeway is defined by the sequence of links, {20,21), {21,22), and {22,23). Links {8001, 19) and {3, 8011) are Entry and Exit links, respectively. An arterial extends from node 3 to node 19 and is partially subsumed within a grid network. Note that links (21,22) and {17,19) are grade-separated. Table C-1. Selected Measures of Effectiveness Output by DYNEV II < " 0 .. * 'Unl1l'° ' . \ :. '. ies to : * * * ... * :: *Measure -. . . .. " _.,., "" ,, ;': .. *"" .. ..... *< ' II *, Vehicles Discharged Vehicles Link, Network, Exit Link Speed Miles/Hours (mph) Link, Network Density Vehicles/Mile/Lane Link Level of Service LOS Link Content Vehicles Network Travel Time Vehicle-hours Network Evacuated Vehicles Vehicles Network, Exit Link Trip Travel Time Vehicle-minutes/trip Network Capacity Utilization Percent Exit Link Attraction Percent of total evacuating vehicles Exit Link Max Queue Vehicles Node, Approach Time of Max Queue Hours:minutes Node, Approach Route Statistics Length (mi); Mean Speed (mph); Travel Route Time (min) Mean Travel Time Minutes Evacuation Trips; Network NMP/JAF C-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table C-2. Input Requirements for the DYNEV II Model HIGHWAY NETWORK | |||
* Links.defined by upstream and downstream node numbers | |||
* Link lengths | |||
* Number of lanes (up to 9) and channelization * | |||
* Turn bays (1 to 3 lanes) | |||
* Destination (exit) nodes * | |||
* Network topology defined in terms of downstream nodes for each receiving link | |||
* Node Coordinates (X,Y) * | |||
* Nuclear Power Plant Coordinates (X,Y) GENERATED TRAFFIC VOLUMES | |||
* On all entry links and source nodes (origins), by Time Period TRAFFIC CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS | |||
* Traffic signals: link-spetific, turn movement specific | |||
* Signal control treated as fixed time or actuated | |||
* Location of traffic control points (these are represented as actuated signals) | |||
* Stop and Yield signs | |||
* Right-turn-on-red (RTOR) | |||
* Route diversion specifications | |||
* Turn restrictions * . Lane control (e.g. lane closure, movement-specific) DRIVER'S AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS | |||
* Driver's (vehicle-,specific) response mechanisms: free-flow speed, discharge headway | |||
* Bus route designation. DYNAMIC TRAFFfCASSIGNMENT | |||
* Candidate destination nodes for each origin. (optional) * .Duration of DTA sessions | |||
* Duration of simulation "burn time" | |||
* Desired number of destination nodes per origin INCIDENTS | |||
* Identify and Schedule of closed lanes | |||
* Identify and Schedule of closed links NMP/JAF C-3 | |||
* Eva.cuation Ti.me Estimate | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Entry, Exit Nodes*are numbered 8xxx . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate :_8 Figure Representative Analysi,s Network C-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 | |||
---------------C.1 Methodology C.1.1 The Fundamental Diagram It is necessary to define the fundamental diagram describing flow-density and speed-density relationships; Rather than "settling for" a "triangular representation, a more realistic representation that includes a "capacity drop", (1-R)Qmax, at the critical density when flow conditions enter the forced flow regime, is developed and calibrated for each link. This representation, shown in Figure C-2, asserts a constant free speed up to a density, kr, and then a linear reduction in speed in the range, kr:::; k:::; kc = 4S vpm, the density at capacity. In the flow-density plane, a quadratic relationship is prescribed in the range, kc < k :::; ks = 9S vpm which roughly represents the "stop-and-go" condition of severe congestion. The value of flow rate, Qs, corresponding to ks, is approximated at 0.7 RQmax. A *linear relationship between ks and ki completes the diagram shown in Figure C-2. Table C-3 is a glossary of terms. The fundamental diagram is applied to moving traffic on every link. The specified calibration values for each link are: (1) Free speed, Vf ; (2) Capacity, Qmax; (3) Critical density, kc = 4S vpm; (4) Capacity Drop Factor, R = 0.9; (5) Jam density, k1*. Then, Ve = Qmax , kr = kc -. . Setting k = k -k then Q = RQ -RQmax k2 for 0 < k < k = SO . It can be Qmax | |||
* c ' max 8333 --s shown that Q = ( 0.98 -O.OOS6 k) RQmax for ks :::; k :::; ki, where ks = SO and k; = 17S. C.1.2 The.Simulation Mod.el The simulation model solves a sequence of "unit problems." Each unit problem computes the | |||
* movement of traffic on a link; for each specified turn movement, over a specified time interval. (Tl) which serves as the simulation time step for all links. Figure C-3 is a representation of the unit problem in the.time-distance plane. Table C-3 is a glossary of terms that are referenced in the following description of the unit problem procedure. NMP/JAF Evacuation Tim*e Estimate C-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 Volume, vph Qmax -R Qmax-Capacity Drop .__--..-------.------;--------.........;:-----Density, vpm Flow Regimes I Speed, mph 111 Free Forced, Vf R Ve -L..----..------+-----T----------=.,._ ______ _. Density, vpm I kc Figure C-2. Fundamental Diagrams NMP/JAF C-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Distance Qoown L Up ----*Time I Ei. TI Ez Figure C-3. A UNIT Problem Configuration with ti> 0 NMP/JAF C-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Cap E G/C h k L LN M 0 NMP/JAF Table C-3 .. Glossary The maximum number of vehicles, of a particular movement, that can discharge from a link within a time interval. The number of vehicles, of a particular movement, that enter the link over the time interval. The portion, b1, can reach the stop-bar within the Tl. The green time: cycle time ratio that services the vehicles of a particular turn movement on a link. The mean queue discharge headway, seconds. Density in vehicles per lane per mile. The average density of moving vehicles of a particular movement over a Tl, on a link. The length of the link in feet. The queue length in feet of a particular movement, at the [beginning, end] of a time interval. The number of lanes, expressed as a floating point number, allocated to service a particular movement on a link. The mean effective length of a queued vehicle including the vehicle spacing, feet. Metering factor (Multiplier): 1. The number of moving vehicles on the link, of a particular movement, that are moving at the [beginning, end] of the time interval. These vehicles are assumed to be of equal spacing, over the length of link upstream of the queue. The total number of vehicles of a particular movement that are discharged from a link:over a time interval. The components of the vehicles of a particular movement that are discharged from a link within a time interval: vehicles that were Queued at the beginning of the Tl; vehicles that were Moving within the link at the beginning of the Tl; vehicles that Entered the link during the Tl. The percentage, expressed as a fraction, of the total flow on the link that executes a particular turn movement, x. C-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* R RCap Tl w-NMP/JAF The number of queued vehicles on the link, of a particular turn movement, at the [beginning, end] ofthe time interval. The maximum flow rate that can be serviced by a link for a particular movement in the absence of a control device. It is specified by the analyst as an estimate of link capacity, based upon a field survey, with reference to the HCM. The factor that is applied to the capacity of a link to represent the "capacity drop" when the flow condition moves into the forced flow regime. The lower capacity at that point is equal to RQmax . The remaining capacity available to service vehicles of a particular movement after that queue has been completely serviced, within a time interval, expressed as vehicles. Service rate for movement x, vehicles per hour (vph). -Vehicles of a particular turn movement that enter a link over the firstt1 seconds of a time interval, can reach the stop-bar (in the absence of a queue down-* stream) the same time interval. -The time interval, in seconds, which is used as the simulation time step. The mean speed of travel, in feet per second (fps) or miles per hour (mph), of moving vehicles on the link. The mean speed of the last vehicle in a queue that discharges from the link within the Tl. This speed differs frorii the *mean speed of moving vehicles, v. The width of the intersection in feet. This is the difference between the link --length which extends from stop-bar to stop-bar and the block length. -C-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 The formulation and the associated logic presented below are designed to solve the unit problem for each sweep over the network (discussed below), for each turn movement serviced on each link that comprises the evacuation network, and for each Tl over the duration of the evacuation. | |||
* Given= Qb,Mb ,L, TI,E0 ;LN, G/c*,h,Lv,Ro ,Lc1E,M Compute = 0 , Qe , Me Define 0 = OQ + OM + OE ; . E = Ei + E2 1. For the first sweep, s = 1, of this Tl, get initial estimates of mean density, k0 , the R -factor, R0 and entering traffic, E0, using the values computed for the final sweep of the prior Tl. For each subsequent sweep, s > 1, calculate E == Li Pi Qi + S where Pi, Oi are the relevant turn from feeder link, i, and its total outflow (possibly metered) over this Tl; Sis the .total source flow (possibly metered) during the current Tl. Set iteration counter, n = 0, k = k0 , and E = E0 . 2. Calculate v (k) such that k ::::;; 130 using the analytical representations of the fundamental diagram. . . C 1 1 t. c . QmaxCTI) (G/ ) L.N * *h* *1 h *.... 1 b d d a cu a e ap = 3600 . *. C , m ve ic es, t is va ue may ere uce due to metering* Set R = 1.0 if G/c < 1 or ifk::::;; kc; Set R = 0.9 only if G/c = 1 and k > ke: . L Calculate queue length; Lb = Qb . | |||
* L . t 3. Calculate, ti = TI -v : If ti < 0 , setti = Ei = OE = 0 ; | |||
* Else; Ei ,;,,, E . | |||
* 4. | |||
* Then E2 = E-E1 ; . t2 = 1J -ti 5. If Qb then OQ =Cap,OM =OE =O | |||
* If.*** ti > o , then . .. *.*.* == Qb +Mb Cap | |||
* End if . *Calculate .Qe *and Me using Algorithm A 6 .. Else. {Qb < tap) OQ ='= Qti , *.* * . RCap = Cap -'-OQ 7. If Mb::::;; RCap ,then NMP/JAF C-10 Evacuatio.n Time Estimate . K_LD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
: 8. = Ei -OE If > 0 , then Calculate Qe , Me with Algorithm A Else Qe = 0 , Me = Ez . End if Else (t1 = O) OM = (v(TI)-Lb) Mb and OE = 0 | |||
* L-Lb Me = Mb -OM +E ; Qe = 0 End if 9. Else (Mb> RCap) OE= 0 If t1 > 0 , then OM= RCap, =Mb -OM+ E1 Calculate Qe and Me using Algorithm A 10. Else (t1 = O) End if Endif End if Md= Mb]. If Md > RCap, then *OM= RCap =Md -OM Apply Algorithm A to calculate Qe and Me | |||
* Else OM= Md Me= Mb -OM +E and Qe = 0 End if 11. Calculate a new estimate of average density, kn = + 2 km + keJ , 4 where kb =density at the beginning of the Tl ke = density at the end of the Tl km = density at the mid-point of the Tl . All values of density apply only to the moving vehicles. If lkn* "-kn"-il > E and n < N where N. = max number of iterations, and E is a convergence criterion, then C-11 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. February24, 2016. . NMP/JAF Time Estimate | |||
: 12. set n = n + 1 , and return to step 2 to perform iteration, n, using k = kn . End if Computation of unit problem is now complete. Check for excessive inflow causing spill back. 13. If Q +M > (L-W) LN then e e Lv , The number of excess vehicles that cause spill back is: SB = Qe + Me -(L-W) | |||
* LN , Lv where W is the width of the upstream intersection. To prevent spillback, meter the outflow from the feeder approaches and from the source flow, S, during this Tl by the amount, SB. That is, set SB M = 1 -(E + S) ;;:::: 0, where Mis the metering factor (over all movements). This metering factor is assigned appropriately to all feeder links and to the source flow, to be *applied during the next network sweep, discussed later. Algorithm A This analysis addresses the flow environment over a Tl during which moving vehicles can Q'e Qe v .I values ofl, Tl, v, E, t, Lv, LN, . When ti > 0 and Qb ::;; Cap: join a standing or discharging queue. For the case shown, Qb ::;; Cap, with ti > 0 and a queue of length, , *formed by that portion of Mb and E . that reaches the stop-bar within the Tl, but could not discharge due to inadequate capacity. That is, Qb +Mb+ Ei > Cap. This queue length, = Qb +Mb+ Ei '--Cap can be extended to Qe by traffic entering the approach during the current Tl, traveling at speed, v, and reaching the rear of the | |||
* queue within the Tl. A portion of the entering vehicles, E3 == E t3 , will likely join the queue. This . TI .. analysis calculates t3 , Qe and Me for the input . . . Define: = -.. From the sketch, L3 = v(TI -ti -t3) = L -+ E3)-* * -* LN LN Substituting E3 = ii E yields: +ii E = L -v(TI -ti},.... . Recognizing that the first t\No terms on the;! right hand side cancel, solve for t3 to obtain: NMP/JAF C-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Time Estimate February 24, 2016 .... | |||
such that 0 ::;; t3 ::;; TI -ti If the denominato.r, [v -:1 ::;; 0, set t3 = TI -ti . . t Then,Qe = +ET; , The complete Algorithm A considers all flow scenarios; space limitation precludes its inclusion, here. C.1.3 Lane Assignment The "unit problem" is solved for each turn movement on each link. Therefore it is necessary to calculate a value, LNx, of allocated lanes for each movement, x. If in fact all lanes are specified by, say, arrows painted on the pavement, either as full lanes or as lanes within a turn bay, then the problem is fully defined. If however there remain un-channelized lanes on a link, then an analysis is undertaken to subdivide the number of these physical lanes into turn movement specific virtual lanes, LNx. C.2 Implementation C.2.1 | |||
* Computational Procedure The computational procedure for this model is shown in the form of a flow diagram as Figure C-4. *As discussed earlier, the simulation .*model processes traffic flow for each link independently over Tl that the analyst specifies; it is usually 60 seconds or longer. The first step is to execute <rn,algorithm to define the sequence in which the network links are processed so that as many links as possible are processed after their feeder links are processed, within the same network sweep. Since a general network Will have many closed loops, it is not possible to guarantee that every link processed will have all of its feeder links processed earlier. The processing then continues as a succession of time steps of duration, Tl, until the simulation is completed. Within each time step, the processing performs a series of "sweeps" over all network links; this is necessary to ensure that the traffic flow is synchronous over the entire network. Specifically, the sweep ensures continuity of flow among all the network links; in the context of this model, this means that the values of E, M, and Sare all defined for each link such that they represent the synchronous movement of traffic from each link to all of its outbound links. These sweeps also serve to compute the metering rates that control spillback. Within each sweep, processing solves the "unit problem" for each turn movement on each link. With the turn movement percentages for each link provided by the DTRAD model, an algorithm NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate | |||
* C-13 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 | |||
,----1 allocates the number of lanes to each movement serviced on each link. The timing at a signal, if any, applied at the do'wnstream end of the link, is. expressed as a G/C ratio, the signal timing needed to define this ratio is an input requirement for the model. The model also has the capability of representing, With macroscopic fidelity, the actions of actuated signals responding to the time-varying competing demands on the approaches to the intersection. The solution of the unit problem yields the values of the number of vehicles, 0, that discharge from the link over the time interval and the number of vehicles that remain on the link at the end of the time interval as stratified by queued and moving vehicles: Qe and Me . The procedure considers each movement separately (multi-piping). After all network links are processed for a given network sweep, the updated consistent values of entering flows, E; metering rates, M; and source flows, S are defined so as to satisfy the "no Spillback" condition. The procedure then performs the unit problem solutions for all network links during the following sweep. Experience has shown thatthe system converges (i.e. the values of E, M and S "settle down" for all network links) in just two sweeps if the network is entirely under-saturated or in four sweeps in the presence of extensive congestion with link spillback. (The initial sweep over each link uses the final values of E and M, of the prior Tl). At the completion of the final sweep for a Tl, the procedure computes and ,stores all measures of effectiveness for each link and turn movement for output purposes. It then prepares for the following time interval by defining the values of Qb and Mb for the start of the next Tl as being those values of Qe and Me at the end of the prior Tl. In this manner, the simulation model processes the traffic flow over time until the end of the run. Note that there is. no space-discretization other than the specification of network links. . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate C-14 .. KLD Engineering, P.C. * . | |||
* February 24, 2016 Sequence Network Links 01--Next Time-step, ofduration, Tl B Next sweep; Define E, M, Sfor all Links Next Link Next Turn Movement, x Get lanes, LNx Service Rate, Sx; (G/Cx) Get inputs to Unit Problem: Qb ,Mb IE Solve Unit Problem: Qe, Me, 0 Last Movement? No Yes Last Link? No Yes Last Sweep? No Yes Cale., s.tore all Link, MOE Set up next Tl : Last Time -step ? No Yes. DONE C-4. Flow of Simulation.Processing (See Glossary: Table C-3) NMP/JAF *Evacuation Time Estimate .KLD Engineering, P.C. .*February 24, 2016 | |||
* C.2.2 Interfacing with Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTRAD) The DYNEV II system reflects NRC guidance that evacuees will seek to travel in a general direction away from the location of the hazardous event. Thus, an algorithm was developed to identify an appropriate set of destination nodes for each origin based on its location and on the expected direction of trayeL This algorithm also* supports the DTRAD model in dynamically varying the TripTable (0-D matrix) over time from one DTRAD session to the next. Figure B-1 depicts the .interaction of the simulation model with the DTRAD model in the DYNEV II system. As indicated, DYNEV II performs a succession of .DTRAD "sessions"; each such session computes the turn link percentages for each link that remain constant for the session duration, [T0 , T2] , specified by the analyst. The end product is the assignment of traffic volumes from each origin to paths connecting it with its destinations. in such a way as to minimize the network-wide cost function. The output of the DTRAD model is a set of updated link turn percentages which represent this assignment of traffic. As indicated in Figure B-1, the simulation model supports the DTRAD session by providing it with operational link MOE that are needed by the path choice model and included in the DTRAD cost function. These MOE represent the operatic:>nal state of the network at a time, Ti T2, which lies within the session duration, [T0, Tz] . This "burri time", Ti -T0, is selected by the analyst. For each DTRAD iteration, the simulation model computes the change in network operations over this burn time using the latest set of link turn percentages computed by the DTRAD model. Upon convergence of the DTRAD iterative procedure, the simulation mode.I accepts the latest turn percentages provided by the DTA model, returns to the origin time, T0 , and executes until it arrives at the end of the DTRAD session duration at time, T2. Atthis time the next DTA session is launched and the whole process repeats until the end of the DYNEV II run. Additional details presented in Appendix B. 'NMP/JAF *. c-i6 Evacuation Time Estimate *.* Engineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016. | |||
APPENDIX D Detailed Description of Study Procedure D. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF STUDY PROCEDURE This appendix describes the* activities that. were performed to compute Evacuation Time Estimates. The individual steps of this effort are represented as a flow diagram in Figure D-1. Each numbered step in the description that follows corresponds to the numbered element in. the flow diagram. Step 1 The first activity was to obtain EPZ boundary information and create a GIS base map. The base map extends beyond the Shadow Region which extends approximately 15 miles (radially) from the power pla.nt location. The base map incorporates the local roadway topology, a suitable topographic background and the EPZ boundary. Step 2 2010 Census block population and Census population growth (using 20141 population estimates published by the US Census) information was obtained in GIS format. This information was used to project the resident population within the EPZ and Shadow Region to the year 2015 and to define the spatial distribution and demographic characteristics of the population within the study area. In 2012, employee and transient data were obtained from local emergency management agencies and from phone calls to transient attractions. Information concerning schools, day camp, medical and other types of special facilities within the EPZ was obtained from county and municipal sources. | |||
* Step 3 A kickoff meeting was conducted, in 2012, with major stakeholders (state and local emergency managers, on-site and off-site utility emergency managers, local and state law enforcement agencies). The purpose of the kickoff meeting was to present an overview of the work effort, identify key agency personnel, and indicate the data requirements for the study. Specific requests for information were presented to local emergency managers. Unique features of the study a*rea were discussed to identify the local concerns that should be addressed by the ETE study. Step4 . In 2012, a physical survey of the roadway system in the study area was conducted to determine the geometric properties of the highway sections, the channelization of lanes on each section of roadway, whether there are any turn restrictions or special treatment of traffic at | |||
* intersections, the type and functioning of traffic control devices, gathering signal timings for pre-timed traffic signals, and to make the necessary observations needed to estimate realistic values of roadway capacity. 1 The annual population estimates prepared by the Census Bureau for the entire U.S. involves an extensive data gathering process. As such, population estimates are a year behind -2014 data are released in 2015. The schedule . for release of Censu,s data is provided*on the Census website: http://www.census.gov/popest/schedule.html NMP/JAF D-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 * .. _..J Step 5 The data from the 2012 telephone survey of households within the EPZ was used to identify household dynamics, trip generation characteristics, and evacuation-related demographic information of the EPZ population. This information was used to determine important study factors including the average number of evacuating vehicles used by each household, and the time required to perform pre-evacuation mobilization activities. Step 6 A computerized representation of the physical roadway system, called a link-node analysis network, was developed using the UNITES software (see Section 1.3) developed by KLD. Once the geometry of the network was completed, the network was calibrated using the information gathered during the 2012 road survey (Step 4). Estimates of highway capacity for each link and other link-specific characteristics were introduced to the network description. Traffic signal timings were input accordingly. The link,-node analysis network was imported into a GIS map. 2010 Census. data (extrapolated to 2015 using annual growth rates based on 2014 Census population estimates) were overlaid in the map, and origin centroids where trips would be generated during the evacuation process were assigned to appropriate links. Step 7 The EPZ is subdivided into 29 ERPAs. Based on wind direction and speed, Regions (groupings of ERPAs) that may be advised to evacuate, were developed. The need for evacuation can occur over a range of .seasonal and weather-related conditions. Scenarios were developed to capture the variation in evac*uation demand, highway capacity and mobilization time, for different time of day, day of the week, | |||
* time of year, and weather conditions. . . . . . . The input stre.am fort.he DYNEV II model, which integrates the dynamic traffic assignment and distribution model, DTRAD; with the evacuation simulation model; was created for a prototype evacuation case--. the evacuation .entire EPZ for a representative scenario. . *step 9 After creating this input syeam; *the DYNEV II System was executed on the prototype to compute evacuatir:ig*traffic routing patterns consistent with the appropriate NRC guidelines. DYNEV II contains an extensive* *suite of data* diagnostics. which check the completeness and consistency o(the input data specified. The analyst reviews all warning and error produced by the model. and then corrects the database to create an input stream that properly executes to completion. . . . . . The IT1odel. assigns destinations .to . all origin . centroids consistent with a (general) radial evacuation of.the .EPZ and Shadow* Region. The analyst may optionally supplement and/or **replace the.se model-'assigned destinations, based on professional judgment, after studying the topology of the **analysis highway. The model produces. link and network-wide measures of effectiveness as well as estimates of evacuation time. . .. . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate D-2. KlD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 Step 10 The .results generated by the prototype evacuation case are critically examined. The examination includes observing the animated graphics (using the EVAN software which operates on data produced by DYNEV II) and reviewing the statistics output by the model. This . is a labor-intensive activity, requiring the direct participation of skilled engineers who possess the necessary practical experience to interpret the results. and to determine the causes of any problems reflected in the results. Essentially, the approach is to identify those bottlenecks in the network that represent locations where congested conditions are pronounced arid to identify the cause of this congestion. This cause can take many forms, either as excess demand due to high rates of trip generation, improper routing, a shortfall of capacity, or as a quantitative flaw in the way the physical system Was represented in the input stream. This examination leads to one of two conclusions: * | |||
* The results are satisfactory; or | |||
* The input stream must be modified accordingly. This decision requires, of course, the application of the user's judgment and experience based upon the results obtained in previous applications of the model and a comparison of the results of the latest prototype evacuation case iteration with the previous ones. If the results are satisfactory in the opinion of the user, then the process continues with Step 13. Otherwise, proceed to Step 11. Step 11 There are* many "treatments" available to the. user in resolving apparent problems. These treatments range from decisions to reroute the traffic by assigning additional evacuation destinations for one or more sources, imposing tum restrictions where they can produce significant improvements in capacity, changing the control treatment at critical intersections so . as to provide improved service for one or more* movements, or in prescribing specific treatments for channelizing the flow so cis to expedite the movement of traffic along major roadway systems. Such "treatm'ents" take the form of modifications to the original prototype 'evacuation case input Alltreatments are designed to improve the representation of evacuation behavfor. -Step 12 * | |||
* As noted above, the changes to the input :stream must be implemented to reflect the modifications undertaken in Step 11. At the com'pletion of this activity, the process returns to Step 9 where the DYNEV II System is again executed .. | |||
* Step 13 Evacuation of transit-dependent evacuees and special facilities are included in the evacuation analysis: Fixed *ro_uting for transit buses andfor school/day camp buses, ambulances, and other *transit vehicles are introduced into the final prototype evacuation case data set. DYNEV II generates route-specific speeds over time for use in the. estimation of evacuation times for the ' | |||
* NMP/JAF _. Evacuation Time Estimate D-3 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 241 2016 transit dependent and special facility population groups; Step 14 The prototype evacuation case is used as the basis for generating all region and specific evacuation cases to be simulated. This process was automated through the UNITES 'user interface. For each specific case, the population to be evacuated, the trip generation distributions, the highway capacity and speeds, and other factors are adjusted to produce a customized case-specific data set. Step 15 All evacuation cases are executed using the DYNEV II System to compute ETE. Once results are available, quality control procedures are used to assure the results are consistent, dynamic routing is reasonable, and traffic congestion/bottlenecks are addressed properly. Step 16 Once vehicular evacuation results are accepted, average travel speeds for transit and special facility routes are used to compute evacuation time estimates for transit-dependent permanent residents, schools, day hospitals, and other special facilities. Step 17 The simulation results are analyzed, tabulated and graphed. The results arethen documented, as required by NUREG/CR-7002. Step 18. Following the completion bf documentation activities, the ETE criteria checklist (see Appendix N) is completed. An appropriate report reference is provided for each criterion provided in the checklist. ' NMP/JAF . . . KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24,2016 Step 1 Create GIS Base Map Step 2_ Gather Census Block and Demographic Data for Study Area. Project population to 201S. Step 3 Conduct Kickoff Meeting with Stakeholders Step4 Field Survey of Roadways within Study Area Step 5 Analyze Telephone Survey and Develop Trip Generation Characteristics Step 6 Create and Calibrate Link-Node Analysis Network Step7 | |||
* Develop Evacuation Regions and Scenarios Step 8 Create and Debug DYNEV II Input Stream Step9 Execute DYNEV II for Prototype Evacuation Case Ste 10 Examine Prototype Evacuation Case using EVAN and DYNEV II Output Results Satisfactory Step 11 Modify Evacuation Destinations and/or Develop Traffic Control Treatments Step 12 Modify Database to Reflect Changes to Prototype Evacuation Case Step 13 Establish Transit and Special Facility Evacuation Routes and Update DYNEV II Database Step 14 Generate DYNEV II Input Streams, for All Evacuation Cases Step 15 Execute DYNEV II to Compute ETE for All Evacuation Cases Step 16 Use DYNEV II Average Speed Output to Compute ETE for Transit and Special Facilicy Routes. . Step 17 Documentation* __ Step 18 Complete ETE Criteria Checklist .Figure D-1. Flow Diagram of Activities NMP/JAF D-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _ | |||
APPENDIX E Special Facility Data E. SPECIAL FACILITY DATA Based on conversations with Exelon and Entergy, the database of facility data from May 2012 was maintained. The name of Oswego County BOCES and the Holiday Inn Express in Oswego, scheduled to open in mid-2016, have been updated. The following tables list population information for special fadlities, transient attractions, recreational areas, and major employers that are located within the NMP/JAF EPZ. Special facilities are defined as schools, preschools, day camps, hospitals, other medical care facilities, and correctional facilities. Transient population data is included in the tables for recreati0nal areas and lodging facilities. Employment data is included in the tables for major employers .. The location of the fac:ility is defined by its straight-line distance (miles) and direction (magnetic bearing) from the center point of NMP/JAF. Maps of each school, preschools, day camp, medical facility, correctional facility, recreational area, lodging facility, and major employer are also provided . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate E-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 | |||
.. Table E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ Distance ERPA (miles) Direction School Name Street Address Municipality Phone Enrollment Staff 1 1.1' WSW Ontario Bible Conference1 385 Lakeview Rd Oswego (315) 343-6111 91 12 4 5.2 ESE .*.New Haven Elementary School 4320SR104 New Haven (315) 963-8400 238 45 10 4.0 SSW. School Age Children Care Program 5495 SR 104E-Oswego (315) 342-6919 33 4 12 6.7 . SW Charles E. Riley Elementary 268 E 8th St Oswego (315) 341-2980 497 75 12 6.2 SW Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 195 E Bridge St Oswego (315) 341-2940 416 70 12 6.4 SW Headstart of Oswego 43 E Schuyler St Oswego (315) 342-0629 80 11 12 6.7 . SW Little Luke's Childcare Center 10 Burkle St Oswego (315) 342-4600 100 35 12 5.6 SW Oswego Community Christian School 400 E Albany St Oswego (315) 342-9322 76 20 12 6.5 SW Trinity Catholic School 115 E 5th St Oswego (315) 343-6700 173 30 13 8.0 SW Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 131 Sheldon Hall Oswego (315) 342-9322 100 16 13 7.7 **SW Frederick Leighton Elementary School .* 1 Buccaneer Blvd Oswego (315) 341-2970 485 80 .13 7.3 SW | |||
* Kingsford Park Elementary 275 W 5th St Oswego (315) 341-2950 381 60 13. 7.6 SW Oswego High School 2 Buccaneer Blvd Oswego (315) 341-2920 1,281 150 13 7.9 SW *Oswego Middle School 100 Mark Fitzgibbons Dr Oswego (315) 341-2930 597 80 13 7.0 SW . Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 249W1st St Oswego (315) 343-1981 60 5 16 9.5** ESE Mexico Elementary School 26 Academy St Mexico (315) 963-8400 358 65 16 9.7 ESE Mexico High School 3338 Main St Mexico. (315) 963-8400 700 108 .16 9.0 ESE: Mexico Middle School 16 Fravor Rd Mexico (315) 963-8400 701 115 *Center for Instructional Technology and 17 ESE Innovation (Oswego County BOCES)2 176 CR 64 Oswego (315) 963-4481 446 100 21 9.4 SSW Minetto Elementary School 2411CR8 Minetto (315) 341-2960 367 78 22 8.0 . SW SUNY Oswego 7060SR104 Oswego (315) 312-2500 8,3003 1,721 S.R. 12.5 SSE Palermo Elementary School4 1638 CR 45 Fulton (315) 963-8400 255 60 . s:;>7. .. ... "*' 'll'.'" ***\'* i . * '. ** ***. .;,;\?:;;,;::' c,;",;0* ;Jtf:;*:'.'': .J ':.: '*'-''"'>':' . ****** ******:::\;*::ir>:n0; ' ' , , >)"""','N.V*\,*';, :15;.1735 ,,,,,, *,:,llH", *i *' ... .. ' . **** *i.1;r> *...* ': h' y .*. El>i TOTAL; '2,940 ** *.'*'* . . .. 1 According to Oswego County officials, Ontario Bible Conference, included in this table, is a summer camp program for which they need transportation assistance. The rest of the year, the camp is open to retreats for family events for which they can furnish their own transportation. 2 Oswego County BOCES is now known as the Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Citi). 3 All SUNY Oswego students including commuter students listed in Table E-4 . . 4 Palermo Elementary School is located in the Shadow Regi_on, but will be evacuated according to Oswego County Emergency Plans. NMP/JA.F E-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 .. | |||
Table E-2. Medical Facilities within the EPZ Ambula-Wheel-Bed-Distance Di rec-Ca pa-Current tory chair ridden ERPA (miles) ti on Facility Name Street Address _ Municipality Phone city Census Patients Patients Patients Bishop Commons at St .. 12 SW Luke's 4 Burkle St Oswego (315) 349-0798 68 68 66 2 0 12 6.7 SW Ladies Home of Oswego 43 E Utica St .Oswego (315) 343-6951 21 15 15 0 0 Oswego Hospital Behavioral ** 12 6.4 SW Health Services 74 Bunner St Oswego (315) 326-4100 28 17 15 2 0 12 6.8 SW Pontiac Nursing Home 303 E River Rd *Oswego (315) 343-1800 80 80 25 55 0 12 6.8 SW Simeon-Dewitt Apts. . 150 E 1st St Oswego (315) 343-0440 150 150 150 0 0 . 12 6.8 SW St Luke Health Services 299 E River Rd Oswego (315) 342-3166 200 192 57 115 20 12 6.7 SW Valehaven Home for Adults 24 E Oneida St Oswego (315) 342-3959 35 28 28 0 0 13 8.0 -SW Morning Star Nursing Home 17 Sunrise Dr Oswego (315) 342-4790 120 117 17 96 4 .13 7.2 SW Oswego Hospital* 110 w 6th St Oswego (315) 349-5526 100. 65 55 7 3 13 6.9 SW Pontiac Terrace Apts *225w1st st Oswego {315) 342c110l | |||
* 80 80 72 8 0 .15: 8.9 . ESE Fravor Rd IRA 43 Fravor Rd Mexico (315) 963-3995 10 9 7 2 0 16 9.7 ESE Parkview Manor Apts 3313 Main St Mexico (315) 343-3167 24 24 23 1 0 17 ESE . Sabill Drive IRA 9 Sabill Dr Mexico (315) 963-8529 6 6 5 1 0 20 8.9 SSW Springside at Seneca Hill 10 CR45A Oswego . (315) 343-5658 75 75 . 74 1 0 20 9.0 SSW The Manor at Seneca Hill 20 Manor Dr Oswego (315) 349-5300 120 116 0 116 0 ... 21 SSW 12 Schu ler St Oswego (315) 343-2513 38 | |||
* 9.1 Minetto Senior Housing 38 . 37 1 0 . " ... .. 1 *:.t 4n:,j'""" ... .*. t:* . TOTltll:* . .. | |||
* NMP/JAF E-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time.Estimate February 24, 2016 Table E-3. Major Employers within the EPZ Distance Di rec-Employees % Non-Employees ERPA (miles) ti on Facility Name Street Address Municipality Phone (max shift) EPZ (Non EPZ) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear 1 0.0 N/A Power Plant 268Lake Rd Oswego (315) 342-3840 450 57% 257 1 . 0.0. N/A *Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Lake Rd Oswego (315) 343-2i10 724 60% 434 6 3,1 SW Novelis Corporation 448CR1A Oswego (315) 342:0039 454 35% 159 (> 4.3 SW Oswego Wire Inc. 1Wire Dr Oswego (315) 343-0524 65 52% 34 12 SW Greatlakes Veneer 375 Mitchell St Oswego (315) 342-9178 47 52% 24 . 12 5.2 SW *Lowe's Home Improvement 445.SR 104 Oswego (315) 326-5030 77 52% 40 12 6.8 SW St Luke Health Services 299 E River Rd Oswego (315) 349-0700 131 52% 68 12 5.6 SW Walmart 341SR104 Oswego (315) 342-6210 . 70 10% 7 13 7.6 SW Oswego Harbor Power LLC . 261 Washington Blvd Oswego (315) 349-2200 53 52% 28 13 8.0 SW Sunrise Residential Healthcare 17 Sunrise Dr Oswego (315) 342-4790 88 52% 46 22 8.2 SW Eagle Co Inc. 1043 CR 25 Oswego (315) 343-9464 54 52% 28 22 8.3 SW SUNY Oswego 7060SR104 Oswego (315) 312-2500 1,132 52% 589 ; ' *< ' ,, EPZ TOT AL:. 3,345 1,714 ' .. , *. "** *, , *,' ;; ... ' ' ' ' ..... * -'C:'. ""' NMP/JAF E-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016. | |||
Table E-4. Recreational Attractions and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ 4 4.4 E Catfish Creek Fishing Camps Campground 118 Chase Drive New Haven (315) 963-7310 68 24 4 4.4 E Catfish Creek Fishing Camps Mari.na Marina 118 Chase Drive New Haven (315) 963-7310 22 18 6 3.2 SW K & G Lodge Campground 1881CR1 Oswego (315) 343-8171 242 69 '6 3.8 SW Tamarak Golf Club Golf 2021CR1 Oswego (315) 315-3426 24 16 7 6.8 E Dowie Dale Campground Campground Dowie Dale Beach Rd Mexico (315) 963-7895 670 272 7 6.8 E Dowie Dale Marina Marina Dowie Dale Beach Rd Mexico (315) 963-7895 74 62 12 6.6 SW Oswego Marina Marina 3 Basin Street Oswego (315) 342"0436 71 59 12 5.8 SW Oswego Speedway Race Track 300 E Albany St. Oswego (315) 343-3829 2,440 1,021 13 7.2 SW Oswego Country Club Golf 610 W 1st Street Oswego (315) 343-4664 35 23 13 6.9 SW Oswego International Marina Marina 19 Lake Street Oswego (315) 343-0086 84 70 13 6.9 SW Wright's Landing Marina Marina Lake Street Oswego (315) 342-8186 191 160 14 10.9 E Bears Sleepy Hollow State Park Campground 7065 SR 3 Pulaski (315) 298-5560 121 43 14 10.3 E Chedmardo Campsite Campground 110 Patrick Dr Pulaski (315) 298-5739 188 75 14 10.9 E Selkirk Shores State Park Campground 7101SR3 Pulaski (315) 298-5737 34 11 15 7.7 E Mexico Point State Boat Launch Marina 245 CR 40 Mexico (315) 963-3656 66 55 15 8.0 E Mike's Marina Sales & Service Marina 266 SR 1048 Mexico (315) 963-3119 131 110 15 8.0 E Mike's Marina Sales & Service Campground 266 SR .1048 Mexico (315) 963-3119 10 3 Salmon Country Inc. Marina & 58 Mexico Point Dr 15 7.8 E Campground Campground West Mexico (315) 963-8049 102 36 Salmon Country Inc. Marina & 58 Mexico Point Dr 15 7.8 E Campground Marina West Mexico (315) 963-8049 109 91 15 7.6 E Yellow Rose Campground Campground 159 Ladd Rd Mexico (315) 963-2060 38 15 15 8.1 ESE Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Campground 601CR16 Mexico (315) 963-7096 300 105 15 8.0 ESE Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Marina 601CR16 Mexico (315) 963-7096 22 18 22 8.0 SW SUNY Oswego5 Commuter College 7060SR104 Oswego (315) 312-2500 2,349 2,155 . >er. ,, r "'.;rY:,,r r'Lr '. ... **. 11*:*:1;:., : *: .I, ' ,; .; ;llf"' 6?1* " r" .. r* EPZ TOTAL: , i \i"' <;,\'., ,"'" ., '7,391 4,511 5 See Section 3.1.1 for details on SUNY Oswego. NMP/JAF E-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
. Table E-5. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ Distance Di rec-ERPA ' (miles) ti on Facility Name Street Address Municipality Phone Transients Vehicles 5 3.9 s All Seasons Motel 5422SR104 Oswego (315) 342-9771 54 21 7 5.2 *. ESE ,* Sticks Sports Bar/Grill and Motel | |||
* 3738 CR 6 New Haven (315) 963-3084 40 20 10 3.6 SSE Evergreen Motel 5047 SR 104 Oswego (315) 343-6880 32 24 12 6.7 SW Best Western Captain's Quarters | |||
* 26 E 1st St Oswego (315) 342-4040 200 109 12 5.9 SW Holiday Inn' Express6 E 13th St & SR 104E . Oswego N/A 180 88 ,' 12 5.9 SW Knights Inn 101SR104E Oswego (315) 343-3136 135 44 12 6.2 SW Oswego Inn 180 ElOth St Oswego (315) 342-6200 30 13 12 6.7 SW Quality Inn and Suites 70E1st St Oswego (315) 343-1600 200 92 13 . SW Beacon Hotel 75 W Bridge St Oswego (315) 343-3300 42 14 13 8.0 ' SW The Thomas Inn 309 W Seneca St Oswego (315) 343-4900 100 71 ' 14 . '11.3 ENE **Port Lodge Motel 7351 SR3 Pulaski (315) 298-6876 91 45 .. . * .*.,r* *::z;L;,.,v: .* ;::r1.*;:*' .' * . : *.* *:' ',;'' . . .. ... ,, . .. .. . .. :;*. * . ... . .. .;,** 'i:*** . *' ... " . f"'', ',<<1ke'h!:;jfa1:11)-m@!Jti>''ht ""''i"11l4 ,, '"f"'i!!''" ,7 :<< ''t .. . ''0* EPZTOTAL: .541 ... " *. . .... . .... . ... *. ....... ... I , . . N/A =Not Available Table E-6. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ ** EPZ.TOJAL: 6 See Section 3.3 for details on the Holiday Inn Express, opening in mid-2016. NMP/JAF E-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate Februa,.Y 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Schools and Preschools within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ 0 28 ''"'-."' 29 2 <'.: 7 \ See Figure E-2 Legend NMP/JAF ,! School Mexico Hgh School Preschool/Day Camp 9 Mexico Berrentary School 10 Mexico Mddle School ' -_ ,1 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings 11 New Haven Berrentary School t:;J ERPA 12 Palermo Berrentary School 38 School Age Oiildren Care Program 105 Ontario Bible Conference Shadow Region 168 Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Figure E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ E-7 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Schools within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ i.<Jk') Ontar;o 28 \ ii < ** , i l Rd : \ 22 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF (El Pre-School ! School I'_ 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings 0 ERPA Shadow Region "*, ,Copyright: ESRI / , ', Energy,-1Entergy \ 6 5 10 A 12 63 (El Map No. | |||
* Facility Name 1 Oswego High School (.'\,, 2 Oswego Mddle School r , 4 Fitzhugh Park 8errentary School \i\1 ': 6 Kingsford Park 8errentary __ 13 OswegoCommunrty Christian School 53 Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 63 Little Luke's Childcare Center 14 7 Charles E Riley 8errentary 148 Frederick Leighton 8errentary School 152 Trinity Catholic School 155 Heads tart of Oswego 157 Oswego YMCA School's Out A-ogram 165 SUNY Oswego Io 2 I . *****====********-Miles Figure E-2. Schools and Preschools within the City of Oswego NMP/JAF E-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Medical Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ Map No.* Facility Name 16 Os w ego Hospital 132 Bishop Commons at St Luke's 133 Fravor Rd IRA 134 Ladies Horre of Oswego 135 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services 136 R:mtiac Terrace Apts '""*"'\ 29 137 SabiU Drive IRA I 138 The Manor at Seneca HU / 27 \. 139 Sirreon-Dewitt Apts. 26 <{ $"' 140 St Luke Health Services "' 141 Morning Star Nursing Horre 142 Valehaven 1-brre for Adults 143 Fbntiac Nursing Horre 144 Springside at Seneca HU 145 Parkview Manor Apts \ \ Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF r:J Hospital | |||
* Medical Facility (' -_ .) 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings GJ ERPA Shadow Region Figure E-3. Medical Facilities within the EPZ NMP/JAF E-9 Evacuation Time Estimate /( Pm:ish 135 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
* NMP/JAF -illiit Major Employer I' -_ ./ 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings GJ ERPA Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 127 Low e's Herre lrrproverrent 166 i Nine Mle Fbint Nuclear Station 167 i Novelis O:>rporation 10 ******c====:::i************Miles Figure E-4. Major Employers within the EPZ E-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 5 Recreational Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ 17 Salrron Country Inc. Marina & Carrpground s 18 IVexico A>int State Boat Launch 20 Oswego International Marina 22 Wright's Landing Marina 23 Salrron Country Inc. Marina & Carrpground 24 Oswego Marina 79 Oswego Speedway 85 Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park 87 Catfish 0-eek Fishing Carrps 88 I Catfish Oeek Fishing Carrps Marina 93 ())w ie O.ie Carrpground 94 ())w ie O.ie Marina 96 Mkes Marina Sales & Service 97 Mke's Marina Sales & Service 98 Selkirk Shores State Park 100 Yellow Rose Carrpground 101 Bears Sleepy 1-bllow State Park 102 Oiedrrardo Carrpsite 103 K & G Lodge 165 SUNY Oswego 169 Oswego Country Oub 170 I Tarrarak Golf Oub Legend * ' ,. L ( -.. __. 0 NMP/JAf Campground Golf Marina Speedway School 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings ERPA Shadow Region r 3' , />*: ' , ' , ' .,_.., r-"_,, ,, ; ' Due 9/7/2013_ , S,,opyn1ht: ESR,I OaQ .J .. KlD,En1ineeri,ng, Entergy Lake On:/ " I ( \ ., 10 ******=====:::11***********Miles Figure E-5. Recreational Facilities and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ NMP/JAF E-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Lodging Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & NMP/JAF / I v \ NMP/JAF Lodging I'_ -,I 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings 0 ERPA Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate 28 !Ai\eS Y'o' 26 La Onta I ,, ., .. f ( \ "' .. . ,*7 \ 1/25/2016 y 1 I )' or-J | |||
* COPYl"ighr: ESRI BHem1p Dita / KLD E11elon Entergy 29 Figure E-6. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ E-12 29 30 31 32 80 81 84 90 171 Oswego Inn Beacon Hotel Best Western Captain's Quarters All Seasons Motel The Thorres Inn Knights Inn Quality Inn and Suites E/ergreen Motel R>rt Lodge Motel Sticks Sports Bar/Grin and Motel ft>liday Inn Express 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Correctional Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ NMP/JAF Correctional Facility I' -_ ,1 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings ERPA Shadow Region ' ' /' Figure E-7. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ NMP/JAF E-13 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIX F Telephone Survey F. TELEPHONE SURVEY F;1 Introduction The development of evacuation time estimates for the NMP/JAF EPZ requires the identification of travel patterns, car ownership and household size of th.e population within the EPZ. | |||
* Demographic information can be obtained from Census data. The use of this data has several limitations when applied to emergency planning. First, the Census data does not encompass the range of information needed to identify the time required for preliminary activities (mobilization) that must be undertaken prior to evacuating the area. Secondly, Census data does not contain attitudinal responses needed from the population of the EPZ and consequently may not accurately represent the anticipated behavioral characteristics of the evacuating populace. These concerns are addressed by conducting a telephone survey of a representative sample of the EPZ population. The survey is designed to elicit information from the public concerning family demographics and estimates of response times to well defined events. The design of the survey includes a limited number of questions of the form"What would you do if ... ?" and other questions regarding activities with which the respondent is familiar ("How long does it take you to ... ?") NMP/JAP F-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 F.2 Survey Instrument and Sampling Plan Attachment A presents the final survey instrument used in this study. Following the completion of the instrument, a sampling plan was developed. A sample size of approximately 500 completed survey forms yields results with a sampling error of +/-4.5% at the 95% confidence level. The sample must be drawn from the EPZ population. Consequently, a list of zip codes in the EPZ was developed using GIS software. This list is shown in Table F-1. Along with each zip code, an estimate of the population and number of households in each area was determined by overlaying Census data and the EPZ boundary, again using GIS software. The proportional number of desired completed survey interviews for each area was identified, as shown in Table F-1. Note that the average household size computed in Table F-1 was an estimate for sampling purposes and was not used in the ETE study. The completed survey adhered to the sampling plan. The survey discussed herein was performed in 2012 for the Development of Evacuation Time Estimates Technical Report -KLD TR -521, dated November 2012 . .The EPZ population has decreased by about 1.11 percent (an estimated 464 people) between 2012, when the survey was conducted, and 2015. As such, demographics within the EPZ have not significantly changed since 2012 and consequently, the use of the 2012 telephone results can be justified on this basis. Table F-1. NMP/JAF Telephone Survey Sampling Plan Population within Required Zip Code .EPZ (2010) Househalds Sample 13036 84 36 1 13069. 1,640 621 20 13114 5;465 2,096 68 *13126 *34,515 . 12,620 408 13142 183 78 3 Average Household Size: 2.52 Total Sample Required: 500 The preliminary .determination of Whether a household was 16cated insi9e the EPZ was based on telephone listings with street Telephone surveys were then conducted using those numbers, seleded in random order; until the target level of surveys was completed, or the entire calling list was exhausted. or households outside the EPZ . were discarded; _Numbers with "no ahswer" were re-cycled up to ten attempts in different | |||
* time windows . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time E_stimate F KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 F.3 Survey Results The results of the survey fall into two categories. First, the household demographics of the area can be identified. Demographic information includes such factors as household size, automobile ownership, and automobile availability. The distributions of the time to perform certain evacuation activities are the second category of survey results. These data are processed to develop the trip generation distributions used in the evacuation modeling effort, as discussed in Section 5. A review of the survey instrument reveals that several questions have a "don't know" (DK) or "refused" entry for a response. It is accepted practice in conducting surveys of this type to accept the answers of a respondent who offers a DK response for a few questions or who refuses to answer a few questions. To address the issue of occasional DK/refused responses from a large sample, the practice is to assume that the distribution of these responses is the same as the underlying distribution of the positive responses. In effect, the DK/refused responses are ignored and the distributions are based upon the positive data that is acquired. F.3.1 Household Demographic Results Household Size Figure F-1 presents the distribution of household size within the EPZ. The average household contains 2.39 people. The estimated household size (2.52 persons) used to determine the survey sample (Table F-1) was drawn from 2010 Census data. The close agreement between the average household size obtained from the survey and from the Census is an indication of the reliability of the survey. NMP/JAF 50% Ill 40% ..c Cl) g 30% :I: . -. 2 20% c Cl) u 10% c.. 0% Evacuation Time Estimate 1 Household Size 2 3 People 4 Figure F-1. Household Size in the EPZ F-3 5+ KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 --------------------------- | |||
Automobile Ownership The average number of automobiles available per household in the EPZ is 1.81. It should be noted that approximately 6.6 percent of households do not have access t9 an automobile. The distribution of automobile ownership is presented in Figure F-2. Figure F-3 and Figure F-4 present the automobile availability by household size. Note that the majority of households without access to a car are single person households. As expected, nearly all households of 2 or more people have access to at least one vehicle. . NMP/JAF 50% "' ::!:! 40% 0 .c Qj 30% 0 J: -2 20% c Qj u Qi 10% c.. 0% Evacuation Time Estimate 0 Vehicle Availability 1 2 Vehicles 3 Figure F-2. Household Vehicle Availability F-4 4+ KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF "' "1::J 100% 0 80% ..c Cll "' 5 60% :J: -0 40% .... c Cll 20% Cll Cl. "' "1::J 0 ..c Cll "' :::J 0 :J: -0 .... c Cll u ... Cll Cl. 0% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Evacuation Time Estimate Distribution of Vehicles by HH Size 1-5 Person Households | |||
* 1 Person | |||
* 2 People | |||
* 3 People | |||
* 4 People | |||
* 5 People 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Vehicles Figure F-3. Vehicle Availability -1 to 5 Person Households Distribution of Vehicles by HH Size 6-9+ Person Households | |||
* 6 People | |||
* 7 People 8 People | |||
* 9+ People 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Vehicles Figure F-4. Vehicle Availability -6 to 9+ Person Households F-5 9+ 9+ KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Ridesharing 89% of the households surveyed who do not own a vehicle responded that they would share a ride with a neighbor, relative, or friend if a car was not available to them when advised to evacuate in the event of an emergency. Note, however, that only those households with no access to a vehicle or refused to answer the question regarding vehicle availability -28 total responses were gathered out of the sample size of 500 -answered this question. Thus, the results are not statistically significant. As such, the NRC recommendation of 50% ridesharing is used throughout this study. Figure F-5 presents this response. Rideshare with Neighbor/Friend 100% "' 80% "C 0 ..c Cl.I "' 60% :::J 0 ::c .... 0 40% .... c Cl.I u ... Cl.I c.. 20% 0% Yes No Figure F-5. Household Ridesharing Preference NMP/JAF F-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Commuters Figure F-6 presents the distribution of the number of commuters in each household. Commuters are defined as household members who travel to work or college on a daily basis. The data shows an average of 0.98 commuters in each household in the EPZ, and 56% of households have at least one commuter. NMP/JAF 50% 40% Ci ..c QJ 30% 0 ::c: .... 20% c QJ u .... :. 10% 0% Evacuation Time Estimate Commuters Per Household 0 1 2 3 4+ Commuters Figure F-6. Commuters in Households in the EPZ F-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Commuter Travel Modes Figure F-7 presents the mode of travel that commuters use on a daily basis. The vast majority of commuters use their private automobiles to travel to work. The data shows an average of 1.09 employees per vehicle, assuming 2 people per vehicle -on average -for carpools. Commuter Evacuation Response 100% 80% "' ... Cll .. :J 60% E E 0 u .... 0 40% .. c Cll u ... Cll . c.. 20% 0% Bus Walk/Bike Drive Alone Carpool (2+) Figure F-7. Modes of Travel in the EPZ F.3.2 Evacuation Response Several questions were asked to gauge the population's response to an emergency. These are now discussed: "How many of the vehicles would your household use during an evacuation?" The response is shown in Figure F-8. On average, evacuating households would use 1.24 vehicles. "Would your family await the return of other family members prior to evacuating the area?" Of the survey participants who responded, 45 percent said they would await the return of other family members before evacuating and 55 percent indicated that they would not await the return of other family members. "If you had a household pet, would you take your pet with you if you were asked to evacuate the area?" Based on the responsesfrom the survey, 77 percent of households do have a family pet. Of the households with pets, 94 percent of them indicated that they would take their pets, as shown in Figure F-9. NMP/JAF F-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Evacuating Vehicles Per Household 100% 80% Ill "ti 0 .c* Cl.I 60% Ill :I 0 ::c .... 40% 0 .... c Cl.I u .... Cl.I 20% a.. 0% 0 1 2 3+ Vehicles Figure F-8. Evacuating Vehicles per Household Households Evacuating with Pets 100% Ill 80% "ti 0 .c Cl.I Ill 60% :I 0 ::c .... 0 40% .... c Cl.I u ... Cl.I 20% a.. 0% Yes No Figure F-9. Households Evacuating with Pets . NMP/JAF F-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016. | |||
. "Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home in an emergency. Would you?" This question is designed to elicit information regarding compliance with instructions to shelter in place. The results indicate that 79 percent of households who are advised to shelter in place would do so; the remaining 21 percent would choose to evacuate the area. Note.the baseline ETE study assumes 20 percent of households will not comply with the shelter advisory, as per Section 2.5.2 of NUREG/CR-7002. Thus, the data obtained above is in good agreement with the federal guidance. "Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home now in an emergency and possibly evacuate later while people in other areas are advised to evacuate now. Would you?" This question is designed to elicit information specifically related to the possibility of a staged evacuation. That is, asking a population to shelter in place now and then to evacuate after a specified period of time. Results indicate that 70 percent of households would follow instructions and delay the start of evacuation until so advised, while the balance of 30 percent would choose to begin evacuating immediately. F.3.3 Time Distribution Results The survey asked several questions about the amount of time it takes to perform certain evacuation activities. These activities involve actions taken by residents during the course of . their day-to-day lives. Thus, the answers fall withiri the realni of the responder's experience. The mobilization distributions provided below are the result of having applied the analysis described in Section 5.4.1 on the component activities.of the mobilization. l\JMP/JAF F-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Eyacuation Time Estimate February 24, | |||
---------------------------------------------------"How long does it take the commuter to complete preparation for leaving work?" Figure F-10 presents the cumulative distribution; in all cases, the activity is completed by about 60 minutes. 85 percent can leave within 20 minutes. Time to Prepare to Leave Work 100% .,, .... 80% aJ .... ::i E E 60% 0 u -0 40% .... c aJ u .... 20% aJ Cl. 0% 0 10 20 30 40 so 60 Preparation Time (min) Figure F-10. Time Required to Prepare to Leave Work/School "How long would it take the commuter to travel home?" Figure F-11 presents the work to home travel time for the EPZ. About 90 percent of commuters can arrive home within about 40 minutes of leaving work; all within 90 minutes. Work to Home Travel 100% .,, .... 80% aJ .... ::i E E 60% 0 u -0 40% .... c aJ u .... 20% aJ Cl. 0% 0 20 40 60 80 Travel Time (min) Figure F-11. Work to Home Travel Time NMP/JAF F-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 "How long would it take the family to pack clothing, secure the house, and load the car?" Figure F-12 presents the time required to prepare for leaving on an evacuation trip. In many ways this activity mimics a family's preparation for a short holiday or weekend away from home. Hence, the responses represent the experience of the responder in performing similar activities. The distribution shown in Figure F-12 has a long "tail." About 90 percent of households can be ready to leave home within 60 minutes; the remaining households require up to an additional 75 minutes. Preparation Time with Everyone Home 100% .,, :E 80% 0 .s::. QI .,, 60% :J 0 ::c ..... 0 40% .... c QI u .. 20% QI Cl.. 0% 0 30 60 90 120 Preparation Time (min) Figure F-12. Time to Prepare Home for Evacuation NMP/JAF F-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I J "How long would it take you to clear 6 to 8 inches of snow from your driveway?" During adverse, snowy weather conditions, an additional activity must be performed before residents can depart on the evacuation trip. Although snow scenarios assume that the roads and highways. have been plowed and are passable (albeit at lower speeds and capacities), it may be necessary to clear a private driveway prior to leaving the home so that the vehicle can access the street. Figure F-13 presents the time distribution for removing 6 to 8 inches of snow from a driveway. The time distribution for clearing the driveway has a long tail; about 90 percent of driveways are passable within 45 minutes. The last driveway is cleared 150 minutes after the start of this activity. Note that those respondents (53%) who answered that they would not take time to clear their driveway were assumed to be ready immediately at the start of this activity. Essentially they would drive through the snow on the driveway to access the roadway and begin their evacuation trip. Time to Remove Snow from Driveway._ 100% BO% UI "D 0 .s::: Cl.I 60% UI :J 0 :I: ...,;...' ., 0 .... 40% c Cl.I u ... Cl.I Cl. 20% 0% 0 ' 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 . Time (min) Figure F-13. Time to Clear-Driveway of 611-811 of Snow F.4 Conclusions The telephone su'rvey provides relevant data associated with the EPZ. population, which have been used t6 quantify demographics specific to the EPZ, and "mobilization time" which can iri-fluence evacuation.time estimates. -NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate -* KLD Engineering, P.C. __ February 24, 2016 ATTACHMENT A Telephone Survey Instrument NMP/JAF F-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Telephone Survey Instrument Hello, my name is and I'm working on a survey for your county emergency management agency to identify local behavior during emergency situations. This information will be used for emergency planning and will be shared with local officials to enhance emergency response plans in your area for all hazards; emergency planning for some hazards may require evacuation. Your responses will greatly contribute to local emergency preparedness. I will not ask for your name or any personal information, and the survey will take less than 10 minutes to complete. COL. 1 COL. 2 COL. 3 COL. 4 COL. 5 Sex Unused Unused Unused Unused Unused COL. 8 1 Male 2 Female INTERVIEWER: ASK TO SPEAK TO THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OR THE SPOUSE OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD. (Terminate call if not a residence.) DO NOT ASK: lA. Record area code. To Be Determined lB. Record exchange number. To Be Determined 2. What is your home zip code? 3A. In total, how many running cars, or other vehicles are usually available to the household? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) 3B. In an.emergency, could you get a ride out of the area with a neighbor or friend? 4. How many people usually live in this household? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate COL. 9-11 COL. 12-14 COL. 15-19 COL. 20 SKIP TO 1 ONE Q.4 2 TWO Q.4 3 THREE Q.4 4 FOUR Q.4 5 FIVE Q.4 6 SIX Q.4 7 SEVEN Q.4 8 EIGHT Q.4 9 NINE OR MORE Q.4 0 ZERO (NONE) .Q. 3B x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED Q.3B COL.21 1 YES 2 NO x DON'T KNOW/REFUSED COL. 22 COL. 23 1 ONE 2 TWO 3 THREE 4 FOUR 5 FIVE 6 SIX F-15 0 1 2 3 4 5 TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN FIFTEEN KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 | |||
: 5. How many drivers in the household commute to a job, or to college on a daily basis? 7 SEVEN 8 EIGHT 9 NINE COL. 24 0 ZERO 6 SIXTEEN 7 SEVENTEEN 8 EIGHTEEN 9 NINETEEN OR MORE X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED SKIP TO Q.9 1 ONE Q. 6 2 TWO Q. 6 3 THREE Q. 6 4 FOUR OR MORE Q. 6 5 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED Q. 9 INTERVIEWER: For each person identified in Question 5, ask Questions 6, 7, and 8, 6. Thinking about commuter #1, how does that person usually travel to work or college? (REPEAT QUESTION FOR EACH COMMUTER) Commuter#l Commuter#2 Commuter#3 Commuter#4 COL. 25 COL. 26 COL. 27 COL. 28 Rail 1 1 1 1 Bus 2 2 2 2 Walk/Bicycle 3 3 3 3 Drive Alone 4 4 4 4 Carpool-2 or more people 5 5 5 5 Don't know/Refused 6 6 6 6 7. How much time.on average, would it take Commuter #1 to travel home from work or college? (REPEAT QUESTION FOR EACH COMMUTER) (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) COMMUTER#l COMMUTER#2 COL. 29 COL. 30 COL. 31 COL. 32 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT OVER 1 HOUR, BUT 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1HOUR15 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1 HOUR MINUTES 15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 30 MINUTES HOUR 30 MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR31 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 6 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 6 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 45 MINUTES HOUR 45 MINUTES . NMP/JAF . F-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation _Time E_stimate February 24; 2016 BETWEEN 1HOUR46 BETWEEN 1HOUR46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS (SPECIFY __ ) (SPECIFY __ ) 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 0 0 x DON'T KNOW x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED /REFUSED NMP/JAF F-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 COMMUTER#3 COMMUTER#4 COL. 33 COL. 34 COL. 35 COL. 36 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT OVER 1 HOUR, BUT 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 -LESS THAN 1 HOUR 15 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1 HOUR MINUTES 15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 30 MINUTES HOUR 30 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 BETWEEN 1HOUR31 6 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 6 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 45 MINUTES HOUR 45 MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR46 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS (SPECIFY __ ) (SPECIFY __ ) 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 0 0 x DON'T KNOW x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED */REFUSED 8. Approximately how much time does it take Commuter #1 to complete preparation for leaving work or college prior to starting the trip home? (REPEAT QUESTION FOR EACH COMMUTER) (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) COMMUTER#l COL. 37 COL. 38 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT. 4. 16-20MINUTES 4 LESSTHAN lHOUR 15 .MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR16 -5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR -30 MINUTES BETWEEN-i HOUR 31 6 26-30MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 45MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS _(SPECIFY_-___ ) 9-41-45 MINUTES 9 .o NMP/JAF F-18 Evacuation Time Estimate _ COMMUTER#2 COL. 39 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 2 6-10 MINUTES 3 _ 11-15 MINUTES 4 16-20 MINUTES 5 MINUTES 6 26-30 MINUTES 7 31-35 MINUTES 8 36-40 MINUTES 9 MINUTES COL. 40 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 46-50 MINUTES 51-55 MINUTES 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT LESS THAN 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 MINUTES AND 1 -HOUR 30 MINUTES -. BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 45 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 MINUTES AN_D 2 HOURS OVER2 HOURS (SPECIFY __ ) KLD Engineering, P.C. ' February 24, 2016 | |||
--------------------------x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED COMMUTER#3 COMMUTER#4 COL. 41 COL. 42 COL. 43 COL. 44 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR -OVER 1 HOUR, BUT OVER 1 HOUR, BUT LESS 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1 HOUR 15 4 MINUTES 4 MINUTES THAN 1HOUR15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1HOUR30 30 MINUTES MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR31 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 6 -26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 6 | |||
* 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1HOUR45 45 MINUTES MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS {SPECIFY (SPECIFY __ ) __ ) 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 0 0 x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED | |||
* 9. If you were_ advised by local authorities to evacuate, how much time would it take the household to pack clothing, medications, secure the house, load the car, and complete preparations prior to evacuating the area? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) OOL.% 1 LESS THAN 15 MINUTES 1 3 HOURS TO 3 HOURS 15 MINUTES. 2 15-30 MINUTES 2 3 HOURS 16 MINUTESTO 3 HOURS 30 MINUTES 3 31-45 MINUTES 3 3 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 3 HOURS 45 MINUTES 4* 46.MINUTES-1 HOUR 4 3 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 4 HOURS 5 1 HOUR TO 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES 5 4 HOURS TO 4 HOURS 15 MINUTES 6 1HOUR16 MINUTES TO 1HOUR30 MINUTES 6 4 HOURS 16 MINUTES TO 4 HOURS 30 MINUTES 7 1HOUR31 MINUTES TO 1HOUR45 MINUTES 7 4 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 4HOURS 45 MINUTES 8 | |||
* 1HOUR46 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 8 4 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 5 HOURS 9 2 HOURS TO 2 HOURS 15 MINUTES 9 5 HOURS TO 5 HOURS 30 MINUTES 0 2 HOURS 16 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 30 MINUTES 0 5 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 6 HOURS x 2 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 45 MINUTES x OVER 6 HOURS (SPECIFY y 2 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 3 HOURS z WILL NOT EVACUATE_ (Optional response) COL. 47 1 DONTKNOW/REFUSED NMP/JAF. F-19 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 10 If there is 6-8" of snow on your driveway or curb, would you need to shovel out to evacuate? If yes, how much time, on average, would it take you to clear the 6-8" of snow to move the car from the driveway or curb to begin the evacuation trip? Assume the roads are passable. (DO NOT READ RESPONSES) COL. 48 COL. 49 1 LESS THAN 15 MINUTES 1 OVER 3 HOURS (SPECIFY __ _ 2 15-30 MINUTES 3 31-45 MINUTES 4 46 MINUTES-1 HOUR 5 1 HOUR TO 1HOUR15 MINUTES 6 1HOUR16 MINUTES TO 1 HOUR 30 MINUTES 7 1HOUR31MINUTESTO1HOUR45 MINUTES 8 1HOUR46 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 9 2 HOURS TO 2 HOURS 15 MINUTES 0 2 HOURS 16 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 30 MINUTES x 2 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 45 MINUTES y 2 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 3 HOURS z NO, WILL NOT SHOVEL OUT 11. Please choose one of the following (READ ANSWERS): A. I would await the return of household commuters to evacuate together. B. I would evacuate independently and meet other household members later. 2 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED COL. 50 1 A 2 B x DON'T KNOW/REFUSED 12. How many vehicles would your household use during an evacuation? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) COL. 51 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *8 9 0 x NMP/JAF F-20 Evacuation Time Estimate | |||
* ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN EIGHT NINE OR MORE ZERO (NONE) DON'T KNOW/REFUSED KLD Engineering, P.C February24, 2016 13A. Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home in an emergency. Would you: (READ ANSWERS) 13B. A. SHELTER; or B. EVACUATE Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home now in an emergency and possibly evacuate later while people in other areas are advised to evacuate now. Would you: (READ ANSWERS) A. SHELTER; or B. EVACUATE COL. 52 1 A 2 B X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED COL. 53 1 A 2 B X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED 14. If you have a household pet, would you take your pet with you if you were asked to evacuate the area? (READ ANSWERS) COL. 54 1 DON'T HAVE A PET 2 YES 3 NO X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED Thank you very much.-------------(TELEPHONE NUMBER CALLED) IF REQUESTED: For additional information, contact your County Emergency Management Agency during normal business hours. County EMA Phone Oswego 1-800-962-2792 NMP/JAF F-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 APPENDIX G Traffic Management Plan | |||
-----. -------G. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN NUREG/CR-7002 indicates that the existing TCPs and ACPs identified by the offsite agencies should be used in the evacuation simulation modeling. The traffic and access control plans for the EPZ were provided by Oswego County. These planswere reviewed and the TCPs were modeled accordingly. G.1 Traffic Control Points As discussed in 9, traffic control points at intersections (which are controlled) are modeled as actuated signals. If an intersection has a pre-timed signal, stop, or yield control, and the intersection is identified as a traffic control point, the control type was changed to an actuated signal in the DYNEV II system. Table K-2 provides the control type and node number for those nodes which are controlled. If the existing control was changed due to the point being a Traffic Control Point, the control type is indicated as "TCP-Actuated" or "TCP-Uncontrolled" in Table K-2. The TCPs within the study area are mapped in Figure G-1. G.2 Access Control Points It is assumed that Access Control Points (ACPs), also known as TCPs to Prohibit EPZ Ingress, will be established within 2 hours of the advisory to evacuate to discourage through travelers from using major through routes which traverse the EPZ. In this analysis, as discussed in Section 3.6,. external traffic was considered on the major through rqute which traverses the study area, 1-81. In the simulation, the generation of the external trips on 1-81 ceased at 2 hours after the advisory to evacuate due to the ACPs. Figure G-1 maps the ACPs identified in the county *emergency plans. These ACPS are concentrated on roadways giving access to the EPZ. Theses ACPs would be* manned during evacuation by traffic guides who would direct evacuees in the proper direction away from NMP/JAF and facilitate the flow of traffic through the intersections. This study did not identify any additional that should be identified as TCPs or ACPs. . -.. **, NMP/JAF Evacuation *Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 I Traffic and Access Control Points I NMP/JAF Lake Ontano Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Traffic Control Point | |||
* Access Control Point (jl ERPA I '-/ 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings , ' Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate I I /, / / I / / Lake Ontano Figure G-1. Traffic and Access Control Points for NMP/JAF G-2 / / / 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIX H Evacuation Regions H EVACUATION REGIONS This appendix presents the evacuation percentages for each Evacuation Region (Table H-1) and maps of all Evacuation Regions (Figure H-1 through Figure H-29). The percentages presented in Table H-1 are based on the methodology discussed in assumption 5 of Section 2.2 and shown in Figure 2-1. Note the baseline ETE study assumes 20 percent of households will not comply with the shelter advisory, as per Section 2.5.2 of NUREG/CR-7002. NMP/JAF H-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Region Desaiption ROl 2-Mile Radius ROZ 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Region Wind Direction From N/A R04 ROS R06 R07 ROS R09 RlO E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW w WNW NW, NNW N NNE NE ENE Region Wind Direction From R11 E, ESE, SE Rl2 SSE,S, SSW Rl3 SW Rl4 WSW RlS w R16 WNW R17 NW RIB NNW R19 N R20 NNE, NE R21 ENE Region Wind Direction From N/A R22 R23 R24 R25 R26 R27 R28 R29 E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW w WNW NW, NNW N NNE NE ENE 5-Mile Radius Evacuation Time Estimate Table H-1. Percent of Sub-Area Population Evacuating for Each Region ERPA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 I 1003 10031 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 ERPA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Refer to ROl 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 I 1003 1003 203 I 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 ! 1003 1003 203 I 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 I 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 ERPA 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 1003 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 100311003 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% f 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% I 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 100% 100% 100% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 1003 1003 203 203 1003 1003 1003 203 1003 1003 100% 20% 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 29 Refer to ROl 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 203 1003 100% 203 203 20% 203 203 203 20% 20% 203 20% 203 203 203 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 20% 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 100% 1003 203 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 203 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% I 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 203 20% 203 20% 20% 203 20% 203 203 100% 1003 203 20% ERPA Shetter-in-Place H-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \..-:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-1. Region ROl H-3 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate 1... _.,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 1 Date: 1/8/2016 Copyright: KtD Engineering, Generation, Enrer1v 10 Figure H-2. Region R02 H-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF ERPA 23, 24 & 25 Evacuate Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miies Figure H-3. Region R03 H-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '--:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miles Figure H-4. Region R04 H-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF I Region Ros I Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_., 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miles Figure H-5. Region ROS H-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF I Region ROG I Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 'l D*te: 1/8/'2016 ESRl 9ata and Maps 2014 l<LD£nglneerlng.helot1Generttlon,Entergy Figure H-6. Region ROG H-8 . 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \... _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-7. Region R07 H-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate 1...--:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-8. Region ROS H-10 KLD Engineering, P .C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \. __, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate \ Date: 1/8/2016 Copyrigh1; ESRI 9a1aandM1ps2014 KLDfnglneer!ng,EwelonGeneratlon.Entergv Miles Figure H-9. Region R09 H-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '--:, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '] Otte: 1/8/2016 KlOfnglneerlng,ExelonGenerttlon,Entergy I ERPA: 29 / ----Figure H-10. Region RlO H-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate I LV'>t'>'VXY'[/ vv....,v<<,,, // '\ Date: l/8/2016 ESRI Data and Maps 2014 KLD£ngin'eerin{.£Q!!onGeneratlon,Entergy Figure H-11 Region Rll H-13 Miles KLD Engineering, P,C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_., 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 'l Date: 1/8/2016 Copyright':ESRIDataarn:IMaps2014 KLO Exelon Generation, En!Hgy 10 Figure H-12 Region Rl2 H-14 KLD Engineering, P .C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \..-:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-13 Region R13 H-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '\ 01te; lfB/2016 IClOEng!neerlng.EJGelonGener1tlon,Entergy Miles Figure H-14 Region R14 H-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 1 Date: 1/8/2016 Copyright': ESRID1t111'1dMaps2014 KLO Engirteerrri' E11tlon Getier1tlol'I, Entergy Figure H-15 Region RlS H-17 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_,, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings ---Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate *1 Date* 1/8/2016 ESRI and Map5 2014 KLDEnglnnrlng.[)(elonGener1tlon,Entergy 10 Figure H-16 Region R16 H-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. __, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate l Date: 1/8/2016 Copvrlght: £SRI D*ta Ind M1ps 2014 KLD £1111ri'eerin[ htlol'I Genet1tlol'I, E111ergv 10 Figure H-17 Region R17 H-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF GJ ERPA Evacuate \..--:::. 2* S, 10 Mile R. mgs NMP/JAF F;gu*e H-18 R . Evacuat;on r egoon R18 H-20 ime Estimate KLD E | |||
* ngmeering p c February 24, NMP/JAF ERPA 23, 24 & 25 Evacuate Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-.; 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miles Figure H-19 Region R19 H-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF ERPA 23, 24 & 25 Evacuate Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '\ Copyr!gh1': ESRI Data and Maps 2014 KLO helon Gener11lon, Eniergv Figure H-20 Region R20 H-22 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF ERPA 23 Evacuates Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate ---10 Figure H-21 Region R21 H-23 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate t -::::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-22 Region R22 H-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate ( -::::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-23 Region R23 H-25 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate { -: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-24 Region R24 H-26 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate ( -:::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate l cnta 1MI M1pi 2014 l(lO Engineering, E11elon Gene,.llon. En!trgy -----i:=====:mm---------Miles Figure H-25 Region R25 H-27 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate -:::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-26 Region R26 H-28 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate -=:; 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-27 Region R27 H-29 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate <.. 21 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-28 Region R28 H-30 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate ( -:::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '\ O.te: tJBl2016 O.t.1 *nd M*pi 2014 KLO£nginuring.£xelonGener1tlon,£n1erav Figure H-29 Region R29 H-31 10 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIXJ Representative Inputs to and Outputs from the DYNEV II System J. REPRESENTATIVE INPUTS TO-AND OUTPUTS FROM THE DYNEV II SYSTEM This appendix presents data input to and output from the DYNEV II System. Table J-1 provides the volume and queues for the ten highest volume signalized intersections in the study area. A residual queue, existing at the start of the RED signal indication, indicates that the demand could not be entirely served by the GREEN phase. No residual queue indicates that the traffic movement is under-saturated (i.e., not congested) throughout the duration of evacuation. Refer to Table K-2 and the figures in Appendix K for a map showing the geographic location of each intersection. Table J-2 provides source (vehicle loading) and destination information for several roadway segments (links) in the analysis network: Refer to Table K-1 and the figures in Appendix K for a map showing the geographic location of each link. Table J-3 provides network-wide statistics (average travel time, average speed and number of vehicles) for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) for each scenario. As expected, Scenario 13; which is the special event, exhibits the slowest average speed and longest average travel times of all scenarios. Table J-4 provides statistics (average speed and travel time) for the major evacuation routes -SR 481, SR 104, SR 48, and .SR 3 -for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) under Scenario 1 conditions. As discussed in Section 7.3 and shown in Figures 7-3 through 7-7, SR 104 westbound and SR 481 southbound are congested for the first 3 hours of the evacuation, respectively. As such, the average speeds are comparably slower (and travel times longer) than other evacuation routes during these times. Table J-5 provides the number of vehicles discharged and the cumulative. percent of total vehicles discharged for each link exiting the analysis network, for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) under Scenario 1 conditions. Refer to Table K-1 and the figures in Appendix K fora map showing the geographic location of each link. . .* . Figure J-1 through Figure J-14 plot the trip generation time versus the ETE for each of the 14 Scenarios considered. T.he distance between the trip generation and ETE is the travel time. Plots of trip generation versus ETE: are. indicative of the level of traffic congestion evacuation. For low population density sites, the curves are close together,, indicating short travel times and minimal traffic congestion. For higher population density sites, the curves are farther apart indicating longer travel times arid the presence of traffic congestion. As seen in Figure J-1 through Figure J-14, curves are spatially separated due to the presence o.f traffic congestionwithinOswego, which was discussed in detail ir:i Sedion .. NMP/JAF J-1 Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate .* February 24, 2016 | |||
* Table J-1. Characteristics of the Ten Highest Volume Signalized Intersections Approach Total Turn Intersection (Up Volume Queue Node Location .control Node} (Veh} 368 5,431 0 367 SR 481 and SR3 TCP -654 1,306 0 Actuated 371 2,415 0 TOTAL 9,152 42 653 1,863 1 366 SR 481 and Oneida St TCP -652 5,111 0 Actuated 651 2,069 0 TOTAL 9,043 -SR 481 and CR57 (S 1st 392 0 0 390 Actuated 393 7,569 0 St) TOTAL 7,569 42 397 1,233 3 387 SR 481 and Fay St Actuated 389 37 0 399 6,262 62 TOTAL 7,532 -530 2,221 383 TCP -521 1,474 149 511 SR 104 and Hillside Ave Actuated 533 1,205 44 546 226 10 TOTAL 2,156 42 346 2,805 91 669 1,228 77 524 W 1st St and W Utica St Actuated 539 0 0 538 2,854 46 TOTAL 6,887 -520 2,176 256 529 1,006 110 530 SR 104 and Liberty St Actuated 531. 529 13 511 2,893 157 TOTAL 6,604 -409 2,900 0 406 SR 3 and SR48 TCP-371 1,081 2 Actuated 644 2,569 0 TOTAL 6,550 -661 2,822 82 548 1,257 23 346 E 1st St and E Utica St Actuated 662 394 12 524 1,814 40 TOTAL 6,287 -526 1,885 87 689 493 80 527 SR 104 and W 5th St TCP-538 551 29 Actuated 520 3,303 178 TOTAL 6,232 -.* NMP/JAF. | |||
* J-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table J-2. Sample Simulation Modellnput 3 I 4 I E I 8048 1,700 8282 1,575 138 I 72 I SE I 8298 6,750 8279 1,700 8282 1,575 1052 I 131 I SE I 8298 6,750 8279 1,700 8456 1,700 314 I 12 I s I 8730 1,700 8431 1,700 8431 1,700 457 I 35 I s I 8442 1,575 8391 1,575 8730 1,700 547 I 26 I s I 8431 1,700 8442 1,575 I I I 8457 1,700 645 0 SW I 8456 1,700 722 I 44 I SW I 8391 1,575 826 I 110 I SW I 8440 2,250 8457 1,700 986 I 241 I SW I 8456 1,700 8730 1,700 NMP/JAF J-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _I I I I Table J-3 .. Selected Model Outputs for the Evacuation of the Entire EPZ {Region R03} Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average* 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 5.6 2.8 Travel Time * (Min/Veh-Mi) Network-Wide Average 21.3 . 20.6 21.3 18.8 20.0 20.4 19.6 19.2 22.9 21.4 20.8 20.4 10.6 21.2 Speed (mph) Total Vehicles Exiting . 36,831 36,874 36,943 37,605 31,558 38,754* 38,922 38,716 34,657 35,088 34,630 30,702 58,473 36,680 Network NMP/JAF J-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table J-4. Average Speed (mph) and Travel Time (min) for Major Evacuation Routes (Region R03, Scenario 1) SR 481SB 7.4 15.9 28.0 5.0 88.6 22.2 20.0 57.2 7.8 SR 104 WB 9.6 11.4 50.9 10.0 57.7 43.8 13.2 44.7 12.9 SR 48 SB 6.1 33.9 10.7 26.4 13.7 46.5 7.8 48.0 7.6 SR 104 EB 10.4 48.0 12.9 47.9 13.0 47.0 13.2 49.5 12.6 SR 3 NB 4.6 42.1 6.6 5.7 49.2 5.6 50.6 5.5 NMP/JAF J-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: i. I I I i I. Table J-5. Simulation Model Outputs at Network Exit Links for Region R03, Scenario 1 27 37 so 53 66 74 85 94 360 393 397 399 543 554 588 593 631 632 637 639 ,640 . NMP/JAF ***Evacuation Time Estimate Cumulative Vehicles Discharged by the Indicated Time Cumulative Percent of Vehicles Discharged by the Indicated Time Interval 39 109 0.4% 0.5% 67 166 0.7% 0.7% 1,315 2,711 14.5% 11.6% 42 151 0.5% 0.7% 195 419 2.1% 1.8% 309 822 3.4% 3.5% 254 614 *2.8% 2.6% 110 300 1.2%. 1.3% 325 797 3.6% 3.4% 162 649 1.8% 2.8% 1,478 3,330 16.2% 14.2% 73 289 0.8% 1.2% 415 1,132 4.6% 4.8% 651 1,960 7.2% 8.4% 390 1,402 4.3%. .6.0% 224 1,002. 2.5%*' 4.3% 878 2,199 9.7% *. 9.4% 734 1,636 8.1% 7.0% -522 1,184 5.7% 5.1% ** 24 654 .0.3% 2.8% 896 1,928 9.6% 7.9% J-(i 124 0.4% 185 0.6% 3,189 9.8% 181 0.6% 472 1.5% 907 2.8% 688 2.1% 345 1.1% 894 2.8% 775 . 2.4% 3,934 12.1% 350 1.1% 2,104 6.5% 2,816 8.7% 2,174 6.7% .1,591 4.9% 3,388 10.4% i,192 . 6.7% 1,762 5.4% 1,733 5.3%' 2,745 8:1% 124 0.3% 185 b.5% 3,190 8.7% 183 0.5% 473 1.3% 909 2.5% 689 1.9% 347 0.9% 896 2.4% 780 .2.1% 3,943 10.7% 353 1.0% 2,356 6.4% 3,417 9.3% 2,566 *7.0% 1:;858 . '*5:0% 4;167 1).:3% 2;624 7.1%. 1,849 5.0% 2,028 5.5% . 3,893 10.6% KlD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 100% "' Cll :g 80% ..c Cll > (ij 60% ... 0 I-.... 40% 0 ... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 1) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-1. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 1) 100% "' Cll 80% ..c Cll > (ij 60% ... 0 I-.... 40% 0 ... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-2. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) NMP/JAF J-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' C1I 31 80% .s::. C1I > iQ 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c C1I 20% u .... C1I Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 3) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-3. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 3) 100% "' C1I 31 80% .s::. C1I > iQ 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c C1I 20% u .... C1I Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-4. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) NMP/JAF J-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% Ill ..c 80% > iii 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c 20% v ... 0.. 0% 0 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 5) -Trip Generation -ETE 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time (min) 240 270 Figure J-5. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 5) 100% Ill ..c 80% > Ill 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c 20% v ... 0.. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 6) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-6. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 6) NMP/JAF J-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' GJ .s::. 80% GJ > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c GJ 20% u ..... GJ Q. 0% 0 100% "' GJ .s::. 80% GJ > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c GJ 20% u ..... GJ Q. 0% 0 NMP/JAF 30 -------------ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-7. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-8. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) J-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' (IJ ..c 80% (IJ > iQ 60% ... 0 I--40% 0 ... c (IJ 20% .... ... (IJ Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 9) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-9. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 9) 100% "' (IJ 80% ..c (IJ > iQ 60% ... 0 I--40% 0 ... c (IJ 20% .... ... (IJ Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-10. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) NMP/JAF J-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _J 100% "' QI ..c 80% QI > "iii 60% ... 0 ..... -40% 0 ... c QI 20% u ... QI 0.. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-11. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) 100% "' QI 80% ..c QI > "iii 60% ... 0 ..... -40% 0 ... c QI 20% u ... QI 0.. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 12) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time (min) 240 270 Figure J-12. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 12) NMP/JAF J-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' Cll u 80% :c Cll > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Cl. 0% 0 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good, Special Event (Scenario 13) -Trip Generation -ETE 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 390 420 450 480 Elapsed Time (min) Figure J-13. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather, Special Event (Scenario 13) 100% "' Cll 80% ..c Cll > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Cl. 0% 0 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) -Trip Generation -ETE 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time (min) 240 270 Figure J-14. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) NMP/JAF J-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 APPENDIX K Evacuation Roadway Network K. EVACUATION ROADWAY NETWORK As discussed in Section 1.3, a link-node analysis network was constructed to model the roadway network within the study area. Figure K-1 provides an overview of the link-node analysis network. The figure has been divided up into 32 more detailed figures (Figure K-2 through Figure K-33) which show each of the links and nodes in the network. The analysis network was calibrated using the observations made during the field survey conducted in March 2012. Table K-1 lists the characteristics of each roadway section modeled in the ETE analysis. Each link is identified by its road name and the upstream and downstream node numbers. The geographic location of each link can be observed by referencing the grid map number provided in Table K-1. The roadway type identified in Table K-1 is generally based on the following criteria: | |||
* Freeway: limited access highway, 2 or more lanes in each direction, high free flow speeds | |||
* Freeway ramp: ramp on to or off of a limited access highway | |||
* Minor arterial: 2 or more lanes in each direction | |||
* Collector: single lane in each direction | |||
* Local roadways: single lane in each direction, local roads with low free flow speeds The term, "No. of Lanes" Table K-1 identifies the number of lanes that extend throughout the length of the link. Many links have additional lanes on the immediate approach to an intersection (turn pockets); these have been recorded and entered into the input stream for the DYNEV II System. As discussed in Section 1.3, lane width and shoulder width were not physically measured during the road survey. Rather, estimates of these measures were based on visual observations and recorded images. Table K-2 identifies each node in the network that is controlled and the type of control (stop sign, yield sign, pre-timed signal, actuated signal, traffic control point) at that node. Uncontrolled nodes are not included in Table K-2. The location of each node can be observed by referencing the grid map number provided. NMP/JAF K-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Node ,.. Link GJ ERPA c:.*_::: Index Grid ,-:: 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings tzZ:3 Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate Date:914f2012 Copyright. ESRJ Basemap Data KLO Enginetlfing, c0nstdatl0fl Energy, Entergy Figure K-1. Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick Link-Node Analysis Network K-2 Constantin 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region | |||
* Node --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings link Water 0 ERPA C":] Index Grid ; :( 0 °'1 I I Sana Pt NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-¢r* Grid 1 0.25 0.5 \ \ {---==----Miles __ <.or,...,_..,, _._.,. .. DJ0\1'-_I_,_ Figure K-2. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 1 NMP/JAF K-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures | |||
* Node -=-2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 2 ... Link Water Q ERPA L .. J Index Grid 0.5 ---===----*Miles _,_,,. . .,.,.,u _,,_.. "'>"'"'-< ... --*-Figure K-3. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 2 NMP/JAF K-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
\ \ , ,i_. ------' J-,,..., \.Hi/Ion Rd I <S' ,'% ', \ * -r--'/ -,-, , ,' Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF \ \ r J Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures \ \ | |||
* Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 3 ... Link Water !'.;? ERPA l .. J Index Grid ---====-----*Miles -* ... fjJ,J.1011 l .... lt*>*.,.._ .... D,,,llf_foo_l_IJ> 'n Figure K-4. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 3 NMP/JAF K-5 KLD Engineering, P,C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ERPA28 1-*-**-*-----*------*-*---*-**-l Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF f, | |||
* J Shadow Region | |||
* Node ... Link G'.J ERPA "::-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water c:_l Index Grid Grid 4 Lek.e On la no ERPA 26 I Qr "' I I I I / / / NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 1 ---===----*Miles Grid 4 -.. c-,C..151.l>>ll ,_,..,.,.io*oA>l1.< ...... ""-*-.,.*-..-. Figure K-5. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 4 NMP/JAF K-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 __ .... | |||
Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF I, ,'J Shadow Region Node -... Link GJ ERPA --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water C:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures ' 0.5 1 ---===----*Miles Grid 5 *-*-*lih' <IP1llll,<-. .. t.. b1"'"P Figure K-6. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 5 NMP/JAF K-7 KLD Engineering, P,C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _J | |||
! i ERPA29 ! LDJ.(1 ! OntorlO "K-*-* -----*-**------------------*-------* -------*-* -----*-*------'--! ! =;\fl ! ! ! ! ! ! i i i ! ! i i i i i i ERPA27 i i i i i i i ! ! 1i i \ couniY Rte 1 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF ' Shadow Region Grid 6 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures | |||
* Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 6 ... Link Water Q ERPA L __ J Index Grid 0.5 ---====-----Miles -(-u..''"1 _c_..,. .. o ..... _,.. __ ,_,.. Figure K-7. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 6 NMP/JAF K-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures | |||
* Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 7 Link Water (;l ERPA l-:-:_] Index Grid Figure K-8. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 7 NMP/JAF K-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 8 e Node --=--2, S, 10, lS Mile Rings ... Link Water 0 ERPA l ___ 1 Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate . o.s 1 ---====-----*Mites Figure K-9. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 8 K-10 11111 .. nJL>u.t_...t.t,..,,_..,,_,..,. KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 i i i i ! i i 1 I I \ t \ I I i i I ! i i i I ! ! ! ! ! ! ! i ! ! ! ! ! ! i i r----i i i ! Legend I 1 I I \ \ l 1 \ I I I \ *: NMP/JAF f J Shadow Region | |||
* Node "::--2, S, 10, lS Mile Rings Link GJ ERPA Water Index Grid Grid 9 " "' 0. i i !"" i j 52!1; 521 | |||
* 5\'ll6 ,. 681 ' &' 680* ... i ,-"'"\ 1; _533 | |||
* Ave (I') * ' p-...-... 510-507 535 t 54!1 509* *-678 i"* | |||
* 108 "i 542 "' I'-"' () g. ! C£l i , < "' c. ERPA' 13 , ... ' ** 505 " -?.,. 710 673 " NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 05 I ---===----*Miles Grid 9 --.c.,,,,,i.1lf.l10ll I .... \__,. *D.ol\l.f- ... 1 .... 'Q' Figure K-10. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 9 NMP/JAF K-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ERPi.\"28**-----*-------Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF ' Shadow Region | |||
* Node -=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings ... Link Water Q ERPA l__J Index Grid <l: -----*-:a;-------*------------------------------*--"' Grid l 0 343 * *.348 t,peedway I J NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures ' 0.25 0.5 ---===-----MUes Grid 10 -.:....-IY.UOl1 '°D.IOllJl-W ,..1--.. Figure K-11. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 10 NMP/JAF K-12 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend ' ERPA26 339 Lctkt> Omo no * | |||
* 335 ERPA 12 " | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region | |||
* Node --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings "" Link Water GJ ERPA L_ __ l Index Grid 331 Grid I I ERPA6 r :! ERPAJ ERP;AS Middf" Rd, NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *--<?-* Grid 11 0.2 0.4 --==----Miles ,PUlllJllU -!-""' O!OIG ... t ...... .,. __ I_"' Figure K-12. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 11 NMP/JAF K-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
\ Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region | |||
* Node "::' 2, 5, 10, lS Mile Rings .,. Link Water Q ERPA L .. J Index Grid \ NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures . 0.25 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 12 -... c-l>>JMI ,_,_-,p .. a1u1*-'--*-**-T< Figure K-13. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 12 NMP/JAF K-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
! i i i ute stale ,...o Legend 660 I I l I | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region I I ) | |||
* Node --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings ... link Water Q ERPA L.J Index Grid ERPA6 308 ------=---* fii...: 1 <>Drl ' ' \1 ' ' ...... -.f:t1nne<1y Dr ...... ...... \ ...... ERPA II 1V\J 'es Cs ,f I§ /l 0 " ,'! 311 ... I Cl -!' § cJ I ERPA 19 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *--</-* Grid 13 0.2 0.4 --==----Miles -<->PUll*IJ _,_.,...,g ................ __ , ... .. Figure K-14. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 13 NMP/JAF K-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Shadow Region | |||
* Node -=-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,.. Link Water (;l ERPA c_:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 14 ) Figure K-15. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 14 NMP/JAF K-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Node _.,. Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF .J Shadow Region 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water [_._l Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 15 Figure K-16. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 15 K-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Node .... Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF [ * | |||
* Shadow Region "'::' 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water [_J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 16 Figure K-17. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 16 K-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
' /' ''' Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF r-j Shadow Region | |||
* Node .,.. Link GJ ERPA --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures . 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 17 ..._.,,.C....,!O<UlllJOU """'-il!o' *<>AlU<-i.. r.t-"h Figure K-18. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 17 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate K-19 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF [ 'J Shadow Region "' Node _.,..Link i:;'.;l ERPA -:=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 5 ---====-----Miles Grid 18 "'"°"""'.ihioJD'"'1}.t ...... t.._l_ ... ,_,IY Figure K-19. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 18 NMP/JAF K-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 512y, ' e ; ,,'-Legend 467 .... \ | |||
* NMP/JAF f, J Shadow Region | |||
* Node .,. Link (;I ERPA --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water CJ Index Grid I ERPA 20 .... 239 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures ---===----*Mites Grid 19 -C-c.t'WlWJOU *-*-'¢' *DJl.llJ.l-.. lal ... 1-*p Figure K-20. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 19 NMP/JAF K-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 221 -; .. 215 216 county Route 45 .,.l 208 ... , 209 ... 210 327 ERPA 20 | |||
* 630 s:: i G 1) d "' 2JJ234 233 .* 631 " .. 142 ......__ -10*MiJes-----r legend | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region | |||
* Node -=--2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,. link Water Q ERPA L_J Index Grid 247 | |||
* j i i i ! i i __ ) ___ _ ! i i -.i!' NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 ji I --r===----*Miles Grid 20 _,_.,. *llW\1,1-'-'**-... 1--.. Figure K-21. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 20 NMP/JAF K-22 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Node .. Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF [, J Shadow Region --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water CJ Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 1iO 1 ---===-----Miles Grid 21 -.. .. .:-.,.,._CAJ)l>J.J _,,_.. *P}l}IJ.1-'""-'-'"''""-P Figure K-22. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 21 K-23 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P,C February 24, 2016 __J Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF ' ] Shadow Region Node .,.. Link GJ ERPA '::" 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid \ 616 _ .... \ 611* I 2641 267,, NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5"' I ---====-----Miles Grid 22 __ C.,.,..,..l'\&'JlllJ ... Ol,Jl>>ll.C-U.--..1-Figure K-23. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 22 NMP/JAF K-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 i i ! i j j j ! j i i ! ! i *'> J1 I -ti' Hogsback I'-j f I 594 r r \ Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF ' J Shadow Region | |||
* Node --=-2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings ... Link Water Q ERPA [..-**11ndex Grid -* ( I Grid 23 ( / I I -{ I I J Cro""YRd I / NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures r' I Grid 23 0.5 I ---====-----*Miles ,,"' Figure K-24. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 23 NMP/JAF K-25 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF J Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 24 | |||
* Node -=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings *-<?' .... Link Water . 0.5 Q ERPA [_:-J 1ndex Grid ---===-----*Miles ......,_"-,...,...,,.,u ..... ,_.,... "-D_,,.,..,,. __ ,_ Figure K-25. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 24 NMP/JAF K-26 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 i -,i \ I I *:, ! ......... i i i ! ! i Peai Bed Rd ! -i fMuck Legend 414 " | |||
* NMP/JAF . --\-. ----..._ / J Shadow Region Grid 25 ii NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures | |||
* Node --=-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 25 _.,. Link Water Q ERPA [.---1 Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate o.s I ---===-----Miles Figure K-26. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 25 K-27 .. JOll °""''-"""' @,1)11.c-...... 1-... 1-llt KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
,' legend | |||
* NMP/JAF '.<J Shadow Region e Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings _.,. Link Water 0 ERPA [..---! Index Grid ,"''',' , , ,' ,,:',' ',, ,' ',/',' ,' ,' ,' ,' NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-?-* 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 26 ..... ..,.Ptw.' .... l'll';Zl\J g,,,o.,c_.,.t<llUIJOU.C_.,..,.f,,,, .... _tl' Figure K-27. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 26 NMP/JAF K-28 KLD Engineering, P,C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
\ , , , ....,. ,, , , : \: ,_' .... , , -*-7*---:-: .... ,.., ,' , , , , , *9;.-Ffd "' >-/ , , r Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF ' J Shadow Region | |||
* Node .,. Link GJ ERPA --=--2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid ', '* ,' ,'/*' , , ,, , , Grid 27 ,' ,' ...... ,. ,' ,' , , , ,' , , , ,'' ,' , , , , , , , -i ,' '! ., , ! ! ! i -! , ! ! ! NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.25 0.5 --==::11---*Miles Grid 27 ---(-'f"ll .. ,.IDU _'-,,.... JDu.c ............ l>oo<,.1-n Figure K-28. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 27 NMP/JAF K-29 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 i i i 15*Miles* i Legend \ I I I | |||
* NMP/JAF Shadow Region ---442 ., rsoll.._ .Z. \f'lgeor WhitcofflbRd g '\ o.. 8442 \ '!! C/I Patn<*. 0 Mccollum Ln (. Daisy <-Or \ G'r id \ 28 Daisy Ln | |||
* Node "::--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,. Link Water GJ ERPA C::.:.::.l Index Grid ,' Maple Av r* Ir ,. L i ! ',j r -I Owens Rd ! i NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-<!-* 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 28 _.._,_._, ..... ,, .. 11 ... ur-.. a.. ... 1 ...... ,_" Figure K-29. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 28 NMP/JAF K-30 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Node Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF ] Shadow Region 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water l-:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-<>-* 0.25' 0.5 ---===----*Miles Grid 29 Figure K-30. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 29 K-31 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF , j Shadow Region | |||
* Node -::' 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,.. Link Water GJ ERPA C:::-:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures o.s 5 I ---====----*Miles Grid 30 .... IWJll!J .. l>Xlll.<_ ......... 1,,...,..1_., Figure K-31. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 30 NMP/JAF K-32 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend | |||
* NMP/JAF | |||
* Node ... Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF ,. ] Shadow Region 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water c::.=.11ndex Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-<?* 0.5' I ---===----*Miles Grid 31 Figure K-32. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 31 K-33 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
\,, legend | |||
* NMP/JAF *' <J Shadow Region | |||
* Node .,. Link (;I ERPA -=-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water [_-:J Index Grid Q \ I \ I .-\ Grid 32 \ I \ \ \ \ Stats Hwy NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 32 0.5 ---====-----*Miles Figure K-33. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 32 NMP/JAF K-34 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table K-1. Evacuation Roadway Network Characteristics Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 1 2 3 us 11 collector 13SS 1 12 0 13SO 30 .8 2 2 S99 ' us 11 Collector 1ss2* 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 8 3 2 683 SR 13 collector 2432 1 12 0 17SO 40 8 4 3 2 US11 collector* 13SS 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 s 3 4 us 11 collector 374 1 12 0 112S 2S 8 6 4 3 us 11 collector 374 1 12 0 112S 2S 8 7 4 6 us 11 coliector 277 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 8 s 2 SR 13 collector 1203 1 12 0 17SO 3S 8 9 5 4 S Jefferson St local 1861 1 10 0 13SO 30 7 roadway 10 6 4 us 11 collector 277 1 12 0 13SO 30 8 11 6 7 us 11 collector 389 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 12 7 6 us 11 collector 389 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 13 7 22 CR 2 collector 1060 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 8 14 7 27 us 11 collector S123 1 12 6 1S7S 3S 3 I lS 7 29 Park St collector 2S4 1 12 0 13SO 30 8 16 8 S98 CR S collector 4394 1 12 0 1700 so 2 17 9 8 CR S collector 1979 1 12 0 1700 so 2 18 10 9 CR S collector 2813 1 12 0 1700 so 2 19 11 12 SR 3 collector 208S 1 12 4 17SO SS 2 20 11 21 SR 3 collector 2966 1 12 4 1700 SS 2 21 11 721 CR S collector iS94 1 12 0 1700 so 2 *22 12 *11 SR 3 collector 208S 1 12 4 17SO SS 2 23 12 720 SR 13 collector 1794 1 12 3 1700 so 7 24 13 14 SR 13 collector 4691 1 12 3 1700 so 7 2S 14 lS SR 13 collector 2229 1 12 3 1700 so 7 26 lS s SR 13 collector 1440 1 12 3 1700 40 7 NMP/JAF K-35 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
, Saturation Free Up-Down-Roadway Roadway tength No. of Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 27 . . 16 17 . SR 3 collector . 2215 1 12 4 . 1700 55 2 ,., ,._ 28 *' : 16 .: 28 . tR 15 **collector 5550 1 12 0 1700 50 2 29 18 16 CR 15 collector 1952 1 12 0 1700 45 2 .* 30 :19 16 SR 3 collector 3886 | |||
* 1 12 4 1700 55 2 31 20' .19 SR 3 collector 12283" 1 12 4 1700 55 2 32-:_-21 11 3 collector . 2968 1 12 4 1750 . 55 2 33 21 20 SR 3 collector 4954 1 12 4 1700 55 2 34 * .. 22. ,23 *CR 2 collector 1091 1 12 0 1575 *'* 35 8 .. , ... 35. 23 24 '' *. CR2 collector 2121 1 12 0 1700 45 8 36. . . . . 24o 25 181_ -CR 2 -freeway 907 1 12 6 1700 50 8 **Ramp ramp 37 24 26 . CR 2 collector . 461 . 1 12 0 1700 45 8 38 25 47 *. . 181 freeway 6190 2 12 10 2250 75 8 39 25 . -589 181 freeway 10140 2. 12 10 2250 . 75 3 40 27 42 . ust"1 collector 15421 1 12 6 . 1700 55 3 . 41 28 16:. CR 15 collector 5550 1 12 0 1700 50 2 . 42" . 28 >38 Lake St collector 23i9 1 12 0 1700 45 2 43 29 7 Park St collector 254 1 12 0 1750 30 8 44' 29 30 . North St collector 1141 1 12 0 1575 35 3 45' 30 29 North St collector 1141 .1 12 0 1575 35 3 46 30 32 | |||
* North St collector 5623 1 12 0 1700 45 3 . 47.' 31 30 . Lincoln Ave local 438 1 12 4 1350 30 3 roadway 48 32 . 28 . North St collector 15394 1 12 0 1700 . 50 2 49 .* 33 34 181-CR 22A **freeway 1173 1 12 4 1700 50 1 Ramp ramp , 50 34 ' 43 181 freeway 900 2 12 10 2250 75 1 51 | |||
* 3.4 588 181 freeway . 5999 2 12 10 2250 75 3 . . __ NMP/JAF | |||
* K-36 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Shoulder Saturation Free Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) . * :52 .. **35 .. ' 33 CR22A collector 2080 .. 1 12 0 1700 45 1 53_ 35 44 us 11 collector 805 1 12 0 1575 35 1 54 3Ei 35 US11 collector. 648 1 12 0 1575 35 1 55 37 36 .. CR 15 collector 912 1 12 0 1750 35 1 56 38 39 Lake st collector 3189 1 12 0 1700 50 3 57 39 40 Lake St | |||
* collector | |||
* 5795 1 12 0 1700 50 3 !, 58. 40 36 Lake St collector 2943 1 12 0 1750 45 1 59 41 . '.' 36 USll collector 2122 1 12 0 1750 35 1 '*60 42 ,'*-' 41 US11 collector 7375 1 12 6 1700 55 3 61 43 34 181. freeway 900 2 12 10 2250 75 1 62 45 51 CR 28 collector 1311 1 12. 0 1700 55 8' 63 45 116 us 11 collector 16298 1 12 10 1700 55 8 64 45 163 us 11 collector 9635 1 12 10 1700 . 55 16 65 46 47 . I Sl -SR 13 freeway 1650 1 12 3 1700 50 8 Ramp ramp 66 46 48 SR 13 collector -2821 l 12 0 1700 40 8 * .. ,' 67 47 25 181 freeway *6190 2 12 10 2250 *75 8 68 47 590 181 freeway 6688 2 12 10 2250 75 8 69 49 11 CR 5 local 1286 1 12 0 1750 35 2 roadway 70 50 '21 | |||
* Brennan local 2072' 1 12 . 0 1575 35 2 Beach Rd roadway 71 51 52 CR 28 collector 1001 1 12 o. 1700 55 8 72 51 54: I 81-CR28 *freeway 1225 1 12 6 1700 50 8 Ramp ramp 73 52 53 I 81-CR 28 freeway 1415 1 12 6 1700 50 8 Ramp ramp 74 52 55 CR 28 collector 2790 1 12 0 1700 55 8 75 53 54 181 freeway 2380 2 12 10 2250 75 *8 NMP/1AF K-37 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 76 53 590 181 freeway 8911 2 12 10 2250 75 8 77 54 53 181 freeway 2380 2 12 10 2250 75 8 78 54 591 181 freeway 7143 2 12 10 2250 75 17 79 56 57 SR 104 collector 6062 1 12 6 1700 55 16 80 56 163 us 11 collector 8900 1 12 10 1700 55 16 81 56 166 us 11 collector 13419 1 12 6 1700 55 16 82 57 58 SR 104 collector 1353 1 12 6 1700 55 17 83 57 60 181-SR 104 freeway 1084 1 12 6 1700 50 17 Ramp ramp 84 58 59 I 81-SR 104 freeway 941 1 12 6 1700 50 17 Ramp ramp 85 58 61 SR 104 collector 923 1 12 6 1700 55 17 86 59 60 181 freeway 1914 2 12 10 2250 75 17 87 59 591 181 freeway 8873 2 12 10 2250 75 17 88 60 59 181 freeway 1914 2 12 10 2250 75 17 89 60 592 181 freeway 5379 2 12 10 2250 75 17 90 62 63 SR 69 collector 1543 1 12 0 1575 35 23 91 63 64 SR 69 collector 1230 1 12 8 1700 40 23 92 63 71 I 81-SR 69 freeway 997 1 12 4 1350 30 23 Ramps ramp 93 64 65 CR 26 collector 1239 1 12 6 1700 60 23 94 64 67 SR 69 collector 853 1 12 8 1700 40 23 95 65 66 I 81-CR 26 freeway 810 1 12 4 1575 35 23 Ramp ramp 96 66 71 181 freeway 1453 2 12 10 2250 75 23 97 66 593 181 freeway 5464 2 12 10 2250 75 23 98 68 71 181 freeway 1591 2 12 10 2250 75 23 99 68 594 181 freeway 4172 2 12 10 2250 75 23 NMP/JAF K-38 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
. ' .. Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type {ft.} Lanes (ft.) {ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 100 -69 .70 US.11 collector 81S1 1 12 6 1700 SS 22 101 69 166 .* us .11 coilector | |||
* S49 1 12 6 1700 -SS 22 102 *_. 69 686 SR 69 collector 3860 1. 12 8 1700 SS 22 103*. 70 617 us 11 collector 6284 1. 12 6 1700 SS 22 i04 71 66 181 *freeway 14S3 2 12 10 22SO 7S 23 lOS 71 68 181 freeway 1S91 2 12 10 22SO 7S . 23 106 72 73 SR 69 collector 6860 1 12 8 1700 SS 16 107 73 69 SR 69 collector 4887 1 12 8 1700 SS 22 108 74 72 SR 69 collector 3860 1 12 8 1700 SS 16 109 -7S 74 SR 69 collector 8464 1 12 8 1700 SS 16 110 7S 610. SR 69 collector 2S8 1 12 0 13SO 30 16 111 .. 76* 77 SR 104 collector 899 1 12 0 17SO 30 lS 112. 76 84 SR 104 collector 968 *. 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 16 113 76 610 SR69 collector 1379 1 12 0 13SO 30 16 114 77 76 SR 104 collector 899 1 12 0 13SO 30 15 11S 77 78 SR 104 .. collector 1390 1 12 0 17SO 30 lS 116 77 88 Scenic Ave collector 2212 1 12 8 1S7S 3S lS 117 78 77 SR 104 collector 1390 1 12 0 17SO 30 lS 118 78 79 SR 3 collector 979 1 12 8 1700 40 lS 119 79 78 SR3 collector 979 1 12 8 17SO 40 lS 120 79 80 SR 3 collector 3000 1 12 8 1700 4S lS. 121 . 80 79 SR 3 collector 3000 1 12 8 1700 4S lS 122 80 200 SR 3 collector 3091. 1 12 8 1700 SS lS 123 81 82 SR 3 collector 2606 1 12 8 17SO SS 21 i24 82 83 SR 3 collector S971 1 12 8 17SO SS 21 12S 83 128 CR4 collector 9S17 1 12 0 1700 so 21 126 83 129 SR 3 collector S603 1 12 8 1700 SS 21 127 84 169 Pulaski Dr local 1183 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 16 NMP/JAF K-39 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February i4, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type {ft.) Lanes {ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) roadway . 128 84 607 SR 104 *collector 186S 1 12 6 1700 40 *16 i29 8S 86 SR 104 *collector 4747 1 12 6 17SO SS 16 130 86 608 SR 104 . collector 107S7 1 12 6 1700 60 16 131 86 613 Rowe Rd* .local S96S 1 12 0 . 1S7S 3S 16 roadway 132 87 78 Academy St collector 1047 1 12 0 17SO 40 lS 133 88 77 Scenic Ave collector 2212 1 12 8 17SO 3S 1S 134 88 96 Scenic Ave collector 3876 1 12 8 1700 4S lS 135 89 78 SR104 collector 2673 1 12 6 17SO 40 lS 136 90 88 Liberty St local 629 1 12 0 1350 30 . 1S roadway 137 92 79 Spring St local 719 1 12 0 13SO 30 1S roadway 138 93 79 Spring St local 636 1 12 0 13SO 30 lS roadway 139 94 7S Munger Hill local 704 1 12 0 1700 40 16 Rd roadway 140 9S 80 Munger Hill local 1099 1 12 0 1700 40 lS Rd roadway 141 96 88 Scenic Ave collector 3876 1 12 8 1700 4S lS 142 96 120 SR 3 . collector 764S 1 12 4 1700 SS lS 143 97 98 SR 3 collector 3882 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 144 97 121 SR 3 collector 3873 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 14S 98 99 SR 3 collector 3761 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 146 99 100 SR 3 collector S296 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 147 100 102 SR 3 collector 1766 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 148 100 103 CR 28 collector 188S 1 12 0 1700 4S 7 149 101 12 SR 3 collector 483S 1 12 4 17SO 4S 7 NMP/JAF | |||
* K-40 KLD Engineering, P.C. .Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
'. :*.* Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Node Node lSO *.102' iOl **isl '.103 *,.' 104 is2 104** . 161' 153 lOS *11S *. 1S4 106 694 lSS ' 107 110 1S6 108 109 1S7. 109 ,* 111 i 158 110 .,, ld9 *. 1S9' 111 *112 *, 160 112 113 161' 113 114' 162 113 118 163 114 '106 164 'llS .4S ' 16S' 116 4S' .166 116 S99 ' 167 117 116 '* 168' 118 602 " 169: 119 113 170 120 96 j71' 120' .** 121 | |||
* 172 121 ,97 173 121 120 174 122 97 i7S 123 122 176 124 .123 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Roadway Length Name Type (ft.) SR3 collector. I | |||
* 2740 . CR.28 coilector I 97S | |||
* CR 28 collector' 1977 . CR 28 collector 1435 CR 28 . collector 3016 Salisbury Rd I collector 872 Salisbury Rd I collector '2099 CR 28 I collector 2778 sa'lisbury Rd I co.llector 193 CR 28 . * * *I collector 2331 CR28 I collector 1223 CR 28 I collector 1283 CR 41 | |||
* I collector 3988 | |||
* CR 28 | |||
* I* collector i467 CR28 collector I 18SS *US 11 us 11 CR41 CR41 CR41 , SR 3 | |||
* SR 3 SR 3 SR 3 SR 104B SR 104B Meixco Point *. DrW collector 1. 16298 collector I 23S2 . collector I | |||
* 1990 . collector I 874S collector I 4S06 collector 764S collector 2927 *collector 3873 collector* 2902 collector 5895 collector 1499 collector 1891 K-41 No.of Lanes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Width Width Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 12 4 1700 SS 7 12 *o 1700 4S 7 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 0 1700 S5 7 12 0 1700 '40 7 12 0 1700 40 7 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1700 40 7 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1S7S 3S 7 12 0 1700 4S 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 0 1700 4S 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 10 1700 SS 8 12 6 1700 4S 8 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 ' 12 4 1700 5S 15 12 4 1700 SS 6 12 4 1700 SS 7 12 4 1700 SS 6 12 6 1700 60 6 12 6 1700 so 6 12 0 1S7S 3S 6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Februar-Y 2412016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes Width Width Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 177. *12s* .* 122. CR40 collector . 2057. 1 0 1575 35 6 178 126 123 SR f04B collector 2146 1 12 .6 1700 50 6 179 127 126 SR 1048 collector 3254 1 12 6 1700 55 6 180 128 254 CR4 collector 6035 1 12 0 1700 50 21 . 181 129 259 SR3 collector 5232 1 12 8 1700 55 21 182 130 131 SR 3 collector. 5309 1 12 8 1700 50 21 183 136 .CR45 | |||
* collector 7245 12 0 1700 so 21 131 1.32 SR 3 collector * | |||
* 3272 1 12 8 1700 55 30 . -185 . 131 ** '250 SR 264 .-collector 9748 1 12 6 1700. 55 30 . 186 132 131 SR 3. collector 3277 1 . 12 8 1700 55 30 187. 132 133 SR 3 collector 2718 1 12 8 1700 55 30 188 133 132 SR 3 . collector 2709 1 12 8 1700 55 30 189 133 134 SR 3 collector 6537 1 12 8 1700 55 30 190 134 i33 SR 3 collector 6538 1 12 8 1700 SS 30 191 134. 135 . SR 3 collector 1693 1 12 8 1700 SS 30 192 13S *134. SR 3 collector 169S 12 8 1700 SS 30 .193. 13S 237 SR 3 collector* 7.823 .1 12 8 1700 SS 27 194 | |||
* 13S 2S3 SR49 collector 779S 1 12 6 1700 so 30 136 301 CR4S collector 3794 1 12 0 1700 4S 21 196 137. 139 CR4 collector 2792 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 197 137 . 71S CR 176 collector 1278 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 198 138 632 Myers Rd collector 2304 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 199 138 .724 CR4 collector 1191 1 12 0. 1700 SS 14 . 200 * .. ** 138. 726 .CR4 *collector 1224 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 201 139 187 CR4 collector 3396 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 202 140 141 CR4 collector 4062 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 203 141 194 CR.4 collector 2312 1 12 0 1700 so 20 .204 142 143 CR4 collector S978 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 NMP/JA.F K-42 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Link# Stream Stream Node Node Name Type 20S 143 144 CR4 collector 206 143 628 . CR 6 collector 207 144 626 CR 3S collector 208 144 698. CR4 collector 209 14S 146 CR 6 collector 210 14S 183 CR 6 collector 211 146 14S .CR6 collector 212 146 147 CR 6 collector 213 147 146 CRG' collector* 214 147 199 CR 6 collector 21S 148 199 CR 6 collector 216 149 716 SR 104 collector . 217 149 728 CR 6 collector 218 lSO 363 SR 104 collector 219 lSl 1S2 SR 104 collector 220 lSl 363 . SR 104 collector 221 .* lSl 729 *Tollgate Rd . collector 222 1S2 1S3 SR 104 collector 223 1S3 89 SR 104 collector 224 1S4 149 CR6 collector 22S 1S4 717 SR104B collector 226 lSS 1S6 SR 104B collector 227 lSS 609 SR 104 . collector . 228 . 1S6 1S4 SR 104B collector 229 1S7 86 Smithers Rd collector . 230 1S7. 60S Spath Rd local roadway 231 1S8 1S7 .Tubbs Rd collector . NMP/}AF Evacuation Time Estimate Lane Length No. of Width (ft.) Lanes (ft.) 13490 1 12 10680 *. 1 12 198S 1 12 2817 1 12 206S 1 12 *3428 1 12 20SO 1 12 1480 1 12 1480 1 12 1221 1 12 2328 1 12 1109 1 12 1360 1 12 1790. 1 12 2906 1 12 1987 1 12 706 1 12 3317 1 12 2904 1 12 2776 1 12 809 1 12 1643 1 12 989 1 12 3S6S 1 12 48SS 1 10 4997 1 12 377 1 12 K-43 Shoulder Saturation Flow Width (ft.} Rate (pcphpl) 0 17SO 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 4 1700 0 1700 4 1700. 4 1700 4 1700' 4 1700 4 1700 6 1700 4 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 4 1700 6 1700 10 1700 6 1700 10 1700. 0 17SO 0 1700 0 17SO Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) SS 21 SS 20 so 21 SS 21 so lS SS lS so lS so lS so lS. so lS so lS SS lS so lS SS lS SS lS SS lS SS lS SS lS SS lS 4S . lS 60 lS SS 14 40 lS SS lS 40 16 4S 16 so 16 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Link# Stream Stream Node Node Name 232 159 *121 Fort leazier ****.*Rd . ' .. . . 233' 160 :161 S Daysville Rd 234 161 110 | |||
* CR 28 23S : 162 .. '163 Drybridge Rd . 236 163 4S us 11** ' 237 163 S6 US11 238 164 60S CR41 239 164 719, CR41 *.240 16S 119 CR41 241 166 56 us 11 242 166 69 us 11 243 .. 167 164 .. Sherman Rd 244 169 170 . Tubbs Rd 24S 170 is8 TubbsRd | |||
* 246 171 1S7 Tubbs Rd 247 172 1S4 CR 6 248 172 718 .CR 1 249 174 127 SR 104B 2SO . 174 603 *. Tollgate Rd* 2s1* 17S 176 SR 104B 252 176 174 SR 104B 2S3 178 172 CR 6 2S4 179 172 CR 1 2SS 180 179 CR 1 NMP/JAF **Evacuation Time Estimate L __ --Lane Roadway Length No. of Width Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) collector 3172 1 . 12 local roadway 1726 1 12 collector 2298 1 12 collector* S44S 1 12 collector 963S 1 12 collector 8899 1 12 collector 3832 1 12 collector 791 1 12 collector 2048 1 12 collector* 13419 1 12 collector S49 1 12 local 2948 1 12 roadway . collector 1017 1 12 collector 4202 1 . 12 collector 4014 1 12 collector S379 1 12 collector 730 1 12 collector. 2600 1 12 collector 1066 1 12 collector 4017 1 12 collector 4129 1 12 local 793 1 12 roadway collector 7136 1 12 collector 30S6 1 12 K-44 Shoulder Saturation Flow Width (ft.} Rate (pcphpl} 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 10 1700 10 17SO 4 1700 4 1700 0 1700 6 17SO 6 1700 0 17SO 0 1700 0 1700 0 17SO 4 1700 0 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 10 1700 0 1700 0 1700 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 40 7 40 7 so 7 40 16 SS 16 SS 16 SS 16 SS 16 SS 7 SS 16 SS 22 40 16 40 16 so . 16 so 16 so 1S SS 6 60 6 40 6 60 1S 60 6 40 6 SS s SS s KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No.of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 2S6 181 20S CRl collector 411 1 12 0 17SO SS 14 2S7 181 Dennis Rd local : 1700 714 *roadway 676 1 12 0 40 14 '' 2S8 182 181 CR 1 collector 4S63 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 2S9. 182 706 CR 29 collect.or 868 1 12 0 1700 . SS . 14 260 183 143 CR 6 . collector 494S 1 12 0 1700 . SS 21 261 184 18S CR 29 | |||
* collector S084 1 12 0 1700 so 14 262 18S 186 CR 29 collector 2720 1 12 0 1700 so 14 263 186 187 CR 29 *collector 4063 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 264 187 140 CR4 collector 2348 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 26S 188 189 SR 104 collector 1164 1 12* 6 1700 SS 14 266 188 604 SR 104 collector 4497 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 267 189 184 CR 29 collector 3668 1 12 0 1700 so 14 268 189 188 SR 104 collector 1164 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 269 189 306 SR 104 collector .346S 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 270 190 14S. Darrow Rd local 7742 1 12 0 1700 so lS roadway 271 191 202 SR 104 collector 1177 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 272 191 604 SR 104 collector 1816 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 273 191 722 CR Sl collector 811 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 274 192 193 CR Sl collector 4493 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 27S 193 19S CRSl collector 1477 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 276 193 197 Mud Lake Rd collector 3477 1 10 0 1700 4S 14 277 194 142 CR4 collector 19SS 1 12 0 1700 so 20 278 19S 196 CR Sl collector 4168 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 279 196 14S CR Sl collector 3788 1 12 0 1700 4S lS 280 197 194 Mud Lake Rd collector 43S9 1 10 0 1700 4S 14 281 198 190 Darrow Rd local 7S73 1 12 0 1700 4S lS NMP/JAF K-45 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Roadway . Link# ... Nam*e Type:**. Node Node roadway 282 199 ' 147 CR 6 coilector 283 199 723 Hurlbut Rd local roadway 284 200 81 SR 3 collector 28S 201 80 Munger Hill local Rd roadway 286 201 200 Munger Hill local ., Rd roadway . 287 202 lSS SR 104 collector 288 202 191 SR 104 local roadway 289 203 202 Middle Rd collector 290 20S 180 CR 1 collector 291 205 181 CR 1 collector 292 206 20S Nine Mile local Point Rd roadway 293 207 208 CR 176 collector 294 208 209 CR 176 collector 29S 208 210 CR4S collector 296 209 327 CR4S collector 297 209 328' CR 176 collector 298 210 208 CRAS collector '299 210 216 CR4S collector 300 211 239 Kingdom Rd local roadway 301 211 637 CR4S collector 302 212 211 Kingdom Rd local roadway NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Lane Length . of (ft:) *:h lanes . (ft.) 1212 1 12 72S 1 10 8301 1 12 1431 1 12 1842 1 12 6970 1 12 1177 1 12 1082 1 12 4078 1 12 411 1 12 8924 1 12 S193 1 12 606 1 12 2980 1 12 1972 1 12 7600 1 12 2980 1 12 2040 1 12 SOS9 1 12 3731 1 12 426 1 12 K-46 Shoulder . Saturation Flow Width* .. : Rate (ft.) (pcphpl) 4 1700 0 1700 8 1700 0 1700 0 1700 6 1700 6 1700 0 13SO 0 1700 0 1700 0 1750 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 Free Flow Grid *Speed Numl>'er (mph) so lS so lS SS lS 40 lS 40 lS SS 14 SS 14 30 14 SS 14 55 14 40 s SS 20 SS 20 so 20 so 20 SS 20 so 20 so 20 40 19 4S 19 40 19 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 | |||
..... CR4S collector 1 12 1700 so 30S .. 213 221 *CR4S collector 3040 1 12 0 1700 so 20 . ;* '. 306 2i4 243 SR 481 minor 786S 2* 12 12 1900 60 . 19 arterial 307 214 *. .47S CR4S collector. 2468. 1 12 0 1700 4S 19 214 637 *CR4S collector 462 1 12 0 1700. 4S 19 . 309 .* 21s**. 216 Rd* *collector 2SS7 1 12 0 1700 so 20 .* 310 21S. <221 CR4S collector 648 1 12 0 1S7S 3S . 20 311 216 **210 .CR4? .. collector 2040 1 12 0 i700 so 20 312 *. 216 .* 217 Myers Rd *collector 5917 1 12 0 '1700 4S 20 313 217 218 Myers Rd collector 437S 1 12 0 1700 *. 4S 20 314 218 700 .. CR57 collector 2339 1 12 0 1700 . so 20 31S 219 634 CR S7* collector 239 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 19 .*. 316 219 . 635 | |||
* SR 481 minor S233 2 12. | |||
* 12 1900 60 19 . *arterial* . * '* 317 220 218 . CR S7 collector . 918 1 12 0 1700 so 20 '318 *.. 221 .. 213 . .CR4S collector 3031 1 12 0 1700 so 20 319 221 21S CR4S collector 649 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 20 320 222 224 CRS7 collector 1387 1 12 0 1700 4S 26 *321 223 .* 22S CR57 collector 192 1 12 0 1700 *so 26 .. * .. 322 224 223 CR S7 collector 4140 1 12 0 1700 4S 26 323 22S *. 384 SR481 collector iS34 1 12 12 1700 4S 26 324 226 223 '. Van Buren St **local 1216 1 12 0 13SO 30 26 . roadway*. 32S 227 231 SR 481. collector 1217 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 326 228 230 SR 481. collector '2182 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 327. 229 228 SR481 collector 2760 1 12 12 1700 SS 20 NMP/JAF K-47 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 328 230 227 SR 481 collector 1346 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 . 329 231 22S SR 481 collector 783 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 330 232 222 CRS7 collector 2984 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 331 232 711 Howard Rd local 4026 1 12 0 1700 40 20 roadway 332 233 234 .CR4S collector 14S1 1 12 0 1700 so 20 333 233 327 .CR4S collector 3066 1 12 0 1700 so 20 334 234 233 CR4S collector 14S1 1 12 0 1700 so 20 .. *_*33s 234 631 CR4S collector 467 1 12 0 1S7S . 3S 20 336 23S 236 CR4S collector 2279 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 337 236 237 CR 6 collector 12864 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 338 236 246 CR4S coUector 11S8 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 . 339 237 13S SR 3 collector 7823 1 12 8 1700 SS 27 340 237 329 CR6 .collector 6487 1 12 0 1700 SS 27 34i 237 383 SR 3 collector 6633 1 12 12 1700 SS 27 342. 238 236 CR 6 collector 2183 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 343 239 240 Kingdom Rd . local | |||
* 2310 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 344 240 24S Kingdom Rd local S378 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 34S 240 636 March Rd*. local 1862 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 346 241 219 CR S7 collector 3694 1 12 0 1700 4S 19 347 241 243 March Rd local 616 1 12 0 1700 40 19 . roadway . 348 242 472 Minetto collector 1033 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 19 Bridge Rd 349 242 476 CR S7 collector 6S3S 1 12 0 1700 so 19 3SO 243 219 SR481 minor 3313 2 12 12 1900 60 19 NMP/JAF K-48 KLD Engineering, P.C. *Evacuation Time.Estimate February 24, 2016 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length. No. of Width Width Rate Speed Number Link# Stream Stream Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (mph) Node Node . arterial 3SL 243 241 March Rd* local 616 1 12 , 0 1700 40 19 . roadway 3S2 , 243* 636 March Rd local 467 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 3S3 244 220 . CR S7 collector 3338 1 12 0 1700 so 19 .**3s4 24S 220 Kingdom Rd local SS3 .1 12 0 13SO 30 20 *roadway "(. 3SS 24Ei 247 CR4S 'collector 3472 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 3S6 247 248 CR4S collector 488S 1 12 0 1700 so 21 357 248 249 CR4S collector 3336 1 12 0 1700 so 21 3S8 249 130 CR4S collector 667S 1 12 0 1700 so 21 3S9 2SO 2S1 SR 49 collector S4S2 , 1 12 6 1700 so 30 360 2SO ', 2S2 , SR 264 collector 1643 1 12 6 1700 SS 30 361 2Sl , 62S SR 49 collector 3379 1 12 6 1700 so 30 , 362 2S3 2SO *sR49 collector 4367 1 12 6 1700 SS 30 363 2S4 2SS CR4 collector 4S39 1 12 0 1700 so 22 364 2S4 2S7 CR4S collector 4304 1 12 0 1700 so 21 36S 2S4 262 CR4S collector 2341 1 12 0 1700 4S 22 366 2SS 2S8 CR4 collector 4109 1 12 0 1700 so 31 .367 2S6 268 CR4 collector 760 1 12 0 1700 4S 31 368 2S7 2S4 CR4S collector 4304 1 12 0 1700 so 21 369 2S7 2S8 CR4S collector 6662 1 12 0 1700 4S 31 370 2S7 301 . CR4S collector 4007 1 12 0 1700 4S 21 371 2S8 256 CR4 collector 3002 1 12 0 1700 so 31 372 2S9 3S9 .. SR 3 collector 2360 l 12 8 1700 SS 21 373 260 263 CR4S collector 4838 1 12 0 1700 so 22 374 26,0 622 Graves Rd local S3SS 1 12 0 1700 4S 22 ; , NMP/JAF K-49 KLD Engineering, P.C .. . Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Link# 37S. 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 39S 396 397 398 . NMP/JAF. stream Node 260* 261 262 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 27S 276 277 277 278 278 .Evacuation Time Estimate stream Node 623 260 254. 623 265 267 616 263 288 269 292 270 271. 272 273 287 297 280 281 277 278 279 298 597 Roadway Name *cR4S * .* Paradise Rd CR4S CR4S | |||
* CR45 us 11 .CR4S Villiard Rd us 11 CR 18 CR4 CR 33 . CR 33 CR33 SR49 SR 49 SR49 SR 49 us 11 *SR 49 . I 81-SR 49 Ramps SR 49 181 181 Roadway Length Type (ft.) roadway collector 2162* *local 2670 . roadway collector* *2361 collector 2632 collector 1370 :collector 1743 . collector 6S10 local 7199 roadway collector 10574 . collector 3749 collector 4993 collector 4522 collector 7832 collector 1377 collector 256S collector 3203 collector 7603 collector* 2680 | |||
* collector 1073 collector 1247 freeway 973 ramp collector 523 freeway 797 freeway S884 K-50 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid No. of Width Width Speed Number Rate Lanes (Jt.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (rnph) 1 12 0 1700 4S 22 1 12 .0 1700 40 22 . 1 12 .. a* . 1700 . 4S 22 1 12 0 1700 45 .22 1 12 0 1700 50 22 1 12 12 1700 40 22 1 12 0 1700 50 22 1 12 0 1575 35 22 1 12 10 1700 55 . 22 1 12 0 1700 50 31 1 12 a* 1700 so 31 1 12 0 1700 50 31 1 12 0 1700 so 31 1 12 0 1700 so. 31 1 12 6 1700 50 31 1 12 6 1700 50 31 1 12 6 1700 55 30 1 12 6 1700 40 31 1 12 0 1S7S 35 31 1 12 6 1750 40 32 1 12 .4 1700 50 32 1 12 6 1750 40 32 3 12 10 2250 7S 32 2 12 10 2250 7S 32 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
.. * :-* Up-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Down-Roadway Roadway Length No.of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph} 399 279 :7l3. SR49 collector 612 1 12 6 -1700 45 32 -* 400 .280' *-** 276 : SR49 collector 1978 1 12 6 1750 40 31 401 282 275*. SR49 collector 2194 1 12 0 1750 35 31 402 283 282 ,* . SR49 col.lector 1075 1 12 6 1700 45 31 403 284 283 SR49 collector 831 1 12 6 1700 45 31 *_ -404' ,285 284 SR 49. collector 1406 .* 1 12 6 1700 ' 50 31 | |||
* 4o5 286 285 SR49 .** collector 2748 1 12 '6 1700 50 31 406 287 SR 49 collecto*r. 4298 1 12 6 1700 50 31 . .407 288 '' 289 ' us 11 collector 8665 1 12 10 1700 55 31 '' 408** 289 290 us 11 ,' . collector 4425-1 12 10 1700 55 31 409 290 295 ** USll collector 2656 1 12 10 1700 55 31 ,, 410 291 290 CR4 collector 4120' 1 12 0 1700 50 31 411 292 .'293 -CR4 collector 3869 1 12 0 1700 so 31 412 293 294. CR4 collector 5308 1 12 o* 1700 so 31 413 294 291 CR4 collector 1293 1 12 0 1700 40 31 414 295 275' us 11* collettor 3879 1 12 10 1750 40 31 415 -296 ' 272 SR49 *collector 2554 1 12 6 1700 50 31 416 297 296 . SR49 collector '988 1 12 6 1700 45 31 -. ,' 417' 298 '' 2,78 ' > 181 freeway 797 3 12 10 2250 75 32 ' 4i8 299 82 Pople Ridge local 5708 1 10 0 1750 40 21 Rd roadway " local 419*.*., 300 73 St 2747 1 10 0 1700 40 22 roadway .\ 420 301 _257 *.CR45 collector 4006 1 12 0 1700 45 21 421 . 301 624 Winks Rd collector 2485 1 12 0 1700 45 30 422 302 274 Winks Rd collector 8255 1 12 0 1700 45 30 423 303 309 CR4 collector 7829 1 12 0 1700 55 13 424: ,' 303 553 ' EasfAve collector 2645 1 12 0 1700 40 12 | |||
* NMP/JAF K-51 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 42S *.304 . sso City Line Rd , local 2S27 1 12 0 1S7S 3S. 13 . roadway 426 304 687 SR 104 collector 2616 1 12 0 17SO 40 11 'i, 427 . 30S. ns.* SR 104 collector 13Sl 1 12 6 1700 so 11 428 . 30S 727 Kloc ks collector .1682 1 12 0 1700 4S 11 Corners Rd 429 3d6 189 SR 104 collector 346S 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 *.430 30fr -JOS. SR104 * .. *collector 8434 1 12 6 1700 so 14 ; 431 *. 3d7 ' 633 CR 1 collector 3737 1 12 o* 1700 SS 11 432 307 70S collector 1094 1 12 0 1700 4S 11 433. 308 . 310 CR S3 collector 3371 1 12 0 1700 4S 13 434 308 334 SR 104 collector 602S 1 12 6 1700 so 11 43S 138 CR4 collector 6S60 1 12 0 1700 SS 13 436 309 303 CR4 collector 7829 1 12 0 1700 SS 13 437 309 311 .. CR S3 collector 2798 l 12 0 1700 so 13 438 310* 309 CRS3 .collector 4491 1 12 0 1700 SS 13 .* .... 439 311 312 CR. S3 collector 88SS 1 12 0 1700 SS 19 440 312 212 .CR S3 collector 3411 1 12 0 1700 SS 19 441 313 . 344 E 10th St collector 1178 1 12 0 13SO 30 12 442 313 SS3 East Ave collector 1392 1 12 0 1700 40 12 ,. local 443 313. SS4 Church St roadway 1334 1 12 0 13SO 30 12 .. | |||
* 444 314 .570 E 10th St collector 1406 1 12 0 . 17SO 30 12 .44S .314 6S7 SR104 minor SS3 2 12 0 17SO 4S 12 arterial 446 31S 331 Lake Rd collector 1870 1 12 0 1700 so 11 447 316 31S Lake Rd collector 179S 1 12 0 17SO so 11 448 317 3SO Lake Rd collector 1646 1 12 0 1700 so 4 NMP/JA.F K-52 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) | |||
* 449 318 317 Lake Rd colle.ctor 2027 1 '12 0 1700 50 5. 450 319 318 ' * *Lake Rd collector 3481 1 12 0 1700 50 5 451 320 695 Lake Rd collector 954 1 12 0 1700 40 5 452 321 206 Lake Rd collector 4452 1 12 0 1700 40 5 453 321 ' 322 CR29 collector 6581 1 12 0 1700' 55 5 454 322 182 .CR 29 collector* 3955 1 12 0 1700 50 14' 455 323 206 Ni.ne Mile local 1589 1 12 0 1700 40 5 Point Rd roadway 456 324 182 CRl collector 3727 1 12 0 1700 55 14. 457 324 325 CR 1 collector 4246 1 12 0 1700 55 14 458 325 307 CR 1 col.lector 4503 1 12 0 1700 55 14 459 327 209 CR45 collector 1972 1 12 0 1700 50 20 '460 327 233 CR45 collector 3066 1 12 0 1700 50 20 461 328 364 CR 176 . collector 4495 1 12 0 1700 55 20 462 329 380 CR9. collector 2506 1 12 0 1700 55 27 463 329 381 CR 6 collector 2799 .1 12 0 1700 55 27 464 330 315 Novel is collector 785 1 12 0 1750 35 11 Driveway 465 331 333 Lake Rd collector 5146 1 12 0 1700 50 11 4.66 332 331 Novelis collector 1338 1 12 0 1575 35 11 Driveway. 467 333 334 CR E 63 collector 4541 1 12 0 1700 50 11 468 333 335 Lake Rd** . collector 1021 1 '12 0 1700 50 11 469 334 304 SR104 collector 659 1 12 0 1750 45 11 470 335 337 E Seneca St collector 4002 1 12 0 1750 50 10 471 335 339 Mitchell St collector 203 1 12 8 1700 50 11 472 336 337 St Paul collector 1405 1 12 0 1750 40 10 473 336 340 Mitchell Si: collector 3816 1 '12 8 1700 40 10 . NMP/JAF K-53 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway length No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Node Node Name Type fft.) Lanes Width Width Flow Flow Grid {ft.) {ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 474' .* 337 336 St Paul collector 1405 1 12 0 1700 40 10 475 337 338 E 4th St collector 2312 1 12 0 1750 *40 10 476 '337 552 E Seneca St collector 3892 1 12 0 1575 35 10 477 338 342 SR104 collector 1286. 1 12 0 1750 40 12 478 33Q 336 M.itchell St .collector 3842 1 12 8 . 1700 50 10 479 340 584 .* E. 10th St collector* 987 . 1 12 0 1350 30 10 '480 341 340 Mitchell St *collector 581 1 12 8 1350 30 10 481 342 571 E 13th St local 560 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 482 342 656, SR 104 collector 930 1 12 0 1700 40 .12 483 343 345 E Albany St collector 1057 1 12 0 1575 35 12 .. 484 344 313 E 10th St collector 1178 1 12 0 1350 30 12 485 344 563 .E Albany St collector 1138 1 12 0 1350 30 12 486 . 344 570 E 10th St collector 445 1 12 0 1750 30 12 487 345 344 . E Albany St collector 1857 1 12 0 1575 35 12 488 346 524 E Utica St . collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 12 489 346 661 E 1st St local 1237 2 12 0 1900 30 12 roadway 490 346 662 E 1st St local 213 2 12 0 1900 30 12 roadway 491 347 338 SR 104 . collector 610 1 12 0 1750 40 12 Jim local 492 347 348 Shampine roadway* 1004 1 12 0 1700 40 .12 Blvd 493 ,348 343 E Albany St collector 334 1 12 0 1575 35 12 494 349 316 .. | |||
* Lake Rd collector 3092 1 12 0 1700 50 11 495 350 349 Lake Rd . collector 2642 1 12 0 1700 50 4 496 351 319 Lake Rd .collector 2356 1 12 0 1700 50 *5 497 351 320 Lake Rd collector* 1012 1 12 2 1700 50 5 NMl'/JAF . K-54 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
'498 3S2 3S1 Driveway . roadway 698 1 12 0 1S7S 3S s .. local 499 3S3 306 Duke Rd roadway | |||
* 3269 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 soo 3S4 3S7' CR3S collector 3083 1 12 0 1700 so lS SOl 3S4 361 Hurlbut Rd local 2S41 1 10 0 1700 so lS roadway S02 3SS 627 CR 35 collector 2037 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 21 S03 3S7 3SS CR.3S *collector 7703 1 12 0 1700 SS lS S04 3S8 3S9 CR 3S collector* S033 . 1 12 0 1700 so 21 sos 3S9 130 SR 3 collector 1371 1 12 8. 1700 4S 21 . S06 360 3S8 CR3S collector 2097 1 12 0 1700 so 21 S07 361 201 Hurlbut Rd local 11S07 1 10 0 1700 4S lS roadway S08 361 3S4 Hurlbut Rd local 2S41 1 10 0 1700 so lS roadway S09 362 612 CR44 collector 4847 1 12 0 1700 so lS SlO 363 1S1 SR 104 collector 1987 1 12 6 1700 SS lS Sll 363 362 CR44 collector 4277 1 12 0 1700 so is S12 364 40S CR 176 collector .9141 1 12 0 1700 SS 26 S13 36S 374 CR 176 local. S21 1. 12 0. 13SO 30 26 | |||
* roadway S14 36S 376 Oneida St collector 173S 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 ,SlS 36S 6S3 Oneida St collector 20S9 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 S16 366 368 SR 481 minor 816 2 12 0 17SO. 3S 26 arterial S17 366 6S1 Oneida St collector 188 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 S18 366 6S3 Oneida St collector 3SS 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 S19 367 371 SR 3 *minor 4SS 2 12 0 1750 3S 28 NMP/JAF K-55 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
.. "-!lin'k .#f. lJp.: Down,. * ;. .. .' .. | |||
* Node * * ** *i\!Ctd . * | |||
* Name'" * * . . .. e . ,.,.;*'i ____ "'"" arterial 520 I 367 I 399 I SR 481 minor I arterial 521 I 367 654 SR 3 collector 522 . I 368 367 SR 481 minor arterial 523 I 369 368 Rochester St collector 524 I 370 371 1st St collector '' minor 525 I 371 367 SR 3 arterial 526 371 406 I SR 3 I minor I arterial 527 372 371 1st St collector 528 373 377 CR 9 collector 529 373 386 SR3 collecto*r 530 I 374 375 CR 176 local roadway 531 375 386 SR 3 collector 532 375 395 SR 3 collector 533 376 365 Oneida St collector 534 376 373 SR 3 collector 535 377 373 CR 9 collector 536 377 378 CR 9 collector 537 378 377 .CR 9 collector 538 378 319 CR 9 collector 539 379 378 CR 9 collector 540 379 380 CR 9 collector 541 380 329 CR 9 collector 542 380 379 CR 9 collector NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate :;;:Nb .. o.i . La.ne : shoulder :* Saturation* * : .. (.ft.;f * .. | |||
* Wi.i;f,t.b Width*** i;;:.' *flow ., * >> " * ( f:f.} * '(tt.J" ,.. : (pcphpl) 1432 I 2 12 I 0 1900 313 1 12 0 1575 1852 2 12 0 1750 1377 1 12 0 1750 983 1 12 0 1750 455 2 12 0 1750 1325 I 2 I 12 0 1750 442 1 12 0 1750 1122 1 12 0 1575 1067 1 12 0 1575 1451 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1350 1107 1 12 0 1575 1204 1 12 0 1750 1735 1 12 0 1575 1415 1 12 0 1750 1122 1 12 0 1750 2318 1 12 0 1700 2335 1 12 0 1700 4565 1 12 0 1700 4565 1 12 0 1700 1276 1 12 0 1700 2502 1 12 0 1700 1249 1 12 0 1700 K-56 free 'Flow : *.speed: . J_i)'tph) 35 35 35 ' 30 30 35 I 35 30 35 35 I 30 35 35 35 35 35 50 50 55 55 50 55 50 | |||
* 28 26 I 26 I 26 I 26 I 28 28 28 26 26 I 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 27 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder* Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid link#* Stream Stream Name Type (ft.) 'tanes Width Width Rate Speed Number Node Node (ft.) (ft.) ' *' ., ''' ' (mph) 543 . ' 381 .' 704 CR6 * | |||
* collector '4048 1* 12 .. 0 1700 55 29. 544 382 *.*. 376. SR 3 collector 2521 1 12 12 '1700 45 26 . ' 545. . 383 382 SR 3 collector 3876 1 12 12 1700 55 26 546 384 '402'* SR481 collector 1769 1 12 12 1700 40 26 547 '385' 365 CR 176 local 1172 1 12 0 .* 1350 30 26 '. . roadway .. '548' 385 404 Ontario St local 1163 1 12 0 1350' 30 26 ,'. *roadway . ; .. *' 549** 386 :*373 SR 3 .*collector 1070 l 12 0 1750 35 26 550 386. 375 SR 3 collector 1107 1 12 0 1575 35 26 551 | |||
* 387 393 *. SR 481 *minor 2736 2 12 0 1900 40 28 .. arterial 552 388. 397 *.Fay St collector 2429 1 12 0 1700 40 28 553 .. | |||
* 389 387 Fay St collector '680 1 12 0 1750 40 28 '554 390 391 CR 57 collector 2232*. 1 12 0 1575 35 28 ... .. 555 390 .* -439* SR481 minor '3684 *2 12 12 1900 60 28. ' arterial 556 *.. 392 390 Driveway . collector 500 1 12 0 1750 30 28 557 393 390 SR 481 minor 644 2 12 0 1750 35 28 arterial ' 558 394 393 .** Pierce Dr* collector 1237 1 12 0 1575 35 28 559 395 375 SR 3 **collector 1204 1 12 0 1575 35 26 *' local 560. ,395 '397 .4th St . roadway 2480 1 12 o* 1350. 30 28 561 395 654 SR 3 | |||
* collector* 558 1 12 0 1575 35 26 562 396 395 4th St local 790 1 12 0 1750 30 26 roadway 563 397 387 Fay St collector* 138 1 12 0 1750 40 28 564 398 377 S 12th St local 629 1 12 0 1350 30 26 NMP/JA.F K-57 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 link# 565 566 567 568 569 . . 570 571 572 . 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 NMP/JAF Up* Stream Node 399 400 401 401 401 402 403 404 405 405 406 406. 406 407 407 408 409 410 410 411 411 411 *Evacuation Time Estimate Down* Stream Node 387 . 368 409 410 650 . 652 . .* 402 402 382 385 371 441 644 420 641 409 406 401 411 419 641 643 Roadway Roadway Name Type rmn SR 481 minor arterial Rochester St collector SR48 collector SR48 colfector .. Oneida St collector SR 481 collector Ontario St local roadway Ontario St local roadway Gillespie Rd local roadway CR 176 collector SR 3 minor arterial SR 48 collector SR 3 collector SR 3 collector SR 3 collector Phillips local roadway* SR 48 .collector SR48 *Collector Hannibal St ,collector SR 3 collector SR 3 collector CR3 collector Length., No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free (ft.) lanes Width Widtli Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number fpcphpl) (mph) .. 1273 2 12 0 1750 .35 28 335 1 12 0 1750 30 26 1397 1 12 0 1750 35 26 790 1 12 O* 1575 35 26 1231 1 12 0 1575 35 26 775 1 12 12 | |||
* 1700 45 26 474 1 12 0 1350 30 26 980 1 12. 0 1350 30 26 1996 . 1 12 0 1575 35 26 *2494 1 12 0 1700 45 26. 1325 2 12 0 1750 35 28 3454 1 12 0 1575 35 28 1014 2 . 12 0 1750 35 28 3177 1 12 10 1700 45 . 25 3255 1 12 6 1750 45 25 669 1 12 0 1750 30 26 1943 1 12 0. 1750 35 39 790 1 12 0 . 1750 35 26 5759 1 12 0 1750 35 25 2558 1 12 12 1700 55 25 990 1 12 6 1750 45 25 1303 1 12 0 1700 45 25 KLD Engineering, P .c: February 24, 2016 Y. Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Link# Stream Stream Name Type Node Node 587 412 413 CR 3 collector 588 412 431 collector 589 *. . 413 .414 CR3 collector | |||
* 590* 413 489 Rathburn. Rd collector 591 414 415 . CR 3. collector 592 415 432 .. CR 7 collector* . 593 415 730 CR 7. collector 594 417 453 SR 104 | |||
* collector 595 417 638 SR 3 collector 596 418 412. CR8 collector 597 418 419 SR 3 collector 598 418 489 SR 3 collector 599 . 419 411 SR3 collector 600 . 419 418. SR 3 collector 601 420 407 SR 3 collector 602 420 644 SR 3 .collector 603 421 407 Phillips St collector 604. 422 410 SR48 collector 605 423 422 SR48 collector 606 424 423 SR48 collector 607 425 424 SR 48 . collector 608 425 426 .CR 85 collector 609 426 42S CR 8S collector 610 426 428 | |||
* CR 8 . collector 611 426 SOl CR 8S | |||
* collector 612 427 494 Rathburn Rd collector 613 427 67S CR 8S collector 614 427 676 CR 8S. collector NMP/JAF .. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate Lane Length No.of Width (ft.) Lanes (ft.) 8607 1 12 6797 1 12 6522 1. 12 1245 1. 12 4741 1 12 1075 1 12 1743 1 12 779 1 12 3035 1 12 910 1 12 3095 1 12 8613 1* 12 2569 1 12 3095 1 12 3165 1 12 681 2 12 119S 1 12 1413 1 12 S373 1 12 6377 1 12 232S 1 12 7134 1 12 7134 1 12 S325 1 12 2SS2 1 12 4951 1 12 SS60 1 12 1S78 1 12 K-59 Saturation Shoulder Flow Width Rate (ft.) (pcphpl) 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1575 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 4 1700 0 1700 12 1700 12 1700 12 1750 12 1750 6 1700 0 17SO 0 1575 0 1S7S 3 1700 3 1700 3 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 50 25 55 25 45 25 35 25 45 24 45 24 45 24 55 24 40 24 55 25 55 25 60 25 55 25 55 25 45 25 3S 28 3S 2S 3S 26 50 26 50 2S 50 19 so 19 so 19 SS 19 55 19 40 25 SS 19 so 19 KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 I, I I Link# 0.L[] :617 618 619 ,, 620 621 622 623 624 62S ' 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 63S 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 NMP/JAF .' Up* Stream Node stream Node I , 428 , I 429 429 430 430 418 432 41S 432 4S9 432 489 433 432 433 446 433 677 434 433 43S 437 436 438 436 46S 436 466 437 434 438 703' 439 440 441 442 443 460 444 443 44S 444 446 44S ', 447 4S2 4S3 4S8 4SS 4S6 4SS 4S7 4S8 4SS 4S9 417 Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Name [] 8 CR 8 CR 8 CR 7 SR3. SR 3 , CR 7 CR 8S CR 8S CR 7 CR 7 CR 7 CR 20 CR 20 CR 7 CR 7 1481 SR48 SR104 CR 8S CR 8S CR8S SR 104A SR104 CR 34 SR 104 SR 104 SR 3 Roadway Type | |||
* 1 **collector* .. I 2S68 .*collector 1808 *collector **3460 collector 107S collector. ' 43S9 collector 10770 collector 10664 collector 1890 collector 4366 collector 'S363 collector 3193 collector 3669 collector S2S7 collector 1490 collector 4219 collector 2830 *freeway .2422 collector 1772. collector 8242 collector 3860 collector 1S16 collector 1014 collector 1370 collector 3234 collector 2119 collector 1299 collector 3724 collector 37S7 K-60 1* No. of Lanes 1 *1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 Larie Width (ft.) 12' 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 Shoulder Width (ft.,} *-0 0 0 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 8 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 12 Saturation Flow Rate (pcphpl) 1700.] 1700 17SO 1700 1700 1700-1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 *1100 1700 1700 1700 1700 2250 1S7S 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 17SO Free Flow Speed (mph) SS SS 4S 60, 60 SS so ', so 50' so so so so so so 7S 3S 60 so 40 40 SS SS SS SS SS SS -2S 2S 24 . 24 2S 24 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 29 28 24 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 | |||
.,, ' .... " Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl} (mph} .* 643 460 4i7 SR 104 collector 2799 1 12 8 1750 55 24 644 -** 461 *-' 443 : SR 104 collector -16427 1 12 s 1700 60, 18 645 462 461 SR 104 collector' 4337 1 12 8 1700 55 18 646 462 486 '' SR104A .collector 3776 1 12 4 1700 50 18 ', 647 463 .. 462 SR104 collector 1245 1 12 0 1700 50 18 648 .** 464 463 CR 20. collector 2758 1 12 0 1700 ' 50 18 *. 649 465 464 CR20** collector 363.1 ', ' 1 ' 12 0 1700 50 18 ... 650 466 436 CR 20 collector 1490 i 12 0 '1700 50 18 .-, : 466 .****498 .-. CR 20 collector ' ' ',', 1276 1 12 0 1700 50 19 '.** '652* *_*** __ * -467 ,'' 468* CR20 *collector | |||
* 2572 1 12 0 1700 50 **. 19 . **., 653 467 ., -498 -***tR20 ' collector .3096 1 12 0 1700 50 19 654 468 -467 CR20 collector 2572 1 12 0 1700 50 19 655 468. .469 .CR 25 collector *3625 1 12 0 1700 50 19 656 469 *, 468 CR25 collector .. 3625 1 12 o* 1700 so 19 ' 657 '469' 470 | |||
* CR24. collector *1245 1 12 0 1700 '45 19 **658 469 * .. .. -CR 25 -collector 1919 1 12 0 1700 45 19 659 470 469 CR24 ;. collector 1245 1 12 0 170,0 45 19 660 470 471 '* CR 24 .collector '1655 1 12 0 1700 45 19 -, 661 471 .4.70 ' , .. *CR24 collector 1655 1 12 0 ' 1700 45 19 ' ,' 662' 471 483 CR 24. collector ' 4245 1 12 0 1700 50 19' -663 472 483 Minetto | |||
* collector 519 1 12 ' 0 1125 25 19 . Bridge Rd ' ' 664 473 701 SR48 | |||
* collector 3181 1 12 3 1700 50 19 ' 665 474 473 ***SR48 collector 4865 1 12 3 1700 50 19 666 475 :242 *CR 57 colledor | |||
* 957 1 12 0 1700 45 19 667 476 241 CR 57 collector 1575 1 12 0 1700 45 19 668 477 475 CR 57 collect.or 6336 1 12 0 1700 50 19 669 ,. 478 477' CR 57 colledor 670 1 12 0 1700 50 19 _.NMP/JAF | |||
* K-61 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I I.*. .. ) . Up-Link# Stream Node 670 .*.* 479* 671 479 672 *.480 673 . 481 | |||
* 674 482 . 675. 483 '.679 .. 483 . 677 484 678. *, 484 679 485 680 4.85 681 486 . . 682 487. 683 488 .684 *.. .. 489 . 685 489 686 490 687 491 .* .... 688 492 689 493 690'* . 494 .. 691 *495 692 495 693 496 NMP/JA_F Evacuation Time Estimate Down-Roadway Stream Node Name *. 478 ' CR 57 481 SR 481 479. E River Rd* *. 482 SR 481 . *.*. *214* SR 481 ,471 .*CR24 .' 484 CR24 483 . CR 24 '485 | |||
* 48 426 CR 8 474 .. SR48 447 :' '* SR 104A 463 CR 20 447 CR 96 418 SR 3 432. SR 3 489. Rathburn Rd 490 Rathburn Rd 491 Rathburn Rd .492 Rathburn Rd .* '493 . Rathburn Rd 427 Rathburn Rd 712 Phillips Rd 495 Rathburn Rd Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Width Width Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpi) (mph) . | |||
* collector. 4757 . 1 12 0 | |||
* 1100 50 12 collector 2638 1 12 12 1700 55 12 collector 6776 1 12. 12 1700 55 12 minor 1618 2* 12 12 1900 60 13 arterial minor 8439 2 12 12 1900 60 19 arterial *collector . 4245 1 12 0 1700 50 19 . collector 312 1 12 0 1575 35 19 collector . 312 1 . 12 0 1575 35 19 *collector 1072 1 12. 12 1700 40 19* collector 11458 1 12 0 1700 50 19 collector 3321 1 . . 12 3 1700 50 19 collector 15063 1 12 4 1700 55 18 collector 7757 1 12 0 1700 50 . 18. *local 4098 1 12 0 1700 40 18 roadway | |||
* collector 8613 1 12 12 1750 60 25 collector 10771 1 12 12 1700 60 25 collector 3704 1 12 0 1700 40 25 collector 1390 1 12 0 1700 40 25 collector 574 1 12 0 1350 30 25 .*collector 1537 1 12 0 1700 40 25 *collector 414 1 12 0 1350 30 25 collector 3556 1 12 0 1700 45 19 local 4796 i 12 0 1575 35 19 roadway collector 6733 1 12 0 1700 45 19 K-62 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Up-Dowo-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Node Node Name Type 694 497 673 Rathburn Rd collector . 695 498 466 CR20 collector 696 *. 498 467 CR 20. collettor 697 498 702 Rathburn Rd collector 698 499 500 CR 25* collector 699 500 . 501 | |||
* CR 25 *collector 700 501 426 CR85 collector 701 501 . . 675 CR 85 | |||
* collector .. 702 502 468 . , CR 25 collector 703 503 514 Ellen St local* roadway 704 503 519 W 5th St collector . {OS 503 537 W 5th St local roadway 706 503 543 Ellen St local roadway 707 504 512 Liberty St local roadway 708 505 710 CR7 | |||
* collector 709 506 505 CR 7 collector 710 507 506 CR 7 collector 711 507 678 SR104 minor .arterial .* 7i2 507 680 | |||
* S.R 104 minor arterial 713 508 679 SR 104 .collector 714 509 678 SR 104 collector 715 509 708 SR 104 collector 716 510 . 509 Sweet Rd collector NMP/JAF Evacuation Time.Estimate Lane Shoulder Length No. of Width Width (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) 4538 1 12 0 1275 1 12 0 3095 1 12 0 . 7455 1 12 0 10918 1 12 0 2010 1 12 0 2553. 1 12 0 2736 1 12 0 5776 1 12* 0 163.1 1 12 0 5338 1 . 12 0 991 1 12 0 2153 1 12 0 4044 1 12 0 5.85 1 12 0 3113 1 12 0 7214 1 12 0 620 2 12 0 1572 2* 12 0 4550 1 12 4 888 1 12 0 645 1 12 4 1282 2 12 0 K-63 Saturation Flow Rate (pcphpl) 1700 1700 1700 . 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1350 1700 1350 1350 1700 1700 1700 1700 1900 1750 1700 1700 1700 . 1750 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 45 19 50 19 50 19 45 . 19 50 19 50 19 55 19 55 55 19 30 12 40 12 30 12 30 12 40 12 55 18 55 9 45 9 40 9 . 40 9 50 *9 45 9 50 9 40 9 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 | |||
:* .. *. '*' ..... * ". /' ... ,*r:**,.:*.* . . .'. .. * **-.; * ... ; S'aturatian Fr.ee * | |||
* Up... *. *Down-* * * * ***. ** ' *** * | |||
* Lane **Shoulder * * " ** **." .& *: * .. "i, -""'",,", "': ,,,.!f >$ : 'I>. *: ""' ** * | |||
* Grid | |||
* L" *k # . . . St . . . . .. St .. : '. , *.. ,. Roaaway. . . Roa .wa:Y: * *,No. of | |||
* W'B h. *w*ci h : .. E;low Flow m . . .. re.all)* .. , ream ..... ,,, *** **<$. ... _.,,,, * .*, :*.,,.. ... 1 :t ..* , 1 t . *. . ** ... Number ' * '* N .d. , .N d"* .* Narng**.. .:*-.:* *. (ft.).,* .' ... (f *) .... * :*(tt*) . : *.*Rate. : . Speed * . . . o e . o ti! . . . :-* ., . . * * . . . * . * . *. t.. * , . ( .. 'l'i 'I) { h} * * * * * * * * * ** * . .,: * * * .. ;: ,, * * * .*. J:, * . .. .. . *: . . PGP. P *. *. mp | |||
* 717 511 530 SR 104 major 1446 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 718 511 533 Hillside Ave collector 1475 1 12 0 1750 35 12 719 511 680 SR104 minor 1277 2 12 1750 arterial 0 40 9 720 512 505 Gardenier local 4983 1 12 0 1700 40 9 Hill Rd roadway 721 513 514 Ellen St local 863 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 722 513 517 SR 48 collector 1901 1 12 3 1700 40 12 723 513 670 W 1st St collector 851 1 12 0 1575 35 12 724 514 503 Ellen St local 1631 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 725 514 513 Ellen St local 863 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 726 515 484 SR48 collector 4100 1 12 3 1700 45 19 727 516 515 SR48 collector 3027 1 12 3 1700 50 19 728 517 518 SR 48 collector 2461 1 12 0 1700 45 12 729 518 692 SR 48 collector 2985 1 12 3 1700 45 12 730 519 497 Rathburn Rd collector 2824 1 12 0 1700 45 12 731 519 502 CR 25 collector 1326 1 12 0 1700 50 12 732 520 527 SR 104 major 1087 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 733 520 530 SR 104 minor 908 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 734 521 511 W Seneca St local 1031 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 735 522 523 W 1st St collector 956 1 12 0 1750 30 12 736 522 668 W Seneca St local 275 1 12 0 1350 30 12 NMP/JAF K-64 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Shoulder Saturation Free Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) {mph} roadway 737 *'* 523 522 W 1st St. * .*collector 956 1 12. 0 1350 30 12 '. *. minor .* '.738 523 5'26 SR 104 arterial 246 2 12 0 1750 *35 12 739 523 669 W 1st St collector. 1212 1 12 0 1350 30 . ,12 740 523 707 SR 104 minor 859 2 12 0 1900 35 12 arterial 741 524 346 E Utica St collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 12 742 524 538. W Utica St collector 1200 2 12 0 1750 35 12 ". 743 524 539 W lst St collector* .1014 .2 12 0 1750 35 12 744 524 669 W 1st St collector . 267 2 12 0 *1900 30 12 745 525 . 661 E 1st St local 265 2 12 0 1900 30 12 roadway 746 . 525 707 . SR 104 minor 206 2 12 0 1900 35 12 arterial . 747 526 523 .*. SR 104 minor 245 2 12 0 1750 35 12 " arterial 748 526 527 SR 104 | |||
* minor 878 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 749 526 666 W 2nd St local 483 1 12 0 1125 25 12 roadway 750 527 520 SR 104 minor 1087 2 12 0 1900 35 12 arterial 751 527 526 SR 104 minor 878 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 752 527 538 W 5th St local 1472 1 12 0 1750 35 12 roadway 753 527 689 W 5th St local 541 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway . NMP/JAF K-65 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) . 754 528 *-522. | |||
* W 1st St collector. 1094 1 12. *o 1350 30 12 ' ' *focal 755 529 521. W Seneca St 399 1 12 0 1350 30 12 **-.. roadway 756 529 530 liberty St lac.al 710 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway . 757* 530 . 511 SR104 minor .1446 2 12 0 1750 ' 35 12 arterial 758.' '. 530 520 ,SR 104 minor 909 2 12 0. 1900 35 12. . ' .. arterial . ' . 759, .. * '530 529 Liberty St local. 710 . 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 760 ,* 531 Liberty St local 1544 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 761 ' 531 . '* 530 Liberty St local 1544 1 12 0 1750 30 12 *. r. ro.adw(ly 762 531 533 . W Utica St | |||
* collector '1469 1 12 0 1750 35 12 763 . _531 534 W Utka St .collector 888 1 12 0 1575 35 12 .* . local 764 531 665 Liberty St* roadway 1041 1 12 0 1350 30 12 . ' local *. 765 532 529 Liberty St roadway 1831 1 12 0 1350 30 12 766 533 511 Hillside Ave | |||
* collector 1475 1 12 ' 0 1750 35 12 767' 533 531 W .Utica St collector ' 1469 1 12 0 1575 35 12 768 533 544 Hillside Ave collector .740 1 12 0 1575 35 12 769 534 531 W Utica St collector 889 1 12 0 1575 35 12 770 534 538 W Utica St collector 1574 2 12 0 1750 35 12 .. 771 535 ' 533 W Utica St collector* 596 1 12 0 1750 35 9 772 .. 536 529 . wseneca st local 1930 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway | |||
* NMP/JAF. K-66 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type {ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) ' *'.* ***.local '' 773 *.' 536 .** 689 .w 5th St 455 1 12 0 1350 30 12' *roadway 7}4. 537 '503' WSth St . local 991 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' roadway )75 537 '540 WSthSt | |||
* local 859 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' . roadway*. 776 | |||
* 538 524 WUtica St*. collector 1199 2. 12 0 1750 35 12 ' local .777* 5_38 ' *., .527 '*, WSth St* . roadway 1472 l 12 0 1750' '* 35 12 ' ' 778 538 ' ' *534 W Utica St collector 1574 2 ' 12 0 1900 35 12 " local 779 538 540 . WSth St roadway 996 1 12 0 1350 30 12 780 . ', ' 539 524' W 1st St collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 12 ., local 781' 539 540 .Erie St roadway 1254 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ,' 782 539 *. *.670 ' . Wlst St collector 1466 1 '12 0 1575 35 ,. 12 ' -.. local 183 : 540 537 '' ...* WSth St roadway 859 1 12 0 1350 30 12 784 540 538 W 5th St local .996 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 785 '540 ' .539 Erie St . local 1254' 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway s4o " local 786 *69,1 Erie St roadway* 1173 1 12 0 1350 30 12 787 541 543 Hawley St local 1075 1 12 0 1350 30 12 , ' roadway 788 541 665 Erie St local 870 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 789 541 691 Erie St local 785 1 12 0 1350 30 12 NMP/JAF . K-67 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
, .. **;._': .. Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) ,:._.,, d roa way 790 542 544 Erie St local* ' 393 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' roadway 791 542 665 Erie St local 1190 1 12 0 1575 35 12 ,* roadway 792 543 '503 Ellen St local 2153 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ,' | |||
* roadw'ay ' 793 543 504 Ellen st local 632 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 794 544 512 Hillside Ave collector* 5150 1 12 0 1700 45 12 795 544 533 H.illside Ave colleC:tor 740 1 12 0 1750 35 12 796 544 542 Erie St local 393 1 ' 12 0 1350 30 12 | |||
* roadway 797. 545 536 . W 5th St local ' 514 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 798 546 511 Washington *collector 1631 1 12 0 1750 35 9 Blvd 799 547 586 Syracuse St local 1102 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 800 547 664 Syracuse St local 1686 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 801 548 346 E UtiC:a St collector 339 2 12 0 1750 30 12 802 548 566 E 2nd St. local 1479 1 12 0 1750 30 12 ' roadway ' local 803 548 572 E 2nd St roadway 533 1 12 0 '1350 30 12 '804 549 480 SR 481 collector 3201 1 12 4 1700 45 12 805 549 662 E 1st St local 322 1 12 0 1350 *30 12 roadway NMP/JAF K-68 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
. '* .::-.-** . Link# 806 . 807.* 808 809 | |||
* 810 811 812 813 814 815 . 816 817 818 . 819 820 821 822 NMP/JAF .. Stream Node stream Node 550. .... . 550 348 551 342 552 565 552 582 553 303 553 313 554 547' 554 563 555 553 556 525 557 556 557 566 558 556 559 557 560 568 560 569 | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Name City Line Rd | |||
* E Alban_y St E 13th St .E Seneca St E 10th St East Ave East Ave | |||
* Church St E 7th St Bunner St E 1st St E Cayuga St | |||
* E 2nd st E 1st St E .2nd St SR 104 E 7th St Roadway Type .. roadway | |||
* collector local roadway collector collector **collector collector local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway minor arterial .. | |||
* local roadway Length (ft.) 2404 2370 314 1177 493 2645 1392 877 1107 1001 505 265 526 711 929 932 1457 K-69 No. of Lanes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 Lane Width (ft.) 12 12. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 Shoulder Width (ft.) 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a* 0 0 0 0 0 0 Saturation Flow Rate (pcphpl) . 1575 1575 1575 1750 1350 1350 1700 1700 1350 1350 1350 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 1350 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 35 13 ... 35 12 30 12 30 10 30 10 40 12 40 . 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 35 12 30 12 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 823 561 578 E Schuyler St local 870 1 12 0 *1350 30 .10 . roadway | |||
* 824 563 554 E 7th St Iota I 1107 1 12. 0 1350 30 12 roadway 825 563 569 E7th St :local 517 1 12 0 . 1350 30 . 12 roadway 826 563 663 E Albany St collector 919 1 12 *0 1350 30 *12 827 565 580 E Seneca St collector 885 1 12 0 1350 30 10 828 565 581 . E 7th St local 482 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 829 566 525 SR 104 minor 303 2 12 0 1750. 35 12 arterial 830 566 548 E 2nd St local 1479 1 12 0 | |||
* 1350 30 . 12 roadway minor .* 831 567 566 SR 104 arterial 290 2 12 0 1750 35 12 832 568 567 SR 104 minor 276 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 833 568 577 E 4th St local 1499 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 834 569 560 E 7th St local 1457 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 835 569 563 E 7th St -local 516 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 836 569 577 E Utica St collector 888 1 12 0 1750 30 12 837 570 314 E 10th St collector 1406 1 12 0 . 1750 30 12 838 570 344 E 10th St collector 445 1 12 0 1350 30 12 839 570 569 E Utica St collector 1192 1 12 0 1350 30 12 840 571 570 E Utica St collector 1781 1 12 0 1750 30 12 . NMP/JAF K-70 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time* Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes Width Width Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 841 _.,. 572 548 roadway ' 5,33 **,.1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' 842 572 '549, E Albany St collector 281. 1 12. 0 1350 30 12 843 573 572 E 2nd St | |||
* local 463 1 12 0 . 1350 30 12 roadway * .. . | |||
* 557 local . 844. ,. 574 E*Cayuga st .304 1 12 0 1750 30 12 .. roadway .84s: 574 *. ,' 567, E 3rd St | |||
* local * '496 1 12 0 1750 30 12. i,,.*.*. **i roadway 846. 575 568 .. E4th St local*. 471 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 847' 575 *574 .. E_Cayuga St local 290 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 848 577 548 E Utica St collector 578 1 12 0 1350 30 12 849 577 568 E 4th St local. .1499 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway I, 850 577 " .663 E 4th St local 508 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 85J'* ,. E Schuyler St | |||
* local 1750 3d . 578 . *, . 559 584 1 12 0 10 ..... *( roadway 852 578 580 E 4th St local 496 1 12 0 1350 30 10 -roadway . 853.' 579 578 E4th St local 385 1 12 0 1350. 30 10 roadway 854 ,580 575 E 4th St local 495 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 855 581 560 . E 7th St local | |||
* 531 1 12c 0 1350 30 12 roadway 8,56 ... 581 575 ' | |||
* E*Cayuga St local 911 1 12 0 1350 30 12 NMP/JAF -K-71 KLD Engineering, P.C Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
: . Saturation Free Up-Down-.. Lane Shoulder . Roadway .. No. of* W"d *h W"d h* Flow Flow Grid Stream ... Name fft.} *\.;"Lanes * * * | |||
* Rate* :Speed | |||
* Number Nod'e Ni,>de (pcphpl) (mph} roadway 857 582 314 E 10th St collector 662 1 12 0 1750 30 12 858 582 658 E Cayuga St local 524 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 859 583 582 E Cayuga St local 645 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 860 584 552 E 10th St collector 462 1 12 0 1350 30 10 861 584 561 E Schuyler St local 1177 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 862 585 584 | |||
* E Schuyler St local 629 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 863 586 547 . Syracuse St local 1102 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 864 586 572 E Albany St collector 282 1 12 0 1350 30 12 865 587 554 E 7th St local 423 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 866 588 34 81 freeway 5999 2 12 10 2250 75 3 867 . 588 589 81 freeway 14746 2 12 10 2250 75 3 868 589 25 81 freeway 10128 2 12 10 2250 75 3 869 589 588 81 freeway 14802 2 12 10 2250 75 3 870 590 47 81 freeway 6696 2 12 10 2250 75 8 871 590 53 81 freeway 8881 2 12 10 2250 75 8 .872 591 54 81 freeway 7136 2 12 10 2250 75 17 873. 591 59 81 .freeway 8848 2 12 10 2250 75 17 874 592 60 81 freeway 5379 2 12 10 2250 75 17 875 592 593 81 freeway 6219 2 12 10 2250 75 17 876 593 66 81 freeway 5464 2 12 10 2250 75 23 877 593 592 81 freeway 6219 2 12 10 2250 75 17 878 594 68 81 freeway 4172 2 12 10 2250 75 23 NMP/JAF K-72 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
***. *' .*,.. ,: . Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.} (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 879 594 595 181 . freeway 5778 2 12 10 .2250 75 23 880 595 594 181 freeway 5778 2 12 10 2250 75 23 881 '595 615 181 freeway 3430 2 12 10 2250 75 23 882 596 597' 181 freeway '12349 2 12 10 2250 75 32 883 596 615 181 freeway 11581 2 12 10 2250 75 32 884 597 278 181 freeway 5884 2 12 10 2250 75 32 885 597 596 181 freeway 12339 2 12 10 2250 75 32 886 598 6 CR 5 collector 2614 1 12 0 i750 35 7. ' 887 599 ' 2 us 11 collector 1552 1 12 0 1750 35 8 888 599 116 us 11 collector 2352 1 12 6 1700 45 8 889 600 12 Sharoun Dr local 739 1 10 0 1750 30 7 ., roadway '890 601 117 CR41 collector 1229 1 12 0 1700 50 7 891 602 601 CR41 .collector 1865 1 12 0 1700 55 7 892 603 151 *Tollgate Rd collector 9721 1 12 6 1700 55 15 893 603 174 Tollgate Rd collector 1065 1 12 6 1700 40 6 894 604 188 SR104 collector 4495 1 12 6 1700 55 14 895 604 191 SR 104 collector 1816 1 12 6 1700 55 14 896 605 157 Spath Rd local 4997 1 12 0 1750 45 16 roadway 897 605 164 CR41 collector 3832 1 12 4 1750 55 16 " 898 606 605 CR41. collector 4799 1 12 0 1700 50 16 899 607 85 SR 104 collector 2527 1 '12 6 1700 50 16 900 607 697 Sandpipe Rd collector '3227 1 12 0 1700 45 16 901 608 56 SR 104 collector 1484 1 12 6 1750 50 16 902 609 149 SR 104 collector 3361 1 12 6 1700 40 15 903 609 198 Soper Mills local 745 1 12 0 1350 30 15 Rd roadway NMP/JAF K-73 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
. _:{. Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) {ft.) Rate Speed Number {pcphpl) (mph) 904 610 . 75 SR 69 . collector 258 1 12 0 1350 30 16 905 610 76 SR 69 coilector 1379 1 12 0 1350 30 16 906**. 611. 610 Madison Ave local. 685 1 10 0 1350 30 16 roadway 907 612 361 *CR44 collector 2106 1 12 0 1700 45 15 908 613 166 Rowe Rd local 9085 1 12 0 . 1700 50 16 roadway 909 ' 614 62. SR69 collector 2273 1 . 12 8 1575 35 23 910 . 615 595 181 freeway 3430 2 12 10 2250 75 23 911 615 596 181 . freeway 11581 2 12 10 2250 75 32 912 616 264 CR45 collector 2155 1 12 0 1700 40 22 913 617 264 us 11 colleetor 2524 1 12 6 1700 40 22 914 618 277 I 81-SR 49. freeway 612 1 12 4 1750 50 32 Ra nips . ramp 915 619 276 Driveways local 621 1 12 0 1750 30 32 roadway 916 620 276 Driveways local 393 1 12 0 1750 30 32 roadway 917 621 279 I 81-SR 49 freeway 671 1 12 4 1750 50 32 Ramps ramp 918 622 255 Pangborn Rd. local . 261 1 12 0 1700 40 22 roadway 919 .623 260 CR45 collector 2142 1 12 0 1700 45 22 920 623 262 . CR45 collector 2632 1 12 0 1700 45 22 921 624 302 Winks Rd collector 7207 1 12 0 1700 45 30 922 625 274 SR49 collector 2905 1 12 6 1700 50 30 923 626 360 CR 35 collector 3325 1 12 0 1700 50 21 924 627 144 CR 35 collector 4149 1 12 0 1750 50 21 925 628 238 CR6 collector 1622 1 12 o* 1700 45 20 . NMP/JAF K-74 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate '**-* February 24, 2016 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Speed Number Rate Link# Stream Stream Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (mph) Node Node 926 I 629 I 320 I JAF Driveway local -I 676 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1575 I 35 I 5 *roadway 9i7 630 234 . Mt Pleasant-local I 5678 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I 40 I 20 Rd roadway 928 631 235 CR45 collector 7487 1 12 -0 1700' 55 20 929 632 215 Myers Rd collector 11859 1 12 0 1700 45 20 930 633 315 CR 1 collector 919 1 12 0 1750 55 11 931 634 244 CR57 collector 417 1 12 0 1575 35 19 932 635 699 SR 481 collector 1049 1 12 4 1700 60 20 933 I 636 240 March Rd local I 1862 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I 40 I 19 roadway 934 636 I 243 I March Rd local I 467 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I 40 19 roadway 935 637 211 CR45 collector 3730 1 12' 0 1700 45 19 936 637 214 CR45 collector 461 1 12 0 1700 _45 19 937 638 455 CR 34 collector 5517 1 12 4 1700 40 24 938 641 407 SR 3 collector 3255 1 12 6 1700 45 25 939 641 411 SR3 collector 990 1 12 6 1750 45 25 940 642 641 Driveway collector 453 1 12 0 1750 30 25 941 643 412 CR 3 collector 4005 1 12 0 1700 45 25 942 644 406 SR 3 collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 28 943 644 420 SR 3 collector 681 2* 12 0 1900 35 28 944 645 644 W 4th St -local I 813 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1750 I 30 I 28 roadway 945 I 646 I 644 I W 4th St I local 674 1 12 0 1750 30 28 roadway 946 647 650 Oneida St collector 250 1 12 0 1575 35 26 947 647 651 Oneida St collector 189 2 12 0 1900 35 26 948 648 647 1st St local 264 1 12 0 1750 30 26 NMP/JAF --K-75 KLD Engineering, P.C. _Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Node Node Name 949 649. : 647. . 1st St 950 650 401 Qneida St '951 650 647 Oneida St 952 .. 651 .* 366 Oneida St 953 651 647 Oneida St* 954:, 652 *. 366 .. .SR 481 . : 955 653 365 .. Oneida st* 956 653 366 Oneida St 957 (554 367 SR 3 958 654 395 SR 3 959 655 | |||
* 559 E 2nd St 960 . 656 ,* 314 SR 104 961 657 . 560 | |||
* SR104 .*. 962 658 581 E Cayuga St ,. 963 .. 658 *.*.657' E 9th St I I 964 659 657 E 9th St 965 660 304 Driveway 966 .. 661 346 E 1st St . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Length No. of Type (ft.) Lanes roadway. local 271 1 roadway collector 1240 1 . collector 253 2 collector 188 1 *collector 188 1 minor '410 2 -.arterial . collector 2059 1 | |||
* collector 354 1 minor 313 2 arterial collector 558 1 local. 305 1 roadway *collector 1004 2 minor 644 2 arterial | |||
* local 647 1 roadway local 564 1 roadway local 396 1 roadway local 395 1 roadway local 1237 2 roadway* K-76 Lane Shoulder Saturation Width Width Flow (ft.) (ft.) Rate (pcphpl) ' . 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1575 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1900 12 0 1350 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) . 30 26 35 26 35 26 . 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 30 10 40 12 45 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 11 30 12 KLD Engineering, P.C. . Februar¥ 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Link# Stream Stream Node Node Name 967 661 ,' 525 E ist St '968' 662 346. E 1st St ' . 969 662 549 * . E 1st St ,, 970-,. 6_63 .,**' 577 E4th St ' ,: 663 586 '' E Albany St 972 664 480 Syracuse St '* 973 665 531' '' Liberty St -' 974 665 54,1 ** * .. Erie St ,, 975 665' *' 542 ''* Erie St -: ' -976 ',*, 666 526 W2nd St 977 666 668 \Al 2nd St ' 978 667 526 W 2nd St 919 *, 668 '536 w Seneca St . 980 668 666 W2nd St 981 669 523 W 1st St '982' 669 524 W 1st St NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Length No. of Type (ft.) lane's . .local 265 1 *roadway . local 213 2 roadway *local 322 1 . roadway. *' local 508 1 'roadway collector 290 .1 local* 174 1 *roadway local 1041 1 roadway local 870' 1 roadway local 1190 1 **.* roadway local *. 483 1 roadway local 477 1 roadway local roadway 519 1 local 881 .1 *roadway .. local 477 1 roadway collector 1212 1 collector 266 1 . K-77 Lane Shoulder Saturation Flow Width Width (ft.) (ft.) Rate (pcphpl) 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 i2 0 1350 12 0 1750 ' 12 0 1350 ' 12 0 1350 12 0 1350 i2 0 1350 . 12 0 1575 12 0 1750 12 0 1125 12 0 1750 12 0 1350 12 0 1125 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 30. 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 35 12 25 12 25 12 25 12 30 12 25 12 30 12 30 '12 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder | |||
* Saturation free Link# Stream .. Stream Roadway RoadWC!Y length No.of Widtljt : Width ' i:. flow Flow Grid Na*Me *TY,pi:<" . (ft.) . *Lanes " .. ' ' " . :speed Number *Node* ., (ft.) (ft.) {pcphpl) (mph) 983 670 513 W 1st St collector 851 1 12 0 1575 35 12 984 670 514 Murray St local 966 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 985 670 539 W 1st St collector 1466 2 12 0 1750 35 12 986 671 514 Murray St local 2374 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 987 672 539 Birdie Cir local 226 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway . 988 673 674 Rathburn Rd collector 244 1 12 0 950 20 19 989 674 498 Rathburn Rd collector 1064 1 12 0 1700 45 19 990 675 427 CR85 collector 5560 1 12 0 1700 55 19 991 675 501 CR 85 collector 2737 1 12 0 1700 55 19 992 676 427 CR 85 collector 1578 1 12 0 1350 30 19 993 676 677 CR85 collector 2278 1 12 0 1700 40 19 994 677 433 CR 85 collector 4366 1 12 0 1700 50 18 995 677 676 CR 85 collector 2285 1 12 0 1700 40 19 996 678 507 SR 104 minor 620 2 12 0 1900 40 9 arterial 997 678 509 SR 104 minor 888 1 12 0 1750 45 9 arterial 998 679 463 SR 104 collector 4562 1 12 4 1700 45 18 999 680 507 SR 104 minor 1571 2 12 0 1900 40 9 arterial 1000 680 511 S.R 104 minor 1277 2 12 0 1750 40 9 arterial 1001 681 680 5th Ave local 255 1 12 0 1750 30 9 roadway 1002 682 680 5th Ave local 372 1 12 0 1750 30 9 roadway NMP/JAF K-78 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 1003 683 46 SR13. collector 956 1 12 0 1700 40 8 1004 684 683 Driveway local 256 1 12 0 1750 30 8 roadway 100,5 685 614 SR 69. collector 2851 1 12 8 1700 55 22 1006 686 685 SR 69 collector 1584 1 12 8 1700 45 22 1007 687 347 .. SR 104. collector 444 1 12 0 1700 40 10 .**ioo8 688 687 Driveway local 279 1 12 0 1750 30 10 roadway 1009 689 527 W 5th St local 541 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 1010 689 536 W 5th St local 455 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 1011 690 528 Lake collector 937 1 12 0 1350 30 10 1012. 691 . 540 Erie St local 1173 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway .*. *.**1013 691 541 E.rie St local 784 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 1014 692 516 SR48 collector 5010 1 12 3 1700 55 19 1015 693 105 CR 28 collector 767 1 12 0 1700 55 7 1016 694 693 CR 28 colledor 709 1 12 0 1700 40 7 1017 695 321 Lake Rd collector 2280 1 12 0 1700 . 40 5 1018 696 695 JAF Driveway local 596 1 12 0 1350 30 5 roadway 1019 697 613 Sandpipe Rd collector* 8866 1 12 0 1700 45 16 1020 698 83 CR4 collector 3233 1 12 0 1750 55 21 1021 699 229 SR 481 collector 1204 1 12 4 1700 60 20 1022 700 232 CR 57 collector 729 1 12 0 1700 so 20 1023 700 699 Van Bruen local 904 1 12 0 1700 40 20 roadway.* . NMP/JAF K-79 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type {ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 1024 701 42S SR48 collector 2284 1 12 3 1700 so 19 102S 702 496 Rathburn Rd. collector 3S03 1 12 0 1700 4S 19 . 1026 703 43S CR7 *collector 3142 1 12 0 1700 50 18 1027 70S 305 Creamery Rd collector 6719 1 12 0 1700 4S 11 1028 706 188 CR29 collector 4946 1 12 0 1700 SS . 14 1029 707 523 SR 104 minor 8S7 2 12 0 17SO 3S 12 arterial 1030 707 S25 SR 104 minor 20S 1 12 0 17SO 35 12 | |||
* arterial 1031 708 508 SR 104 collector 6S98. 1 12 4 1700 50 9 1032 708 709 Thompson local 6186 1 12 o* 1700 40 9 Rd roadway 1033 709 710 Thompson local 4006 1 12 0 1700 40 18 Rd roadway 1034 710 436 CR 7 collector 1772 1 12 0 1700 55 18 103S 711 364 Howard Rd local 3011 1 12 0 1700 40 20 roadway 1036 712 67S Ridge Road local 1604 1 12 0 157S 3S 19 roadway 1037. 714 203 Dennis Rd local 49S4 1 12 0 1700 40 14 roadway 1038 71S 207 CR 176 . collector 8167 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 1039 716 lSO SR.104 collector S6S1 1 12 6 1700 SS lS 1040 717 17S SR 104B collector 261S 1 12 6 1700 60 lS 1041 718 174 CR 1 collector 9429 1 12 0 1700 SS 6 1042 719 16S CR41 collector 4344 1 12 4 1700 SS 16 1043 720 13 SR 13 collector S281 1 12 3 1700 so 7 1044 721 10 CR S collector 2916 1 12 0 1700 so 2 104S 722 192 CR Sl collector 698S 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 )\JMP/JAF K-80 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Speed Number Rate Link# Stream Stream Name Type {ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (mph) Node Node -1046 723 -: 3S4 . Hurlbut-Rd_ -local--.3187 1 -10 0 1700 so lS I I .*.**. -roadway I 1047 724' * '309_-_ . CR4 collector S369 1 12 0 1700 55 14 1048 _--_ 72S 308 SR104 collector 2765 1 12 6 1700 so 11 -_1049 726 137 CR4 collector 4637 1 12 0 -1700 55 14 lOSO ' -727 138 -collector I 8S49 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I -4S I 13 Corners Rd lOSl 728 --148 CR 6 collector ,9631 1 12 4 1700 so 15 __ ,-, -I i052 729. '.,603 TollgateRd . collector 901S 1 12 6 1700 SS 15 ---10S3 8043 43 181 -_freeway -4SO -2 12 10 22SO 7S 1 1054 --8298 298 ---181 freeway 837 3 12 10 22SO 7S 32 (exit link) -17 8017 SR 3 collector 519 -1 12 4 1700 SS 2 (exit link} 26 8026 CR 2 collector 343 1 12 0 1700 45 8 (exit link) 43 -8043 1_81 *freeway 4SO 2 12 10 2250 7S 1 (exit link} -44 '8044 ' us 1l collector 351. 1 12 6 1700 55 1 (exit l_ink) 48 8048 -SR 13 collector 1422 1 12 0 1700 -SS 8 -(exit link) SS 80S6 CR 28 :collector 11S7 1 12 0 1700 SS 8 (exit link) | |||
* 61 8061 ' -SR 104 collector -*8Sl 1 12 6 1700 55 17 (exit link} 67 **8067 SR 69 colleC:tor S06 1 12 8 1700 4S 23 (exit link} 252 -82S3 -SR264 collector 771 1 12 6 1700 5S 30 (exit link) 281 8282 us 11 collectar 428 1 12 0 1S75 3S 31 (exit link) 298 -8298-181 -freeway 837 3 12 10 22SO 7S 32 (exit link} 391 8391 CR-57 * . collector 416 1 12 0 1700 SS 28 (exit link) 431 8431 _CR 8 collector 511 1 12 0 1700 SS 2S .(exit link} . 440 8440 1481 -_freeway 1002 1 12 12 22SO 75 29 (exit link)' 442 8442 SR48 collector 443 1 12 0 1700 40 28 (exit link) 4S2 84S2 SR 104A collector 8S4 1 12 4 1700 S5 18 (exit:link) 4S6 84S6 CR 34 collector 400 1 12 4 1700 5S 24 NMP/JAF K-81 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free * '.Unk# Stream S .... , . . Roadway Length *. No. of WidtH :. Width . " Flow Flow Grid ..* tream . N r -. . ,. (ft.) : . * *:* | |||
* Rate Speed N.umoer Node ; . * . | |||
* ame . * * (ft.) (ft.) *. (pcphpl) (mph) . ' (exit link) 457 8457 SR104 collector 320 1 12 4 1700 60 24 (exit link) 704 8381 CR 6 collector 420 1 12 0 1700 55 29 (exit link) 713 8279 SR 49 collector 704 1 12 6 1700 45 32 (exit link) 730 8730 CR 7 collector 2022 1 12 0 1700 45 24 NMP/JAF K-82 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table K-2. Nodes in the Link-Node Analysis Network which are Controlled Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate Control Grid Map 2 941271 1298261 Actuated 8 4 940930 1299861 Stop 8 6 941048 1300112 Actuated 8 7 941255 1300442 Actuated 8 11 925344 1301924 TCP-Actuated 2 12. 925125 1299850 Actuated 7 16 934094 1324086 Stop 2 21 926839 1304437 Stop 2 28 939456 1322649 Stop 2 29 941023. 1300546 Stop 8 30 940891 1301680 Stop 3 36 951731 1328340 Actuated 1 45 940947 1278062 Stop 8 56 936666 1260028 Actuated 16 69 933064 1246560 Stop 22 73 928256 1247247 Stop 22 75 914525 . 1259199 Stop 16 76 914481 1260838 Stop 16 77 913582 1260863 Actuated 15 . 78 912195 1260959 *TCP-Actuated 15 79 912262 125998:2 Stop 15 80 912448 1256987 . Stop 15 82 908817 1243723 21 83 907028 . 1238025. TCP-Actuated 21 86 924440 1259431 TCP-Actuated . 16 88 913432. 1263070 Stop 15 97 915707 1280562 . Stop 7 100 923651* 1290773 TCP-No 7 Control 109 928226 1285485 Stop 7 110 928072 1285367 Stop 7 113 931858 1280655 Stop 7 116 941293 1294356 Stop 8 121 913605 1277309 Stop 6 122 909823 1280195 Stop 6 123 908324 1280150 Stop 6 130 900208 1226118 Stop 21 131 900361 1221043 Stop 30 138 861928 1252649 Stop 14 143 888473 12.44027 Stop 21 . NMP/JAF . Estimate K-83 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 . . . . . 1* | |||
Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate 144 901122 1239335 ** 145 889941 1252116 149 891534 1268011 151 901715 1266098 154 891321 1270778 157 921457 1263262 161 926672 1287191 163 938764 1268677 '164 925842 1270925 165 928194 1275491 166 933037 1247109 172 890969 . *1276146 174 901103 1276869 182 872828 1271246 187 873533 1249694 188 873121 1265439 . , 194 881683 1247475 200 911076 1254216. 201 911379 . 1256034 202 880221 1267564 205 877259 1273111 206 876741. 1282021 . 208. 8.69066 1236599*. 209 869228 1236014 211 856881 1239881 . 212 856997 1240291 214 852712 1239430 215 863943 . . 1238651 216 864072 *1236097 218 862216 1226917 . 219 858651 1229960 220 861864 1227765 223 865177 1216054 225*. 864990 1216007 . 234 874743 1234306 .. ... 235 882118 1231515 i36. 884137 1230458 ";'. *. 23? .. * *880195 1218213 . NMP/JAF . K-84 , * .* * .* Evacuation Time. Est.imate Control TCP-Actuated Stop Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated Stop Stop TCP-Actuated TCP-No Control Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated Stop Stop Stop *Stop Stop Stop Stop . Stop Stop** Stop .. Stop Stop Stop Stop TCP-No Control* . Stop Stop Grid Map 21 15 15 15 15 16 7 16 16 7 22 6 6 14 14 14 20 15 15 14 14 5 20 20 19 19 19 20 20 20 19 20 26 26 20 20 20 . 27 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 ... | |||
Node 240 241 243 250 254 255 257 258 260 "263 264 268 272 274 275 276 277 279 290 303 304 _305 306 309 313 314 315 *318 321 325 328 329 331 334 336 --_ 337 NMP/JAF ----Evacuation Time Estimate X Coordinate Y Coordinate 859087 1232917 856157 1232611 856768 1232691 898907 1211404 914627 1225262 918597 1223060 913366 1221146 919716 1219130 920477 122806Ei 925223 1229006 934909 1229749 921470 1215939 919353 1202669 908648 1205098 936517 1198091 940772 1198035 941992 1_197777 942503 1197658 934852 1204362 848269 1257175 849930 1261818 860678 1262784 869i05 -1263135 855677 1254640 844355 1258167 -_ 843118 1260922 855859 -1270694 863061 1279014 872316 1281770 864864 1270844 869986 1228451 -879785 1211823 854424 1269495 -850590 *1261818 845702 1264709 846269 1263423 K-85 Control Grid Map Stop 19 Stop 19 Stop 19 Stqp 30 Stop 22 Stop 22 Stop 30 Stop 31 Stop -22 Stop 22 Stop 22 Stop 31 Stop 31 Stop 30 Actuated 31 Actuated 32 Actuated 32 Actuated 32 Stop 31 Stop 13 Actuated 11 Stop 11 Stop 14 Stop 13 Stop 12 Actuated 12 TCP-Actuated 11 TCP-No 5 Control TCP-No 5 Control TCP-No 14 Control TCP-No 20 Control Stop 27 Stop 11 Stop 11 Stop 10 Actuated 10 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate 338 846327 1261111 342 845052 1260939 344 843766 1259188 346 840837 1258531 . 348 846790' 1260232 351 868096 1281568 359 900177 1227447 364 869991 1223956 365 866945 1212165 366 864609 1211553 367 865692 1209119 368 864872 1210780 371 865305 1208880 373 868889 1211588 374 867004 1211647 375 867428 1210258 377 869987 1211822 382 870451 1214539* 387 867662 1207388 390 870077 1205031 393 869558 1205414 395 866414 1209608 397 867733 . 1207507 401 862777.. 1211339 402 864595 .. 1212738 406. . 864122. 1208281 407 . .. | |||
* 1208944 .. *. 409 863.356' .** **.1210061 411 856759 1211930 412 8S152o 1212127* 415 832159. *' . 1211130' 417 . 824249 1210851. 418 .. 851481 1213036 .*425 857193* 1226028 426 850061 1225866 .. *. 427. 839710 1223155 432 .. ... B321lS. 1212192' 433 831535 1222840 436 8333.34. 1244195 443. 823622 1221874 NMP/JAF K-86 | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate Control TCP-Actuated Actuated Stop Actuated Stop Yield Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated TCP-Actuated TCP-Actuated Actuated Actuated Stop Stop Stop Stop Actuated Actuated Stop Actuated Stop TCP-Actuated Stop TCP-Actuated Stop TCP-Actuated *Actuated Stop ,Stop -. . *Actuated . Actuated .. Stop ., .Stop Stop *Stop Stop Stop " Stop Grid Map 12 12 12 12 12 5 21 20 26 26 28 26 28 26 26 26 26 26 28 28 *28 26 28 26 26 . 28 25 26 . 25 . 24 24 25 19 19 19 24 18. 18 18 . . KLD Engineering, P.C. *, * . February 24, 2016 I Node X Coordinate V Coordinate 447 809615 1228096 455 821190 1204555 463 821704 1243558 465 828086 1243868. 468 841538 1242849 469 842615 1239387 475 850256 1239192 480 843361 1255918 483 849168 1238265 484 849480 1238278 489 842877 1212630 498 836046 1243772 501 847508 *1225854 503 839570 1255007 505 833318 1246553 509 831360 1255984 511 834930 1258482 512 835299 1251126 513 841870 1255583 514 841201 1255037 523 *839315 1259512 524 839896 1258151 525 840293 1259932 526 . 8390S3 1259431 527 838278 '. 1259080 528 838580 1261426 529 836117 1259264 . 530 836372 . 1258600 .. | |||
* 531 836443. 1257057. 533 834974 1257007. 536 .. 1260002 537 839530 .1255998 538 838785* 1257698 539 *. 840347 1257242 540 1256783 54i 837366 1256042 543.* . 837417 *. 1254968 . 547 842271** *1257428 548 841147 1258670 NMP/JAF | |||
* K-87 *Evacuation Time Estimate Control Yield Stop Stop TCP-No Control Stop Stop Stop Yield Stop Stop Stop Stop .Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated Stop Stop . Actuated Actuated TCP-Actuated . TCP-Actuated Stop Stop . Ac.tuated . Stop Attuated . Stop _Stop Aduated Actuated . Stop **Stop Stop Stop .Stop* Grid Map 18 24 18 18 19 19 19 12 19 19 25 19 19. 12 18 9 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 12 12 . t2 12 . 12 . 12 12 12 12 12 . 12 . 12 li * | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. *.February 24, 2016 Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate Control Grid Map 549 841083 1258055 Stop 12 552 842654 1261981 *Stop 10 553 845708 1257840 Stop 12 554 843094 1257731 *Stop 12 556 840126 1260409 Actuated 12 557 840368 1260518 Actuated 12 559 840048 1261390 Actuated 10 560 841969 1260599 Stop 12 563 842708 1258769 Stop 12 565 841566 1261529 Stop 10 566 840578 1260035 Actuated 12 567 840841 1260162 Actuated 12 568 841094 1260278 Actuated .12 569 842498 1259241 Stop 12 570 843631 1259612 Actuated 12 572 841339 1258172 Stop 12 575 840928 1260719 Stop 12 577 841679 1258897 Actuated 12 *. . 578 840574 1261646 Stop 10 580 840751 1261182 Stop 12 . 581 841761 1261089 Stop 12 582 842848 1261527 Stop 10 584 842475 1262408 Stop 10 586 . 841593 1258298 Stop 12 605 923915 1267613 Stop 16 610 914514 1259458 *. Stop 16 613 977486. 1254302 Stop 16 622 . 918841 1222967 Stop 22 628 885332 1233819 TCP-No 20 *Control 634 858890 1229979 Stop 19 636 857234 1232726 Stop 19 637 853170 1239492 Stop 19 641 857444 1211215 Actuated 25 644 863191 1207876 Actuated 28 647 864233 1211581 Actuated 26 657 842581 1260802. Actuated 12 658 842364 1.261324 Stop 10 663 841857 1258420 Stop 12 .664 8.43244 1256050 Stop 12 * .. NMP/JAF * . K-88 | |||
* KLD Engineering, P.C. EvacuationTime Estimate | |||
* February 24, 2016. ** | |||
*Node x Y Coordinate Control 665 836496 1256016 Stop 12 666 838897 1259878 Stop 12 668 838722 1260323 Stop 12 675 844817 1225354 Stop 19 679 823063 1247913 TCP-No 18 Control 680 833865 1257776 Actuated 9 683 943294 1296923 Actuated 8 687 847359 1261333 Actuated 10 689 838068 1259579 Stop 12 691 838089 1256348 Stop 12 695 870037 1281825 Stop 5 697 919801 1258551 TCP-No 16 Control 698 903888 1238801 TCP-No 21 Control 699 861844 1224569 Stop 20 701 856309 1228134 TCP-No 19 Control 702 836516 1236331 TCP-No 19 Control 703 832160 1237968 TCP-No 18 Control 710 833267 1245970 Stop 18 712 844181 1226826 Stop 19 1Coordinates are in the North American Datum of 1983 New York Central Plane Zone NMP/JAF K-89 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _j APPENDIX L ERPA Boundaries L. ERPA BOUNDARIES ERPA 1 Lake Ontario on the North; Nine Mile Point, and Parkhurst Rds. to the East; Miner Rd. to the South; Bayshore, and Lakeview Rds. to the_ West. ERPA 2 Lake Ontario on the North; Shore Oaks Drive to the East; County Rte. 1 on the South; and to just west of County Rte. 29 between Miner and North Rds. to the West. ERPA 3 Lake View and Miner Rds. on the North; just east of County Rte. 29 to the East; to County Rte. 1 on the South; corner of County Rtes. 1 and lA to the West. ERPA 4 Lake Ontario on the North; Dempster Beach Drive, County Rte 6 and 6A to the East; US Rte 104 on the South; Shore Oaks Dr., County Rte. 1, and to just west of Woolson and Dennis | |||
* Rds. to the West. ERPA 5 Rte. 1 on the North; just west of Woolson and Dennis Rds. to the East; U.S. Rte: 104 on.the South; and Creamery Rd. to the West. ERPA 6 The road just east of the Alcan Plant and Co. Rte. lA on the North; Creamery Rd. to the East; U.S. Rte. 104 on the South; and County Rte. 63 to the West. ERPA 7 Lake Ontario on the North; just west of Mexico Pt. between County Rte. 43 and Ladd Rd. to the East; U.S. Rte. 104 on the South; and.County Rte. 6 and Dempster Beach Drive to the West. ERPA 8 U.S. Rte. 104 on the North; just east of and Green Rd. to the East; the intersection of Johnson and Craw Rds. in Vermillion on the South; and County Rte. 6 to the West. . . ERPA 9 lj.S. Rte. 104 on the North; County Rte. 6 to the East; just. North of Tapian Drive on the South; and to just west of Co. Rte. 51 to the West. | |||
* ERPAlO U.S. Rte. io4 on the North; just east bf co, Rte. 51 fo the County Rte. 4 on the South; . and Klocks Corners Rd. to the West. . ' . .. . . . ERPA 11 U.S; Rte. 104 on the North; Klocks Corners Rd. to the East; CountyRte. 4 on .. the South; and City line Rd. to the West. . . . . ERPA12 TheCity of Oswego, east of.the ERPA 13 The City of Oswego, west'ofthe Oswego River. ERPA.14 County Rte. 5 (just past the bridge ih'Port on the North; N.Y. Rte. 3,. Manwaring Rd . . and just east of s: Daysvi!le Rd. to. the East; Sherman Rd. on the South; and Lake Ontario to -,-, .. . . . -the West. ERPA 15 Just north of the intersections of 104B, N.V. Rte. 3 and Sherman Rd. on the North; Sherman, Spath and Smithers Rds. to the East; U.S. Rte. 104, excluding the Village of on the South; the intersection of George.Rd. and U.S. Rte. 104, just west of Mexico Pt., and . County 43._and Ladd Rd. to the West ... * --**. ERPA 16 . The Village of Me.xico. , Nl\'IP/JAF L-1 | |||
* KLD Engineering; P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ERPA 17 U.S. Rte. 104 and the southern boundary of Village of Mexico, on the North; Emery, Stone, Larson and Pumphouse Rds. to the East; Gillette Rd. on the South; and just east of and Green Rd. to the West. ERPA 18 Just below County Rte. 51, just above Tapian Dr and the intersections of Johnson and Craw Rds. on the North; N.Y. Rte. 3, County Rte. 4, and County Rte. 35 to the East; Clifford Rd. on the South; Baldwin, Silk, and just east of O'Connor Rds. to ERPA 19 County Rte. 4 on the North; just east of Silk Rd. to the East; just above County Rte. 45 (intersecting with County Rte. 53), Myers, Black Creek, and Paddy Lake Rds. on the South; the Oswego River to the West. ERPA 20 Just above Co. Rte. 45 (intersecting with County Rte. 53), Myers, Black Creek, and Paddy Lake Rds. on the North; Silk, and Baldwin Rds. to the East; Hawk and Rowlee Rds. on the South; the Oswego River to the West. ERPA 21 Oswego City Line on the North; the Oswego River to the East, Hickory Grove Rd. ERPA 22 Lake Ontario on the North; County Rte. 7, Byer Rd., and County Rte. 25 to the East; Furniss and Tug Hill Rds. on the South; Bunker Hill Rd. and Maple Ave. to just west of Crestwood Dr. to the West. ERPA 23 Oswego River within the Oswego City limits. ERPA 24 Oswego River south of the Oswego City limits to Lock #5 in Minetto. ERPA 25 Oswego River south of Lock #5 in Minetto north to Hickory Grove Rd. ERPA 26 Portion of Lake Ontario within 5 miles and west of the plants. ERPA 27 Portion of Lake Ontario within 5 miles and west of the plants. ERPA 28 Portion of Lake Ontario between 5 and 10 miles west of the plants. ERPA 29 Portion of Lake Ontario between 5 and 10 miles east of the plants. NMP/JAF L-2 *Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIX M Evacuation Sensitivity Studies M. EVACUATION SENSITIVITY STUDIES This appendix presents the results of a series of sensitivity analyses. These analyses are designed to identify the sensitivity of the ETE to changes in some base evacuation conditions. M.1 Effect of Changes in Trip Generation Times A sensitivity study was performed to determine whether changes in the estimated trip generation time have an effect on the ETE for the entire EPZ. Specifically, if the tail of the mobilization distribution were truncated (i.e., if those who responded most slowly to the Advisory to Evacuate, could be persuaded to respond much more rapidly), how would the ETE be affected? The case considered was Scenario 6, Region 3; a winter, midweek, midday, with good weather evacuation of the entire EPZ. Table M-1 presents the results of this study. Table M-1. Evacuation Time Estimates for Trip Generation Sensitivity Study Tdp Evacuation Time Estimate for Entire.EP.Z: ** .. -':."" *--. . ., GeneratiPI'! **** . .. : " Period .. 901h Percentile ' . '---, .. 2 Hours 30 Minutes 2:50 3:45 3 Hours 2:55 3:45 3 Hours 30 Minutes (Base) 2:55 3:50 As discussed in Section 7.3, for Scenario 6, Region 3, traffic congestion persists within the EPZ for about 3 hours and SO minutes. As such, the ETE for the 10oth percentile is not affected by the trip generation time (at most 5 minutes), but by the time needed to clear the congestion within the EPZ. The goth percentile ETE are also not sensitive to truncating the tail of the mobilization time distribution. NMP/JAF M-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 M.2 Effect of Changes in the Number of People in the Shadow "'"'"'""'"''"' Who Relocate A sensitivity study was conducted to determine the effect on ETE of changes in the percentage of people who decide to relocate from the Shadow Region. The case <;:onsidered was Scenario 6, Region 3; a winter, midweek, midday, with good weather evacuation of the entire EPZ. The movement of people in the Shadow Region has the potential to impede vehicles evacuating . from an Evacuation Region within the EPZ. Refer to Sections 3.2 and 7.1 for additional information on population within the Shadow Region. Table M-2 presents the evacuation time estimates for each of the cases considered. The results show that reducing the shadow percentage from 20 percent to 0 percent will reduce the' goth percentile by 5 minutes and 10 minutes in the 10oth percentile ETE. Reducing the shadow percentage of the base care by 5 percent will reduce the goth and 1ooth percentile ETE by 5 minutes. Tripling the shadow percentage from 20 percent to 60 percent results in no change in the goth percentile ETE and increases the 10oth percentile. ETE by 15 minutes. Evacuating 100 percent of the shadow region will increase the goth percentile ETE by 5 minutes increase the 1ooth percentile ETE by 25 minutes. The telephone survey results presented in Appendix F indicate that 21 percent of households* would elect to evacuate if advised to shelter, which differs from assumption of 20 percent Compliance suggested in NUREG/CR-7002. The difference in percentage is minimal, thus, the base assumption of 20 percent is valid and a sensitivity study for 21. percent was not performed. Table Time Estimates for Shadow Sensitivity Study " ** < ** : .. . . Evacuation Time Estimate for£ntirel:Pz:: ** ''. * . Percent Shadow Shadow ;<-<:_:-,"': '""""* *r. 4 , * , . .. ,.. " Evacuation goth.Percentile . . 'rpotii Pei:centile * ".. ', . Vehicles *' 0 0 2:50 3:40 15 2,402 2:50 3:45 ., 20 (Base) 3,203. 2:55 3:50 " 60 9,609 2:55 4:05 100 16,015 3:00 4:15 . NMP/JAF M-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* M.3 Effect of Changes in EPZ Resident Population A sensitivity study was conducted to determine the effect on ETE of changes in the resident population within the study area (EPZ plus Shadow Region). As population in the study area changes over time, the time required to evacuate the public may increase, decrease, or remain the same. Since the ETE is related to the demand to capacity ratio present within the study area, changes in population Will cause the demand side of the equation to change and could impact the ETE. As per the NRC's response to the Emergency Planning Frequently Asked Question (EPFAQ) 2013-001, the ETE population sensitivity study must be conducted to determine what percentage increase in permanent resident population causes an increase in the goth percentile ETE of 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less. The sensitivity study must use the scenario with the longest goth percentile ETE (excluding the roadway impact scenario and the special* event scenario if it.is a 1 day per year special event). Thus, the sensitivity study was conducted using the following parameters*: 1. The percent change in population within the study area was increased by up to 30 percent.* Changes in population were applied to permanent residents only (as per federal guidance), in both the EPZ area a'nd in the Shadow Region. The transportation infrastructure remainedfixed; the presence of new roads or highway capacity improvements wcisnot considered. 3. The study was performed for the 2-Mile Region (ROl), the 5-Mile Region (R02) and the *entire EPZ (R03}. . 4. The scenario (excluding rocidway impact an.d spe.cial event) with the highest goth percentile ETE values was selected as the case fo be considered in this sensitivity study (Scenario 8 -winter, midweek, midday, with snow). Table M-3 presents the results oft.he sensitivity study. Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO {lOCFRSO), and NUREG/CR-:7002, Section 5.4,. require licensees to provide an updated ETE analysis to the NRC when a increase within the EPZ causes ETE values (for the 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region or en'iire EPZ) to increase by 25 perteht or 30 minutes, whichever is less. : All ETE for the region, are greater than 2 hours;. 25 percent of these base ETEs is always greater than 30 minutes .. Therefore, 30 minutes is the lesser and is the criterion for Twenty 'percent of the goth percentile ETE 'for the 2-mile region . (1:50) is 28 which is .less 30 minu!es an*d is the criterion for .updating fo'rthis region .. .. Those percenfpopulation changes whic.h result in the goth percentile ETE changes greater. than 30. minutes (or 28 minutes for the 2-,mile region) are highlighted in red in Table ETE Variation with P'opulation Change -a, population increase of 22 percent or niorewould require a full ETE update .. Exelon will haveto estimate the EPZ population on an annual basis. If the EPZ population 22 percent or more, an updated ETE analysis will be needed. . . NMP/JAF M-3. KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estfrnate February 24, 2016 *!,'. | |||
Table M-3. ETE Variation with Population Change Region Population Change Base 20% 21% 22% 2-Mile 1:50 1:50 1:50 1:50 5-MILE 2:10 2:15 2:15 2:15 FULL EPZ 3:15 3:40 3:40 3:50 Region Base Population Change 20% 21% 22% 2-Mile 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5-MILE 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 FULL EPZ | |||
* 4:25 4:25 4:40 5:00 M.4 Enhancements in Evacuation Time This appendix documents sensitivity studies on critical variables that could impact ETE. | |||
* Reducing trip generation time does not significantly impact the goth and 1ooth percentile ETE since congestion continues beyond the trip generation (Section M.1). Nonetheless, public outreach should be considered to inform people within the EPZ to mopilize quicker. | |||
* Shadow evacuation can have a marginal impact on ETE (Section M.2). If the evacuating shadow vehicles drop below 15%, it will drop the goth percentile ETE by 5 minutes and not affect the moth percentile ETE. If a full shadow evacuation were to occur, then the goth percentile ETE would increase by 5 mimites and the moth percentile ETE would increase by 25 minutes. Nonetheless, public outreach could be considered to inform those people within the EPZ (and potentially beyond the EPZ) that if they are not advised to evacuate, *they should not. | |||
* Population growth results in more evacuating vehicles which could significantly increase ETE (Section M.3). If the population were to increase by 22% or more; then a new ETE | |||
* study will need to be condu.cted. Public outreach t6 inform those people within the EPZ to evacuate as a family in a single vehicle would reduce the number of evacuating vehicles . . and reduce ETE or offset the impact of population growth. NMP/JAF M-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 APPENDIX N ETE Criteria Checklist N. ETE CRITERIA CHECKLIST. Table N-1. ETE Review Criteria Checklist NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis LO lntrodudion a. The emergency planning zone (EPZ) and surrounding area Yes Section 1 should be described. b, A map should be included identifies primary features Yes Figure 1-1 of the site, including major roadways, significant topographical features, boundaries of counties, and population centers within the EPZ. c. A comparison of the current and previous ETE should, be Yes Table 1-3 provided and includes similar information as identified in Table 1-1, "ETE Comparison," of NUREG/CR-7002. 1.1 Approach a. A discussion of the approach and level of detail obtained Yes Section 1.3 during the field survey of the roadway network should be provided. b. Sources of demographic data for schools, special facilities, Yes Section 2.1 large employers, and special events should be identified. Section 3 c: Discussion should be presented on use of traffic control Yes Section 1.3, Section 2.3, Section 9, plans in the analysis. Appendix G d. Traffic simulation models used for the analyses should be Yes Section 1.3, Table 1-3, Appendix B, C and identified by name and version. D NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis e. Methods USE;!d to address data uncertainties should be Yes* Section 3 -avoid double counting described. Section 5, Appendix F -4.5% sampling error at 95% ,confidence interval for telephone survey 1.iAssumptions a. The planning basis for the ETE includes the assumption Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption 1 that the evacuation should be ordered promptly and no Section 5.1 . early protective actions have been implemented .. b .. Assumptions consistent with Table 1-2, "General Yes Sections 2.2, 2.3 | |||
* Assumptions/' of NUREG/CR-7002 should be provided and include the basis to support their use. 1.3 Scenario Development . a. The ten scenarios in Table 1-3, Evacuation Scenarios, Yes Tables 2-1, 6-2 should be developed for the ETE analysis, ora reason . should be provided for use of other scenarios. L3.1 Staged Evacuation a. A discussion should be provided on the approach used in Yes Sections 5.4.2, 7 .2 development of a staged evacuation. 1.4 Evacuation Planning Areas a. A map of EPZ with emergency response planning areas Yes Figure 6-1 (ERPAs) shou,ld be included. b. A table should be provided identifying the ERPAs Yes Table 6-1 considered for each ETE calculation by downwind direction in each sector. NMP/JAF N-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I | |||
.: *,". NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis c. A table s.ir:nilar to Table 1-4, "Evacuation Areas for a Staged Yes Table 7-5 | |||
* Keyhole," of NUREG/CR-7002 should be* ... : :provided *and: the complete* evacuation of the 2, 5; .*. arid 10 mile and forthe 2 mile area/Smile keyhole evacuations . . , *. Demand Estimation a. Demand estimation should be developed for the four Yes Permanent residents, employees, population groups, including permanent of the transients -Section 3, Appendix E .. *.* EPZ, transients, special facilities, ahdschools: . Special facilities, schools -Section 8, *. . . *'. Appendix E 2.1 Permanent Residents Population | |||
* a. . The US Census should be the source ofthe population Yes Section 3.l values; or another cred,ible source be provided . . | |||
* b . . Population values should be adjusted_ as necessary for .. Yes Used 2010 US Census data to project out **1.* growth tp reflect population estimates to the year of the to 2015 using 2014 growth rates. ETE. c. *:A sector diagram should be included, similar to. Figure 2-1, Yes Figure 3-3 . . . ' . . . . . "Po_pulation by Sector/' of NU REG/CR-7002, showing the* population distribution for permanent residents. 2.1.1 Permanent Reside'nts with Vehicles a . The persons per vehicle value should be between 1 and 2 . Yes 1.93 persons per vehicle -'-Table . or justification should be provided for other values. b. Major employers should be listed. Yes Appendix E -Table E-3 *. NMP/JAF N-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis ... 2.1.2 Transient PopU,l,ation, a. . A list of facilities which attract transient populations Yes Sections 3.3, 3.4, Appendix E should be induded, and peak and average attendance for .* these facilities s.hould be listed. The source of information t1Sed to develop attendance values should be provided. b. The average population during the season should be used, . Yes Tables 3-6, 3-::7 and Appendix E itemize the itemized and totaled for eacb scenario. transient population and employee estimates. These estimates are multiplied *,. by the scenario specific percentages provided in Table 6-:3 to estimate transient . --population by scenario . c. . The percent of permanent assumed to be at Yes Sections 3.3, 3.4 facilitie;!s should be estimated. d. The number.of people per vehicle should be provided. Yes Sections 3.3, 3.4 . . . Numbers may vary by scenario, an*9 if sci, discussion on why values vary should be provided. e. Asector diagram should b.e included, similar to Figure 2-1 Yes Figure 3 transients of NUREG/CR-7002, showing: the population distribution * .* Figure 3 employees for the transient population. 2.2 Transit Dependent Permanent Residents a. The methodology used to qetern:iine the number of transit Yes Section 8.1, Table 8-1 dependent residents should be discussed. b. Transportation resources needed to evacuate this group Yes Section 8.1, Tables 8-5, 8-10 should be quantified. c. | |||
* The county/local evacuation plans for transit dependent. Yes Sections 8.1, 8.4, Table 8-6 residents should be used in the analysis. NMP/JAF N-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time* Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments * .... in ETE Analysis d; The methodology used to determine the number of* Yes Section 8.5 .people With disabilities and those with access and functic>nal needs who inay need assistance and do not reside in special facilities should be provided. Data from local/county registration programs should be used in the. estimate, but should not bethe only set of data. e. Capacities should be provided for all types of Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption :I.a transportation resources. Bus seating :capacity of 50% Sections 3.5, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 should be used or justification should be provided for | |||
* higher values. f. An estimate of this population should be provided and Yes Table 8-1 :-transit dependents information should be provided that the existing Sections 8-1, 8.4 registratioh programs were used iri developing thE;? estimate. g . A summary table of the total number of buses, Yes Section 8.3, 8.4 . ambulances, or other transport needed to support evacuation should be provided and the quantification of Table 8-5 resources should be detailed enough to*assu.re double counting has not occurred. 2.3 Special Facility Residents a. A list of special facilities, including the type of facility, Yes Appendix E, Tables E-2, E list facilities, location, and average population should be provided. type, location, and population Special facility staff should be included in th.e totaLspecial facility population. b. A discussion should be provided on how special facility Yes Section 3.5 data was obtained. ,* ** NMP/JAF N-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ------------------- | |||
NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis ". . . c. The number of wheelchair and bed-bound individuals Yes Section 3.5 and Table 8-4 | |||
* shouldbe provided. ..* d. An estimate of the nurnber and capacity of vehicles* Yes Section 8.3 | |||
* needed to support the ofthe facility should be Tables 8-4, provided. e. *The logistics for mobilizing specially trained staff (e.g., . Yes Sections 3.5, 8.3 medical support or security supportfc:ir prisons, jails, and .. . other correctional facilities) should be discussed when appropriate .. 2.4 School$ a. A list of schools including name, location, student Yes Table 8-2, E-1 pdpulatlon, and trc:insportation resources required to Section 8.2 -. -supportthe evacuation, should be provided. The source _of this information should be provided. b. Transportation resources for elementary and middle Yes Table 8-2 schools should be based bn 100% of the school capacity. _c. The estimate of high school students who will use their Yes Section 8.2 discusses it is conservatively personal vehicle to evacuate should be provided and a assumed no students will evacuate in their basis for the values used should be discussed. personal vehicles. d; The need for return trips should be identified if necessary. Yes There are sufficient resources to evacuate schools in a single wave. However, Section 8.4 and Figure 8-1 discuss the potential for a multiple wave evacuation. NMP/JAE: KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ET.E.Analysis " .. . . . . . 2.5.1 Special Events a. A complete list of special events should be provided and Yes Section 3.7 ineludes information on the population, estimated duration, and season of the event. b. The special event that encompasses the peak transient Yes Section 3.7 population should be analyzed inthe ETE. c. The percent of permanent residents attending the event Yes Section 3.7 should be estimated. 2.5.2 Shadow Evacuation a. A shadow evacuation of 20 percent should be included for Yes Section 2.2 -Assumption 5 | |||
* areas outside the evacuation area extending to 15 miles Figure 2-1 from the NPP. Section 3.2 b. Population estimates for the shadow evacuation in the 10 Yes Section 3.2 to 15 mile area beyond the EPZ are provided by sector. Figure 3-5 Table 3-5 c. The loading of the shadow evacuation onto the roadway Yes Section 5 -Table 5-9 footnote network should be consistent with the trip generation time generated for the permanent resident population. NMP/JAF | |||
* N-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis 2.5.3 Background and PassThrough Traffic * . a. . The v.olume of background traffic and. pass through,traffic .* Yes . Section.3.6 *,**. * 'isb.ased on, the average daytime traffic. Values maybe . 'reduced for nighttime scenarios. Table 3-8 . . Section 6 .; Table 6-3, 6-4 * '' b. . eass'through traffic is assumed to stopped entering Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption s* ' th*e EPZ abouttwo* hours afterthe.initial _notification. | |||
* Section 3.6 2;6 s*umniary of Demand Estir,Tlation . a. t:.. summary*table shduldbe provided that identifies the Yes total populations a11d totalvehicles used in analysis for* Section 3.8 perma_nent residents, transients, dependent Tables 3-9, 3-10 | |||
* residents, special facili't:ies1.schools, shac;low population, ; , and pass-through demand used in each scenario, . . | |||
* 3.0 Roadway Capacity * *, *a .. The niethod(s) used to assess roadway capacity should be Yes Section 4 discussed:* * .. 3.1 Roadway Characteristics a. Afield survey of key routes within the EPZ has been Yes Section 1.3 ..conducted. b. ,. Information should be provided describing the extent of Yes Section 1.3 the survey, and types of information g'athered and used in . the analysis. * | |||
* N-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
* | |||
* NRC Review criteria . *; 4.* . .. ;. Crit"ericmAClltressed .. : , *cc>>mm*ents *: .. *. '" g" " "' *' . in ETE " ,. .. . .. . ""'* c. A table similar to that in Appendix A, "Roadway Yes Appendix K,Table K-1 Characteristics," of NUREG/CR-7002 should be provided. . . . d. Calculations for a representative roadway segment should Yes Section 4 b.e provided. e. A legible ma*p of the roadway system that identifies node Yes Appendix K, Figures K-1 through K-33 numbers and segments used to develop the ETE should be present the entire link-node analysis provided and should be simHar to Figure 3-1, "Roadway network at a scale suitable to identify all | |||
* Network Identifying Nodes and Segments," of NU REG/CR-links and nodes 7002. 3.2 Capacity Analysis .a. The approach used to calculate the roadway capacity for Yes Section 4 the transportation network should be described in detail and identifies factors that should be expressly used in the modeling. b. The capacity analysis identifies where field information Yes Section 1.3, Section 4 should be used in the ETE calculation. 3.3 Intersection Control a. A list of intersections should be provided that includes the Yes Appendix K, Table K-2 total number of intersections modeled that are unsignalized, signalized, or manned by response . personnel. b. Characteristics for the 10 highest vo'lume intersections Yes Table J-1 within the EPZ are provided including the location, signal cycle length, and turn lane queue capacity . c. . Discussion should be provided on how signal cycle time is Yes Section 4.1, Appendix C used in the calculations. NMP/JAF N-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis 3.4 Adverse Weather a. The adverse weather condition should be identified and Yes Table 2-1, Section 2.3 -Assumption 9 the effects of adverse weather on mobilization time Mobilization time -Table 2"2, Section 5.3 should be considered. (page 5-10) b. The speed and capacity reduction factors identified in Yes Table 2 based on HCM 2010. The Table 3-1, "Weather Capacity of NUREG/CR-7002 factors'provided in Table of should be used or a basis should be provided for other NUREG/CR-7002 are from HCM 2000. values. c. The study identifies assumptions for snow rel'!loval on Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption 9 streets and driveways, when applicable. Section 5.3:.... page 5-10 Appendix F-Section F.3.3 4.0 Development of Evacuation Times 4.1 Trip Generation Time a. The process used to develop trip generation times should Yes Section 5 be identified. b. When telephone surveys are used, the scope of the Yes Appendix F survey, area of survey, number of participants, and statistical relevance should be provided .. , . c. Data obtained from telephone surveys should be Yes . Appendix F summarized. d. The trip generation time for each population group should Yes Section 5, Appendix F be developed from site specific information. , NMP/JAF N-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Reyiew. Crite,ria : Criterion Addressed Comments in Analysis . 4.1.1 Permanent Residents and Transient Population a. Permanent residents are assumed to evacuate from their Yes Section 5 discusses trip generation for homes but are not assumed to be at home at all times. households with and without returning Trip generation time includes the assumption that a commuters. Table 6-3 presents the percentage of residents will need to return home prior to percentage of households with returning evacuating. commuters and the percentage of households either without returning commuters or with no commuters. Appendix F presents the percent households who will await the return of commuters. b. Discussion should be provided on the time and method Yes Section 5.4.3 used to notify transients. The trip generation time discusses any difficulties notifying persons in hard to reach areas such as on lakes or in campgrounds. c. The trip generation time accounts for transients Yes Section 5, Figure 5-1 potentially returning to hotels prior to evacuating. d. Effect of public transportation resources used during Yes Section 3.7 special events where a large number of transients should be expected should be considered. e. The trip generation time for the transient population Yes Section 5, Table 5-9, Figure 5-4 should be integrated and loaded onto the transportation network with the general public. NMP/JAF N-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
'. NRC Rev:iew Criteria "*' . , *. , .. * .Criterion Addressed *"'" r. * " ***.Comments *., " . ,: . " . ..-... " Analysis .... . .. . . . '* ... * .iii 4.1.2 Transit Dependent Residents a. If available, existing plans and bus routes should be used Yes Section 8.4. 76 pre-established bus routes in the ETE analysis. If new plans should be developed with were used in the ETE analysis -see Table the ETE, they have been agreed upon by the responsible 8-6. authorities. b. Discussion should be included on the means of evacuating | |||
* Yes Section 8.3, 8.5 ambulatory and non-ambulatory residents. c. The number, location, and availability of buses, and other Yes Section 8.4 resources needed to support the demand estimation Table 8-5 should be provided. d. Logistical details, such as the time to obtain buses, brief Yes Section 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 drivers, and initiate the bus route should be provided. Figure 8-1 e. Discussion should identify the time estimated for transit Yes Section 8.4, 8.5 dependent residents to prepare and travel to a bus pickup point, and describes the expected means of travel to the pickup point. f. The number of bus stops and time needed to load Yes Section 8.4 passengers should be discussed. g. A map of bus routes should be included. Yes Maps of the bus pick-up routes in each ERPA are contained in the EMO calendar. h. The trip generation time for non-ambulatory persons Yes Section 8.5 includes the time to mobilize ambulances or special vehicles, time to drive to the home of residents, loading time, and time to drive out of the EPZ should be provided. NMP/JAF N-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
,,:* . , ,* .. _'. NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments i. Information shoulq be provided to supports analysis of return trips, if necessary. . ': 4.1.3 Special Facilities a. | |||
* Information on evacuatipn logistics and mobilization times should be provided. b, Dis.cussi.ori should be provided on the inbound and oUtbounq speeds. . . .. . .* .. c The number of wheelchair and bed-bound individuals sho.uld be provided, and the logistics of evacuating these residents should be discussed . . * .d. Time for loading of residents should beprovided e.* | |||
* Information should be provided that indicates whether the evacu(!tion can in a single trip or if | |||
* additional trips should be needed;* in ETE Analysis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes t If frips should oe needed; the destination of Yes vehicles should be provided. g. Discussion should be provided onwhethe.r special facility Yes residents are expected to pass through the reception center prior to being evacuated to thefr final destination. h. Supporting information should be provided to quantifythe Yes .* time elem.ents for the return trips. * .. NMP/JAF N-13 Evacuation Time Estimate Sections 8.4 Figure 8-1 Tables 8-11 through 8-13 Section 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, Tables 8-4, 8-14 through 8-16, Table 8-17 Sections 8.4, 8.6 Section 8.3 Tables 8-4, 8-14 through 8-16 Section 8.4, 8.6 Section 8.4, Table 8-4, 8-5 Section 8.4 Figure 10-1 Section 8.4 Section 8.4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Februar\f 24, 2016 NRC Review criteria Criterion Addressed Comments .. in Ef:E Analysis 4.1.4 Schools a. lnformatioil on evacuation logistics and mobilization time Yes Section 8.4 should be provided. Tables 8-7 through 8-9 b. Discussion should be provided on the inbound and Yes School bus routes are presented in Table outbound speeds. 8-6. School bus speeds are presented in Tables 8-7 (good weather), 8-8 (rain) and 8 (snow). Outbound speeds are defined as the minimum of the evacuation route speed and the State school bus speed limit. Inbound speeds are limited to the State school bus speed limit. c. Time for loading of students should be provided. Yes Tables 8-7 through 8-9, Discussion in Section 8.4 d. Information should be provided that indicates whether Yes Section 8.4 -page 8-8 the evacuation can be completed in a single trip or if Table 8-5 additional trips are n.eeded. e. If return trips are needed, the destination of school buses Yes Return trips are not needed should be provided.* f. If used, reception centers should be identified. Discussion Yes Table 8-3. Students are evacuated to should be provided on whether students are expected to reception center where they will be picked *pass through the reception center prior to being up by parents or guardians. evacuated to their final destination. NMP/JAF N-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
. NRC.Review Criteria , . *.. '* . Cr.i:terio.n* Addressed * . Comments , . . . . -"" . in ETE Analy,sis. "' j * * * | |||
* g. Supporting information should be provided to quantify the .time elements for the return trips. 4.2 ETE Modeling a. General information about the model should be provided and demonstrates its use in ETE studies. b. If a traffic simulation model is not used to conduct the ETE caiculation, sufficient detail should be provided to validate the analytical approach used. All criteria elements should have been met, as appropriate. 4.2.1 Traffic Simulation Model Input a. Traffic simulation model assumptions and a representative . set of model inputs should be provided. . b. A glossary of terms should be provided for the key performance measures and parameters used in the analysis. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Yes Yes No Yes Yes N-15 Return trips are not needed. Tables 8-7 through 8-9 provide time needed to arrive at reception center, which could be used to compute a second wave evacuation if necessary DYNEV II (Ver. 4.0.19.2). Section 1.3, Table 1-3, Appendix B, Appendix C. Not applicable as a traffic simulation model was used. Appendices Band C describe the simulation model assumptions and algorithms Table J-2 Appendix A Tables C-1, c..:2 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 "NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Cpmments : , , " in ETE Analysis . 4.2.2 Traffic Simulation Model Output a. A discussion regarding whether the traffic simulation Yes Appendix B model used must be in equilibration prior to calculating the ETE should be provided. b. The minimum following model outputs should be provided Yes 1. Table J-5. to support review: 2. Table J-3. 1. Total volume and percent by hour at each EPZ exit 3. Table J-1. node.*. 4. Table J-3. 2. Network wide average travel time. 5. Figures J-1 through J-14 (one plot . 3. Longest queue length for the 10 intersections with the for each scenario considered) . highest traffic volume. 6. Table J-4. Network wide average 4. Total vehicles exiting the network. speed also provided in Table J-3. 5. A plot that provides both the mobilization curve and evacuation curve identifying the cumulative percentage of evacuees who have mobilized and exited the EPZ. 6. Average speed for each major evacuation route that exits the EPZ. c. Color coded roadway maps should be provided for various Yes Figures 7-3 through 7-7 times (i.e., at 2, 4, 6 hrs., etc.) during a full EPZ evacuation scenario, identifying areas where long queues exist including level of service (LOS) "E" and LOS "F" conditions, if they occur. 4.3 Evacuation Time Estimates for the General Public a. The ETE should include the time to evacuate 90% and Yes Tables 7-1, 7-2 100% of the total permanent resident and transient \ population NMP/JAF . N-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 | |||
.,. .. , .. ,NRC Review Griteria .. " ** * ** | |||
* it. ' * ' '' .. ' ' . ' . b. The ETE for 100% of the general public should include all members of the general public. Any reductions or truncated data should be explained. c. Tables should be provided for the 90 and 100 percent ETEs similar to Table 4-3, "ETEs for Staged Evacuation Keyhole," of NUREG/CR-7002. d. ETEs should be provided for the 100 percent evacuation of special facilities, transit dependent, and school populations. 5.0 Other Considerations 5.1 Development of Traffic Control Plans a. Information that responsible authorities have approved the traffic control plan used in the analysis should be provided. b. A discussion of adjustments or additions to the traffic control plan that affect the ETE should be provided. 5.2 Enhancements in Evacuation Time a. The results of assessments for improvement of evacuation time should be provided. b. A statement or discussion regarding presentation of enhancements to local authorities should be provided. NMP/JAF | |||
* Evacuation Time Estimate Criterian A:ddressed .* ., *" "***" . ' .. .. in Analysis. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N-17 . ' ; ' Section 5.4 -truncating survey data to eliminate statistical outliers Table 7 1ooth percentile ETE for general public Tables 7-3, 7-4 Section 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 Tables 8-7 through 8-9 Tables 8-11 through 8-18 Section 9, Appendix G Appendix G Appendix M No recommended enhancements. ETE results were reviewed by local authorities in the draft report and were accepted. KLD Engineering, P.C. | |||
* February 24, 2016 | |||
......-----NRC Review Criteria .. trite.ii . "' " ' Comments . ,; "* ,, in:ETE'.Analysis * * . ""' "'" . .:--.: ***. .* ,., ... ' *. 5.3 State and Local.Review a. A list of agencies contacted and the extent of interaction Yes Table 1-1. ETE results were reviewed by with these agencies should be discussed. | |||
* local authorities in the draft report and were accepted. -b. lnformatibn should be provided on any unresolved issues Yes There are no outstanding issues. that may affect the ETE .. 5.4 Reviews and Updates a'.*, A.discussion of when an ETE analysis is required Yes Appendix M, Section M.3 *to' be performed and to the NRC. 5.5 Reception Centers and Congregate Cc:1re Center a. A map of congregate care centers and reception centers Yes Figure 10-1 should be provided. b. If return trips are required, assumptions used to estimate Yes Section 8.4 discusses a multi-wave return times for buses should be provided. evacuation procedure. Figure 8-1 c. It should be clearly stated if ft is assumed that passengers Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption 7h are left at the reception center and are taken by separate Section 10 | |||
* busesto the congregate care center. NMP/JAF N-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ATTACHMENT 4 Emergency Plan Annex Revision EP-AA-1006, Revision 38, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station" Exelon Generation EXELON NUCLEAR ' EP-AA-1006 Revision 38 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX FOR QUAD CITIES STATION Table of Contents Section Page SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... QC 1-1 1.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION .............................................................................. QC 1-1 1.2 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES .................................................................. QC 1-1 1.3 STATE OF IOWA ........................................................................................ QC 1-2 SECTION 2:0RGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES .................................................. QC 2-1 2.1 SHIFT ORGANIZATION STAFFING ................................................................ QC 2-1 2.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION BLOCK DIAGRAM ........................... QC 2-1 2.3 NON-EXELON NUCLEAR SUPPORT GROUPS ................................................ QC 2-1 SECTION 3: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES .................................................................. QC 3-:1 SECTION 4: EMERGENCY MEASURES ................................................................................. QC 4-1 4.1 NOTIFICATION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ..................................... QC 4-1 4.2 ASSESSMENT ACTIONS ............................................................................. QC 4-1 4.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THE 0FFSITE PUBLIC ......................................... QC 4-1 4.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR ONSITE PERSONNEL ......................................... QC 4-2 SECTION 5: EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ......................................................... QC 5-1 5.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES .......................................... , ................ QC 5-1 5.2 ASSESSMENT RESOURCES ........................................................................ QC 5-1 5.3 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ................................................... QC 5-4 5.4 FIRST AID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES ........................................................... QC 5-4 5.5 LAW ENFORACEMENT AGENCIES ................................................................ QC 5-5 5.6 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANIZATIONS AND EMS SUPPORT .................................. QC 5-5 APPENDIXES Appendix 1: NUREG-0654 Cross-Reference Appendix 2: Station Letters of Agreement AD DEN DU MS Addendum 1: On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis | |||
* Addendum 2: Evacuation Time Estimates for Quad Cities Generating Station Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone Addendum 3: Emergency Action Levels for Quad Cities Station November 2016 ii EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
REVISION HISTORY Revision O; 04/BO Revision BN; 01/9B Revision 34, 12/12 Revision 1; 07/BO Revision BP; 07/9B . Revision 35, 6/13 Revision 2; 04/B1 Revision 9; 05/99 Revision 36, 6/14 Revision 3; 04/B2 Revision 10; 01/00 Revision 37, 12/14 Revision 4; 04/B3 Revision 11; 01/01 Revision 3B, 11/16 Revision 5; 12/B4 Revision 12; 10/01 Revision SA; 03/BS Revision 13; 10/01 Revision 6; 03/B6 Revision 14; 01/02 Revision 7; 02/B7 Revision 15; 07/02 Revision 7A; 12/B7 Revision 16; 09/02 Revision 78; OB/BB Revision 17; 06/03 Revision 7C; 05/B9 Revision 1 B; OB/03 Revision 70; 12/B9 Revision 20, Canceled Revision B; 09/94 Revision 21, 10/05 Revision BA; 01 /95 Revision 22, 12/05 Revision B8; 03/95 Revision 23, 04/06 Revision BC; 09/95 Revision 24, 04/07 Revision BO; 12/93 Revision 25, 10/07 Revision BE; 12/93 Revision 26, 03/0B Revision BF; 01/94 Revision 27, 12/0B Revision BG; 04/94 Revision 2B, 03/10 Revision BH; 10/94 Revision 29, 06/10 Revision Bl; 12/95 Revision 30, 01/11 Revision BJ; 12/95 Revision 31, 03/11 Revision BK; 04/96 Revision 32, 06/12 Revision BL; 05/96 Revision 33, 11/12 November 2016 iii EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section* 1: Introduction As required in the conditions set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the operating licenses for the Exelon Nuclear Stations, the management of Exelon recognizes its responsibility and authority to operate and maintain the nuclear power stations in such a manner as to provide for the safety of the general public. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Program consists of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan (Emergency Plan), The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Annex, Exelon emergency plan implementing procedures, and associated program administrative documents. The Emergency Plan .outlines the basis for response actions that would be implemented in an emergency. This document serves as the Quad Cities Station Annex and contains information and guidance that is unique to the station. This includes facility geography location for a full understanding and representation of the station's emergency response capabilities. The Station Annex is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the Emergency Plan. 1.1 Facility Description The Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2, is located in Cordova Township of Rock Island County in northwestern Illinois. The station is located on the east bank of the Mississippi River three miles north. of Cordova, Illinois. Cooling water for the plant is provided by the Mississippi River, with the water being returned to the river by diffuser pipes. The plant consists of two boiling water reactors (BWR), nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS), and turbine generators furnished by General Electric Company. The steam supply system is designed for a power output of 2957 MWt for each of the two units. The Quad Cities Station area consists of approximately 126 acres (with a radius of about 1/4-mile about the Units 1/2 chimney) and is owned and controlled by Mid American Energy Company and Exelon Nuclear as tenants in common. For more specific site location information, refer to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2. 1.2 Emergency Planning Zones The Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for Quad Cities Station is an area surrounding the station with a radius of about ten miles, (exact boundaries are determined by the States of Illinois and Iowa). Refer to Figure 1-1. The Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for Quad Cities Station is an area surrounding the Station with a radius of about 50 miles. November 2016 QC 1-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 1.3 State of lovva Much of the Plume Exposure EPZ for the Quad Cities Station lies within the State of Iowa. The State of Iowa has developed an "Iowa Emergency Plan." This section provides a summary of the essential elements of the Iowa Emergency Plan, outlining the specific responsibilities of certain "key" Iowa State Agency players in a response operational mode. Basic descriptions for the Iowa State agencies responsible for actions in the event of a nuclear power station are as follows: 1.3.1 Iowa Emergency Management Division (IEMD) IEMD coordinates all activities of State agencies and departments, all local governments, and the utility in support of emergency response activities.* These activities are coordinated from the Iowa State EOC in Des Moines. 1.3.2 The Iowa Commissioner of Public Health The Iowa Department of Public Health alerts the State Hygienic Lab when emergency action conditions are reported by a commercial nuclear power reactor, which impacts upon the public health and safety in Iowa, and when emergency team response has been determined to be necessary or imminent. They perform necessary calculations and evaluate the impact of existing and projected radioactivity releases in terms of public health risk. They translate the evaluation of existing and projected environmental contamination and resulting dose into terms of alternative protective actions. They recommend appropriate protective actions to the Governor's Office, IEMD and other State agencies as appropriate. 1.3.3 University Hygienic Lab (UHL) The UHL, located in Iowa City, Iowa conducts and coordinates all field surveillance and monitoring activities directed toward measuring radiation exposure and radioactivity contamination in the environment resulting from an accident at a commercial nuclear power reactor; provides and coordinates laboratory support of all environmental sampling and radiological monitoring activities-during a nuclear emergency; communicates all relevant data and protective action recommendations to the State Department of Public Health; provides radiological laboratory support for environmental samples analysis; and | |||
* provides recommendations for decontamination of contaminated area. 1.3.4 Clinton County Clinton County will provide a coordinated local government response in conjunction with the State of Iowa, from the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Clinton, IA. 1.3.5 Scott County Scott County will provide a coordinated local government response in conjunction with the State of Iowa, from the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Davenport, IA. November 2016 QC 1-2 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Figure 1-1: Quad Cities Station Location And 10 Mile EPZ 0 -N 0 SCALE s tO I I Exelon Nuclear s s t5 ll0--I 1 November 2016 QC 1-3 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 2: Organizational Control of Emergencies This section describes the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and its key positions. It outlines the staffing requirements which provide initial emergency response actions and provisions for timely augmentation of on-shift personnel when required. It also describes interfaces among Exelon Nuclear emergency response personnel ctnd specifies the offsite support available to respond to the nuclear generating stations. 2.1 Shift Organization Staffing Initial response to any emergency is by the normal plant organization present at the site. This organization includes positions that are onsite 24 hours perday and is described in Section B.1 of the Emergency Plan. The Normal Shift Organization will be augmented, in an emergency, with designated/additional Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel within 60 minutes of classification as specified under EP-QC-1000 Table QDC B-1. ERO activation is described in Section H.4 of the Emergency Plan. EP-QC-1000 Table QDC B-1 outlines ERO positions required to meet minimum staffing and full augmentation of the on-shift complement at an Alert or higher classification, and the major tasks assigned to each position. Responsibilities for each position are described in Section 8.5 of the Emergency Plan. 2.2 Emergency Response Organization Block Diagram Figures 8-1 a through 8-1 d *of the Emergency Plan illustrates the overall emergency response organization. 2.3 Non-Exelon Nuclear Support Groups Exelon Nuclear has contractual agreements with several companies whose services would be available in the event of a radiological emergency. These agencies and their available services are listed in Appendix 3 of the Emergency Plan. | |||
* Emergency response coordination with governmental agencies and other support organizations is discussed in Part II, Section A of the Emergency Plan. Agreements exist on file at Quad Cities Station with several support agencies. These agencies and their support roles are listed in Appendix 2, Station Letters of Agreement. November 2016 QC 2-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 3: Classification of Emergencies 3.1 General The Quad Cities Emergency Action Levels and supporting information are located in EP-AA-1006, Addendum 3. November 2016 QC 3-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 4: Emergency Measures 4.1 Notification of the Emergency Organization Standard NARS notifications for the Quad Cities Station are made to the State of Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), the State of Iowa Emergency Management Division (IEMD), Scott County Sheriffs Office, and Clinton County Sheriff's Office. At the Quad Cities Generating Station, if a General Emergency is the initiating event, the Emergency Director is responsible for notifying the following additional Illinois, Iowa and local agencies: | |||
* Rock Island Communications Center | |||
* Whiteside County Sheriff 4.2 Assessment Actions Throughout each emergency situation, continuing assessment will occur. Assessment actions at Quad Cities Station may include an evaluation of plant conditions; in-plant, onsite, and initial offsite radiological measurements; and initial estimates of offsite doses. Core damage information is used to refine dose assessments and confirm or extend initial protective action recommendations. Quad Cities Station utilizes NEDC-33045P-A, Revision 0, (2001) as the basis for the methodology for post-accident core damage assessment. This methodology utilizes real-time plant indications. In addition, Quad Cities Station may use samples of plant fluids and atmospheres as inputs to the CDAM (Core Damage Assessment Methodology) program for core damage estimation. 4.3 Protective Actions for the Offsite Public To aid the Emergency Response Organization during a developing emergency situation, EP-AA-111, "Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations" has been developed based on Section J.1 O.m of the Emergency Plan. 4.3.1 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Sirens This ANS consists of a permanently installed outdoor notification system within a ten-mile radius around the station. The ten-mile radius around the station is primarily an agricultural area with a population density below 2000 persons per square mile. The ANS, as installed, consists of mechanical and electronic sirens that will cover this entire area with a minimum sound level of 60 db. Additionally, the ANS will cover the heavily populated areas within ten-mile radius around the station with a minimum sound level of 70 db to ensure complete coverage. Backup means of notification is achieved through Route Alerting, which is contained within the State and respective counties' Radiological Emergency Response Plans and procedures. The means consists of utilizing vehicles with public address (PA) systems in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable. The backup method has the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within a reasonable time, but does not need to meet the 15-November 2016 QC 4-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. -4.3.2 Evacuation Time Estimates The ETE study used population data from the 2010 census which includes parts of two counties in Iowa (Clinton, Scott) and two counties in Illinois (Rock Island and Whiteside). The evacuation times are based on a detailed consideration of the EPZ roadway network and population distribution. The ETE Study, contained in EP-AA-1006 Addendum 2, Evacuation Time Estimates for the Quad Cities Generating Station Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone, presents evacuation times for daytime and nighttime scenarios under various weather conditions for the evacuation of various areas around the Quad Cities Station, once a decision has been made to evacuate. 4.4 | |||
* Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel Quad Cities Station has a siren system to warn personnel of emergency conditions. Upon hearing a continuous two (2) minute siren, all personnel not having emergency assignments have been instructed to assemble in predesignated assembly areas. Refer to Figure 4-1. If a site evacuation of non-essential personnel is required, personnel will be released to their homes or relocated and monitored at one of the following designated relocation centers for Quad Cities: -Morrison Relocation Cen_ter, Morrison, Illinois -Byron Station, Byron Illinois For evacuation routes, refer to EP-AA-113-F-21. Traffic control for onsite areas will be handled by the Quad Cities Station security force, if necessary. When a site evacuation is imminent, the TSC Security Coordinator notifies by phone or dispatches a security guard to notify those personnel in buildings outside the .protected* area (Training Building, Warehouse, Wastewater Treatment Plant, etc.). These personnel are evacuated using the prescribed route to the designated relocation center. Personnel in the warehouses, sewage treatment plant, wastewater treatment plant, and training building will assemble at their present location and await further instructions (e. g. evacuation). Equipment and personnel would be available at the Morrison Relocation Center and Byron Station for monitoring and decontamination of evacuated personnel. If major decontamination and follow-up or bioassay samples are necessary, those persons would be sent to Byron Station. November 2016 QC4-2 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) J z 0 < CD 3 O'" CD ..., N 0 _,. O') 0 () I (,.) m "'U I _,. 0 0 O') -:;u CD < (jj" ,,. :::J (,.) (X) .......,. QUAD CITIES STATION MACHINE SHOP &BREAKROOM ooo OCC/OSG D RAD WASTE BUILDING DO TURBINE BUlLDING Meetlng Room & 3rd Floor REACTOR BUILDING [j TSC D Caf,eteria I -l *, "-, I ' ' I I ' ' I I I I I I I .......... ,* ..... , l . ....._ '-......._ I I Ii ; ' ' Protected Area Fence line ' ' Outage Support z .. .PREDESlGNATEO ASSEMBLY AREAS Sc1'eening ..... Facility.'-.,, ce* c: CD I 1J .... (?) a. (?) C/I :::::s I>> -(?) a. C/I (?) 3 C"' )> CD I>> C/I 0 c: I>> a. (') :!: (?) C/I )> :::::s :::::s (?) >< m >< (?) 0 :::::s z c: 0 (?) I>> .... | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 5: Emergency Facilities and Equipment 5.1 Emergency Response Facilities Refer to Figure 5-1 for the location of the Quad Cities Station Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Operations Support Center (OSC) within the Station's Protected Area boundary. 5.1.1 Station Control Room The Quad Cities Station Control Room shall be the initial onsite center of emergency control. The Control Room is located on the 620-foot elevation of the Service Building. 5.1.2 Technical Support Center (TSC) Quad Cities Station has established a Technical Support Center (TSC) in a building located south of the Service Building. The TSC fully meets the requirements of Section H.1.b of the Emergency Plan. 5.1.3 Operational Support Center (OSC) Quad Cities Station has designated an Operational Support Center. The OSC is located on the ground floor in the Service Building in a space designated as the Outage Control Center. The OSC conforms to the requirements of Section H.1.c of the Emergency Plan, and is the location to which operations support personnel will report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments in support of emergency operations. 5.1.4 Alternative Facility The Alternative Facility maintains the capability for staging the TSC/OSC emergency response organization personnel in the event of a hostile action. This alternative facility has the capability for communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation. Consistent with NRC EPFAQ No. 2013-005, the EOF will satisfy the offsite notification responsibilities for the Alternative Facility. The Alternative Facility is located at 14439 Crosby Road, Morrison Illinois. (CM-1, ref. AR 1362747.44) 5.2 Assessment Resources 5.2.1 Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation The meteorological tower, located 1623 meters SSE of the plant, is 300 ft. high and is instrumented at three levels. The 33 ft., 196 ft. and 296 ft. levels correspond to the elevations of the possible points of airborne effluent release. Wind speed and wind direction are measured at all three elevations. Ambient temperature is measured at 33 ft. and differential temperatures referenced to 33 ft. are measured at 196 ft. and 296 ft. Precipitation is measured nearby. November 2016 QC 5-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear The onsite meteorological monitoring program is covered in the contractor specification and vendor procedures of the meteorological monitoring contractor. These data are used to generate wind roses and to provide estimates of airborne concentrations of gaseous effluents. 5.2.1.1 Instrumentation The meteorological tower is instrumented with equipment that conforms with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 and ANSI/ANS 2.5 (1984). The equipment is placed on booms oriented into the general prevailing wind at the site. Equipment signals are brought to the process computers and to an instrument building with controlled environmental conditions. The building at the base of the tower houses the recording equipment, signal conditioners, etc., used to process and re-transmit the data to the end point users. 5.2.1.2 Meteorological Measurement Program During a Disaster Cooperation between the corporate office and the meteorological contractor assures that a timely restoration of any outage can be made. Emergency field visits to the site are made as quickly as possible after detection of a failure. Should a disaster of sufficient magnitude occur to destroy the tower structure, a contract is maintained to have a temporary tower erected within 72 hours, weather conditions permitting. Further, the meteorological contractor maintains two levels of sensors (wind speed, wind direction and temperature) in a state of readiness for use on the temporary tower. Additionally, Exelon Nuclear's existing instrumented towers at other nuclear sites provide a high density measurement network with multiple backup opportunities. Meteorological data are available to the station Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Emergenqy Operations Facility for use in the Dose Assessment Computer Model for estimating the environmental impact of unplanned releases of radioactivity from the station. 5.2.2 Onsite Radiation Monitoring Equipment Sections 2.7, 7.6 and 9.5 of the UFSAR for Quad Cities Station, Unit 1 and 2, describe in detail the radiation monitoring systems and equipment. The modified off-gas treatment system is described in Section 9.2 of the UFSAR. In addition to the dedicated systems described here, chemistry and health physics personnel are trained and equipped to perform radiological monitoring and sampling. The radiation monitoring and equipment can be categorized into four (4) groups: November 2016 QC 5-2 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 5.2.2.1 Radiological Noble Gas Effluent Monitoring: A wide-range monitoring system is installed in the effluent stream in the main chimney and in the effluent stream of the reactor building vent stack. Methods for converting instrument readings to release rates have been developed and are incorporated into Station procedures. 5.2.2.2 Radioiodine and Particulate Effluent Monitoring: Effluent sampling media are analyzed in the Station counting room using a HPGe isotopic system. 5.2.2.3 High-Range Containment Radiation Monitors: Two high range containment radiation monitors are installed on each of Quad Cities Station's units. The range of these monitors is from 1 R/hr to 108 R/hr. 5.2.2.4 In-plant Iodine Instrumentation: Quad Cities Station has the capability to sample and determine iodine concentrations in the plant using Silver Zeolite or charcoal cartridges and gamma ray spectroscopy. Monitors may be used to measure increasing levels of iodine during emergency conditions (e.g. a portable gamma ray spectroscopy system). 5.2.3 Onsite Process Monitors Adequate monitoring capability exists to properly assess the plant status for all modes .of operation. The operability of the post-accident instrumentation ensures information is available on selected plant . parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. Instrumentation is available to monitor the parameters and ranges given in Technical Specifications. Station procedures have been developed which would aid personnel in recognizing inadequate core cooling using applicable instrumentation. 5.2.4 Onsite Fire Detection Instrumentation Quad Cities Station has a fire protection system that is designed to quickly detect any fires, annunciate locally and in the Control Room, and initiate the appropriate automatic action. The station fire protection system is described in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report. The detection instrument minimum requirements and further system description are contained in QCAP 1500-1 (Administrative Requirements for Fire Protection). In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, contingency actions are taken as defined in the above. 5.2.5 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring Consult Part II, Section q of the station specific Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the most current location for fixed continuous air samplers and Dosimeter of Legal Record (DLR) locations. November 2016 QC 5-3 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 5.2.6 Site Hydrological Characteristics Assessments covering the hydrological aspects of the site (i.e., effects of the Mississippi River) are made as follows: a. Onsite: River level gauge located in the intake bay. b. Offsite: The U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers will provide information regarding river levels and other conditions of importance. (Flood information can be obtained from the U.S. National Weather Service.) 5.3 Protective Facilities and Equipment The onsite assembly areas for Quad Cities Station are shown in Figure 4-1. These areas are suitable because: 1) They are large open areas suitable for assembling a large number of people in a short time; 2) They are relatively close to the Security Gatehouse; and 3) They have a low probability of being affected by a serious accident involving the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS). The offsite evacuation assembly areas for Quad Cities Station are discussed in Section 4.4 of this annex. These areas are suitable because they are easily accessible. The relocation routes to these facilities would be determined by the actual wind direction at the time of evacuation. 5.4 First Aid and Medical Facilities Quad Cities Station has a aid room on the ground floor of the Service Building near the entrance to the plant. This room is provided with a sink, showers, and supply cabinet. First aid kits, stretchers, sinks, eyewashes, and emergency showers have been placed in strategic locations throughout the station. Medical treatment given to injured persons at the station is of a "first aid" nature. When more professional care is needed, injured persons are transported to a local hospital or clinic. Genesis Medical Center Illini Campus in Silvis, Illinois, is the Quad Cities Station primary supporting medical facility. Trinity Medical Center West Campus in Rock Island, Illinois is the backup medical facility. Presence St. Joseph Medical Center in Joliet, Illinois, is an additional backup medical facility. All three hospitals agree in the event of an emergency, including a hostile action based event, to ensure the medical treatment of contaminated injured/ill personnel and to ensure the capability for the evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including assurance that persons providing these services are adequately prepared to handle contaminated individuals and capable of providing medical support for any contaminated injured individual. November 2016 QC 5-4 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 5.5 Law Enforcement Agencies A Letter of Agreement is established for Local Law Enforcement, to support Quad Cities Station to respond to a Radiological Event including a Hostile Action Based Event, in conjunction with the National Incident Management System upon notification by the station in accordance with the established communications protocol. ' 5.6 Fire Fighting Organizations and EMS Support A Letter of Agreement is established with the Local Fire Protection District to respond to a Radiological Event, including a hostile action based event, in conjunction with the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System as requested via the established notification protocol. The Genesis Medical Center, Illini Campus Hospital/Emergency Medical System (EMS) agrees to assist Quad Cities Station as requested by transporting injured/ill personnel, including radiologically contaminated injuries, from the Quad | |||
* Cities Station in Cordova, Illinois and subsequent medical treatment of injured/ill personnel at Illini Campus hospital via the established notification protocol. November 2016 QC 5-5 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Figure QCA 5-1: Location Of Onsite Area Emergency Response Facilities I 0 I I -Control Turbine Room Building -Reactor Building Service Building D osc )N TSC November 2016 QC 5-6 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Appendix 1: NUREG-0654 Cross-Reference Annex Section NUREG-0654 1.0 Part I, Section A 1.1 Part I, Section C 1.2 Part I, Section D 1.3 Part II, Section A.1 Figure 1-1 Part I, Section D 2.0 Part II, Section A.4 2.1 Part II, Section A.3 3.0 Part II, Section D 4.1 Part II, Section E.1 & J.7 4.2 Part II, Section 1.2 & 3 4.3 Part II, Section J.10.m 4.3.1 Part II, Section E.6 4.3.2 Part II, Section J.8 4.4 Part II, Section J.1-5 EP-AA-111 Part II, Section J.1 O.m Figure 4-1 Part 11, Section J.5 4.4 Part II, Section J.2 & 3 EP-AA-1006, Part II, Section J.8 Addendum 2 EP-AA-1006, Part II, Section J.1 O.b Addendum 2 5.1 Part 11, Section H.1 & G.3 5.2.1 Part II, Section H.5.a & 8 5.2.2 Part II, Section H.5.b & 1.2 5.2.3 Part II, Section H.5.c 5.2.4 Part II, Section H.5.d 5.2.5 Part II, Section H.6.b & 7 5.2.6 Part II, Section H.5.a & 6.a 5.3 " Part 11, Section J .1-5 5.4 Part 11, Section L.1 & 2 Figure 5-1 Part II, Section H.1 November 2016 Appendix 1-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) | |||
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Appendix 2: Station Letters of Agreement 1. The Illinois State Police -law enforcement 2. The Rock Island County Sheriffs Office -law enforcement 3. Genesis Medical Center Illini Campus in Silvis, Illinois -medical treatment and ambulance services 4. Trinity Medical Center West Campus -medical treatment. 5. Cordova Fire Department -fire protection 6. Presence St. Joseph Medical Center of Joliet, Illinois . November 2016 . Appendix 2-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) J ATTACHMENT 5 Emergency Plan Revision EP-QC-1000, Revision 0, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan" | |||
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* Exelon Generation@ EP-QC-1000 Revision 0 EXELON NUCLEAR QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN November 2016 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
Part I: INTRODUCTION | |||
* Section A: Purpose .............................................................................................. Part 1, 1 Section B: Background**********************************************************:***************************** Part 1, 2 Section C: Scope ................................................................................................. Part 1 , 2 Section D: Planning Basis .................................................................................... Part 1, 2 Section E: Contiguous -Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning ........... Part 1, 3 Section F: Integrated Emergency Planning ............................ : ............................ Part 1, 3 Section G: Funding and Technical Assistance ..................................................... Part 1, 3 Section H: Emergency Response Organization ................................................... Part 1, 3 Section I: Federal Response .............................................................................. Part 1 , 3 Section J: Form and Content of Plan .................................................................. Part 1, 4 Part II: PLANNING STANDARDS AND CRITERIA Section A: Assignment of Responsibility .................................................................... 1 1 . Concept of Operations ............................................................................................. 1 2. State and County Functions and Responsibilities .................................................... 8 3. Agreements in Planning Effort ................................................................................. 8 | |||
* 4. Continuous Coverage .............................................................................................. 8 Section B: Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Organization ............................... 1 1 . On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Assignments .................................... 1 2. Authority Over the Emergency Response Organization .......................................... 2 3. Criteria for Assuming Command and Control (Succession) .......................... ; ......... 2 4. Non-Delegable Responsibilities ............................................................................... 3 5. Emergency Response Organization Positional Responsibilities ............................. .4 6. Exelon Emergency Response Organization Block Diagram .................................. 33 7. Exelon Corporate Emergency Response Organization ......................................... 33 8. Industry/Private Support Organizations ................................................................. 34 9. Supplemental Emergency Assistance to the ERO ................................................. 37 Section C: Emergency Response Support and Resources ....................................... 1 1. Federal Response Support and Resources ............................................................. 1 2. Liaisons ................................................................................................................... 1 3. Radiological Laboratories ........................................................................................ 2 4. Other Assistance ..................................................................................................... 2 | |||
* November 2016 ii EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* Section D: Emergency Classification System ............................................................. 1 1. Emergency Classification System ............................................................................ 1 2. Emergency Action Level Technical Bases ............................................................... 5 3. Timely Classification of Events ................................................................................ 6 4. Off site Classification Systems ................................................................................. 7 5. Offsite Emergency Procedures ................................................................................ 7 Section E: Notification Methods and Procedures ....................................................... 1 1 . Bases for Emergency Response Organization Notification ..................................... 1 2. Notification and Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel. .......................... 1 3. Initial Notification Messages .................................................................................... 3 4. Follow-up Messages ................................................................................................ 4 5. State and County Information Dissemination ......................................................... .4 6. Notification of the Public ......................................................................................... .4 7. Messages to the Public ............................................................................................ 5 Section F: Emergency Communications ..................................................................... 1 1 . Communications/Notifications ................................................................................. 1 2. Medical Communications ......................................................................................... 4 3. Communications Testing ......................................................................................... 4 | |||
* Section G: Public Education and lnformation ............................................................. 1 1. Public Information Publication ................................................................................. 1 2. Public Education Materials ...................................................................................... 1 3. Media Accommodations .......................................................................................... 1 4. Coordination of Public lnformation ........................................................................... 3 5. Media Orientation .................................................................................................... 3 Section H: Emergency Facilities and Equipment. ....................................................... 1 1. Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center ............ 1 2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ..................................................................... 3 3. Emergency Operations Centers .............................................................................. 4 4. Activation ................................................................................................................. 5 5. Monitoring Equipment Onsite .................................................................................. 6 6. Monitoring Equipment Offsite .................................................................................. 9 7. Off site Monitoring Equipment Storage ................................................................... 10 8. Meteorological Monitoring ...................................................................................... 10 9. OSC Capabilities ................................................................................................... 11 10. Facility and Equipment Readiness ........ ; ............................................................... 11 11 . General Use Emergency Equipment ..................................................................... 11 12. Collection Point for Field Samples ......................................................................... 11 | |||
* November 2016 iii EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* Section I: Accident Assessment ................................................................................... 1 1 . Plant Parameters and Corresponding Emergency Classification ............................ 1 2. Onsite Accident Assessment Capabilities ............................................................... 1 3. Source Term Determination ..................................................................................... 1 4. Effluent Monitor Data and Dose Projection .............................................................. 3 5. Meteorological Information ..................................................................................... .4 6. Unmonitored Release .............................................................................................. 4 7. Field Monitoring ....................................................................................................... 4 8. Field Monitoring Teams ........................................................................................... 4 9. Iodine Monitoring ..................................................................................................... 5 10. Dose Estimates ........................................................................................................ 5 11. State Monitoring Capabilities ................................................................................... 5 Section J: Protective Response ... ............................................................................... 1 1 . Notification of On site Personnel .............................................................................. 1 2. Evacuation Locations ............................................................................................... 1 3. Radiological Monitoring of Evacuees ....................................................................... 1 4. | |||
* Evacuation ............................................................................................................... 2 5. Accountability ............................................. : ............................................................. 2 6. Provisions for Onsite Personnel .............................................................................. 3 7. Mechanism for Implementing Protective Action Recommendations ........................ 3 | |||
* 8. Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) ........................................................................ .4 9. Capability of Implementing Protective Action Recommendations ............................ 5 10. Implementation of Protective Action Recommendations ......................................... 5 11. Ingestion Pathway Protective Measures .................................................................. 7 12. | |||
* Monitoring of Evacuees ........................................................................................... 7 Section K: Radiological Exposure Control .................................................................. 1 1. Emergency Exposure Guidelines ............................................................................. 1 2. Emergency Radiation Protection Program: .............................................................. 2 3. Personnel Monitoring .......... ; .................................................................................... 2 4. Non-Exelon Personnel Exposure Authorization ....................................................... 3 5. Contamination and Decontamination ....................................................................... 3 6. Contamination Control Measures ............................................................................ 3 7. Decontamination of Relocated Personnel .............................................................. .4 Section L: Medical and Public Health Support ........................................................... 1 1. Offsite Hospital and Medical Services ..................................................................... 1 2. Onsite First Aid Capability ....................................................................................... 1 3. Medical Service Facilities ......................................................................................... 2 4; Medical Transportation ............................................................................................ 2 | |||
* November 2016 iv EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* Section M: Reentry and Recovery Planning ................................................................ 1 | |||
* 1 . Reentry and Recovery ............................................................................................. 1 2. Recovery Organization ............................................................................................ 4 3. Recovery Phase Notifications .................................................................................. 7 4. Total Population Exposure ....................................................................................... 7 Section N: Drill and Exercise Program ........................................................................ 1 1. Exercises ................................................................................................................. 2 2. Drills .......................................................................................... : .............................. 3 3. Conduct of Drills and Exercises ............................................................................... 5 4. Critique and Evaluation ............................................................................................ 5 5. Resolution of Drill and Exercise Findings ................................................................ 6 Section 0: Emergency Response Training ................................................................. 1 1. Assurance of Training ..................................................................................... .-........ 1 2. Functional Training of the ERO .................................................. : ............................ 1 3. First Aid Response .................................................................................................. 2 4. Emergency Response Organization Training Program ............................................ 2 5. General, Initial, and Annual Training Program Maintenance ................................... 6 Section P: Responsibility for the Maintenance of the Planning Effort ...................... 1 | |||
* 1. Emergency Preparedness Staff Training ................................................................. 1 2. Authority for the Emergency Preparedness Effort ................................................... 1 3. Responsibility for Development and Maintenance of the Plan ................................. 1 4. E-Plan and Agreement Revisions ........................................................................... .4 5. E-Plan Distribution ................................................................................................... 5 6. Supporting Emergency Response Plans ................................................................. 5 7. Implementing and Supporting Procedures .............................................................. 6 8. Cross Reference to Planning Criteria ...................................................................... 6 9. Audit/Assessment of the Emergency Preparedness Program ....... : ......................... 6 10. Maintenance of Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory' ......... ? | |||
* November 2016 v EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
Part Ill: APPENDICES | |||
* Appendix 1 : References ............................................................................................. 1-1 * | |||
* Appendix 2: Procedure Cross-Reference to NUREG-0654 ........................................ 2-1 Appendix 3: List of Corporate Letters of Agreement .................................................. 3-1 Appendix 4: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms .......................................................... 4-1 STATION ANNEX The Station Annex subject to the requirements of this plan is as follows: EP-AA-1006: Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station REVISION HISTORY REVISION EFFECTIVE DATE 0 TBD 2016 November 2016 vi EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Section A: Purpose As required in the conditions set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the operating licenses for the Exelon Nuclear Stations, the management of Exelon recognizes its responsibility and authority to operate and maintain the nuclear power stations in such a manner as to provide for the safety of the general public. This document describes the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Program. The philosophy that guides the development and maintenance of this program is the protection of the health and safety of the general public in the communities around Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and the personnel who work at the plant. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan (E-Plan) establishes the concepts, evaluation and assessment criteria, and protective actions that are necessary in order to limit and mitigate the consequences of potential or actual radiological emergencies. It has been prepared to establish the procedures and practices for management control over unplanned or emergency events that may occur at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. It also provides the necessary pre-arrangements, directions and organization so that all nuclear emergencies can be effectively and efficiently resolved. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Program consists of the E-Plan, Station Annex, emergency plan implementing procedures, and associated program administrative documents. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station E-Plan outlines the basis for response actions that would be implemented in* an emergency. | |||
* This document is not intended to be used as a procedure. The Quad Cities Station Annex contains information and guidance that is unique to the station. The annex addresses site-specific criteria, including: | |||
* Emergency Action Levels (EALs) located in Addendum 3 to the Annex, | |||
* Deviations from the E-Plan (such as station specific on-shift staffing, unique aspects of ERO augmentation, and so forth). | |||
* Facility geography and location for a full understanding and representation of the station's emergency response capabilities. * | |||
* Plant specific facilities and equipment associated with the Emergency Preparedness Program. The Station Annex and it's Addendums become a part of the plan and is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the plan. In the areas where a Station Annex deviates from the general requirements of the E-Plan, the Station Annex shall serve as the controlling document. Detailed E-Plan implementing procedures are maintained separately and are used to guide those responsible for implementing emergency actions. November 2016 Part I Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Section B: Background The primary hazard consideration at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is the potential unplanned release of radioactive material resulting from an accident. The probability of such a release is considered very low due to plant design and strict operational guidelines enforced by the NRC. Notwithstanding, federal regulations require that a solid emergency preparedness program exist for each commercial nuclear power station. A detailed description of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is given in the Updated Final-Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR). In order to minimize the number of ad-hoc decisions made during an emergency and to ensure that necessary equipment, supplies, and essential services are available to meet the needs of an emergency, Exelon Nuclear has developed this E-Plan for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The E-Plan considers the consequences of radiological emergencies, as required by 10 CFR 50, Paragraph 50.47 and Appendix E. Additionally, the E-Plan addresses guidance and adheres to the intent of the criteria established and provided within NUREG-0654. The E-Plan also considers the consequences of non-radiological emergencies. Section C: Scope This document describes actions to be taken in the event of a radiological accident that . may impact the health and safety of the general public or station employees. It also serves to limit the damage to facilities and property, and provide for the restoration of such facilities in the event of an emergency. If such an accident were to occur, the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) would be put in place and maintained until such time where the plant is returned to a stable condition and the threat to the general public or station personnel no longer exists. This plan describes the functions and operation of the ERO, including assignments of authority and responsibility. It does not, nor is it intended to, provide guidance for actual plant equipment manipulations. These instructions are contained in site-specific normal and emergency operating procedures as required by Technical Specifications and other regulatory guidance. The E-Plan provides for: identification and evaluation of emergency situations, protective measures, communications, coordination and notification of governmental authorities, document review and control, emergency preparedness assessment, and training of all *emergency personnel. An emergency recovery phase is also described in this E-Plan. Section D: Planning Basis The E-Plan, in conjunction with the Station Annex and implementing and administrative procedures, documents the methods by which the Exelon Emergency Preparedness Program meets the planning standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. Development of the E-Plan was based on NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" . November 2016 Part I Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Acceptable alternate methods, which deviate from NUREG-0654, are allowed under Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors." However, deviations will be documented in the Station Annex and evaluated as continuing to meet the Planning Standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 under the 10 CFR 50.54(q) process to ensure the continued effectiveness of the E-Plan and Station Annex. Other applicable regulations, publications, and guidance were used (see Appendix 1, "References") along with site-specific documents to ensure consistency in the planning effort. Section E: Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning The E-Plan recognizes the state, in cooperation with the local EPZ communities, as the overall authority responsible for protective action directives in order to protect the health and safety of the general public. Section F: Integrated Emergency Planning State and local (county level) emergency response plans were utilized in the development of this plan to ensure a consistent and integrated response to a classified event. Section G: Funding and Technical Assistance Exelon Nuclear is dedicated to providing the level of support necessary, as dictated by federal regulation, to ensure appropriate integration of the state, county, and utility radiological emergency programs. Section H: Emergency Response Organization Exelon Nuclear acknowledges its primary responsibility for planning and implementing emergency measures within the site boundary and for overall plant accident assessment. These emergency measures include corrective actions, protective measures, and aid for personnel onsite. To accomplish these responsibilities, advance arrangements have been made with offsite organizations for special emergency assistance such as ambulance, medical, hospital, fire, and police services. Section I: Federal Response Provisions are made within the E-Plan for the integration of appropriate elements of the federal assistance activities. Arrangements have been made to accommodate a federal response organization presence at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station as well as support communications between utility and federal emergency facilities. NRG response as described in NUREG-1471, "Concept of Operations: NRG Incident Response", was used in the development of the E-Plan as guidance to ensure coordination between Exelon Nuclear and NRG EROs . November 2016 Part I Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Section J: Form and Content of Plan As required by federal regulations, the E-Plan is governed by and contained (or referenced) in the Station UFSARs. The E-Plan is administratively maintained as a separate document. The E-Plan has been formatted similar to REP-1 , Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." The use of this format lends itself to uncomplicated comparison with the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. Appendix 2, "Procedure Cross-Reference to NUREG-0654", provides a cross-reference between the NUREG-0654 evaluation criteria and the E-Plan implementing procedures and applicable administrative documents . November 2016 Part I Page 4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Required Content of the Station Annex Information that is in the plan need not be restated in the Annex. The Annex shall address what means, methods, and resources are used to satisfy the requirements and responsibilities set forth in the E-Plan. Annex Format and Specific Content: As a minimum, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Annex shall address the areas described as follows: 1. Section 1: Introduction The station and surrounding area are described by the inclusion of maps, drawings and/or diagrams. A summary statement describes the Annex's interface with the Plan. 2. Section 2: Organizational Control of Emergencies The agencies with which the station has independent agreements for support during an emergency are provided. 3. Section 3: Classification of Emergencies The Classification levels are described in this Section. Note that the Site Specific EALs are located in Addendum 3 to the Annex and are included for all emergency classes for the purpose of event classification . 4. Section 4: Emergency Measures Maps indicating the location of Assembly Areas, site evacuation routes, and centers for the monitoring of evacuated nonessential personnel are included. Roadway/traffic control measures of roads under control of the station are addressed. 5. Section 5: Emergency Facilities and Equipment | |||
* Descriptions of the station Control Room, Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center are provided. | |||
* A description of the specific equipment is provided. | |||
* _ A description of the capability and resources available to categorize accidents . November 2016 Part I Page 5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section A: Assignment of Responsibility This section describes the primary responsibilities and organizational control of Exelon, federal, state, county, and other emergency response organizations within the Plume Exposure Pathway and the Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs). Various supporting organizations are also described as well as staffing for initial and continuous response. 1. Concept of Operations The relationships and the concept of operations for the organizations and agencies who are a part of the overall ERO are as follows: a. Identified below are federal, state, and county organizations that are involved in a response to an emergency at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. 1) Federal Agencies: The National Response Framework (NRF), Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex outlines the statutory and regulatory responsibilities. The primary federal response for supporting an emergency at an Exelon station include: a) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): The NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and materials and for conducting research in support of the licensing and regulatory process. These responsibilities include protecting the public health and safety, protecting the environment, protecting and safeguarding materials and plants in the interest of national security and assuring conformity with antitrust laws. The NRC Regional Office has the responsibility for auditing of nuclear power stations. It is responsible for ensuring that such activities are conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of such NRC licenses and that as a result of such operations, there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, performs licensing functions associated with the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and with the receipt, possession, ownership, and use of special nuclear and byproduct materials used at reactor facilities. With regard to emergency preparedness, the NRC shall: | |||
* Assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy; | |||
* Review the* Federal Emergency Management Agency findings and determinations on the adequacy and capability of implementation of state and local plans; and | |||
* Make decisions with regard to the overall state of emergency preparedness and issuance of operating licenses. November 2016 A-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The NRC shall respond to incidents at licensed facilities or vehicular accidents involving licensed materials, including radionuclides, in transit. The NRC shall act as the lead Federal agency with regard to technical matters during a nuclear incident including radiological assistance. The NRC shall be prepared to recommend appropriate protective actions for the public and technical actions to the licensee. FEMA shall act as the lead Federal agency for offsite, non-technical concerns. During an incident, the Chairman of the Commission is the senior NRC authority for all aspects of a response. The Chairman shall transfer control of emergency response activities to the Director of Site Operations when deemed appropriate by the Chairman. All NRC Regions as well as Headquarters are prepared to respond to potential emergencies. All Regions and Headquarters have developed plans and procedures for responding to radiological incidents involving NRC licensees. Headquarters has developed the NRC Incident Response Plans and Implementing Procedures. Each NRC Region has developed Regional Supplements that detail how the Region will fulfill all of the responsibilities assigned in the NRC Incident Response Plan. All NRC organizations are responsible for maintaining an effective state of preparedness through periodic training, drills and exercises. Each Region and Headquarters has established and maintains an Incident Response Center designed to centralize and coordinate the emergency response function. Adequate communications are established to link the licensee, Headquarters and the Region. The NRC has established lines of communications with local government, state government, other Federal agencies, Congress and the White House. Public information will be disseminated in a timely manner and periodically. Each Region is prepared to send a team of qualified specialists to the scene expediently. All of the necessary supplies and equipment needed for emergency response will be provided and maintained by the NRC. The NRC Incident Response Plan objectives are to provide for protection of the public health and safety, property, and the environment, from the. effects of radiological incidents that may occur at licensed facilities or which involve licensed materials, including radio-nuclides in transit. The objectives of the agency plan set forth the organizational and management concepts and responsibilities needed to assure that NRC has an effective emergency response program. The plan is intended to ensure NRC preparedness: November 2016 A-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* To receive and evaluate notification information of incidents, accidents and unusual events and determine the extent of NRC response necessary to meet NRC responsibilities for mitigating the consequences of these events; | |||
* To determine the cause of incidents, accidents, and unusual events in order to ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken by the licensee to minimize the consequences of these events; | |||
* To provide onsite expertise in a timely manner, to evaluate the nature and extent of the incident, ascertain plant status (for reactors and fuel facilities), monitor licensee activities, determine compliance, make recommendations, and, if necessary, issue orders relative to the event; | |||
* To inform the public and others of plant status and technical details concerning the incident; | |||
* To recommend adequate protective .actions to the responsible local and/or state agencies; | |||
* To provide technical assistance; | |||
* To ensure the plant is returned to a safe condition; and | |||
* To return the NRC Headquarters and Regional office to normal operations. b) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): Per the National Response Framework (NRF), FEMA is responsible for the overall coordination of a multi-agency Federal response to a significant radiological incident. The primary role of FEMA is to support the state by coordinating the delivery of Federal non-technical assistance. FEMA coordinates state requests for Federal assistance, identifying which Federal agency can best address specific needs. If deemed necessary by FEMA, it will establish a Federal Response Center from which it will manage its assistance activities. c) Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC): The FRPCC consists of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which chairs the Committee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and where appropriate and on an ad hoc basis, other Federal departments and agencies. The FRPCC shall assist FEMA in providing policy direction for the program of Federal assistance to state and local governments in their radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. November 2016 A-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear d) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): The Department of Energy (DOE) has extensive radiological monitoring equipment and personnel resources that it can assemble and dispatch to the scene of a radiological incident. The Department of Energy (DOE) local operations office can assist Exelon Nuclear following a radiological incident as outlined in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP). If Exelon Nuclear, the NRC or the affected states deem that assistance from DOE is necessary or desirable, the affected state(s) would notify the appropriate DOE office. e) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Assists with field radiological monitoring/sampling and non-plant related recovery and reentry guidance. f) The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): The USCG patrols and ensures the safety of navigable waterways in the United States. The USCG is promptly notified of any oil or hazardous substance discharges into rivers or lakes or radioactive contamination of rivers or lakes under its jurisdiction at levels requiring assistance to effect protective actions. The USCG is contacted by the appropriate state agencies in the event of an incident at an applicable nuclear power plant. The USCG is responsible for officially closing the waterways to all commercial traffic [Refer to the appropriate State Plan]. g) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers control barge and boat traffic at locks and dams on navigable waterways in the United States. The Corps of Engineers will be contacted by the appropriate state agencies in the event of an incident at an applicable nuclear power plant. The Corps will be responsible for closing their locks and dams to all waterway traffic leading to the affected area, allowing only traffic leaving the area [Refer to the appropriate State Plan]. h) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Support from the FBI is available through its statutory responsibility based in Public Law and the US code, and through a memorandum of understanding for cooperation with the NRC. Notification to the FBI of emergencies in which they would have an interest will be through provisions of the Nuclear Station's Security Plan, or by the .NRC. i) National Weather Service (NWS): Provides meteorological information during emergency situations, if required. Data available will include existing and forecasted wind directions, wind speed, and ambient air temperature . November 2016 A-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2) State Agencies a) The State of Illinois: The State of Illinois has the statutory responsibility and authority for protecting the health and safety of the public in Illinois. The State of Illinois has developed an "Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents" (IPRA). This plan was developed in accordance with the guidance suggested by NUREG-0396 and NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP;.1, Rev. 1. The IPRA has received 44 CFR 350 unconditional approvals from FEMA for all Exelon Nuclear's generating stations in the state of Illinois. Basic descriptions for the Illinois state agencies responsible for actions in the event of a nuclear power station are as follows: | |||
* Governor of the State of Illinois: The Governor of the State of Illinois has overall command authority for both the radiological and radiological aspects of a nuclear incident. The Governor shall make the final recommendation for protective actions and shall serve as the state's primary spokesperson. | |||
* Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA): IEMA coordinates the operational response and recovery functions of all State agencies. IEMA proposes Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the Governor. IEMA also coordinates the implementation of the Go.vernor's PARs. November 2016 IEMA has both the command authority for radiological aspects of a nuclear incident and the responsibility for performing various radiological functions. These functions include milk, water and food control, radiation exposure control for state emergency workers, and confirmatory accident assessment. During an emergency situation, IEMA shall make protective action recommendations to the Governor. The IEMA response to a nuclear incident utilizes two functional subgroups. They are the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) and the Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT). -Radiological Emergency Assessment Cente*r (REAC): IEMA has established REAC in Springfield Illinois. REAC will serve as the command location for all (State related) radiological aspects of a nuclear incident. The Manager of the Office of Nuclear Facility Safety, or his/her designated alternate, is in command of REAC. -Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT): RAFT has been organized to perform the field radiological functions of confirmatory accident assessments during a nuclear emergency. RAFT includes a Mobile Command Center, a Mobile Nuclear Laboratory, and monitoring and sampling teams . A-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b) The State of Iowa: Much of the Emergency Planning Zone for the Quad Cities Nuclear Station lies within the State of Iowa. The State of Iowa has developed an "Iowa Emergency Plan". This section provides a summary of the essential elements of the Iowa Emergency Plan, specifically outlining the specific responsibilities of certain "key" Iowa State Agency players in a response operational mode. Basic descriptions for the Iowa state agencies responsible for actions in the event of a nuclear power station are as follows: * | |||
* Iowa Emergency Management Division (IEMD): IEMD coordinates all activities of State agencies and departments, all local governments, and the utility in support of emergency response activities. These activities are coordinated from the Iowa State EOC in Des Moines. | |||
* The Iowa Commissioner of Public Health, or his/her designee, from the Iowa Department of Public Health: The Iowa Department of Public Health shall alert the State Hygienic Lab when emergency action conditions are reported by a commercial nuclear power reactor, which impacts upon the public health and safety in Iowa, and when emergency team response has been determined to be necessary or imminent. They shall perform necessary calculations and evaluate the impact of existing and projected radioactivity releases in terms of public health risk. They shall translate the evaluation of existing and projected environmental contamination and resulting dose into terms of alternative protective actions. They shall recommend appropriate protective actions to the Governor's Office, the Iowa Emergency Management Division and other State agencies as appropriate. | |||
* University Hygienic Lab (UHL): The UHL, located in Iowa City, Iowa, conducts and coordinates all field surveillance and monitoring activities directed toward measuring radiation exposure and radioactivity contamination in the environment resulting from an accident at a commercial nuclear power reactor. They also communicate all relevant data and protective action recommendations to the State Department of Public Health, provide radiological laboratory support for environmental samples analysis, and provide recommendations for decontamination of contaminated area. 3) County Government Agencies Exelon and the surrounding communities that comprise the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZs have developed integrated emergency response programs that call upon the resources of their community. The community organizations are responsible for implementing and coordinating the community response to an emergency. November 2016 A-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) serve as the primary coordinating center for local government response within the county's jurisdiction and for coordination between counties. b. During an event classified as an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ERO replaces the normal plant organization. The ERO consists of three major response sub-organizations: 1) The Station Organization, directed by the Station Emergency Director, provides for: | |||
* Control and operation of the plant. | |||
* Mitigation of the emergency condition. | |||
* Protection of station personnel. | |||
* Emergency event classification. | |||
* Notification of the appropriate individuals and agencies prior to EOF taking Command and Control. , | |||
* Emergency support for operations, engineering, maintenance, firefighting, material acquisition, security, and first aid . 2) The Corporate Organization, directed by the Corporate Emergency Director, provides for: | |||
* Emergency notifications to Federal, state and local agencies. | |||
* Offsite radiological accident assessment and Protective Action Recommendations to offsite authorities. | |||
* The primary interface between Exelon Nuclear and outside organizations responsible for the protection of the public. 3) The Public Information Organization, directed by the Corporate Spokesperson, coordinates with public information officers from other organizations to provide information to the public through the news media. c. Interrelationships between major Exelon Nuclear organizations and organizations in the total response effort are illustrated in a block diagram in Figures A-1 and A-2. For a more detailed diagram of the Exelon Nuclear ERO, see Figures B-1 a to B-1 d. d. The Corporate Emergency Director is a senior Exelon employee with overall responsibility for coordinating emergency response actions in support of the affected Exelon Nuclear station, Emergency Public Information Organization, and affected state(s) and local agencies. November 2016 A-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exe.Ion Nuclear e. Procedures for training and maintenance of the emergency organization are in place to ensure 24-hour per day staffing for emergency response, including established communication links. 2. State and County Functions and Responsibilities The state and counties have emergency response plans that specify the responsibilities and functions for the major agencies, departments, and key individuals of their emergency response organizations. This information is located in their respective plans. 3. Agreements in Planning Effort Written agreements establishing the concept of operations developed between Exelon Nuclear and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the EPZs have been developed. These agreements identify the emergency measures to be provided, the mutually accepted criteria for implementation, and the arrangements for exchange of information. Agreement letters are not necessary with Federal Agencies who are legally required to respond based on Federal law; however, agreements are necessary if the agency was expected to provide assistance not required by law. Letters of Agreement with private contractors and others who provide services in support of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station shall be obtained by the station. Letters of Agreement are referenced in the Station Annex and the actual letters are maintained on file at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. Letters of Agreement, as a minimum, state that the cooperating organization will provide their normal services in support of an emergency at the affected station. A contract/purchase order with a private contractor is considered acceptable in lieu of a Letter of Agreement for the specified duration of the contract. 4. Continuous Coverage Exelon Nuclear maintains 24-hour emergency response capability at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The normal on-shift complement provides the initial response to an emergency. This group is trained to handle emergency situations (e.g. initiate implementation of the E-Plan, make initial accident assessment, emergency classification, notifications, communications, and protective action recommendations) until the augmented ERO arrives. The ERO is composed of a broad spectrum of personnel with specialties in operations, maintenance, engineering, radiochemistry, health physics, material control, fire protection, security, and emergency planning and are available and trained to augment on-shift personnel in an emergency. Procedures for training and maintenance of the emergency organization are in place to provide the capability of continuous (24-hour) operations. The Corporate Emergency Director, located in the EOF, has the authority and responsibility for assuring continuity of resources (technical, administrative, and material) in the event of the activation of the ERO . November 2016 A-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure A-1: Exelon Emergency Response Organization Interrelationships Station Emergency Response Technical Support Center (TSC) -Corporate Emergency Response November 2016 ... Operations Support Center (OSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Joint Information Center (JIG) News Media/ Public A-9 Control Room .H H EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure A-2: Agency Response Organization Interrelationships | |||
* FEMA Governor's ,---Office t---US NRC Emergency Mgt. --Headquarters Agency I *r " US NRC Exelon State -Region Agencies DOE --State Police ,, Field Monitoring FBI Teams Agriculture I Fish --& Wild Life | |||
* USCG -Other Agencies --U.S. Army Corp of Engrs Hospitals --NWS Fire -Department ,. ,, County Medical Agencies Support -Municipal -Local Law Enforcement | |||
* November 2016 A-10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section B: Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Organization This section describes the Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Organization (ERO), its key positions and associated responsibilities. It outlines the staffing requirements which provide initial emergency response actions and provisions for timely augmentation of on-shift personnel when required. It also describes interfaces among Exelon Nuclear emergency response personnel and specifies the offsite support available to respond to Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. 1. On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Assignments The normal plant personnel complement is established with the Station Vice President having overall authority for station operations. The Station Vice President directs the site organization in the management of the various departments while the Shift Manager retains the responsibility for actual operation of plant systems. Emergency Preparedness must consider the capabilities of the normal plant organization, the Station and Corporate Emergency Response Organizations of Exelon Nuclear, and the non-Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response agencies. The initial phases of an emergency situation at a nuclear station will most likely involve a relatively small number of individuals. These individuals must be capable of (1) determining that an emergency exists; (2) providing initial classification and assessment; and (3) promptly notifying other groups and individuals in the emergency organization. The subsequent phases of the emergency situation may require an increasing augmentation of the emergency organization . Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has personnel on shift at all times that can provide an initial response to an emergency event. ERO staffing tables, contained within this document, outline the plant on-shift emergency organization and its relation to the normal staff complement. Members of the on-shift organization are trained on their responsibilities and duties in the event of an emergency and are capable of performing all response actions in an Unusual Event or the initial actions of higher classifications. On Shift Personnel Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has the capability at all times to perform detection, mitigation, classification, and notification functions required in the early phases of an emergency. Shift augmentation and further ERO involvement will be determined by the extent and magnitude of the event. When a transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) is initiated, the shift crew assumes the duties and responsibilities of the SAMG Implementers. Shift Manager: While acting as Shift Emergency Director, will take immediate action during an emergency and will activate the Station ERO, as appropriate. In the Shift Manager's absence or incapacitation, the line of succession is defined by Station p raced u res . November 2016 8-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Shift Technical Advisor (STA): During normal plant operations, the Senior Reactor Operators report to the Shift Manager and directly supervise the licensed Reactor Operators and all activities in the Control Room. During an abnormal condition, the Shift Manager assumes direct supervision of personnel and all activities in the Control Room while a qualified individual steps back and assumes an overview role as an STA with the specific responsibility of monitoring the maintenance of core cooling and containment integrity. An individual assigned the duty as the ST A shall be available to the Control Room at all times. Radiation Protection: The Station Radiation Protection personnel are responsible for the handling and monitoring of radioactive materials. Included in this organization are Health Physicists, Radiation Protection Supervisors and Technicians. Chemistry: The Station Chemistry personnel are responsible for sampling of system effluents, and the chemical and radio-analytical analysis of those samples. Included in this organization are Chemists, Chemistry Supervisors and Technicians. Security: The Station Security personnel are responsible for the physical security of the site. Included in this organization are Security Supervisors and Security Guards. 2. Authority Over the Emergency Response Organization The Emergency Director in Command and Control is the designated Exelon Nuclear individual who has overall authority and responsibility, management ability, and technical knowledge for coordinating all emergency response activities at the nuclear power station. | |||
* Control Room: Shift Emergency Director (Shift Manager) | |||
* TSC: Station Emergency Director | |||
* EOF: Corporate Emergency Director 3. Criteria for Assuming Command and Control (Succession) Emergency personnel assume responsibility for their positions upon receiving notification to activate. The responsibility for initial assessment of and response to an emergency rests with the Shift Manager. The Shift Manager is the Shift Emergency Director and has the Station Emergency Director's responsibilities and authority until relieved by a qualified Station Emergency Director. The Station Emergency Director, once having relieved the Shift Manager of the Emergency Director responsibilities, is responsible for continued assessment of the severity of the emergency and for the necessary functions as described in the E-Plan, the Station Annex, and the emergency implementing procedures. Final succession is achieved when the Corporate Emergency Director assumes overall Command and Control, and directs Exelon Nuclear:s Emergency Response activities . November 2016 B-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The Shift Emergency Director is relieved of Command and Control as soon as possible after the declaration of an Alert (or higher classification if Alert not declared). Command and Control may be transferred directly to the Corporate Emergency Director, or transferred to the Station Emergency Director on an interim basis. Command and Control does not transfer until the following criteria have been met: | |||
* Adequate staff levels are present in support of the non-delegable responsibilities. | |||
* The staff has been fully briefed as to the status of the event and the currently proposed plan of action. | |||
* A turnover between the Emergency Director relinquishing Command and Control and the Emergency Director assuming Command and Control has been made. Although Exelon Nuclear's ERO fulfills all regulatory requirements for emergency response, it may be altered by the Emergency Director. This type of alteration will be based upon identified within the ERO, event dependent criteria, and identified needs of the company as* a whole. 4. Non-Delegable Responsibilities Non-delegable responsibilities include the following functions: | |||
* Event classification. | |||
* Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the general public . | |||
* Notification of offsite authorities (approval of state/local and NRC notifications). | |||
* Authorization of emergency exposure controls in excess of 5 Rem TEDE and the issuance of potassium iodide (Kl), for Exelon Nuclear emergency workers per EPA-400. . . The Shift Manager is responsible for the initial classification of an event and assumes the position as Shift Emergency Director. In this capacity, the Shift Manager has responsibility for performing the non-delegable responsibilities until relieved. The Station Emergency Director will assume overall authority and responsibility for performing all of the non-delegable duties from the Shift Manager. The Corporate Emergency Director (EOF) will subsequently relieve the Station Emergency Director (TSC) of overall Command and Control and assume the non-delegable responsibilities for PAR determination and notifications to offsite authorities . November 2016 8-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Transition of "Non-Delegable" Responsibilities . Control Room TSC EOF (Shift Emergency Director) (Station Emergency Director) (Corporate Emergency Director) Classification--------PARs --------* Notifications Emergency Exposure Controls ----* Classification PARs---------PARs Notification Notifications Emergency Exposure Controls 5. Emergency Response Organization Positional Responsibilities ERO staffing tables contained within this document outline ERO positions required to meet minimum staffing and full augmentation of the on-shift complement at an Alert or higher classification, and the major tasks assigned to each position. The full augmentation staffing levels are used as a planning basis to cover a wide range of possible events. For extended events (one which lasts for more than 24 hours), actual staffing will be established by the Emergency Director based on the event and personnel availability. However, additional staffing or reduced staffing will only occur after discussion concerning the impact on plant operations and emergency response. In addition to maintaining adequate documentation of the event, responsibilities for each position are as follows: a. Station Emergency Response Organization: The Station ERO is the onsite group that is activated during an emergency. It functions under the Station Emergency Director, who is responsible for organizing and coordinating the emergency efforts at and within the immediate vicinity of the station (including carrying out all onsite emergency efforts and the initial offsite environs monitoring efforts necessary to assess plant releases). The Station ERO consists of station personnel who are involved with emergency response efforts necessary to control the plant during an incident. This organization operates out of the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support Center (OSC). Collectively, members of the Station ERO provide for the following activities during an emergency: | |||
* Plant systems operations | |||
* Radiological survey and monitoring (including Environs Monitoring) | |||
* Firefighting | |||
* Rescue operations and First Aid | |||
* Decontamination | |||
* Security of plant and access control | |||
* Repair and damage control | |||
* Personnel protection including Assembly, Accountability and Evacuation November 2016 B-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Communications | |||
* Initial Liaison responsibilities with Federal, state and local authorities When plant conditions warrant entry into the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs), the Station Emergency Director or other qualified individual (e.g., Operations Manager) assumes the role of Decision-Maker. The Technical Manager and/or another qualified individual(s) assumes the role of Evaluator (at least 2 are required), and the Control Room staff assumes the role of Implementers. Control Room personnel will perform mitigating actions for severe accidents per EOPs prior to TSC activation. All Station ERO personnel shall have the authority to perform assigned duties in a manner consistent with the objectives of this plan. 1) Shift Manager (Shift Emergency Director) Control Room A Shift Manager is on duty 24 hours a day and is the Shift Emergency Director in a declared emergency until relieved of this function. While serving in this capacity the Shift Manager is responsible for: | |||
* Activating the ERO (as deemed appropriate or as procedurally required). | |||
* Performing those duties outlined in Section 8.5.a.2 for the Station Emergency Director. The responsibilities described for the Station Emergency Director applies to either the Shift Emergency Director or the Station Emergency Director depending on which individual is in Command and Control. The on-duty Shift Manager directs the activities of the operating crew and is responsible for the safe operation of the plant in compliance with the station NRC operating license and the station operating procedures. The Shift Manager, after relinquishing Command and Control, functionally reports to the Operations Manager in the TSC. The Shift Manager's responsibilities, when not in Command and Control, are described below: | |||
* The authority and responsibility to shut down the reactor when determined that the safety of the reactor is in jeopardy or when operating parameters exceed any of the reactor protection circuit set-points and automatic shutdown does not occur; | |||
* To ensure a review has been completed to determine the circumstance, cause, and limits under which operations can safely proceed before the reactor is returned to power following a trip or an unscheduled or unexplained power reduction; November 2016 8-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* The responsibility to be present at the plant and to provide direction for returning the reactor to power following a trip or an unscheduled or unexplained power reduction; | |||
* The responsibility to adhere to the station Technical Specifications and to review routine operating data to assure safe operation; | |||
* The responsibility to identify applicable EALs and emergency classifications; and | |||
* The responsibility to adhere to plant operating procedures and the requirements for their use. During an emergency, operations personnel may depart from approved procedures where necessary to prevent injury to personnel, including the public, or damage to the facility consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y). | |||
* Supervise the activities of the Control Room Crew, Operations Communicator and Damage Control Communicator in the Control Room. 2) Station Emergency Director TSC The Station Emergency Director reports to the Corporate Emergency Director and supervises and directs the Station ERO. The Station Emergency Director's responsibilities include organizing and coordinating the onsite emergency efforts. Additionally, the Station Emergency Director has the requisite authority, plant operating experience and qualifications to implement in-plant recovery operations. a) Station Emergency Director Responsibilities while in Command and Control: | |||
* Perform all non-delegable responsibilities as the Emergency Director in Command and Control until relieved by the EOF. | |||
* Conduct personnel assembly/accountability and evacuation of non-essential personnel at Site Area Emergency, General Emergency or as conditions warrant. | |||
* If the emergency involves a hazardous substance and/or oil discharges, ensure that appropriate notifications and responses have been made. | |||
* Determine if the OSC is to remain activated at the Alert Classification. b) Station Emergency Director Responsibilities while not in Command and Control: | |||
* Event classification. | |||
* Emergency exposure controls. November 2016 B-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Protective actions for all onsite personnel. | |||
* Supervision of the Station ERO. | |||
* Inform the Corporate Emergency Director and onsite NRC as to the status of the plant. | |||
* Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in the acquisition of information for the state/local notifications, N RC notifications and offsite agency updates. | |||
* Provide information and recommendations to the Corporate Emergency Director. | |||
* Implement plans, procedures and schedules to meet emergency response objectives as directed by the Corporate Emergency Director. | |||
* Request from the Corporate ERO any additional material, personnel resources or equipment needed to implement response plans and operations. | |||
* Assume the duties and responsibilities of Decision-Maker when a transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) is initiated. This responsibility can be delegated to the Operations Manager if qualified. 3) TSC Director TSC The TSC Director reports to the Station Emergency Director and is responsible for the content of information transmitted from the TSC to other agencies (or facilities) and for documenting information received at the TSC in coordination with the Station Emergency Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Verify that qualified individuals are filling Communicator positions in the Control Room, TSC and OSC. | |||
* Supervise the activities of the Logistics Coordinator and state/local Communicator. | |||
* Ensure that communications are established with appropriate parties as directed by the Station Emergency Director. | |||
* Ensure that all required notifications to offsite governmental agencies (state/local and NRC) are timely and accurate. | |||
* Act as the Exelon Nuclear Liaison to any NRC Site Team Representatives . | |||
* Ensure that the NRC Site Team Representatives are directed to their appropriate counterparts. November 2016 B-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _J | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in the acquisition of information for off-site agency updates. | |||
* Record and relay inquiries to the Station Emergency Director. In addition, record responses to such inquiries prior to transmission. | |||
* Assist the Station Emergency Director in maintaining proper records. 4) Communicators CR/TSC/OSC The Communicators are responsible for transmitting/receiving information to and from the TSC, OSC and Control Room. General responsibilities assigned to all Communicators include: | |||
* Establish communications with appropriate parties as directed. | |||
* Transmit information that has been reviewed and/or approved by the responsible Manager or Coordinator. | |||
* Document time, date and information being transmitted or received on appropriate forms. | |||
* Record and relay inquiries and the responses to those inquiries. | |||
* Assist appropriate Managers and Coordinators in maintaining proper records and logs of emergency related activities. | |||
* Gather, record and post appropriate information. a) Specific responsibilities assigned to the State/Local Communicator include: | |||
* Communicate and receive information via the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) circuit or commercial telephone line with appropriate agencies prior to the EOF accepting Command and Control. | |||
* Monitor NARS communications until released by the TSC Director. b) Specific responsibilities assigned to the Damage Control Communicator include: | |||
* Relay requests from the Control Room and TSC for the dispatching of OSC Teams. | |||
* Apprise the station emergency response facilities of the status of OSC Team activities . November 2016 8-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c) Specific responsibilities assigned to the Operations Communicator include: | |||
* Apprise the TSC and EOF staff of the overall plant condition and significant changes to system and equipment status. | |||
* Inform the Control Room, TSC, and EOF of significant changes in event status (e.g. changes in classification, command and control, initiation of station assembly, accountability, evacuation, etc.). d). Specific responsibilities assigned to the TSC Technical Communicator include: | |||
* Establish and maintain contact with the EOF Technical Advisor. | |||
* Provide EOF with updates on technical support activities and priorities. e) Specific responsibilities assigned to the ENS Communicator include: | |||
* Notify the NRC of changes in event classification, prior to the EOF accepting Command and Control, and assist the EOF ENS Communicator in completing the NRC Event Notification Worksheet and responding to NRC inquiries . | |||
* Provide real time updates of significant changes to plant and system status and responses to NRC inquiries. | |||
* Maintain continuous communications with the NRC, if requested, via the NRC ENS phone or commercial telephone line. f) Specific responsibilities assigned to the HPN Communicator include: | |||
* Maintain continuous communications with the NRC, if requested, via the NRC Health Physics Network (HPN) phone or commercial telephone line. | |||
* Communicate current Health Physics information to NRC representatives, as requested. | |||
* Coordinate the communications of radiological information to the NRC with the EOF HPN Communicator (onsite vs. environmental data) . November 2016 B-9 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 5) Operations Manager TSC The Operations Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director. Major functions include determining the extent of station emergencies, initiating corrective actions, and implementing protective actions for onsite personnel. In the event that the Station Emergency Director becomes incapacitated and can no longer fulfill the designated responsibilities, the Operations Manager will normally assume the responsibilities until relieved by another qualified Station Emergency Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Coordinate TSC efforts in determining the nature and extent of emergencies pertaining to equipment and plant facilities in support of Control Room actions. | |||
* Initiate immediate corrective actions to limit or contain the emergency invoking the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(x) if appropriate, and specifically when addressing Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). | |||
* Recommend equipment operations checks and miscellaneous actions to the Control Room in support of restoration and accident mitigation. | |||
* Approve emergency special procedures, and implement as required under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(x) . | |||
* Assist the Maintenance Manager in determining the priority assigned to OSC activities. | |||
* Organize and direct medical response efforts for injured personnel. | |||
* Ensure adequate staffing of the Control Room and TSC subordinates. | |||
* Ensure the Shift Manager is informed of OSC staffing utilization and activities. | |||
* Identify steps or procedures that the Operations staff should be utilizing to properly respond to the emergency condition. | |||
* Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating changes in event classification. | |||
* Supervise the activities of the Operations Communicator and the ENS Communicator in the TSC. | |||
* Act as the TSC liaison with the appropriate NRG Site Team Representative. | |||
* At the direction of the Station Emergency Director, assume the duties and responsibilities of the Evaluator, or Decision-Maker if qualified, when transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) is initiated. November 2016 B-10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 6) Technical Manager TSC The Technical Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director and directs a staff in performing technical assessments of station emergencies and assists in recovery planning. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Accumulate, tabulate and evaluate data on plant conditions. | |||
* Evaluate plant parameters during an emergency to determine the overall plant condition. | |||
* Coordinate core damage assessment activities. * | |||
* Identify data points and control parameters that the Operations staff should monitor. | |||
* Ensure that current and adequate technical information is depicted on status boards. | |||
* Identify and direct staff in the development of special procedures needed to effect long-term safe shutdown or to mitigate a release. | |||
* Supervise the total onsite technical staff effort. | |||
* Act as the TSC liaison with state and appropriate NRC Site Team representatives. | |||
* Assist the Radiation Protection Manager for onsite radiological/technical matters. | |||
* Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating plant based PARs (prior to Corporate Emergency Director accepting command and control) and changes in event classification. | |||
* Supervise the activities of the TSC Technical Communicator. | |||
* Assume the duties and responsibilities of an Evaluator when transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) is initiated and supervise the activities of the SAMG Evaluator Team 7) Technical Support Staff The TSC Technical Support Staff consists of the following minimum staff engineering positions: -Electrical Engineer -Mechanical Engineer TSC -Core/Thermal Hydraulic Engineer -serves as Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) Evaluator, as applicable. November 2016 B-11 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear In addition, station Engineering support will be augmented on an as needed basis to support accident assessment and mitigation activities. 8) Logistics Coordinator TSC The Logistics Coordinator reports to the TSC Director and provides administrative services in support of emergency/recovery operations. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Coordinate shift relief and continual staffing of the station. | |||
* Arrange for clerical staff at the TSC, OSC and Control Room. | |||
* Assist the Security Coordinator in coordinating ERO and station activities in support of on-going security contingency, accountability or site/area evacuation efforts. | |||
* Support the processing of special procedures and interim reports during an emergency. | |||
* Ensure that event status and priority logs are being maintained in the TSC. | |||
* Coordinate record-keeping efforts at the station . | |||
* Arrange for food, sleeping facilities and other necessary accommodations for onsite emergency workers. | |||
* Arrange for specialized training of Emergency Response personnel as needed. 9) Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) TSC The Radiation Protection Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director and supervises the activities of the Radiation Controls Coordinator and Radiation Controls Engineer. The TSC RPM directs a staff in determining the extent and nature of radiological or hazardous material problems onsite. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Accumulate, tabulate and evaluate data on plant conditions such as meteorological and radiological monitoring readings, and other pertinent data. | |||
* Act as the TSC liaison with the appropriate NRC Site Team representative. | |||
* Ensure use of protective clothing, respiratory protection, and access control within the plant as deemed appropriate to control personnel exposures. November 2016 B-12 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Ensure that appropriate bioassay procedures have been implemented for onsite personnel when a radioactivity incident has occurred. | |||
* Ensure that personnel are decontaminated, if necessary. | |||
* Authorize personnel exposures below 5 Rem TEDE (EPA-400 lower limit). | |||
* Assist the Station Emergency Director in determining if exposures in excess of the 5 Rem TEDE (EPA-400 lower limit) are necessary. | |||
* Advise the Station Emergency Director of situations when the use of Kl should be considered. | |||
* Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating dose-based PARs (prior to Corporate Emergency Director accepting command and control) and changes in radiological event classification. | |||
* Advise the Station Emergency Director and EOF Radiation Protection Manager of changes in radiological release status. | |||
* Assist the Operations Manager in planning rescue operations and provide monitoring services as required, including the transfer of injured and/or contaminated personnel. | |||
* Coordinate with the Security Coordinator to determine the routes to be used for evacuation of non-essential personnel. | |||
* Assure additional radiation protection personnel and/or equipment is arranged for, as necessary. 10) Radiation Controls Engineer (RCE) TSC The Radiation Controls Engineer reports to the Radiation Protection Manager and coordinates the radiological and chemistry interface between the technical support engineering efforts. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Monitor area and process radiation monitors to identify trends and potential hazards within the station. | |||
* Evaluate plant environmental factors regarding radiological and other hazardous material conditions. | |||
* Evaluate radiological and hazardous material surveys and chemistry sample results as appropriate. | |||
* Direct the performance of sampling activities through coordination with the OSC Chemistry Lead in support of operations and core damage estimates as necessary. November 2016 B-13 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon | |||
* Coordinate radiological and chemistry information with the Core/Thermal Hydraulic Engineer in support of core damage assessment. 11) Radiation Controls Coordinator (RCC) TSC The Radiation Controls Coordinator reports to the Radiation Protection Manager. The RCC coordinates site and in-plant Radiation Protection response activities through the OSC Radiation Protection Lead. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Support the OSC Radiation Protection Lead in the dispatching of OSC Teams. | |||
* Assist the Operations Manager in planning radiological controls for personnel dispatched from the Control Room. | |||
* Ensure the proper use of protective clothing, respiratory protection, and access controls in the plant as appropriate to control personnel exposure. | |||
* Monitor habitability concerns impacting access to plant and site areas. | |||
* In coordination with the OSC Radiation Protection Lead, assemble and dispatch the Field Monitoring Teams as required. | |||
* Supervise the activities of the HPN Communicator in the TSC . | |||
* Request additional Radiation Protection personnel and/or equipment, as necessary in support of station activities and staff relief. | |||
* Prior to EOF Protective Measures Group staffing: -Perform dose assessments and provide appropriate dose-based PARs. -Coordinate Field Monitoring Team activities. -Monitor meteorological conditions and remain cognizant of forecast data. | |||
* Following EOF Protective Measures Group staffing: -Transfer control of the Field Monitoring Teams to the EOF Environmental Coordinator when appropriate. -Transfer responsibility of dose assessment activities to the EOF Dose Assessment Coordinator . -Assist the EOF Environmental Coordinator in the acquisition of information for the off-site agency updates. November 2016 B-14 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 12) Maintenance Manager TSC The Maintenance Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director and directs a staff in providing labor, tools, protective equipment and parts needed for emergency repair, damage control and recovery efforts to place the plant in a safe condition or return the plant to its pre-accident status. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Direct the total onsite maintenance and equipment restoration effort. | |||
* Request additional equipment in order to expedite recovery and restoration. | |||
* Supervise the activities of the OSC Director and the TSC Damage Control Communicator. | |||
* Ensure the Operations Manager is informed of OSC staffing utilization and activities. | |||
* In coordination with the Operations Manager, determine the priority assigned to OSC activities. | |||
* Ensure adequate staffing of the OSC . | |||
* Assist in rescue operations. | |||
* Identify required procedures that need to be written or implemented in support of the response efforts. 13) Security Coordinator TSC The Security Coordinator reports to the Station Emergency Director and maintains plant security and personnel accountability at the nuclear station. Responsibilities include: * | |||
* Maintain plant security and account for all personnel within the protected area. | |||
* Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating changes in security related threats and event classifications. | |||
* Identify any non-routine security procedures and/or contingencies that are in effect or that require a response. | |||
* Expedite ingress and egress of emergency response personnel. | |||
* Coordinate with the Radiation Protection Manager in controlling ingress and egress to and from the Protected Area if radiological concerns are present. November 2016 B-15 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Provide for access control to the Control Room, TSC and OSC, as appropriate. | |||
* Expedite entry into the Protected Area, as necessary, for the NRC Site Team. | |||
* Act as the TSC liaison with the appropriate NRC Site Team representative. | |||
* Assist the Radiation Protection Manager in determining personnel evacuation routes as necessary. | |||
* Coordinate the evacuation of station non-essential personnel with the appropriate Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEAs). 14) Operations Support Center Director osc The OSC Director reports to the Maintenance Manager and supervises the activities of OSC personnel. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Assign tasks to designated Leads as available: -Operations -Mechanical Maintenance -Electrical/l&C Maintenance -Radiation Protection -Chemistry | |||
* Coordinate with the OSC Operations Lead in the dispatch of Operations personnel to support Control Room and OSC Team activities. | |||
* Notify the Control Room and TSC prior to dispatch of any OSC teams into the plant. | |||
* Maintain OSC resources including personnel, material, and equipment. | |||
* Maintain accountability for all individuals dispatched from the OSC. | |||
* Conduct periodic briefings on the overall plant status, emergency response activities, and station priorities . November 2016 B-16 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 15) Assistant Operations Support Center Director OSC The Assistant OSC Director reports to the OSC Director and supports the OSC Director in supervising the activities of personnel reporting to the OSC. The Assistant OSC Director may be filled by an OSC Lead, normally the Radiation Protection Lead. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Assist the OSC Director in supervising personnel assigned to the OSC. | |||
* Assist in formation of Field Monitoring Teams as directed by the TSC. | |||
* Assist in formation of sampling teams. | |||
* Ensure that records of in-plant survey information and radiochemistry results are maintained. | |||
* Ensure that accumulated exposure records for all essential onsite personnel are maintained. | |||
* Coordinate with the OSC Leads to organize in-plant teams to support station priorities. | |||
* Ensure that in-plant team dispatch briefings include expected activities and radiological hazards . | |||
* Ensure that periodic facility briefings are conducted on plant radiological conditions. 16) OSC Leads osc OSC Leads report to the OSC Director and are assigned from the following station departments: | |||
* Mechanical Maintenance | |||
* Electrical I Instrument and Control | |||
* Radiation Protection | |||
* Chemistry | |||
* Operations (on-shift Supervising Operator or designated Operations representative) The OSC Lead assigned to an OSC team is responsible at all times for the safety of team personnel and to keep the OSC Director apprised of team status. Specifically, the OSC Leads are responsible for the managing and supervising OSC team personnel, including: | |||
* Conduct of adequate pre-dispatch briefings. November 2016 B-17 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Ensuring adequate protective equipment and measures have been identified. | |||
* Tracking of OSC team activities while dispatched. | |||
* Debriefing of team personnel upon return to the OSC. b. Corporate Emergency Response Organization 1) Nuclear Duty Officer (NDO) The NDO is the Exelon Nuclear individual who acts as the initial Corporate contact for declared events. Responsibilities include: a) Actions for all classified events: | |||
* Contact the affected station to verify and obtain updated information concerning emergency response actions and event status. | |||
* Notify Exelon Nuclear Executives of event. | |||
* Provide information on the event to State Duty Officers, if requested. | |||
* Notify the on-call Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Representative . | |||
* Prior to EOF activation, review any news releases for accuracy. b) Actions for Alert classifications and above: | |||
* Complete all actions as listed above. | |||
* Notify American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) prior to being transferred to the EOF. 2) Corporate Emergency Director EOF a) When the Station Emergency Director has Command and Control, the ongoing responsibilities include: | |||
* Coordinate all Exelon Nuclear activities involved with the emergency response. | |||
* Ensure off-site agency updates are periodically communicated as required/requested. | |||
* Coordinate Exelon Nuclear press releases with the Nuclear Duty Officer and Exelon Communications and Public Affairs . | |||
* Request assistance from non-Exelon Nuclear emergency response organizations, as necessary. November 2016 B-18 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b) Following assumption of Command and Control, the additional responsibilities assigned to the Corporate Emergency Director include: | |||
* Assumes overall Command1 and Control of emergency response activities and the non-delegable responsibilities for PAR determination and the notification of offsite authorities. | |||
* Ensure that Federal, state and local authorities and industry support agencies remain cognizant bf the status of the emergency situation. If requested, dispatch informed individuals to offsite governmental Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs). | |||
* Approve the technical content of Exelon Nuclear press releases prior to their being released to the media. 3) EOF Director EOF The EOF Director reports to the Corporate Emergency Director and has the authority, management ability and technical knowledge to assist the Corporate Emergency Director in the management of Exelon Nuclear's offsite ERO. . In the event that the Corporate Emergency Director becomes incapacitated, the EOF Director shall assume the responsibilities of the Corporate Emergency Director until a transfer of Command and Control can be affected either back to the station or to another qualified Corporate Emergency Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Direct and coordinate the activation and response efforts of the EOF staff in support of the Corporate Emergency Director. | |||
* Evaluate the need to augment the EOF staff based on events in progress. | |||
* Assess the effectiveness of ongoing EOF working relationships. | |||
* Monitor information flow within the EOF to ensure that facility activities remain coordinated. | |||
* Prepare state/local notification forms with the assistance of the EOF Radiation Protection Manager and the Technical Support Manager. | |||
* Coordinate services as necessary to support EOF operations. | |||
* Coordinate with the Administrative Coordinator for continual shift staffing requirements. | |||
* Assist in the conduct of Corporate Emergency Director duties . November 2016 B-19 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Act as the designated alternate for approval of the technical content of Exelon Nuclear Press Releases and information released to the News Media. | |||
* Act as purchasing agent in support of the TSC for contract negotiation/administration. 4) Technical Support Manager EOF The Technical Support Manager reports to the EOF Director and directs the activities of the Technical Support Group. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in monitoring changes in event classification. | |||
* Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in determining plant-based PARs when necessary. | |||
* Provide information to the EOF Director for completing the state/local notification form. | |||
* Provide the Corporate Emergency Director information concerning the status of plant operations, and recommendations for mitigating the consequences of the accident. | |||
* Coordinate the overall Exelon Nuclear engineering support from corporate staff and unaffected stations. | |||
* Interface with Industry and contractor engineering support organizations. | |||
* Ensure that the EOF Radiation Protection Manager is informed of -changes in plant status that impacts or potentially impacts the offsite environment or PARs. | |||
* Provide technical on facility and system design. | |||
* Assist in the development of post-accident recovery measures. 5) Operations Advisor EOF The Operations Advisor reports to the Technical Support Manager, directs the ENS Communicator, and is responsible for obtaining and analyzing plant status information and ensuring that it is disseminated. Specific responsibilities include: | |||
* Monitor the Operations Status Line to keep apprised of: -Control Room activities including progress on Emergency Operating Procedures. November 2016 B-20 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear -Significant changes in plant system/equipment status and critical parameters. -Possible changes in event classification. | |||
* Identify and track critical parameters for the identification and trending of current plant status information. | |||
* Assist the station in identifying Operations resources from corporate staff or unaffected stations for direct support of plant shift operations personnel. | |||
* Assist the ENS Communicator in the completion of the NRC Event Notification Worksheet and in responding to NRG inquiries. | |||
* Ensure that the EOF Radiation Protection Manager is informed of changes in plant status that impact or potentially impact the offsite environment or PARs. 6) ENS Communicator EOF The ENS-Communicator reports to the Operations Advisor. Specific responsibilities include: | |||
* Notify the NRG of changes in event classification. Generally, the TSC ENS Communicator focuses on real time plant operations and the EOF ENS Communicator focuses on notifications following changes in event classification and overall changes in event response or status. | |||
* Establish and maintain continuous communications with the NRC, if requested, via the NRG ENS phone or commercial telephone line. | |||
* Coordinate NRG communications with the ENS Communicator in the TSC. 7) Technical Advisor EOF The Technical Advisor reports to the Technical Support Manager and is responsible for obtaining and analyzing technical support information, accident mitigating activities and priorities and ensuring that it is disseminated. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Monitor the Technical Conference Line to remain aware of TSC technical support activities, strategies and priorities. | |||
* Assist the Dose Assessment Coordinator in acquiring technical information pertaining to release pathway and core damage assessment. | |||
* Supervise the activities of the Events Recorder. November 2016 B-21 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 8) Events Recorder EOF The Events Recorder reports to the Technical Advisor. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Gather/record approved information on status boards as requested. | |||
* Maintain an event chronology/status log. 9) Radiation Protection Manager EOF The Radiation Protection Manager reports to the EOF Director and directs the activities of the EOF Radiation Protection staff. Specific responsibilities include: | |||
* Recommend changes in event classification and PARs based upon effluent releases or dose projections. | |||
* Assist the EOF Director in the evaluation of the significance of an emergency with respect to the public. | |||
* Notify the EOF Director of meteorological changes that may impact identification of downwind areas. | |||
* Advise the Corporate Emergency Director of protective actions taken by the station for plant personnel. | |||
* Assist the TSC in the planning and coordination of activities associated with the evacuation of non-essential personnel. | |||
* Advise the Corporate Emergency Director on the need for emergency exposures or for issuance of Kl to the Field Monitoring Teams or Exelon personnel required to enter the plume. | |||
* Determine the need for and contact Occupational Health/Industrial Safety Services personnel for assistance. | |||
* Monitor plant radiological conditions and advise the TSC Radiation Protection Manager of any adverse trends or potential release pathways that may impact existing event classification. | |||
* Assist in the completion and review of the state/local notification form. | |||
* Maintain cognizance of environmental sampling activities. | |||
* Ensure state authorities are provided information pertaining to Exelon Field Monitoring Team activities and sample results . | |||
* Assist the affected station in the following areas: November 2016 B-22 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _j | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear -Planning and coordination of activities associated with the evacuation of non-essential personnel. -* Acquisition of additional instrumentation, dosimetry, protective equipment and radiological support personnel. | |||
* Assist and interface with the EOF Technical Support Group and the station in the development of plans for plant surveys, sampling, shielding, and special tools in support of waste systems processing and design modification activities. | |||
* Upon request, provide in-plant health physics data to Emergency Public Information personnel and the HPN Communicator. 1 O) Environmental Coordinator EOF The Environmental Coordinator reports to the EOF Radiation Protection Manager and directs the Field Team Communicator, Field Monitoring Teams and the State Environs Communicator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Coordinate the transfer of control of the Field Monitoring Teams if initially under the direction of the TSC Radiological Controls Coordinator. | |||
* Ensure communications are established with the TSC to obtain information on the accident conditions, meteorological conditions and estimates of radioactive material releases. | |||
* Maintain cognizance of Field Monitoring Team exposure. When warranted, ask the Dose Assessment Coordinator to initiate an evaluation of the need for administering Kl to Exelon nuclear workers. | |||
* Determine needs of the Dose Assessment Coordinator, the Dose Assessor, the HPN Communicator and the State Environs Communicator(s) for updates on Field Monitoring Team data and ensure distribution of new data to them in accordance with those needs. * | |||
* Upon request, provide environmental data to Emergency Public Information personnel. | |||
* Evaluate and coordinate additional equipment and personnel as necessary from unaffected stations to augment and/or relieve station Field Monitoring Teams . November 2016 B-23 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 11) State Environs Communicator EOF The State Environs Communicator is staffed as requested by the applicable state agencies. The State Environs Communicator reports to the Environmental Coordinator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* As needed, obtain release and dose assessment data from the Dose Assessment Coordinator and Field Monitoring Team data from the Environmental Coordinator. | |||
* Coordinate activities and information flow between the EOF Protective Measures Group and the affected state(s) environmental authorities, including periodic updates on meteorological conditions, Field Monitoring Team activities and survey/sample results. | |||
* Ensure that the Environmental Coordinator is aware of state environmental activities and sample results. 12) Field Team Communicator EOF The Field Team Communicator reports to the Environmental Coordinator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Establish and maintain contact with the dispatched Field Monitoring Teams . | |||
* Document the Environmental Coordinator's instructions and then relay this information to the Field Monitoring Teams. | |||
* Document environmental data reported by the Field Monitoring Teams. | |||
* Periodically obtain and document information on Field Monitoring Team radiological exposure. | |||
* Promptly report new environmental or Field Monitoring Team exposure data to the Environmental Coordinator. | |||
* Document questions and answers directed to and received from the Field Monitoring Teams. Ensure the Environmental Coordinator is cognizant of these information requests and relay replies to these requests. 13) Dose Assessment Coordinator EOF The Dose Assessment Coordinator reports to the EOF Radiation Protection Manager and directs the activities of the Dose Assessor and the HPN Communicator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Interpret radiological data and provide PARs based upon dose projections to the EOF Radiation Protection Manager. November 2016 B-24 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) J | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Advise the EOF Radiation Protection Manager of changes in event classification based on effluent releases or dose projections. | |||
* Initiate evaluation of the need for administering Kl to Exelon nuclear workers when requested by the Environmental Coordinator. | |||
* Remain cognizant of forecast and meteorological data and ensure the status is updated periodically. | |||
* Notify the EOF Radiation Protection Manager of meteorological changes that may impact identification of downwind areas. | |||
* Upon request, provide release and dose assessment data to Emergency Public Information personnel, the HPN Communicator, and the State Environs Communicators. 14) Dose Assessor EOF The Dose Assessor reports to the Dose Assessment Coordinator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Perform dose projections using the Dose Assessment computer models as directed by the Dose Assessment Coordinator. | |||
* Monitor meteorological and plant effluent conditions . | |||
* Notify the Dose Assessment Coordinator of meteorological changes that may impact identification of downwind areas. | |||
* Evaluate the need for administering Kl to Exelon nuclear workers when requested by the Dose Assessment Coordinator. 15) HPN Communicator EOF The HPN Communicator reports to the Environmental Coordinator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Provide updates and respond to inquiries from the NRG on offsite environmental data, release status, dose projections and changes to PARs for the general public. | |||
* Obtain release and dose assessment data from the Dose Assessment Coordinator and Field Monitoring Team data from the Environmental Coordinator. | |||
* Maintain continuous communications with the NRG, if requested, via the NRG HPN phone or commercial telephone line . | |||
* Communicate current Health Physics information to NRG representatives, as requested. November 2016 B-25 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 16) Logistics Manager EOF The Logistics Manager reports to the EOF Director and directs the activities of the administrative, security and liaison personnel. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Ensure contact is made and communications are maintained with appropriate Non-Exelon Nuclear personnel whose assistance may be required to terminate the emergency conditions and to expedite the recovery. | |||
* Advise the' EOF Director concerning the status of activities relating to governmental interfaces. | |||
* Obtain support from Human Resources, the Comptroller's Office, the Legal Department, Accounting Department and others as required. | |||
* Coordinate with the Nuclear Duty Officer to maintain communications with ANI and INPO. | |||
* Ensure that access to the EOF is limited to Emergency Responders and authorize admittance to non-Exelon personnel. | |||
* Implement the Exelon Nuclear Fitness for Duty Program. | |||
* Ensure that NRC Site Team Representatives are directed to the Regulatory Liaison upon arrival at the EOF. | |||
* Ensure that updates and information are provided to the EOC Liaisons and to offsite officials present in the EOF. | |||
* Assist in obtaining and coordinating additional equipment/materials.and /or technical expertise to support station requests, including Exelon Corporate staff, unaffected stations and vendor/contractors. | |||
* Coordinate maintenance of EOF equipment as necessary. | |||
* Ensure shift relief and continual staffing for the EOF. 17) Administrative Coordinator EOF The Administrative Coordinator reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Direct the activities of the Computer Specialist. | |||
* Direct the clerical staff and ensure the clerical requirements for the other EOF and JIC staff are met. | |||
* Obtain clerical support for the EOF and JIC. November 2016 B-26 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Coordinate shift relief and continual staffing for the EOF . | |||
* Obtain services as appropriate to support operation of the EOF. I 18) Computer Specialist EOF The Computer Specialist reports to the . Administrative Coordinator. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Assist any personnel in logging in, initializing or using a desired computer program. | |||
* Investigate and repair problems encountered with communications equipment and computer equipment/applications. 19) Security Coordinator EOF The Security Coordinator* reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Provide and interpret information on security events. | |||
* Assist with access control activities at the EOF and JIC. | |||
* Perform the following in support of the TSC Security Coordinator: -Provide assistance in resolving security events. Assist as a liaison for local, state and federal law enforcement agencies during security related events. -Serve as the primary contact to the security force for additional support, if necessary, during a security event. | |||
* Obtain additional resources to support access control measures needed at the EOF and JIC. 20) State/Local Communicator EOF The State/Local Communicator reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Communicate and receive information via the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) circuit or commercial telephone line with appropriate state and county agencies. | |||
* Ensure that the Logistics Manager is made aware of issues and questions raised by offsite agencies and then relay the replies to these requests . November 2016 B-27 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 21) EOG Communicator EOF The EOG Communicator reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include: * | |||
* Coordinate and dispatch EOG Liaisons as needed or requested. | |||
* Establish and maintain periodic contact with each location where Exelon Nuclear EOC Liaisons have been dispatched. | |||
* Ensure EOG Liaisons are provided event information and notifications. | |||
* Ensure that the Logistics Manager is made aware of issues and questions raised by offsite agencies and then relay the replies to these requests. 22) County EOG Liaison(s) County EOCs The County EOG Liaison(s) will be dispatched to County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) based on established agreements with the counties. The County EOG Liaisons use the EOG Communicator as their contact at the EOF. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Monitor and report County EOC activities to the EOF. | |||
* Conduct briefings and answer questions . | |||
* Provide simplified explanations to EOG personnel of technical details distributed through approved channels. | |||
* Assist with confirmation/verification of information distributed through approved channels. | |||
* Provide media at the EOG with approved Exelon Nuclear press releases. | |||
* Assist Emergency Public Information personnel in rumor control and media monitoring. 23) State EOG Liaison(s) State EOCs At the request of state officials and/or at the discretion of the Corporate Emergency Director, Exelon Nuclear will provide Liaison personnel to state Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs). The state EOG Liaisons use the EOC Communicator as their contact at the EOF. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Monitor and report state EOG activities to the EOF. | |||
* Conduct briefings and answer questions as requested. | |||
* Assist Emergency Public Information personnel in rumor control and media monitoring . November 2016 B-28 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O) | |||
* * | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 24) Regulatory Liaison EOF The Regulatory Liaison reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Coordinate interfaces between Exelon Nuclear personnel and governmental agencies within the EOF. | |||
* Obtain necessary equipment and supplies to support activities of governmental agencies located in the EOF. | |||
* Act as the Exelon Nuclear Liaison to the NRC Site Team representatives. c. Public Information Emergency Response Organization 1) Corporate Spokesperson JIC The Corporate Spokesperson reports to the Corporate Emergency Director and is responsible for directing the Exelon Emergency Public Information Organization and providing news information to the media. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Maintain command and control of the Joint Information Center. | |||
* Coordinate with Federal, state and local agencies, as well as with other organizations involved in the emergency response, to maintain factual consistency of information to be conveyed to the news media/public. | |||
* Conduct periodic briefings with the news media. | |||
* Interface with the Public Information Director. | |||
* Coordinate and direct responses to media inquiries. | |||
* Ensure that the composition and timeliness of Exelon News Releases are adequate. | |||
* Provide for timely exchange of information between other spokespersons. 2) Technical Spokesperson JIC The Technical Spokesperson reports to the Corporate Spokesperson. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Assist in development of technical and plant status information for use in news releases and media briefings. | |||
* Assist the Events Recorder in the preparation of a chronological event description log . November 2016 B-29 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And c*riteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Prepare briefing papers which contain additional detail and background not found in the news releases. | |||
* Provide answers as soon as possible to media questions. | |||
* Provide a follow-up explanation that corrects misinformation as soon as practicable. 3) Radiation Protection Spokesperson JIC The Radiation Protection Spokesperson reports to the Corporate Spokesperson. Responsibilities include. | |||
* Assist in development of environmental and health physics information for use in news releases and media briefings. | |||
* Assist the Events Recorder in the preparation of a chronological event description log. | |||
* Prepare briefing papers which contain additional detail and background not found in the news releases. | |||
* Provide answers as soon as possible to media questions. | |||
* Provide a follow-up explanation that corrects misinformation as soon as practicable. 4) JIC Director JIC The JIC Director reports the Corporate Spokesperson to ensure the operability of and to supervise the activities in the JIC. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Maintain cognizance of conditions of the plant and environment, and the actions of Exelon Nuclear and governmental support personnel. | |||
* Coordinate with Federal, state and local agencies, as well as with other organizations involved in the emergency response, to maintain factual consistency of information to be conveyed to the news media/public. | |||
* Participate, as needed, in rumor control activities. | |||
* Ensure that adequate information flow between the EOF and the JIC is coordinated through the Public Information Director. | |||
* Authorize admittance of non-Exelon Nuclear officials to the JIC . November 2016 8-30 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 5) JIC Coordinator JIC The JIC Coordinator reports to the JIC Director and supervises the facilities support staff. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Ensure the JIC is activated and operational. This includes the availability of communications and visual aids. | |||
* Ensure that access to the JIC areas occupied by Exelon personnel is controlled. | |||
* Establish a minimum frequency for addressing news media/public representatives and ensure that some form of communication occurs within that time frame (i.e., an update at least hourly). | |||
* Ensure that approved News Releases and Chronological Event Description Logs are made available in the JIC. | |||
* Document unanswered questions and serious public misinformation issues. Follow-up on these questions and issues to ensure that they are being adequately addressed. | |||
* Coordinate the interface between Exelon Nuclear and the news media/public, including, as necessary, briefings, news conferences, interviews and responses to information requests. 7) Administrative Coordinator JIC The Administrative Coordinator reports to the JIC Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Coordinate with the EOF Administrative Coordinator to ensure the clerical requirements for the other JIC staff are met. | |||
* Coordinate shift relief and continual staffing for the JIC. | |||
* Obtain services as appropriate to support operation of the JIC . November 2016 B-31 EP-QC-1000 (Revision .o) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 8) Access Controller JIC The Access Controller reports to the JIC Director and is responsible for controlling facility access and obtaining authorization prior to admitting Exelon Nuclear officials into the JIC. 9) Public Information Director (PIO) JIC When the Emergency Public Information Organization is activated, the Public Information Director reports to the Corporate Spokesperson and is responsible *tor all emergency event related information intended to be conveyed from Exelon Nuclear to the news media/public. The Public Information Director supervises the activities of the News Writer, Events Recorder and media monitoring and rumor control personnel. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Provide the Corporate Emergency Director with an overview of the public and media impacts resulting from the Exelon Nuclear and governmental activities. | |||
* Participate with the Corporate Emergency Director regarding information to be released to the public. | |||
* Authorize the issuance of news releases . | |||
* Interface with the Corporate Spokesperson at the JIC. | |||
* Act as a liaison between the ERO and Exelon Nuclear's corporate executives. | |||
* Maintain cognizance of conditions of the plant and environment, and the actions of Exelon Nuclear and governmental support personnel. | |||
* Coordinate information flow between the EOF and the JIC. | |||
* Coordinate with the Media Monitoring Staff to review and access media coverage of the emergency event. 10) News Writer JIC The News Writer reports to the Public Information Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Compose draft news releases with assistance from the Technical Spokesperson and the Radiation Protection Spokesperson. | |||
* Provide the drafted news releases to the Corporate Emergency Director for technical review prior to Public Information Director approval. November 2016 8-32 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 11) Events Recorder JIC The Events Recorder reports to .the Public Information Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Develop a chronological event description log. 12) Media Monitoring Staff JIC The Media Monitor reports to the Public Information Director. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Ensure that the media is being monitored and that Exelon Nuclear personnel review the information detailed or contained in media releases. | |||
* Inform the Public Information Director of all media reports and of actions taken to correct any misinformation or rumors. | |||
* Direct the activities of the Rumor Control Staff with respect to the function of monitoring rumors from sources other than the media. 13) Rumor Control Staff JIC The Rumor Control Staff reports to the Public Information Director and acts in support of the Media Monitors. Responsibilities include: | |||
* Ensure that rumors are reviewed, documented and responded to by Exelon Nuclear personnel as deemed appropriate. | |||
* Until the JIC is fully activated, document and respond to rumors as quickly as possible, through the Exelon Communications and Public Affairs. | |||
* Inform the Media Monitors when rumors representing serious misinformation are encountered. 6. Exelon Emergency Response Organization Block Diagram ERO staffing tables list the key positions of the ERO and the supporting positions assigned to interface with federal, state, and county authorities. Figures B-1 a through B-1 d illustrates the overall emergency response organization. Section B.5 discusses specific responsibilities and the interrelationships for key positions. 7. Exelon Corporate Emergency Response Organization The Corporate ERO consists of the EOF Organization and the Emergency Public Information Organization. Personnel staffing these corporate organizations are covered in detail in Section B.5 of this plan . November 2016 B-33 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The Corporate Emergency Response Organization is staffed by Exelon personnel, and operates out of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the Joint Information Center (JIC). The Corporate ERO is supported by News Media Spokespersons, environmental assessment staff and monitoring teams that provide long-term support to the affected station. Additionally, the Corporate ERO has long term liaison responsibilities with federal, state, and local authorities. The Emergency News Center (ENC) function is responsible for the collection and analysis of event information and status, and development of Company news statements. This information is then communicated to the JIC Spokespersons. The ENC function is located at the EOF. The Corporate ERO is activated at an Alert. The EOF Organization is responsible for evaluating, coordinating and directing the overall company activities involved in the emergency response. Within the EOF, the Corporate Emergency Director shall assume Command and Control from the Station Emergency Director when classification escalates to an Alert or higher, unless the EOF capabilities are limited such that the overall control and responsibility for PARs and offsite notifications cannot be assumed. The EOF may also function in a supporting role to the station when the Station Emergency Director maintains Command and Control. 8. Industry/Private Support Organizations Exelon Nuclear retains contractors to provide supporting services to nuclear generating stations. A contract/purchase order with a private contractor is acceptable in lieu of an agreement letter for the specified duration of the contract. Among services currently provided are the following: a. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO): Experience has shown that a utility may need resources beyond in-house capabilities for the recovery from a nuclear plant emergency. One of the roles of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is to assist affected utilities by quickly applying the resources of the nuclear industry to meet the needs of an emergency. INPO has an emergency response plan that enables it to provide the following emergency support functions: | |||
* Assistance to the affected utility in locating sources of emergency personnel, equipment and operational analysis. ' | |||
* INPO, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) maintain a coordination agreement on emergency information with their member utilities. | |||
* INPO provides the "Nuclear Network", or its replacement, electronic communications system to its members, participants, NEI, and EPRI to coordinate the flow of media and technical information about the emergency. | |||
* Exelon Nuclear may obtain utility industry information and assistance from any party to this agreement through the coordination of INPO. | |||
* November 2016 B-34 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear To support these functions, INPO maintains the following emergency support capabilities: | |||
* A dedicated emergency call number. | |||
* Designated INPO representative(s) who can be quickly dispatched to the utility emergency response organization to coordinate INPO support activities and information flow. | |||
* The 24-hour per day operation of an Emergency Response Center at INPO headquarters. Exelon Nuclear will notify INPO (via the designated emergency call number) for all situations involving an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency declaration per the Exelon Nuclear Reportability Manual. , INPO has coordinated the preparation of a Voluntary Assistance Agreement for Transportation Accidents. Exelon Nuclear has signed this agreement which establishes the rights and responsibilities of electric utilities in requesting or providing assistance for response to a nuclear materials Transportation Accident. b. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI): In early 1982, ANI issued Bulletin #58 (1981) "Accident Notification. Procedures for Liability Insurers" which provides revised criteria for the notification of the Pools in the event of a nuclear emergency at one of the liability insured nuclear power reactor sites. This-revision brings the ANl/MAELU (Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters) notification criteria into alignment with the standard emergency classification system adopted by the nuclear industry. This document also identifies a suitable channel for follow-up communication by ANI after initial notification. | |||
* ANl/MAELU Emergency Assistance: In the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence (as defined in the Price-Anderson Law) ANI and MAELU (the insurance pools) have plans prepared to provide prompt emergency funding to affected members of the public. | |||
* ANl/MAELU Emergency Assistance (Claims Handling Procedures): The pools' emergency assistance arrangements contemplate the mobilization and dispatch of emergency claims teams to directly dispense. emergency assistance funds to affected members of the public. The pools should be notified in the event of a nuclear emergency requiring notification of state or Federal governmental agencies, or if the insured believes that offsite persons may be affected and financial assistance of a nature discussed may be required. In these instances, ANI expects notification as soon as possible after the initiation of the emergency. Exelon notification to the pools in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency will be in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear Reportability Manual. November 2016 *s-35 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O} | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Even if it appears to be remote that offsite persons will be affected, the pools should be notified in order that response plans can be initiated to the point of alerting teams of adjusters to stand by. Response activity can be discontinued if it proves less severe and does not require pool response. All nuclear occurrences of an emergency or non-emergency nature that fall under the nuclear liability policy should be reported formally in writing to ANI by the Exelon Nuclear Insurance Administrator. | |||
* Emergency Notification and Follow-up Procedures: Pre-established lines of communication exist between each utility and ANI in order to exchange all required information during a developing emergency situation. ANI maintains 24-hour coverage of an emergency notification number. During normal office hours (8:00 am -4:00 pm) their number will be answered by the receptionist who will transfer an incoming emergency call to an appropriate individual in the office. Outside of normal office hours, this telephone line is covered by an answering service. The answering service will intercept the call and obtain the name, affiliation and telephone number of the caller. They will then notify a designated ANI staff member who will in turn call back the utility to obtain appropriate information regarding the nuclear accident. In order that follow-up information is available to the Insurance Pool Exelon Nuclear has established the Corporate Emergency Director or their designee as a Point of Contact that ANI personnel may use to update themselves regarding the status of the emergency. NOTE: For the below listed support services, the specific contractors may change but the functions are maintained. c. Environmental Monitoring Services: Environmental Inc.: Environmental Inc. provides emergency Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) services for all Exelon Nuclear Stations. These services include: | |||
* Sample collection | |||
* Handling, packaging and, storage of test samples | |||
* Sample shipment | |||
* Chain of Custody-The Environmental Inc. Midwest Laboratory in Northbrook, Illinois would analyze the environmental samples for their radioactivity content and report results to Exelon Nuclear. November 2016 B-36 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear d. Teledyne Brown Engineering: Teledyne Brown Engineering provides bioassay analysis and radiochemical analysis services. e. Department Of Energy (DOE) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS): DOE REAC/TS provides services of medical and health physics support. REAC/TS advises on the health physics aspects of situations requiring medical assistance. f. Murray and Trettel. Inc.: Murray and Trettel, Inc. provide meteorological monitoring services, including weather forecasts. Murray and Trettel maintain *all Exelon Nuclear station meteorological facilities. Murray and Trettel have computer capability to poll remotely the meteorological facilities to ascertain local conditions and to detect instrument failure. g. Landauer. Inc.: Landauer provides extremity dosimetry services. In an emergency Landauer would provide additional dosimetry to the affected nuclear station and EOF, if needed. h. Manufacturer Design and Engineering Support: Under established contracts, the following will provide available engineering expertise, specialized equipment and other services identified as needed and deemed appropriate to assist in an emergency situation: | |||
* General Electric (GE) Nuclear Energy | |||
* Westinghouse Electric Company 9. Supplemental Emergency Assistance to the ERO Agreements are maintained with outside support agencies who do not take part in the organizational control of the emergency that provide assistance when called on | |||
* during an emergency or during the recovery phase. These agreements identify the emergency measures to be provided, the mutually accepted criteria for implementation, and the arrangements for exchange of information. These support agencies (named in the Station Annex) provide services of: a. Law enforcement; b. Fire protection; c. Ambulance services; d. Medical and hospital support Support groups providing transportation and treatment of injured station personnel are described in Section L of this plan . November 2016 B-37 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Table QDC B-1 Minimum Staffing Requirements Minimum Staffing Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions Minimum *60 Minute Other Full Shift Size Augmentati On-Augmentati on Call on 1. Plant Operations/Safe -Control Room Staff Shift Manager 1 Shutdown and Assessment Shift Supervisor 2 of Operational Aspects Nuclear Station Operator 4 Non-Licensed Operator 4 2. Emergency Direction and Command and Control Shift Emergency Director (CR) 1 \a) Control Station Emergency Director (TSC) 1 Corporate Emergency Director (EOF) 1 3. Notification & Emergency Plant Shift Personnel 1 Communication Communications TSC Director (TSC) 1 EOF Director (EOF) 1 State/Local Communicator 1 (EOF) 1 (TSC) ENS Communicator 1 (TSC) 1 (EOF) HPN Communicator 1 (EOF) 1 (TSC) Plant Status OPs Communicator (CR/TSC) 2 Operations Advisor (EOF) 1 In-Plant Team Control Damage Control Comm. (CR/TSC/OSC) 3 Technical Activities Technical Communicator (TSC) 1 Technical Advisor (EOF) 1 Governmental State Environs Communicator (EOF) (b) EOC Communicator (EOF) 1 State EOC Liaison (State EOC) (b) County EOC Liaison (County EOC) (b) Regulatory Liaison (EOF) 1 4. Radiological Assessment Offsite Dose RP Personnel 1 Assessment Dose Assessment Coordinator (EOF) 1 Dose Assessor (EOF) 1 Radiation Controls Coordinator (TSC) 1 Offsite Surveys Environmental Coordinator (EOF) 1 Field Team Communicator (EOF) 1 Offsite Field Team Personnel 4 (b) Onsite Surveys Onsite Field Team Personnel 2 (b) In-plant Surveys RP Personnel 1 2 (b) Chemistry Chemistry Personnel 1 1 (b) RP Supervisory Radiation Protection Manager(TSC/EOF) 2 November 2016 B-38 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Table QDC 8-1 Minimum Staffing Requirements (Cont'd) Minimum Staffing Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions Minimum *60 Minute Other Full Shift Size Augmentati On-Augmentati on Call on 5. Plant System Engineering, Technical Support STA I Incident Assessor (CR) 1 Repair, and Corrective Technical Manager (TSC) 1 Actions Core Thermal/Hydraulic Engineer (TSC) 1 Mechanical Engineer (TSC) 1 Electrical Engineer (TSC) 1 SAMG Decision-Maker (TSC) 1 (a) SAMG Evaluator (TSC) 2(a) Operations Manager (TSC) 1 Radiation Controls Engineer (TSC) 1 Technical Support Manager (EOF) 1 Repair and Corrective Mechanical Maintenance (OSC) 1 (a) 2 (b) Actions Electrical/l&C Maintenance (OSC) 1 (a) 3 (b) Maintenance Manager (TSC) 1 OSC Director (OSC) 1 Assistant OSC Director .(OSC) 1 OPs Lead & Suooort Personnel (OSC) (b) 6. In-Plant Protective Actions Radiation Protection RP Personnel 2\a) 4 (b) 7. Fire Fighting --Fire Brigade1c1 5 8. 181 Aid and Rescue --Plant Personnel 21a1 (b) Operations 9. Site Access Control and Security & Security Team Personnel (d) (d) Personnel Accountability Accountability Security Coordinator (TSC) 1 EOF Security Security Coordinator (EOF) 1 10. Resource Allocation and Logistics Logistics Manager (EOF) 1 Administration Logistics Coordinator (TSC) 1 Administration Administrative Coordinator (EOF) 1 Clerical Staff (TSC/EOF/JIC) (b) Inter Facility Logs Events Recorder (EOF/JIC) 2 Facility Support | |||
* Computer Specialist (EOF) 1 November 2016 8-39 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) l | |||
* | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Table QDC B-1 Minimum Staffing Requirements (Cont'd) Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions 11. Public Information Media Interface Corporate Spokesperson Rad Protection Spokesperson Technical Spokesperson Information Public Information Director Development News Writer Media Monitoring and Media Monitoring Staff Rumor Control Rumor Control Staff Facility Operation and JIG Director Control JIG Coordinator Administrative Coordinator Access Controls Facility Support Staff | |||
* Response time is based on optimum travel conditions. (a) May be provided by personnel assigned other functions. (b) Personnel numbers depend on the type and extent of the emergency. (c) Fire Brigade per USAR/Technical Specifications, as applicable. (d) Function performed by on-shift security personnel. November 2016 B-40 (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) TOTAL: | |||
* Exelon Nuclear Minimum Staffing Minimum *60 Minute Other Full Shift Size Augmentati On-Augmentati on Call on 1 1 1 1 1 (b) (b) 1 1 1 1 (b) 21 37 3 321111 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Figure 8-1 a: Overall ERO Command Structure EOF Director Shaded/Bold Boxes indicate minimum staffing positions. November 2016 | |||
* Corporate Emergency Director Station Emergency Director B-41 Corporate Spokesperson | |||
* Exelon Nuclear EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear F" . 8 1b E 0 "t 0 f 1gure -. mergencll ns1 e rgamza ion . Station Emergency Director* I I Security TSC Coordinator Director I I State/Local Logistics Communicator Coordinator Clerical L__ Support I I Rad Protection Maintenance Operations Technical Manager Manager Manager* Manager* I I I I Technical Rad Controls Rad Controls osc Damage Control Operations -Communicator ENS Coordinator Engineer Director Communicator Communicator Communicator (TSC) (TSC) {TSC) l Core!Thermal HPN Asst OSC Damage Control Control Room -Engineer -f-Communicator Director Communicator Shift Manager (OSC) Mechanical -Engineer I I I I Control Room >-----Mechanical Electrical/l&C Rad Protection Chemistry Operations Shift Staff Pool (2) Pool (3) Pool (8) Pool (1) Pool Electrical Operations -Engineer Communicator s haded/Bold Boxes indfcate minimum staffing positions. (in CR) ERO response pool personnel do not include the on-shift complement. Damage Cont Communicator SAMG functions may be assigned to other qualified personnel. Minimum staffing (in CR) .. -requires 1 Dec1s1on Maker and 2 Evaluators. | |||
* November 2016 8-42 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear gure B-1 c: Offsite Organization Director Fi I I Rad Protection Technical Logistics Manager Support Manager Manager I I I I I I Environmental Dose Assmt Operations Technical >-----Security -State/Local Coordinator Coordinator Advisor Advisor Coordinator Communicator I I ENS Events Administrative -Regulatory -State Environs -Dose Communicator Records Coordinator Liaison Communicator Assessor -Computer -EOG -Field Team -HPN Specialist Communicator Communicator Communicator -Clerical Field Monitoring Support -State EOG -Teams (2) Liaisons -County EOG Liaisons Shaded/Balded Boxes indicate minimum staffing positions. November 2016 B-43 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure 8-1 d: Emergency Public Information Organization Corporate Spokesperson I I I I JIG Technical Rad Protection Public Info Director Spokesperson Spokesperson Director I I I Administrative JIG Access News Coordinator Coordinator Controller Writer Events Facility Support Recorder Staff Media Monitoring Staff Rumor Control Staff Shaded/Balded Boxes indicate minimum staffing positions. November 2016 B-44 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section C: Emergency Response Support and Resources This section describes the provisions for requesting and effectively utilizing support resources and for accommodating offsite officials at the Exelon Nuclear emergency response facilities. 1. Federal Response Support and Resources Assistance is available from federal agencies through the National Response Framework (NRF). The lead federal agency who provides direct assistance to Exelon during an emergency is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Other federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Energy (DOE), provide assistance to the state through implementation of the NRF. a. Sections A and B of this plan identify the specific individuals by title who are authorized to request federal assistance. b. Federal agencies that may provide assistance in direct support of Exelon Nuclear in the event of an accident are identified in Section A of this plan. If needed, federal resources are made available to Exelon Nuclear in an expeditious and timely manner. c. Each emergency response facility has the equipment and communications capability necessary for a continuous high level of response, interaction, and communication among key personnel during emergency conditions. The emergency facilities are able to accommodate federal representatives with working areas provided for their use. Accommodations for the expected NRC site response team assume the following approximate numbers for each facility: EOF TSC CR JIC Initial Full Activation Activation (minimum) 9 3 1 1 16 5 1 10 The Exelon Emergency Response Organization will provide senior management support for site response teams and communications over a Management Counterpart Link to federal response headquarters. 2. Liaisons a. The NRC, FEMA, and the state(s) may dispatch representatives to the EOF where accommodations have been provided. b. At the Alert level and above, Exelon Nuclear personnel may be assigned as liaisons to the requesting state's and/or county Emergency Operations Center (EOC). These representatives act as technical liaisons to interpret emergency action levels and protective action recommendations made by Exelon. November 2016 C-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 3. Radiological Laboratories Support of the radiation monitoring and analysis effort is provided by an onsite laboratory. The onsite laboratory is the central point for receipt and analysis of all onsite samples and includes equipment for chemical analyses and for the analysis of radioactivity. The equipment and analytical capabilities for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station's laboratories are listed in the station's E-Plan Annex. Additional facilities for counting and analyzing samples can be provided by the other Exelon Nuclear generating stations, state, federal or contracted laboratory services. These laboratories can act as backup facilities in the event that the plant's counting room and laboratory become unusable or the offsite radiological monitoring and environmental sampling operation exceeds the capacity or capability of the station laboratory during an emergency. Additional outside analytical assistance may be requested from contracted vendors or state and federal agencies. The state, federal and contract laboratories maintain independent evaluation and certification processes and have the capability of quantitative analysis of terrestrial, marine and air samples. 4. Other Assistance Any unaffected Exelon Nuclear Generating station is available to provide certain types of assistance and support, including engineering, design, consultation, whole body counting, and dosimetry evaluation and equipment. Additional facilities, organizations, and individuals, as listed in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory, are available and may be used in support of emergency response. In addition, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) provides insurance to cover Exelon legal liability up to the limits imposed by the Price-Anderson Act, for bodily injury and/or property damage caused by the nuclear energy hazard resulting from an incident at the plant. Written agreements which describe the level of assistance and resources provided to Exelon Nuclear by external sources are included in Appendix 3 as applicable . November 2016 C-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section D: Emergency Classification System This section describes the classification and emergency action level scheme used to determine the minimum response to an abnormal event at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This scheme is based on plant systems, effluent parameters, and operating procedures. The initial response of federal, state, and county agencies is dependent upon information provided by the ERO. Exelon works closely with the state and county agencies to ensure consistency in classification schemes and procedural interfaces. 1. Emergency Classification System The E-Plan provides for classification of emergencies into five (5) categories or conditions, covering the postulated spectrum of emergency situations. The first four (4) categories: Notification of Unusual Event (referred to as Unusual Event), Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, are characterized by Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or event initiating conditions and address emergencies of increasing severity. The fifth, the Recovery classification, is unique in that it may be viewed as a phase of the emergency requiring specific criteria to be met and/or considered prior to its declaration. Recovery is that period when the emergency phase is over and activities are in progress to return the situation to a normal state (acceptable condition). a. Unusual Event -Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. This is the least severe of the four (4) levels. The purpose of this classification is to bring response personnel and offsite agencies to a state of readiness in the event the situation degrades and to provide systematic handling of information and decision making. The Shift Manager, as Shift Emergency Director will classify an Unusual Event. Required actions at this classification include: | |||
* Notifications to station management and the NDO. | |||
* Notification, within 15 minutes, of the state and local communities. | |||
* At the discretion of the Emergency Director, station management or the Nuclear Duty Officer (NDO), full or selective staffing of the TSC, OSC and EOF may be initiated. | |||
* Notification of the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State and local agencies and not later than 60 minutes of classification . | |||
* Assessment of the situation and response as necessary, which may include escalating to a higher classification if conditions warrant. November 2016 D-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear * | |||
* When the event is terminated, close-out is performed over communication links to offsite authorities participating in the response (i.e., NRC, state, county), followed by formal transmission of a state/local notification form within 24 hours. b. Alert -Events are in process or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. The purpose of this classification is to ensure that emergency response personnel are readily available and to provide offsite authorities with current status information. An Alert will be classified as the initiating event or as escalation from an Unusual Event. In either case, the classification will most likely made by the Shift Manager (Shift Emergency Director) prior to the transfer of Command and Control. Required actions at this classification include: | |||
* Notifications to station management and the NDO. | |||
* Notification, within 15 minutes, of the state and local communities. The EOF will assume state update responsibilities . | |||
* Activation of the TSC, OSC, EOF, and the JIC organizations. | |||
* Transfer of Command and Control. | |||
* Notification of the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State and local agencies and not later than 60 minutes of classification. | |||
* Notification of INPO and ANI. | |||
* Assessment of the situation and response as necessary, which may include escalating to a higher classification if conditions warrant. | |||
* On-site and off-site Field Monitoring Teams are sent to staging areas or dispatched to monitor for releases of radiation to the environment. | |||
* Keeping offsite authorities informed of plant status by providing periodic updates to include meteorological and radiological data. | |||
* When the event is terminated, notification is performed over communication links followed by an Initial Incident Report to offsite authorities participating in the response (i.e., NRC, state, county) within 8 hours . November 2016 D-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c. Site Area Emergency -Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. The purpose of this classification, in addition to those of the Alert level, is to ensure that all emergency response centers are staffed and provisions are made for information updates to the public through offsite authorities and the news media. The classification will most likely be made by the Station Emergency Director following activation of the TSC. Required actions at this classification, in addition to those listed under the Alert level, include: | |||
* If not previously performed, Assembly/Accountability shall be performed and Site Evacuation of non-essential personnel shall be initiated. | |||
* Keeping offsite authorities informed of plant status by providing periodic updates to include meteorological data and projected or actual doses for any releases that have occurred . d. General Emergency -Event(s) are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. The purpose of this classification, in addition to those of the Site Area Emergency level, is to initiate predetermined protective actions for the public and provide continuous assessment of information from monitoring groups. The classification will most likely be made by the Station Emergency Director following activation of the TSC. Required actions at this classification, in addition to those listed under the Alert and Site Area Emergency, include: | |||
* A Protective Action Recommendation will be determined. | |||
* Assessment of the situation and response as necessary . November 2016 D-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear e. Recovery: That period when the emergency phase is over and activities are being taken to return the situation to a normal state (acceptable condition). The plant is under control and no potential for further degradation to the plant or the environment is believed to exist. Recovery will be classified by the Station Emergency Director after obtaining authorization from the Corporate Emergency Director. Required actions at this classification include: | |||
* The affected state(s) and the NRC should be consulted prior to entry into Recovery. | |||
* Notifications will be made to station management, the NDO, state(s) and NRC. | |||
* A Recovery organization will be established to manage repairs to return the Unit to an acceptable condition, and support environmental monitoring activities as requested in coordination with Federal and state efforts. | |||
* INPO and ANI are notified of Recovery classification. f. Classification Downgrading: Exelon Nuclear policy is that emergency classifications shall not be downgraded to a lower classification. Once declared, the event shall remain in effect until no Classification is warranted or until such time as conditions warrant classification to Recovery. g. Guidance for Termination of an Emergency: The purpose of terminating an emergency is to provide an orderly turnover of plant control from the Emergency Response Organizations to the normal Exelon Nuclear plant organization. Termination of the emergency is authorized by the Emergency Director in Command and Control. The considerations provided in . the Recovery/Termination Checklist in the emergency implementing procedures must be performed prior to exiting the emergency event. Consultation with governmental agencies and other parties should be conducted prior to termination of an event classified as Site Area or General Emergency. Notifications shall be transmitted to appropriate agencies to terminate an event. h. Station Nuclear Security Plan: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has a Security Plan that complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 73. The interface between the E-Plan and the Security Plan is one of parallel operation. The plans are compatible. The E-Plan response measures, once initiated, are executed in parallel with measures taken in accordance with the Security Plan . November 2016 D-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Threats made to Exelon Nuclear facilities are evaluated in accordance with established threat assessment procedures, and the respective Security Plans. The Security Plan, Appendix C, Contingency Events, identifies situations that could be initiating conditions for EAL classifications. Contingency events include bomb threats, attack threats, civil disturbances, protected area intrusions, loss of guard/post contact, vital area intrusions, bomb devices discovered, loss of guard force, hostages, extortion, fire/explosions, internal disturbances, security communications failure, and obvious attempts of tampering. The Security Plan provides guidance for decisions and actions to be taken for each security contingency event. As guidance, the Security Plan allows for differing responses depending upon the assessment of the actual situation within each contingency event classification. The assessment of any security contingency event and the decision to initiate, or not to implement the E-Plan, will be the responsibility of the Shift or Station Emergency Director. All identified security contingency events have the potential of being assessed as initiating conditions for a radiological emergency declaration. Determination of a credible security threat may require the staffing of emergency response facilities based on the classification of an Unusual Event per the Emergency Action Levels (EALs). 2. Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Addendum 3 to the Station Annex includes Site Specific Emergency Action Levels (EALs) consistent with the general class descriptions and provided in NEI guidance documentation in accordance with Regulatory, Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors." Where possible, these EALs will be related to plant instrumentation readings. Emergency classifications are characterized by Emergency Action Levels (EALs). The Threshold Values are referenced whenever an Initiating Condition is reached. An Initiating Condition is one of a predetermined subset of unit conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency, or such an emergency has occurred. Defined in this manner, an Initiating Condition is an emergency condition, which sets it apart from the broad class of conditions that may or may not have the potential to escalate into a radiological emergency. Initiating Conditions are arranged in one of the Recognition Categories. EALs are for unplanned events. A planned evolution involves preplanning to address the limitations imposed by the condition, the performance of required surveillance testing, and the implementation of specific controls prior to knowingly entering the condition. Planned evolutions to test, manipulate, repair, perform maintenance or modifications to systems and equipment that result in an EAL Threshold Value being met or exceeded are not subject to classification and activation requirements as long as the evolution proceeds as planned. However, these conditions may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. November 2016 D-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear An emergency is classified after assessing abnormal plant conditions and comparing them to EAL Threshold Values for the appropriate Initiating Conditions. Classifications are based on the evaluation of each unit. Matrix tables organized by recognition categories are used to facilitate the comparison. The matrix tables are used when the unit is in the Technical Specification defined modes of Power Operations, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown (for classifications purposes, startup evolutions are included in the Power Operations mode) and Cold Shutdown or Refueling (for classification purposes a defueled plant will be considered in the Refueling mode). All recognition categories should be reviewed for applicability prior to classification. The initiating conditions are coded with a letter and/or number designator. All initiating conditions, which describe the severity of a common condition (series), have the same initial designator. 3. Timely Classification of Events Classification of an emergency condition occurs within 15 minutes after the availability, of indications from plant instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that an EAL has been exceeded and, is then promptly made upon identification of the appropriate EAL. The 15-minute period encompasses all assessment, classification, and declaration actions associated with making an emergency declaration from the first availability of a plant indication or | |||
* receipt of a report up to and including the declaration of the emergency. | |||
* Validation or confirmation of plant indications or reports of the condition are to be accomplished within the 15-minute period as part of the assessment. Since this validation or confirmation is being performed to determine the validity of an alarm, indication, or report, the 15-minute period starts with the availability of the alarm, indication, or report, and not the completion of the validation or confirmation, because the former is the time that the information was first available. The 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace period in which atternpts to restore plant conditions are taken to avoid declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. This statement does not preclude taking actions to correct or mitigate an off-normal condition, but once an EAL has been recognized as being exceeded, the emergency declaration shall be made promptly without waiting for the 15-minute period to elapse. The 15-minute criterion shall not prevent the implementation of response actions deemed necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in the declaration would not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety. For EAL thresholds that specify duration of the condition, the emergency declaration process runs concurrently with the specified threshold duration. Once the condition has existed for the duration specified in the EAL or it is determined that the duration time will likely be exceeded, no further assessment is necessary-the EAL has been exceeded. November 2016 D-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 4. Offsite Classification Systems Exelon Nuclear works with the state to ensure consistency between classification schemes. The content of the EALs is reviewed with the state and county authorities on an annual basis. 5. Offsite Emergency Procedures Exelon Nuclear works with the state and county authorities to ensure that procedures are in place that provide for emergency actions to be taken which are consistent with the protective actions recommended by Exelon accounting for local offsite conditions that exist at the time of the emergency . November 2016 D-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section E: Notification Methods and Procedures This section describes the notification of state and county response organizations and Exelon emergency response personnel. It outlines the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). 1. Bases for Emergency Response Organization Notification Exelon Nuclear, in cooperation with state and county authorities, has established mutually agreeable methods and procedures for notification of offsite response organizations consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme. | |||
* Notifications to offsite agencies include a means of verification or authentication such as the use of dedicated communications networks, verification code words, or providing call back verification phone numbers. Notification/Classification for Dual Unit Emergencies: when the classification involves both units (i.e., tornado or earthquake), the classification shall be reported as affecting both units. In situations when both units are affected by emergency events, but the events are not related or the classification for each unit is different, notification will be made for the highest classification. Clarification of the relationship between the classification levels determined for the units should be provided in the periodic state updates and the NRC Event Notification Worksheet. In situations when one unit is affected by unrelated events, notification will be made for the highest classification via the state/local notification and the second event information provided in the periodic state updates. Notification for Transportation Accidents: A Transportation Accident is defined in 49 CFR 171.15 and 49 CFR 171.16. If a Transportation Accident involving material in the custody of an Exelon facility occurs, Exelon Nuclear will notify the appropriate internal and offsite agencies in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear Reportability Manual. 2. Notification and Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel Emergency implementing procedures are established for notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel as follows: a. Onsite: When an emergency is declared, reclassified, or terminated an announcement is made (over the plant public address system or by other means) that includes the emergency classification declared and response actions to be taken by site personnel. At the Unusual Event classification, select ERO augmentation personnel are notified and requested to remain available to respond. At an Alert classification or higher ERO augmentation personnel are notified for activation of the TSC, OSC, EOF, and JIC using the ERO Notification System. November 2016 E-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b. Offsite: Notifications are promptly made to offsite emergency response organizations as follows: 1) State/Local Agencies: A notification shall be made within fifteen (15) minutes of: | |||
* The initial emergency classification. | |||
* Classification escalation. | |||
* The issuance of or change to a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for the general public. | |||
* Changes in radiological release status, occurring outside of an event classification or PAR notification, based on an agreement with the state(s). The emergency warning points are simultaneously notified using the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), or a commercial telephone line as backup. A notification will also be initiated to cognizant state/local government agencies as soon as possible but within one hour of the termination of an event classification, or entry into Recqvery Phase . 2) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): An event will be reported to the NRC Operations Center immediately after notification of the appropriate state or local agencies but not later than one (1) hour after the time of initial classification, escalation, termination or entry into the Recovery Phase. The NRC is notified by a dedicated telephone system called the Emergency Notification System (ENS). If the ENS is inoperative, the required notification is made via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone service, or any other method that shall ensure that a report is made as soon as practical. An NRC Event Notification Worksheet should be utilized to transmit initial information to the NRC. If a continuous communication is requested and established, a log is used in lieu of the ENS Worksheet. Specific requirements for the notifications to the NRC for classified emergency events are detailed in 10 CFR 50.72 with guidance provided in the Exelon Reportability Manual. The computerized data link to the NRC, referred to as the Emergency Response Data System (EROS), continuously supplies specified plant data to the NRC. Mobilization of federal, state, and county response organizations is performed in accordance with their applicable emergency plan and procedures. At a minimum, mobilization of federal response organizations and activation of state and county EOCs is expected to occur at the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. November 2016 E-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The state and county authorities are responsible for the process of notification of the general public. c. Support Organizations: When an emergency is initially classified, escalated or terminated, notifications are promptly made to the following support organizations: | |||
* Medical, rescue, and fire fighting support services are notified for assistance as the situation dictates. | |||
* The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is notified at an Alert or higher classification with requests for assistance as necessary. | |||
* The American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) are notified at an Alert or higher classification with requests for assistance as necessary. | |||
* Vendor and contractor support services are notified for assistance as the situation dictates. 3. Initial Notification Messages Exelon Nuclear, in conjunction with state and county authorities, has established the contents of the initial notification message form transmitted during a classified emergency. The contents of the form include, as a minimum: | |||
* Designation ("This is a Drill" or "Actual Event"). | |||
* Identity of site. | |||
* Event classification. | |||
* EAL number (as agreed upon with state authorities). | |||
* Non-technical event description (as agreed upon with state authorities). | |||
* Date and time of declaration (or entry into Recovery or Termination). | |||
* Whether a release is taking place (Note: "Release" means a radiological release attributable to the emergency event.) | |||
* Wind direction and speed. | |||
* Whether offsite protective measures may be necessary. | |||
* Potentially affected Subareas (or Sectors as applicable) when a General Emergency is declared. Notification approval, transmittal date and time, and offsite agencies contacted are recorded on the notification form. November 2016 E-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 4. Follow-up Messages For all emergency classifications, update messages to state authorities will be provided at the time of the notification on a prearranged frequency. The facility in Command and Control is responsible for ensuring that the updates are completed. State updates contain the prearranged information plus any additional information requested at the time of the notification. Follow-up notifications are provided to the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible, but not later than one (I) hour after significant new information is available involving: a. The results of evaluations or assessments of plant conditions. b. The effectiveness of response or protective measures taken. c. Information related to plant behavior that is not understood. If requested by the NRC, an open, continuous communications channel will be maintained with the NRC Operations Center over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and/or Health Physics Network (HPN) Circuits. 5. State and County Information Dissemination The state and county emergency response plans describe procedures for state and county officials to make a public notification decision promptly (within about 15 minutes) on being informed by the plant of an emergency. The system for disseminating information to the public includes notification by pre-scripted messages through appropriate broadcast media such as the Emergency Alert System (EAS). 6. Notification of the Public The capability exists for the prompt notification of the general public within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This notification capability consists of two principal elements: (1) the Alert and Notification Systems (ANS) and (2) the Emergency Alerting System (EAS) radio stations. | |||
* The Alert and Notification System (ANS) consists of fixed sirens used as a primary means of notification. Activation of the ANS sirens by the civil authorities will alert the public to turn on their radios to a local EAS radio station for detailed information on the emergency situation. A backup means of notification is provided and is described within the station Annex. | |||
* The Emergency Alerting System (EAS) is a network of local radio stations prepared to transmit or relay emergency information and instructions from the civil authorities to the general public November 2016 | |||
* E-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The ANS is operated by local governmental agencies and maintained by Exelon Nuclear. To assure the ANS is maintained in an operational readiness posture, the local agencies have agreed to test the system (by sounding the sirens) on a periodic basis that meets or exceeds FEMA guidance and to report inoperable equipment to EP-designated maintenance personnel. The goal of the testing and maintenance program is to identify inoperable equipment in a timely manner and to restore equipment to a functional status commensurate with FEMA operability requirements as referenced in the FEMAREP Manual, "Alert and Notification Systems" Part V. In addition to this routine test and repair program, preventive maintenance of the ANS will be performed on an annual basis. A more site-specific description of the various prompt public notification systems is presented in the station annex to the E-Plan. The activation of the ANS sirens, deployment of emergency service vehicles and operation of the Emergency Alerting System is discussed in detail in the state specific response plans. 7. Messages to the Public The respective States have developed EAS messages for the public consistent with the classification scheme. These draft messages are included as part of the States' Emergency Plan and contain instructions with regard to specific protective actions to be taken by occupants and visitors of affected areas. Messages may include instructions such as: take shelter and go indoors, close windows and doors, turn off ventilation systems; directions given for evacuation; directions to stay tuned to specific stations for further information, ad-hoc respiratory protection, (e.g. handkerchief over mouth, etc.). Exelon will provide support for the content of these messages when requested. The States control the distribution of radioprotective drugs to the general public . November 2016 E-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section F: Emergency Communications This section describes the provisions utilized for prompt communications among principal emergency response organizations, communications with the ERO and communications with the general public. 1. Communications/Notifications Exelon Nuclear has extensive and reliable communication systems installed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and the offsite Emergency Response Facilities. Examples of the communications network include systems such as normal and dedicated telephone lines on *landlines, fiber-optic voice channels, cell phones, satellite phones, mobile radio units, handi-talkies and computer peripherals. This network provides: | |||
* Voice communication through normal telephone, dedicated line and automatic ring-down between selected facilities, conference call capability, speaker phones, and operator assistance where required. | |||
* Communications between selected Exelon vehicles and appropriate fixed locations, as well as with state mobile units and fixed locations. | |||
* Facsimile, network, and modem transmission. Figure F-1 depicts the initial notification paths and the organizational titles from the Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) to federal, state and local emergency response organizations, and industry support agencies. The Exelon primary and alternate methods of communication, and the NRC communications network, are illustrated on Figures F-2 and F-3. a. Exelon Nuclear maintains the capability to make initial notifications to the designated offsite agencies on a 24-hour per day basis. The offsite notification system, referred to as the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) provides . communications to state and county warning points and Emergency Operations Centers from the CR, TSC, and EOF. Backup methods include facsimile and commercial telephone lines. State and county warning points are continuously staffed. b-d. Exelon Nuclear has established several dedicated communication systems that ensure reliable and timely exchange of information necessary to provide effective Command and Control over any emergency response; (1) between Exelon and state and local agencies within the EPZs, (2) with federal emergency response organizations, (3) between the plant, the EOF, and the state and county EOCs, and (4) between Emergency Response Facilities and Field Monitoring Teams. A general description of the systems is as follows: November 2016 F-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) . | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 1) Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS): The t-:JARS is a dedicated communications system that has been installed for the purpose of notifying state and local authorities of declared nuclear emergencies. This system links together the station Control Rooms, the EOF, TSCs and state and local authorities as appropriate. 2) Damage Control Line: A dedicated telephone link called the Damage Control Line that enables communication between the Control Room, the TSC and the OSC to coordinate the dispatching of emergency damage control teams from the OSC (see Figure F-2). 3) Operations Status Line: A dedicated telephone link called the Operations Status Line that enables communication between the Control Room, the TSC and the EOF to monitor the activities of the Control Room staff (see Figure F-2). 4) Technical Conference Line: A dedicated telephone line called the Technical Conference Line between the TSC and the EOF to communicate mitigating activities and priorities for the station to the EOF (see Figure F-2). 5) Director's Hotline: A dedicated telephone link called the Director's Hotline that enables direct Emergency Director communication between the Control Room, TSC, and the EOF (see Figure F-2) . | |||
* 6) Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System: The PBX telephone system provides communication capability between telephones located within the plant. The PBX is used to connect the CR, TSC, EOF, and OSC. The PBX telephone system also provides for outside communications through interconnections with the corporate telephone communications system and commercial telephone lines. 7) Local Commercial Telephone System: This system provides standard commercial telephone service through the public infrastructure, consisting of central offices and the wire line and microwave carrier. The commercial telephone system includes connections to PBX, emergency telephone system, dedicated lines to emergency facilities, and lines to the JICs. The commercial vendor provides primary and secondary power for their lines at their central office. 8) Emergency Response Data System (EROS): EROS will continuously supply the NRC with selected plant data points on a near real time basis. The selected data points are transmitted automatically to the NRC at approximately 1-minute intervals . November 2016 F-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 9) Field Monitoring Team (FMT) Communications: A separate communications system has been installed to allow coordinated environmental monitoring and assessment during an emergency. This system consists of the necessary hardware to allow communication between the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and mobile units in Exelon Nuclear vehicles. Though direct communications between the Control Room and the FMTs is not required per the prescribed methods of FMT coordination, the FMTs can be contacted from equipment in *the Control Room if required. Commercial cell phones or other means are available as back up to the primary field team communications system. In addition, station communication links exist to ensure appropriate information transfer capabilities during an emergency. The station may also utilize its Public Address System, station radios and notification devices to augment its emergency communications. e. ERO Notification System: Exelon Nuclear utilizes an automated ERO Notification System to rapidly notify members of the ERO. The system consists of a network of physical infrastructure capable of initiating and receiving contact via multiple notification devices. When activated, the system contacts the notification devices (e.g., through commercial and cellular phone, email, text message) belonging to members of the ERO. The System includes redundant activation methods via the internet, call-centers, or direct telephone activation, as well as redundant, geographically separated call centers and data centers, with redundant power sources. Implementing procedures specify the course of action to be taken if the primary ERO Notification System activation path fails to respond. The ERO Notification System provides primary and back-up notification functions. f. NRC Communications (ENS and HPN) Communications with the NRC Operations Center will be performed via the NRC ENS and HPN circuits or commercial telephone line. Information is normally communicated from an approved NRC Event Notification Worksheet prior to establishing an open ENS and/or HPN line. Installation and use of these NRC telephones is under the direction of the NRC (see Figure F-3). Emergency Notification System (ENS): Dedicated telephone equipment is in place between the Control Room and the NRC, with an extension of that line in the TSC. A separate line is available in the EOF with the capability of being patched with the station through the NRC: This line is used for NRC event notifications and status updates. Health Physics Network (HPN): There also exists a separate dedicated telephone between the NRC, the TSC, and EOF for conveying health physics information to the NRC as requested or as an open line . November 2016 F-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2. Medical Communications Communications are established with the primary and backup medical hospitals and transportation services via commercial telephone that is accessed by station personnel. 3. Communications Testing Communications equipment is checked in accordance with Section H.10. Communications drills between Exelon Nuclear and state and county government facilities are conducted in accordance with Section N.2.a. In addition, minimum siren testing is performed in accordance with the site specific siren Design Report . November 2016 F-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) ' -j | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure F-1: Exelon Notification Scheme (For Full Augmentation) Control Room (Shift Manager) TSC ENS NRC Headquarters NRC Region (ENS/HPN Comm) (Duty Officer) ,__-----<_ (Duty Officer) (TSC Director) EOF (ENS/HPN Comm) (State/Local Comm) Nuclear Duty Officer Initial (NARS) Updates (Commercial) November 2016 State Warning Points/EOCs (Dispatcher/comm) F-5 As appropriate Local Warning Points/EOCs (Dispatcher/comm) EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Figure F-2: ERF Communications Matrix Control Room osc I ................... ! TSC D E EOF _J*-1 0-------_ _j .----Dedicated Line (Independent or PBX) ______. Station Line (PBX or Commercial) .............. . Exelon Nuclear A= Damage Control Line between the OSC, TSC, and Control Room. B =Directors Hotline line between the Control Room, TSC and EOF. C =Operations Line between the TSC, Control Room and EOF. D =Technical Conference Line between the TSC and EOF. E = Station telephone line . November 2016 F-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Figure F-3: NRC Communications for Nuclear Response NRC Headquarters NRC Region patch Commercial only Exelon Nuclear Control Room TSC NOTE: ENS a.nd HPN circuits may use the Federally maintained system, company tie lines or PBX as dedicated primary communications systems and have commercial backups . November 2016 F-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section G: Public Education and Information | |||
* This section describes the Exelon Nuclear public education and information program. It outlines the methods for distributing public information materials on an annual basis and describes how the public is informed in the event of an emergency. * | |||
* 1. Public Information Publication The state has overall responsibility for maintaining a continuing disaster preparedness public education program. The emergency public information publication for the Exelon Nuclear generating stations is updated annually, in coordination with state and county agencies, to address how the general public is notified and what their actions should be in an emergency. Exelon distributes the publication on an annual basis by mail to all residents within the ten-mile plume exposure EPZs and to appropriate locations where a transient population may obtain a copy. The public information publication includes the following information: a. Educational information on radiation. b. A description of the times that require public notification (what to do if a take-shelter or evacuate recommendation is given). c. A map of major evacuation routes. d. A list of communities likely to serve as host shelter areas and instructions on how to obtain additional information, especially for the disabled or their caretakers and those without transportation. 2. Public Education Materials Public information publications instruct the public to go indoors and turn on their radios when they hear the ANS sirens operating. These publications also identify the local radio stations to which the public should tune in for information related to the emergency. 3. Media Accommodations a. The Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Department is notified when an Unusual Event or higher Emergency condition exists. They will handle public and media inquiries in the early stages of the event (until the JIG is activated) by distributing background information, news releases, and providing information to corporate management. 1) The Emergency Public Information Organization: The Emergency Public lnformation_Organization is part of the Corporate ERO. It may be activated at any time at the discretion of the Nuclear Duty Officer. However, when there is a procedural requirement to activate the EOF, the Emergency Public Information Organization shall also be activated . November 2016 G-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The primary purpose of the Emergency Public Information Organization is to disseminate information from Exelon Nuclear's ERO about the emergency events to the public, via the news media. However, the authority for issuance of news releases for the classification of an Unusual Event or prior to ERO activation will always reside with the Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Department. Upon activation, the Emergency Public Information Organization has the responsibility and authority for issuance of news releases to the public. The Emergency Public Information Organization is comprised of senior managers from Exelon Nuclear who will function as spokespersons, and other Exelon Nuclear individuals including personnel from the Governmental Affairs and Human Relations areas. Exelon Nuclear's spokespersons disseminate information to the news media/public concerning the emergency events out of a Joint Information Center (JIG). 2) The Joint Information Center (JIG): The JIC is the facility *in which media personnel gather to receive information related to the emergency event. The JIG is the location where approved news releases will be provided to the media for dissemination to the public. News releases are coordinated between the EOF and JIG personnel and state and/or Federal representatives in the JIG. Exelon public information personnel operate from the EOF and the JIC, which is under the direction of the Corporate Spokesperson and functions as the single point contact to interface with Federal, state, and local authorities who are responsible for disseminating information to the public. The JIG is equipped with appropriate seating, lighting and visual aids to allow for public announcements and briefings to be given to the news media. Additionally, the JIG is equipped with commercial telephone lines for making outgoing calls. The Emergency Public Information Organization functions from the JIG and EOF in preparing and releasing utility information about the emergency event. The JIC is activated at the declaration of an Alert or higher classification. Functions of the JIG include: | |||
* Serving as the primary location for accumulating accurate and current information regarding the emergency conditions and writing news releases. | |||
* Providing work space and phones for public information personnel from the state, counties, NRG, FEMA, and industry-related organizations. | |||
* Providing telephones for use by the news media personnel. ; | |||
* Providing responses to media inquiries through Media Monitoring Staff telephones that the media can call for information about an emergency . . b. The news media is not permitted into the EOF during an emergency. November 2016 G-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 4. Coordination of Public Information a. The JIC is staffed by Exelon and government public information representatives who will be the source of public information during an emergency at the station. The Corporate Spokesperson is the primary spokesperson for Exelon Nuclear. The Corporate Spokesperson has direct access to all necessary information (see Section B.5). b. The JIC is staffed by federal, state, county, and utility personnel to assure timely, periodic exchange and coordination of information. Representatives coordinate information prior to conducting news briefings. c. Rumors or misinformation are identified during an emergency by the media/rumor control monitors. They respond to public and news media calls and monitor media reports. d. The JIC for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is located west of Chicago, in Warrenville IL, in the Exelon Nuclear Cantara facility. 5. Media Orientation Emergency Preparedness, in conjunction with Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Department, offers training (at least annually) to acquaint news media with the E-Plan, information concerning radiation, and points of contact for release of public information in an emergency. Training is provided for those media agencies that accept the training offer . November 2016 G-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) . I | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section H: Emergency Facilities and Equipment Onsite and offsite facilities are available for emergency assessment, communications, first aid and medical care, and damage control. Of particular importance are the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs); the Control Room (CR), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Joint Information Center (JIG). This section describes the emergency facilities and equipment used by the Emergency Response Organization and outlines the requirements which aid in timely and accurate -re-sponse a-ction-s.---1t also--describes-th_e_ su-rveillance-ptograms--1.:rsea--10-mcfnitor ------------ensure that these facilities and equipment are maintained in a high degree of constant readiness. 1. Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center Exelon Nuclear has established a TSC and an on-site OSC, which are activated upon declaration of an Alert or higher classification. Until they become operational, required functions of these facilities are performed in the Control Room. Under certain adverse conditions for Security-Based Events, personnel may be assembled in an Alternative Facility prior to being dispatched to one of the facility ERFs. a. Station Control Room: The Control Room is the centralized onsite location from which the Nuclear Station's reactors and major plant systems are operated. The Control Room is equipped with instrumentation to supply detailed information on the reactors and major plant systems. The Control Room is continuously staffed with qualified licensed operators. The Control Room is the first onsite facility to become involved with the response to emergency events. Control Room personnel must evaluate and effect control over the emergency and initiate activities necessary for coping with the emergency until such time that support centers can be activated. These activities shall include: | |||
* Reactor and plant control. | |||
* Initial direction of all plant related operations. | |||
* Accident recognition, classification, mitigation and initial corrective actions. | |||
* Alerting of onsite personnel. | |||
* Notification of appropriate individuals. | |||
* Activation of emergency response facilities and ERO notification. | |||
* Notification of offsite agencies . | |||
* Continuous evaluation of the magnitude and potential consequences of an incident. November 2016 H-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) i | |||
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* Initial dose projections . | |||
* Recommendations for immediate protective actions for the public. As other ERFs become activated, they will supply support to the Control Room, although overall Command and Control of the emergency will transfer to the SEO (TSC) or the CED (EOF). Throughout all emergencies, the Control Room maintains its emergency activation status until its normal operational status may be resumed. b. Technical Support Center (TSC): Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has established a TSC for use during emergency situations by station management, technical, and engineering support personnel. The TSC is activated for all emergencies classified as Alert or higher. Activation for other events is optional. When activated the TSC functions include: | |||
* Support for the Control Room's emergency response efforts. | |||
* Support the SEO with assigned Command & Control functions. | |||
* Continued evaluation of event classification. | |||
* Assessment of the plant status and potential offsite impact. | |||
* Coordination of emergency response actions. | |||
* Notification of appropriate corporate. and station management. | |||
* Notification and update of the NRC via Emergency Notification System (ENS). The TSC is the onsite location utilized to support the Control Room for . assessment of plant status and potential offsite impact, and for implementation of emergency actions. TSC provides technical data and information to the EOF. Figure B-1 b illustrates the staffing and organization of the TSC. The TSC provides reliable voice communications to the Control Room, the OSC, the EOF, the NRC, and state and local Emergency Operations Centers. In addition, they provide facsimile transmissions capability (see Section F.1 ). The TSC is sized to accommodate a minimum of 25 spaces and supporting equipment. This includes provisions for five NRC representatives. Adequate space is also available for the appropriate state representative(s) . November 2016 H-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O} I I | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Personnel in the TSC shall be protected from radiological hazards, including direct radiation and airborne contaminants under accident conditions with similar radiological habitability as Control Room personnel. To ensure adequate radiological protection, permanent radiation monitoring systems have been installed in the TSC and/or periodic radiation surveys are conducted. These systems indicate radiation dose rates and airborne radioactivity inside the TSC while in use. In addition, protective breathing apparatus (full-face air purifying respirators) and Kl are available for use as required. The TSC has access to a complete set of as-built drawings and other records, including general arrangement diagrams, P&IDs, and the electrical schematics. The TSC has the capability to record and display vital plant data, in real time, to be used by knowledgeable individuals responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations, and for implementation of emergency procedures. c. Operations Support Center (OSC): Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has established an OSC. The OSC is the onsite location to where station support personnel report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments or duties in support of emergency operations. The OSC shall be activated whenever the TSC is activated, but need not remain activated at the Alert level if its use is judged unnecessary by the Station Emergency Director. At the Site Area and General Emergency levels, the OSC or an alternate OSC shall be activated at all times (except in the case of a Hostile Action Event when site access is restricted). Activation for other events is optional. Station disciplines reporting to the OSC include, but are not limited to: | |||
* Operating personnel not assigned to the Control Room, | |||
* Radiation Protection Personnel, | |||
* Chemistry Personnel, | |||
* Maintenance Personnel (mechanical, electrical and l&C). Figure 8-1 b illustrates the staffing and organization for the OSC. Each OSC is equipped with communication links to the Control Room, the TSC and the EOF (see Section F). A limited inventory of supplies will be kept for the OSC. This inventory will include respirators, protective clothing, flashlights and portable survey instruments. 2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) The EOF is the location where the Corporate Emergency Director will direct a staff in evaluating and coordinating the overall company activities involved with an emergency. Activation of the EOF is mandatory upon declaration of an Alert or higher classification. The EOF provides for: | |||
* Management of overall emergency response. November 2016 H-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Coordination of radiological and environmental assessments . | |||
* Determination of recommended public protective actions. | |||
* Management of recovery operations. | |||
* Coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies. The EOF for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is located west of Chicago, in Warrenville IL, in the Exelon Nuclear Cantara facility. The facility is des.igned with the following considerations: | |||
* The location provides optimum functional and availability characteristics for carrying out overall strategic direction of Exelon Nuclear onsite and support operations, determination of public protective actions to be recommended to offsite officials, and coordination with Federal, state and local organizations. | |||
* It is well engineered for the design life of the plant and is of sufficient size to accommodate about 50 people. | |||
* It is equipped with reliable voice communications capabilities to the TSC, the OSC, the Control Room, NRC, and state and local emergency operations centers. In addition, the EOF has facsimile transmission capability. | |||
* Equipment is provided to gather, store, and display data needed in the EOF to analyze and exchange information on plant conditions with the Station. The EOF technical data system receives, stores, processes, and displays information sufficient to perform assessments of the actual and potential onsite and offsite environmental consequences of an emergency condition. | |||
* The EOF has ready access to plant records, procedures, and emergency plans needed for effective overall management of Exelon Nuclear emergency response resources. 3. Emergency Operations Centers EOCs operated by the state and local communities have been established to perform direction and control of emergency response functions. The Illinois and Iowa state EOCs are capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted period. These centers contain sufficient communications (radio, telephone and teletype) equipment, maps, emergency plans, and status boards to provide the necessary interfaces with other federal, state, county, and Exelon emergency facilities . November 2016 H-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The county EOCs serve as Command and Control headquarters for local emergency response activities as well as a center for the coordination of communications to field units and to the state EOCs. These EOCs have the equipment necessary, (such as facsimile machines, telecommunications equipment, radio gear, photocopiers, wall maps, etc.) to carry out their emergency responsibilities. 4. Activation NOTE: NUREG-0654 Criterion 11.B.5 states that the "licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency". It further defines that short period as 30 and 60 minutes. The time frames for rapid augmentation of a nuclear power plant staff in the event of an emergency are not rigid inviolate requirements but rather goals. It is Exelon Nuclear's intent to expend its best efforts to meet the augmentation criteria goals regarding staffing Emergency Response Facilities with sufficiently skilled individuals capable of handling an emergency. Both the NRC and Exelon Nuclear realize that due to diversity of normal residential patterns for the stations' staff, possible adverse weather conditions, road congestion and site access restrictions, these time frames might be exceeded. Exelon Nuclear has put into place plans and procedures to ensure timely activation of its emergency response facilities. The Shift Manager (as Shift Emergency Director) will initiate a call-out in accordance with the implementing procedures. The ERO augmentation process identifies individuals who are capable of fulfilling the specific response functions that are listed in ERO staffing tables contained within this document. This table was developed based on the functions listed in NUREG-0654, Table B-1. Although the response time will vary due to factors such as weather and traffic conditions, a goal of 60 minutes for minimum staffing, following the. classification of an Alert or higher emergency classification, has been established for the ERO personnel responding to the station emergency facilities and the EOF. Additionally, plans have been developed to ensure timely functional activation and staffing of the JIC when the classification of Alert is declared . November 2016 H-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear It is the goal of the organization to be capable of activating the applicable Emergency Response Facility upon achieving minimum staffing. The facility can be declared activated when the following conditions are met: a. Minimum staffing has been achieved. b. The facility is functional. Although the minimum staffing criteria applies to the JIC, the activation time is not applicable. Public Information personnel must first coordinate the decision to activate the JIC with the appropriate offsite authorities. The Director in charge may elect to activate their facility without meeting minimum staffing; if it has been determined that sufficient personnel are available to fully respond to the specific event (this would not constitute a successful minimum staff response). 5. Monitoring Equipment Onsite Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is equipped with instrumentation for seismic monitoring, radiation monitoring, fire protection and meteorological monitoring. Instrumentation for the detection or analysis of emergency conditions is maintained in accordance with station Technical Specifications, if applicable, or commitments made to the NRC. Descriptions of the equipment appear below. Additional description may be found in the Station Annex. This equipment includes but is not limited to the following: -a. Geophysical Monitors 1) Meteorological Instrumentation: A permanent meteorological monitoring station is located near each station for display and recording of wind speed, wind direction, and ambient and differential temperature for use in making offsite dose projections. Meteorological information is presented in the CR, TSC, and EOF by means of the plant computer system. This information is remotely interrogated using a computer or other data access terminal. With regard to Exelon Nuclear's meteorological monitoring program, there has been a quality assurance program adopted from 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. However, since the meteorological facilities are not composed of structures, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and are not "safety related," not all aspects of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix B, apply. Those aspects of quality assurance germane to supplying good meteorological information for a nuclear power station were adopted into the meteorological quality assurance program. The meteorological program is also subject to the requirements of the QATR, Section 19, Augmented Quality . November 2016 H-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The National Weather Service (NWS), or regional weather forecast providers, may be contacted during severe weather periods. These providers analyze national and local weather in order to provide localized weather forecasts for the system or for the station area as appropriate. 2) Seismic Monitoring: The seismic monitoring system measures and records the acceleration (earthquake ground motion) of the structure. Earthquakes produce low frequency accelerations which, when detected by the remote sensing devices, are permanently recorded as information which defines the response spectrum. The system remains in a standby condition until an earthquake causes the remote unit(s) to activate the recording circuits. It also provides signals for immediate remote indication that specific preset response accelerations have been exceeded. 3) Hydrological Monitors: The design basis flood, probable maximum precipitation, and other improbable, conceivable extremes in hydrologic natural phenomena are well below any design limits for the stations as detailed in the UFSAR. b. Radiological Monitors and Sampling 1) The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS): In-plant radiological measurements provide information that may help determine the nature, extent and source of emergency conditions. The RMS is available to give early warning of a possible emergency and provides for a continuing evaluation of the situation in the Control Room. Radiation monitoring instruments are located at selected areas within the facility to detect, measure, and record radiation levels. In the event the radiation level should increase above a preset level, an alarm is initiated in the Control Room. Certain radiation monitoring. instruments also alarm locally in selected areas of the facility. The RMS is divided into 3 subsystems: a) Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) are used for the direct measurement of in-plant exposure rates. The ARM readings allow in-plant exposure rate determinations to be made remotely without requiring local hand-held meter surveys. This information may be used, initially, to aid in the determination of plant area accessibility. In addition to permanent monitors, portable Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) measure airborne particulate and airborne iodine activities at various locations within the operating areas. b) Process Radiation Monitors (PRMs) are used for the measurement of radioactive noble gas, iodine, and particulate concentrations in plant effluent and other gaseous and fluid streams . November 2016 H-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c) The accident, or high range, radiation monitoring system monitors radiation levels at various locations within the operating area. These are high range instruments used to track radiation levels under accident or post accident conditions. These instruments include the Containment/Drywall Radiation Monitors. The RMS provides the necessary activity or radiation levels required for determining terms in dose projection procedures. Key RMS data is linked to the plant computer, which allows information to be passed to the TSC and EOF. The isotopic mix, including isotopes such as those in Table 3 of NUREG-0654, is based upon a default accident mix. Refer to t.he Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station UFSAR for further detail on the RMS capabilities and design. 2) Liquid and Gaseous Sampling Systems: The process sampling system consists of the normal sampling system and additional sampling panels located throughout the plant. Sampling systems are installed or can be modified to permit reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling even under severe accident conditions. The sampling systems use a number of manual sampling techniques to enable reactor coolant and containment sampling operations over a wide range of plant conditions. It is capable of providing information relative to post-accident plant conditions to allow operator actions to be taken to mitigate and control the course of an accident. Refer to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station UFSAR for further detail on sampling capabilities. 3) Portable Radiation Monitoring Equipment: Portable radiation survey instruments are available for a wide variety uses such as area, sample, and personnel surveys and continued accident assessment. Instruments are stored throughout the plant and in the emergency facilities. c. Process Monitors: The Control Room and applicable redundant backup locations are equipped with extensive plant process monitors for use in both normal and emergency conditions. These indications include but are not limited to reactor coolant system pressure and temperature, containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, status or lineup of equipment components. This instrumentation provides the basis for initiation of corrective actions. 1) Plant Monitoring/Information System: A plant monitoring/information system provides the data acquisition and database capability for performing plant monitoring and functions. The system is designed to scan, convert to engineering units, make reasonability and alarm limit checks, apply required transformations, store for recall and analysis, and display the reading of transformed data from plant instrumentation. The system scans flows, pressures, temperatures, fluid levels, radiation levels, equipment, and valve status at required frequencies. Scanned variables are quality tagged. The system provides for short and mid term storage of data for on-line retrieval and fast recall, and long term storage to appropriate media. November 2016 H-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2) Safety Parameter Display (SPDS) & Plant Parameter Display (PPDS) Systems: SPDS and PPDS provide a display of plant parameters from which the safety status of operation may be assessed in the Control Room, TSC and EOF. The primary function of the SPDS and PPDS is to help operating personnel in the Control Room make quick assessments of plant safety status. SPDS and/or PPDS displays in the TSC and EOF promote the exchange of information between these facilities and the Control Room and assists the emergency organization in the decision making process. d. Fire Detection System: The Fire Detection System is designed to quickly detect visible or invisible smoke (o'r other products of combustion) and/or heat in designated areas of the plant. The fire alarm communication systems and subsystems are located at strategic points throughout the plant to warn personnel of a nuclear incident or other emergency conditions. Existing plant alarm systems are sufficiently audible to alert personnel in the event of a fire or need for assembly. These alarm communication systems consist of warning sirens and lights (in high noise areas) and the PA system. Refer to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station UFSAR for further description of the station's fire protection system. 6. Monitoring Equipment Offsite Exelon has made provisions to acquire data from and have 'access to the following offsite sources of monitoring and analysis equipment: a. Geophysical Monitors: In the event that the onsite meteorological tower or monitoring instrumentation becomes inoperative and the contracted weather provider cannot be contacted, meteorological data may be obtained directly from the National Weather Service or the internet. A considerable array of seismometers are located in the region. A central point of contact to obtain information about a seismic event is the National EarthquakE! Information Service in Golden, Colorado. Exelon Nuclear Corporate Offices can coordinate hydrology and seismology expertise in the event onsite information becomes unavailable. b. Radiological Environmental Monitors and Sampling: Exelon Nuclear has contracted with a company to conduct an extensive offsite environmental monitoring program to provide data on measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials in the environs. The program (described fully in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual), includes: | |||
* Fixed continuous air samplers. | |||
* Routine sampling of river water; milk and fish . | |||
* A fixed dosimeter monitoring network. The dosimeter program consists of the following elements: November 2016 H-9 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* A near-site ring of dosimeters covering the 16 meteorological sectors . | |||
* A 16-sector ring of dosimeters placed in a zone within about 5 miles from the plant. | |||
* Dosimeters placed at each of the normal fixed air sampler locations (typically about 8-15 air samplers per nuclear station). c. Laboratory Facilities: External facilities for counting and analyzing samples can be provided by the other Exelon Nuclear stations, state, federal or contracted laboratories. These laboratories can act as backup facilities in the event that the affected station's counting room and laboratory become unusable or the offsite radiological monitoring and environmental sampling operation exceeds the capacity or capability of the station laboratory during an emergency. It is estimated that these laboratories will be able to respond within several hours from initial notification. Outside analytical assistance may be requested from state and federal agencies, or through contracted vendors. The state maintains a mobile radiological laboratory that provides the primary means of analyzing off-site environmental samples. The NRC mobile laboratory may be made available for Site Area and General Emergencies. The DOE, through the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) has access to any national laboratory with a Bell Lab contract (e.g., Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore, etc.) . A general description of the laboratory capabilities is provided in Section C.3. 7. Offsite Monitoring Equipment Storage Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains a sufficient supply of emergency equipment (such as portable survey, counting, and air sampling instrumentation and other radiological monitoring equipment and supplies) that may be used for environmental monitoring. These supplies meet the initial requirements of two environmental Field Monitoring Teams. During subsequent phases of an emergency, additional equipment is available from other Exelon Nuclear generating stations, vendors and offsite response organizations. 8. Meteorological Monitoring The station has installed and maintains a meteorological tower equipped with instrumentation for continuous reading of the wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and delta air temperature. Additional capabilities are available to obtain representative current meteorological information from other sources, such as the National Weather Service. A full description of the onsite meteorological capabilities is given in Section H.5.a of this Plan . November 2016 H-10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 9. OSC Capabilities The OSC provides area for coordinating and planning of OSC activities and the staging of personnel. Further space is available in adjacent offices and locker rooms to accommodate additional personnel as may be required. Alternate locations are available. The onsite storeroom maintains a supply of parts and equipment for normal plant maintenance. These parts, supplies and equipment are available for damage control use as necessary. Sufficient radiation protection equipment (i.e., protective clothing, respiratory protection gear, Kl, and other health physics equipment and supplies) is stored and maintained near the OSC (as well as the other emergency response facilities). Damage Control Team equipment is available near the OSC as well as in the maintenance shops. This equipment includes items such as a camera, portable lighting, and additional portable communications equipment. The OSC is stocked with an assortment of first aid and medical treatment equipment and supplies. The OSC maintains reliable voice communications with the CR, TSC, and EOF. For a complete description of communications equipment, refer to Section F. When an emergency condition exists at one station, additional supplies can be obtained from other unaffected stations and Exelon resources upon request. 10. Facility and Equipment Readiness Emergency facilities and equipment are inspected and inventoried in accordance with emergency preparedness procedures. These procedures provide information on location and availability of emergency equipment and supplies. An inventory of all emergency equipment and supplies is performed on a quarterly basis and after each use in an emergency or drill. During this inventory, radiation monitoring equipment is checked to verify that required calibration period and location are in accordance with the inventory lists. Inspections include an operational check of instruments and equipment. Equipment, supplies, and parts which have a shelf-life are identified, checked, and replaced as necessary. Sufficient reserves of instruments and equipment are maintained to replace those which are removed from emergency kits or lockers for calibration or repair. The station is responsible for maintaining a supply of Kl at the site. 11. General Use Emergency Equipment Inventory procedures identify the equipment that makes up kits used in an emergency situation available within each emergency facility. 12. Collection Point for Field Samples The onsite chemistry lab has been designated as the central point for the receipt of radiological field monitoring samples. Sampling and analysis equipment is available for quantitative activity determination of marine and air samples, and qualitative activity determination of terrestrial samples. Sufficient field monitoring equipment is maintained at the station for initial sampling. Instrumentation and equipment utilized for sample activity determination are routinely calibrated to ensure timely availability. Additional facilities as described in C.3 and H.6.c are available for sample and analysis of environmental samples. November 2016 H-11 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Refer to the Station Annex for further description of contracted environmental | |||
* sampling and analysis support . * | |||
* November 2016 H-12 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _J PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exeio*n Nuclear Section I: Accident Assessment | |||
* To effectively coordinate and direct all facets of the response to an emergency situation, diligent accident assessment efforts are required throughout the emergency. All four emergency classifications have similar assessment methods, however, each classification requires a greater magnitude of assessment effort dependent upon the plant symptoms and/or initiating event(s). * | |||
* 1. Plant Parameters and Corresponding Emergency Classification Plant system and effluent parameter values are utilized in the determination of accident severity and subsequent emergency classification. Environmental and meteorological events are also determining factors in emergency classification. An emergency condition can be the result of just one parameter or condition change, or the combination of several. The specific symptoms, parameter values or events for each level of emergency classification are detailed in the emergency implementing procedures. Specific plant system and effluent parameters that characterize a classifiable event (EALs) are presented in Addendum 3 to the Station Annex. In order to adequately assess the emergency condition, each emergency facility has the necessary equipment and instrumentation installed to make available essential plant information on a continuous basis. Evaluation of plant conditions is accomplished through the monitoring of plant parameters both from indication in the Control Room and within the plant. Some of the more important plant parameters to be monitored in the Control Room are assembled into a single display location, which is entitled the "Safety. Parameter Display System" (SPDS). The SPDS monitors such parameters as: reactor coolant system pressure, reactor or pressurizer water level, containment pressure, suppression pool water level and temperature, reactor power, safety system status, containment radiation level and effluent monitor readings. The instrumentation and equipment capabilities available for each emergency facility are described in Section H. 2. Onsite Accident Assessment Capabilities The resources available to provide initial and continuing information for accident assessment throughout the course of an event include plant parameter display systems, liquid and gaseous sampling system, Area and Process Radiation Monitoring Systems, and Accident Radiation Monitoring Systems (which includes the high range containment radiation monitors). Descriptions of these systems are given in Section H.5.b. 3. Source Term Determination Source term (or core damage) estimations serve several roles within the Exelon Emergency Preparedness Program. For planning purposes, core damage considerations are used as the bases for several of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) 'Initiating Conditions and as the threshold for the declaration of a General Emergency (the definition of a General Emergency specifies conditions which involve 'substantial' core degradation or melting as one of the bases for classification). November 2016 1-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _J | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear From an implementation perspective, core damage estimations provide a means of realistically differentiating between the four core states (no damage, clad failure, and fuel melt, and vessel melt-through) to: | |||
* Evaluate the status of the fuel barriers and how their status relates to the risks and possible consequences of the accident. | |||
* Provide input on core configuration (coolable or uncoolable) for prioritization of mitigating activities. | |||
* Determine the potential quality (type) and/or quantity(%) of source term available for release in support of projected offsite doses and protective action recommendations. | |||
* Provide information that quantifies the severity of an accident in terms that can be readily understood and visualized. | |||
* Support the determination of radiological protective actions that should be considered for long term recovery activities. The assessment methodologies utilized by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station are intended to provide a rapid best estimate of core damage which, when evaluated together, help to develop an overall picture of the extent of core damage. The methods used to estimate the amount or type of core damage occurring under accident conditions includes the following: | |||
* Containment Radiation Monitors: An indirect method used to determine the amount of core damage. Applicable to Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenarios. Based upon an end-of-life source term and static nuclide ratio assumptions yielding a limited accuracy. Valid any time following an accident. | |||
* Core Temperatures: Methods such as Core Exit Thermocouple (CET), Peak Core Temperatures and Hot Leg Temperatures provide indirect methods used to indicate the type and/or amount of core damage. Applicable for all types of accidents. Valid any time following an accident. | |||
* Core Uncoverv: Methods such as Core Uncovery Time, RVLIS Level and Source Range Monitor count rate provide indirect methods used to indicate the type of core damage (clad failure or fuel melt). Applicable for all types of accidents. Provides a relatively accurate estimate of the state of the core early in the event. Valid any time following an accident. | |||
* Containment Hydrogen Concentration: An indirect method used to establish the type of core damage. Applicable to LOCA type accidents where all the hydrogen generated by the metal-water reaction is released into containment. Valid any time following an accident. | |||
* Sample Analysis -Isotopic Ratio Comparison: A direct method used to establish the type of core damage. Compares expected isotopic ratios with a sample to determine a general core state. Applicable under all types of accidents. Valid any time following an accident. November 2016 1-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* Sample Analysis -Presence of Abnormal Isotopes: A direct method used to provide a go/no go indication of fuel melt by the presence of unusually high concentrations of the less volatile fission products. Applicable under all types of accidents. Valid any time following an accident. | |||
* Sample Analysis -Concentration Evaluation: A direct method that yields the most accurate numerical estimations of the amount of core damage. Applicable for all types of accidents.* Requires the sampled system(s) be in a steady state that usually prevents its use until the plant is in a stable condition. 4. Effluent Monitor Data and Dose Projection Dose assessment or projection represents the calculation of an accumulated dose at some time in the future if current or projected conditions continue. During an accident, the Plant Parameter Display System and personal computers will provide the ERO with the timely information required to make decisions. Radiological and meteorological instrumentation readings are used to project dose rates at predetermined distances from the station, and to determine the integrated dose received. Dose assessment methods used by Exelon personnel to project offsite doses include: A. Monitored Release Points -This method utilizes the plant's effluent radiation monitors and system flow rates. Effluent release points are used to directly calculate a release rate. The point of the release determines the way the source term is affected and is adjusted by the dose assessment process . B. Containment Leakage/Failure -This method uses a variety of containment failures or leak rates in conjunction with available source term estimations to develop a release rate to the environment. A direct vent of containment can be modeled as a failure to isolate. C. Release Point Samples -This method uses a sample at the release point and an estimated flow rate to develop a release rate at the point of release. D. Field Monitoring Team Data -This method uses a field survey or sample and the atmospheric model to back calculate a release rate and ratio concentrations of radioactive material at various points up and downwind of plume centerline. The computer applications used to provide dose calculations are evaluated against the EPA-400 plume exposure Protective Action Guides (PAGs) applicable for the early phase of an accident. These evaluations place an emphasis on determining the necessity for offsite protective action recommendations. Dose assessment actions will be performed in the following sequence: First: Onset of a release to 1 hour post-accident: Shift personnel will rely on a simplified computerized dose model to assist them in developing offsite dose projections using real time data from effluent monitors and site meteorology. November 2016 1-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * * --------------------PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Second: 1 hour post-accident to event termination: Estimates of off-site doses based on more sophisticated techniques are provided. Dedicated ERO personnel will analyze the offsite consequences of a release using more complex computerized dose modeling. These additional methods are able to analyze more offsite conditions than the simplified quick method, as well account for more specific source term considerations. 5 .. Meteorological Information Local meteorological data is available from an onsite meteorological tower. The data available includes wind speed, wind direction, temperature, and delta temperature. These data are used by the utility, state, and NRC to provide near real-time predictions of the atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion. Meteorological data from the tower is available in the CR, TSC, and EOF. A full description of the onsite meteorological capabilities is given in Section H.5.a. 6. Unmonitored Release Dose projections can be made during a release through use of actual sample data in situations where effluent monitors are either off-scale or inoperative or the release occurs by an unmonitored flow path. In the absence of effluent sample data, a dose projection can be performed simply by specifying the accident category as a default. The selection of a default accident category defines the mix, the total curies, and the release pathway(s). The total number of curies from a default mix for each isotope is used to provide an upper bound for release concentration, and hence, an upper bound for the dose rate and dose to the public. 7. Field Monitoring In addition to the capabilities and resources described in Section H.6.b and H.7, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains the ability to take offsite air samples and to directly measure gamma dose rates the event of an airborne or liquid release. The capability to take offsite soil, water, and vegetation samples is also provided by either the Field Teams or a contracted vendor. The environmental monitoring equipment, as described in Section H, contain portable survey, counting, and air sampling instrumentation and other radiological monitoring equipment and supplies to be used by the Field Monitoring Teams. Samples are taken at predetermined locations as well as those specified both during and after a release. Environmental measurements are used as an aid in the determination and assessment of protective and recovery actions for the general public. 8. Field Monitoring Teams Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to perform a variety of functions during conditions that may involve significant releases of radioactive materials from the plant. Radiological survey and sample data is used to define affected area boundaries, verify or modify dose projections and protective action recommendations, and assess the actual magnitude, extent, and significance of a liquid or gaseous release. November 2016 1-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear In addition to contamination and dose rate measurements, the change out of dosimeters and air sampler cartridges can be performed. Other actions may include soil, water and vegetation sampling. The initial environmental surveys involve simple-to-perform measurements to quickly confirm or modify the dose projections based on plant parameters. Subsequent environmental monitoring efforts will be aimed at further defining the offsite consequences including instituting an expanded program to enable prompt assessments of any subsequent releases from the plant. The expertise necessary to conduct limited offsite environmental survey and sampling exists onsite 24 hours a day. A minimum of two offsite Field Monitoring Teams are notified and activated at an Alert or higher classification. Teams composed of two individuals are assembled at the station to test and inventory dedicated survey and sampling equipment. Teams are then dispatched in company or personal vehicles into the surrounding area when a release is or is expected to occur. Radiological survey and sample data is transmitted to the emergency facilities. Vendor/contractor support can be used to perform collection, shipment and analysis of environmental sample media as described in Section 8.8.c. 9. Iodine Monitoring Field monitoring equipment has the capability to detect and measure airborne radio iodine concentrations as low as 1 x 10-7 µCi/cm3 in the presence of noble gases. Interference from the presence of noble gas and background radiation will be minimized by ensuring that monitoring teams move to areas of low background prior to analyzing the sample cartridge. The collected air sample is measured by hand held survey meter as an initial check of the projection derived from plant data to determine if significant quantities of elemental iodine have actually been released (the chemical form that would pose a health hazard). 10.Dose Estimates Specific procedures exist for the correlation of air activity levels to dose rate for key isotopes. Provisions have been established for estimating integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates and for the comparison of these estimates with the protective action guides. 11. State Monitoring Capabilities The states have the ability to dispatch their own field monitoring teams to track the airborne radioactive plume. The states also have the ability and resources to coordinate with federal and utility monitoring teams to compare sample results . November 2016 1-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section J: Protective Response Protective response consists of emergency actions, taken during or after an emergency situation, which are intended to minimize or eliminate hazards to the health and safety of the public and/or station personnel. A range of protective actions has been developed for emergency workers and the general public in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. Additionally, guidelines have been established to aid in choosing protective actions during an emergency that are consistent with federal guidance. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is responsible for onsite actions, while the responsibility for offsite actions rests with the state, county, and other offsite response agencies. 1. Notification of Onsite Personnel For all emergency classifications, all personnel within the Protected Area are notified within 15 minutes of the initial classification or escalation of an emergency by recognizable alarms and/or verbal announcements over the plant Public Address (PA) System. Announcements include the emergency classification and response actions to be taken by personnel onsite (such as ERO, non-ERO, contractor personnel, and visitors). Provisions are made to alert personnel in high noise areas and outbuildings within the Protected Area as applicable. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has identified locations where people might be expected to be present outside the Protected Area but within the Owner Controlled Area. Accountability of persons within the Owner Controlled Area but outside the Protected Area is not required. However, provisions are established for notification of personnel within the Owner Controlled Area any time a Site Evacuation has been initiated, or as otherwise deemed appropriate. 2. Evacuation Locations If a Site Evacuation is required, nonessential personnel are directed to either assemble within designated Assembly Areas or to immediately evacuate the site. Personnel will be directed to either proceed to their homes or to reassemble at designated offsite locations. Visitors to the station will assemble with and follow the instructions of their escorts. Nonessential personnel within the Protected Area will normally exit through the security building. Personal transportation (if available) will normally be used and established evacuation routes will be followed. Personnel without transportation will be identified and provided transportation as necessary. 3. Radiological Monitoring of Evacuees Personnel evacuating the site will be monitored for contamination by the portal monitors as they exit the Protected Area, with portable friskers in Assembly Areas, or sent to offsife monitoring locations on an as needed basis . November 2016 J-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria -Exelon Nuclear 4. Evacuation Evacuation is the primary protective action anticipated for onsite personnel not having immediate emergency response assignments. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has identified locations that serve as Assembly Areas and offsite locations for non-essential personnel when they are not instructed to proceed home. The specific locations of these areas are shown in the Station Annex. Implementing procedures describe equipment, supplies and general operation of these facilities. The Station Emergency Director will designate personnel within the Site Boundary as essential or nonessential. Evacuation of non-essential personnel is usually conducted immediately after accountability if a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency has been declared and conditions permit. Evacuation shall commence in accordance with station procedures as directed by the Station Emergency Director or his/her designee, unless one of the following conditions exist: a. Severe weather conditions threaten safe transport. b. A significant radiological hazard would be encountered. c. There is a security threat occurring, which would have an adverse impact on the personnel while leaving the site. d. A condition similar to the above in magnitude, which in the opinion of the Station Emergency Director would adversely affect the site personnel. | |||
* Security forces will be dispatched, when available, to access road(s) to control entry to site facilities. Unauthorized and non-ERO personnel will be denied entry. | |||
* The initiation of a site evacuation will be reported to the appropriate state/local agency. Exelon has established the implementation of alternate onsite protective actions for security-based events that are more appropriate than the actions for radiological emergencies. These alternate protective actions could include taking immediate cover, immediate protected area evacuation, immediate owner controlled area evacuation, and dispatch of the ERO to their alternative facility. 5. Accountability The purpose of Accountability is to determine the locations of all personnel inside the Protected Area and to muster emergency personnel at prearranged locations. When Accountability of onsite personnel is determined to be necessary by the Station Emergency Director, all personnel within the protected area shall be accounted for and the names of missing individuals (if any) are determined within thirty (30) minutes of the announcement. Accountability is usually performed in conjunction with Assembly, and is required to be initiated whenever a Site Area Emergency or higher classification is declared . The movement of personnel for the purposes of Accountability may be delayed if their health and safety could be in jeopardy, such as severe weather or for security concerns. November 2016 J-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * * . PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear If it is determined that the prearranged Assembly Area is unfit for personnel, the Station Emergency Director may designate an alternative Assembly Area and direct personnel using appropriate communication systems that are available. Once established, Accountability within the Protected Area is maintained throughout the course of the event. Should missing personnel be identified, search and rescue operations are initiated. 6. Provisions for Onsite Personnel Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains an inventory of respiratory protection equipment, anti-contamination clothing, and Kl that is made available to emergency workers remaining onsite should conditions warrant. During the course of emergency, protective actions are considered to minimize radiological exposures or contamination problems associated with all onsite personnel. For those who must work within the restricted area of the affected site, measures that are considered are: a. Use of Respirators: On-shift and emergency response personnel use respiratory protection in any environment involving exposure to high level gaseous activity or oxygen deficient atmosphere, or where air quality is in doubt. In the presence of airborne particulates, emergency response personnel may be directed by health physics personnel to use full-face filter type respirators. The criteria for issuance of respiratory protection are described in Radiation Protection procedures . b. Use of Protective Clothing: Anti-contamination clothing, located in the TSC, OSC and station dress out areas is available for use by onsite personnel. The criteria for issuance of protective clothing are described in Radiation Protection procedures. c. Use of Potassium Iodide (Kl): The use of Kl may be recommended when a projected dose of 50 Rem Committed Dose Equivalent (COE) is exceeded for an emergency worker's thyroid. This is the value specified in EPA 400-R-92-001, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.". Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is responsible for maintaining a supply of Kl on site. The Station Emergency Director has the responsibility for approval of issuing Kl to Exelon Nuclear emergency workers. 7. Mechanism for Implementing Protective Action Recommendations Plant conditions, projected dose and dose rates, and/or field monitoring data are evaluated to develop PARs for the purpose of preventing or minimizing exposure to the general public. PARs are provided to the offsite agencies responsible for implementing protective actions for the general public within the 10-mile EPZ. PARs are approved by the Emergency Director in Command and Control. In an emergency that requires immediate protective actions be taken prior to activation of the offsite emergency facilities, PARs are provided directly to the state and county 24 hour warning points by the Emergency Director. November 2016 J-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 8. Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) The evacuation time estimates (ETE) were developed in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002, Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies. Section IV of Appendix E to 1 OCFR50 requires that an analysis of the time required to evacuate be provided for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent residents which includes special facilities schools, nursing homes, hospitals, and recreational areas The evacuation time estimate (ETE) is a calculation of the time to evacuate the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), which is an area with a radius of about 10 miles around the station. The ETE study used population data from the 2010 census. The evacuation times are based on a detailed consideration of the EPZ roadway network and population distribution. The ETE Study is contained in an addendum to the station Annex and presents evacuation times, for daytime and nighttime scenarios under various weather conditions for the evacuation of various areas around the station. Within 365 days of the availability of each decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau, each station shall develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under 1 OCFR50.4 to the NRC. The ETE analysis shall be submitted to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies . During the years between decennial censuses, EPZ permanent resident population changes are estimated once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the ETE analysis will be updated to reflect the impact of that population increase. These estimates are available for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and will be submitted to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis under 1 OCFR50.4 no later than 365 days after the determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies . November 2016 J-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 9. Capability of Implementing Protective Action Recommendations The responsibility for implementing protective measures based on protective action guides for the offsite population at risk is the responsibility of the state and local governments. Detailed procedures for public protective actions are contained in the state and other local radiological emergency response plans as appropriate. The state agencies are responsible for evaluation of Exelon Nuclear recommended protective actions and preparing a recommendation to the Governor, or his/her appointed agent. Only when the state acts under the Governor's order does a recommended protective action become a directed protective action. If the plant conditions are stable and offsite radiological conditions are such that the public health and safety are not endangered, then return to evacuated areas may be discussed with the affected state(s). State authorities are responsible for actually recommending return and transmitting this recommendation. 1 O. Implementation of Protective Action Recommendations The utility, state, and county emergency plans used to implement the protective measures for the plume exposure pathway take numerous factors into consideration as stated in NUREG-0654 11.J. Among these considerations are: a. Most of the public evacuees are expected to travel in their own vehicles, leaving the EPZ via designated evacuation routes. The Station Annex shows the evacuation routes, EPZ Subareas and pre-selected sampling/monitoring points. The state and county plans contain official maps and information on the locations of off-site centers. b. The population distribution around the station. Population distribution for the plume exposure EPZ is illustrated in the Station Annex. c. As indicated in Section E, offsite agencies are notified in the event the E-Plan is activated. State and county agencies have the capability to notify all members of the transient and resident population within the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. d-1. NUREG-0654 11.J.1 O.d-1 items are addressed separately in state and county emergency plans. November 2016 J-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear m. At a General Emergency classification, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station will provide the state with recommendations for protective actions for the public. For incidents involving actual, potential, or imminent releases of radioactive material to the atmosphere, EPA 400-R-92-001, the NRC Response Technical Manual (RTM-96) and NUREG-0654, Supp. 3, Revision 1 are used as the basis for the general public PARs. 1) Plant Based PARs Station specific PAR Flowcharts have been developed to aid Exelon Nuclear personnel providing PARs based on the above. Station specific PAR Flowcharts with Subarea or Sector tables are documented in the Exelon EP Implementing Procedures, including station-specific requirements regarding PAR determination. These flowcharts and tables provide technically based Protective Action Recommendations based on plant conditions and core damage indicators as applicable to the Exelon site and described within the implementing procedures. Possible plant based PARs issued by Exelon Nuclear, in support of NUREG-0654 Supp. 3, at a General Emergency could include as appropriate for the Station: | |||
* Response to a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident. | |||
* Utilization of the staged evacuation concept as determined by station ETE's . | |||
* Shelter of the general public in response to but not limited to; a controlled containment vent lasting less than 1 hour in duration less than PAGs, impediments to evacuation, or Hostile Action event. | |||
* Evacuation of the general public. In addition to the above actions to minimize or prevent potential exposure to radiation, a recommendation of "monitor and prepare" will be issued for the remainder of the EPZ. 2) Dose Based PARs Evacuation is recommended if projected doses reach the minimum EPA PAGs 1 Rem EPA TEDE1 or 5 Rem COE Thyroid) . 1 EPA TEDE is defined as the sum of the doses from external exposure and inhalation from the plume, and from 4 days of external exposure to deposited materials. November 2016 J-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Many assumptions exist in dose assessment calculations, involving both source term and meteorological factors, which make computer predictions over long distances highly questionable. However, in the event dose assessment results indicate the need to recommend actions beyond the outer EPZ boundaries, which is past 10 miles, Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched to downwind areas to verify the calculated exposure rates prior to issuing PARs outside the EPZ. Exelon personnel normally do not have the necessary information to determine whether off site conditions would require sheltering instead of evacuation. External factors (such as road conditions, traffic/traffic control, weather, or offsite emergency response capabilities) are determined by the state. 11. Ingestion Pathway Protective Measures The responsibility for specifying protective measures to be used for the ingestion pathway rests with the state. These measures include the methods for protecting the public from consumption of contaminated water and foodstuffs. 12. Monitoring of Evacuees The state and county organizations have the capability to register and monitor evacuees at designated reception centers. This capability includes personnel and equipment capable of monitoring residents and transients evacuating from the plume exposure EPZ and arriving at the reception centers, in accordance with FEMA guidelines . November 2016 J-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section K: Radiological Exposure Control This section of the plan describes the means for controlling emergency worker radiological exposures during an emergency, as well as the measures that are used by Exelon to provide necessary assistance to persons injured or exposed to radiation and/or radioactive materials. Exposure guidelines in this section are consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides described in EPA 400-R-92-001. 1. Emergency Exposure Guidelines Being licensed by the NRC, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains personnel exposure control programs in accordance with 1 O CFR 20 under normal operating conditions. The Station Emergency Director is assigned the non-delegable responsibility for authorizing personnel exposure levels under emergency conditions per EPA-400. In emergency situations, workers may receive exposure under a variety of circumstances in order to assure safety and protection of others and of valuable property. These exposures will be justified if the maximum risks or costs to others that are avoided by their actions outweigh the risks to which the workers are subjected. The Emergency Worker Dose Limits are as follows: Dose Limit Activity *Condition (Rem TEDE) 0-5 All Personnel should be kept within normal 10 CFR 20 limits during bona fide emergencies, except as authorized for activities as indicated below. 5-10 Protecting valuable Lower dose not practicable. property 10-25 Lifesaving or protection of Lower dose not practicable. large population!? > 25 Lifesaving or protection of Only on a voluntary basis to persons fully large populations aware of the risks involved. Limit dose to the lens of the eye to 3 times the above va!ues and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) to 10 times the above values. Whenever possible, the concurrence of the Station's Radiation Protection (Department) Manager should be secured before exposing individuals to dose equivalents beyond the EPA-400 lower limit. November 2016 K-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2. Emergency Radiation Protection Program The TSC Radiation Protection Manager is the individual responsible for the implementation of the radiation protection actions during an emergency. Radiation protection guidelines include the following: -* Volunteers over forty-five years of age are considered first for any emergency response action requiring exposure greater than normal limits. Routine dose limits shall not be extended to emergency* dose limits for declared pregnant individuals. As in the case of normal occupational exposure, doses received under emergency conditions should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable. | |||
* Persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 Rem TEDE should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects. | |||
* In the context of the emergency limits, exposure of workers that is incurred for the protection of large populations may be considered justified for situations in which the collective dose avoided by the emergency operation is significantly larger than that incurred by the workers involved. | |||
* Exposure accountability is maintained and proper personnel radiological | |||
* monitoring equipment is provided for all personnel during emergency conditions. | |||
* Access to high radiation areas is only permitted with prior approval of the applicable Radiation Protection Manager. Personnel are not allowed to enter known or potential high radiation areas unless their exposure has been properly evaluated. | |||
* Periodic habitability surveys of emergency facilities are performed during an emergency. If the facility is determined to be uninhabitable, the facility is evacuated in order to prevent or minimize exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Alternate assembly areas are established, as necessary, to relocate and monitor evacuated personnel. 3. Personnel Monitoring a. Emergency workers will receive DLR badges and personal* self-reading dosimeters capable of measuring expected exposures on a real time basis. The capability exists for the emergency processing of DLRs on a 24-hour per day basis, if necessary. b. Emergency worker dose records are maintained by the Radiation Protection Managers (as appropriate) in accordance with the emergency and radiological protection procedures. Emergency workers are instructed to read their | |||
* dosimeters frequently. DLRs may be processed with increased periodicity. November 2016 K-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria *Exelon Nuclear 4. Non-Exelon Personnel Exposure Authorization The responsibility for authorizing non-Exelon emergency workers (i.e. state and local agency emergency workers) to receive exposures in excess of the EPA General Public Protective Action Guides rests with the state and county organizations, except when such emergency workers are onsite. Authorization of exposures in excess of EPA General Public Protective Action Guides, in this latter instance, rests with the Station Emergency Director. 5. Contamination and Decontamination During an emergency, the Station Emergency Director is responsible for preventing or minimizing personnel exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other surfaces. Special consideration should be given to setting up contamination control arrangements for personnel entering the OSC after completion of assigned activities. a. During emergency conditions, normal plant contamination control criteria will be adhered to as much as possible. However, these limits may be modified by the applicable Radiation Protection Manager per existing Radiation Protection procedures, should conditions warrant. b. Contamination Control Means: Personnel found to be contaminated will normally be attended to at decontamination areas located onsite. Temporary decontamination areas can also be set up inside at various locations . Decontamination showers and supplies are provided onsite with additional personnel decontamination equipment and capabilities. Shower and sink drains in the controlled area are routed to the miscellaneous waste processing system where the liquid is processed and monitored prior to discharge. Potentially contaminated emergency vehicles will be surveyed before they are allowed to leave the plant or offsite assembly area. If the survey area is not suitable for monitoring and decontamination due to radiological or other concerns, vehicles will be surveyed at an alternate location. 6. Contamination Control Measures Controls are established 24 hours per day to contain the spread of loose surface radioactive contamination . November 2016 K-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear a. Contaminated areas are isolated as restricted areas with appropriate radiological protection and access control. Personnel leaving contaminated areas are monitored to ensure they and their clothing are not contaminated. If contamination above acceptable levels is found, they will be decontaminated in accordance with plant procedures. If normal decontamination procedures do not reduce personnel contamination to acceptable levels, the case will be referred to a competent medical authority. Supplies, instruments, and equipment that are in contaminated areas or have been brought into contaminated areas will be monitored prior to removal. If found to be contaminated, they will be decontaminated using normal plant decontamination techniques and facilities or | |||
* may be disposed of as radwaste. Contaminated vehicles will be decontaminated before being released. b. Measures will be taken to control onsite access to potentially contaminated potable water and food supplies. Under emergency conditions when uncontrolled releases of activity have occurred, eating, drinking, smoking, and chewing are prohibited in all station emergency response facilities until such time as habitability surveys indicate that such activities are permissible. c. Restricted areas and contaminated items will be returned to normal use when contamination levels have been returned to acceptable levels. Contamination control criteria for returning areas arid items to normal use are contained in the plant procedures. | |||
* 7. Decontamination of Relocated Personnel | |||
* Nonessential onsite personnel may be evacuated to an offsite relocation center or assembly area, as discussed in Section J. Radiological controls personnel at that location monitor evacuees and determine the need for decontamination. Existing and temporary facilities to limit contamination and exposure will be utilized and established at the site as necessary during an emergency situation. In the event that decontamination of. evacuees locally is not possible, personnel will be sent to designated locations for monitoring and decontamination. Provisions for extra clothing are made and suitable decontamin.ates are available for the expected type of contaminations, particularly with regards to skin contaminations . November 2016 K-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section L: Medical and Public Health Support This section describes the arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals sent from the station. 1. Offsite Hospital and Medical Services Hospital personnel have been trained and hospitals are equipped to handle contaminated or radiation injured individuals. Specifically, training of medical support personnel at the agreement hospitals will include basic training on the nature of radiological emergencies, diagnosis and treatment, and follow-up medical care. Station personnel are available to assist medical personnel with decontamination radiation exposure and contamination control. Arrangements, by letter of agreement or contract, are maintained by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station with a qualified hospital located in the vicinity for receiving and treating contaminated or exposed persons with injuries requiring immediate hospital care. Exelon Nuclear shall provide medical consultants to aid in any special care necessary at these facilities. Arrangements are also maintained by the corporate office with a qualified medical facility well equipped and staffed for' dealing with persons having radiation injuries and whenever necessary, such persons will be transferred to this hospital facility for extended specialized treatment. Exelon Nuclear will have available to the staff of this hospital, medical consultants who will provide the direction of the special care necessary for the treatment of persons having radiation injuries . These agreements are verified annually. Refer to section 11.P.4 for details. 2. Onsite First Aid Capability Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains onsite first aid supplies and equipment necessary for the treatment of contaminated or injured persons. In general, physicians or nurses are not staffed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, and as such, medical treatment given to injured persons is of a "first aid" nature. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has an industrial hygiene advisor. Additionally, the Radiation Protection Technicians at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station are experienced in control of radioactive contamination and decontamination work. Station personnel are also trained and qualified to administer first aid. At least two of these individuals are available on shift at all times. The functions of station personnel in handling onsite injured people are: 1) Afford rescue; 2) Administer first aid including such resuscitative measures as are deemed necessary; 3) Begin decontamination procedures; and 4) Arrange for suitable transportation to a hospital when required . November 2016 L-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Primary attention shall be directed to the actual factors involved in the treatment of casualties, such as: control of bleeding, resuscitation including heart and lung, control of bleeding after resuscitation, protection of wounds from bacterial or radioactive contamination and the immobilization of fractures. Station personnel provide an initial estimate of the magnitude of surface contamination of the injured and preliminary estimates of total body dose to the injured. Primary rapid and simple decontamination of the surface of the body (when possible and advisable) before transportation to a designated hospital may be carry out as directed or performed by Radiation Protection personnel. When more professional care is needed, injured persons are transported to a local clinic or hospital. Contaminated and injured persons are transported to a dedicated specified facility. 3. Medical Service Facilities Because of the specialized nature of the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injuries, Corporate Emergency Preparedness maintains an agreement with REAC/TS. REAC/TS is a radiological emergency response team of physicians, nurses, health physicists and necessary support personnel on 24-hour call to provide consultative or direct medical or radiological assistance at the REAC/TS facility or at the accident site. Specifically, the team has expertise in and is equipped to conduct: medical and radiological triage; decontamination procedures and therapies for external contamination and internally deposited radionuclides, including chelation therapy; diagnostic and prognostic assessments or induced injuries; and radiation dose estimates by methods that include cytogenetic analysis, bioassay, and in vivo counting. In addition to REAC/TS, the Station Annex may identify additional medical consultants, based on agreements with local hospitals, to support personnel training and medical response. 4. Medical Transportation Arrangements are made for prompt ambulance transport of persons with injuries involving radioactivity to designated hospitals. Such service is available on a 24-hour per day basis and is confirmed by letter of agreement. Radiation monitoring services shall be provided by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station whenever it becomes necessary to use the ambulance service for the transportation of contaminated persons. A qualified Radiation Protection person shall accompany the ambulance to the hospital. Additional Radiation Protection personnel may be contacted and dispatched to local hospitals to assist in the monitoring and decontamination of the injured victim and hospital and ambulance facilities and personnel. November 2016 L-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section M: Reentry and Recovery Planning This section describes the measures to be taken for reentry into the areas of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station which have been evacuated as a result of an accident. It also outlines the Exelon Nuclear Recovery Organization and its concepts of operation. 1. Reentry and Recovery a. Evaluating Reentry Conditions During an emergency, immediate actions are directed toward limiting the consequences of the accident to afford maximum protection to station personnel and the general public. Once corrective measures have been taken and effective control of the plant has been re-established, a more methodical approach to reentry is taken. This E-Plan divides reentry into two separate categories: | |||
* Reentry during the emergency phase of an accident is performed to save a life, control a release of radioactive material, prevent further damage to plant equipment or restore plant equipment. If necessary, this category of reentry may be performed using emergency exposure limits. Briefings, rather than written radiation protection procedures, may be used when making these entries. All reentry activities conducted during the emergency are authorized by the Station Emergency Director and coordinated by the OSC Director and the Radiation Protection Manager. | |||
* Reentry during the recovery phase of an accident is performed using normal exposure limits. Either normal procedures or procedures that consider existing as well as potential conditions inside affected areas are developed specifically for each reentry. Reentry activities during the recovery phase are authorized by the Recovery Director and coordinated by the recovery organization managers in charge of personnel making the reentry. The following items are considered when planning for any reentry: | |||
* Review of available radiation surveillance data to determine plant areas potentially affected by radiation and/or contamination. | |||
* Review of radiation exposure history of personnel required to participate in the accident mitigation or recovery operations. | |||
* Determination of the need for additional personnel and the sources of these additional personnel. | |||
* Review of adequacy of radiation survey instrumentation and equipment (types, ranges number, calibration, etc.). November 2016 M-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Review of non-radiological hazards and required protective measures (e.g., fire, electrical, Hazmat). | |||
* Pre-planning of activities and briefings for the reentry team that include the following: -Personnel knowledge requirements. -Methods and procedures that will be employed during the entry. -Specific tasks to be performed. -Anticipated radiation and contamination levels. -Radiation survey equipment and types and ranges of dosimetry required. -Shielding requirements and availability. -Appropriate communications. -Protective clo'thing and equipment requirements. -Access control procedures . -Decontamination requirements. -De-briefing requirements. Respiratory protection. | |||
* A review of security controls to prevent unauthorized or unintentional entry into hazardous areas. b. Evaluating Entry into Recovery The Recovery Phase is that period when major repairs are being performed to return the plant to an acceptable condition and the possibility of the emergency condition degrading no longer exists. Once the plant has been stabilized, contained and controlled, the Recovery Phase may be entered. It is the responsibility of the Station Emergency Director to classify Recovery after obtaining authorization from the Corporate Emergency Director . November 2016 M-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Establishment of Recovery can be conducted from any emergency classification level. However, it is possible that the lower classifications of Unusual Event and Alert will conclude with the event being terminated. There may be cases where certain EAL initiating conditions remain exceeded, but the station is under control and no further danger of degradation exists. In such a case, it may be appropriate to enter Recovery. Site Area and General Emergencies will require a Recovery Phase to be established prior to event termination. Exelon Nuclear may consult with/notify cognizant governmental agencies prior to declaring Recovery or event termination. Termination/Recovery considerations are contained in the implementing procedures to provide guidance for evaluating the risk of entering RecoverY without alleviating the intent of the Initiating Condition. The purpose of Recovery is to provide the necessary personnel to handle the long-term activities and to return the plant to an acceptable condition. The following conditions are guidelines for the determination of establishing Recovery (this is not intended to be a complete list and additional criteria may apply, depending on the specifics of the event): | |||
* The risk to the health and safety of the public has been mitigated. | |||
* Plant parameters and equipment status have been established and controlled . | |||
* In-plant radiation levels are stable or decreasing, and acceptable, given the plant conditions. | |||
* The potential for uncontrolled releases of radioactive material to the environment has been eliminated. | |||
* Environmental monitoring has been established. | |||
* The radioactive plume has dissipated and plume tracking is no longer required (the only environmental assessment activities in progress are those necessary to assess the extent of deposition resulting from passage of the plume). | |||
* Exelon Nuclear workers have been protected. | |||
* Any security threat has been neutralized, and/or plant security is under the direction of Exelon Nuclear personnel. | |||
* Adequate plant safety systems are operable. | |||
* The reactor is in a stable shutdown condition and long-term core cooling is available November 20.16 M-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* The fuel pool damage has been mitigated, or spent fuel damage has been contained and controlled. | |||
* Primary and/or secondary containment integrity has been established. | |||
* Plant systems and equipment are restored and/or replaced such that plant conditions are stable highly unlikely to degrade further. | |||
* Conditions that initiated the emergency have been contained, controlled, eliminated or stabilized such that the classification is no longer applicable. | |||
* The operability and integrity of radioactive waste systems, decontamination facilities, power supplies, electrical equipment and of plant instrumentation including radiation monitoring equipment. | |||
* Any fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition or threat to security no longer exists. | |||
* All required notifications have been made. | |||
* Discussions have been held with federal, state and county agencies and agreement has been reached to terminate the emergency. | |||
* At an Alert or higher classification, the ERO is in place and emergency facilities are activated. | |||
* Any contaminated injured person has been treated and/or transported to a medical care facility. | |||
* Offsite conditions do not unreasonably limit access of outside support to the station and qualified personnel and support services are available. It is not necessary that all conditions listed above be met; however, all items must be considered prior to entering the recovery phase. For example, it is possible after a severe accident that some conditions remain that exceed an Emergency Action Level, but entry into the Recovery Phase is appropriate. 2. Recovery Organization Once plant conditions have been stabilized and the Recovery Phase has been initiated, the Emergency Director may form a Recovery Organization for long-term operations. These types of alterations will be discussed with the NRC prior to implementation. | |||
* For events of a minor nature, (i.e. for Unusual Event classifications) the normal on shift organization is normally adequate to perform necessary recovery actions . November 2016 M-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* For events where damage to the plant has been significant, but no offsite releases have occurred and/or protective actions were not performed, (i.e. for Alert classifications) the station Emergency Response Organization, or portions thereof, should be adequate to perform the recovery tasks prior to returning to the normal station organization. | |||
* For events involving major damage to systems required to maintain safe shutdown of the plant and offsite radioactive releases have occurred, (i.e. for Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classifications) the station recovery organization is put in place. The specific members of the station recovery organization are selected based on the sequence of events that preceded the recovery activities as well as the requirements of the recovery phase. The basic framework of the station recovery organization is as follows: a. The Recovery Director: The Corporate Emergency Director is initially designated as the Recovery Director. The Recovery Director is charged with the responsibility for directing the activities of the station recovery organization. These responsibilities include: | |||
* Ensuring that sufficient personnel, equipment, or other resources from Exelon and other organizations are available to support recovery . | |||
* Directing the development of a recovery plan and procedures. | |||
* Deactivating any of the plant Emergency Response Organization which was retained to aid in recovery, in the appropriate manner. Depending upon the type of accident and the onsite and offsite affects of the accident, portions of the ERO may remain in place after initiation of the recovery phase. | |||
* Coordinating the integration of available federal and state assistance into onsite recovery activities. | |||
* Coordinating the integration of Exelon support with federal, state and county authorities into required offsite recovery activities. | |||
* Approving information released by the public information organization which pertains to the emergency or the recovery phase of the accident. | |||
* Determining when the recovery phase is terminated. b. The Recovery Plant Manager: The Station Manager or a designated alternate will become the Recovery Plant Manager. The Recovery Plant Manager reports to the Recovery Director and is responsible for: | |||
* Coordinating the development and implementation of the recovery plan and procedures. November 2016 M-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Ensuring that adequate engineering activities to restore the plant are properly reviewed and approved. | |||
* Directing all onsite activities in support ofthe station recovery effort. | |||
* Designating other Exelon recovery positions required in support of onsite recovery activities. c. The Recovery Offsite Manager: A senior Corporate Emergency Preparedness or Regulatory Affairs individual, or a designated alternate, is the Recovery Offsite Manager. The Recovery Offsite Manager reports to the Recovery Director and is responsible for: | |||
* Providing liaison with offsite agencies and coordinating Exelon assistance for offsite recovery activities. * | |||
* Coordinating Exelon ingestion exposure pathway EPZ sampling activities and the development of an offsite accident analysis report. | |||
* Developing a radiological release report. | |||
* Designating other Exelon recovery positions required in support of offsite recovery activities . d. The Company Spokesperson: A senior Exelon management individual is designated as the Company Spokesperson .. The Company Spokesperson reports to the Recovery Director and is responsible for: | |||
* Functioning as the official spokesperson to the press for Exelon on all matters relating to the accident or recovery. | |||
* Coordinating non-Exelon public information groups (federal, state, county, etc.). | |||
* Coordinating media monitoring and rumor control. | |||
* Determining what public information portions of the ERO will remain activated. The remainder of the recovery organization is established and an initial recovery plan developed at the end of the emergency phase or just after entry into the recovery phase. Consideration is given to recovery activity needs and use of the normal station organizations. Individual recovery supervisors may be designated in any or all of the following areas: | |||
* Training * | |||
* Radiation Protection | |||
* Chemistry November 2016 M-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning *standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Technical/Engineering Support | |||
* Nuclear Oversight | |||
* Operations | |||
* Security | |||
* Maintenance | |||
* Special Offsite Areas (Community Representatives, Environmental Samples, Investigations, etc.) 3. Recovery Phase Notifications When the decision is made to enter the recovery phase, all members of the Exelon ERO are informed of the change. All Exelon personnel are instructed of the Recovery Organization and their responsibilities to the recovery effort. 4. Total Population Exposure Total population exposure calculations are performed and periodically updated during the recovery phase of an accident. A method has been developed for estimating the total population exposure resulting from the accident from data collected in cooperation with the state and other federal agencies. Total population exposure is determined through a variety of procedures including: * | |||
* Examination of pre-positioned dosimeters. | |||
* Bioassay. * | |||
* Estimates based on release rates and meteorology. | |||
* Estimates based on environmental monitoring of food, water, and ambient dose rates. The state will be the lead agency in the collection and analysis of environmental air, soil, foliage, food, and water samples and for the generation of radiation monitoring reports. Exelon Nuclear environmental sampling activities will be coordinated with state efforts, as requested, and results shared with cognizant agencies . November 2016 M-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section N: Drill and Exercise Program This section describes the Drill and Exercise Program that Exelon Nuclear has implemented to: | |||
* Verify the adequacy of the Emergency Preparedness Program. | |||
* Develop, maintain, and evaluate the capabilities of the ERO to respond to emergency conditions and safeguard the health and safety of station personnel and the general public. | |||
* Identify deficiencies in the E-Plan and the associated procedures, or in the training of response personnel, and ensure that they are promptly corrected. | |||
* Ensure the continued adequacy of emergency facilities, supplies and equipment, including communications networks. The Exercise Cycle is defined as an eight year period of time. During each eight calendar year exercise cycle, the site shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements: | |||
* hostile action directed at the plant site, * | |||
* no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, * | |||
* an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, | |||
* implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. Exelon uses drill and exercise scenarios that provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses do not result from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action November 2016 N-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) J PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 1. Exercises | |||
* a. Biennial Exercises * | |||
* Federally prescribed exercises are conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station in order to test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods; to test emergency equipment and communication networks; and to ensure that emergency personnel are familiar with their duties. Exercises involving offsite agency participation, required under Section F.2.c & d to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, are conducted based on FEMA REP Manual guidance and the respective state and local emergency response plans. Partial participation means appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in the exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions to include protective action decision making related to Emergency Action Levels and communication capabilities among affected state and local authorities and Exelon Nuclear. Full participation exercises will include appropriate offsite local and state authorities and Exelon personnel physically and actively taking part in testing the integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at the plant. Additionally, full participation exercises will includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of state, local, and Exelon personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario . Where partial or full participation by offsite agencies occurs, the sequence of events simulates an emergency that results in the release of radioactivity to the offsite environs, sufficient in magnitude to warrant a response by offsite authorities. b. Off-Year Exercises An Off-Year Exercise is conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station during the calendar year when an NRG Evaluated Exercise is not scheduled. An Year Exercise shall involve a combination of at least two facilities in order to demonstrate at least two of the functions of management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision-making, or plant system repair and corrective actions. For Off-Year Exercises involving no or limited participation by offsite agencies, emphasis is placed on development and conduct of an exercise that is more mechanistically and operationally realistic. Players will be able, by implementing appropriate procedures and corrective actions, to determine the outcome of the scenario to a greater extent than when core damage and the release of radioactivity are prerequisites for demonstration of all objectives . November 2016 N-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c. Pre-Exercises Pre-Exercise Drills should be conducted prior to a Biennial Exercise where Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluation of state and local performance is expected. Pre-Exercise Drills may be conducted prior to Off-Year Exercises that only involve the utility. The Pre-Exercise is a training and experience tool for the participants to sharpen awareness a:nd practice skills necessary to accomplish specific E-Plan duties and responsibilities. Exercises provide an opportunity to evaluate the ability of participating organizations to implement a coordinated response to postulated emergency conditions. Exercises are conducted to ensure that all major elements of the E-Plan and preparedness program are demonstrated at least once in each exercise cycle. Each station shall conduct at least one off-hours exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. every exercise cycle. Weekends and holidays are also considered off-hours periods. Provisions will be made for qualified personnel from Exelon, federal, state, or local governments to observe and critique each exercise as appropriate. 2. Drills In addition to the exercises described above, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station conducts drills for the purpose of testing, developing, and maintaining the proficiency of emergency responders. Drills are scheduled on the Emergency Preparedness annual events plan, which contains provisions for the following drills: a. Communication Drills | |||
* Monthly -The capability of the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) to notify the state and local government warning points and EOCs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ are demonstrated. Also, the capability to notify the NRC is demonstrated using the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and the Health Physics Network (HPN) where available. | |||
* Quarterly -The capability to notify the NRC Region, FEMA Region, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and federal emergency response organizations as listed in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory are demonstrated from the EOF. Also, computer and critical communications equipment shall be functionally tested. Communications between states outside the 10 mile EPZ but within the 50-mile EPZ are tested by the host state. | |||
* Annually -The emergency communications systems outlined in Section F are fully tested. This includes (1) communications between the plant and the state and local EOCs and Field Monitoring Teams, and (2) communications between the CR, the_TSC, and the EOF . Each of these drills includes provisions to ensure that all participants in the test are able to understand the content of the messages. November 2016 N-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b. Fire Drills: Fire drills shall be conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station in | |||
* accordance with Station Technical Specifications and/or Station procedures. * | |||
* c. Medical Emergency Drills: A medical eme_rgency drill, involving a simulated contaminated individual, and containing provisions for participation by local support services organizations (i.e., ambulance and support hospital) are conducted annually. The offsite portions of the medical drill may be performed as part of the required biennial exercise. d. Radiological Monitoring Drills: Plant environs and radiological monitoring drills (onsite and offsite) are conducted annually. These drills include collection and analysis of all sample media (such as, water, vegetation, soil, and air), and provisions for communications and record keeping. e. Health Physics Drills: Health Physics Drills involving a response to, and analysis of, simulated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements within the plant are conducted semi-annually. At least annually, these drills shall include a demonstration of the sampling system capabilities, or the Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) objectives as applicable. f. Augmentation Drills: Augmentation drills serve to demonstrate the capability of the process to augment the on-shift staff with a TSC, OSC and EOF in a short period after declaration of an emergency. These drills are conducted using the following methods: | |||
* Quarterly, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station will initiate an unannounced off-hours ERO augmentation drill where no actual travel is required. The Midwest region's Corporate ERO shall also perform an unannounced hours ERO augmentation drill that may be conducted independent of, or in conjunction with, a station drill. | |||
* At least once per exercise cycle, an off-hours unannounced activation of the ERO Notification System with actual response to the emergency facilities is conducted by the station. The Midwest region's Corporate ERO need only participate once per cycle. g. Accountability Drills: Accountability drills are conducted annually. The drill includes identifying the locations of all individuals within the protected area . November 2016 N-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon-Nuclear 3. Conduct of Drills and Exercises Advance knowledge of the scenario will be kept to a minimum to allow "free-play" decision making and to ensure a realistic participation by those involved. Prior to the drill or exercise, a package will be distributed to the controllers and evaluators that will include the scenario, a list of performance objectives, and a description of the expected responses. For each emergency preparedness exercise or drill conducted, a scenario package is developed that includes at least the following: a. The basic objective(s) of the drill or exercise and the appropriate evaluation criteria. b. The date(s), time period, place(s), and participating organizations. c. The simulated events. d. A time schedule of real and simulated initiating events. e. A narrative summary describing the conduct of the scenario to include such things as simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities . f. A description of the arrangements for and advance materials to be provided to official observers. Prior approval by the appropriate station management is obtained for all drills and exercises conducted in support of the Emergency Preparedness Program. 4. Critique and Evaluation Drill and exercise performance objectives are evaluated against measurable demonstration criteria. As soon as possible following the conclusion of each drill or exercise, a critique is conducted to evaluate the ability of the ERO to implement the E-Plan and procedures. A formal written critique report is prepared by Emergency Preparedness following a drill or exercise involving the evaluation of designated objectives or following the final simulator set with ERO participation. The report will evaluate the ability of the ERO to respond to a simulated emergency situation. The report will also contain corrective actions and recommendations. Biennially, representatives from the NRC observe and evaluate the licensee's ability to conduct an adequate self-critical critique. For partial and full offsite participation exercises both the NRC and FEMA will observe, evaluate, and critique . Critique comments identified by participants during a training drill where objectives are not formally being evaluated will be reviewed and dispositioned by Emergency Preparedness, but do not require a formal report. November 2016 N-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 5. Resolution of Drill and Exercise Findings The critique and evaluation process is used to identify areas of the Emergency Preparedness Program that require improvement. The Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for evaluation of recommendations and comments to determine which items will be incorporated into the program or require corrective actions, and for the scheduling, tracking, and evaluation of the resolution to the items. Whenever exercises and/or drills indicate deficiencies in the E-Plan or corresponding implementing procedures, such documents will be revised as necessary. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during the Biennial Exercise, such that NRC, in consultations with FEMA, cannot find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises . November 2016 N-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section 0: Emergency Response Training This section describes the emergency response training that is provided to those who may be called upon in an emergency. It outlines the training provided by Exelon Nuclear to both its employees and offsite support personnel requiring site access. 1. Assurance of Training The E-Plan Training Program assures the training, qualification, and requalification of individuals who may be called on for assistance during an emergency. Specific emergency response task training, prepared for each E-Plan position, is described in lesson plans and study guides. The lesson plans, study guides, and written tests are contained in the ERO Training Program. Responsibilities for implementing the training program are contained in plant procedures, A description of the content of the training courses is given in TQ-AA-113. Exelon personnel who are assigned an E-Plan position will receive retraining per TQ-AA-113 at a frequency of once per calendar year not to exceed 18 months between training sessions. Offsite training is provided to support organizations that may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency. The following outlines the training received by these organizations: a. Emergency Preparedness shall annually train, or document an annual written offer to train, those non-Exelon Nuclear organizations referenced in the Station Annex that may provide specialized services during a nuclear plant emergency (e.g., local law enforcement, fire-fighting, medical services, transport of injured, etc.). The training made available is designed to acquaint the participants with the special problems potentially encountered during a nuclear plant emergency, notification procedures and their expected roles. Those organizations that must enter the site shall also receive site-specific emergency response training and be instructed as to the identity (by position and title) of those persons in the onsite organization who will control their support activities. b. Training of offsite emergency response organizations is described in their respective radiological emergency plans, with support provided by Exelon *Nuclear as requested. 2. Functional Training of the ERO In addition to general and specialized classroom training, members of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ERO receive periodic performance based emergency response training. Performance based training is provided using one or more of the following methods: | |||
* Familiarization Sessions: A familiarization session is an informal, organized tabletop discussion of predetermined objectives . November 2016 0-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Walk Throughs: Consists of a facility walk through to familiarize plant ERO personnel with procedures, communications equipment, and facility layout. Walk throughs also provide the opportunity to discuss facility activities, responsibilities and procedures with an instructor. | |||
* Drills: A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. Drills described in Section N of this plan are a part of training. These drills allow each individual the opportunity to demonstrate the ability to perform their assigned emergency functions. During drills, on-the-spot correction of erroneous performance may be made and a demonstration of the proper performance offered by the Controller. 3. First Aid Response Selected station personnel are trained in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear approved First Aid Program. First-Aid Teams will likely be augmented with additional personnel such as Fire Brigade Members and other personnel qualified to assist in the rescue. 4. Emergency Response Organization Training Program Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ERO personnel who are responsible for implementing this plan receive specialized training. The training program for emergency response personnel is developed based on the requirements of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E and position specific responsibilities as defined in this document. On-Shift emergency response personnel perform emergency response activities as an extension of their normal duties and are trained annually as part of their duty specific training. Additional Emergency Preparedness information is provided as part of the Station Nuclear General Employee Training. New ERO personnel receive an initial overview course that familiarizes them with the E-Plan by providing basic information in the following areas as well as specific information as delineated in the sections below: | |||
* Planning Basis | |||
* Emergency Classifications | |||
* Emergency Response Organization and Responsibilities | |||
* Call-out of Emergency Organization | |||
* Emergency Response Facilities | |||
* Communications Protocol/Emergency Public Information | |||
* Offsite Organizations November 2016 0-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Emergency response personnel in the following categories receive knowledge and/or performance based training initially and retraining thereafter once per calendar year not to exceed 18 months between training sessions. a. Directors, Managers and Coordinators within the station and corporate ERO: Personnel identified by the Emergency Response Organization Telephone Directory as Directors, Managers and Coordinators for the station and corporate EROs receive training appropriate to their position in accordance with the approved ERO Training Program. These personnel receive specialized training in the areas of: | |||
* Notifications | |||
* Emergenc;y Classifications | |||
* Protective Action Recommendations | |||
* Emergency Action Levels | |||
* Emergency Exposure Control Selected Directors, Managers, Coordinators and Shift Emergency Directors receive training in accordance with the approved ERO Training Program. Training in accident assessment sufficient to classify an event and to mitigate the consequences of an event are also covered . b. Personnel Responsible for Accident Assessment: The skills and knowledge required to perform plant stabilization and mitigation are a normal function of operations specific positions, as identified in Section B of this plan. Power changes and planned and unplanned reactor shutdowns are handled on a normal operation basis. Subsequent plant stabilization and restoration is pursued utilizing normal operating procedures. Licensed Operators receive routine classroom and simulator training to ensure proficiency in this area. 1) Active Senior Licensed Control Room Personnel shall have training conducted in accordance with the approved ERO Training Program such that proficiency is maintained on the topics listed below. These subjects shall be covered as a minimum on an annual basis. | |||
* Event Classification. | |||
* Protective Action Recommendations. | |||
* Radioactive Release Rate Determination. | |||
* Notification form completion and use of the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS). | |||
* Federal, state and local notification procedures as appropriate. November 2016 0-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) I __J | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Site specific procedures for activating the onsite and offsite ERO . To remove peripheral duties from the Operations shift, the following group of positions responsible for accident assessment, corrective actions, protective actions, and related activiti,es receive the training listed below: 2) Core Damage Assessment Personnel: During an emergency when core/cladding damage is suspected, a specialized group of trained individuals perform core damage assessment. At a minimum, personnel responsible for core damage assessment receive classroom and hands-on training in the following areas: | |||
* Available Instrumentation and Equipment | |||
* Isotopic Assessment and Interpretation | |||
* Computerized Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) and/or proceduralized assessment methods. c. Radiological Monitoring Teams and Radiological Analysis Personnel 1) Offsite Radiological Monitoring: Offsite radiological monitoring is performed by trained individuals who provide samples and direct readings for dose assessment calculations and dose projection comparisons . Personnel identified as members of Field Monitoring Teams receive training in accordance with the approved training program. Field Monitoring Team members receive classroom and hands-on training in the following areas: | |||
* Equipment and Equipment Checks | |||
* Communications | |||
* Plume Tracking Techniques 2) Personnel Monitoring: Personnel monitoring is performed by trained individuals who monitor station personnel and their vehicles for contamination during an emergency. Personnel Monitoring Team members receive classroom and hands-on training in the following areas: | |||
* Personnel Monitoring Equipment and Techniques | |||
* Decontamination Techniques for Personnel | |||
* Decontamination Techniques for Vehicles November 2016 0-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 3) Dose Assessment: Dose Assessment training includes the skills and knowledge necessary for calculation and interpretation of an offsite release and its impact on the environment under varying meteorological conditions. Individuals responsible for performing dose assessment are trained in the following areas: | |||
* Computerized Dose Assessment | |||
* Protective Action Recommendations | |||
* Field Monitoring Team Interface | |||
* Protective Action Guidelines associated with offsite plume exposure doses | |||
* Basic Meteorology d. Police, Security, and Fire Fighting Personnel 1) Local Police and Fire Fighting Personnel: The local Police and Fire Departments are invited to receive training as outlined in Part 1 .a of this section. 2) Security Personnel: Station security personnel are trained in accordance with training defined by the Nuclear General Employee Training (NGET) and Exelon Nuclear Security Program. 3) Fire Control Teams (fire brigades): Station fire brigades are trained in accordance with training defined by the Exelon Nuclear Fire Protection Program. Fire Brigade personnel are considered the primary members of rescue teams and will receive the appropriate EP training as part of their training program. Training also includes rescue of personnel from hazardous environments. e. Repair and Damage Control Teams: Operations, Maintenance and Radiation Protection personnel are trained as part of their normal job specific duties to respond to both normal and abnormal plant operations. Operations personnel are trained to: (1) recognize and to mitigate degrading conditions in the plant, (2) mechanically and electrically isolate damaged or malfunctioning equipment, (3) isolate fluid leaks, and (4) minimize transients. Maintenance personnel are trained to troubleshoot and repair damaged or malfunctioning electrical, mechanical, or instrumentation systems as appropriate to their job classification . November 2016 0-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Radiation Protection personnel are trained to assess the radiological hazards associated with equipment repair and instruct personnel as to the appropriate protective clothing requirements, respiratory protection requirements, stay times, and other protective actions specific to the conditions present. At least 50% of personnel from those departments, who are potential responders to the OSC as Damage Control Team members, are required to be qualified in the use of respiratory protection equipment. This includes in-plant supervision and craft/technicians for the following departments: | |||
* Operations | |||
* Radiation Protection | |||
* Chemistry | |||
* Maintenance (mechanical, electrical and l&C) f. First Aid and Rescue Personnel: First aid and rescue team members receive training as outlined in Part 3 of this section. g. Local Support Service Personnel: Local support service personnel providing assistance during an emergency are invited to receive training as outline in Parts 1.a and 1.b of this section. | |||
* h. Medical Support Personnel: Onsite medical personnel receive specialized training in the handling of contaminated victims and hospital interface. Offsite ambulance and hospital personnel are offered annual training in accordance with a program provided by Emergency Preparedness. i. Public Information Personnel: Corporate and station personnel responsible for disseminating emergency public information and responding to media and public information requests receive specialized public information training. j. Communications Personnel: ERO personnel receive training on communications protocol as a part of the initial Emergency Response Overview Course. Personnel using specialized communications equipment that is not part of their normal daily function receive initial and requalification training on the equipment. Personnel involved in notifications to offsite agencies receive specialized training in the notification process. 5. General, Initial, and Requalification Training Program Maintenance a. Station Departments and Emergency Preparedness share the responsibility for ensuring that the ERO receives all necessary training and retraining. In order to carry this out, responsibilities are assigned as follows: Corporate Responsibilities for Corporate ERO Personnel | |||
* Scheduling and conducting initial, retraining, and make-up classes. November 2016 0-6 EP-QC,-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear * | |||
* Acting as the sole contact point for ensuring attendance . Record keeping for the training courses, including dates of scheduled classes and non-attendance information. | |||
* Verifying that all emergency response personnel training records are current. | |||
* Ensure instructional materials are prepared and reviewed every two years. Station Responsibilities for Station ERO Personnel * * | |||
* Station management shall ensure the attendance of onsite personnel for training, including required E-Plan courses. The Station shall conduct onsite emergency personnel initial and retraining for station Emergency Response Personnel using approved lesson plans. The Station Training Department shall provide those shift personnel included in a continuing, training program an annual review of the following items as a minimum: -Assembly Areas -Emergency Response Facility assignment -Potential Hazards (radiological and non-radiological) -Anticipated actions including assembly requirements, protective equipment requirements (clothing, masks, SCBA, etc.), the use of Kl, emergency exposure limits and accountability requirements. b. Initial and Requalification ERO Training: The proficiency of emergency response personnel (as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E) is ensured by the following means: | |||
* Assigning persons to emergency duties that are similar to thqse performed as a part of their regular work assignment or experience. | |||
* Initial training and annual retraining on applicable generic and site-specific portions of the E-Plan and the corresponding implementing procedures. Individuals not demonstrating the required level of knowledge in initial or retraining classes receive additional training on the areas requiring improvement. Annual retraining is conducted once per calendar year not to exceed 18 months between training sessions. | |||
* Training on E-Plan changes shall be completed within one hundred twenty (120) days of implementation of the change. November 2016 0-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Participation in exercises and/or drills as developed or authorized by the Emergency Preparedness Department and designed to sharpen those skills that they are expected to use in the event of a nuclear emergency. All personnel assigned position specific responsibilities in the ERO are documented by inclusion in the Emergency Response Organization Telephone directory listing of positions and personnel. c. Nuclear General Employee Training (NGET): All personnel with unescorted station access are provided with initial orientation training on the notification and instruction methods used in the event of an emergency. Additionally, all badged individuals also receive initial orientation on the basic principles of radiological safety including the effects of radiation and the theory and use of radiation detection devices. Appropriate actions for escorted individuals shall be the responsibility of the escort. NGET provides initial and annual requalification training on the basic elements of the E-Plan for all personnel working at the plant. Specifically, these elements include: | |||
* Station emergency alarms and their meaning | |||
* Assembly areas | |||
* Site and Exclusion Area Evacuation procedures | |||
* Special precautions and limitations during an emergency | |||
* Purpose of the E-Plan November 2016 0-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section P: Responsibility for the Maintenance of the Planning Effort This section describes the responsibilities for development, review and distribution of the E-Plan and actions that must be performed to maintain the emergency preparedness program. It also outlines the criteria for insuring that personnel who perform the planning are properly trained. 1. Emergency Preparedness Staff Training The Emergency Preparedness staff is involved in maintaining an adequate knowledge of state of the art planning techniques and the latest applications of emergency equipment and supplies. At least once each calendar year each member of the Emergency Preparedness staff is involved in one of the following activities: | |||
* Training courses specific or related to emergency preparedness. | |||
* Observation of or participation in drills and/or exercises at other stations. | |||
* Participation in industry review and evaluation programs. | |||
* Participation in regional or national emergency preparedness seminars, committees, workshops or forums. | |||
* Specific training courses in related areas, such as systems, equipment, operations, radiological protection, or Problem Identification & Resolution (Pl&R) . 2. Authority for the Emergency Preparedness Effort The Site Vice President is responsible for the safe and reliable operation of the generating station. The issuance and control of this plan and the activities associated with emergency preparedness at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station shall be the overall responsibility of the Vice President, Fleet Support. This individual is assigned the responsibility for overall implementation of the E-Plan and station Annex. 3. Responsibility for Development and Maintenance of the Plan Each regional Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for the overall radiological emergency preparedness program associated with the operation of the nuclear power station and to administer the program to ensure availability of resources in the event of an emergency. The regional Emergency Preparedness Managers report to an EP Director who in turn reports to the Vice President, Fleet Support . November 2016 P-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * *-----PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The Emergency Preparedness Manager is assisted by regional corporate and Station Emergency Preparedness staff. Specific responsibilities include the following: Program Administration | |||
* Develop and maintain the E-Plan, Station Annex, implementing procedures and administrative documents. | |||
* Develop and maintain 50.54(q) evaluations for changes to EP documents. | |||
* Coordinate and maintain the EP Activities Schedule. | |||
* Develop and maintain working relationships and coordinate meetings with Federal, state and local agencies. | |||
* Ensure integration of plans between Exelon and offsite agencies. | |||
* Provide an opportunity to discuss Emergency Action Levels and the availability of Nuclear Oversight audit results relating to interface with governmental agencies. | |||
* Coordinate, negotiate and maintain agreements and contracts with offsite agencies and support organizations . | |||
* Obtain Letters of Agreement with medical facilities, and medical consultants specifically skilled in the medical aspects of radiation accidents and other medical consultants as might be necessary for the case of a person involved in a radiation incident. | |||
* Coordinate the development and annual distribution of the station's public information publication. | |||
* Coordinate and administer the Self Evaluation Program to monitor and evaluate the adequacy of the Emergency Preparedness Program. | |||
* Coordinate and support EP Self-Assessments, Audits and Inspections. | |||
* Ensure the documentation and resolution of adverse conditions in the emergency preparedness program discovered through drills, audits, etc. in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear Corrective Action Program. | |||
* Coordinate and develop Operational Experience responses. | |||
* Coordinate, document and review Performance Indicator data and reports. | |||
* Provide oversight of Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) evaluations during License Operator Requalification (LOR) Training. * ----Coordinate and conduct EP Event reviews and reports. November 2016 P-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Maintain adequate documentation/files to support EP activities . | |||
* Develop and manage the EP budget. | |||
* Maintain the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory. Drills and Exercises | |||
* Coordinate and maintain the EP Drill and Exercise Schedule. | |||
* Coordinate and conduct exercises and drills. | |||
* Coordinate N RC, FEMA, state, and local exercise scheduling and development activities. | |||
* Coordinate drill and exercise scenario development activities. | |||
* Develop and publish drill and exercise scenario manuals. | |||
* Coordinate and perform controller and evaluator functions for drills and exercises. | |||
* Coordinate response cells for drills and exercises. * | |||
* Develop and issue drill and exercise reports. | |||
* Facilities and Equipment | |||
* Provide maintenance and administration of the Alert and Notification System (ANS). | |||
* Provide maintenance of the ERO call-out system. | |||
* Ensure the Emergency Response Facilities are maintained in a constant state of readiness. | |||
* Coordinate and review the EP equipment inventories. | |||
* Coordinate and conduct maintenance and testing of the communications systems. | |||
* Maintain the EP computer applications. ERO Qualification and Administration | |||
* Develop and maintain ERO Lesson Plans, Examinations, and Qualification Cards . | |||
* Maintain EP NGET training content. November 2016 P-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* | |||
* PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Coordinate, schedule and conduct ERO qualification and requalification training . | |||
* Oversee the maintenance of ERO training records. | |||
* Maintain and coordinate publishing of the ERO Duty Rosters. | |||
* Provide adequate oversight and support for the training of offsite response personnel. | |||
* Coordinate conduct of Emergency Medical Assistance Program training. | |||
* Coordinate annual training for the media. The Plant Manager is responsible for implementation of the E-Plan at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The Plant Manager has the following responsibilities for maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Program: | |||
* Ensure the adequate staffing and training of station ERO members. | |||
* Schedule and conduct drills and exercises to maintain the state of readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Program. | |||
* Ensure the operational readiness of station facilities and communication systems for use during an emergency . | |||
* Ensure the operational readiness of station emergency equipment and supplies is maintained. | |||
* Ensure the emergency response procedures and the training and retraining of Station Emergency Response personnel are maintained. 4. E-Plan and Agreement Revisions The E-Plan, its' Annex, and supporting Agreements are reviewed on an annual basis. This review may also include applicable state and local emergency response agencies based on established agreements. The annual E-Plan review/update includes required changes identified during audits, assessments, training, drills, and exercises. The Emergency Preparedness Director is responsible for determining which recommended changes are incorporated into a plan or emergency procedure revision. In those years when the review does not warrant a revision, a letter to that affect will be issued. * .* ---** -. *-November 2016 P-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * *-----PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The E-Plan and its Annex shall be revised as needed and the most current approved revisions shall remain in effect so long as they are certified as current. Revisions to the E-Plan are reviewed by the Stations' Plant Operational Review Committee (PORC) prior to approval. Changes to the plan are made without NRC only if such changes do not result in a reduction in effectiveness of the plan per 10 CFR 50.54(q), and the plan as changed continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E. Proposed changes that reduce or have a potential to reduce the effectiveness of the approved plan are not implemented without prior approval by the NRC. | |||
* Proposed revisions to the E-Plan and Station Annex shall be completed in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear review and approval processes. | |||
* E-Plan and Station Annex changes shall be categorized as (1) minor/ administrative or (2) significant programmatic changes. Minor/administrative changes shall be implemented within 30 days of approval. Significant programmatic changes shall be implemented as soon as practical and within 60 days of final approval. | |||
* After review and approval, the E-Plan and Station Annex shall be: a) Reviewed by the Emergency Preparedness Manager and EP Director, or designee(s), and b) Approved for use by the Vice President, Fleet Support or designee. | |||
* The Implementing Procedures shall be developed and revised concurrent with the E-Plan and Annex, and reviewed every two years. Annually, each Letter of Agreement is reviewed and certified current in order to assure the availability of assistance from each supporting organization not already a party to the individual State Plan for Radiological Accidents. 5. E-Plan Distribution E-Plan manuals, the Station Annex and implementing procedures are distributed on a controlled basis to the Emergency Response Facilities. All controlled documents holders are issued revision changes upon approval. Selected Federal, state, and local agencies, and other appropriate locations requiring them are also issued copies. Procedures in place that control the revision of the E-Plan and require the use of revision bars and individual page identifications (i.e. section of plan, revision number, etc.). 6. Supporting Emergency Response Plans Other plans that support this E-Plan are: | |||
* NU_REG-1471, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Concept of Operations: ______ NR_C _Incident ___ ___ -------November 2016 P-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * --*--PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear | |||
* National Response Framework (NRF), Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex . | |||
* Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA). | |||
* The Iowa Emergency Plan. | |||
* Department of Energy, Region 5, "Radiological Assistance Plan" | |||
* INPO Emergency Resources Manual. | |||
* Nuclear Station Security Plans -Note: The Station Security Plan contains industrial security information that must be withheld from public disclosure under provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d). 7. Implementing and Supporting Procedures Appendix 2 of this plan contains a listing, by number and title, of those procedures that implement this plan during an emergency (EP-ANMW-11X series procedures). Additionally, administrative procedures that outline the steps taken to maintain the Exelon Emergency Preparedness Program have been developed (EP-AN MW-12X series procedures) and are listed in Appendix 2. 8. Cross Reference to Planning Criteria The Plan is formatted in the same manner as NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1 , "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants." The use of this format lends itself to uncomplicated comparison of the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1. 9. Audit/Assessment of the Emergency Preparedness Program To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), Exelon Nuclear Oversight shall coordinate an independent review the Emergency Preparedness Program to examine conformance with 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.54, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. lneluded in the audit/assessment are the following: | |||
* The E-Plan and associated implementing procedures. | |||
* The Emergency Preparedness Training Program including drills and exercises. | |||
* The readiness of the station Emergency Response Organization to perform its function. | |||
* The readiness of facilities and equipment to perform as outlined in the plan and p raced u res. | |||
* The interfaces between Exelon, the state, and county governmental agencies pertaining to the overall Emergency Preparedness Program. November 2016 P-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * --*--PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Results of this audit are submitted for review to Corporate Management and the Station Vice President. The Emergency Preparedness Manager ensures that any findings that deal with offsite interfaces are reviewed with the appropriate agencies. Written notification will be provided to the state and counties of the performance of the audit and the availability of the audit records for review at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. Records of the audit are maintained for at least five years. 10. Maintenance of Emergency Organization Telephone Directory Names and phone numbers of the Emergency Response Organization and support personnel shall be reviewed and updated at least quarterly . November 2016 P-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* -* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Appendix 1: References References consulted in the writing of this E-Plan are listed in this section. With exception of regulatory requirements, inclusion of material on this list does not imply adherence to all criteria or guidance stated in each individual reference. 1. 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans 2. 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors 3. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants 4. 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities 5. 6. 7. 8 . 9. 10. 11. 12. 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation 10 CFR 70, 73, and 100. 33 CFR 153. 40 CFR 110, 112, 116, 118, 302 and 355. 44 CFR 350. 44 CFR 401. 49 CFR 171 and 172. NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1 , November, 1980. 13. NUREG-0654, Supplement 1, "Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and Preparedness." 14. NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, "Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents." 15. NUREG-0396, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," Dec. 1978. 16. NUREG-0578, "TMl-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Term Recommendations." 17. NUREG-0696, Revision 1, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities November 2016 Appendix 1 Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* | |||
* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear 18 . 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, dated October 1980. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability, December 1982. NUREG 0728 -"Report to Congress: NRC Incident Response Plan." U.S. NRC Response Technical Manual {RTM-96) NEI 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels. EPA 400-R-92-001, October 1991, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents." 24. Exelon Nuclear Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR), NO-AA-10 25. INPO Emergency Resources Manual 26. "Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Manual," dated December, 1996 INPO 96-009. 27. "Federal Bureau of Investigation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation Regarding Threat, Theft, or Sabotage in U.S. Nuclear Industry," Federal Register, Vol. 44, p. 75535, December 20, 1979. 28. Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, Title 32, Chapter II, Subchapter b, Part 340, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." 29. "Voluntary Assistance Agreement By and Among Electric Utilities involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials," dated November 1, 1980. 30. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. 31. American Nuclear Insurers Bulletin #5B (1981 ), "Accident Notification Procedures for Liability Insureds". 32. Letter from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, NRC, to Dr. Donald F. Knuth, President KMC, Inc. dated October 26, 1981. 33. INPO Coordination agreement on emergency information among USCEA, EPRI, INPO, NUMARC and their member utilities, dated April {1988). 34. ANl/MAELU Engineering Inspection Criteria For Nuclear Liability Insurance, Section 6.0, Rev. 1, "Emergency Planning." ---*------__ 3?._ NRC RIS 2006-12, Endorsement of lnstit11te Gu_idanqe __ _ -"Enhancement-to Emerge-ncy Prep-are-dness Programs for Hostile Action." November 2016 Appendix 1 Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear 36. NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for | |||
* Security-Based Events." 37. NRC Information Notice 2009-01, National Response Framework * | |||
* November 2016 Appendix 1 Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Appendix 2: Procedure Cross-Reference to NUREG-0654 Criteria Planning Standard Procedure/Document NUREG-0654.11.A Assignment of Responsibility EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration (Organization Control) Letters of Agreement NUREG-0654.11.B Onsite Emergency Organization EP-AA-112, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) I Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-100, Control Room Operations EP-AA-112-200, TSC Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-300, Operations Support Center Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-400, Emergency Operations Facility Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-500, Emergency Environmental Monitoring EP-AA-112-600, Public Information Organization Activation and Operations EP-AA-112-700, Alternative Facility Operation EP-AA-130, 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, On-Shift Staffing Assessment NUREG-0654.11.C Emergency Response Support EP-AA-112-400, Emergency Operations Facility | |||
* and Resources Activation and Operations NUREG-0654.11.D Emergency Classification EP-AA-111 , Emergency Classification and System Protective Action Recommendations NUREG-0654.11.E Notification Methods and EP-AA-114, Notifications Procedures EP-MW-114-100, Midwest Region Offsite Notifications NUREG-0654.11.F Emergency Communications EP-AA-114, Notifications EP-MW-114-100, Midwest Region Offsite Notifications EP-AA-124, Inventories and Surveillances EP-MW-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests NU REG-Public Education and Information EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration 0654.11.G NUREG-0654.11.H Emergency Facilities and EP-AA-112, Emergency Response Organization Equipment (ERO) I Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Activation and Operation EP-AA-121, Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Readiness -*--EP-AA-121-1001, Automated Call-Out System --------------Maintenance -----------------------------November 2016 Appendix 2 Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Criteria Planning Standard Procedure/Document | |||
* EP-MW-121-1003, Mazon and Morrison Fire Alarm System Notification EP-MW-121-1004, Siren Change Documentation EP-AA-120-1006, EP Reportability-Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities EP-MW-121-1006, Contracted Siren Maintenance Oversight EP-AA-123, Computer Programs EP-AA-124, Inventories and Surveillances EP-MW-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests EP-AA-125-1004, Emergency Response Facilities & Equipment Performance Indicators Guidance NUREG-0654.11.1 Accident Assessment EP-AA-110, Assessment of Emergencies EP-AA-110-200, Dose Assessment EP-AA-110-201, On Shift Dose Assessment | |||
* EP-AA-110-301, Core Damage Assessment (BWR) EP-MW-110-1001, Data Point Tables EP-AA-123, Computer Programs NU REG-0654.11.J Protective Response EP-AA-113, Personnel Protective Actions EP-AA-113-F-07, MW Emergency Director -Site Assembly, Accountability And Evacuation EP-AA-123, Computer Programs EP-AA-113-F-03, Thyroid Blocking Agent Authorization. NUREG-0654.11.K Radiological Exposure Control EP-AA-110, Assessment of Emergencies EP-AA-113, Personnel Protective Actions NUREG-0654.11.L Medical and Public Health EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration Support UREG-0654.11.M Recovery and Reentry Planning EP-AA-115, Termination and Recovery and Post-Accident Operations EP-AA-120-1002, Offsite Readiness Evaluation NUREG-0654.11.N Exercises and Drills EP-AA-122, Drills & Exercises Program EP-AA-122-100, Drill and Exercise Planning and ----*--Scheduling ---------------------------EP-AA-122-.1 OO_-F_-01 through_F-21-,_ [Drill and Exercise Planning and Scheduling Forms] November 2016 Appendix 2 Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear | |||
* Criteria Planning Standard Procedure/Document EP-AA-122-200, Drill & Exercise Execution EP-AA-122-200-F-01 through F-05, [Drill & Exercise Execution Forms] EP-AA-122-300, Drill and Exercise Evaluation EP-AA-122-300-F-01 through F-04, [Drill and Exercise Evaluation Forms] EP-AA-125-1001, EP Performance Indicator Guidance EP-AA-125-1002, ERO Performance-Performance Indicators Guidance EP-AA-125-1003, ERO Readiness -Performance Indicators Guidance NU REG-Radiological Emergency TQ-AA-113, ERO Training And Qualification 0654.11.0 Response Training NUREG-0654.11.P Responsibility for the Planning EP-AA-1, Emergency Preparedness Effort: Development, Periodic EP-AA-1 O, Emergency Preparedness Program Review and Distribution of Description Emergency Plans EP-AA-11, Operating Stations Emergency Preparedness Process Description | |||
* EP-AA-1101, EP Fundamentals EP-AA-1102, ERO Fundamentals EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration EP-AA-120-1001, 1 OCFR50.54( q) Change Evaluation. EP-AA-125, Emergency Preparedness Self Evaluation Process | |||
* EP-AA-125-1001, EP Performance Indicator Guidance Emergency Response Facilities Telephone Directory | |||
* November 2016 Appendix 2 Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* PART Ill: Appendices . Appendix 3: List of Corporate Letters of Agreements Organization/ Agreement Type Department Of Energy (DOE) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site, REAC/TS (Letter on File) Medical Consultant Environmental, Inc. (P.O.) Radiological Environmental Monitoring GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, BWRs (Letter on File) BWR Emergency Support Landauer, Inc. (P .0.) Emergency Dosimetry INPO (Letter on File) Emergency Event Support Murray & Trettel, Inc. (P .0.) Meteorological Support Presence St. Joseph Medical Center (Letter on File) | |||
* Back-up Emergency Medical Facility | |||
* Teledyne Brown Engineering (P.O.) Bioassay Analysis/Radiochemical Analysis Fulton Technologies (P.O.) Emergency Met Tower National Foam, Inc. (P.O.) Fire Foam Supply November 2016 Appendix 3 Page 1 Exelon Nuclear EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Appendix 4: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Accident Assessment Activation Annual Acciqent assessment consists of a variety of actions taken to determine the nature, effects anq severity of an accident and includes evaluation of reactor operator status reports, damage assessment reports, meteorological observations, seismic observations, fire reports, radiological dose projections, in plant radiological monitoring, and environmental monitoring. (1) "ERO Activation" is the process of initiating actions to notify and mobilize Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel following an event classification under the emergency plan. (2) "Facility Activation" refers to the decision to consider a facility fully operational based on the minimum staffing required in the ERO staffing tables contained within the Emergency Plan and the ability of facility staffing and equipment to perform its designed function(s). Frequency of occurrence equal to once per calendar year, January 1 to December 31 . Assembly/Accountability A procedural or discretionary protective action taken for all persons within the security "Protected Area", which involves the gathering of personnel into pre-designated areas, and the subsequent verification that the location of these personnel is known. Assessment Actions Biennial Biennial Exercise November 2016 Those actions taken during or after an emergency to obtain and process information that is necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures. Frequency of occurrence equal to once per two calendar year periods. An event that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within an emergency plan. An exercise usually* involves participation of personnel from state and local governments, utility personnel, and may involve participation of Federal government personnel. Appendix 4 Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
* * | |||
* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Classification Command and Control Committed Dose Equivalent (COE) Corrective Action Damage Assessment Damage Control Decontamination Dedicated Communications November 2016 The classification of emergencies is divided into FIVE (5) categories or conditions, covering the postulated spectrum of emergency situations. The first four (4) emergency classifications are characterized by Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or event initiating conditions and address emergencies of increasing severity. The fifth, the Recovery classification, is unique in that it may be viewed as a phase of the emergency, requiring specific criteria to be met and/or considered prior to its declaration. When in Command and Control, the designated Emergency Director (Shift, Station or Corporate) has overall responsibility for Exelon Nuclear's emergency response efforts, including the nondelegable responsibilities of Command and Control. The Dose Equivalent to organs or tissues of reference that will be received from an intake of radioactive material by an individual during the 50-year period following the intake. Those emergency measures taken to lessen or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem, to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, or to reduce the magnitude of a release. Corrective actions include equipment repair or shutdown, installation of emergency structures, fire fighting, repair, and damage control. Estimates and descriptions of the nature and extent of damages resulting from an emergency or disaster; of actions that can be taken to prevent or mitigate further damage; and of assistance required in response and recovery efforts based on actual observations by qualified engineers and inspectors. The process of preventing further damage from occurring and preventing the increase in severity of the accident. The reduction or removal of contaminated radioactive material from a structure, area, material, object, or person. Decontamination may be accomplished by (1) treating the surface so as to remove or decrease the contamination; (2) letting the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of natural decay; and (3) covering the contamination. A communications link between two or more locations, access to which is limited to designated locations, and used only for the purpose intended. The communications link may be either telephone or radio. Appendix 4 Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Deep Dose Equivalent (DOE) Dose Dose Equivalent (DE) Dose Projection Dose Rate Dosimeter Dosimeter of Legal Record (DLR) Drill Early Phase November 2016 Exelon Nuclear The dose equivalent at a tissue depth of 1 cm (1000 mg/cm2); applies to external whole body exposure . A generic term that means absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent, deep dose equivalent, committed dose equivalent, committed effective dose equivalent, or total effective dose equivalent. The product of the absorbed dose in tissue, quality factor, and all other necessary modifying factors at the location of interest. The unit of dose equivalent is the Rem. The calculated estimate of a radiation dose to individuals at a given location (normally off-site), determined from the source term/quantity of radioactive. material (Q) released, and the appropriate meteorological dispersion parameters (X/Q). The amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation to which an individual would be exposed per unit of time. As it would apply to dose rate to a person, it is usually expressed as rems per hour or in submultiples of this unit, such as millirems per hour. The dose rate is commonly used to indicate the level of radioactivity in a contaminated area . An instrument such as a Dosimeter of Legal Record (DLR), self-reading pocket dosimeter (SRPD), or electronic dosimeter (ED) for measuring, registering, or evaluating total accumulated dose or exposure to ionizing radiation. Specific station type dosimeters used for monitoring personnel and the environment. A supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. The period at the beginning of a nuclear incident when immediate decisions for effective use of protective actions are required and must be based primarily on predictions of radiological conditions in the environment. This phase may last from hours to days. For the purposes of dose projections it is assumed to last four days . Appendix 4 Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold for a | |||
* Levels (EALs) plant Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL can be an instrument reading; an equipment status indicator; a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency class. Emergency Alert A network of broadcast stations and. interconnecting facilities System (EAS) which have been authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate in a controlled manner during a war, state of public peril or disaster, or other national or local emergency. In the event of a nuclear reactor accident, instructions/notifications to the public on conditions or protective actions would be broadcast by state or local government authorities on the EAS. Emergency Director Individual in Command and Control. One of the following: the Shift Emergency Director (Control Room), Station Emergency Director (TSC) or the Corporate Emergency Director (EOF). Emergency Notification The NRC Emergency Notification System hot line is a System (ENS) dedicated telephone system that connects the plant with | |||
* NRC headquarters in White Flint, Maryland. It is directly used for reporting emergency conditions to NRC personnel. Emergency Operations Designated location from which the Licensee Emergency Facility (EOF) Response Organization conducts the company's overall emergency response in coordination with Federal, State and designated emergency response organizations. Emergency Operating EOPs are step-by-step procedures for direct actions taken by Procedures (EOPs) licensed reactor operators to and/or correct an off normal plant condition through the control of plant systems. Emergency Operations A facility designed and equipped for effective coordination Center (EOC) and control of emergency operations carried out within an I organization's jurisdiction. The site from which civil I government officials (municipal, county, state, and Federal) exercise direction and control in a civil defense emergency. I Emergency Personnel Those organizational groups that perform a functional role during an emergency condition. Within Exelon Nuclear, emergency personnel include the Managers and Directors of the Emergency Response Organization, accident assessment personnel, radiological monitoring teams, fire | |||
* brigades, first aid teams and security personnel. November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) Emergency Preparedness Emergency Response Data System (EROS) Environmental Monitoring Essential Personnel Evacuation Exclusion Area Exercise Exercise Cycle November 2016 That area surrounding a nuclear station in which emergency planning is conducted for the protection of the public. With respect to protecting the public from the plume exposure resulting from an incident, the EPZ is usually an area with a radius of about 10 miles surrounding the facility. With respect to the ingestion exposure pathway, the EPZ is usually an area with a radius of about 50 miles. A state of readiness that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken upon implementation of the E-Plan in the event of a radiological emergency. EROS is a continuous direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. The use of radiological instruments or sample collecting devices to measure and assess background radiation levels and/or the extent and magnitude of radiological contamination in the environment around the plant. This may be done in various stages such as pre-operational, operational, emergency, and post operational. Essential personnel are those needed to achieve the goals and tasks as deemed necessary by the Station Emergency Director. The urgent removal of people from an area to avoid or reduce high level, short-term exposure usually from the plume or from deposited activity. An Exclusion Area is an area specified for the purpose of reactor site evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 100. It is an area of such size that an individual located at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated release would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure. An event that tests the integrated capability of a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency -preparedness plans and organizations. An eight-year period of time. Appendix 4 Page 5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Fission Product Barrier The fuel cladding, reactor coolant system boundary, or the containment boundary. Hazardous Material Health Physics Network (HPN) Line High Radiation Sampling System Imminent Ingestion Exposure Pathway Initiating Condition Integrated Drill Intermediate Phase November 2016 A substance or material which has been determined by the United States Secretary of Transportation to be capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in commerce, and which has been so .* designated in 49 CFR 172. In the event of a Site Area Emergency, the NRC HPN line will be activated by the NRC Operations center in White Flint, Maryland. This phone is part of a network that includes the NRC Regional Office and the NRC Operations Headquarters in White Flint, Maryland. This system is dedicated to the transmittal of radiological information by plant personnel to NRC Operations Center and the Regional office. HPN phones are located in the TSC and EOF. Post-accident sampling *capability to obtain and perform radioisotopic and chemical analyses of reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples. Mitigation actions have been ineffective and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur within 2 hours. The potential pathway of radioaCtive materials to the public through consumption of radiologically contaminated water and foods such as milk or fresh vegetables. Around a nuclear power plant this is usually described in connection with the 50-mile radius Emergency Planning Zone (50 mile EPZ). A predetermined UNIT condition where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency or such an emergency has occurred. A drill conducted in the year that a Biennial Exercise is not scheduled including at least two Emergency Response Facilities in order to demonstrate at least two of the functions of management and control of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision-making, or plant system repair and corrective action. The period beginning after the source and releases have been brought under control and reliable environmental measurements are available for use as a basis for decisions on additional protective actions . Appendix 4 Page 6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Joint Information Center A Corporate Emergency Facility activated by Exelon and staffed by Exelon, state, and Federal Public Information personnel. This facility serves as the single point of contact for the media and public to obtain information about an emergency. Late Phase Local Evacuation Low Population Zone (LPZ) Main Control Room Monthly Non-Essential Site Personnel Notification, Public November 2016 The period beginning when recovery action designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable levels for unrestricted use are commenced and ending when all recovery actions have been completed. This period may extend from months to years (also referred to as the recovery phase). The evacuation of personnel from a particular area, such as a room or building. As defined in 10 CFR 100.3, the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which contains residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious accident. The operations center of a nuclear power plant from which . the plant can be monitored and controlled. Frequency of occurrence equal to once per calendar month. Those personnel not needed for the continuing existence or functioning of the ERO. They are personnel not required to fill certain positions in the ERO. Identification of non-essential personnel is circumstance-oriented as determined by the Station Emergency Director. Public notification means to communicate instructions on the nature of an incident that prompted the public alerting/warning and on protective or precautionary actions . that should be .taken by the recipients of the alert. A state and local government process for providing information promptly to the public over radio and TV at the time of activating the alerting (warning) signal (sirens). Initial notifications of the public might include instructions to stay inside, close windows, and doors, and listen to radio and TV for further instructions. Commercial broadcast messages are the primary means for advising the general public of the conditions of any nuclear accident. (See Emergency Alert System.) Appendix 4 Page 7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Off-Site The area around a nuclear generating station that lies outside the station's "site boundary". Offsite Dose Calculation The ODCM presents a discussion of the following: Manual (ODCM) 1. The ways in which nuclear power stations can affect their environment radiologically 2. The regulations which limit radiological effluents from the nuclear power stations; and 3. The methodology used by the nuclear power stations to assess radiological impact on the environment and compliance with regulations. On-Site The area around a nuclear generating station that lies within the station's "site boundary". Owner Controlled Area Company owned property on which a Nuclear Station is located and may include Exelon Nuclear leased lands adjacent to that Nuclear Station. Operations Support Center (OSC) Personnel Monitoring Plume Exposure Pathway Population-at-Risk Potassium Iodide November 2016 An emergency response facility at the Plant to which support personnel report and stand by for deployment in an emergency situation. The determination of the degree of radioactive contamination on individuals, using standard survey meters, and/or the determination of dosage received by means of dosimetry devices. The potential pathway of radioactive materials to the public through: (a) whole body external exposure from the plume and from deposited materials, and (b) inhalation of radioactive materials. Those persons for whom protective actions are being or would be taken. In the 10-mile EPZ the population-at-risk consists of resident population, transient population, special facility population, and industrial population. (Symbol Kl) A chemical compound that readily enters the thyroid gland when ingested. If taken in a sufficient quantity prior to exposure to radioactive iodine, it can prevent the thyroid from absorbing any of the potentially harmful radioactive iodine-131 . Appendix 4 Page 8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Potential Projected Dose Protected Area Protection Factor (PF) Protective Action Protective Action Guide (PAG) Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) Public Alerting/Warning Puff Release November 2016 Mitigation actions are not effective and trended information indicates that the parameters are outside desirable bands and not stable or improving. That calculated dose that some individuals in the population group may receive if no protective actions are implemented. Projected doses are calculated to establish an upper limit boundary. That onsite area within the security boundary as defined in each station's Security Plan. The relation between the amount of radiation that would be received by a completely unprotected person compared to the amount that would be received by a protected person such as a person in a shielded area. PF = Shielded dose rate I Unshielded dose rate. Those emergency measures taken for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures to affected population groups. Projected radiological dose values to individuals in the general population that warrant protective action. Protective Action Guides are criteria used to determine if the general population needs protective action regarding projected radiological doses, or from actual committed (measured) dose values. Recommended actions to the States for the protection of the offsite public from whole body external gamma radiation, and inhalation and ingestion of radioactive materials. Access control and other recommendations concerning the safeguards of affected food chain processes may be issued by the States as PARs. The process of signaling the public, as with sirens, to turn on their TV's or radios and listen for information or instructions broadcast by state or local government authorities on the Emergency Alert System (EAS). A controlled containment vent that will be terminated prior to exceeding 60 minutes in duration and is less than the limit as defined in the Station Annex . Appendix 4 Page 9 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Quarterly Recovery Release Restricted Area Restricted Area Boundary Safety Analysis Report, Updated Final (UFSAR) Frequency of occurrence equal to once in each of the following four periods: January 1 through March 31; April 1 through June 30; July 1 through September 30; October 1 through December 31. The process of reducing radiation exposure rates and concentrations of radioactive material in the environment to levels acceptable for unconditional occupancy or use. A 'Release in Progress' is defined as ANY radioactive release that is a result of, or caused by, the emergency event. Any area, access to which is controlled by Exelon for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. For classification and dose projection purposes, the boundary is a 400-meter (1/4-mile) radius around the plant. The actual boundary is specified in the ODCM. The UFSAR is a comprehensive report that a utility is required to submit to the NRC as a prerequisite and as part of the application for an operating license for a nuclear power plant. The multi-volume report contains detailed information on the plant's design and operation, with emphasis on related matters. Semi-Annual Frequency of occurrence equal to once in each of the following periods: January 1 through June 30; July 1 through December 31. Shall, Should, and May The word "shall" is used to denote a requirement, the word "should" to denote a recommendation and the word "may" to denote permission, neither a requirement nor a recommendation. Shielding Any material or barrier that attenuates (stops or reduces the intensity of) radiation. Site Boundary The Nuclear Station's Site Boundary is described in detail in the ODCM. Site Evacuation The evacuation of non-essential personnel from the plant site. Source Term November 2016 Radioisotope inventory of the reactor core, or amount of radioisotope released to the environment, often as a function of time. Appendix 4 Page 10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
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* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Technical Support Center (TSC) Threshold Value Thyroid Blocking Agent Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) Unrestricted Area Vital Areas Vital Equipment Weekly A center outside of the Control Room in which information is supplied on the status of the plant to those individuals who are knowledgeable or responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations in the event of an emergency, and to those persons who are responsible for management of the on-site emergency response. Measurable, observable detailed conditions which must be satisfied to determine an EAL applicability. An agent which when properly administered to an individual will result in sufficient accumulation of stable iodine in the thyroid to prevent significant uptake of radioiodine. Potassium Iodide is such an agent. The sum of the deep dose equivalent (for external exposure) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposure) and 4 days of deposition exposure. Any area to which access is not controlled by the licensee for protecting individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, and any area used for residential quarters . Areas within the station security fence which contain vital equipment. Examples include Control Rooms, Containment/Reactor Buildings, Turbine Buildings and Electrical Equipment Rooms. | |||
* Any equipment, system, device or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Equipment or systems which would be required to function to protect public health and safety following such failure, destruction, or release are also considered to be vital. Frequency occurrence equal to once per calendar week: Monday through Sunday. Any abbreviation followed by a lower case's' denotes the plural form of the term . November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 11 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear ACRONYMS | |||
* ALARA ........................................................................... as low as reasonably achievable ANI .......................................................................................... American Nuclear Insurers ANS ..................................................................................... Alert and Notification System ARM .............................................................................................. Area Radiation Monitor BWR ................................................................................................. boiling water reactor COE ...................................................................................... Committed Dose Equivalent CFR ..................................................................................... Code of Federal Regulations CR ........................................................................ ....................................... Control-Room DEP ................................................................................. Drill and Exercise Performance DLR ........................................................................................ Dosimeter of Legal Record DOE ....................................................................................... U. S. Department of Energy | |||
* DOT ........................................................................... U. S. Department of Transportation EAL ............................................................................................. Emergency Action Level EAS ....................................................................................... Emergency Alerting System EMA .............................................................................. Emergency Management Agency ENC ........................................................................................... Emergency News Center ENS ................................... .................................. Emergency Notification System (NRC) EOC ........................................................... Emergency Operations (or Operating) Center EOF .................................................................................. Emergency Operations Facility EOP .............................................................................. Emergency Operating Procedure EPA ..................................................................... U. S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ ......................................................................................... Emergency Planning Zone ERF .................................................................................... Emergency Response Facility | |||
* FEMA ............................................................... Federal Emergency Management Agency FR MAP ........................................ Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 12 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear | |||
* FRPCC ................ , ............. Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee FSAR .................................................................................... Final Safety Analysis Report GET ....................................................................................... General Employee Training HPN .................................................................................. Health Physics Network (NRC) IDPH ........... : ................................................................ Iowa Department of Public Health IEMA .................................................................. Illinois Emergency Management Agency IEMD .................................................................... lowa Emergency Management Division INPO ...................................... ............................... Institute of Nuclear Power Operations JIC ............................................................................................ .-. Joint Information Center LOCA ......................................................................................... Loss of Coolant Accident LPZ ................................................................. : ................................ Low Population Zone MAELU ......................................................... Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters | |||
* mR .................................................................................................... ' ............. mi Iii roentgen NARS ..................................................................... : .. Nuclear Accident Reporting System NRC ...................................................................... U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRF .................................................................................. National Response Framework NWS ......................................................................................... National Weather Service OSC ........................................................................................ Operations Support Center PAG ............................................................................................. Protective Action Guide PAR ........................................................................... Protective Action Recommendation QATR. .......................................................................... Quality Assurance Topical Report R ................................................................................ * .......................................... roentgen RAFT ...................................................... Radiological Assistance Field Team (ILLINOIS) RAP ................................................................... Radiological Assistance Plan (ILLINOIS) | |||
* REAC ........................................ Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (ILLINOIS) RERP ................................................................. Radiological Emergency Response Plan November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 13 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) | |||
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear RMS ..................................................................................... Radiation Monitoring System | |||
* SAMG .............................................................. Severe Accident Management Guidelines SCBA ....................................................................... Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SHL. ..................................................................... , ...... State Hygienic Laboratory (IOWA) SPDS ........................................................................... Safety Parameter Display System STA ............................................................................................... Shift Technical Advisor TEDE ............................................................................... Total Effective Dose Equivalent TSC .......................................................................................... Technical Support Center UFSAR ................................................................... Updated Final Safety Analysis Report * | |||
* November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 14 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) * | |||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:50, 30 April 2018
| ML16355A036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/2016 |
| From: | David Gudger Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RS-16-245 | |
| Download: ML16355A036 (814) | |
Text
Exelon Generation 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 RS-16-245 www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50, Appendix E 1 O CFR 50.54(q){5). 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 72.44(f) December 9; 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Facility Operating License No. DPR-2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos.50-010, 50-237, 50-249, and 72-37 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69 NRC Docket Nos. 50-220, 50-410, and 72-1036 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265, and 72-53 Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Revisions In accordance with 1 O CFR 50.4(b)(5), "Emergency Plan and related submissions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) is submitting the Emergency Plan document revisions identified in the table below for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (Nine Mile Point), and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). [ Procedure No.* Revision Title EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3 5 Emergency Action Levels (or Dresden Station EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2 1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates EP-AA-1006 38 Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station EP-QC-1000 0 Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan --EP-AA-1000 (superseded 28 Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological for Quad Cities) Emer_aencv Plan The changes to the Emergency Plan documents were evaluated under the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(q) and were determined not to result in a reduction in the effectiveness of the Emergency Plans for Dresden, Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities. As noted in the table above, EP-AA-1000, Revision 28 was superseded for Quad Cities and a copy of the superseded document . I c:.... is not included in this submittal. This notification is being submitted within 30 days of .4 X Jf-__) implementation of the changes as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5). The changes continue to I' * } meet the applicable planning standards established in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Iv'] 5 SD Appendix E. tJ S Z,(p j\ !/v1 S> . /V tJf_.fL rJMs7.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Emergency Plan Revisions December 9, 2016 Page2 In addition, as required by 1 O CFR 50.54(q)(5), this submittal includes a summary analysis of the changes to the Emergency Plan Addendums for the cited plants (Attachment 1 ). This submittal also satisfies the reporting requirements associated with 10 CFR 72.44(f), which stipulates that within six months after any change is made to the Emergency Plan, the licensee shall submit a report containing a description of the changes to the Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation. Copies of the revised Emergency Plan documents are included in Attachments 2 through 5 of this letter. There are no regulatory commitments in this submittal. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Richard Gropp at (610) 765-5557. Resp{f ully, ... j J J. =4--) yu--David T. Gudger Manager, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: 1. 1 O CFR 50.54(q)(5) Procedure Change Summary Analysis 2. EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3, Revision 5, "Emergency Action Levels for Dresden Station" 3. EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates" 4. EP-AA-1006, Revision 38, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station" 5. EP-QC-1000, Revision 0, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan" cc: w/ Attachment 1 only Regional Administrator -NRC Region I Regional Administrator -NRC Region Ill Director, NRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, ONMSS NRC Senior Resident Inspector -Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Project Manager, NRR -Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC Project Manager, NRR -Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Illinois Emergency Management Agency -Division of Nuclear Safety A. L. Peterson, NYSERDA ATTACHMENT 1 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) Procedure Change Summary Analysis Change Summary Analysis Page 1 of 18 1 O CFR 50.54(g)(5) Procedure Change Summary Analysis Dresden Nuclear Power Station-Procedure/Title Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG) is submitting the following Emergency Plan Addendum revision for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden):
- EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3, Revision 5, "Emergency Action Levels tor Dresden Station" Description of Procedure EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3 describes the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) implemented at Dresden for entering Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs). Description of Changes The following changes were made to EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3 under this revision: 1. The EAL thresholds for MG1 (Prolonged Loss of all AC Power) and MS3 (Failure to Scram) were revised based on a change to the Minimum Steam Cooling Water Level (MSCWL). The change to the MSCWL is due to the Unit 3 use of ATRIUM fuel or a mix bf ATRIUM and OPTIMA fuel versus all OPTIMA fuel. A full-core or partial-core load of ATRIUM fuel changes the minimum active fuel length percentage covered to maintain Peak Centerline Temperature (PCT) < 1500 degrees Fahrenheit; therefore, the need for MSCWL change. The change in MSCWL was developed by the site and is documented in calculation DRE15-0015, Revision 1. 2. The Initiating Condition (IC) for the Hot Reference Matrix and Basis section for EAL MS3 was revised to use the phrase "RPV water level" versus "core cooling" since this is consistent with the guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels tor Non-Passive Reactors," for use with Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants. The phrase "core cooling" is terminology used for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plants. Using standard site wording is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 schemes and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. 3. The Basis section for EAL RC4 was revised to reference "Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs)/Target Rock SRV" versus "safety relief valves (SRVs)" as this is equivalent specific wording when referencing the generic term "safety relief valves (SRVs)." Using standard site wording is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 schemes and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Description of How the Change Still Complies with Regulations 1. The change to the EAL thresholds reflects a change in the plant design parameter for MSCWL. This change in the MSCWL set point is used in both Dresden Emergency Plan EALs MG1 (Prolonged Loss of all AC Power) and MS3 (Failure to Scram). The change is due to the use of ATRIUM fuel or a mix of ATRIUM and OPTIMA fuel versus all OPTIMA Change Summary Analysis Page 2 of 18 fuel. The minimum active fuel length percentage covered to maintain PCT < 1500 degrees Fahrenheit (Fafl-15) has changed from 66.7% for OPTIMA fuel to 85.6% for ATRIUM or a mix of ATRIUM and OPTIMA fuel. This value is multiplied by the Length of Active fuel in inches (Lfuel). For ATRIUM fuel, Lfuel is 145.24 inches. To determine the MSCWL in inches, the following equation is used: Lfuel(Fafl-15) + WLrpv-baf = MSCWL in inches Where Lfuel = Length of active fuel in inches Fafl-15 = Minimum active fuel length percentage covered to maintain PCT < 1500 degrees Fahrenheit WLrpv-baf =Water level at bottom of active fuel in inches 145.24 inches (85.6%) + (-286.69 inches)= -162.4 inches, this has been rounded to -162 inches for use in Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and EALs. This MSCWL change is documented in calculation DRE15-0015, Revision 1 and DEOP 100 RPV Control (Unit 3). Updating the EAL threshold values based on an approved technical basis change does not alter the meaning or intent of the basis of the approved EAL. 2. Planning Standard 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part: "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters; is in use by the nuclear facility licensee." In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.D.1 states in part: "An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall identify .the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class." The IC Hot Reference Matrix and Basis section EAL MS3 was revised to state "RPV water level" versus "core cooling" as this terminology is consistent with the guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6 for use for BWR plants rather that terminology used for PWR plants ("core cooling"). Revising the terminology does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. 3. Planning Standard 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4) states in part: "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee." In addition, the guidance NUREG-0654, Section 11.D.1 states in part: "An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall identify the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class." The Basis section for EAL RC4 was revised to reference "Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs)ffarget Rock SRV" versus "safety relief valves (SRVs)" as this is equivalent specific wording when referencing the generic term "safety relief valves (SRVs)." Using standard site wording is consistent yvith the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 scheme and Change Summary Analysis Page 3 of 18 does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Additionally, the regulations and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Description of Why the Change is Not a Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) 1. Updating the EAL threshold values EALs MG1 (Prolonged Loss of all AC Power) and MS3 (Failure to Scram) as noted above based on an approved technical basis change does not alter the meaning or intent of the basis of the approved EALs. Additionally, Emergency Preparedness (EP) requirements have not been deleted or minimized under this revision and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Therefore, the changes to the cited EALs do not result in a reduction in effectiveness in the Emergency Plan for Dresden. 2. Using standard site/reactor type terminology for EAL MS3 as noted above is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 schemes and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Additionally, EP requirements have not been deleted or minimized under this revision and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Therefore, this change would not result in a reduction of effectiveness of the Emergency Plan for Dresden. 3. Using standard site wording in Basis section for EAL RC4 as noted is consistent with the approved NEI 99-01, Revision 6 scheme and does not alter the meaning or intent of the approved EAL. Additionally, EP requirements have not been deleted or minimized under this revision and commitments to the NRG continue to be met. Therefore, this change would not result in a reduction of effectiveness of the Emergency Plan for Dresden. Change Summary Analysis Page 4 of 18 Procedure/Title Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon is submitting the following Emergency Plan Addendum revision for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (Nine Mile Point):
- EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates" Description of Procedure EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2 provides the Evacuation Time Estimates {ETEs) for the Nine Mile Point Station. The ETEs are calculations of the time to evacuate the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), which is an area with a radius of about 1 O miles (16 km) around a nuclear power plant. The ETEs are primarily used to inform protective action decision-making and may also be used to assist in development of traffic management plans to support an evacuation. The ETEs are developed to provide the time to evacuate 90 percent and 100 percent of the total population of the EPZ. The 90 percent ETE provides the time value that would typically be used to support protective action decisions. The ETEs are used as an information tool, and therefore, no minimum evacuation time must be achieved per the regulatory guidance. The ETEs should be used by licensees in the development of offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and by Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) when making offsite protective action decisions. The ETE studies are incorporated as an addendum to Nine Mile Point's Emergency Plan Annex, (i.e., EP-AA-1013) to satisfy 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, which provides direction that the content of the Emergency Plan contain the ETEs. Description of Changes The following changes are included in this revision to EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2:
- The Nine Mile Point ETEs were revised to implement the use of standard cardinal wind directions in the development and application of affected Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) in the ETEs for Nine Mile Point. This aligns the sectors in the Nine Mile Point and FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ETEs with the sectors suggested in the industry guidance, NUREG/CR-7002, "Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies." Specifically, the ETEs would be based on the 16 secondary-intercardinal directions (e.g., NNE, ENE). Note that the ETEs are applicable for both Nine Mile Point and the FitzPatrick (currently operated by Entergy) as they have the same EPZ. (Note: Exelon and Entergy have requested NRG approval to transfer the FitzPatrick license from Entergy to Exelon.) In September 2015, Exelon received a question from Oswego County, NY regarding ETE Table 6-1 of the KLD ETE report TR-521, {dated November 2012) for the "Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 1 O Miles" Regions -Regions R15 through R36. Specifically, Oswego County questioned why ERPAs 7, 14 and 15 would evacuate for Evacuation Region 16 (wind from 234° Change Summary Analysis Page 5 of 18 to 240°) when they are generally the same direction relative to the plant as ERPA 4, but ERPA 4 is closer to the plant and it does not evacuate, which was depicted on figure (i.e., Figure 1) in the ETEs. The ETEs for Nine Mile Point (and FitzPatrick) have been rewritten under this revision to reflect new wind ranges. The wind ranges have been revised to be equal sizes consistent with the examples provided in NUREG/CR-7002. As a result of this change, the total number of Evacuation Regions evaluated was reduced. Table 6-1 of the previous ETE report (KLD TR-521) identified 54 total Evacuation Regions. Table 6-1 of the revised ETE report (KLD TR-823) identifies 29 total Evacuation Regions. The previous number of Evacuation Regions is based on the unnecessarily narrow and inconsistently sized wind ranges used in previous ETEs at the site. These extraneous_ Evacuation Regions have been eliminated in the revised ETE report. However, the revised ETE report continues to address all of the Evacuation Regions suggested in NUREG/CR-7002 (i.e., an evacuation of the 2-mile radius, 5-mile radius, and full EPZ, as well as keyhole evacuations of the 2-mile radius and downwind to 5 miles for both staged and un-staged evacuation). The table below presents a summary of the differences between the present ETE study and the 2012 study. Resident Population Basis Employee Population Table -ETE Study Differences ArcGIS Software using 2010 US Census blocks; area ratio method used. Population= 41,887 Employee estimates based on information provided by Oswego County about major employers in EPZ. 1.09 employees per vehicle based on telephone survey results. Employees= 1,714 ArcGIS software using 2010 US Census blocks and projecting out to 2015 using 2014 population changes published by the US Census; area ratio method used. Population= 41,423 Employee estimates based on information provided by Oswego County about major employers in EPZ. 1.09 employees per vehicle based on telephone survey results. Employees= 1,714 Change Summary Analysis Page 6 of 18 Transit-Dependent Population Transient Population School, Preschool, and Day Camp Population Network Size Modeling Evacuation Cases Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of the telephone survey. A total of 1,881 people who do not have access to a vehicle, requiring at least 63 buses to evacuate. An additional 208 homebound special needs persons require transportation to evacuate (151 ambulatory and 57 wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 wheelchair vans). Transient estimates based upon information provided about transient attractions in EPZ, supplemented by observations of the facilities during the road survey, internet searches and from phone calls to facilities. Transients = 8,315 (including 2,349 commuting SUNY students). School population based on information provided by Oswego County Emergency Management. School enrollment = 15,377 (including SUNY commuter students) Buses required = 160 Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of the telephone survey. Dispatching a total of 76 buses to provide transit for 1,860 people who do not have access to a vehicle. An additional 208 homebound special needs persons require transportation to evacuate (151 ambulatory and 57 wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 wheelchair vans). Transient estimates based upon information provided about transient attractions in EPZ, supplemented by phone calls made to facilities from the previous 2012 ETE were reviewed. Transients = 8,495 (including 2,349 commuting SUNY Oswego students). School, Preschool, and Day Camp population based on information provided by Oswego County Emergency Management. Total enrollment= 15,735 (including SUNY Oswego commuter students and Ontario Bible Conference) Buses required = 156 1,057 links; 716 nodes 1,075 links; 729 nodes DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.8.0 DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.19.2 54 Regions and 14 Scenarios producing 756 29 Regions and 14 Scenarios unique cases. producing 406 unique cases. Change Summary Analysis Page 7 of 18 Evacuation Time Estimates for the entire EPZ, 90th and 1 OOth percentile Winter Midweek Midday, Good Weather: 2:55 and 4:00 Winter Midweek Midday, Good Weather: 2:55 and 3:50 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:35 and 3:40 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:30 and 3:40 The resultant ETEs have been nominally impacted. The table below summarizes the changes to the Average 901h Percentile ETE. Table -Comparison of ETE and PAR for Previous ETE Study and Revised ETE Study Average 1 901n Percentile ETE (hr:min) Evacuation Previous Revised Comment Region ETE ETE (KLD TR-(KLD TR-521) 823) 2-mile ETE 1 :30 1:30 Less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, PAR for RPSA would be to evacuate 2-mile immediately. Same result for Previous ETE and Revised ETE. Keyhole (2-5 1:39 1 :40 Less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, PAR for RPSA would be mile) to evacuate keyhole to 5-miles immediately. Same result for Previous ETE and Revised ETE. Full EPZ 2:41 2:37 Less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, PAR for RPSA would be to evacuate keyhole to EPZ boundary immediately. Same result for Previous ETE and Revised ETE. Staged Not effective Not effective Staged evacuation would not be Evacuation of implemented under any circumstances. Keyhole (2-5 Same result for Previous ETE and Revised mile) ETE. The major factors contributing to the differences between the ETE values obtained in this study and those of the previous study can be summarized as follows:
- The population has been updated using the 201 O US Census and projected out to 2015 using 2014 growth rates. EPZ population decreased by 1.11 % since the last study, which contributes to the slightly shorter ETE. 1 Excludes snow, special event, and roadway closure scenarios. Change Summary Analysis Page 8 of 18
- The number of regions considered was significantly reduced (i.e., 54 in the previous study versus 29 in this study) due to the omission of slivers (i.e., small pieces of an ERPA within the keyhole that have little or no population) and the use of the sixteen cardinal wind directions (i.e., 22.5° sectors in accordance with Federal guidelines, rather than the narrow sectors, as little as 4°, used in legacy PAR for the sites). Description of How the Change Still Complies with Regulations 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires that ETEs are developed in accordance with the Federal guidance (i.e., NUREG/CR-7002). In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.J further requires that Nine Mile Point's Emergency Plan contain time estimates for evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ. Additionally, the time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances shall be based on a dynamic analysis (time-motion study under various conditions) for the plume exposure pathway EPZ. 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E requires that the ETE analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations are performed using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC. Further guidance is provided by NUREG/CR-7002 and NUREG-0654, Appendix 4. These requirements are satisfied with KLD's Revision 1 to the Nine Mile Point ETEs and have been demonstrated in part by the satisfactory performance of NUREG/CR-7002, Table B-1 ETE Review Criteria Checklist. It is concluded that the Nine Mile Point ETEs are in compliance with the regulatory guidance of 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(1 O) as well as 1 O CFR 50, Appendix IV. As discussed above, all of the Evacuation Regions suggested in NUREG/CR-7002 have been considered in the revised ETE report. Furthermore, the critical ETE values for PAR development outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3 have not significantly changed. *
- It is noted that both the Revision 1 and Revision O ETEs utilized the same industry methodology from NUREG/CR-7002. This has been validated and documented through the completion of the NUREG/CR-7002 ETE Criteria Checklist provided in Appendix N of the ETE Report. It is understood that ETEs are used as an information tool, and no minimum evacuation time must be achieved per the regulatory guidance. The nominal changes identified with this revision do not impact conclusions made regarding Sheltering or Staging of Evacuees in the protective action process. Existing requirements and capabilities under the station's Emergency Plan have not been deleted or reduced as part of this revision and as such, the station's Emergency Plan continues to meet regulatory requirements. A review of existing regulatory commitments was made to ensure existing commitments continue to be met. Description of Why the Change is Not a Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) As previously discussed, it is understood that ETEs are used as an information tool, and no minimum or target evacuation time must be achieved under the regulatory guidance. A resultant change in any of the evacuation times between Revision O and Revision1 does not infer a reduction in effectiveness of the ETEs. The methodology for completing the ETEs Change Summary Analysis Page 9 of 18 continues to be provided by NUREG/CR-7002. All of the Evacuation Regions suggested in NUREG/CR-7002 have been considered in the revised ETE report. The critical ETE values for PAR development outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3 have not significantly changed. Existing requirements and capabilities under the station's Emergency Plan have not been deleted or reduced as part of this revision and as such, the station's Emergency Plan continues to meet regulatory requirements. A review of Nine Mile Point's outstanding commitments to the NRG was performed, which included commitments through EP-related regulatory correspondence and commitments made through the Exelon Standard Radiological Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures. There was no reduction in stated regulatory commitments based on this revision to the Nine Mile Point ETEs. Therefore, the changes to use cardinal wind directions in the revised ETE report does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the Emergency Planning for the Nine Mile Point. Change Summary Analysis Page 10 of 18 ProcedurefTitle Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Exelon is submitting the following Emergency Plan revisions for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities):
- EP-AA-1006, Revision 38, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station"
- EP-QC-1000, Revision 0, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan"
- EP-AA-1000, Revision 28, "Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan" (superseded for Quad Cities) Description of Procedure
- The Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan (i.e., EP-AA-1000), referred to the Standard Plan, outlines the basis for the response actions that would be implemented during an emergency. The planning efforts common to all Exelon nuclear stations are encompassed within the Standard Plan. Station Annexes and their associated Addendums contain information and guidance unique to each station. This includes facility geography, emergency response facility locations, and process and radiation monitoring instrumentation that provides a description of each station's emergency response capabilities, as well as any station unique commitments. The Station Annex is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the Exelon Standard Plan. Quad Cities announced the intent to permanently shut down the reactor in June 2018. In conjunction with the shutdown, Quad Cities intended to submit changes to the station's Emergency Plan under 1 O CFR 50.90 to seek relief from commitments and regulatory requirements no longer applicable to a permanently shutdown reactor. This revision to the Emergency Plan establishes the Quad Cities Emergency Plan as an independent Emergency Plan separate and de-linked from the Exelon Fleet Standardized Emergency Plan. This revision is necessary such that future changes to the Emergency Plan in support of decommissioning can be implemented without impacting the Standard Plan by inserting multiple Quad Cities specific exceptions. A new Emergency Plan pro6edure was created for Quad Cities to contain the regulatory commitments applicable to Quad Cities which are currently held in the Exelon Standard Plan. The new procedure is EP-QC-1000, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan." Description of Changes The changes primarily consist of deleting requirements which would not be applicable to a stand-alone Quad Cities' Emergency Plan (e.g., removing references to the Exelon Nuclear fleet, removing descriptions relating to States and agencies applicable to other Exelon stations). The changes do not introduce new or remove any existing regulatory requirements or commitments currently applicable to Quad Cities. Change Summary Analysis Page 11 of 18 A change is also being made to the Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan Station Annex (EP-AA-1006) to reflect the existence of the new Quad Cities' Emergency Plan (EP-QC-1000). References to the Standard Plan (EP-M-1000) are replaced with references to EP-QC-1 OQO, since the Standard Plan has been superseded for Quad Cities. Specific exceptions to the Standard Plan contained in the Annex are removed and incorporated in the EP-QC-1000 procedure. The changes to the station's Emergency Plan Annex do not introduce or remove any regulatory requirements or commitments currently applicable to Quad Cities. Following the implementation of this revision, the revised Quad Cities Emergency Plan will be independent of the Exelon fleet Standard Plan. The new Quad Cities Emergency Plan will form the regulatory basis for developing and submitting license amendment requests to the NRC to support the decommissioning effort. Any changes to the Emergency Plan commitments will not occur until the NRC has approved any license amendment requests and certain decommissioning milestones have occurred (e.g., fuel removed from the reactor, zirc fire milestone, and ISFSI). The changes are described in more detail below. Description of How the Change Still Complies with Regulations ' Administrative Changes EP-QC-1000 As part of the conversion of the Exelon Standard (EP-AA-1000) into the stand-alone Quad Cities Emergency Plan (EP-QC-1000), it is appropriate to delete general references to other Exelon nuclear sites since they are no longer covered by the Quad Cities specific procedure. This separation of the Quad Cities Emergency Plan allows future changes related to decommissioning to be made without affecting the other Exelon statio*ns' Emergency Plans. There is no intent to revise commitments currently maintained under the Emergency Plan with this revision and the changes do not impact compliance with EP regulations or regulatory guidance. Some of the specific changes are as follows:
- Change 1 -There are a number of changes that have been implemented that are editorial in nature (i.e., they do not change intent of the document). These changes do not impact the level of commitments made in the Emergency Plan or the ability to comply with applicable regulatory guidance. These include: o Changes in step numbers as a result of information which has been relocated or deleted. o Page number changes within the Table of Contents o Correction of spelling errors o Changes in the Table of Contents which reflect changes made within the Plan o Instances where the reference to the fleet Standard Emergency Plan was changed to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan o Instances where Exelon Nuclear was replaced by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station o Instances where "respective region" (e.g., Mid Atlantic) was deleted or replaced by "MW Region" _ o References to the multiple fleet "Annexes" were revised to reference only the Quad Cities "Annex" as well as references to other station Annexes Change Summary Analysis Page 12 of 18
- Change 2 -Section 1.A, "Purpose of the emergency plan," was revised to delete a reference to the other Exelon nuclear stations. Specifically, a sentence which describes that planning efforts common to all Exelon stations are encompassed within the Standard Plan.
- Changes 3 and 4 -Section 1.B, "Background," was revised to delete reference to the 12 other nuclear stations and to remove the sentence referring to "all generating stations operated by Exelon Nuclear list above."
- Change 5 -Section 1.J was revised to remove a discussion regarding station specific differences. The Quad Cities stand-alone Emergency Plan will not need to differentiate between station-specific differences within the Exelon fleet.
- Changes 6 and 7 -Section 11.A.1 was revised to address an editorial revision being made to the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan to remove references and discussions regarding agencies and organizations previously contained in the Standard Plan, which do not apply to Quad Cities. For Change 6, these include references to the State of Indiana (State Emergency Management Agency) and the State of Wisconsin (Department of Emergency Government), as well as references to other nuclear stations (i.e., Braidwood, Byron, and Dresden). For Change 7, these references include the State of Wisconsin, the State of Indiana, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the State of Maryland, the State of Delaware, the State of New Jersey, the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Virginia. These organizations do not have any relation to Quad Cities and can be deleted in conjunction with the development of the stand-alone Emergency Plan for Quad Cities. An additional revision is being made to change "IEMA Technical" to "IEMA" based on comments received from the State of Illinois. This revision is editorial and does not affect commitments under the Emergency Plan.
- Change 8 -Figure A-2 was revised to make a change to delete reference to the State Agency Department of Safety/Radiation Protection. The change is based on comments received from Illinois Emergency Management Agency in review of the Clinton Emergency Plan. Specifically, Exelon was informed that the Department of Safety/Radiation Protection was eliminated and references in the Emergency Plans should be removed.
- Changes 9 -11, 14, 29, and 45 -Table QDC B-1 was revised as part of the conversion to a Quad Cities stand-alone Emergency Plan, Table 2-1, "Minimum Staffing Tables," contained in the station Annex EP-AA-1006 was relocated to the new EP-QC-1000 Emergency Plan document. This table contains the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) position descriptions. The Minimum Staffing Tables are not being changed, but they are now incorporated in the EP-QC-1000, Section 11.B, which describes the station ERO. The change is necessary to locate the position descriptions for the Quad Cities ERO in one location.
- Change 12 -In Section 11.B.7 under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, the description of the location of the Emergency News Center (ENC) functions was intentionally generic to identify that that ENC functions could be located as part of the Joint Information Center (JIG) or the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), depending on the existing station logistics. As part of the separation of the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan, it is appropriate to specify the functions of the ENC as being part of the EOF function. The statement contained in Section Change Summary Analysis Page 13 of 18 11.B.7 which states: "The ENC function may be located at either the EOF or the JIC," is being revised to delete the reference to the EOF since the ENC reports to the EOF for Quad Cities.
- Change 13-Section 11.B.8 was revised to delete reference to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) sampling activities for the Exelon Mid-Atlantic stations. As a de-linked Emergency Plan for Quad Cities, the reference to the Mid-Atlantic stations is no longer appropriate in the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. *
- Change 15-Section 11.C.3 was revised to make an editorial change to relocate the sentence: "The equipment and analytical capabilities for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station's laboratories are listed in the station's E-Plan Annex," elsewhere within the paragraph. The change helps readability and provides a more logical sequence of information.
- Change 16-In Section 11.D.2 under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, EP requirements were sometimes written to address both single unit and multi-unit situations. Section 11.D.2 discusses EALs and states: "Classifications are based on the evaluation of each unit for multi-reactor sites." Since the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan is Quad Cities specific, the words "for multi-reactor sites," which was used to differentiate between Exelon reactor sites, is no longer required.
- Change 17 -Section 11.E.1 discusses ERO notification. Under the fleet Exelon Standard Plan, there is a discussion regarding "notification/classification for dual unit emergencies." Since the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan is Quad Cities specific, the words "dual unit facility," which was used to differentiate between Exelon single-reactor sites, is no longer required.
- Change 18-Step 11.E.3 was revised to delete the reference to the event logbook. The event logbook was a reference from the Exelon fleet Standard Plan and does not apply to Quad Cities. *
- Changes 19 and 36 -Section 11.E.6 was revised to correct the title of the FEMA REP Manual. The title was changed from FEMA-REP-1 O to FEMA REP Manual. The comment is editorial and does not affect commitments made under the Emergency Plan.
- Change 20 -Under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, Section 11.F.1 provided a general discussion on communications and notifications. The discussion summarized information applicable to the Exelon fleet leaving specific details contained in each station's Annex. With the separation of the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific statements in this section, which are not applicable to Quad Cities were removed. Specifically, for Section 11.F.1, the reference to communication systems being installed at stations other than Quad Cities is revised. The Quad Cities' communication systems are installed attheir respective Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). Additionally, the reference to microwave systems is not applicable to Quad Cities and is being removed.
- Change 21 -Section 11.F.1 was revised to remove reference to other Exelon stations and the differences in NARS systems. Once the station implemented a stand-alone Emergency Plan independent of the Exelon fleet, the reference to other Exelon regions/stations is not applicable. Change Summary Analysis Page 14 of 18
- Change 22 -In Section 11.F.1 under the Exelon Standard Plan, Section 11.F.1.d provided a discussion of the Exelon Northeast sites' ERO notification systems. The discussion stated that the description of the system is contained in the station Annexes. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet Standard Plan, specific statements in this section, which are not applicable to Quad Cities are being removed. Specifically, for Section 11.F.1.e, the reference to the Northeast station's ERO notification systems was removed.
- Change 23-Under Section 11.F.1, Section 11.F.1.f was revised to delete the sentence "The actual configuration of these systems may vary from station to station." The Quad Cities' Emergency Plan no longer covers other Exelon stations. This sentence no longer applies to the station-specific Emergency Plan.
- Change 24-Section 11.G.3 was revised to delete reference to other station's JICs. Specifically, the statement "Each station has a designated JIG" is deleted such that the Emergency Plan only refers to Quad Cities' JIG. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific statements in this section which refer to other JICs, which are not applicable to Quad Cities are being removed.
- Change 25-Section 11.G.4 was revised to remove guidance that does not apply to Quad Cities. Specifically, a change is being made to this step regarding the location of each JIG in the Exelon fleet. The locations of the JICs, other than Quad Cities, are being deleted because they are not applicable or required for the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan.
- Changes 26 and 34 -Section 11.H.1 refers to 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E,Section IV.E.8.d which states licensees shall maintain: "an alternative facility (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and collectively having the following characteristics: the capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security; the capability to perform offsite notifications; and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action." A change was made to Section 11.H.1 to identify the ERO Offsite Staging Area as an "Alternative Facility" consistent with the regulation language and references in the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan implementing procedures. A similar change is being made to Section 11.J.4 to identify the Alternative Reporting Center as the Alternative Facility. In 2011, the EP rulemaking initiative added additional requirements for the facility beyond being a staging area. The Alternative Facility is discussed in further detail in Section 5.1.7 of the station's Annex EP-AA-1006. This change is administrative in nature and reflects how this facility is referenced in the Emergency Plan. There are no changes to the function of the facility implemented with this change.
- Change 27 -Section 11.H.1 refers to 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(8) which requires that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained. Specifically, NUREG-0654, Section 11.H.1 states: "Each licensee shall establish a Technical Support Center and an onsite operations support center (assembly area) in accordance Licensee with NUREG-0696, Revision 1." Section H.1.c was revised to recognize that the Operations Support Center (OSC) may not be activated at all times as stated. In the case of a Hostile Action Event, site access may not be possible due to safety Change Summary Analysis Page 15 of 18 concerns. In those cases, members of the OSC would be staged at the designated Alternative Facility in accordance with the regulatory guidance implemented with the 2011 EP rulemaking initiative. While the OSC would not be "activated," OSC teams could be dispatched from the Alternative Facility to address urgent plant issues. The Emergency Plan statement has been amended to clarify the OSC would be activated at all times for a General Emergency and Site Area Emergency, "except in the case of a Hostile Action Event when site access is restricted."
- Change 28-Section 11.H.2 provides a description of the EOFs, including the location of the EOFs for each station in the Exelon fleet. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific statements in this section which are not applicable to Quad Cities are being removed. Specifically, the locations of the EOFs for stations other than Quad Cities are deleted from this section.
- Change 30 -Section 11.H.4 refers to 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(2) which states: "timely augmentation of response capabilities is available." In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.B.5 further states: "The licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency." The Quad Cities' station Annex (EP-AA-1006) Section 2.1 states that: "The Normal Shift Organization will be augmented, in an emergency, with designated/additional Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel within 60 minutes of classification." The new Emergency Plan EP-QC-1000, Section 11.H.4 provides a description of the activation process used at Quad Cities and utilizes the word "declaration." The word "classification" has replaced the word "declaration" to maintain consistency between EP-QC-1000 and EP-AA-1006. Quad Cities' Emergency Plan implementing procedures are written to require augmentation to occur within 60 minutes of classification. The change does not revise the point at which the augmentation starts because "classification" and "declaration" refer to the same point in time. This change is being made to align the language used in the Emergency Plan and the station Annex.
- Change 31 -Section 11.H.5 under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, provided a general discussion of the on-site monitoring equipment. The discussion summarized information applicable to the Exelon fleet leaving specific details contained in each station's Annex. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific descriptions in this section which are not applicable to Quad Cities were removed. Specifically, Section 11.H.5 was revised to delete reference to Oyster Creek's lack of seismic monitors. The section was also revised to delete reference to other Exelon sites since the revised Emergency Plan will apply solely to Quad Cities. Furthermore, the section was revised to recognize that the description of the some of the listed monitors may be included in the Emergency Plan rather than the Annex.
- Change 32 -Section 11.H.5 was revised to remove reference to tape transports for the seismic monitors as Quad Cities' seismic monitors due not use tape transports. The reference to tape transports applied to other Exelon stations under the Standard Plan.
- Change 33-Section 11.H.12 under the Exelon Standard Plan provided a general description for the onsite chemistry lab. The section is revised to provide station-specific detail for the site Chemistry lab location. Change Summary Analysis Page 16 of 18
- Changes 35 and 46 -Section 11.J.4 was revised to reflect the specific definition of a Drill Cycle for Quad Cities. The 2011 EP Rulemaking initiative revised the length of a Drill Cycle from six (6) years to eight (8) years. 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E states: "The first eight-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is conducted." Exelon's Standard Plan was written to reflect that the Drill Cycle would be six (6) years until the completion of the first evaluated Hostile Action Drill. Now that Quad Cities has completed its Hostile Action Based Exercise in 2014, it is appropriate to revise the language in the Emergency Plan to clearly state that the Drill Cycle is defined to be eight (8) years and the language explaining the start of the eight-year cycle as it relates to the Hostile Action Based Exercise can be deleted without affecting regulatory requirements or Quad Cities' commitments. An additional change was made to the Appendix 4, "Glossary of Terms and Acronyms," to revise the definition of the Drill Cycle to "an eight year perioc;:I of time."
- Change 37 -Section 11.N.2 was revised to reflect that there are no local support service organizations that support more than one station. Under the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, hospitals in close proximity to multiple stations such as Byron, Braidwood and Dresden would be able to take credit for Medical drills at other stations in proximity. Quad Cities' location does not allow them to take advantage of this credit, and therefore, the statement is being removed from the Emergency Plan.
- Change 38-Section 11.N.4 was revised to delete a discussion regarding the implementation of revisions to the Exelon fleet Standard Plan simultaneously at each of the Exelon stations. Since the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan is being separated and de-linked from the Exelon fleet Standard Plan, this paragraph is no longer applicable to Quad Cities. Future Emergency Plan changes for Quad Cities, following this revision, will not be related and will not affect the fleet Standard Plan.
- Change 39-Section 11.P.6 and Appendix 1 contain a listing of other plans and references that support the Exelon Standard Plan. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, there are some listed Emergency Response Plans, References, and Letters of Agreements (LOAs) that do not support Quad Cities. The referenced Emergency Plans that are being deleted from the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan include: o State of Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan o Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Radiological Emergency Response Plan o State of Maryland Radiological Emergency Response Plan o State of New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants -Annex B: Oyster Creek o Emergency Operations Plan for Ocean County While these Emergency Response Plans, References, and LOAs continue to support stations within the Exelon fleet, it is not correct or appropriate to list them in the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. As such, these listings were removed from the list.
- Change 40 -Step 11.P.7 was revised to delete reference to Emergency Plan implementing procedures which do not apply to Quad Cities. Specifically, the reference to "MA" Atlantic) procedures were removed. It is no longer correct or appropriate to list these procedures in a Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. Change Summary Analysis Page 17 of 18
- Change 41 -Appendix 1 (Reference section) of the Emergency Plan was updated to remove outdated industry references. The references do not denote or imply commitments to the documents and were only included as a source of additional information. The references are not specifically identified within the Emergency Plan.
- Change 42 -Appendix 2 (Procedure Cross Reference to NUREG-0654) was revised to delete procedures which do not apply to Quad Cities. With the separation of Quad Cities' Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific procedures in this section are identified to be applicable to stations other than Quad Cities (e.g., Mid-Atlantic). As such, they are being deleted from the Quad Cities Emergency Plan. The procedures being deleted include: o EP-MA-114-100, Mid-Atlantic State/Local Notifications o EP-MA-124-1001, Facility Inventories and Equipment Tests o EP-MA-121-1002, Exelon East Alert Notification System (ANS) Program o EP-MA-121-1004, Exelon East ANS Corrective Maintenance o EP-AA-110-302, Core Damage Assessment (PWR) o EP-AA-113-F-04, MA Emergency Director -Site Assembly, Accountability
- Change 43 -Appendix 3 (Letters of Agreement) was revised. Specifically, the column which designates the applicable stations for which the LOAs apply was deleted. There is no need to designate specific stations for the LOAs since the Emergency Plan only applies to Quad Cities. There were no changes to the actual LOAs and no LOAs were deleted from the Emergency Plan, so this change is considered editorial in nature.
- Change 44 -Appendix 3 (Letters of Agreement) was revised. Specifically, the names of the service providers have been updated to their current firm names. The Fire Fighting Foam Supplier has been changed from Red Alert Service to National Foam, Inc. Additionally, the names of the Provena St. Joseph Medical Center and GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy were corrected. The LOA referencing Westinghouse Electric Company was removed as it applies to a PWR only. No applicable LOAs were deleted from the Emergency Plan.
- Changes 47 and 48 -Appendix 4 was revised to delete acronyms which do not apply to Quad Cities. With the separation of the Quad Cities's Emergency Plan from the fleet, specific acronyms in this section are identified to be applicable to the Mid-West Exelon stations or other Exelon stations. As such, they are being deleted from the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan. EP-AA-1006 Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station
- Change 49 -The Quad Cities' Annex, Section 1, "Introduction," and the Section 2, "Organizational Control of Emergencies," were revised to recognize that the Exelon Standard Plan for the fleet is no longer associated with Quad Cities. The new Quad Cities Emergency Plan document EP-QC-1000 was created in its place and is specific to Quad Cities. As such, reference to the Standard Plan and other nuclear stations is no longer accurate. The paragraphs were revised to delete these references and reference to the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan was applied. Change Summary Analysis Page 18 of 18
- Change 50 -Section 2 was revised to include an additional change to recognize that the Table 2-1, "Minimum Staffing Tables" contained in the station's Annex EP-AA-1006 was relocated to the new EP-QC-1000 Emergency Plan document. The Minimum Staffing Tables are not being changed, but they are now incorporated in the EP-QC-1000, Section 11.B, which describes the station ERO. The change is necessary to locate the position descriptions for the Quad Cities' ERO in one location.
- Change 51 -Section 2 refers to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) which states: "timely augmentation of response capabilities is available. 11 In addition, the guidance in NUREG-0654, Section 11.B further states: "The licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency. 11 The Quad Cities' Annex Section 2.1 states that: "The Normal Shift Organization will be augmented, in an emergency, with designated/additional Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel within 60 minutes of notification." This is inconsistent with requirements contained in the EP-AA-1000 (EP-QC-1000), which requires augmentation within 60 minutes of classification (reference Sections D.1.a, D.1.b, H.4,). This change is to correct the inconsistency for augmentation of the ERO. The Quad Cities' Emergency Plan implementing procedures are written to require augmentation to occur within 60 minutes of classification.
- Change 52 -Section 5 was updated pertaining to the description of the isotopic counting system at Quad Cities to reflect the installation of a High-Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector. The previously used Geli detector used for gamma spectroscopy has been updated at Quad Cities to a HPGe detector. The upgraded HPGe detector performs the same function as the Geli detector. Before current purification techniques were refined, germanium crystals could not be produced with purity sufficient to enable their use as spectroscopy detectors, and consequently, germanium crystals were doped with lithium ions (Geli). Improved technology now allows high-purity germanium crystals to be used in gamma spectroscopy. The revision to the Emergency Plan reflects the use of the new detector.
- Change 53 -Section 5 was also updated related to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) chapter reference for the location of fixed continuous air samplers and Dosimeter of . Legal Record (DLR) locations. Description of Why the Change is Not a Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) The changes to the Quad Cities Emergency Plan were evaluated under the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.54(q). Existing requirements and capabilities under the Quad Cities' Emergency Plan have not been deleted or reduced as part of this revision, and therefore, the station's Emergency Plan continues to meet regulatory requirements. The changes continue to meet the applicable planning standards established in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. A review of existing regulatory commitments was made to ensure all existing commitments continue to be met. Therefore, the changes described do not constitute a reduction in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan for Quad Cities.
ATTACHMENT 2 Emergency Plan Addendum Revision EP-AA-1004, Addendum 3, Revision 5, "Emergency Action Levels for Dresden Station" 4f!J!1ffJWf
- Exelon Generation,,, EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 Revision 5 EXELON NUCLEAR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR DRESDEN STATION Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear REVISION HISTORY Rev. 0 December 2014 Rev. 1 November 2015 Rev. 2 February 2016 Rev. 3 June 2016 Rev. 4 August 2016 Rev. 5 November 2016 ' November 2016 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Section 1 : Classification of Emergencies , 1.1 General Exelon Nuclear Section D of the Exelon Nuclear Standardized Emergency Plan divides the types of emergencies into four EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS (ECLs). The first four are the UNUSUAL EVENT (UE), ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE), and GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE). These ECLs are entered by satisfying the Initiating Condition (IC) through meeting an Emergency Action Level (EAL) of the IC provided in this section of the Annex. The ECLs are escalated from least severe to most severe according to relative threat to the health and safety of the public and emergency workers. Depending on the severity of an event, prior to returning to a standard day-to-day organization, a state or phase called RECOVERY may be entered to provide dedicated resources and organization in support of restoration and communication activities following the termination of the emergency. UNUSUAL EVENT (UE): Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
- ALERT: Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE): Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE): Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. November 2016 DR 1-1 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOVERY: Recovery can be considered as a phase of the emergency and is entered by meeting emergency termination criteria provided in EP-AA-111 Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL (EGL): One of a set of names or titles established by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) for grouping normal events or conditions according to (1) potential or actual effects or consequences, and (2) resulting onsite and offsite response actions. The emergency classification levels, in ascending order of severity, are:
- UNUSUAL EVENT (UE)
- ALERT
- SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE)
- GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) INITIATING CONDITION (IC): An event or condition that aligns with the definition of one of the four EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS by virtue of the potential or actual effects or consequences. EMERGENCY ACTION *LEVEL (EAL): A pre-determined, site-specific, . . observable threshold for an INITIATING CONDITION that, when met or exceeded, places the plant in a given EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL. An emergency is . classified by assessing plant conditions and comparing abnormal conditions to ICs and EALs. Individuals responsible for the classification of events will refer .to the Initiating Condition and EALs on the matrix of the appropriate station Standardized Emergency Plan Annex (this document). This matrix will contain ICs, EALs, Mode Applicability Designators, appropriate EAL numbering system, and additional guidance necessary to classify events. It. may be provided as a user aid. The matrix is set up in six Recognition Categories. The first is designated as "R" and relates to Abnormal Radiological Conditions I Abnormal Radiological Effluent Releases. The second is designated as "F" and relates to Fission Product Barrier Degradation. The third is designated as "M" and relates to hot condition System Malfunctions. The fourth is designated as "C" and relates to Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions. The fifth is designated as "H" and relates to Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety. The sixth is designated H" and relates to ISFSI Malfunctions. The matrix is designed to provide an evaluation of the Initiating Conditions from the worst conditions (General Emergencies) on the left to the relatively less severe conditions on the right (Unusual Events). Evaluating conditions from left to right will reduce the possibility that an event will be under classified. All Recognition Categories should be reviewed for applicability prior to classification. November 2016 DR 1-2 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear The Initiating Conditions are coded with a two letter and one number code. The first letter is the Recognition Category designator, the second letter is the Classification Level, "U" for (NOTIFICATION OF) UNUSUAL EVENT, "A" for ALERT, "S" for SITE AREA EMERGENCY and "G" for GENERAL EMERGENCY. The EAL number is a sequential number for that Recognition Category series. All ICs that are describing the severity of a common condition (series) will have the same number. The EAL number may then be used to reference a corresponding page(s), which provides the basis information pertaining to the IC:
- Mode Applicability
- Basis Classification is not to be made without referencing, comparing and satisfying the specified Emergency Action Levels. A list of definitions is provided as part of this document for terms having specific meaning to the EALs. Site specific definitions are provided for terms with the intent to be used for a particular IC/EAL and may not be applicable to other uses of that term at other sites, the Emergency Plan or procedures. References are also included to documents that were used _to develop the EALs. References to the Emergency Director means the person in Command and Control as defined in the Emergency Plan. Classification of emergencies is a non-delegable responsibility of Command and Control for the onsite facilities with responsibility assigned to the Shift Emergency Director (Control Room Shift Manager) or the Station Emergency Director (Technical Support Center). Classification of emergencies remains the responsibility of the applicable onsite facility even after Command and Control is transferred to the Corporate Emergency Director (Emergency Operations Facility). Although the majority of the EALs provide very specific thresholds, the Emergency Dii-ector must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL is IMMINENT. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an IMMINENT situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the EAL has been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher ECL (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all ECLs. November 2016 DR 1-3 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear 1.2 Classification, Instrumentation and Transient Events Classifications are based on evaluation of each Unit. All classifications are to be based upon valid indications, reports or conditions. Indications, reports or conditions are considered valid when they are verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indications, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indication's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this is the need for timely assessment. Indications used for monitoring and evaluation of plant conditions include the normally used instrumentation, backup or redundant instrumentation, and the use of other parameters that provide information that supports determination if an EAL has been reached. When an EAL refers to a specific instrument or indication that is determined to be inaccurate or unavailable, then alternate indications shall be used to monitor the specified condition. During an event that results in changing parameters trending towards an EAL classification, and instrumentation that was available to monitor this parameter becomes unavailable or the parameter goes off scale, the parameter should be assumed to have been exceeded consistent with the trend and the classification made if there are no other direct or indirect means available to determine if the EAL has not been exceeded. The assessment of some EALs is based on the results of analyses that are necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL has been exceedeo (e.g., dose assessments, chemistry sampling, RCS leak rate calculation, etc.); the EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis. In these cases, the 15-minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the EAL to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available). Planned evolutions involve preplanning to address' the limitations imposed by the condition, the performance of required surveillance testing, and the implementation of specific controls prior to knowingly entering the condition in accordance with the specific requirements of the site's Technical Specifications. Activities which cause the site to operate beyond that allowed by the site's Technical Specifications, planned or unplanned, may result in an EAL being met or exceeded. Planned evolutions to test, manipulate, repair, perform maintenance or modifications to systems and equipment that result in an EAL being met or exceeded are not subject to classification and activation requirements as long as the evolution proceeds as planned and is within the operational limitations imposed by the specific operating license. However, these conditions may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50. 72. November 2016 DR 1-4 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear When two or more EALs are determined, declaration will be made on the highest classification level for the Unit. When both units are affected, the highest classification for the Station will be used for notification purposes and both Units' ECLs will be noted. Concerning ECL Downgrading, Exelon Nuclear policy is that ECLs shall not be downgraded to a lower classification. Once declared, the event shall remain in effect until no Classification is warranted or until such time as conditions warrant classification to Recovery. There may be cases in which a plant condition that exceeded an EAL was not recognized at the time of occurrence but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review), and the condition no longer exists. In these cases, an emergency should not be declared. Reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 are applicable, the guidance of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 and the Reportability Reference Manual, should be applied. 1.3 Mode Applicability The plant-operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs. If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant-operating mode is reached before the emergency classification can be made, the declaration shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred. For events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refueling, escalation is via EALs that have Cold Shutdown or Refueling for mode applicability, even if Hot Shutdown (or a higher mode) is entered during any subsequent heat-up. In particular, the Fission Product Barrier Matrix EALs are applicable only to events that initiate in Hot Shutdown or higher. If there is a change in Mode following an event declaration, any subsequent events involving EALs outside of the current declaration escalation path will be evaluated on the Mode of the plant at the time the subsequent events occur. 1.4 Emergency Director Judgment Emergency Director (ED) Judgment EALs are provided in the Hazards and Other Condition Affecting Plant Safety section and on the Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Matrix. Both of the ED Judgment EALs have specific criteria for when they should be applied. The Hazards Section ED Judgment EALs are intended to address unanticipated conditions which are not addressed explicitly by other EALs but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the ED to fall under specific emergency classifications (UE, Alert, SAE or GE). November 2016 DR 1-5 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear The FPB Matrix ED Judgment EALs are intended to include unanticipated conditions, which are not addressed explicitly by any of the other FPB threshold values, but warrant determination because conditions exist that fall under the broader definition for a significant Loss or Potential Loss of the barrier (equal to or greater than the defined FPB threshold values). 1.5 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold A fission product barrier threshold is a pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold indicating the loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. FPB thresholds represent threats to the defense in depth design concept that precludes the release of radioactive fission products to the environment. This concept relies on multiple physical barriers, any one of which, if maintained intact, precludes the release of significant amounts of radioactive fission products to the environment. The primary FPBs are:
- Fuel Clad (FC)
- Containment (CT) Upon determination that one or more FPB thresholds have been exceeded, the combination of barrier loss and/or potential loss thresholds is compared to the FPB IC/EAL criteria to determine the appropriate ECL. In some accident sequences, the ICs and EALs presented in the Abnormal Radiation Levels/ Radiological Effluent (R) Recognition Category will be exceeded at the same time, or shortly after, the loss of one or more fission product barriers. This redundancy is intentional as the former ICs address radioactivity releases that result in certain offsite doses from whatever cause, including events that might not be fully encompassed by fission product barriers (e.g., spent fuel pool accidents, design containment leakage following a LOCA, etc.). 1.6 Fission Product Barrier Restoration Fission Product Barriers are not treated the same as EAL threshold values. Conditions warranting .declaration of the loss or potential loss of a FPB may occur resulting in a specific classification. The condition that caused the loss or potential loss declaration could be rectified as the result of Operator action, automatic actions, or designed plant response. Barriers will be considered established when there are direct verifiable indications (containment penetration or open valve has been isolated, coolant sample results, etc) that the barrier has been restored and is capable of mitigating future events. November 2016 DR 1-6 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear The reestablishment of a FPB does not alter or lower the existing classification. Termination and entry into RECOVERY phase is still required for exiting the present classification. However the reestablishment of the barrier should be considered in determining future classifications should plant conditions or events change. 1.7 -Definitions CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under existing plant conditions. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fire. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) THRESHOLD: A pre-determined, specific, observable threshold indicating the loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. November 2016 DR 1-7 EP-AA.:.1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. NORMAL LEVELS: As applied to radiological IC/EALs, the highest reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding the current peak value. OPERATING MODES REACTOR MODE SWITCH POSITION (1) Power Operation: (2) Startup: (3) Hot Shutdown <a>: (4) Cold Shutdown <a>: (5) Refueling (b): Run Refuel (a) or Startup/Hot Standby Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown or Refuel TEMP N/A N/A > 212° F :::; 212° F N/A (D) Defueled: All reactor fuel removed from reactor pressure vessel (full core off load during refueling or extended outage). (a) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. (b) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned. Hot Matrix -applies in modes (1 ), (2), and (3) Cold Matrix -applies in modes (4), (5), and (D) OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station and owned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for official business. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. November 2016 DR 1-8 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION. UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visua.1 impact of the. damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure. November 2016 DR 1-9 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action Level Technical Basis Page Index General Site Area Alert Unusual Event EAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg. RG1 2-25 RS1 2-27 RA1 2-29 RU1 2-32 RG2 2-35 RS2 2-36 RA2 2-37 RU2 2-40 RA3 2-43 RU3 2-47 FG1 2-48 FS1 2-49 FA1 2-50 Fuel Clad RCS Containment FC1 2-51 FC2 2-52 RC2 2-57 CT2 2-65 RC3 2-59 CT3 2-66 RC4 2-60 FC5 2-55 RCS 2-63 CT5 2-68 CT6 2-69 FC? 2-56 RC? 2-64 CT? 2-72 MG1 2-73 MS1 2-75 MA1 2-77 MU1 2-79 MG2 2-80 MS2 2-82 MS3 2-83 MA3 2-85 MU3 2-87 MA4 2-90 MU4 2-92 MA5 2-94 MU6 2-97 MU? 2-99 .. CA1 2-101 CU1 2-103 CA2 2-105 CU3 2-108 CU4 2-110 CA5 2-112 CU5 2-115 CG6 2-117 CS6 2-121 CA6 2-124 CU6 2-126 HG1 2-129 HS1 2-131 HA1 2-133 HU1 2-136 HS2 2-138 HA2 2-140 HU3 2-141 HU4 2-145 HA5 2-147 HU6 2-150 HG? 2-153 HS? 2-154 HA? 2-155 HU? 2-156 E-HU1 2-157 November 2016 DR 1-10 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev 5)
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG1 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Notes: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+09 uCl/sec for<: 15 minutes (as determined by DDP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 1000 mRem TEOE OR b. > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continue for<: 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation.
- RS1 Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid COE. Emergency Action Level!EAL): Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. *
- 1. 2. 3. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+OB uCi/sec for<: 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 100 mRem TEOE OR b. > 500 mRem COE Thyroid OR Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continue for<: 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. ALERT RA1 Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDEor 50 mrem thyroid COE.
- Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT RU1 Any rele.ase of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment greater than 2 times the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.
- Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that
- a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification
- 1. 2. 3. 4. flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+07 uCilsec for<: 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 10 mRem TEDE OR b. > 50 mRem COE Thyroid Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary OR a. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposure OR b. 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposure Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates > 10 mR/hr are expected to continue for<: 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. 1. Reading on ANY of the following effluent monitors> 2 times alarm setpoint established by a current radioactive release discharge permit for:!:: 60 minutes. OR Radwaste Effluent Monitor 2/3-2001-948 OR Discharge Permit specified monitor 2. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.34 E+05 uCi/sec for<: 60 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates> 2 times OOCM Limit with a release duration of<: 60 minutes. Modes. 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-1 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG2 Spent fuel pool level cannot be [§ restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Levels (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Table R1 Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitors
- Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2( 4)
- Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor RS2 Spent fuel pool level at 0.60 ft. [§ as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) Emergency Action Level !EAL): Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Table R2 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy
- Main Control Room (Unit 2 ARM Station #22)
- Central Alarm Station -(by survey) Table R3 Areas with Entrv Related Mode Applicability Reactor Building 517' elevation
- MCC 28-1 area
- MCC 29-1 area
- MCC 38-1 area
- MCC 39-1 area
- CRD 25 valve area 545' elevation
- Bus 23-1 area
- Bus 24-1 area
- Bus 33-1 area
- Bus 34-1 area RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation
- 250VDC MCC 2A area
- 250VDC MCC 28 area
- 250VDC MCC 3A area
- 250VDC MCC 38 area 589' elevation
- Isolation Condenser Floor 2(3) Cribhouse 2&3 Turbine Building 495' elevation 2(3) CRD Pump Area 534' elevation
- Bus23 area
- Bus24 area 538' elevation *Bus 33 area *Bus 34 area 2 Modes 3, 4, and 5 RA2 Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level fEAU: 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. OR 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity , from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R1 Radiation *Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr. OR 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10.20 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). RAJ Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. Emergencv Action Level <EAU: Note: If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R3 was already inoperable, or out of service. before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted 1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the areas contained in Table R2. OR 2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to any of the areas contained in Table R3. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng *o -Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-2 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT RU2 Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: 1. a. UNPLANNED waler level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:
- Refueling Cavity water level < 466 in. (Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrument LI 2(3)-263-114) OR Spent Fuel Pool water level < 19 ft. above the fuel (< 33 ft. 9 in. indicated level). OR
- Indication cir report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. AND b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitors in Table R1. RU3 Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Emergency Action Level <EAU: 1. Offgas system radiation monitor HI-HI alarm. OR 2. Specific coolant activity> 4.0 µCi/gm Dose equivalent 1-131. HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Sub-Category 1. RCS Activity 2. RPVWater Level 3. Primary Loss Coolant activity> 300 pCilgm Dose Equivalent 1-131. 1. Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. FC -Fuel Clad Potential *Loss None 2. RPV water level 9!!!!Q! be restored and maintained> -143 Inches (TAF) OR 3. RPV water level cannot be determined. Containment None None Pressure/Conditions 4.RCS Leak Rate 5.Primary Containment Radiation 6.Primary Containment Isolation Failure 7. Emergency Director Judgment None Drywall radiation monitor reading > 6.70 E+02 R/hr (670 R/hr). None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. None None None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. RC -Reactor Coolant System CT
- Containment Loss None 1. RPV water be restored and maintained> -143 Inches (TAF) OR 2. RPV water level 9!.!m..Q! be determined. 1. DryweJJ pressure >2.0 psig. AND 2. Drywell pressure rise is due to RCS leakage 1. UNISOLABLE Main Steam Line (MSL), Isolation Condenser, HPCI, Feedwater, or RWCU line break. OR 2. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required. Drywell radiation monitor reading > 100R/hr (>1.00 E+02 R/hr). None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCS Barrier. Potential Loss None None None 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following: a. Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Loss None None 1. UNPLANNED rapid drop in Drywell pressure following Drywell pressure rise. OR 2. Drywall pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions. Normal operating levels. None OR b. Secondary Containment area radiation level > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Normal operating level. None None None ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. 1. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primary containment isolation signal. OR 2. Intentional Primary Containment venting/purging per EOPs or SAMGs due to accident conditions. OR 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1, Maximum Safe operating levels. ANY Condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Containment Barrier. Potential Loss None Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. 3. Drywell pressure 62 psig and rising. OR 4. a. Drywall or torus hydrogen concentration AND b. Drywall or torus oxygen concentration OR 5. Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig.M) exceeded. None Drywell radiation monitor reading > 1.60 E+03 R/hr (1600 R/hr) None ANY Condition in the Opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled November 2016 DR2-3 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY System Malfunction D. 0 c 'O Ill Ill .3 MG1 Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1 Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. EITHER of th.e following: a. Restoration of at least one unit ECCS bus in < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely. OR b. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained: (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches MG2 Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3) and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Voltage is < 105 voe on 125 voe battery buses #2 and #3. AND 4. ALL AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost for ?_ 15 minutes. MS1 Loss of all Off-site and On-Site AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC Power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Failure to restore power to at least one ECCS bus in < 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. MS2 Loss of all Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is < 105 voe on 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3 for?_ 15 minutes. MA1 ALERT Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only one of the following power sources for?_ 15 minutes.
- Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32)
- Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31)
- Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3)
- Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3
- Unit crosstie breakers AND 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-4 MU1 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to unit ECCS buses for?_ 15 minutes. I HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY System Malfunction 2! ..:! "iii IL (/) II. a: Ul c: 0 :; u '5 .E E 0 0 a: e 'E 0 u Table M1 Control Room Parameters Reactor Power RPV Water .Level RPV Pressure Primary Containment Pressure Torus Level Torus Temperature Modes. 1 -Power Operalion 2-Startup HOT MATRIX November 2016 SITE AREA EMERGENCY MS3 Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or RCS heat removaL Emergency Action Level !EAL): 1. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power? 6%. AND 2. ALL manual I ARI actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful as indicated by Reactor Power > 6%. AND 3. EITHER ot'the following conditions exist:
- RPV water level £l!.!!.!!.!1! be restored and maintained: (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches OR
- Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig. M) exceeded. Table M2 Significant Transients Turbine Trip Reactor Scram ECCS Activation Recirc. Runback > 25% Reactor Power Change Thermal Power oscillations > 10% Reactor Power Change ALERT MA3 Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. Emergency Action Level !EAL): MU3 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core. and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. Note: A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually 1. driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. a. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. 1. Automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 6%. AND 2. Manual I ARI actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. MA4 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room for;::: 15 minutes. AND 2. ANY Table M2 transient in progress. AND b. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power OR 2. a. Manual scram did not shutdown the reactor a.s indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND b. EITHER of the following: 1. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor 6%. OR 2. Subsequent automatic scram I ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor 6%. MU4 UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Emergencv Action Level !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room for;::: 15 minutes. 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX DR2-5 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT System Malfunction MAS Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. EmergencJl Action Level {EAL}: Note: If it is determined that the conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: . Seismic event (earthquake) . Internal or external flooding event E . High winds or tornado strike .2! . FIRE UI . EXPLOSION >-U) . Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager .e AND l'CI 2. EITHER of the following: U) a. Event damage has caused indications of tl degraded performance in at least one train of a £ SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical l'CI Specification for the current operating mode. 'E OR l'CI b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a N SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure l'CI ::r: required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. MUS RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. Emergencl£ Action Level {EAL}: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event l'CI promptly upon determining that the applicable time Q) has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded . ...I U) 0 1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage in the a:: Drywell > 10 gpm 15 minutes -OR 2. RCS identified leakage in the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes OR 3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-6 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT System Malfunction MU7 Loss of all On-site or Off-site l!l§rn Table M3 Communications Capability communication capabilities. System Onsite Off site NRC UI Plant Radio x Emergency Action Level (EAL): c:: .2 Plant Paoe x 1. Loss of ALL Table M3 Onsite communications 'lii All telephone Lines capability affecting the ability to perform routine (.J operations. '2 (Commercial and x x x ::J microwave) OR E E ENS x x 2. Loss of ALL Table M3 Offsite communication 0 HPN x x capability affecting the ability to perform offsite 0 notifications. Satellite Phones x x OR 3. Loss of ALL Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRG notifications. Modes. 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-7 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5}
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HG1 HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss HS1 HOSTILE ACTION within the [fil [9 HA1 HOSTILE ACTION within the [fil [9 HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION of physical control of the facility PROTECTED AREA OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack or threat. threat within 30 minutes. c: Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level IEALl: Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE 1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the u ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the 1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security <C PROTECTED AREA. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the threat < 30 minutes from the site. Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities. PROTECTED AREA. AND OR OR '1ii 2. A validated notification from the NRC providing 0 2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be 2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE :c controlled or maintained. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the information of an aircraft threat. OWNER CONTROLED AREA. OR OR 3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY b. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is CONDITION that does.!!!!! involve a HOSTILE IMMINENT ACTION. " HS2 Inability to control a key safety [fil [9 HA2 Control Room evacuation resulting function from outside the Control Room in transfer of plant control to alternate locations Table H1 Safety Functions Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Emergency Action Level (EAL}: . Reactivity Control Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control e (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it promptly upon determining that the applicable time has being transferred from the Control Room to alternate -shutdown) been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure-c: Control Room Evacuation. 0 1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control (.) . RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core) 'E being transferred from the Control Room to alternate ns . RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain a heat sink) locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -ii: Control Room Evacuation. -AND 0 .. 2. Control of ANY Table H1 key safety function is not rn reestablished in < 30 minutes. c: ns .. I-Modes. 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-8 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety Modes: 1 -Power Operatron 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-9 ALERT Table H2 Vital Areas
- Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt)
- Aux Electric Room
- Control Room
- Unit and Shared Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms
- Battery Rooms
- CRD & CCSW Pump Rooms
- Turbine Building Cable Tunnel
- Turbine Building Safe Shutdown Areas as follows:
- B-Train Control Room HVAC Room
- Battery Rooms and DC Distribution Areas 1) U2 Battery Room (includes DC switchgear, 125V, and 250V battery rooms) 2) U3 Battery Room, Battery Cage area, and U3 Battery Charger Room (all on U3 TB 538)
- Crib House Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU3 FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not ex1inguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm OR 2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE). AND b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt. -OR 3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not ex1inguished in < SO-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. OR 4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to ex1inguish. HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX I GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HU4 Seismic event greater than OBE levels EmergencJl Action Level (EAL): Note: Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS For emergency classification if EAL 2 is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is confirmed in manrier deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in =: 15 mins of the event. Seismic event as indicated by: CD 1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic .IC I'll event. ::I tr AND .c t:: 2. ANY one of the following confirmed in =: 15 mins of the I'll w event:
- The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) and occurred:: 3.5 miles of the plant.
- The earthquake was magnitude 6.0
- The earthquake was magnitude 5.0 and occurred =: 125 miles of the plant. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-10 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERALEMERGENeY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HA5 Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. I/) Table H3 Emergency Action Level !EAL!: ns Areas with Entrv Related Mode Applicabilitv (!) Entry Related Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was tJ Area Unit Mode already inoperable, or out of service, before the *;;: 0 Aoplicabilitv event occurred, then no emergency classification I-Reactor Building is warranted. 517' elevation 1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or *MCC 28-1 area flammable gas in a Table H3 area. *MCC 29-1 area *MCC 38-1 area AND *MCC39-1 area 2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or
- CRD 25 valve area impeded 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area HUG Hazardous Event *Bus 24-1 area *Bus 33-1 area *Bus 34-1 area 2(3) Emergency Action Level (EAL):
- RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation Note: EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments *250VDC MCC 2A such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or area accidents.
- 250VDC MCC 2B Escalation of the emergency classification level would area Modes 3, 4, and 5 be via IC CA2 or MA5 .... *250VDC MCC 3A c: area 1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. Cl) >
- 250VDC MCC 3B OR w area 2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to I/) 589' elevation require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a :::s 0 *Isolation Condenser SAFETY SYSTEM component required by Technical "C ... Floor Specifications for the current operating mode. ns N Cribhouse 2&3 OR ns :r: 3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is Turbine Building impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous 495' elevation 2(3) materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas
- CRD Pump Area release). 534' elevation OR *Bus 23 area 2 4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions *Bus 24 area sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site 538' elevation via personal vehicles. *Bus 33 area 3 OR *Bus 34 area 5. Abnormal River level, as indicated by EITHER: a. High river level > 509 ft. OR b. Low river level < 501 ft. 6 i.nches. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-11 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety c: Cl) E Cl "C :::s ..., ... i5 >. 0 c: Cl) Cl) E w HG7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@]@][fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@J@][fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. ALERT HA7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@]@][fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuellng D-Defueled HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-12 Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU7 Other conditions exist which in the IIJ[?J@]@l[fil[g judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. HOT MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT I ISFSI Malfunction E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Emergencll Action Level {EAL}: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading: 1. EAST HI-STAR: . > 160 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR . > 250 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR iii 2. EAST HI-STORM: LL . > 20 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR . >100 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR . > 90 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts of the Overpack . OR 3. WEST HI-STORM: . > 40 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR -. >220 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack, excluding inlet and outlet ducts Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2-Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled HOT MATRIX HOT MATRIX November 2016 DR2-13 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG1 Release of gaseous radioactivity 11J[gj@]l1J@][g resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+09 uCi/sec for?. 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 1000 mRem TEOE OR b. > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continue for?. 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. SITE AREA EMERGENCY RS1 Release of gaseous radioactivity 11J[gj@]l1J@][g resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
- Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
- The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+OB uCi/sec for?. 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 100 mRem TEOE OR b. > 500 mRem COE Thyroid OR 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continue for?. 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RA1 Release of gaseous or liquid 11J[gj@ll1J@][g radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1 O mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: * * *
- 1. 2. The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+07 uCi/sec for?, 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 10 mRem TEOE OR b. > 50 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary OR a. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposure OR b. 50 mRem CDE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposure 4. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates> 10 mR/hr are expected to continue for::, 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. D-Defueled DR2-14 RU1 Any release of gaseous or liquid 11J[gj@]l1J@][g radioactivity to the environment greater than 2 times the ODCM for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes: * *
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes. Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. 1. Reading on ANY of the following effluent monitors > 2 times alarm setpoint established by a current radioactive release discharge permit 60 minutes. OR
- Radwaste Effluent Monitor 213-2001-948 OR
- Discharge Permit specified monitor 2. The sum of readings on the Unit 213 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.34 E+05 uCi/sec for?, 60 minutes (as. determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS-Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates > 2 times OOCM Limit with a release duration of?, 60 minutes. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Abnormal Rad Levels I Radiological Effluents RG2 Spent fuel pool level cannot be [9 restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Levels !EAL!: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Table R1 Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitors
- Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2(4)
- Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor SITE AREA EMERGENCY RS2 Spent fuel pool level at 0.60 ft. [9 as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) Emergency Action Level (EAL): Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Table R2 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy
- Main Control Room (Unit 2 ARM Station #22)
- Central Alarm Station -(by survey) Table R3 Areas with Entrv Related Mode ADplicabilitv Reactor Building 517' elevation
- MCC 28-1 area
- MCC 29-1 area
- MCC 38-1 area
- MCC 39-1 area
- CRD 25 valve area 545' elev'ation
- Bus 23-1 area
- Bus 24-1 area
- Bus 33-1 area
- Bus 34-1 area
- RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation
- 250VDC MCC 2A area
- 250VDC MCC 28 area
- 250VDC MCC 3A area
- 250VOC MCC 38 area 589' elevation
- Isolation Condenser Floor 2(3) Crlbhouse 2&3 Turbine Building 495' elevation 2(3)
- CRD Pump Area 534' elevation
- Bus23 area
- Bus24 area 538' elevation
- Bus33 area *Bus 34 area Modes 3, 4, and 5 Modes: 1 -Power Operatron 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 ALERT RA2 Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level !EAL!: 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. OR 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R1 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr. OR 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10.20 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. Emergency Action Level (EAL!: Note: If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R3 was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted 1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the areas contained in Table R2. OR 2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to any of the areas contained in Table R3. D-Defueled DR2-15 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT RU2 Unplanned loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following:
- Refueling Cavity water level < 466 In. (Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrument LI 2(3)-263-114) OR
- Spent Fuel Pool water level < 19 ft. above the fuel (< 33 ft. 9 In. indicated level). OR
- Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. AND b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitors in Table R1. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions CA1 Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power @1[§]19 CU1 Loss of all but one AC power source @][§J[g to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. .. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Emergency Action Level IEALl: Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event 0 promptly upon determining that the applicable time promptly upon determining that the applicable time has ll.. has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 0 <( 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. 1 . AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only ... one of the following power sources for:::, 15 minutes. 0 AND UI . Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32) UI 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 213 emergency 0 . Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31) ..I diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. . Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3) AND . Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3 . Unit crosstie breakers 3. Failure to restore power to at least one unit ECCS AND bus in< 15 minutes from the time of loss of both 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a offsite and onsite AC power. loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. CA2 Hazardous event affecting SAFETY @][§ SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. Emergency Action Level {EAL}: Note: If it is determined that the conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: . Seismic event (earthquake) E . Internal or external flooding event QI . High winds or tornado strike .... UI >. . FIRE en EXPLOSION . J!! . Other events with similar hazard ca characteristics as determined by the Shift en Manager AND 2. EITHER of the following: a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. OR b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure required by Technical *specifications for the current operating mode. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR2-16 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions CU3 Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes ... or longer. ; 0 Emergencl£ Action Level (EAL): II.. 0 Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event c promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is< 105 VDC on required 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3 for::_ 15 minutes. CU4 Loss of all onsite or offsite communication Table C1 Communications Capability capabilities. System On site Off site NRC Emergencl£ Action Level (EAL): U) c Plant Radio x 0 Plant PaQe x 1. Loss of ALL Table C1 Onsite communications :;::; capability affecting the ability to perform routine cu u All telephone operations. '2 Lines x x x :I (Commercial and OR E E microwave) 2. Loss of ALL Table C1 Offsite communication 0 ENS x x capability affecting the ability to perform offsite 0 notifications. HPN x x Satellite Phones x x OR 3. Loss of ALL Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications. CA5 Inability to maintain plant in cold UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature. Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds CU5 shutdown RCS Containment Heat-up Emergencl£ Action Levels (EAL!: Emergencl£ Action Levels (EAL): Status Closure Status Duration Intact Not Applicable 60 minutes* Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time promptly upon determining that the applicable time .:.: has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded . has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Established 20 minutes* c A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the c;; Not Intact Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature -cu limit when heat removal function is available does limit when heat removal function is available does Q) not warrant classification. not warrant classification. ::c Not Established O minutes 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F for 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F.
- If an RCS heat removal system is in operation >Table C2 duration. OR within this time frame and RCS temperature is being OR 2. Loss of the following for::_ 15 minutes. reduced, then EAL Threshold #1 is not apolicable. 2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise> 10 psig as a . ALL RCS temperature indications result of temperature rise. AND . ALL RPV level indications Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-17 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Cold Shutdown I Refueling System Malfunctions .9 c: Q) > .E -Q) Cl ca .II: ca Q) ...J (/J 0 0:: CG6 Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1 a. RPV Level< -143 inches (TAF) for;:: 30 minutes. AND b. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) OR 2. a. RPV level cannot be monitored for;:: 30 minutes. 3. AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following: AND
- Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. OR
- Refuel Floor Hi Range ARM >3000 mR/hr. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications
- Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration ::: 6% and Oxygen ;:: 5%
- UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*
- ANY Secondary Containment radiation monitor > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Safe ooeratina level *if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncovery time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 SITE AREA EMERGENCY CS6 Loss of RPV inventory affecting core d_ecay heat removal capabilities. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV level < -60 inches -OR 2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV* level <
- 143 inches (TAF) OR 3. a. RPV level cannot be monitored for::: 30 minutes AND b. Core uncovery is indicated. by ANY of the following:
- Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.
- UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*
- UNPLANNED Torus level rise*
- UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise
- Observation of leakaae or inventorv loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling ALERT CA6 Loss of RPV inventory Emergencv Action Level !EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < -54 inches. OR 2. a. RPV level cannot be monitored for::: 15 minutes. AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications D-Defueled DR2-18 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT CU6 UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintain RPV level to above the. procedurally established lower limit for;:: 15 minutes. OR 2. a. RPV level cannot be monitored AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HG1 HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ HS1 HOSTILE ACTION within the IIJ[fil@]@][fil[§ HA1 HOSTILE ACTION within the II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ HU1 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ of physical control of the facility PROTECTED AREA OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack or threat. threat within 30 minutes. c Emergency Action Level !EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): 0 1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE +: A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE 1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the u ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the 1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft <C PROTECTED AREA. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the attack threat < 30 minutes from the site. site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security PROTECTED AREA. Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities. +: AND OR OR UI 0 2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be 2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE 2. A validated notification from the NRC providing :r: controlled or maintained. ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the information of an aircraft threat. OR OWNER CONTROLED AREA. OR b. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is 3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE IMMINENT ACTION. HS2 Inability to control a key safety IIJ[fil@]@][fil[§ HA2 Control Room evacuation resulting II] [fil@l@I [fil [§ function from outside the Control Room in transfer of plant control to alternate locations Table H1 Safety Functions Emergency Action Level (EAL): Emergency Action Level (EAL): . Reactivity Control Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control 0 (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it promptly upon determining that the applicable time has being transferred from the Control Room to alternate ... shutdown) been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure--c Control Room Evacuation. 0 1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control CJ . RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core) being transferred from the Control Room to alternate -c locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -ta . RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain a heat sink) a: Control Room Evacuation. .... AND 0 ... .S! 2. Control of ANY Table H1 key safety function is not UI reestablished in < 30 minutes. c I-Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refueling D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-19 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety Q) ... ii: Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 . . . . . . . . ALERT Table H2 Vital Areas Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt} Aux Electric Room Control Room Unit and Shared Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms 4KV ECCS Switchgear Area (includes Bus 23, 24, 33 and 34 only) C.RD & CCSW Pump Rooms Turbine Building Cable Tunnel Turbine Building Safe Shutdown Areas as follows:
- B-Train Control Room HVAC Room
- Battery Rooms and DC Distribution Areas 1) U2 Battery Room (includes DC switchgear, 125V, and 250V battery rooms) 2) U3 Battery Room, Battery Cage area, and U3 Battery Charger Room (all on U3 TB 538)
- Crib House D-Defueled DR 2-20 -----1 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU3 FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS 1. A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not extinguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm OR 2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE). AND b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt. -OR 3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in < 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. OR 4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX I GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HU4 Seismic event greater than OBE levels EmergencJl Action Level (EAL}: Note: Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS For emergency classification if EAL 2 is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is ; confirmed in manner deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in !:_ 15 mins of the event. Seismic event as indicated by: Q) 1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic ""' ca event. ::I C" AND ..c: t: 2. ANY one of the following confirmed in !:_ 15 mins of the ca w event:
- The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI);:: VI and occurred!:_ 3.5 miles of the plant.
- The earthquake was magnitude;:: 6.0
- The earthquake was magnitude;:: 5.0 and occurred !:_ 125 miles of the plant. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR 2-21 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety HAS Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. U) Table H3 Cll Areas with Entrv Related Mode Aoolicabilitv EmergencJt: Action Level (EAL): (!) Entry Related Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was u Area Unit Mode ")( already inoperable, or out of service, before the 0 Aoolicabilitv event occurred, then* no emergency classification I-Reactor Building is warranted. 517' elevation *MCC 28-1 area 1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or *MCC 29-1 area flammable gas in a Table H3 area. *MCC 38-1 area AND oMCC 39-1 area 2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or *CRD 25 valve area impeded 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area HUS Hazardous Event *Bus 24-1 area
- Bus 33-1 area *Bus 34-1 area 2(3) EmergencJt: Action Level (EAL):
- RWCU Pump Room Note: EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments 570' elevation such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or *250VDC MCC 2A accidents. area . *250VDC MCC 2B Escalation of the emergency classification level would area Modes 3, 4, and* be via IC CA2 or MAS c *250VDC MCC 3A 5 QI area 1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. > *250VDC MCC 3B OR w 2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to U) area :;J 589' elevation require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a 0 SAFETY S'(STEM component required by technical "C *Isolation Condenser .. Floor Specifications for the current operating mode . Cll N OR Cll Crlbhouse 2&3 3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is :c Turbine Building impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous 495' elevation 2(3) materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas
- CRD Pump Area release). 534' elevation OR *Bus 23 area 2 4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions *Bus 24 area sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site 538' elevation via personal vehicles. *Bus 33 area 3 OR *Bus* 34 area 5. Abnormal River level, as indicated by EITHER: a. High river level > 509 ft. OR b. Low river level < 501 ft. 6 inches. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR2-22 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX GENERAL EMERGENCY Hazards and Other conditions Affecting Plant Safety c GI E Cl "C :I .., .. I!! c c: GI El GI E w HG7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOST! LE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Emergency Action Level !EALI: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. Modes: 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5-Refuehng COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 ALERT HA7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT. Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. D-Defueled DR2-23 Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX UNUSUAL EVENT HU7 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT. Emergency Action Level !EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX ' GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT ISFSI Malfunction E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. Emergencl£ Action Level (EAL}: Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading: 1. EAST HI-STAR: . > 160 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpeck OR . > 250 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpeck OR iii 2. EAST HI-STORM: LL. !!2 . > 20 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpeck OR . >100 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpeck OR . > 90 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts of the Overpeck OR 3. WEST HI-STORM: . > 40 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpeck OR . >220 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpeck, excluding inlet and outlet ducts Modes: _ 1 -Power Operation 2 -Startup 3 -Hot Shutdown 4 -Cold Shutdown 5 -Refueling D-Defueled COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING MATRIX November 2016 DR2-24 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3(Rev.5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RG1 Initiating Condition: Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem thyroid COE. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
- Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
- The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+09 uCi/sec 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 1000 mRem TEDE OR b. > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid OR November 2016 DR 2-25 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RG1 (cont) Emergency Action Level (cont): 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: *a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continue 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. ;Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal .to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public. Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 5000 mRem thyroid COE was established in consideration of the 1 :5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid COE. !Basi_s R.:derence(s): . 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG1 2. EP-AA-112-500 Emergency Environmental Monitoring 3. ODCM Sedion 12.4 Gaseous Effluents and Total Dose 4. DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 6. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control November 2016 DR 2-26 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RS1 Initiating Conditio_n: Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid COE. *operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
- Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
- The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+08 uCi/sec 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: OR a. > 100 mRem TEDE OR b. > 500 mRem COE Thyroid 3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continue for> 60 minutes. b. OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. November 2016 DR 2-27 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RS1 (cont) :easis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public. Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. The TEDE dose is set at 10% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 500 mRem thyroid COE was established in consideration of the 1 :5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid COE. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1. Basis . .. . . . .. 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS1 2. EP-AA-112-500 Emergency Environmental Monitoring 3. ODCM Section 12.4 Gaseous Effluents and Total Dose 4.
- DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 6. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release .Control November 2016 DR 2-28 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA1 Initiating Condition: Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mRem TEDE or 50 mRem thyroid COE. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.
- Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.
- The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available. 1. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.05 E+07 uCi/sec for?. 15 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the site boundary of EITHER: a. > 10 mRem TEDE OR b. > 50 mRem COE Thyroid OR November 2016 DR 2-29 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3. (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear* RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA1 (cont) Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont): 3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the site boundary
- OR a. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposure OR b. 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposure 4. Fielc! survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER: ;Basis: a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates > 10 mR/hr are expected to continue 60 minutes. OR b. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem COE Thyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation. This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1 % of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release). Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. The TEDE dose is set at 1 % of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 50 mRem thyroid COE was established in consideration of the 1 :5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid COE. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RS1. November 2016 DR 2-30 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA1 (cont} . . ____ . 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA1 2. ODCM Section 12.3 Liquid Effluents 3. ODCM Section 12.4 Gaseous Effluents 4. DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate, From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. UNIT 2/3 DAN 2223-6 A-12 "2/3 RADWASTE DISCHARGE HIGH RADIATION" 6. UNIT 2/3 DOP 2000-110, Radioactive Waste Discharge to River With the Stream Liquid Effluent Monitor Operable 7. UNIT 2/3 DOP 2000-109, Waste Surge Tank Batching for a Radwaste River Discharge 8. Structural Drawing B-01A Composite Site Plan Dresden Station Units 1, 2 & 3 9. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 10. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control 11. EP-EAL-:-0620, Dresden Criteria for Choosing Radiological Liquid Effluent EAL Threshold Values November 2016 DR 2-31 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU1 Condition: Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM limits for 60 minutes or longer. :Operating Mode _ 1,2,3,4,5, D *Eme_rgency Action Level (EAL): Notes:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.
- Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes. 1. Reading on ANY of the following effluent monitors > 2 times alarm setpoint established by a current radioactive release discharge permit for 60 minutes. OR
- Radwaste Effluent Monitor 2/3-2001-948 OR
- Discharge Permit specified monitor 2. The sum of readings on the Unit 2/3 Rx Bldg and Unit 2/3 Chimney SPINGs > 2.34 E+OS uCi/sec 60 minutes (as determined by DOP 1700-10 or PPDS -Total Noble Gas Release Rate). OR 3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrations or release rates> 2 times ODCM Limit with a release duration of 60 minutes. November 2016 DR 2-32 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU1 (cont) Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared. Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases,, and to control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment is indicative of degradation in these features and/or controls. Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant .condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions. Releases should not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL. EAL #1 Basis This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas). The effluent monitors listed are those normally used for planned discharges. If a discharge is performed using a different flowpath or effluent monitor other than those listed (e.g., a portable or temporary effluent monitor), then the declaration criteria will be based on the monitor specified in the Discharge Permit. EAL#2 Basis This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous effluent pathways. EAL#3 Basis This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.). Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA 1. November 2016 DR 2-33 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU1 (cont) .Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU1 2. ODCM Section 12.3 Liquid Effluents 3. ODCM Section 12.4 Gaseous Effluents 4. DOP 1700-10, Obtaining And Calculating A Gaseous Release Rate From the Unit 2/3 Chimney, Unit 1 Chimney and Unit 2/3 combined Reactor Vent Using the Eberline Control Terminal 5. UNIT 2/3 DAN 2223-6 A-12 "2/3 RADWASTE DISCHARGE HIGH RADIATION" 6. UNIT 2/3 DOP.2000-110, Radioactive Waste Discharge to River With the Stream Liquid Effluent Monitor Operable 7. UNIT 2/3 DOP 2000-109, Waste Surge Tank Batching for a Radwaste River Discharge 8. EP-EAL-0604, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL Threshold Values Dresden Station 9. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control November 2016 DR 2-34 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level {EAL): RG2 Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B) for 60 minutes or longer. 'Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel. This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment. It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG2 2. EP-EAL-1004, Criteria for Choosing Spent Fuel Pool Level 3 and Level 2 EAL Threshold Values for Dresden Station November 2016 DR 2*35 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Spent fuel pool level at 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 0.60 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Basis: RS2 This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. This condition entails major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration. It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or RG2. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS2 2. EP-EAL-1004, Criteria for Choosing Spent Fuel Pool Level 3 and Level 2 EAL Threshold Values for Dresden Station November 2016 DR 2-36 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
- Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS .Initiating Condition: Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel. Operating Mode Applicability: . 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY. OR RA2 2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY Table R1 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr. OR 3. Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10.20 ft. as indicated on 2(3)-1901-121A(B). Table R1 Fuel Handli.ng Incident Radiation Monitors
- Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2(4)
- Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Basis: REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange. *
- IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of t.ime regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment. This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment. As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1. November 2016 DR 2-37 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA2 (cont) Initiating Condition: EAL #1 Basis This EAL escalates from RU2 in that the loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports _from personnel or camera images), as well as significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters. Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations. While an area radiation monitor could detect a rise in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered. To the degree possible, readings should be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss. A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes. EAL#2 Basis This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly. Spent fuel uncovery represents a major ALARA concern in that radiation levels could exceed 10,000 R/hr on the refuel bridge when fuel uncovery begins. The value of 1000 mR/hr was conservatively chosen for classification purposes. A rise in readings on radiation monitors should be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident). EAL #3 Basis: Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thus it is also a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored in the pool. Escalation of the emergency would be based on either Recognition Category Ror C ICs. November 2016 DR 2-38 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revis_ion 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA2 (cont) _.
- 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA2 2. DAN 902(3)-3 C-16(E-16) Reactor Building Fuel Pool Hi Radiation 3. DAN 902(3)-3 B-1 Refuel Floor Hi Radiation 4. DAN 902(3)-3 A-3(F-14) Reactor building Vent Hi-Hi Radiation 5. UFSAR 9.1 6. DAN 902(3)-4 D-24 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tank Level Lo 7. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation 8. DFP 0850-01 Water Level Loss in SFP or Cavity 9. DOP 1900-03 Reactor Cavity, Dryer/Separator Storage Pit and Fuel Pool Level *control 10. EP-EAL-1004, Criteria for Choosing Spent Fuel Pool Level 3 and Level 2 EAL Threshold Values for Dresden Station November 2016 DR 2-39 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL}: RU2 1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by ANY of the following: AND
- Refueling Cavity water level< 466 in. (Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrument LI 2(3)-263-114) OR
- Spent Fuel Pool water level< 19 ft. above the fuel(< 33 ft. 9 in. indicated level). OR
- Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELING PATHWAY. b. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitors in Table R1. November 2016 Table R1 Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitors
- Refuel Floor High Range ARM Station #2(4)
- Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor DR 2-40 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU2 (cont) Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through which irradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below the flange. This IC addresses a loss in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is also indicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It is therefore a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. A water level loss will be primarily determined by indications from available level instrumentation. Other sources of level indications may include reports from plant personnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available) or from any other temporarily installed monitoring instrumentation. A significant drop in the water level may also cause a rise in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detected by monitors in those locations. The effects of planned evolutions should be considered. For example, a refueling bridge area radiation monitor reading may rise due to planned evolutions such as lifting of the reactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicable only in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level. A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA2. November 2016
- DR 2-41 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RU2 (cont} Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU2 2. RP-AA-203 Exposure Control and Authorization 3. Technical Specifications 3.7.8 4. Technical Specifications 3.9.6 5. UFSAR 9.1 6. DAN 902(3)-4 D-24 Fuel Pool Skimmer Tank Level Lo 7. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation 8. DFP 0850-01 Water Level Loss in SFP or Cavity 9. DOP 1900-03 Reactor Cavity, Dryer/Separator Storage Pit and Fuel Pool Level Control 10. DGP 02-02, Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 11. DAN 902(3)-3 C-16(E-16) Reactor Building Fuel Pool Hi Radiation 12. DAN 902(3)-3 B-1 Refuel Floor Hi Radiation 13. DAN 902(3)-3 A-3(F-14) Reactor building Vent Hi-Hi Radiation November 2016 DR 2-42 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. -Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: RA3
- If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R3 was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. 1. Dose rate> 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following Table R2 areas: Table R2 Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy
- Main Control Room (Unit 2 ARM Station #22)
- Central Alarm Station -(by survey) OR 2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impede access to ANY of the following Table R3 plant rooms or areas: November 2016 DR 2-43 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA3 (cont) Emergency Action Level {EAL) (cont): _ Table R3 Areas with Entry Related Mode Applicability Area Unit Entry Related Mode Applicability Reactor Building 517' elevation
- MCC 28-1 area
- MCC 29-1 area
- MCC 38-1 area
- MCC 39-1 area
- CRD 25 valve area 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area
- Bus 24-1 area 2(3) *Bus 33-1 area
- Bus 34-1 area
- RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation
- 250VDC MCC 2A area
- 250VDC MCC 2B area Modes 3, 4, and 5
- 250VDC MCC 3A area
- 250VDC MCC 3B area 589' elevation
- Isolation Condenser Floor Cribhouse 2&3 Turbine Building 495' elevation 2(3)
- CRD Pump Area 534' elevation *Bus 23 area 2 *Bus 24 area 538' elevation *Bus 33 area 3
- Bus 34 area
- Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures. As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The Emergency Director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable. Assuming all plant equipment is operating as designed, normal operation is capable fro,m the Main Control Room (MCR). The plant is also able to transition into a hot shutdown condition from the MCR, therefore November 2016 DR 2-44 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA3 (cont) Basis (cont): Table R3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that contain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operating procedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plant would not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections). Rooms and areas listed in EAL #1 do not need to be included in EAL #2, including the Control Room. For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the elevated radiation levels preclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding beyond that required by procedure, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits). An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.
- The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation rise occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.
- The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).
- The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).
- The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, C or F ICs. November 2016 DR 2-45 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS RA3 (cont) Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA3 2. DOP 1800-01 Area Radiation Monitors 3. FSAR Section 3.2 Classification of Structures, Components and Systems 4. General Arrangement Drawings M-3, M-4, M-4A, M-5 and M-10 5. DEOP 300-2, Radioactivity Release Control November 2016 DR 2-46 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex
- Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS Initiating Condition: Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): 1. Offgas system radiation monitor HI-HI alarm. OR 2. Specific coolant activity> 4.0 µCi/gm Dose equivalent 1-131. Basis: RU3 This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limit specified in Technical Specifications. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Conditions that cause the specified monitor to alarm that are not related to fuel clad degradation should not result in the declaration of an Unusual Event. This EAL addresses site-specific radiation monitor readings that provide indication of a degradation of fuel clad integrity. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via I Cs FA 1 or the Recognition Category R ICs. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU3 2. Technical Specifications 3.4.6, RCS Specific Activity 3. DAN 902(3)-3 C-2(D-2) Off Gas Rad Monitor Hi-Hi 4. Technical Specifications 3.7.6, Main Condenser Offgas 5. DGA 16 Coolant High Activity/Fuel Element Failure November 2016 DR 2-47 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier. Operating Mode Applice1bility: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): FG1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status. Basis: Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. At the General Emergency classification level each barrier is weighted equally. ,Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-48 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two barriers. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): FS1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status. Basis: Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. At the Site Area Emergency classification level, each barrier is weighted equally. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-49 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3, Emergency Action Level (EAL): FA1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determine barrier status. 'Basis: Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers. At the Alert classification level, Fuel Cladding and RCS barriers are weighted more heavily than the Containment barrier. Unlike the Containment barrier, loss or potential loss of either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier may result in the relocation of radioactive materials or degradation of core cooling capability. Note that the loss or potential loss of Containment barrier in combination with loss or potential loss of either Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier results in declaration of a Site Area Emergency under EAL FS1. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-50 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: ... RCS Activity Ope_rati1J9. 1, 2, 3 Product BarrierJFPB)_Ttireshold: LOSS Coolant activity > 300 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent 1-131. Basis: FC1 This threshold indicates that RCS radioactivity concentration is greater than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this _condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is recognized that sample collection and analysis of reactor coolant with highly elevated activity levels could require several hours to complete. Nonetheless, a sample-related threshold is included as a backup to other indications. There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity. .... :.... . ............ . 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F.:.2 2. DGA-16, Coolant High Activity I Fuel Element Failure November 2016 DR 2-51 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION 'Initiating Condition: RPV Water Level Mode Applicabmty: 1, 2, 3 ,Fission Product (FPB) Threshold: LOSS 1. Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained> -143 inches {TAF) OR 3. RPV water level cannot be determined. :Basis: FC2 RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. Compensated values may be used in accordance with the Technical Support Guidelines. Loss Threshold #1 Basis The Loss threshold represents the EOP requirement for primary containment flooding. This is identified in the BWROG EPGs/SAMGs when the phrase, "Primary Containment Flooding Is Required," appears. Since a site-specific RPV water level is not specified here, the Loss threshold phrase, "Primary containment flooding required," also accommodates the EOP need to flood the primary containment 'when RPV water level cannot be determined and core damage due to inadequate core cooling is believed to be occurring. Potential Loss Threshold #2 and #3 Basis This water level corresponds to the top of the active fuel and is used in the EOPs to indicate a challenge to core cooling. The RPV water level threshold is the same as RCS Barrier RC2 Loss threshold. Thus, this threshold indicates a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and a Loss of the RCS barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specific EOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level following depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of the RCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injection sources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization. November 2016 DR 2-52 EP-AA-.1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION FC2 {cont) Basis (cont): EOPs allow the operator a wide choice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to within prescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitate RPV water level control with pressure injection sources. In some events, elevated RPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops below the shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this Fuel Clad barrier Potential Loss is met only after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or required emergency RPV depressurization has been attempted, giving the operator an opportunity to assess the capability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPV water level or 2) no low pressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPV depressurization in an attempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory. The term "cannot be restored and maintained above" means the value of RPV water level is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). The determination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relation to the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when a threshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does not require immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of active fuel, but does not permit extended operation below the limit; the threshold must be considered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot be attained. Entry into the "Steam Cooling" leg of the EOP's would be an example of an inability to "restore and maintain" level aboveTAF resulting in this threshold being met. In high-power ATWS/failure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator to deliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although such action is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need to reduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictate the need for emergency classification. Since the loss of ability to determine if adequate core cooling is being provided presents a significant challenge to the fuel clad barrier, a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier is specified. November 2016 DR 2-53 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION FC2 (cont) Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. DEOP 100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram 4. DEOP 400-1 RPV Flooding 5. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 6. Technical Support Guidelines November 2016 DR 2-54 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION .Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Radiation *operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS FC5 Drywell radiation monitor reading> 6.70 E+02 R/hr (670 R/hr). 'Basis:* The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release. of all reactor coolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. The radiation monitor reading in this threshold is higher than that specified for RCS Barrier RC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad Barrier and the RCS Barrier. Note that a combination of the two monitor readings appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. There is no Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation. Basis 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2.
- Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) November 2016 DR 2-55 EP-i\A-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) .
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Emergency Director Judgment. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS FC7 1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. Basis: Loss Threshold #1 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is lost. Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-56 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION .Initiating _Condition: _ RPV Water Level 'Operating Mode Applicability:_ 1, 2, 3 _Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RC2 1. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained> -143 inches (TAF) OR 2. RPV water level cannot be determined. Basis: RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. Compensated values may be used in accordance with the Technical Support Guidelines. This water level corresponds to the Top of Active Fuel (TAF) and is used in the EOPs to indicate challenge to core cooling. The RPV water level threshold is the same as Fuel Clad Barrier FC2 Potential Loss threshold. Thus, this threshold indicates a Loss of the RCS barrier and Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency. This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specific EOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level following depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of the RCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injection sources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization EOPs allow the operator a wide choice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to within prescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitate RPV water level control with low-pressure injection sources. In some events, elevated RPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops below the shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this RCS barrier Loss is met only after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or required emergency RPV depressurization has been attempted, giving the operator an opportunity to assess the capability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPV water level or 2) no low pressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPV depressurization in an attempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-57 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION RC2 (cont) Basis (cont): The term, "cannot be restored and maintained above," means the value of RPV water level is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). The determination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relation* to the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when a threshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does not require immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of active fuel, but does not permit extended operation beyond the limit; the threshold must be considered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot be attained. Entry into the "Steam Cooling" leg of the* EOP's would be an example of an inability to "restore and maintain" level above TAF resulting in this threshold being met. In high-power ATWS/tailure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator to deliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although such action is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need to reduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictate the need for emergency classification. There is no RCS Potential Loss threshold associated with RPV Water Level. Basis 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. DEOP100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 4. Technical Support Guidelines *November 2016 DR 2-58 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Pressure Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS 1. Drywell pressure >2.0 psig. AND 2. Drywell pressure rise is due to RCS leakage. Basis: RC3 The > 2.0 psig primary containment pressure is the Drywell high pressure setpoint which indicates a LOCA by automatically initiating ECCS. The second threshold condition focuses the fission product barrier loss threshold on a failure of the RCS instead of the non-LOCA malfunctions that may adversely affect primary containment pressure. Pressures of this magnitude can be caused by LOCA events such as a loss of Drywell cooling or inability to control primary containment vent/purge. There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Pressure. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.5.1-1 3. DAN 902(3)-5 D-11 4. DEOP 100 RPV Control 5. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control November 2016 DR 2-59 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: RCS Leak Rate Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RC4 1. UNISOLABLE Main Steam Line (MSL), Isolation Condenser, HPCI, Feedwater, or RWCU line break. OR 2. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required. POTENTIAL LOSS 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following: a. Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Normal operating levels. OR b. Secondary Containment area radiation level > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Normal operating level. 'Bas-is:* UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. Failure to isolate the leak, within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes, from the start of the leak requires immediate classification. Classification of a system break over system leakage is based on information available to the Control Room from the event. Indications that should be considered are:
- Reports describing magnitude of steam or water release.
- Use of system high flow alarms I indications, if available,
- Significant changes in niakeup requirements,
- Abnormal reactor water level changes in response to the event. The use of the above indications provides the Control Room the bases to determine that the on going event is more significant than the indications that would be expected from system leakage and therefore should be considered a system break. November 2016 DR 2-60 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION RC4 (cont) Basis (cont): Loss Threshold #1 Basis Large high-energy lines that rupture outside primary containment can discharge significant amounts of inventory and jeopardize the pressure-retaining capability of the RCS until they are isolated. If it is determined that the ruptured line cannot be promptly isolated, the RCS barrier Loss threshold is met. Loss Threshold #2 Basis Emergency RPV Depressurization in accordance with the EOPs is indicative of a loss of the RCS barrier. If Emergency RPV Depressurization is performed, the plant operators are directed to open Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs)/Target Rock SRV and keep them open. Even though the RCS is being vented into the Torus, a Loss of the RCS barrier exists due to the diminished effectiveness of the RCS to retain fission products within its boundary. Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis Potential loss of RCS based on primary system leakage outside the primary containment is determined from EOP temperature or radiation Max Normal Operating values in areas such as main steam line tunnel, HPCI, etc., which indicate a direct path from the RCS to areas outside primary containment. A Max Normal Operating value is the highest value of the identified parameter expected to occur during normal plant operating conditions with all directly associated support and control systems functioning properly. The indicators reaching the threshold barriers and confirmed to be caused by RCS leakage from a primary system warrant an Alert classification. A primary system is defined to be the pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPV pressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water being discharged through an unisolated break in the system. In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system is discharging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area radiation condition does not necessarily indicate that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building since this may be caused by radiation shine from nearby steam lines or the movement of radioactive materials. Conversely, a high area radiation condition in conjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, high area temperatures, reports of steam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpected Main Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building. An UNISOLABLE leak which is indicated by Max Normal Operating values escalates to a Site Area Emergency when combined with Containment Barrier CT6 Loss Threshold * #1 (after a containment isolation) and a General Emergency when the Fuel Clad Barrier criteria is also exceeded. November 2016 DR 2-61 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION RC4 (cont) Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. M-12, M-345, Main steam piping 3. Technical Specifications 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE 4. Technical Specifications Section 3.4.5, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 5. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 DRYWELL EQUIP SUMP LVL HI-HI 6. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 DRYWELL FLOOR ORN SUMP LVL HI-HI 7. DOA 0040-01 SLOW LEAK 8. DOP 2000-24 DRYWELL SUMP OPERATION 9. DEOP 300-1, Secondary Containment Control 10. UFSAR Section 5.2.5 November 2016 DR 2-62 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER .DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment radiation Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RCS Drywell radiation monitor reading > 100 R/hr (>1.00 E+02 R/hr). Basis: The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activity equals Technical Specification allowable limits. This value is lower than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier FC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of the RCS Barrier only. There is no RCS Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. EP-EAL-0611, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation Monitor Reading Indicative of loss of the RCS Barrier. November 2016 DR 2-63 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear. RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Emergency Director Judgment. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 _Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS RC7 1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCS Barrier. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. Basis: Loss Threshold #1 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is lost. Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the RCS Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored. 'Basis Refere_nce(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-64 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: RPV Water Level Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: POTENTIAL LOSS CT2 Plant conditions indicate Primary Containment flooding is required. Basis: The Potential Loss threshold is identical to the Fuel Clad Barrier RC2 Loss threshold RPV Water Level. The Potential Loss requirement for Primary Containment Flooding indicates adequate core cooling cannot be restored and maintained and that core damage is possible. BWR EPGs/SAMGs specify the conditions that require primary containment flooding. When primary containment flooding is required, the EPGs are exited and SAMGs are entered. Entry into SAMGs is a logical escalation in response to the inability to restore and maintain adequate core cooling. PRA studies indicate that the condition of this Potential Loss threshold could be a core melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to RPV failure and increased potential for primary containment failure. In conjunction with the RPV water level Loss thresholds in the Fuel Clad and RCS barrier columns, this threshold results in the declaration of a General Emergency. There is no Loss Threshold associated with this IC. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. Severe Accident Management Guidelines 3. DEOP 0100, RPV Control 4. DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding 5. DEOP 0400-05, Failure to Scram November 2016 DR 2-65 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Conditions Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Thres.hold: LOSS 1. UNPLANNED rapid drop in Drywell pressure following Drywell pressure rise. OR 2. Drywell pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions. POTENTIAL LOSS 3. Drywell 62 psig and rising. OR 4. a. Drywell or torus hydrogen concentration 6%. AND b. Drywell or torus oxygen concentration 5%. OR 5. Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig.M) exceeded. Basis: CT3 UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended e,volution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. Loss Threshold #1 and #2 Basis Rapid UNPLANNED loss of primary containment pressure (i.e., not attributable to Drywell spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure rise indicates a loss of primary containment integrity. Primary containment pressure should rise as a result of mass and energy release into the primary containment from a LOCA. Thus, primary containment pressure not increasing under these conditions indicates a loss of primary containment integrity. These thresholds rely on operator recognition of an unexpected response* for the condition and therefore a specific value is not assigned. The unexpected (UNPLANNED) response is important because it is the indicator for a containment bypass condition. A pressure suppression bypass path would not be an indication of a containment breach.
- November 2016 DR 2-66 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION CT3 (cont) 'Basis (cont): Potential Loss Threshold #3 Basis The threshold pressure is t.he primary containment internal design pressure. Structural acceptance testing demonstrates the capability of the primary containment to resist pressures greater than the internal design pressure. A pressure of this magnitude is greater than those expected to result from any design basis accident and, thus, represent a Potential Loss of the Containment barrier. Potential Loss Threshold #4 Basis If hydrogen concentration reaches or exceeds the lower flammability limit, as defined in plant EOPs, in an oxygen rich environment, a potentially explosive mixture exists. If the combustible mixture ignites inside the primary containment, loss of the Containment barrier could occur. Potential Loss Threshold #5 Basis The HCTL is a function of RPV pressure, Torus temperature and Torus water level. It is utilized to preclude failure of the containment and equipment in the containment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant and therefore, the inability to maintain plant parameters below the limit constitutes a potential loss of containment. ,Basis Reference._(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. UFSAR 6.2.1.3.2.1 3. UFSAR Table 6.2-3 4. UFSAR 15.6.5 5. UFSAR 6.2.1.1 6. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control 7. DEOP 200-2 Hydrogen Control November 2016 DR 2-67 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Primary Containment Radiation Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: POTENTIAL LOSS Drywell radiation monitor reading > 1.60 E+03 R/hr (1600 R/hr). Basis: There is no Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation. CT5 The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactor coolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that 20% of the fuel cladding has failed. This level of fuel clad failure is well above that used to determine the analogous Fuel Clad Barrier Loss and RCS Barrier Loss thresholds. NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, indicates the fuel clad failure must be greater than approximately 20% in order for there to be a major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions. For this condition to exist there must already have been a loss of the RCS Barrier and the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is therefore prudent to treat this condition as a potential loss of containment which would then escalate the emergency classification level to a General Emergency. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) November 2016 DR 2-68 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION lniti_ating Condition: Primary Containment Isolation Failure Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fissh:>ri Pro.duct Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS CT6 1. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primary containment isolation signal. OR 2. Intentional Primary Containment venting/purging per EOPs or SAMGs due to accident conditions. OR 3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in Secondary Containment area temperature > DEOP 300-1, Maximum Safe operating levels. 'Basis: UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. Failure to isolate the leak, within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes, from the start of the leak requires immediate classification. These thresholds address incomplete containment isolation that allows an UNISOLABLE direct release to the environment. Loss Threshold #1 Basis The use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through interfacing liquid systems or minor release pathways, such as instrument lines, not protected by the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS). Leakage into a closed system is to be considered only if the closed system is breached and thereby creates a significant pathway to. the environment. Examples include unisolable Main Steamline, HPCI steamline breaks, unisolable RWCU system breaks, and unisolable containment atmosphere vent paths. Examples of "downstream pathway to the environment" could be through the Turbine/Condenser, or direct release to the Turbine or Reactor Building. The existence of a filter is not considered in the threshold assessment. Filters do not remove fission product noble gases. In addition, a filter could become ineffective due to iodine and/or particulate loading beyond design limits (i.e., retention ability has been exceeded) or water saturation from steam/high humidity in the release stream. November 2016 DR 2-69 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION CT6 (cont) . ,Basis (cont): . Following the leakage of RCS mass into primary containment and a rise in primary
- containment pressure, there may be minor radiological releases associated with allowable primary containment leakage through various penetrations or system components. Minor releases may also occur if a primary containment isolation valve(s) fails to close but the primary containment atmosphere escapes to an enclosed system. These releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of primary containment but should be evaluated using the Recognition Category R ICs. Loss Threshold #2 Basis EOPs may direct primary containment isolation valve logic(s) to be intentionally bypassed, even if offsite radioactivity release rate limits will be exceeded. Under these conditions with a valid primary containment isolation signal, the containment should also be considered lost if primary containment venting is actually performed. Intentional venting of primary containment for primary containment pressure or combustible gas control to the secondary containment and/or the environment is a Loss of the Containment. Venting for primary containment pressure control when not in an accident situation (e.g., to control pressure below the Drywell high pressure scram setpoint) does not meet the threshold condition. Loss Threshold #3 Basis The Max Safe Operating Temperature is the highest value of this parameter at which neither: (1) equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant will fail, nor (2) personnel access necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant will be precluded. EOPs utilize these temperatures to establish conditions under which RPV depressurization is required. The temperatures should be confirmed to be caused by RCS leakage from a primary system. A primary system is defined to be the pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPV pressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water being discharged through an unisolated break in the system. In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system is discharging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area temperature condition in conjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, reports of steam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpected Main Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building. In combination with RCS Barrier RC4 Potential Loss Threshold #3 this threshold would result in a Site Area Emergency. There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Isolation Failure. November 2016 DR 2-70 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 2. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control 3. DEOP 200-2 Hydrogen Control 4. DEOP 500-4 Containment Venting 5. DEOP 300-1 Secondary Containment Control November 2016 DR 2-71 CT6 (cont) EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION Initiating Condition: Emergency Director Judgment. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold: LOSS CT7 1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the Containment Barrier. POTENTIAL LOSS 2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier. Basis: Loss Threshold #1 Basis: This threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment Barrier is lost. Potential Loss Threshold #2 Basis: This threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Director in determining whether the Containment Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Director should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the event that barrier status cannot be monitored. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2 November 2016 DR 2-72 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG1 Prolonged loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC power to emergency buses. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. EITHER of the following: a. Restoration of at least one unit ECCS bus in < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely. OR b. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained: (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A prolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of any fission product barriers. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions. RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. The EAL should require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting the thresholds for IC FG1. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsite protective actions. November 2016 DR 2-73 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG1 (cont) Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it is projected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the end of the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses and event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihood of challenges to multiple fission product barriers. The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation. Mitigation actions with a low probability of success should not be used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize the time available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public. The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC power results in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat from the core. Basis Refererice(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG1 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138-kV System and 345-kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4-KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator . Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4-KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power 10. DEOP 100 RPV Control 11. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines November 2016 DR 2-74 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MS1 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. :Operating M()de 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC Power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Failure to restore power to at least one ECCS bus in < 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. :Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under these conditions. This IC represents a condition that involves actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RG1, FG1, MG1, or MG2. November 2016 DR 2-75 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS1 2. UFSAR 8.3 RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MS1 (cont) 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138-kV System and 345-kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-76 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex ln.itiating RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA1 Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAi:.): Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded; or will likely be exceeded. 1. AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only one of the following power sources 15 minutes.
- Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32)
- Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31)
- Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3)
- Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3
- Unit crosstie breakers AND 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. ;Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. This IC provides an escalation path from IC MU1. An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition are presented below.
- A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator). November 2016 DR 2-77 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Bc:tsis (cont):
- RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA1 (cont)
- A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being fed from the unit main generator.
- A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being fed from an offsite power source. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MS1. 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA1 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 KV System and 345 KV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 Station Blackout System 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-78 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex* . Exelon Nuclear Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS MU1 Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating APPU<:ability: _ 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAi:-): Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to unit ECCS buses 15 minutes. Ba$is: This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sources renders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency buses. This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant. For emergency classification purposes, "capability" means that an offsite AC power source(s) is available to the emergency buses, whether or not the buses are powered from it. (e.g. unit cross-tie breakers) Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of offsite power. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MA 1. 'Basis _Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU1 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 kV System and 345 kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4kV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4kV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-79 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG2 Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer. ;Qperatir{g *" 1, 2, 3 Emergency Acti()n Level (EAL):. *
- Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Voltage is < 105 VDC on 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3. AND 4. ALL AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost 15 minutes. 'Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and Vital DC power. A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss of Vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. A sustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fission product barriers. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when all EAL conditions are met. '-November 2016 DR 2-80 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SGS 2. UFSAR 8.3 RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MG2 (cont) 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138-kV System and 345-kV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power 10. UFSAR 8.3.2 11. DOA 6900-02(3) Failure of Unit 2(3) 125 VDC Power Supply 12. Technical Specification 8.3.8.4, DC Power Sources -Operating November 2016 DR 2-81 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: MS2
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is< 105 VDC on 125 VDC battery buses #2 and #3 15 minutes. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this condition involves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via I Cs RG1, FG1 or MG2. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SSS 2. UFSAR 8.3.2 3. DOA 6900-02(3) Failure of Unit 2(3) 125 VDC Power Supply 4. Technical Specification B.3.8.4, DC Power Sources -Operating November 2016 DR 2-82 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MS3 Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV water level or RCS heat removal. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2 Emergency Action Level (EAL}: 1. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND 2. ALL manual I ARI actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND 3. EITHER of the following conditions exist:
- RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained : (Unit 2) > -191 inches (Unit 3) > -162 inches OR
- Heat Capacity Limit (DEOP 200-1, Fig. M) exceeded. Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, all subsequent operator manual actions, both inside and outside the Control Room including driving in control rods and boron injection, are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition will lead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and thus warrants the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may be higher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptoms against the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs. This is appropriate in that the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by a failure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timely declaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown the reactor. A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria. RPV values are actual levels, not indicated levels. Therefore, they may need level compensation depending on conditions. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or FG1. November 2016 DR 2-83 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS5 2. DEOP 100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram 4. DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control 5. Technical Support Guidelines November 2016 DR 2-84 Exelon Nuclear MS3 {cont) EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA3 Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor. Oper_ating Mode 1, 2 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. 1. Automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 6%. AND 2. Manual I ARI actions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 6%. Basis: This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful. This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor is subsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor control consoles since this event entails a significant failure of the RPS. A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor scram. This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operators would immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the reactor control consoles (e.g., locally opening breakers). Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are not considered to be "at the reactor consoles". Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scram action. November 2016 DR 2-85 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA3 (cont} The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolonged enough to cause a challenge to the RPV water level or RCS heat removal safety functions, the emergency classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency via IC MS3. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possible via IC FS1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC MS3 or FS1, an Alert declaration is appropriate for this event. It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declaration in accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL are included to ensure a timely emergency declaration. A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria. :Basis 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA5 2. DEOP 100 RPV Control 3. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram 4. . DEOP 200-1 Primary Containment Control November 2016 DR 2-86 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor. :operating-Mode
- 1, 2 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: Exelon Nuclear MU3
- A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. 1. a. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power >6%. AND b. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power :5, 6%. OR 2. a. Manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power >6%. AND b. EITHER of the following: Basi$: 1. Subsequent manual I ARI action taken at the reactor control consoles is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by ReactorPower :5. 6%. . OR 2. Subsequent automatic scram I ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power :5, 6%. This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manual reactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operator manual action taken at the reactor control consoles or an automatic scram is successful in shutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition and thus represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. November 2016 DR 2-87 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): EAL #1 Basis RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU3 (cont) Following the failure on an automatic reactor scram, operators will promptly initiate manual actions at the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor scram). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems. EAL#2 Basis If an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manual action at another location(s) on the reactor control consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manual reactor scram I ARI using a different switch). Depending upon several factors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually scram the reactor, or a concurrent plant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor scram signal. If a subsequent manual or automatic scram I ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems. A manual action at the reactor control consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manual reactor scram). This action does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies. Actions taken at back-panels or other locations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are not considered to be "at the reactor consoles". Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scram action. The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will vary based upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event, availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at the reactor control consoles are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then the emergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC MA3. Depending upon the plant response, escalation is also possible via IC FA 1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC MA3 or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate for this event. A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency Operating Procedure criteria. November 2016 DR 2-88 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU3 (cont) Should a reactor scram signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpoint testing), the following classification guidance should be applied.
- If the signal generated as a result of plant work causes a plant transient that creates a real condition that should have included an automatic reactor scram and the RPS fails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable, and should be evaluated.
- If the signal generated as a result of plant work does not cause a plant transient but should have generated an RPS scram signal and the scram failure is determined through other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALs are not applicable and no classification is warranted. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU5 2. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.1.1-1 3. DEOP 100 RPV Control 4. DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram November 2016 DR 2-89 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear _Initiating RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with a significant transient in progress. ,Operating AppliC:_CllJility: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: MA4
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room for?. 15 minutes. Table M1 Control Room Parameters
- Reactor Power
- RPV Water Level
- RPV Pressure
- Primary Containment Pressure
- Torus Level
- Torus Temperature AND 2. ANY Table M2 transient in progress. Table M2 Significant Transients
- Reactor Scram
- ECCS Activation
- Recirc. Runback > 25% Reactor Power Change
- Thermal Power oscillations > 10% Reactor Power Change November 2016 DR 2-90 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MA4 (cont) UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fission product barrier challenge is reduced. It thus represents a potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for any of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, computer point, digital and recorder source within the Control Room. An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making. This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, RPV water level and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if all indication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for RPV water level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via I Cs FS 1 or IC RS 1 . . Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev6, SA2 November 2016 DR 2-91 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex lriitiating Condition_: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: Exelon Nuclear MU4
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameter from within the Control Room 15 minutes. Table M1 Control Room Parameters
- Reactor Power
- RPV Water Level
- RPV Pressure
- Primary Containment Pressure
- Torus Level
- Torus Temperature Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the Control Room. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. November 2016 DR 2-92 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU4 (cont) As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for any of the listed parameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation would require a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). For example, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital and recorder source within the Control Room. An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems is evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022) to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported* if it significantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular, emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective action decision-making. This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the key safety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss of the ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room is considered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if all indication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determine the values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. For example, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indications and recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability of other parameter values may be compromised as well. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MA4. Reference(s):. 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2 November 2016 DR 2-93 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MAS Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. 'Operating Mode Applic_ability: 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- If it is determined that the conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:
- Seismic event (earthquake) * * * *
- AND Internal or external flooding event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager 2. EITHER of the following: a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. OR b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. is: FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. November 2016 DR 2-94 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3. (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MAS (cont) EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure. This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, required for the current operating mode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electrical isolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitute degraded performance and is classified under HU6. EAL #2.a Basis This EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train. EAL #2.b Basis This EAL addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not in operation or readily apparent through indications alone, as well as damage to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the totality . of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FS 1 or RS 1. If the EAL conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. November 2016 DR 2-95 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 SA9 November 2016 RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS DR 2-96 Exelon Nuclear MAS (cont) EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating C_c;>_ndition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer. :Operating l\'lode Applicability:_ 1, 2, 3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: Exelon Nuclear MU6
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage in the Drywell > 10 gpm for 15 minutes. OR 2. RCS identified leakage in the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes. OR 3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside the Drywell >25 gpm 15 minutes. 'Basis: UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally. Failure to isolate the leak, within 15 minutes or if known that the leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes, from the start of the leak requires immediate classification. This IC addresses RCS leakage which may be a precursor to a more significant event. In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicable procedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. EAL #1 and EAL #2 Basis These EALs are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage", "pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are defined in the plant Technical Specifications). EAL#3 Basis This EAL addresses an RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through an interfacing system.
- These EALs thus apply to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system or a location outside of containment. November 2016 DR 2-97 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MUG (cont) The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observable with normal Control Room indications. Lesser values typically require time-consuming calculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation). EAL #1 uses a lower value that reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of any relief valve does not warrant an emergency classification. A stuck-open Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV)/Target Rock SRV or ERV/ Target Rock SRV leakage is not considered either identified or unidentified leakage by Technical Specifications and, therefore, is not applicable to this EAL. The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to isolate the leakage, if possible. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs of Recognition Category R or F. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU4 2. Technical Specification 3.4.4, RCS Operational Leakage 3. UFSAR 5.2.5, Detection of Leakage through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 4. Technical Specifications 3.4.5 5. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 6. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 7. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 9. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation 10. DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill November 2016 DR 2-98 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Initiating Condition: RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications capabilities. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3 Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Exelon Nuclear MU7 1. Loss of ALL Table M3 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. OR 2. Loss of ALL Table M3 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications. OR 3. Loss of ALL Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications. Table M3 Communications Capability System On site Off site NRC Plant Radio x Plant Page x All telephone Lines (Commercial and microwave) x x x ENS x x HPN x x Satellite Phones x x Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC. This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.). November 2016 DR 2-99 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Basis (cont): EAL #1 Basis RECOGNITION CATEGORY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear MU7*(cont) Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations. EAL#2 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MW-114-100-F-01, Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Form. EAL #3 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRG of an emergency declaration. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU6 2. EP-MW-124-1001 Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests 3. UFSAR 9.5.2 4. DOA 0010-14 Loss of Off-Site Telephone Communication Systems November 2016 DR 2-100 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA1 Initiating Condition: Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Mode Applicability: 4, 5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to unit ECCS buses. AND 2. Failure of DG 2(3), and shared DG 2/3 emergency diesel generators to supply power to unit ECCS buses. AND 3. Failure to restore power to at least one unit ECCS bus in< 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore an emergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1. November 2016 DR 2-101 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA1 (cont} Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA2 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 KV System and 345 KV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Par1;ial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-102 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU1 Initiating Condition: Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer. Operating _Appltcability: 4,5,D Emergency Action Leve-I (EAL): Note:
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. AC power capability to unit ECCS buses reduced to only one of the following power sources 15 minutes.
- Reserve auxiliary Transformer TR-22 (TR-32)
- Unit auxiliary transformer TR-21 (TR-31)
- Unit Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2(3)
- Shared Emergency Diesel Generator DG 2/3
- Unit crosstie breakers AND 2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of ALL AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or more than one, train of safety-related equipment. November 2016 DR 2-103 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU1 (cont) *easis (cont): When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classified as an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in these modes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AOPs and EOPs, and capable of supplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition are presented below.
- A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency power source (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).
- A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from the unit main generator.
- A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power. The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with IC CA 1. Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01Rev6 CU2 . 2. UFSAR 8.3 3. 12E-2302A, Station Key Diagram 4160V and 480V Switchgears Part 1 4. DOA-6400-01, 138 KV System and 345 KV Alternate Supply Failure 5. DOA 6500-01 4KV Bus Failure 6. UFSAR Fig. 9.5-14 Single-Line Electrical Diagram of Station Blackout Generator Ties to Plant Auxiliary Electric System 7. UFSAR 9.5.9 Station Blackout System 8. DOP 6620-05, Powering Unit 2(3) 4KV Susses via the SBO DIG 2(3) 9. DGA-12 Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power November 2016 DR 2-104 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA2 Initiating Condition: Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode. Operating Mode A,pplicability: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- If it is determined that the conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. 1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events: AND
- Seismic event (earthquake) * * * *
- Internal or external flooding event High winds or tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager 2. EITHER of the following: ;Basis: a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. OR b. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or structure required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. November 2016 DR 2-105 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA2 (cont) Basis (cont): EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from high energy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits, grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Such events may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosion are present. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affected component or structure. This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, needed for the current operating mode, "needed", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electrical isolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitute degraded performance and is classified under HU6. EAL#2.a Basis Addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is "needed", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train. EAL #2.b Basis Addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is "needed", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not in operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on the totality of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1. If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6. November 2016 DR 2-106 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 1. NEI 99:.01 Rev 6, CA6 November 2016 DR 2-107 CA2 (cont} EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer. Operating M()de Applicabilify: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: CU3
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. Voltage is < 105 VDC on required 125 VDC battery busses #2 and #3 15 minutes. Basis: SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditions rise the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. As used in this EAL, * "required" means the Vital DC buses necessary to support operation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment. For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance work and Train Bis in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train B would require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train A would not warrant an emergency classification. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA6 or CA5, or an IC in Recognition Category R. November 2016 DR 2-108 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU3 (cont} Basis Reference( s ): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU4 2. UFSAR 8.3.2.2.1 Safety Related 125-V System 3. DOA 6900-02(3) Failure of Unit 2(3) 125 VDC Power Supply 4. Technical Specification Basis B.3.8.5, DC Power Sources -Shutdown 5. Technical Specification Basis B.3.8.4, DC Power Sources -Operating November 2016 DR 2-109 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities. ,Operating Mode 4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): CU4 1. Loss of ALL Table C1 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. OR 2. Loss of ALL Table C1 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications. OR 3. Loss of ALL Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability to perform NRC notifications. Table C1 Communications Capability System On site Off site NRC Plant Radio x Plant Page x All telephone Lines (Commercial and microwave) x x x ENS x x HPN x x Satellite Phones x x Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communications capabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this event warrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC. This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying of on-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.). EAL#1 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plant operations. November 2016 DR 2-110 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU4 (cont) Basis (cont): EAL#2 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of an emergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MW-114-100-F-01, Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Form. EAL#3 Basis Addresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU5 2. EP-MW-124-1001 Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests 3. UFSAR 9.5.2 4. DOA 0010-14 Loss of Off-Site Telephone Communication Systems November 2016 DR2-111 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown. Operating Mode Applicability: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL}: Note: CAS
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when heat removal function is available does not warrant classification. 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F for> Table C2 duration. Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds RCS Containment Closure Heat-up Status Status Duration Intact Not Applicable 60 minutes* Not Intact Established 20 minutes* Not Established 0 minutes
- If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, then EAL #1 is not applicable. OR 2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise> 10 psig as a result of temperature rise. Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. November 2016 DR 2-112 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA5 (cont) Basis (cont): CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the Cold Shutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.). This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Either condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses a rise in RCS temperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact. The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperature rise. The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses a rise in RCS temperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address the temperature rise without a substantial degradation in plant safety. Finally, in the case where there is a rise in RCS temperature, the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0 minutes). This is because 1) the evaporated reactor coolant may be released directly into the Containment atmosphere and subsequently to the environment, and 2) there is reduced reactor coolant inventory above the top of irradiated fuel. EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1. November 2016 DR2-113 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CAS (cont} Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA3 2. Technical Specifications 3.6.1.1 3. Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 4. OU-AA-103 Shutdown Safety Management Program 5. DGP 02-01 Unit Shutdown 6. DOA 0201-04 Loss of Vessel Flange, Shell, or Recirculation (Recirc) Loop Temperature Recorders During Heatup or Cooldown 7. DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 8. DIS 0263-19 Reactor Wide Range Pressure Transmitter Calibration Eq. Maintenance Inspection November 2016 DR 2-114 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature :operating Mode Applica_bility: 4,5 Emergency Action Level Note: CU5
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when heat removal function is available does not warrant classification. 1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature> 212°F. OR 2. Loss of the following 15 minutes. Basis:
- ALL RCS temperature indications AND
- ALL RPV water level indications UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. This IC addresses an UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established during this event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA5. RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the Cold Shutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.). November 2016 DR 2-115 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS *easis (cont): CU5 (cont) A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant a classification. EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removal at reduced inventory may result in a rapid rise in reactor coolant temperature depending on the time after shutdown. EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentation capability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable to monitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation of power operation. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of indication. Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA6 based on an inventory loss or IC CA5 based on exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria. [Ba_sis Re_ference(s): _ 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU3 2. . Technical Specifications Table 1.1-1 3. DGP 02-01 UNIT SHUTDOWN 4. DOA 0201-04, Loss of Vessel Flange, Shell, or Recirculation (Recirc) Loop Temperature Recorders During Heatup or Cooldown 5.
- DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 6. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 7. DEOP 100 RPV Control, Table A -s. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation November 2016 DR 2-116 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged. Applicability: 4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): -Note: CG6
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. a. RPV water level< -143 inches (TAF) 30 minutes. AND b. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) OR 2. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored 30 minutes. AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. OR
- Refuel Floor Hi Range ARM >3000 mR/hr. AND c. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4) Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage
- UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*
- UNPLANNED Torus level rise*
- UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise
- Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-117 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CG6 (cont) .Emergency Action.Level (EAL) .(cont): Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications
- Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration 6% and Oxygen 5%
- UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established*
- ANY Secondary Containment radiation monitor > DEOP 300-1 Maximum Safe operating level. *if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncovery time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required. :Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a direct and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declaration of a General Emergency is not required. November 2016 DR 2-118 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CG6 (cont) ,Basis (cont): The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at the lower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and could result in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. It therefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity. In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installed hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel cladding damage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentration reading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas rnonitors are out-of-service, operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment is challenged. EAL#1 Basis The 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring. The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. November 2016 DR 2-119 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 'sa.s!s. Reference(s): . CG6 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CG1 2. DEOP 0100-00 RPV Control 3. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.2 4. DOS 0700-01 SRM Functional Test 5. DAN 902(3)-5 E-4 SRM Short Period 6. DEOP 0200-01 Primary Containment Control 7. DEOP 0200-02 Hydrogen Control 8. DEOP 0300-01 Secondary Containment Control 9. USAR Table 6.2-1 10. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating Core Uncovery During Refueling November 2016 DR 2-120 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Initiating Condition: Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability. Mode Applicability: 4,5 Emergency Actio11 Level (EAi:-): Note: CS6
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV water level < -60 inches OR 2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV water level < -143 inches (TAF) OR 3. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored 30 minutes AND b. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:
- Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery. OR
- UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*
- UNPLANNED Torus level rise*
- UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise
- Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-121 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CS6 {cont) Basis: CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken to secure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdown conditions. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration. Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. If RCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable. Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifying CONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory control functions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs 1 and 2 reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lower probability of a fission product release to the environment. In EAL #3.a, the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring. The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. November 2016 DR 2-122 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CS6 (cont) Basis (cont): These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG6 or RG1. ,Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS1 2. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.5.1 1 3. UFSAR 5.2.5 4. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 5. DEOP 0100-00 RPV Control 6. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 7. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 9. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 10. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation 11. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.2 12 DOS 0700-01 SRM Functional Test 13. DAN 902(3)-5 E-4 SRM Short Period 14. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating Core Uncovery During Refueling November 2016 DR 2-123 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Loss of RPV inventory. fQRerati':lg,M(>de , 4,5 Note: CA6
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < -54 inches. OR 2. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored 15 minutes. AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications. Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage
- UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*
- UNPLANNED Torus level rise*
- UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise
- Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is attributed to a loss bf RPV inventory. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety. November 2016 DR 2-124 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 * (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CA6 (cont) Basis (cont): EAL #1 Basis A lowering of water level below -54.15 inches indicates that operator actions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of the coolant will rise as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing drop in water level will lead to core uncovery. Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not the potential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of a Residual Heat Removal suction point). A rise in RCS temperature caused by a loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA5. EAL#2 Basis The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half of the EAL duration specified in IC CS6 If the RPV water level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency would be via IC CS6. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEl99-01 Rev 6, CA1 2. USAR 5.2.5, Detection of Leakage through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 3. Technical Specification 3.3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 4. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 5. DEOP 100 RPV Control 6. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 7. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 9. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 10. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation November 2016 DR 2-125 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS tnitiating C_ondition: _ UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer. :pperating 4,5 ErnEu*geiic::y {EAL): Note: CU6
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintain RPV water level above the procedurally established lower limit 15 minutes. OR 2. a. RPV water level cannot be monitored AND b. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications. Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage
- UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*
- UNPLANNED Torus level rise*
- UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise
- Observation of leakage or inventory loss *Rise in level is to a loss of RPV inventory. November 2016 DR 2-126 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU6 (cont) Basis: UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intended evolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameter change or event may be known or unknown. This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPV water level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band established above the procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedural limit, but it is the procedurally established lower limit. Refueling evolutions that lower RCS water inventory are carefully planned and controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to the reduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered. EAL #1 recognizes that the minimum required RPV water level can change several times during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and system lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the current plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in another controlling document. The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions to restore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering of water level. EAL #2 addresses a condition where all means to determine RPV water level have been lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or tank levels. Sump and/or tank level changes must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV. Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either IC CA6 or CA5. November 2016 DR 2-127 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY COLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS CU6 (cont) Reference(s): _ 1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 tu1 2. USAR 5.2.5, Detection of Leakage through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 3. Technical Specifications 3.4.4 4. Technical Specifications 3.4.5 5. Unit 2(3) Appendix A Unit NSO Daily Surveillance Log 6. DAN 902(3)-4 A-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl HI-HI 7. DAN 902(3)-4 H-18 Drywell Floor Orn Sump Lvl HI-HI 8. DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak 9. DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation 10. DGP 02-02 Reactor Vessel Slow Fill 11. DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use or Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 12. DEOP 0100-00 RPV Control, Table A 13. DIP 0260-01 Refuel Outage Reactor Vessel and Cavity Level Instrumentation 14. Technical Specifications Table 3.3.5.1 1 November 2016 DR 2-128 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating <:ondition: HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility. ,Operating" Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D 'E_mergency Action Level (EAL): HG1 1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA. AND 2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be controlled or maintained. OR b. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENT Table H1 Safety Functions
- Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)
- RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)
- RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink) :sasis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. November 2016 DR 2-129 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HG1 Basis (c;:ont): IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control of the facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessary to maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to a loss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to 1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls, etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot be maintained. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. Basis 1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG1 2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C November 2016 DR 2-130 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: . HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. Operating Mode_ Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): HS1 A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA. Basis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility for damage to plant equipment. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. November 2016 DR 2-131 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HS1 (cont) Basis (cont): Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness by the plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize ORO . resources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actions in the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions. This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTED AREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should be assessed using IC HA 1. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HG1. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS1 2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C November 2016 DR 2-132 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA1 Initiating Con_diti()r1: . HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat within 30 minutes. ()perating 1,2,3,4,5,D 'Emergen,cy Actioh,,Level 1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat< 30 minutes from the site. OR 2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA. Basis:* HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air; land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station and owned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for official
- business. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. November 2016 DR 2-133 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA1 (cont) 'Basis This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to the PROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraft .impact. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness by the plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness of Offsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actioris. This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience, *or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees; etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71or10 CFR § 50.72. EAL #1 Basis Addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipated arrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-related notifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in a heightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information has been validated in accordance with DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion. EAL#2 Basis Is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI that is located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC. November 2016 DR 2-134 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA1 (cont) 'Basis (cont): In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site would clarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs, should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HA 1 2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C 3. DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion November 2016 DR 2-135 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY lnmating Condition: ... Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat. Mode Applic;:C1biljty: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL.): HU1 1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined per SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities. OR 2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat. OR 3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION. Basis: SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are
- typically systems classified as safety-related. HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. November 2016 DR 2-136 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU1 (cont) Basis (cont): This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEM equipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety. Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1. Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event. Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plant personnel and OROs. Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program]. EAL #1 Basis Addresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat is assessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132. EAL#2 Basis Addresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORAD through the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion EAL#3 Basis References Security Force because these are the individuals trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occwred. Training on security event confirmation and classification is controlled due to the nature of Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39 information. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HA 1. 1Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HU1 2. SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities 3. Station Security Plan -Appendix C 4. NRC Safeguards Advisory 10/6/01 5. Letter from Mr. B. A. Boger (NRC) to Ms. Lynette Hendricks (NEI) dated 2/4/02 6. DOA 0010-18, Escalated Security Event/Hostile Force Intrusion November 2016 DR 2-137 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room. Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note: HS2
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded. 1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to alternate locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation. AND 2. Control of ANY Table H1 key safety function is not reestablished in< 30 minutes. Table H1 Safety Functions
- Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)
- RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)
- RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink) Basis: The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either: a. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control Room OR b. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room. This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety function following a transfer of plant control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge to any fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time. November 2016 DR 2-138 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HS2 (cont} (cont): The determination of whether or not "control" is established at the remote safe shutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The Emergency Director is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within 30 minutes whether or not the operating staff has control of key safety functions from the remote safe shutdown location(s). Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG6. 'Basi_!; Reference(s): _ 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS6 2. DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation November 2016 DR 2-139 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA2 Initiating Condition: Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations. Operating Mode Applicab!lity:" 1,2,3,4,5, D Emergency Action Level (EAL): A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to alternate locations per DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation. Basis: This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to control the plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradation in the level of plant safety. Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternate shutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the Control Room, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the Control Room, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel. Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding to these challenges. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS2. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA6 2. DSSP 0100-CR, Hot Shutdown Procedure -Control Room Evacuation November 2016 DR 2-140 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action_ Level (EAL): Note: HU3
- The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.
- Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 1. A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not extinguished in< 15-minutes of ANY of the following FIRE detection indications:
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verification of a single fire alarm Table H2 Vital Areas
- Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt)
- Aux Electric Room
- Control Room
- Unit and Shared Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms
- 4KV EGGS Switchgear Area (includes Bus 23, 24, 33 and 34 only)
- CRD & CCSW Pump Rooms
- Turbine Building Cable Tunnel
- Turbine Building Safe Shutdown Areas as follows:
- B-Train Control Room HVAC Room
- Battery Rooms and DC Distribution Areas 1) U2 Battery Room (includes DC switchgear, 125V, and 250V battery rooms) 2) U3 Battery Room, Battery Cage area, and U3 Battery Charger Room(all on U3 TB 538)
- Crib House OR 2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indications of a FIRE). AND b. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in< 30 minutes of alarm receipt. OR November 2016 DR 2-141 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU3 (cont) _Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont): 3. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in< 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication. OR 4. A FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish. 'Basis: FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. EAL #1 Basis The intent of the 15-m.inute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate against small FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). In addition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure, automatic activation of a suppression system, etc. Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial fire alarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declaration clock starts at the time that initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire duration clock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report. EAL#2 Basis This EAL addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is not verified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EAL assessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm was received, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed. November 2016 DR 2-142 EP-M-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU3 (cont) Basis (cont): A single fire a_larm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipment failure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional time is allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonable amount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, and absent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress. If an actual FIRE is verified by a report. from the field, then EAL #1 is immediately applicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within 15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to an equipment failure or a spurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutes of the receipt of the alarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergency declaration is warranted. EAL#3 Basis In addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degrade the level of plant safety EAL #4 Basis If a FIRE within the plant PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require a response by an offsite firefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then the level of plant safety is potentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Declaration is not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions. ISFSI is not specifically addressed in EAL #3 and #4 since it is within the plant PROTECTED AREA. Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix R Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part: Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. "When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boil-off. . November 2016 DR 2-143 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU3 (cont) !Basis_ (cont): Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under post-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents. In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of 1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify a single alarm is well within this. worst-case 1-hour time period. Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MAS. 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU4 2. UFSAR 3.2, Classification of Structures, Components, and.Systems 3. UFSAR 3.5.3 4. General Arrangement Drawings M-3, M-4, M-4A, M-5 andM-10 November 2016 DR 2-144 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY lnitia_ting Conditiol"!: . _ Seismic event greater than QBE levels. 1,2,3,4,5,D ,_Emergency Actiol"! (EAL): . Note: HU4
- Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5
- For emergency classification if EAL 2 is not able to be confirmed, then the occurrence of a seismic event is confirmed in manner deemed appropriate by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director in 15 mins of the event. Seismic event as indicated by: 1 . Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event. AND 2. ANY one of the following confirmed 15 mins of the event:
- The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) and occurred 3.5 miles of the plant.
- The earthquake was magnitude 6.0 *The earthquake was 5.0 and 125 miles of the plant. . * -** *** *"-. '" ;_ ;-.,.. -. Th is IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greater than those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)1. An earthquake greater than an QBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)2 should have no significant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however, some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-event condition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Given the time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand any impacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. 1 An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the will remain functional.
- An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related) structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional. November 2016 DR 2-145 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5) -------J Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU4 (cont) Bas!s __ Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following an QBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel and recognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g). EAL #2 and the accompanying note is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrations caused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager or Emergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call to USGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude a timely emergency declaration. This EAL wording recognizes that it may cause the site to declare an Unusual Event while another site similarly affected but with readily available QBE indications in the Control Room, may not. Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5. _Basis Reference(s}: 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU2 2. DOA 0010-03, Earthquakes 3. US NRC Reg. Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Earthquake Actions. November 2016 DR 2-146 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HAS Initiating Condition: Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown. 3,4,5 Emergency Action Level (EAL): Note:
- If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted. 1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in a Table H3 area. AND 2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impeded November 2016 Table H3 Areas with Entry Related Mode Applicability Area Reactor Building 517' elevation
- MCC 28-1 area
- MCC 29-1 area
- MCC 38-1 area
- MCC 39-1 area
- CRD 25 valve area 545' elevation *Bus 23-1 area
- Bus 24-1 area
- Bus 33-1 area
- Bus 34-1 area
- RWCU Pump Room 570' elevation
- 250VDC MCC 2A area
- 250VDC MCC 2B area
- 250VDC MCC 3A area
- 250VDC MCC 3B area 589' elevation
- Isolation Condenser Floor Cribhouse Turbine Building 495' elevation
- CRD Pump Area 534' elevation *Bus 23 area *Bus 24 area 538' elevation *Bus 33 area *Bus 34 area Unit 2(3) 2&3 2(3) 2 3 DR 2-147 Entry Related Mode Applicability Modes 3, 4, and 5 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HAS (cont) Basis: This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes or impedes access to equipment necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures. This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Assuming all plant equipment is operating as designed, normal operation is capable from the Main Control Room (MCR). The plant is also able to transition into a hot shutdown condition from the MCR, therefore Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that contain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant from normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operating procedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plant would not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections). This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/design features are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of a hazardous gas. An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required* during the plant operating mode in effect and the gaseous release preclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the release. Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires the Emergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area is sufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. This judgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis, report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operating experience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is not routinely employed). An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.
- The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseous release occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4. . November 2016 DR 2-148 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HAS (cont) Basis (cont):
- The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppression system testing).
- The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).
- The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action. An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death. This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke, that automatically or manually activate a fire suppression system in an area, or to intentional inerting of containment. The Operating Mode Applicability of this EAL has been revised from All Modes to modes 3, 4, and 5 due to the mode applicability of the areas of concern in Table H-3. In the future should the areas of concern in Table H-3 be revised then the Operating Mode Applicability of this EAL should be reevaluated. Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, C or F ICs. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA5 2. UFSAR 3.5.3 3. UFSAR 3.2 4. General Arrangement Drawings M-3, M-4, M-4A, M-5 and M-10 November 2016 DR 2-149 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Initiating Condition: Hazardous Event ;pperating Mode Applica_bility: 1,2,3,4,5,D Action LevelJEAL): Note: HU6
- EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents.
- Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5 1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA. OR 2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual or automatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required by Technical Specification for the current operating mode. OR 3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gas release). OR 4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles. OR 5. Abnormal River level, as indicated by EITHER: a. High river level > 509 ft. OR b. Low river level <501 ft. 6 inches. :Basis: PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security protected area fence. SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plant and/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified as safety-related. November 2016 DR 2-150 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Basis (cont): HUG .(cont) This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. EAL #1 Basis Addresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area. EAL#2 Basis Addresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating power to a SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns. Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automatic isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker or relay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must be required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. EAL#3 Basis Addresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and of sufficient magnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA. EAL#4 Basis Addresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movement and significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personal vehicles .. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavy rains, up-river water releases, dam failure, etc., or an on-site train derailment blocking the access road. This EAL is not intended apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as the Hurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the Cooper Station during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in 2011. November 2016 DR 2-151 EP-M-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU6 (cont) Basis (cont): EAL #5 Basis: The possible maximum flood (PMF) produces a peak flood to 528 ft el. This is significantly above the grade elevation (517 ft) and the high river water level threshold, which is the lowest opening leading to safety-related equipment (509 ft el.). When this level is reached, the reactors are shutdown, the drywells are deinerted, and the vessels are flooded and cooled to cold shutdown conditions as quickly as possible. If the water level reaches 513 ft el., reactor cooldown is transferred to the Isolation Condensers, which thereafter maintain a safe shutdown condition until the flood waters recede and plant startup can be initiated. Minimum river water levels to assure pump suction are:
- Circulating Water Pumps: 490 ft el.
- Service Water Pumps: 494 ft el.
- CCSW Pumps: 501 ft 6 in.
- Unit 2/3 Fire Pump: 498 ft 6 in. The low river water level threshold (501 ft. 6 in.) is based on the most limiting pump suction requirement (CCSW). Escalation of the emergency classification level would -be based on I Cs in Recognition Categories R, F, M, Hor C. Basis Reference(s): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU3 2. DOA 0010-01 Dresden Lock and Dam Failure 3. DOA 0010-04 Floods 4. DOA 0010-02 Tornado Warning/Severe Winds 5. DOA-0010-12, Toxic Gas/Chemical Release from Nearby Chemical Facilities November 2016 DR 2-152 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HG7 Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. qperating Mode 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. Basis: IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within a relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions. HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a General Emergency. Basis Reference(s}: 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG? November 2016 DR 2-153 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HS7 Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration bf a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. Mode, 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. :Basis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a_ NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause. concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a Site Area Emergency. 1. NEI 99-01, Rev6 HS? November 2016 DR 2-154 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA7 Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT Operating Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action Level (EAL): Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. Basis: HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used.to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety. This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an Alert. Bas,is Reference(s,): 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA? November 2016 DR 2-155 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex Exelon Nuclear RECOGNITION CATEGORY HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU7 lnitiati11g Condition: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT. Opere1ting Mode Applicability: 1,2,3,4,5,D Emergency Action_ Level (EAL}: Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. '.Basis: This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an UNUSUAL EVENT. iBasis 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU? November 2016 DR 2-156 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex .lr:titleiting RECOGNITION CATEGORY ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. __ _ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, D Emf3rgency Action-Level (EAL):* Exelon Nuclear E-HU1 Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by an on-contact radiation reading: 1. EAST HI-STAR: * > 160 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR * > 250 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR 2. EAST HI-STORM: * > 20 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR * >100 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack OR * > 90 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts of the Overpack OR 3. WEST HI-STORM: * > 40 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the top of the Overpack OR * >220 mrem/hr (neutron+ gamma) on the side of the Overpack, excluding inlet and outlet ducts. Basis: CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment. INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. November 2016 DR 2-157 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3 (Revision 5)
Dresden Annex (cont): RECOGNITION CATEGORY ISFSI MALFUNCTIONS Exelon Nuclear E-HU1 (cont) This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY of a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The word cask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for dry storage of fuel. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actual release path to the environment, degradation of any fuel assemblies due to environmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges in removing the cask or fuel from storage. The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The technical specification multiple of "2 times", which is also used in Recognition Category RIC RU1, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the "on-contact" dose rate limit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate at some distance from the cask. Security-related events for ISFSls are covered under ICs HU1 and HA1 . . Basis Reference(sj: 1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU1 2. Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 Appendix A, Section 5.7 (WEST HI-STORM) 3. Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 Appendix A, Section 3.2.3 (EAST HI-STORM) 4. Certificate of Compliance No. 1008 Appendix A, Amendment 2, Section 2.2.1 (EAST HI-STAR) November 2016 DR 2-158 EP-AA-1004 Addendum 3. (Revision 5)
ATTACHMENT 3 Emergency Plan Addendum Revision EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2, Revision 1, "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates"
,,,,,,_,. . ..--Exelon Generation EP-AA-1013, Addendum 2 Revision 1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Evacuation Time Estimates KLD TR-823 ENGINEERING, P.C. Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant *-¢-' . Legend
- NMP/JAF 0 ERPA \....-:.. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings February 24, 2016 )\ Development of Evacuation Time Estimates 26 / I I 0.t*:l/l9/lOU Work performed for Exelon Generation1 by: KLD Engineering, P.C. 1601 Veterans Memorial Highway, Suite 340 Islandia, NY 11749 mailto:kweinisch@kldcompanies.com Final Report r 10 KLDTR-823 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1-1 1.1 Overview of the ETE Process ...................................................................................................... 1-2 1.2 The Locations of Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick ....................................................... 1-4 1.3 Preliminary Activities .................................................................................................................. 1-6 1.4 Comparison with Prior ETE Study ............................................................................................ 1-10 2 STUDY ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................. 2-1 2.1 Data Estimates ............................................................................................................................ 2-1 2.2 Study Methodological Assumptions .......................................................................................... 2-2 2.3 Study Assumptions ..................................................................................................................... 2-5 3 DEMAND ESTIMATION ....................................................................................................................... 3-1 3.1 Permanent Residents ................................................................................................................. 3-3 3.1.1 SUNY Os\l\,/ego ..................................................................................................................... 3-5 3.1.2 Day Camp -Ontario Bible Conference .............................................................................. 3-5 3.1.3 Special Facilities ........ , ........................................................................................................ 3-5 3.2 Shadow Population .................................................................................................................. 3-12 3.3 Transient Population .. .' ................................................ : ............................................................ 3-15 3.4 Employees ................................................................................................................................ 3-19 3.5
- Special Facilities ....................................................................................................................... 3-23 3.6 Total Demand in Addition to Permanent Population .............................................................. 3-23 3.7 Special Event ............................................................................................................................ 3-24 3.8 . Summary of Demand ............................................................................................................... 3-24 4 ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY ................................................................................................. 4-1 4.1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections .............................................................. 4-2 4.2 Capacity Estimation along Sections of Highway ........................................................................ 4-4 4.3 Application to the NMP/JAF Study Area ....................... -............................................................. 4-6 4.3.1 Two-Lane Roads ................................................................................................................. 4-6 4.3.2 Multi-Lane Highway ...................................... : .................................................................... 4-6 4.3.3 Freeways .......................................................................................................................... 4-7 4.3.4 Intersections ...................................................................................................................... 4-8 4.4 Simulation and Capacity Estimation .......................................................................................... 4-8 5 ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME .......................................................................................... 5-1 5.1 Background ................................................................................................................................ 5-1 5.2 Fundamental Considerations ..................................................................................................... 5-3 5.3 Estimated Time Distributions of Activities Preceding Event 5 ................................................... 5-6 5.4 Calculation of Trip Generation Time Distribution .................................................................... 5-12 5.4.1 Statistical Outliers ............................................................................................................ 5-13 5.4.2 Staged Evacuation Trip Generation ................................................................................. 5-16 5.4.3 Trip Generation for Waterways and Recreational Areas ................................................. 5-18 6 DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS ..................................................................... 6-1 NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 7 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE) .......................................................... 7-1 7.1 Voluntary Evacuation and Shadow Evacuation ....... : ................................................................. 7-1 7.2 Staged Evacuation ....................................................................................................... , .............. 7-1 7.3 Patterns of Traffic Congestion during Evacuation ..................................................................... 7 7.4 Evacuation Rates* ..................................................................................................... .................. 7-3 7.5 Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Results .................................................................................... 7-4 7 .6 Staged Evacuation Results .......................... .' .............................................................................. 7-5 7.7 Guidance on Using*ETE Tables ................................................................................................... 7-6 8 TRANSIT-DEPENDENT AND SPECIAL FACILITY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES ................................. 8.1 . Transit Dependent People Demand Estimate ............................................................................ 8-2 8.2 School, Preschool and Day Camp Population -Transit Demand ............................................... 8-4 8.3 Medical Facility Demand ............................................................................................................ 8-4 8.4 Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Dependent People ....................................................... 8-5 8.5 Special Needs Population .......... .............................................................................................. 8-10 8.6 Correctional Facilities ............................................................................................................... 8-11 9 .TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STRAT.EGY ............................... -..................................................................... 9-1 lei EVACUATION ROUTES .................................................................................................................. 10-1 11 SURVEILLANCE OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS ........... : ............*........... : ...................................... 11-1 12 CONFIRMATION TIME ...... : ........................................................................................................... 12-1 List of Appendices A. GLOSSARY OF TRAFFIC ENGINEERING TERMS .................................................................................. A-1 B. DYNAMIC TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION MODEL .......................................................... 8-1 C. DYNEVTRAFFIC SIMULATION.MODEL .: ............................................................................................. C-1 C.1 Methodology; ..*...... :., ......... ; ..... , ...............*. ,: ..... * .. , .... : ... : ...... , .................... : ....... * ........................... C-5 C.1.1 . The Fundamental Diagram ........ \ .........*.............................. _. . .-..... * ................ _. ............. , ......... C-5 C.1.2 The Simulation Mode.1 .....*....................... , ..... .' .................. ; ...... : .................................... ;.:.* .. c-5 C.1.3 Lane Assignment . .' ........ , ........ * ................ _ ......................... : ... :*************: ....... , ........... * ............. C:-13 . . . . C:2 lmplementaUon ............... .' ...* : .......................................... ,, ............. * ......... : ....................... : ..... : .. C-13
- C.2.1... Computational Procedure: ...................... '. .... : ........... : ..... _, ................ ........................ ,-........ C-13 C.2.2 lnterfacingwith Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTRAD) ............... : .. ......... , ............... ; ..*... C-16 . D. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF STUDY PROCEDURE .... , ............. ; .. ; ... :****** .......... , .......... ,.: ...................... D-1 . . . . . E. SPECIALFAC.ILITY DATA ..*................. * ...... ................. : ............ , .......................................... : .................. ; .... E-1 F. TELEPHONE SURVEY ...................... : ....................... , ........................................*..................................... F-1 *F.1 Introduction ..................................................... : ..................................................*...................... F-1 F.2 Survey Instrument and Sampling Plan .. , ..................... ::*:*********************************************************** F-2 F3 Survey Results* ................. .' ..... : ........ : ........ :*******************************************************: ............. * ... :* ........ :; F-3 F.3;1 .* Demographic Results ............................ _ ............. : ..... : ....... , ................................... F-3 . F.3.2 Evacuation Response ............... : ....... ::: ...... :-.......................... .-............... :************* .. ********************* F:-8 NMP/JAF Evacuation Estimate ii KLD Engineering, P.L February 24, 2016 F.3.3 Time Distribution Results ..................................................................................................... F-10 F.4 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. F-13 G. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN .......................................................................................................... G-1 G.1 Traffic Control Points ................................................................................................................ G-1 G.2 Access Control Points ................................................................................................................ G-1 H EVACUATION REGIONS ..................................................................................................................... H-1 J. REPRESENTATIVE INPUTS TO AND OUTPUTS FROM THE DYNEV II SYSTEM ..................................... J-1 K. EVACUATION ROADWAY NETWORK .................................................................................................. K-1 L. ERPA BOUNDARIES ............................................................................................................................ L-1 M. EVACUATION SENSITIVITY STUDIES ............................................................................................. M-1 M.1 Effect of Changes in Trip Generation Times ............................................................................ M-1 M.2 Effect of Changes in the Number of People in the Shadow Region Who Relocate ................. M-2 M.3 Effect of Changes in EPZ Resident Population ......................................................................... M-3 M.4 Enhancements in Evacuation Time .......................................................................................... M-4 N. ETE CRITERIA CHECKLIST ................................................................................................................... N-1 Note: Appendix I intentionally skipped NMP/JAF iii KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 List of Figures Figure 1-1. Location of NMP/JAF Nuclear Power Plant ............................................................................ 1-5 Figure 1-2. NMP/JAF Link-Node Analysis Network ................................................................................... 1-8 'Figure 2-1. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology ....................................................................................... 2-4 Figure 3-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ ...................................................................................... 3-2 Figure 3-2. Census Boundaries within the NMP/JAF Study Area .............................................................. 3-7 Figure 3-3. Permanent Resident Population by Sector ........................................................................... 3-10 Figure 3-4. Permanent Resident Vehicles by Sector .................................. : ............................................ 3-11 Figure 3-5. Shadow Population by Sector ............................................................................................... 3-13 Figure 3-6. Shadow Vehicles by Sector ..................... , .............................................................................. 3-14 Figure 3-7. Transient Population by Sector ......................................................................... : ................... 3-17 Figure 3-8. Transient Vehicles by Sector ............................... : ................................................................. 3-18 Figure 3-9. Employee Population by Sector ............................................................ : ............................... 3-21 Figure 3-10. Employee Vehicles by Sector .............................................................................................. 3-22 Figure 4-1. Fundamental Diagrams .................................................................................*....................... 4-10 Figure 5-1. Events and Activities Preceding the Evacuation Trip .... ; ......................................................... 5-5 Figure Evacuation Mobilization Activities ........................................................................................ 5-11 Figure 5-3. Comparison of Data Distribution and Normal Distribution .................. , .................................. 5-15 Figure 5-4. Comparison of Trip Generation Distributions ................................................ : ...................... 5-20 Figure 5-5. Comparison of Staged and Un-staged Trip Generation Distributions in the 2 to 5 Mile Region .......................................................................................................................... 5-22 Figure 6-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ ...................................................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-2. Example of an ERPA "Sliver" when Defining Evacuation Regions .......................................... 6-7 Figure 7-1. Voluntary Methodology ............ , ........................... ; ...................................... : ..... 7-15 Figure 7-2. NMP/JA.F Shadow Region .................................................................... * .................................. 7-16 Figure 7-3. Congestion Patterns at 40 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate .................................... 7-17 Figure 7-4. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour, 30 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ........................ 7-18 Figure 7-5. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours afterthe Advisory to Evacuate .......................................... 7-19 Figure 7-6. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, 30 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ...................... 7-20 Figure 7-7. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, 50 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate ...................... 7-21 Figure 7-8. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 1 for Region R03 ............................ : ... : ..................... 7-22 Figure 7-9. Evacuation Time Scenario 2 for Region R03 ............ , ......................................... 7-22 Figure 7-10. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 3 for Region R03 .................................................... Figure 7-11. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 4 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-23 Figure 7-12. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 5 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-24 Figure 7-13. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 6 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-24 Figure Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 7 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-25 Figure 7-15. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 8 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-25 Figure 7-16. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 9 for Region R03 .................................................... 7-26 Figure 7-17. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 10 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-26 Figure Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 11 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-27 Figure 7-19. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 12 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-27 Figure 7-20. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 13 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-28 Figure 7-21. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 14 for Region R03 .................................................. 7-28 Figure 8-1. Chronology of Transit Evacuation Operations ...... , ............................................................... 8-12 Figure 10-1. General Reception Cen,ter and Medical Host Facilities ....................................................... 10-2 . NMP/JAF. iv
- KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Figure 10-2. Evacuation Route Map ................................................................... , .................................... 10-3 Figure B-1. Flow Diagram of Simulation-DTRAD lnterface ........................................................................ 8-5 Figure C-1. Representative Analysis Network .............................................. ............................................ C-4 . Figure C-2. *Fundamental Diagrams ........................................................................................................... Figure C-3. A UNIT Problem Configuration with ti> O .............................................................................. C-7 Figure C-4. Flow of Simulation Processing (See Glossary: Table C-3) .................................................... C-15 Figure D-1. Flow Diagram ofActivities ..................................................................................................... D-5 Figure E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ ................................................................ E-7 Figure E-2. Schools and Preschools within the City of Oswego ................................................................ E-8 Figure E-3. Medical Facilities within the EPZ ............................................................................................ E-9 . Figure E-4. Major Employers within the EPZ ........................................................................................... E-10 Figure Recreational. Facilities and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ .................................. , ........ E-11 Figure E-6. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ ........................................................................................... E-12 Figure E-7. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ ................................................................................... E-13 Figure F-1. Household Size in the EPZ ......................................... ; ............................................................. F-3 Figure F-2. Household Vehicle Availability ................................................................................................ F-4. Figure F-3. Vehicle Availability-1 to 5 Person Households .......... : ................................ ; .................. ....... F-5 Figure F-4. Vehicle Availability -6 to 9+ Person Households .................................................................... F-5 Figure F-5. Household Ridesharing Preference ......................................................................................... F-6 Figure F-6. Commuters in Households in the EPZ ... .-................................................................................. F-7 Figure F-7. Modes of Travel in the EPZ ....................................................................... : ............................. F-8 Figure F-8. Evacuating Vehicles per Household .......................................................... , ............................. F-9 Figure F-9. Households Evacuating with Pets ........................................................................................... F-9 Figure F-10. Time Required to Prepare to leave Work/School .............................................................. F-11 Figure F-11. Work to Home Travel Time*********************************************************************************.-******:********* F-11 Figure F-12. Time to Prepare Home for Evacuation .............................................. ............... , ................. F-12 Figure Time to Clear Driveway of 6"-8" of Snow ........................................................................... F-13 Figure G-L and Access Control Points for NMP/JAF ., ......................................... ........................ G-2 'Figure H-1. Region ROl ......................................... * .. , ................................................................................... l-i-3 Figure H-2. Region Ro2* ................................... , ..................................................... * .................................... : .. H-4
- Figure H-3. Region R03 . .-................................ : ..... * ..................*.................................................................. H-5 Figure H-4. Region R04 .............. ; *....... : ............. : ...... ; ................................................................................ H-6 Figure H-5. Region ROS .......... , ... , ..................... ; ......................*................................................. : ............... .' H.-7. Figure H-6. Region ROG .. : ......*................... , .... : .......................................................................................... H-8 Figure H-7.-Region R07 ***:: ....... .. ; ........... ; ..................... ............................ : .................................... , .......... H-9 Figure H-8. Region ROS .................................... , ...................................... ,. ................................................. H-10 Figure H-9: R.egion R09.,. ................. '************************'*******************************:************************************************ H-11 . Figure H-10. Region RlO ............*....... , ...... , ........................................... '. .......................... ......................... H-12 Figure H-11 Region Rll .............................................. * *.........*..................................... , ...................... .-..... H-13 .Figure H-12 Region R12 ............ : ........................ _ ...................................................................................... H-14 Figure H-13 .Region R13 ................................................... ; ....... : ..... _ ........................................................... H-15 FigureH-14 Region R14 .......................................... , ........... : ............................................................... , ... H-16 Figure H-15. Region RlS ....... _ *.. ,* .................................................. ' ............................................................... H-17 Region R16 ..... ; ......... * ................. * ..... ,. ..................................................................................... H-18 Figure Region* R17 ............ : ..... -......... : .............................................................................................. H-19 *Figure H-18 Region RlS ... .': .............. ,. ......... .' ............ : ...................... ; ..... _ .................. ................................. H-20 Figure*H-19 Region.R19 ...... , ....... .-....................................................... * ........................................................ H-2i NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate v KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Figure H-20 Region R20 .......... : ................................................................................ '. .............................. H-22 Figure H-21 Region R2l .......................................................................................................................... H-23 Figure H-22 Regio.n R22 .. : .......................................................... ; ............................................................ H-24 Figure H-23 Region R23 ........*................................................................................................................. H-25 Figure H-24 Region R24 ... ;*.* ........................................................ .' ............................................................ H-26 Figure H-25 Region R25 ...... : ................................................................................ ;*********************************** H-27 Figure H-26 R,egion R26 ........................................................................................................................... H-28 Figure H-27 Region R27 : ..... , .................................................................................................. , ................ H-29 Figure H-28 Region R28 .. : ............................................................. * .................................. * ......................... H-30 Figure H-29 Region R29 .......................................................................................................................... H-31 Figure J-1. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 1) .............. J-7 Figure ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek,' Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) ......................... , ..... J-7 Figure J-3. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 3) .............. J-8 Figure J-4 .. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) .............................. J-8 Figure J-5. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, *Good Weather (Scenario 5) ........................................................................................................................ J-9 Figure J-6. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter; Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 6) ................ J-9 Figure J-7. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) ............................... J-10 Figure J-8. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) ............................. J-10 Figure J-9. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 9) .............. J-11 Figure J-10. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) ........................... J-11 Figure J-11. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) ......................... J-12 Figure J-12. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 12) .. , ......... ,. .......*............................................................................................ ,. J-12 Figure J-13. ETE and Trip Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather, Special* Event (Seen.aria 13) .................................................................................................................. : ... J-13 Figure J-14. ETE.and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) ********'*************************************************************************'***************************** J-13 Figure K-l. Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick Link-Node Analysis Network ........................................ K-2 *Figure K-2. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 1 ........................... , ......................................................... K-3 Figure K-3. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 2 ...................................................................................... K-4 Figure K-4. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 3 ........................................................... ; ......................... K-5 Figure link-Node Analysis Network.:... Grid 4 .... , ................................................................................ K-6 Figure K-6. Link-Node. Analysis Network-G.rid 5 ..................................................................................... K-7 Figure K-7. Analysis Network-Grid 6 ..................................................................................... K-8 Figure K-K Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 7 ..................................................................................... K-9 Figure K-9. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 8 ............................................................. : ..................... K-10 Figure K-10: Analysis Network-Grid 9 ...........................................**.................................... K-11 Figure K-11. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 10 ............................................................................... K-12. Figure K-12. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 11 ............................................................................... K-13 Figure K-13. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 12 ............................................................................... K-14 Figure Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 13 ............................................................... , ............... K-15 Figure K-15. Link-Node Analysis Network...:.. Grid 14 ............................................................................... K-16 Figure K-16. Link-Node .Analysis Network-Grid 15 ............................................................................... K-17 Figure K-17. Analysis Network-Grid 16 ............................................................................... K-18 Figure K-18. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 17 ............................................................... , ............... K-19
- Figure K-19. Link-.NodeAnalysis Network-Grid 18 ...... '. ......*........................................ : .... : ................... K-20 NMP/JAF vi KLD Engineering, P.C. . . . . . Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Figure K-20. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 19 ............................. , ................................................. K-21 Figure K-21. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 20 ...... ........................................................................ K-22 Figure K-22. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 21 ............................................................................... K-23 Figure K-23. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 22 ........................... : ..................................... .' .......... , .. K-24 Figure K-24. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 23 ............................................................................... K-25 Figure K-25. Link-Node Analysis Network:.... Grid 24 ....................... : ....................................................... K-26 Figure K-26. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 25 ............................................................................... K-27 Figure K-27. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 26 ............................................................................... K-28 Figure K-28. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 27 ............................................................................... K-29 Figure K-29. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 28 ............................................................................... K-30 Figure K-30. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 29 .................................... : .......................................... K-31 Figure K-31. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 30 ................................................. ." ............................. K-32 Figure K-32. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 31 ............................................................................... K-33 Figure K-33. Link-Node Analysis Network.-Grid 32 ............................................................................... K-34 NMP/JAF vii -KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Tim.e Estimate February 24, 2016 List of Tables Table 1-1. Stakeholder lnteraction. ............................................................................................................ 1-2 Table 1-2. Highway Characteristics ........................................................................................................... 1-6 Table 1-3. *ETE Study Comparisons .......................................................................................................... Table 2-1. Evacuation Scenario .Definitions ............................................................................................... 2-3 Table 2-2. Model Adjustment for Adverse Weather ................................................................................. 2-7 Table 3-1. Town Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 ........... 3-6 Table 3-2. Municipality Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 ............... : ........................................................................................................ 3-6 Table 3-3. EPZ Permanent Resident Population ....................................................................................... 3-8 Table 3-4. Permanent Resident Population and Vehicles by ERPA ........................................................... 3-9 Table 3-5. Shadow Population and Vehicles by Sector ........................................... : ............................... 3-12 Table 3-6. Summary of Transients and Transient Vehicles ..................................................................... 3-16 Table 3-7. Summary of Non-EPZ Resident Employees and Employee Vehicles ...................................... 3-20 Table 3-8. NMP/JAF EPZ External Traffic ................................................................................................ 3-24 Table 3-9. Summary of Population Demand ........................................................................................... 3-25 Table 3-10. Summary. of Vehicle Demand ................................................................... : ........................... 3-26 Table 5-1. Event Sequence for Evacuation Activities ................................................................................ 5-3 Table 5-2. Time Distribution for Notifying the Public ............................................................................... 5-6 Table 5-3. Time Distribution for Employees to Prepare to Leave Work ................................................... 5-7 Table 5-4. Time Distribution for Commuters to Travel_Home .................................................................. 5-8 Table 5-5. Time Distribution for Population to Prepare to E.vacuate **********************:********************************5-9 Table 5-6. Time Distribution for Population to Clear 611-811 of Snow ....................................... : .............. 5-10 Table 5-7. Mapping Distributions to Events ............................................................................................. 5-12 Table 5-8. Description of the Distributions ............................................................................................. 5-13 Table 5-9. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Un-staged Evacuation .................... 5-19 Table 5-10. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Staged Evacuation ....................... 5-21 Table 6-1. Description of Evacuation Regions ...............................................................*........................... 6-4 Table 6-2. Evacuation* scenario Definitions ............................................................................................... 6-8 Table 6-3. PercE;?nt of Population Groups Evacuating for Various Scenarios ............... : ............................ 6-9 Table 6-4. by Scenario ........................... .................................................................... 6-10 Table 7-1. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population ........................... 7-9 Table 7-2. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population .....................** 7-10 Table Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region ............................ 7-11 Table 7-4. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region .......................... 7-12 Table 7-5. Description of Evacuation Regions ................ , .............................................................. : ......... 7-13 Table 8-1. Transit-Dependent Population Estimates ; ...... : .................. .................................................. ,.8-13 Table 8-2. School, Preschool, and .Day Camp Population Demand Estimates ........................................ 8-14 Table 8-3. School; Preschool, and Day Camp Reception Centers .......................................*................... 8-15 Table 8-4. Medical Facility Transit Demand ........................................................... :: .... : .......................... 8-16 Tabl.e 8-5.* Summary of Transportation Resources ............. ; ............................... , ... : .......... : .......... .......... 8-17 Table 8-6.* :Bu_s RoutE! Descriptions .......................... : ..*.................. , ............................................................ 8-18 Table School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather .............. : .. ;8-23 Table 8-8, School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates-Rain ... , .....*. ; ....................... 8-24 Table 8-9. *School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow .... ... * ......................... 8-25 Table 8-10. Summary of Transit-Dependent BusRoutes; ............................................ :: ..... , ................ , .. 8-26 . . . . . . . . NMP/JAF viii KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation, Time Estimate February 241 2016
'Table 8-11. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather ........................................ 8-28 Table 8-12. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain ......................................................... 8-31 Table 8-13. Transit Dependent Evacuation Time* Estimates -Snow ....................................................... 8-34 Table 8-14. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather ............................................. 8-37 Table 8-15. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain ............................................................. 8-39 Table 8-16. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow ..................................................... ; ...... 8-41 Table 8-17. Homebound Special Needs Population Evacuation Time Estimates ................................... 8-43 Table 8-18. Correctional Facilities Evacuation Time Estimates ............................................................... Table 12-1. Estimated Number of Telephone Calls Required for Confirmation of Evacuation .............. 12-2 Table A-1. Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms .................................................................................... A-1 Table C-1. Selected Measures of Effectiveness Output by DYNEV II ......................... : ... : .......................... C-2 Table C-2. Input Requirements for the DYNEV II Model ........................................................................... C-3 Table C-3. Glossary ........... * ......................................................................................................................... C-8 Table E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ .................................................................. E-2 Table E-2. Medical Facilities within the EPZ.; ............................................................................................ E-3 Table E-3. Major Employers within the EPZ ...................................................... , ....................................... E-4 Table E-4. Recreational Attractions and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ ........................................... E-5 Table E-5. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ ......................................... : .................................................... E-6 Table E-6. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ ....................................................................................... E-6 Table F-'l. NMP/JAF Telephone Survey Sampling Plan ............................................................................. F-2 Table H-1. Percent of Sub-Area Population Evacuating for Each Region ... ; ............................................. H-2 Table J-1. Characteristics of the Ten Highest Volume Signalized Intersections, .......... ; ............................ J-2 Table J-2. Samp'le Simulation Model Input ............................................................................................... J-3 Table J-3. Selected Model Outputs for the Evacuation of the Entire EPZ (Region R03) ........................... J-4 Table J-4. Average Speed (mph) and Travel Time (min) for Major Evacuation Routes (Region R03', Scenario 1) .......... ; .................................................................................................... ; J-5 Table Simulation Model Outputs at Network Exit Links for Region R03, Scenario 1 ....... , ................. J-6 Table Evacuation Roadway Network Characteristics ................................. .................................... K-35. Table.k-2. Nodes in the Link-Node Analysis Network which are Controlled .......................................... K-83 Table M-1. Evacuation Time Estimates for Trip Generation Sensitivity Study, ............... : ...................... M-1 Table M-2. Evacuation Time Estimates for Shadow Sensitivity Study .............................. '. ..................... M-2 Table M-3. ETE Variation with Population Change""'.""""""""."'"""""""""""""""'""""""""""""" M-4 Table N-1. ETE Review Criteria Checklist ................................................................................................. N-1 *. NMP/JAF. Evacuation Time Estimate i.x KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 i I I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to update the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP) and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF). NMP and JAF are located on adjacent parcels of land in Oswego County, New York. ETE are part of the required planning basis and provide Exelon Generation (Exelon) and Entergy, along with state and local governments with site-specific information needed for Protective Action decision-making. In the performance of this effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are:
- NUREG/CR-7002, SAND 2010-0061P, "Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies," November 2011. (NRC, 2011a).
- NUREG/CR-1745, "Analysis *of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times Emergency Planning Zones," November 1980. (NRC, 1980a).
- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980. (NRC, 1980b).
- NUREG/CR-6863, SAND2004-5900, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants," January 2005. (NRC, 2005).
- Title 10, Code of .Federal Regulations, Appendix E to Part 50 (10CFR50) -Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 2011. (NRC, 2011b) .. Overview of Project Activities This study was adapted from the previous ETE study (KLD TR-521 dated November 2012) with * . the exception that potential evacuation areas were defined using the sixteen cardinal wind directions (in accordance with federal guidance) based on consultation with Exelon and Entergy in November 2015. The previous ETE study began in March 2012 and extended over a period of 8 months. The major activities performed as part of this updated study are briefly described
- below in chronological sequence:
- Held conference calls with personnel from Exelon and Entergy to discuss the updated regions and scope of work. * . Accessed U.S. Census Bureau data files for the year 2010 and projected it to 2015. Studied Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps of the area in the vicinity of the . NMP/JAF, then conducted a detailed field survey of the highway network. * *'synthesized this information to create an analysis network representing the highway system topology and capacities within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), plus a Shadow Region covering the region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15
- miles radially from the plants .. NMP/JAF ES-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016.
- Utilized the results of a telephone survey conducted in 2012 of residents within the EPZ to gather focused data needed for this ETE study that were not contained within the census database. The survey instrument was reviewed and modified by the licensees and offsite response organization (ORO) personnel prior to conducting the survey in 2012.
- Data pertaining to employment, transients, and special facilities in Oswego County that was collected in 2012 was reviewed and utilized. *
- The traffic demand and trip-generation rates of evacuating vehicles were estimated from the gathered data. The trip generation rates reflected the estimated mobilization time (Le., the time required by evacuees to prepare for the evacuation trip) computed using the results of the 2012 telephone survey of EPZ residents.
- The EPZ is subdivided into 29 ERPAs. Following federal guidelines, these ERPAs are then grouped within circular areas or "keyhole" configurations (circles plus radial sectors and site specific adjustments) that define a total of 29 Evacuation Regions.
- The external circumstances are represented as Evacuation Scenarios, each described in terms of the following factors: (1) Season (Summer, Winter); (2) Day of Week (Midweek, Weekend); (3) Time of Day (Midday, Evening); and (4) Weather (Good, Rain, Snow). One special event scenario involving the Harborfest fireworks display was considered. One roadway impact scenario was considered wherein a single lane was dosed on SR 481 southbound for the duration of the evacuation.
- Staged evacuation was considered for those regions wherein the 2 mile radius and sectors downwind to 5 miles were evacuated.
- As per NUREG/.CR-70,02, the Planning Basis for the calculation of ETE is:
- A rapidly escalating accident at the NMP/JAF that quickly assumes the status of General Emergency such that the Advisory to Evacuate is virtually coincident with the siren alert, and no early protective actions have been implemented.
- While an unlikely accident scenario, this planning basis will yield ETE, measured as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the stated percentage of the population exits the impacted Region, that represent "upper bound" estimates.* This conservative Planning Basis is applicable for all initiating events.
- If the emergency occurs while schools and day camps are in session, the ETE study assumes that the children will be evacuated by bus directly to reception centers' located at the New York State Fairgrounds, outside the EPZ. Parents, relatives, and neighbors are advised to not pick up their children at schools and day camps prior to the arrival of the buses dispatched for that purpose. The ETE for children at these facilities are calculated separately.
- Evacuees who do not have access to a private vehicle will either ride-share with relatives, friends or neighbors, or be evacuated by buses provided as specified in the NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate ES-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016 county evacuation plans. Those in special facilities will likewise be evacuated with public transit, as needed: bus or van, wheelchair bus or van, or ambulance, as required. Separate ETE are calculated for the transit-dependent evacuees, for homebound special needs population, and for those evacuated from special facilities. Computation of ETE A total of 406 ETE were computed for the evacuation of the general public. Each ETE quantifies the aggregate evacuation time estimated for the population within one of the 29 Evacuation Regions to evacuate from that Region, under the circumstances defined for one of the 14 Evacuation Scenarios (29 x 14 = 406). Separate ETE are calculated for transit-dependent evacuees, including children, for applicable scenarios. Except for Region R03, which is the evacuation of the entire EPZ, only a portion of the people within the EPZ would be advised to evacuate. That is, the Advisory to Evacuate applies only to those people occupying the specified impacted region. It is assumed that 100 percent of the people within the impacted region will evacuate in response to this Advisory. The people occupying the remainder of the EPZ outside the impacted region may be advised to take shelter. The computation of ETE assumes that 20% of the population within the EPZ but outside the impacted region, will elect to "voluntarily" evacuate. In addition, 20% of the population in the Shadow Region will also elect to evac.uate. These voluntary evacuees could impede those who are evacuating from within the impacted region .. The impedance that could be caused by voluntary evacuees is considered in the computation of ETE for the impacted region. Staged evacuation is considered wherein those_ people within the 2-mile region evacuate immediately, while those beyond 2 miles, but within the EPZ, shelter-in-place. Once 90% of the 2-mile region is evacuated; those. people beyond 2 miles begin to evacuate. As per federal -guidance, 20% of people beyond 2 miles will evacuate (hon-compliance) .even though they are advised to shelter-in-place. The computational procedure is outlined as follows:
- A link-node representation of the highway network is coded. Each *link represents a unidirectional length of highway; each node usually represents an intersection or merge point. *The capacity of each link is estimated based on the field survey observations and on established traffic-engineering procedt.ires. -* The evacuation trips are generat_ed'.af locations called. "zonal centroids" located within the EPZ and Shadow Region. The trip generation rates vary over time reflecting the --mobilization process, and from one location (centroid) to another depending on population density and on whether a centroid is within, or outside, the impacted area. *. The evacuation model computes the routing patterns for evacuating vehicles that are -compliant with federal guidelines (outbound relative to the location of the plants), and simulates the traffic flow movements over space and time. This simulation process . estimates the rate that traffic flow exits the impacted region. NMP/JAF ES-3 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 The ETE statistics provide the elapsed times for go percent and 100 percent, respectively, of the population within the impacted region, to evacuate from within the impacted region. These statistics are presented in tabular and graphical formats. The goth percentile ETE have been identified as the values that should be considered when making protective action decisions because the 1ooth percentile ETE are prolonged by those relatively few people who take longer to mobilize. This is referred to as the "evacuation tail" in Section 4.0 of NUREG/CR-7002. The use of a public outreach (information) program to emphasize the need for evacuees to minimize the time needed to prepare to evacuate (secure the home, assemble needed clothes, medicines, etc.) should also be considered. Traffic Management This study references the comprehensive traffic management plans provided by Oswego County; no additional traffic or access control measures have been identified as a result of this study. Selected Results A compilation of selected information is presented on the following pages in the form of figures and tables extracted from the body of the report; these are described below. * . Figure 6-1 displays a map of the NMP/JAF EPZ showing the layout of the 2g ERPAs that *comprise, in aggregate, the EPZ.
- Table 3-3 presents the estimates of permanent resident population in each ERPA based on the 2010 Census and used 2014 growth rates tb project out to 2015.
- Table 6-1 defines each of the 2g Evacuation Regions in terms of their respective groups of ERPAs. *
- Table 6-2 defines the Evacuation Scenarios.
- Tables 7-1 and 7-2 are compilations of ETE. These data are the times needed to clear the indicated regions of go and 100 percent of the population occupying these regions, . respectively. These computed ETE include consideration of mobiliza.tion time and of estimated voluntary evacuations from other regions within the EPZ and from the Shadow Region. * .* Tables 7-3 and 7-4 present ETE for the :2-mile region for Lin-staged and staged for the goth and 1ooth percentiles, respectively. .
- Table 8-7 presents ETE for the children at schools and day camp in good weather.
- Table 8-11 presents ETE forthe transit-dependent population in good weather.
- Figure H-8 presents an example of an Evacuation Region (Region ROS) to be evacuated under the circumstances defined in Table 6-1.
- Maps of all regions are provided in Appendix H.
- Conclusions
- General population ETE were computed for 406 unique cases ...:. a* combination of 2g unique Evacuation Regions and 14 unique Evacuation Scenarios. Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 NMP/JAF * ,ES-4 * .. KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 document these ETE for the goth and 1ooth percentiles. These ETE range from 1:30 (hr: min) to 5:20 at the goth percentile.
- Inspection of Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 indicates that the ETE for the 10oth percentile are significantly longer than those for the goth. percentile. These ETE range from 3:30 (hr:min) to 7:20 at the 1ooth percentile. This is the result of the congestion within the EPZ. When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the EPZ cit rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ. Towards the end of the process, relatively few evacuation routes service the remaining demand. See Figures 7-8 through 7-21.
- Inspection of Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 indicates that a staged evacuation provides no benefits to evacuees from within the 2 mile region and unnecessarily delays the evacuation of those beyond 2 miles (compare Regions R04 through RlO with R22 through R28 respectively and R02 with R2g, in Tables 7-1 and 7-2). See Section 7.6 for additional discussion.
- Comparison of Scenarios 5 (summer, midweek/weekend, evening) and 13 (summer, weekend, evening) in Table 7-2 .indicates that the special event raises the goth and 10oth percentile ETE by 2:55 and 3:40, respectively. See Section 7.5 for additional discussion.
- Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 7-1 indicates that the roadway closure -one lane southbound on SR* 481 increases the goth percentile ETE by 5 minutes -not a material impact on ETE -and has no impact on the 1ooth percentile ETE. See Section 7.5 fo(additional discussion.
- The Cities of Oswego is the most congested area in the EPZ during an evacuation. The . last locations in the EPZ to exhibit traffic congestion are SR 104 west of the City of Oswego CR 7, Rathburn Rd and Ridge Rd. All congestion within the EPZ clears by 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> * .. and 50 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate. See Section 7.3 and Figures 7-3 through 7-8.
- Separate ETE were computed for schools, day camp, medical facilities, correctional facilities, transit-dependent persons, and homebound special needs persons. The average single-wave ETE for schools, day medical facilities, transit dependents and correctional facilities are within a similar range as the general population ETE at the goth percentile. ETE for homebound special needs persons exceeds the goth percentile ETE for the general population. See Section 8.
- Table 8-5 indicates that there are scarcely enough buses, wheelchair buses and ambulances available to evacuate the transit-dependent population within the EPZ in a *single wave. However, mutual aid agreements would be invoked to address any potential shortfalls. See Sections 8.4 and 8.5.
- The ETE for the full EPZ general population are insensitive to reductions in the base trip generation time of 3Yz hours due to the traffic congestion within the EPZ. See Table M-1. *
- The general population ETE is relatively insensitive fo the voluntary evacuation of vehicles in the Shadow Region (a full shadow evacuation percentage increases the goth *percentile ETE by 5 minutes and increases lOOth percentile ETE by 25 minutes). See .Table M-2. NMP/JAF ES-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuatiori Time Estimate February 24, 2016 J
- A Population increase of 22% or more results in ETE changes which meet the criteria for updating ETE between decennial Censuses. See Section M.3. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate ES-6 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016.
NMP/JAF Lake Ontario Legend
- NMP/JAF GJ ERPA '--:::.. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Evacuation Time Estimate Figure 6-1. NMP/JAF EPZ ERPAs ES-7 nc:'.u'"n'ryUy * £.l.-'( " c-'-...._ V North ' Pond / j\ -* -i iV) r:D 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 3-3. EPZ Permanent Resident Population : * , *... * *.E:RPA _,, **.*i. ***. * *2o*i:o'Po Uiiiflen .. * *:f ,:;P:firlis:Po ulatian ' ! '" * < * *
- nc,
- o.* * '*** o
- p * *'<* -** .* '*"* .J? ,**
- 1 173 172 2 469 465 3 343 337 4 687 690 5 804 786 6 915 896 7 699 700 8 718 720 9 597 599 10 1,023 1,002 11 1,916 1,875 12 7,960 7,894 13 10,223 10,121 14 193 193 15 1,105 1,104 16 1,624 1,585 17 587 587 18 1,030 1,021 19 1,316 1,295 20 1,783 1,756 21 1,782 1,741 22 5,940' 5,884 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0 ; *. .;i il1 .,,e w * . .*.. *.. fllii :tl1
- 8.87-f .. 1 + ** I
- EPZ Population Growth: -1.11% NMP/JAF ES-8 KLD Engineering,.P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 6-1. Description of Evacuation Regions Region* Description ERPA '13 14 15 16 .17 18 19 20 21 '22 23 24 29 ROl
- Radius ROZ 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction ERPA From 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 E, ESE, SE, SSE, N/A s;ssw,.sw, Refer to ROl WSW R04 w .ROS WNW
- R06 NW, NNW R07 N ROS NNE R09 NE RlO ENE Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to EPZ Boundary Region Wind Direction ERPA From 5 6 7 *8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Rll E, ESE, SE R12 SSE, S, SSW R13 SW R14 WSW RlS w R16 WNW R17 NW R18 NNW R19 N R20 .NNE, l\IE R21 ENE NMP/JAF ES-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- Staged -Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction From ERPA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 . 29 N/A E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW Reflirto ROl R22 w R23 WNW R24 NW,NNW R25 N R26 NNE R27. NE R28 ENE R29 5-Mile Radius . NMP/JAF ES-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 6-2. Evacuation Scenario Definitions ' *' .. Day of Time of Scenario season1 Week . Di;iy W¢ather :; Special **' . ' ' .. . ,*. -* . 1 Summer Midweek *Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None 5 Summer Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None 12 Winter Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 13 Summer Weekend Evening Good Harborfest Fireworks 14 Sum.mer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Impact -Lane Closure on SR 481 SB 1 Winter assumes that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer assumes that school is not in session. NMP/JAF ES-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-1. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday *Region Good Rain Good Rain Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ R01 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 '1:30 1:30. 2:00 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 R02 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 .1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 R03 2:35. . 2:40 2:30 2:45 *2:25 2:55 3:00 3:15. 2:20 . 2:50 i:25 5:15 2:30 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04
- 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:35 1:35 ROS 1:40 1:40 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05. 1:35 1:35 1:40 ROG .. 1:45 1:45 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:45 1:45 2:10 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:30 1:45 R07 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45. . 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 ROS 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 . 1:40 1:50 R09 1:45 1:45 . 1:40 1:40 1:40 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 RlO 1:35 1:35 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:35 1:35 1:55 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary RU 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30* 1:30 .2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R12 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30' 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R13 1:40 1:40 1:30 1:30 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:35 1:40 R14 1:45 1:45 1:40 1:50 1:35 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 R15 1:50 1:50 1:45 2:00 1:35 1:50 1:55 2:15 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:50 R16 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:50 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:35 1:50 R17 1:50 1:50 1:35 1:40 1:40 1:50 1:55 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R18 1:50 1:50 1:40 1:40 1:40 1:50 1:50 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R19 *2:35 2:50 2:35 2:50 2:25 2:55 3:05 3:15 2:25 2:35 2:45 2:20 5:20 2:40 R20 2:40 2:45 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:50 ' 3:05 3:20 2:30 2:35 2:50 2:25 5:15 2:35 R21 2:30 2:45 . 2:30 2:40 2:25 2:50 3:00 3:15 2:20 2:30 2:40 2:20 5:10. 2:35 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:55 1:55 1:55 1,:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 2:25 1:55 1:55 2:30 1:55 1:55 1:55 R23 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:00 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R24 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:35 2:05 2:05 . 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:05 R25 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:20 2:20 2:15 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:15 R26 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:20 R27 2:15 2:15 . 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 . 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:10 2:15 R28 1:55 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:55 1:55 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R29 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:20 2:15 2:15 NMP/JAF ES-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
! Table 7-2. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population
- Region R01 .**.ROZ R03 R04 ROS R06. R07 ROS RO!i RlO Rll R12 R13 R14 RlS R16 R17 R18 Rl!i RZO R21 R22 R23 .R24 R25 R26 . R27 R28 R29
- NMP/JAF Summer Summer Midweek .Weekend Midday .. Midday Good Weather 3:30 3:35 *******3:40' 3:35 3js. . 3:35 ':3:35 3:35 . 3;35* 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 . 3:4o
- 3:40 3.:40 3:40 . 3:40' 3:40 3:35' 3:35 3:35 :fas 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 'Rain Good* Rain 3:30 '3:30 ,3:30 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:40 3:40 . 3:40. 3:35 . 3:35. 3:35 3:35 3:35 ,3:35 .* 3:35. ' 3:35 . 3:35' . 3:35 *.. 3;35 ' .. 3:35 3:35 ... 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:3s*.* 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:30' 3:30 .3:3o . 3:30
- 3:40 '3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40, 3:40 3:40 ... 3:40 .3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 ' 3:40, 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40' 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 *. 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3.:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Evacuation Time Estimate Summer M.id.week Weekend Evening Winter Midweek Midday .Winter Weekend Midday Good. Weather *Good *Rain* Weather* Good Snow
- Rain
- Snow *weather Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ',3:30' . 3:30 3:30' 4:15 . . 3:30 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:4o 3:so 3*:ss 4:25 3:4o ... 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 4!20 3:35 3:35 3:3,5 3.:35 . . 3:35 4:20 4:20 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:15 4:20 4:25 4:20 4:20. . 4:20 .4:20' 3:35 . 3;35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 .* 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 ' .. 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 4:20 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary 3:30. 3:30
- 3:30 4:is 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30* 3:40. 3:40 . 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 ' 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 '3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40 3.:40 3:40 3:55 '3:55 3:45 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:2s 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 3:40 ' 3:40 ,* .. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40.' 3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 1' 3:35* . 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 4:20 3:35 4:20 3:35'. 4:20 3:35 4:20 ES-13 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:15 4:15 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25. 4:25 4:25' 4:25 4:25 '4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Winter Midweek Weekend Evening Good Weather *. 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 .. 3:30. 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 .. 3:,40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Weekend Evening Special Event 3:30 3:35 7:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30' 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40. 7:20 7:10 7:10 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Midweek Midday Roadway Impact 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35. 3:35 3:30 3:36 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3':40 3:40 3:35. 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35, 3:35 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 7-3. Time to Clear 90 Percent of the 2-Mile Region Summer. Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter
- Summer* Summer Midweek Weekend .Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain *Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather . Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ROl **.1:30 .. 1:30. 1:30 1:30'
- 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R02 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 .
- 1:30 _1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30. 1:30 i:30 2-MHe Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30
- 1:30 1:30 1:30 l:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30 *1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .. 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROG 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R07 1:30 :1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:05 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R09 1:30 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30. 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R10 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:30 1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R23 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R24 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R25 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R26 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R27 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R28 1:30 1:30 i:30 1:30 1:30 . 1:30. 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R29 1:30 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 NMP/JAF . ES-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time* Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-4. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2-Mile Region Summer Summer -Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) '* (4) (5) (I;) . . , (7) *(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . (i3)' (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ R01 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30. 3:30 3:30 R02 3:30 3:30 3;30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROG 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R07 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R09 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 -3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R10 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R23 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R24 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R25 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R26 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R27 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R28 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R29 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 NMP/JAF ES-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-7. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Time Estimates -Good Weather Dist. To Travel Dist. EPZ Travel Time Driver Loading EPZ Average Time to Bdryto from EPZ ETEto Mobilization Time Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE R.C. Bdryto H.S. H.S. School, Preschool, or Day Camp Time (min) (min) (mi) (mph) (min) (hr:min) (mi.) (min) (hr:min) Ontario Bible Conference2 90 15 13.0 14.7 53 2:40 26.9 30 ):10, New Haven Elementary School 90. 15 7.4 47.0 10 1:55 28.9 32 2:30 School Age Children Care Program 90 15 11.7 13.8 51 2:401 26.9 30 ... 3:10 Charles E. Riley Elementary 90 15 6.8 . 9.4 44 2:30 26.9 30 3:00 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 90 15 7.9 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Headstart of Oswego 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Little Luke's Childcare Center 90 15 7.3 9.4 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Oswego Community Christian School 90 15 9.2 11.1 50 2:35 26.9 30 .3:05 Trinity Catholic School 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 90 15 9.7 10.3 57 2:45 26.9 30 . 3:15 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 90 15 9.1 9.8 57 , ..
- 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Kingsford Park Elementary 90 15 6.7 23.4 18 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Oswego High School 90 15 8.6 10.0 52 2:40* 26.9 30 3:10 Oswego Mi.ddle School 90 15 5.2 23.6 14 2:00 26.8 30 .. Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 90 15 6.7 22.1 19 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Mexico Elementary School 90 15 4.5 48.9 6 1:55 30.4 34 . 2:25 Mexico High School 90 15 4.8 47.3 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 .. Mexico Middle School 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 Center for Instructional Technology a.nd 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 31.4 35 2:30 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES)3 Minetto Elementary School 90 15 2.2 45.6 3 1:50 26.8 30 2:20 SUNYOswego 90 15 9.9 10.1 59 2:45 26.9 30 *3:15
- Palermo Elementary School 90 15 Located outside the EPZ 27.8 31 2:20 Maximum for EPZ: 1.: .. < Maximum: 3:15 Average for EPZ: ** Average: .. 2:55 , .. 2 According to Oswego County officials, Ontario Bible Conference, included in this table, is a summer camp program that requires 2 buses from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The rest of the year, the camp is open to retreats for family events for which they can furnish their own transportation. 3 Oswego County BOCES is now known as the Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Citi). NMP/JAF ES-16 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 Table 8-11. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 1 1 90 18.5.
- 13.9 80 30 *3:20 26.9 29 5 10 70 30 5:45 2 1 90 16.6 14.0 71 30 3:15 26.9 29 5 10 66 30 5;35 3 1 90 16.2 45.9 21 30 2:25 28.9 32 5 10 . 69 30 4:55 4 1 90 9.7 46.4 13 30 2!15 . 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30 5 1 90 8.7 44.6 12 30 2:15 28.9 32 5 10 51 30 4:25 6 1 90 . 9.9 47.3 13 30 2:15 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30 . 7 1 90 10.2 4q.7 13 30 2:15 30.4 33 5 10 56 30 4:30 *8 1 90 9.2 47.3 12 30 2:15. 30.4 33 5 10 54 30 4:30 9. 1 90 10.4 43.2 14 30 . 2:15 30.4 33 5 10 57 30 4:35 10 1 90 8.3 45.6 11 30 2:15 30.4 33 5 10 51 30 4:25 11 1 90 10.3 52.2 12 30 2:15. 30.4 33 5 10 55 30 4:30 12 1 90 11.1 9.0 74 30 3:15 26.9 29 5 10' 54 30 5:25 13 1 90 12.5 10.1 75 30 .' 3:15* 26.9 29 5 10 57 30 5:30 14 1 90 17.1 10.8 95 30 3:35 26.9 29 5 10 68 30 6:00 15 1 90 17.7 12.2 87 30 3:30 26.9 29 5 10 69 30 . 5:55 16 1 90 19.0 13.4 85 30 .3:30 26.9 29 5 10 72 30 '6:00 17 1 90 7.1 47.4 9 30 2:10 28.9 32 5 10 48 30 4:15 18 1 90 10.4 47.4 13 30 28.9 32 5 10 55 30 4:30 19 1 . 90 9.8 46.6 13 30 2:15 35.4 39 5 10 62 30 4:45 20 1 90 8.9 48.4 11 30 2:15 35.4 39 5 . 10 59 30 4;40 21 1 90 16.3 36.6* 27 30 2:30 35.4 39 5 10 80 30 5:15 22 1 90 12.1 45.0 16 30 2:20 30.4 33 5 10 60 30 4:40. 23 1 90 8.3 45.0 11 30 2:15. 30.4 33 5 10 52 30 4:25 24 . 1 90 6.9 48.4 9 30 2:10 35.4 39 5 10 54 30 4:30 25 1 90 10.5 11.1 57 30 3:00 26.9 29 5 10 53 30 5:10 26 1 90 11.2 .11.2 60 30 3:00. 26.9 29 5 10 54 30 5:10 27 1 90 9.9 8.0 74 30 3::!-5 26.9 29 5 10 52 30 5:25 28 1 90 8.2 14.2 35 30 2:35 26.9 29 5 10 47 30 4:40 29 1 90 9.8 7.7 76 30 3:20 26.9 29 5 10 51 30 5:30 NMP/JAF ES-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Route Bus Mobilization Number Number (min) 31. 1 .90. *. 32 1 90 33 1 90 1
- 34 1. 90 35 1 90 36 1 90 37 1 90 38 1 90 39. 1 90 40 1 90 * .. '*41 1 90 42 1 90 43 1 90 44 1. 90 45 1 90 46 1 90 47 1 90 48 1 90 49 1 90 50 1 90 51 1 90 5? 1 . 90 53 1 90 54 1 90 55. 1 90 56 1 90 57 1 90 58 1 90 59* 1 90 60 1 90 61 1* 90 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Route Length (miles) 8.8 3.4 7.9 8.0 8.6 . 6.S 9.2 6.S 7.6 6.6 8.3 8.7 10.0 9.9 Q.8 9.2 8.4 8.6 10.7 10.0 . 10.6 9.6 17.9 4.1 9.2 9.2 S.3 8.S 6.S 7.0 7.4 One-Wave Route Travel Speed Time (mph) (min) 73 8.4 24. 8.4 S6 8.4 S7 7.9 6S 20.6 I 19 11:s I _ 32 17.S I 22 4.S I . 102 19.0 I . 21 4.6 I 107 s.o I 10s. 8.3 72 20.1 I 29 10.6 I SS 20.1 I 27 46.4 I . 11 46.4 I 11 12.1 I S3* 12.0 I so 8.0. I 79 8.3 I 69 4S.1 I 24 44.9 I s 47.7
- I 12
- 47.7 I .12 47.7 I 7 39.0 I 13 39.9 I 10 39.0 I 11 39.0 I . 11 Travel Pickup Distance Time to Time ETE to R. C. R. C. (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) 30 26.9 29 30 2:25* 26.9 29 30 I*. 3:00\* 26.9 29 30 I
- 3:00 26.9 29 30 I 3:10 26.9 29 30 I '2:20 26.8 29' 30 I 2:35 26.8 29 30 I 2:25 26.8 29 .30 I 3:45 26.8 29 30 I .2:25 26.8 29 . 30 I 3:50
- 26.8 29 30 I -3:45 26.8 29 30 I
- 3:15 26.8 29 30 I 2:30 . 26.8 29 30 I 3:00 26.8 29 30 I 2:30. 26.8 29 30 I 2:15 28.9 32 30 I .2:15 28.9 32 30 I . 2:55. 26.9 29 3o I 2:56 26.9 29 30 I 3:20 26.9 29 30 I 3:10 26.9 29 30 I
- 2:25 30.4 33 30 I 2:10 28.9 32 30 I 2:15 28.9 32 30 I
- 2:15
- 28.9 32 30 I 2:10** 28.9 32 30 I 2:15 26.9 29 30 I 2:10. 26.9 29 30 I . 2:15 26.9 29 30 I. 2:15 26.9 29 ES-18 Unload (min) *S s s s s s s s s s 5 s s s s 5 s s s s s s s s s
s s s s s s Two-Wave . 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 .10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 . 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Route Travel Time (min) 48 36 46 46 48 44 so 44 46 44 49 49 S3 S2 S2 50 S1 S1 S3 S1 S2 S1 73 42 S2 S2 44 49 4S 46 4S Pie up Time ETE (min) (hr:min) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 5:20 :20. 5:05,, 5:05. *5!15 4:20 4:40 **4:25 ' .. 5:50 *4:25 5:55. 5:50. 5:25 4:40 5:10 4:25 4:25 5:05 4:55 5:30 5:15 5:00 4:10 4:25 4:25 4:15' '4:20 4:10 4:15 4:15 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Route
- Number 63 --64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 -73 74 75 76. NMP/JAF Blls Number -1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l\(lobilization (min) "0 90 90 90 90 90 _90 90 90 --90 90 90 90 90 -_ 90 Evacuation Time Estimate 5.2 46.3 -7 30 5.2 -45.8 7 30 7.6 40.3 11 30 4.4 40.3 7 30 4.6 40.3-7 30 -6.1 40.3 9 30 -5.6. 46.3 -7 30 9_.7 4.9 119-30 8.4 5.0 ioo 30 -5.8 3.0 117 30 3.9 6.7 35 30 4.2 6.3 40 30 11.1 8.0 83 30 4.7 48.4 6 30 -Travel t' " '"' *
- Qistance Time to ETE .'. C. (hr:min)':_:; (miles).'* (min) . . . 26.8 29 :2:10;*--*-26.8 29 2!15 ' 26.8 29 *' 2:10;;:* 26.8 29 ::;;"2:10;-.-; -26.8 -29 *** *2:1cf> 26.8 29 ;* '-2.:10: --* 26._8 29 ,: 4:op*--*--26.8 29 1:2; 3!45;;;. 26.8 29 .;; ... 4:00 .---37.7 41 ;*2:35* 37.7 41 *.. ; 37.7 41 ,'.. __ 26.9 29 35.4 39 ES-19 Unload (min) 5 5 5 5-5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 _5 5 two-Wave Route Driver Travel Pickup Rest Time Time ETE (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) I 10 41 10 42 10 51 10 54 10 56 10 55 10 42 10 51 -10 48 10 54 10 50 10 51 10 53 10 49 30 30 30 30 30 .30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 ' , I , I 4:20_ 4:20.-4:10 .6:10: ---5:50 ---6:20 4:'55_ ---5:00 ; 5:35 -;_ 4:25 :lill't55';;4$W\ lk ,,,,, ",' c KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate .. 1 ICLO Enclneerlnc, helon Generatlon, Entersv 10 Figure H-8. Region ROS ES-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 1 INTRODUCTION This report describes the analyses undertaken and the results obtained by a study to develop updated Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (NMP/JAF), located in Oswego County, NY. ETE provide Exelon Generation {Exelon) and Entergy, along with state and local governments with site-specific information needed for Protective Action decision-making. In 2012, an ETE was developed for the NMP/JAF site {KLD TR-521). Regions, grouping of contiguous evacuating ERPAs that forms either a "keyhole" sector-based area, or a circular area within the EPZ, that must be evacuated in response to a radiological emergency, were developed for the 2012 study using specific degree measures. This study has redefined the regions for NMP/JAF site to conform to the 16 cardinal wind directions, as per federal guidance discussed in NUREG/CR-7002. In the performance of this effort, guidance is provided by documents published by Federal Governmental agencies. Most important of these are:
- NUREG/CR-7002, SAND 2010-0061P, "Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies," November 2011. (NRC, 2011a).
- NUREG/CR-1745, "Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones," November, 1980. (NRC, 1980a).
- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980. (NRC, 1980b).
- NUREG/CR-6863, SAND2001-5900, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants," January 2005. (NRC, 2005).
- Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix E to Part SO {lOCFRSO) -Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, 2011. (NRC, 2011b). The work effort reported herein was supported and guided by local stakeholders who contributed suggestions, critiques, and the local knowledge base required. Table 1-lpresents a summary of stakeholders and interactions. NMP/JAF 1-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 1-1. Stakeholder Interaction Stakeholder Nature of Stakeholder Interaction Exelon emergency planning personnel Conference calls to define data requirements and revised regions, as well as set up contacts with local Reviewed and government agencies. Entergy Emergency planning personnel approved all project assumptions. Reviewed and commented on draft ETE report. Provided local emergency plans. Reviewed and Oswego County Emergency Management Office approved all project assumptions. Reviewed and commented on draft ETE report. Provided state emergency plan. Reviewed and New York State Office of Emergency Management approved all project assumptions. Reviewed draft ETE report. Local and State Police Agencies Provided existing traffic management plans. Reviewed draft ETE report. 1.1 Overview of the ETE Process The following outline presents a brief description of the work effort in chronological sequence: 1. Information Gathering: a. Defined the revised regions and scope of work in discussions with representatives from Exelon/Entergy. b. Attended meetings in 2012 with emergency planners from the New York State Office of Emergency Management and Oswego County Emergency Management and local law enforcement to identify issues to be addressed and resources available. c. Conducted a detailed field survey in 2012 of the highway system and of area traffic conditions within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ} and Shadow Region. d. Obtained demographic data from the 2010 Census and state and local agencies. Projected 2010 Census data to the year 2015 (see Section 3.1}. e. Utilized data from 2012 random sample telephone survey of EPZ residents. f. Utilized data from 2012 and updated accordingly to identify and describe schools, special facilities, major employers, transient attractions, transportation providers, and other important information. 2. Estimated distributions of Trip Generation times representing the time required by various population groups (permanent residents, employees, and transients} to prepare (mobilize} for the evacuation trip. These estimates are primarily based upon the random sample telephone survey. 3. Defined Evacuation Scenarios. These scenarios reflect the variation in demand, in trip NMP/JAF 1-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 generation distribution and in highway capacities, associated with different seasons, day of week, time of day and weather conditions. 4. Reviewed the existing traffic management plan to be implemented by local and state police in the event of an incident at NMP/JAF. Traffic control is applied at specified Traffic Control Points (TCP) located throughout the study area. 5. Used existing ERPAs to define Evacuation Regions. The EPZ is partitioned into 29 ERPAs along jurisdictional and geographic boundaries. "Regions" are groups of contiguous ERPAs for which ETE are calculated. The configurations of these Regions reflect wind direction and the radial extent of the impacted area. Each Region, other than those that approximate circular areas, approximates a "key-hole section" within the EPZ as recommended by NUREG/CR-7002. 6. Estimated demand for transit services for persons at special facilities and for dependent persons at home. 7. Prepared the input streams for the DYNEV II system. a. Estimated the evacuation traffic demand, based on the available information derived from Census data, and from data provided by local and state agencies, Exelon, Entergy and from the telephone survey. b. Applied the procedures specified in the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM1) to the data acquired during the field survey, to estimate the capacity of all highway segments comprising the evacuation routes. (TRB, 2010). c. Developed the link-node representation of the evacuation network, which is used as the basis for the computer analysis that calculates the ETE. d. Calculated the evacuating traffic demand for each Region and for each Scenario. e. Specified selected candidate destinations for each "origin" (location of each "source" where evacuation trips are generated over the mobilization time) to support evacuation travel consistent with outbound movement relative to the location of NMP/JAF. 8. Executed the DYNEV II model to determine optimal evacuation routing and compute ETE for all residents, transients and employees ("general population") with access to private vehicles. Generated a complete set of ETE for all specified Regions and Scenarios. 9. Documented ETE in formats in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002. 10. Calculated the ETE for all transit activities including those for special facilities (schools, medical facilities, and correctional facilities), for the transit-dependent population and for homebound special needs population. 1 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM 2010), Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 2010. NMP/JAF 1-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 1.2 The Locations of Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick NMP/JAF are on adjacent parcels of land which border the southeast shore of Lake Ontario in the Town of Scriba in Oswego County, New York. The site is approximately 35 miles northwest of Syracuse, NY. The EPZ consists of parts of Oswego County and Lake Ontario. Figure 1-1 displays the area surrounding NMP/JAF. This map identifies the communities in the area and the major roads. NMP/JAF 1-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I L Legend Lake Ontario / / / I I I I I .. ,, -./:{ NMP/JAF o ... 8/29/2012 \ l '-_, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings / / I ,/ Copyright: ESRI lr::LO Englnl!1!1lng, Constl!llatlon Energy, Entl!rgy ----...... ' Lacona ' --..... / ' \ Altmar / -\ \ /1 *--, I ,/' / I Figure 1-1. Location of NMP/JAF Nuclear Power Plant NMP/JAF 1-5 Evacuation Time Estimate 20 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 1.3 Preliminary Activities These activities are described below. Field Surveys of the Highway Network KLD personnel drove the entire highway system within in 2012 the EPZ and the Shadow Region which consists of the area between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles radially from NMP/JAF. The characteristics of each section of highway were recorded. These characteristics are shown in Table 1-2: Table 1-2. Highway Characteristics
- Number of lanes
- Posted speed
- Lane width
- Actual free speed
- Shoulder type & width
- Abutting land use
- Interchange geometries
- Control devices
- Lane channelization & queuing
- Intersection configuration (including capacity (including turn bays/lanes) roundabouts where applicable)
- Geometrics: curves, grades (>4%)
- Traffic signal type
- Unusual characteristics: Narrow bridges, sharp curves, poor pavement, flood warning signs, inadequate delineations, toll booths, etc. Video and audio recording equipment were used to capture a permanent record of the highway infrastructure. No attempt was made to meticulously measure such attributes as lane width and shoulder width; estimates of these measures based on visual observation and recorded images were considered appropriate for the purpose of estimating the capacity of highway sections. For example, Exhibit 15-7 in the HCM 2010 indicates that a reduction in lane width from 12 feet (the "base" value) to 10 feet can reduce free flow speed (FFS) by 1.1 mph -not a material difference -for two-lane highways. Exhibit 15-30 in the HCM 2010 shows little sensitivity for the estimates of Service Volumes at Level of Service (LOS) E (near capacity), with respect to FFS, for two-lane highways. The data from the audio and video recordings were used to create detailed geographic information systems (GIS) shapefiles and databases of the roadway characteristics and of the traffic control devices observed during the road survey; this information was referenced while preparing the input stream for the DYNEV II System. As documented on page 15-5 of the HCM 2010, the capacity of a two-lane highway is 1, 700 passenger cars per hour in one direction. For freeway sections, a value of 2,250 vehicles per hour per lane is assigned, as per Exhibit 11-17 of the HCM 2010. The road survey has identified several segments which are characterized by adverse geometrics on two-lane highways which are reflected in reduced values for both capacity and speed. These estimates are consistent with the service volumes for LOS E presented in HCM 2010 Exhibit 15-30. These links may be NMP/JAF 1-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 identified by reviewing Appendix K. Link capacity is an input to DYNEV II which computes the ETE. Further discussion of roadway capacity is provided in Section 4 of this report. Traffic signals are either pre-timed (signal timings are fixed over time and do not change with the traffic volume on competing approaches), or are actuated (signal timings vary over time based on the changing traffic volumes on competing approaches). Actuated signals require detectors to provide the traffic data used by the signal controller to adjust the signal timings. These detectors are typically magnetic loops in the roadway, or video cameras mounted on the signal masts and pointed toward the intersection approaches. If detectors were observed on the approaches to a signalized intersection during the road survey, detailed signal timings were not collected as the timings vary with traffic volume. TCPs at locations which have control devices are represented as actuated signals in the DYNEV II system. If no detectors were observed, the signal control at the intersection was considered pre-timed, and detailed signal timings were gathered for several signal cycles. These signal timings were input to the DYNEV II system used to compute ETE, as per NUREG/CR-7002 guidance. Figure 1-2 presents the link-node analysis network that was constructed to model the evacuation roadway network in the EPZ and Shadow Region. The directional arrows on the links and the node numbers have been removed from Figure 1-2 to clarify the figure. The detailed figures provided in Appendix K depict the analysis network with directional arrows shown and node numbers provided. The observations made during the field survey were used to calibrate the analysis network. Telephone Survey A telephone survey was undertaken in 2012 to gather information needed for the evacuation study. Appendix F presents the survey instrument, the procedures used and tabulations of data compiled from the survey returns. These data were utilized to develop estimates of vehicle occupancy to estimate the number of evacuating vehicles during an evacuation and to estimate elements of the mobilization process. This database was also referenced to estimate the number of transit-dependent residents. Computing the Evacuation Time Estimates The overall study procedure is outlined in Appendix D. Demographic data were obtained from several sources, as detailed later in this report. These data were analyzed and converted into vehicle demand data. The vehicle demand was loaded onto appropriate "source" links of the analysis network using GIS mapping software. The DYNEV II system was then used to compute ETE for all Regions and Scenarios. Analytical Tools The DYNEV II System that was employed for this study is comprised of several integrated computer models. One of these is the DYNEV (DYnamic Network Evacuation) macroscopic simulation model, a new version of the IDYNEV model that was developed by KLD under contract with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). NMP/JAF 1-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF " Legend
- NMP/JAF O Node --Link Gl ERPA \....-:. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate "' O.te-:9/6/2012 ' Copyrlght:ESRIBasemapDilla ICtOEng!nttrlng,CbniteH.ilonEntr(IY.Entergy Figure 1-2. NMP/JAF Link-Node Analysis Network 1-8 Lacona Reservoir Altmar *@.*,* Constantia 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 DYNEV II consists of four sub-models:
- A macroscopic traffic simulation model (for details, see Appendix C).
- A Trip Distribution (TD), model that assigns a set of candidate destination (D) nodes for each "origin" (O) located within the analysis network, where evacuation trips are "generated" over time. This establishes a set of 0-D tables.
- A Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA), model Which assigns trips to paths of travel (routes) which satisfy the 0-D tables, over time. The TD and DTA models are integrated to form.the DTRAD (Dynamic Traffic Assignment and Distribution) model, as described in Appendix B.
- A Myopic Traffic Diversion model which diverts traffic to avoid intense, local congestion, if possible. Another software product developed by KLD, named UNITES (UNlfied Iransportation £ngineering was used to expedite data entry and to automate the production of output tables. The dynamics of traffic flow over the network are graphically animated using the software product, EVAN (Evacuation ANimator), developed by KLD. EVAN is GIS based, and displays stc;itistics such as LOS, vehicles discharged, average speed, and percent of vehicles evacuated, output by the DYNEV II System. The use of a GIS framework enables the user to zoom in on areas of congestion and query road name, town name and other geographical information. The procedure for applying the DYNEV II System within the framework of developing ETE is outlined in Appendix D. Appendix A is a glossary of terms. For the reader interested in an evaluation of the original model, 1-DYNEV, the following references are suggested:
- NUREG/CR-4873, PNL-:-6171, "Benchmark Study of the 1-DYNEV. Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code," (NRC, 1988a).
- NUREG/CR-4874, PNL-6172, "The Sensitivity of Evacuation Time Estimates to Changes in Input for the 1-:0YNEV Computer Code," (NRC, 1988b). The evacuation analysis procedures based upon theneed to:
- Route traffic along paths of travel that will expedite their travel from their respective points of origin to points put.side the EPZ.
- Restrict movement toward NMP/JAF to the extent practicable, and disperse traffic demand so as to avoid focusing demand on a limited number of highways .. ' '
- Move traffic in directions that are generally outbound, relative to the lo.cation of NMP/JAF. ' ' DYNEV II provides a detailecj description of traffic operations on the evacuation network. This description enables the analyst to identify bottlenecks and' to develop countermeasures that NMP/JAi=
- Evacuation* Time Estimate 1-9 Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 are designed to represent the behavioral responses of evacuees. The effects of these countermeasures may then be tested with th*e model. 1.4 Comparison with Prior ETE Study Table 1-3 presents a comparison of the present ETE study with the 2012 study. The major factors contributing to the differences between the ETE values obtained in this study and those of the previous study can be summarized as follows:
- The population has been updated using the 2010 US Census and projected out to 2015 using 2014 growth rates. EPZ population decreased by 1.11% since the last study, which contributes to the slightly shorter ETE.
- The number of regions considered was significantly reduced (54 in the previous study versus 29 in this study) due to the omission of slivers (sniall pieces of an ERPA within the keyhole that have little or no population -See Figure 6-2) and the use of the sixteen cardinal wind directions (22.5° sectors in accordance with federal guidelines, rather than the narrow sectors -as little as 4° -used in legacy PAR for the sites). Table 1-3. ETE Study Comparisons *" , . ' Topic Previous ETE Study **Current.J:JE *Study ArcGIS software using 2010 US ArcGIS Software using 2010 US Census Census blocks and projecting out Resident Population blocks; area ratio method used. to 2015 using 2014 population Basis changes published by the US Population= 41,887 Census; area ratio method used. Population= 41,423 Resident Population 2.39 persons/household, 1.24 evacuating 2.39 persons/household, 1.24 Vehicle Occupancy vehicles/household yielding: 1.93 evacuating vehicles/household persons/vehicle. yielding: 1.93 persons/vehicle. Employee estimates based on . Employee estimates based .on information information provided by Oswego Employee provided by Oswego County about major County about major employers employers in EPZ. 1.09 employees per in EPZ. 1.09 employees per Population vehicle based on telephone survey results. vehicle based on telephone Employees = 1; 714 survey results. Employees= 1,714 . NMP/JAF 1-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Topic Previous EJE Study Current EJE Study Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the results of Estimates based upon U.S. Census data and the telephone survey. the results of the telephone survey. A total Dispatching a total of 76 buses of 1,881 people who do not have access to a to provide transit for 1,860 Transit-Dependent vehicle, requiring at least 63 buses to people who do not have access evacuate. An additional 208 homebound to a vehicle. An additional 208 Population . special needs persons require transportation homebound special needs to evacuate (151 ambulatory and 57 persons require transportation wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 to evacuate (151 ambulatory and wheelchair vans). 57 wheelchair bound people, transported in 19 wheelchair vans). Transient estimates based upon . Transient estimates based upon information information provided about provided about transient attractions in EPZ, transient attractions in EPZ, Transient supplemented by observations of the supplemented by phone calls facilities during the road survey, internet made to facilities from the Population searches and from phone calls to facilities. previous 2012 ETE were Transients= 8,315 (including 2,349 reviewed. Transients= 8,495 commuting SUNY students). (including 2,349 commuting SUNY Oswego students). Medical facility population based Medical facility population based on on information provided by . information provided by, Oswego County. Oswego County. Current census= 1,080 Current census= 1,080 Special Facilities Wheelchair and regular buses Required= 223 Wheelchair and regular buses Population Ambulances*Required = 14 Required = 223 Correctional facility census = 160; 6 buses Ambulances Required = 14 required. Correctional facility census = 160; 6 buses required. School, Preschool, and Day Camp School population based on information population based on information provided by Oswego County Emergency provided by Oswego County. School, Preschool,
- Management. Emergency Management. and Day Camp School enrollment= 15,377 (including SUNY Total enrollment= 15,735 Population commuter students) (including SUNY Oswego commuter students and Ontario Buses required = 160 Bible Conference) Buses required = 156 NMP/JAF 1-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Tir;ne Estimate February 24, 2016 .
Topic Previous ETE Study Voluntary evacuation from 20 percent of the population within the EPZ, within EPZ in areas but not within the Evacuation Region (see outside region to be Figure 2-1) evacuated 20% of people outside of the EPZ within the Shadow Evacuation Shadow Region (see Figure 7-2) Network Size 1,0S7 links; 716 nodes Field surveys conducted in March 20l2. Roadway Geometric Roads and intersections were video archived. Data Road capacities based on 2010 HCM. School Evacuation Direct evacuation to designated reception center. SO percent of transit-dependent persons will Ridesharing evacuate with a neighbor or friend. '> Based on residential telephone survey of specific pre-trip mobilization activities: Residents with commuters returning leave between lS and 210 minutes. Trip Generation for. Residents without commuters returning Evacuation
- leave between Sand 16S minutes. Employees and transients leave between S and 120 minutes. All times measured from the Advisory to Evacuate. Normal, Rain, or Snow. The capacity and free flow speed of ail links in the network are Weather reduced by 10% in the event of rain and 20% for snow. Modeling . ' DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.8.0 NMP/JAF 1-12 Evacuation Time Estimate
- Current ETE Study 20 *percent of the population within the EPZ, but not within the Evacuation Region (see Figure 2-1) 20% of people outs.ide of the EPZ within the Shadow Region (see Figure 7-2) 1,07S links; 729 nodes Field surveys conducted in March 2012. Roads and intersections were video archived. Road capacities based on 2010 HCM. Direct evacuation to designated reception center. SO percent of transit-dependent persons will evacuate with a neighbor or friend. Based on residential telephone survey of specific pre-trip mobilization activities: Residents with commuters returning leave between lS and 210 minutes. Residents without commuters returning leave between S and 16S minutes. Employees and transients leave between S and 120 minutes. All times measured from the Advisory to Evacuate. Normal, Rain, or Snow. The capacity and free flow speed of all links in the network are reduced by 10% in the event of rain and 20% for snow. DYNEV II System -Version 4.0.19.2 KLD Engineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016 Topic Previous ETE Study Harborfest Fireworks Special Events Special Event Population = 54,900 additional transients Evacuation Cases 54 Regions and 14 Scenarios producing 756 unique cases. ETE reported for90th and moth percentile Evacuation Time population. Results presented by Region and Estimates Reporting Scenario. Winter Midweek Midday, Evacuation Time Good Weather: 2:55 and 4:00 Estimates for the entire EPZ, goth and 10oth percentile Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:35 and 3:40 NMP/JAF 1-13 Evacuation Time Estimate Current ETE Study Harborfest Fireworks Special Event Population = 54,900 additional transients 29 Regions and 14 Scenarios producing 406 unique cases. ETE reported for9oth and moth percentile population. Results presented by Region and Scenario. Winter Midweek Midday, Good Weather: 2:55 and 3:50 Summer Weekend, Midday, Good Weather: 2:30 and 3:40 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 2 STUDY ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS This section presents the estimates and assumptions utilized in the development of the evacuation time estimates. 2.1 Data Estimates 1. Population estimates are based upon Census 2010 data and are projected to 2015 using annual growth rates computed by comparing 2010 data with 20141 population estimation published by the US Census (see Section 3). 2. Estimates of employees who reside outside the EPZ and commute to work within the EPZ are based upon data obtained from Oswego County Emergency Management in 2012. 3.
- Population estimates at special and transient facilities are based on available data from the county emergency management offices and from phone calls to specific facilities. This data was collected in 2012.
- 4. Roadway capacity estimates are based on field surveys and the application of the Highway Capacity Manual 2010. 5. Population mobilization times are based on a statistical analysis of data acquired from a random sample telephone survey of EPZ residents (see Section 5 and Appendix F). 6 .. The relationship between resident population and evacuating vehicles is developed from the telephone survey. Average values of 2.39 .persons per household (see Appendix F, Figure F-1) and 1.24 evacuating vehicles per: household (Figure F-8) are used. The relationship between persons and vehicles for employees; transients, and the special event is as follows: a. Employees and Commuter Schools: 1.09 employees per vehicle (telephone . surVE!Y results) for all major employers. b. Transient Attractions: Vehicle occupancy varies from 1.2 people per vehicle to 3 . people per vehicle, depending on the type of facility. See Section 3.3 and Appendix E for data gathered from local facilities. c. Special Events: Assumed transients attending the Harborfest firework fravel as families/households iri a single and used the average household
- size of 2:39 persons to estimatethe number of vehicles. 1 The annual po*pulation estimates prepared by the Census Bureau for the entire U.S. involyes an extensive data gathering process .. As such, population estimates are a year behind -2014 data are released in 2015. The .schedule for release of .Census . data is provided on. the Census website: http://www.census.gov/popest/schedu le.htm.1 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 2-1 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 2.2 Study Methodological Assumptions 1. ETE are presented for the evacuation of the goth and 1ooth percentiles of population for each Region and for each Scenario. The percentile ETE is defined as the elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate issued to a specific Region of the EPZ, to the time that Region is clear of the indicated percentile of evacuees. A Region is defined as a group of ERPAs that is issued an Advisory to Evacuate. A scenario is a combination of circumstances, including time of day, day of week, season, a'nd weather conditions. 2. The. ETE are computed and presented in tabular format and graphically, in a format compliant with NUREG/CR-7002. 3. Evacuation movements (paths of travel) are generally outbound relative to NMP/JAF to the extent permitted by the highway network. All major evacuation routes are used in the analysis. 4. Regions are defined by the underlying "keyhole" or circular configurations as specified in Section 1.4 of NUREG/CR-7002 as well as those which result from the plant specific PARs which may be issued at either NMP or JAF. These Regions, as defined, display irregular boundaries reflecting the geography of the ERPAs included within these underlying configurations. .
- 5 .. As indicated in Figure 2-2 of NUREG/CR-7002, 100% of people within the impacted "keyhole" evacuate. 20% of those people within the EPZ, not within the impacted keyhole, will voluntarily evacuate. 20% of those people within the Shadow Region will voluntarily evacuate. See Figure 2-1 for a graphical representation of these evacuation percentages. Sensitivity studies explore the effect ori ETE of increasing the percentage of voluntary evacuees in the Shadow Region (see. Appendix M). 6. A total of 14 "Scenarios" representing different temporal variations (season, time of day, day of week) and weather conditions are considered. These Scenarios are outlined in Table 2-1. 7. Scenario 14 considers the closure of a single lane southbound on SR 481, for the length .
- of the two lane section of this roadway which is about 4/loths of a mile south of Churchill Road to 1;4th mile north of Van Buren DL 8. The models of the 1-DYNEV System were recognized as state of the art by the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board (ASLB) in past hearings. (Sources: Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Hearings on Seabrook and Shoreham; Urbanik2 and NRC, 1988a). The models have continuously been refined and extended since those hearings and were independently validated by a consultant retained by the NRC. The new DYNEV 11 model incorporates the latest technology in traffic simulation and in dynamic traffic assignment. The DYNEV II System is used to compute ETE in this study. 2 Urbanik; T;, et. al. Berichmark Study of the 1-DYNEV Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code, NUREG/CR-4873, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June, 1988. NMP/JAF 2-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 . * . .
Table 2-1. Evacuation Scenario Definitions I Day of Time of Scenario Season3 Week Day Weather Special 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None 5 Summer Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 *Winter Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None 12 Winter Midweek, Evening Good None Weekend 13 Summer Weekend Evening Good Special Event -Harborfest Fireworks 14 Summer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Impact -SB Lane Closure on SR 481 3 Winter assumes that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer assumes that school is not in session. NMP/JAF 2-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 10 Miles Downwind Staged Evacuation: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind
- Plant Location
- Region to be Evacuated: 100% Evacuation 0 20% Shadow Evacuation 0 Shelter, then Evacuate Figure 2-1. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology NMP/JAF 2-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 2.3 Study Assumptions 1. The Planning Basis Assumption for the calculation of ETE is a rapidly escalating accident that requires evacuation, and includes the following: a. Advisory to Evacuate is announced coincident with the siren notification. b. Mobilization of the general population will commence within 15 minutes after siren notification. c. ETE are measured relative to the Advisory to Evacuate. 2. It is assumed that everyone within the group of ERPAs forming a Region that is issued an Advisory to Evacuate will, in fact, respond and evacuate in general accord with the planned routes. 3. 56 percent of the households in the EPZ have at least 1 commuter; 45 percent of those households with commuters will await the return of a commuter before beginning their evacuation trip (see Figure F-6), based on the telephone survey results. Therefore 25 percent (56% x 45% = 25%) of EPZ households will await the return of a commuter, prior to beginning their evacuation trip. 4. The ETE will also include consideration of "through" (External-External) trips during the time that such traffic is permitted to enter the evacuated Region. "Normal" traffic flow is assumed to be present within the EPZ at the start of the emergency. 5. Access Control Points (ACP) will be staffed within approximately 120 minutes following the siren notifications, to divert traffic attempting to enter the EPZ. Earlier activation of ACP locations could delay returning commuters. It is assumed that no through traffic will enter the EPZ after this 120 minute time period. 6. Traffic Control Points (TCP) within the EPZ will be staffed over time, beginning at the Advisory to Evacuate. Their number and location will depend on the Region to be evacuated and resources available. The objectives of these TCP are: a. Facilitate the movements of all (mostly evacuating) vehicles at the location. b. Discourage inadvertent vehicle movements towards NMP/JAF. c. Provide assurance and guidance to any traveler who is unsure of the appropriate actions or routing. d. Act as local surveillance and communications center. e. Provide information to the emergency operations center (EOC) as needed, based on direct observation or on information provided by travelers. In calculating ETE, it is assumed that evacuees will drive safely, travel in directions identified in the plan, and obey all control devices and traffic guides. NMP/JAF 2-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- 7. Buses will be used to transport those without access to private vehicles: a. If schools/day camps are in session, transport (buses) will evacuate students directly to the designated reception center. b. It is assumed parents will pick up children at small day care centers (enrollments of 30 students or less) prior to evacuation. c. Buses, wheelchair vans and ambulances will evacuate patients at medical facilities and at any senior facilities within the EPZ, as needed. d. Transit-dependent general population will be evacuated to reception centers. e. Schoolchildren, if school is in session, are given priority in assigning transit vehicles. f. Bus mobilization time is considered in ETE calculations. g. Analysis of the number of required round-trips ("waves") of evacuating transit vehicles is presented. h. Transport of transit-dependent evacuees from reception centers to congregate care centers is not considered in this study. 8. Provisions are made for evacuating the transit-dependent portion of the general population to reception centers by bus, based on the assumption that some of these people will ride-share with family, neighbors, and friends, thus reducing the demand for buses. We assume that the percentage of people who rideshare is 50 percent. This assumption is based upon reported experience for other emergencies4, and on guidance in Section 2.2 of NUREG/CR-7002. (IES, 1981). 9. Two types of adverse weather scenarios are considered. Rain may occur for either winter or summer scenarios; snow occurs in winter scenarios only. It is assumed that the rain or snow begins earlier or at about the same time the evacuation advisory is issued. No weather-related reduction in the number of transients who may be present in the EPZ is assumed. It is assumed that roads are passable and that the appropriate agencies are plowing the roads as they would normally when snowing. Adverse weather scenarios affect roadway capacity and the free flow highway speeds. The factors applied for the ETE study are based on recent research on the effects of weather on roadway operations5; the factors are shown in Table 2-2. (Agarwal, 2005). 4 Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto, THE MISSISSAUGA EVACUATION FINAL REPORT, June 1981. The report indicates that 6,600 people of a transit-dependent population of 8,600 people shared rides with other residents; a ride share rate of 76% (Page 5-10). 5 Agarwal, M. et. Al. Impacts of Weather on Urban Freeway Traffic Flow Characteristics and Facility Capacity, Proceedings of the 2005 Mid-Continent Transportation Research Symposium, August, 2005. The results of this paper are included as Exhibit 10-15 in the HCM 2010. NMP/JAF 2-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- 10. School buses used to transport students are assumed to transport 70 students per bus for elementary schools, and 50 students per bus for middle and high schools, based on information provided in the local emergency plans. Transit buses used to transport the transit-dependent general population are assumed to transport 30 people per bus. Wheelchair equipped buses are assumed to carry 20 ambulatory and 2 wheelchair bound individuals and wheelchair vans can accommodate 7 ambulatory and 3 wheelchair bound persons. The capacities of wheelchair-carrying vehicles are based on information provided in the local emergency plans. Ambulances are assumed to carry 2 bedridden occupants. Table 2-2. Model Adjustment for Adverse Weather Highway Free Flow Scenario Capacity* Speed* Mobilization Time for General Population Rain 90% 90% No Effect Snow 80% 80% Clear driveway before leaving home (See Figure F-13) *Adverse weather capacity and speed values are given as a percentage of good weather conditions. Roads are assumed to be passable. NMP/JAF 2-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 3 DEMAND ESTIMATION The estimates of demand, expressed in terms of people and vehicles, constitute a critical element in developing an evacuation plan. These estimates consist of three components: 1. An estimate of population within the EPZ, stratified into groups (resident, employee, transient). 2. An estimate, for each population group, of mean occupancy per evacuating vehicle. This estimate is used to determine the number of evacuating vehicles. 3. An estimate of potential double-counting of vehicles. Appendix E presents much of the source material for the population estimates. Our primary source of population data, the 2010 Census, however, is not adequate for directly estimating some transient groups. Throughout the year, vacationers and tourists enter the EPZ. These non-residents may dwell within the EPZ for a short period (e.g. a few days or one or two weeks), or may enter and leave within one day. Estimates of the size of these population components must be obtained, so that the associated number of evacuating vehicles can be ascertained. The potential for double-counting people and vehicles must be addressed. For example:
- A resident who works and shops within the EPZ could be counted as a resident, again as an employee and once again as a shopper.
- A visitor who stays at a hotel and spends time at a park, then goes shopping could be counted three times. Furthermore, the number of vehicles at a location depends on time of day. For example, motel parking lots may be full at dawn and empty at noon. Similarly, parking lots at area parks, which are full at noon, may be almost empty at dawn. Estimating counts of vehicles by simply adding up the capacities of different types of parking facilities will tend to overestimate the number of transients and can lead to ETE that are too conservative. Analysis of the population characteristics of the NMP/JAF EPZ indicates the need to identify three distinct groups:
- Permanent residents -people who are year round residents of the EPZ.
- Transients -people who reside outside of the EPZ who enter the area for a specific purpose (shopping, recreation, visiting a park, camping) and then leave the area.
- Employees -people who reside outside of the EPZ and commute to businesses within the EPZ on a daily basis. Estimates of the population and number of evacuating vehicles for each of the population groups are presented for each ERPA and by polar coordinate representation (population rose). The NMP/JAF EPZ is subdivided into 29 ERPAs, as shown in Figure 3-1. NMP/JAF 3-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF . *-<r* . Lake Ont a no Legend
- NMP/JAF 0 ERPA \..-.:. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Evacuation Time Estimate /l Oue:8/29/2012 BRI Basem1p Data KlDEng!fieerlng.Constelt1tionEnerav,Entergy Figure 3-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ 3-2 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 3.1 Permanent Residents The U.S. Census Bureau conducts a physical census of the permanent resident population in the U.S. every ten years. The last census began on April 1, 2010 with data from the census being published on April 1, 2011. In the years between the decennial censuses, the Census Bureau works with state and local agencies to provide annual population estimates at the state and local levels. These estimates are done using data on deaths, births and migration. This annual data gathering process and analysis is extensive. As such, population estimates are a year behind -2014 data are released in 2015. This study is based on 2010 Census population data from the Census Bureau website1 extrapolated to 2015 using annual growth rates computed from the 2014 Census population estimates as outlined in the methodology below. The Census Bureau QuickFacts2 website provides annual population estimates for each state, county, town3 and municipality4 in the United States. As discussed above, Census population estimates are a year behind. Thus, the most recent population estimates available for the towns and municipalities are for the time period from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 20145. The population change and annual growth rate for each town and municipality in the study area (EPZ plus Shadow Region) are provided in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, respectively. Figure 3-2 shows the town and municipality boundaries identified by the Census Bureau. The permanent resident population, as per the 2010 Census, for the EPZ and the Shadow Region was projected to 2015 using the compound growth formula (Equation 1). In the compound growth formula, g is the annual growth rate and X is the number of years projected forward from Year 2010. The compound growth formula can be solved for g as shown in Equation 2. Equation 1 (Compound Growth for X years): Population 201X Population 2010 (1 + g) x Equation 2 (Solving for the annual growth rate): g = (Population 201X -;-Population 2010)1/x -1 The 2010 and 2014 population data provided in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 were used in Equation 2 to compute the annual growth rate for each town and municipality in the study area using X = 4.25 (4 years and 3 months from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014). The computed annual growth rate for each town and municipality is summarized in the final column of Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, respectively. 1 www.census.gov 2 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html 3 http://www. census. gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2014/S UB-EST2014-4.html 4 http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2014/S UB-EST2014-3.html 5 The schedule for release of Census data is provided on the Census website: http://www.census.gov/popest/schedule.html NMP/JAF 3-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 The most detailed data should always be used when forecasting population. In terms of detailed data, municipal data is the finest level of detail, then town data, county data, and state data. The municipality growth rate was used first and if that was not available or applicable within the study area, then the town growth rate was used. Town growth rates are available for the entire study area and were used {in the absence of municipal data) as they are the finest level of detail available for the entire study area. Thus, county and state data were not used. The Census Bureau does not provide population data specific to the boundaries of the study area. As such, the entire town or municipality population was used to compute the annual growth rate. Then, the appropriate municipality or town growth rate was applied only to those Census blocks located within the study area. All other blocks outside of the study area were not considered as part of the EPZ or Shadow Region population, even if they are located within one of the municipalities or towns that intersect the study area. The appropriate annual growth rate was applied to each Census block in the study area depending on which town or municipality the block is located within. The population was extrapolated, using Equation 2, to September 1, 2015 as the base year for this ETE study. Population estimates are based upon Census 2010 data. The estimates are created by cutting the census block polygons by the ERPA and EPZ boundaries. A ratio of the original area of each census block and the updated area {after cutting) is multiplied by the total block population to estimate what the population is within the EPZ. This methodology assumes that the population is evenly distributed across a census block. Table 3-3 provides the permanent resident population within the EPZ, by ERPA, for 2010 {based on the most recent U.S. Census) and for 2015 {based on the methodology above). As indicated, the permanent resident population within the EPZ has decreased by 1.11% since the 2010 Census. The average household size {2.39 persons/household -See Appendix F, sub-section F.3.1} and the number of evacuating vehicles per household {1.24 vehicles/household -See Appendix F, sub-section F.3.2} were adapted from the telephone survey results. The year 2015 permanent resident population is divided by the average household size and then multiplied by the average number of evacuating vehicles per household in order to estimate number of vehicles. Permanent resident population and vehicle estimates are presented in Table 3-4. Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 present the permanent resident population and permanent resident vehicle estimates by sector and distance from NMP/JAF. This "rose" was constructed using GIS software. It can be argued that this estimate of permanent residents overstates, somewhat, the number of evacuating vehicles, especially during the summer. It is certainly reasonable to assert that some portion of the population would be on vacation during the summer and would travel elsewhere. A rough estimate of this reduction can be obtained as follows:
- Assume 50 percent of all households vacation for a two-week period over the summer.
- Assume these vacations, in aggregate, are uniformly dispersed over 10 weeks, i.e. 10 percent of the population is on vacation during each two-week interval.
- Assume half of these vacationers leave the area. NMP/JAF 3-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 On this basis, the permanent resident population would be reduced by 5 percent in the summer and by a lesser amount in the off-season. Given the uncertainty in this estimate, we elected to apply no reductions in permanent resident population for the summer scenarios to account for residents who may be out of the area. 3.1.1 SUNY Oswego One higher education facility, the State University of New York at Oswego (SUNY Oswego), is located within the EPZ. SUNY Oswego (located in Oswego, 8.0 miles southwest of NMP/JAF) has 8,300 enrolled students with 4,300 of those students considered on-campus residents. Based on data provided by Oswego County Emergency Management, students will be evacuated by bus and private vehicles. There will be 18 buses dispatched to the university with a capacity of 40 students per bus, thereby evacuating a total of 720 students by bus. The plans assume ridesharing amongst students will occur such that all remaining on-campus students will have a ride out of the EPZ. For students evacuating in private vehicles, the same trip mobilization distribution (See Section 5) as transients was used as their commuting patterns are similar. Demographic Census data for cities neighboring SUNY Oswego were used to compute a baseline percentage of college age residents. This baseline percentage was removed from the percentage of 20-24 year olds within the City of Oswego to determine the additional 20-24 year olds present within the city due to its proximity of SUNY Oswego. The remaining percentage of 20-24 year olds was multiplied by the total city population which resulted in 1,651 student commuters within the EPZ. According to school officials, a total of 4,000 students (8,300 -4,000) commute minus the 1,651 EPZ residents (to avoid double counting) results in 2,349 student commuters from outside the EPZ. A vehicle occupancy of 1.09 commuters per vehicle obtained from the telephone survey question relating to commuting employees (See Section 3.4) was used to determine the number of evacuating vehicles for student commuters as their travel patterns are similar. As such, 2,155 vehicles for students commuting to SUNY Oswego have been considered in this study. 3.1.2 Day Camp -Ontario Bible Conference The Ontario Bible Conference (located in 1.1 miles west-southwest from NMP/JAF) is located within the EPZ. This is a summer children's day camp and retreat center (See Table E-1). Based on discussions with Oswego County officials, there are 91 children that attend in the month of July. The day camp will evacuate to the New York State Fairgrounds Reception Center, identical to those of their school counterparts. A total of 2 buses or 4 vehicles (1 bus is equivalent to 2 passenger vehicles -see Section 8) have been incorporated for the Ontario Bible Conference. The evacuation of this facility is modelled the same as schools and is discussed in Section 8. 3.1.3 Special Facilities One correctional facility, Oswego County Correctional Facility (located in Oswego, 7.2 miles south-southwest from NMP/JAF) and several large medical facilities (see Table E-2) are located within the EPZ. This study considers the people residing at these facilities as transit-dependent population, which is addressed in Section 8, including the number and type (bus, wheelchair bus, ambulance) of vehicles needed to evacuate. NMP/JAF 3-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 3-1. Town Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 T 2010 2014 Percent Annual own Population Population Change Growth Rate ., Cayuga County, NY * **. ,,.,, * .. . :; t.:;*"'.;}..; . EPZ Mexico 5,197 5,177 -0.38% -0.09% Minetto 1,659 1,627 -1.93% -0.46% New Haven 2,856 2,873 0.60% 0.14% Oswego 7,984 7,920 -0.80% -0.19% Palermo 3,664 3,651 -0.35% -0.08% Richland 5,718 5,686 -0.56% -0.13% Scriba 6,840 6,726 -1.67% -0.39% Volney 5,926 5,843 -1.40% -0.33% Shadow Region Granby 6,821 6,699 -1.79% -0.42% Hannibal 4,854 4,732 -2.51% -0.60% Hastings 9,469 9,401 -0.72% -0.17% Sandy Creek 3,939 3,872 -1.70% -0.40% Schroeppel 8,482 8,371 -1.31% -0.31% Table 3-2. Municipality Population Change and Annual Growth Rate from April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014 Municipality 2010 2014 Percent Annual Population Population Change Growth Rate 'Ž'""' . ,.<;:;--., ;
- y -'..!i:i*F:1 i *qswego * "'"' EPZ Mexico I 1,624 I 1,592 I -1.97% I -0.47% Oswego I 18,142 I 17,988 I -0.85% I -0.20% Shadow Region Fulton I 11,896 I 11,648 I -2.08% I -0.49% Pulaski I 2,365 I 2,329 I -1.52% I -0.36% NMP/JAF 3-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend
- NMP/JAF Cl EPZ c:::J County Boundary Town Boundary 12.22 Shadow Region Census Places GJ Municipalities with Data Census Designated Places (No Data) Evacuation Time Estimate Figure 3-2. Census Boundaries within the NMP/JAF Study Area 3-7 v Ellisburg r*'!nor J !!ff/r_.11 o n Cu 1111 ty Lorraine Orwell 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 3,3, EPZ Permanent Resident Population ERPA 2010 Population 1 173 2 469 3 343 4 687 5 804 6 915 7 699 8 718 9 597 10 1,023 11 1,916 12 7,960 13 10,223 14 193 15 1,105 16 1,624 17 587, 18 1,030 19 1,316 20 1,783 21 ,1,782 ; 22 5,940 23 0 24 0 25 0 26 O* 27 ' 0 28 .* 0 29. 0 "J 11&; tPTAl-:'f -> ,<<<;; '" < , EPZ Population Growth: . NMP/JAF 3-8 Evacuation Time Estimate 2015 Population 172 465 337 690 786 896 700 720 ' 599 1,002 1,875 7,894 10,121 '193 1,104 1,585 587 1,021 1,295 1,756 1,741 5,884 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.11% '.!jl: KLD Engineering, P.C. * . February 24, 2016 Table 3-4. Permanent Resident Population and Vehicles by ERPA ERPA 2015 Resident Population 1 172 2 465 3 337 4 690 5 786 6 896 7 700 8 720 9 599 10 1,002 11 1,875 12 7,894 13 10,121 14 193 15 1,104 16 1,585 17 587 18 1,021 19 1;295 20 1,756 21 1,741 22 5,884 23 0 24 '0 25 0 26 0 27 0 28 0 29 .. 0 , ,fil?i. 'rOT:it'. * . . . NMP/JAF *Evacuation Time Estimate Resident Vehicles 91 243 175 361 407 464 365 374 311 522 973 4,098 5,253 104 570 820 307 528 672 916 905 3,053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 / o, _, ::.:?'::.
- KLD Erigineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 WNW ITJ *-w CT:] I 0 WSW [ill] NW CD ' SW ' 124,0861 Resident Population ' N NNW ITJ NNE 1-.... ' ' SSW 392 ;... _, SSE I S,477 I I 1,848 I Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 0 1-2 448 448 2-3 752 1,200 3-4 1,551 2,751 w 4-5 1,423 4,174 5-6 3,465 7,639 6-7 9,178 16,817 7-8 9,975 26,792 8-9 7,088 33,880 9-10 4,685 38,565 10 -EPZ 2,858 41,423 -.Total: 41,423 Figure 3-3. Permanent Resident Population by S.ector NMP/JAF 3-10 Evacuation Time Estimate ' NE ITJ ' SE ENE OQ:J --' I. E --f ESE I 3,963 I I 1,947 I 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary N E KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 N NNW CD NNE ITJ ITJ -\ 7 -0 NW NE LO " " CD " ' " ' "' ,, ' ' WNW ,) ' ENE [IJ OU ., . I I ,-w I E [IJI 0 36 I [ill] *-I "f WSW ESE [ill] [L060J ' ,, ' ,, SW ' "' SE ' "' 112,4991 ' "' 11,013 I -' -_, 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary SSW 205 SSE ----'I 2,844 I s [ill] N I 1,163 I Resident Vehicles Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 0 1-2 234 234 2-3 392 626 3-4 806 1,432 w .4-5 738 2,170 5-6 1,802 3,972 6-7 4,762 8,734 7-8 5,179 13,913 8-9 3,677 17,590 9-10 2,430 20,020 10 -EPZ 1,492 21,512 Inset Total: 21,512 0-2 Miles S . Figure 3-4. Permanent Resident Vehicles by Sector NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 3-11 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 Shadow Population A portion of the population living outside the evacuation area extending to 15 miles radially from the NMP/JAF (in the Shadow Region) may elect to evacuate without having been instructed to do so. Based upon NUREG/CR-7002 guidance, it is assumed that 20 percent of the permanent resident population, based on U.S. Census Bureau data, in this Shadow Region will elect to evacuate. Shadow population characteristics (household size, evacuating vehicles per household, mobilization time) are assumed to be the same as that for the EPZ permanent resident population. Table 3-5, Figure 3-5, and Figure 3-6 present estimates of the shadow population and vehicles, by sector. The 2010 Census permanent resident population *within the Shadow Region was also extrapolated to September 1, 2015 using the methodology discussed in Section 3.1 for the permanent resident population within the EPZ. Table 3-S. Shadow Population and Vehicles by Sector Sector 2015 Evacuating Population Vehicles N 0 0 NNE 0 0 NE 169 92 ENE 2,902 1,507 E 1,683 876 ESE 1,437 749 SE 1,665 866 SSE 2,372 1,233 s 14,199 7,376 SSW 2,937 1,525 SW 1,981 1,030 WSW 0 0 w 0 0 WNW 0 0 NW 0 0 NNW 0 0 ::fi* .. *,[;: J .. *. . 0001 ; . NMP/JAF 3-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 WNW 0 w 0 WSW 0 NW 0 SW 1,981 Shadow Population NNW 0 SSW 2,937 / ' ' N 0 EPZ Resident Population See Figure 3-3 s j 14,1991 NNE 0 ' / / 2,372 Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total EPZ-11 842 842 11-12 3,544 4,386 12-13 4,516 8,902 13-14 10,581 19,483 14-15 9,862 29,345 Total: 29,345 Figure 3-5. Shadow Population by Sector NMP/JAF 3-13 Evacuation Time Estimate NE 169 ENE 2,902 E 1,683 ESE 1,437 SE 1,665 : EPZ Boundary to 11 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 WNW 0 w 0 WSW 0 NW 0 SW 1,030 Shadow Vehicles Miles Subtotal by Ring EPZ -11 442 11-12 1,843 12 -13 2,340 13-14 5,497 14-15 5,132 Total: NMP/JAF NNW 0 SSW 1,525 Cumulative Total 442 2,285 4,625 10,.122 15,254 15,254 N 0 EPZ Resident Vehicles See Figure 3-4 s 7,376 NNE 0 1,233 Figure 3"6. Shadow Vehicles by Sector 3-14 Evacuation Time Estimate NE 92 ENE 1,507 E 876 ESE 749 SE 866 ' _, EPZ Boundary to 11 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 I 3.3 Transient Population Based on discussions with Exelon, Entergy, and Oswego County, the transient facilities within the EPZ have not changed considerably from the 2012 study. Thus, all transient data from the 2012 study was maintained. Transient population groups are defined as those people (who are not permanent residents, nor commuting employees) who enter the EPZ for a specific purpose (shopping, recreation, visit a park, Transients may spend less than one day or stay overnight at a campground or lodging facility. The NMP/JAF EPZ has a number of areas and facilities that attract transients, including:
- Lodging Facilities *
- Marinas
- Campgrounds
- GolfCourses
- Oswego Speedway
- SUNY Oswego (large c.ommuter school) Data was provided by Oswego County on the number of rooms, percentage of occupied rooms at peak times, and the number of people and vehicles per room for each lodging facility. These data were used to estimate the number of transients and evacuating vehicles at each of these facilities. Oswego County Emergency Management has requested the Holiday Inn Express, opening in mid-2016 in Oswego, be included within the study. The average number of transien.ts (2.22 people) and evacuating vehicles (1.09 per room) from lodging facilities within the EPZ were used to estimate the number of transients and evacuating vehides at this facility. A total of 81 rooms with 180 transients and 88 evacuating vehicles have been assigned to this facility: A total of 1,104 transients in 541 vehicles are assigned to lodging facilities in. the EPZ. Data was provided by Oswego County on average daily attendance, nuinber of slips and peak season of the marinas in the EPZ. These data were used to estimate the number of transients * .. and eva.cuating vehicles at each of these A total of 770 transients and 643 vehicles are assigned to marinas in the EPZ. Oswego County provided the number of campsites, peak occupancy, and the number of vehicles and people per campsite for each facility. These data were used to estimate the number of evacuating vehicles for transients at each of these facilities. A total of 1,773 transients and 653 vehicles are assigned to campgrounds in the EPZ. There are two golf courses within the EPZ. Surveys of golf courses were conducted to determine the number of golfers and vehicles at each facility on a typical peak day, and the numb.er of golfers that travels from outside the area. A total of 59 transients and 39 vehicles are assigned to golf courses within the EPZ . . Data provided by Oswego County, supplemented with internet based searches, supplied the peak season and attendance at Oswego Speedway and was used to determine the number of transients visiting the race track on a typical summer weekend. A total of 2,440 transients and * . NMP/JAF 3-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate . February 24, 2016.
1,021 vehicles (average household size of 2.39 persons used to compute the number of vehicles) have been assigned to Oswego Speedway. As detailed in Section 3.1.1 above, there are 2,349 transients (commuting students) and 2,155 vehicles assigned to SUNY Oswego. Appendix E summarizes the transient data that was estimated for the EPZ. Table E-4 presents the number of transients visiting recreational areas, while Table E-5 presents the number of transients at lodging facilities within the EPZ. In total, there are 8,495 transients evacuating in 5,052 vehicles, an average of 1.68 transients per vehicle. Table 3-6 presents transient population and transient vehicle estimates by ERPA. Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 present these data by sector and distance from NMP/JAF. Table 3-6. Summary of Transients and Transient Vehicles J.ransients Transient Vehicles *: *-* 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 90 42 5 54 21 6 266 85 7 784 354 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 32 24 11 0 0 12 3,256 1,426 13 452 338 14 434 174 15 778 433 16 0 0 17 0 0 18 0 0 19 0 0 20 0 0 21 0 0 22 2,349 2,155 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0 TOTAL 8,495 .. 5,052 . NMP/JAF 3-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 WNW c::::o WSW I ,-c::::o Transients NW 0 , ' ' ' SW *' I 6,323 I N NNW ITJ 0=1 NNE c::::o 7 -. ., ' ' SSW SSE .o::J DI] . Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 0 1-2 0 0 2-3 0 0 3-4 352 352 w 4-5 90 442 5-6 2,795 3,237 6-7 1,520 4,757 7-8 633 5,390 8-9 2,671 8,061 9-10 0 8,061 10 -EPZ 434 8,495 Total: 8,495 Figure 3-7. Transient Population by Sector NMP/JAF 3-17 Evacuation Time Estimate ' ' ., ., -' -_, NE 0 ' ' ' ,, ,, ., SE 0 ENE DIJ -' I E 343 I I 1,633 I ESE [ill] 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary N E KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
- WNW ITJ *-w u:J.1*0 WSW I -I ITJ NW c:::o. ; , , . \ ., ' ' ' SW ' 14,004 I Transient Vehicles NNW ITJ ; ' *' SSW ITJ N ITJ 7-s OIJ NNE 0 SSE 24 ' Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 0 1-2 0 2-3 0 3-4 130 4-5 42 5-6 1,173 6-7 837 7-8 418 8-9 2,278 9-10 0 10 -EPZ 174 *Total: NMP/JAF EvacuationTime Estimate 0 0 0 130 172 1,345 2,182 2,600 4,878 4;878 5,052 5,052 w Inset 0-2 Miles
- Figure 3-8. Transient Vehicles by Sector 3-18 ' ' ; ; ... -"'\ -. .;_, ' ; NE ITJ ' ENE OD -..... , , SE ITJ I E i ESE [I] 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary N s E
- KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016. .__J ... **
I I I 3.4 Employees Employees who work within the EPZ fall into two categories:
- Those who live and work in the EPZ 9 Those who live outside of the EPZ and commute to jobs within the EPZ. Those of the first category are already counted as part of the permanent resident population. To avoid double counting, we focus only on those employees commuting from outside the EPZ who will evacuate along with the permanent resident population. The number of employees working at major employers as well as the percentage of staff commuting to work from outside of the EPZ was provided by Oswego County. In Table E-3, the Employees (Max Shift) is multiplied by the percent Non-EPZ factor to determine the number of employees who are not residents of the EPZ. A vehicle occupancy of 1.09 employees per vehicle obtained from the telephone survey (See Figure F-7) was used to . determine the number of evacuating employee vehicles for all major employers. Table 3-7 presents non-EPZ Resident employee and vehicle estimates by ERPA. Figure 3-9 and
- Figure 3-10 present these data by sector. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 3-19 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 201q Table 3-7. Summary of Non-EPZ Resident Employees and Employee Vehicles ERPA Employees Employee Vehicles 1 691 634 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 193 177 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 11 0 0 12 139 127 13 74 68 14 0 0 15 0 0 16 0 0 17 0 0 18 0 0 19 0 0 20 0 0 21 0 0 22 617 566 23 0 0 24 0 0 25 0 0 26 0 0 27 0 0 28 0 0 29 0 0
- TOTAL , .. 1,714 : 1,572 *. NMP/JAF 3-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 WNW ITJ w CD I WSW I ,-' ITJ Employees NW o::::J , '. ' ' SW I 1,023 I Miles Subtotal by Ring 0-1 691 1.-2 0 2-3 0 3-4 159 4-5 58 5-6 47 6-7 68 7-8 28 8-9 663 9 c 10 0 lO -EPZ 0 Total: NMP/JAF N NNW CD o::::J NNE CD ". ' *' ' SSW SSE CD s o::::J Cumulative Total 691 i;91 691 850 w 908 955 1,023 1,051 1,714* 1,714 1,714 1,714 Figure Employee Population by Sector 3-21. Evacuation Time Estimate NE ' o::::J ' ' ' , , " SE ,,. o::::J .-'\. ENE o::::J -' I E 0 I o=J ESE o::::J -_, 10 Miles to EPZ Bound1!ry E .s KLD Engineering, P .C. *. February 24, 2016 N NNW ITJ NNE CTJ 7-NW NE ITJ ' CTJ ' ' , ' , WNW ENE [TI ITJ .. -E 0 I I 0 -"f WSW ESE [TI\ ITJ , ' , ' SW ' ' , SE [ill] ' [TI SSW I -' -_, 10 Miles to EPZ Boundary SSE [TI s [TI . I 634 N Employee Vehicles Miles Subtotal by Ring Cumulative Total 0-1 634 634 1-2 0 .634 2-3 0 634 3-4 146 78,0 w .E 4-5 53 833 5-6 43 876 6-7 62 938 7-8 26 964 8-9 608 1,572 9-10 0 l,572 10 -EPZ 0 1,572 Total: 1,572 ' Figure 3-10. Employee Vehicles by Sector NMP/JAF 3-22 .KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 241 2016 I 3.5 Special Facilities Data were provided by Oswego County for each of the medical facilities within the EPZ. Table E-2 in Appendix E summarizes the data gathered. Section 8 details the evacuation of medical facilities and their patients. The number and type of evacuating vehicles that need to be provided depend on the p!=!tients' state of health. It is estimated that buses can transport up to 30 ambulatory people; wheelchair buses up to 22 people (20 ambulatory, 2 wheelchair bound), wheelchair vans up to 10 people (7 ambulatory, 3 wheelchair bound); and ambulances, up to 2 bedridden people. Data was provided by Oswego County for the one correctional facility (Oswego County Correctional Facility) within the EPZ. Table E-6 in Appendix E summarizes the data gathered. Section 8.6 discusses the evacuation of these prisoners. It is estimated that buses can transport up to 30 passengers (inmates and correctional officers). 3.6 Total Demand in Addition to Permanent Population Vehicles will be traveling through the EPZ (external-external trips) at the time of an accident. After the Advisory to Evacuate is announced, these through-travelers will also evacuate. These through vehicles are assumed to travel on the major route traversing the region -Interstate 81 (1-81). It is assumed that this traffic will continue to enter the EPZ during the first 120 minutes following the Advisory to Evacuate. Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) data was obtained from Federal Highway Administration . (HPMS, 2013) to estimate the number of vehicles per hour on the aforementioned route. The AADT was multiplied by the K-Factor, (TRB, 2010)1 which is the proportion of the AADT on a roadway segment or link during the design hour, resulting in the design hour volume (DHV). The design hour is usually the 30th highest hourly traffic volume of the year, measured in vehicles per hour (vpb) .. The DHV is then multiplied by the D-Factor, (TRB, 2010), whi.ch is the proportion. of the DHV occurring in the peak direction of travel (also known as the directional split).* The resulting values are the directional design hourly volumes (DDHV), and are presented .in Table The DDHV is then multiplied by 2 hours (access control points -are assumed to be activated at 120 minutes after the advisory to evacuate) to estimate the total number of external vehicles loaded on the analysis network. As inqicated, there are 5,036 vehicles entering the EPZ as external-external trips prior to the activation of the ACP and the diversion of this traffic. This number is reduced by 60% for evening scenarios (Scenarios 5, 12 and 13) as discussed in Section 6. .* NMP/JAF EvacuationTime Estimate 3-23 KLD Engineering, P.C . February 24, 2016.
Table 3-8. NMP/JAF EPZ External Traffic Upstream Downstream Road Direction HPMS1 K-D-Hourly Node Node Name AADT Factor2 Factor2 Volume Traffic 8043 43 1-81 Southbound 23,537 0.107 0.5 1,259 2,518 8298 298 1-81 Northbound 23,537 0.107 0.5 1,259 2,518 . . '.*.*, . *f .. :;;, . *' *.c: ,, *TOTAL: 1Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Washington, D.C., 2012 2HCM 2010 3.7 Special Event One special event scenario (Scenario 13) is considered for the ETE study -Several special event candidates were considered for this scenario including the workforce influx induced by an outage at either NMP or JAF. Of the events considered, Harborfest fireworks draws in the greatest number of transients by far. Harborfest is a momentous occasion which attracts a considerable number of transients from the greater Central New York region. The capstone of the four-day festival is a Saturday night fireworks display. This event draws 90,000 people, 61% of whom are from outside of the EPZ. It was assumed that families travel to the event as a household unit in a single vehicle; therefore, the average household size of 2.39 was used for vehicle occupancy. A total of 22,971 vehicles were incorporated at various parking locations for this special event. The special event vehicle trips were generated utilizing the same mobilization distributions as transients. Public transportation is not provided for this event and was not considered in the special event analysis. (A shuttle bus is provided from the parking areas, however the total time allocated for transient mobilization -2 hours, see Figure 5 is sufficient to include travel from the main event area to the parking areas, whether on the shuttle bus or by foot.) 3.8 Summary of Demand A summary of population and vehicle demand is provided in Table 3-9 and Table 3-10, respectively. This summary includes all population groups described in this section. Additional population groups -transit-dependent, special facility, and school population -are described in greater detail in Section 8. A total of 73,987 people and 37,159 vehicles are considered in this study. NMP/JAF 3-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 20lq Table 3-9. Summary of Population Demand 1 172 8 0 .691 0 91 0 0 *o 962 2 465 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 486 3 337 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 352 4 690 31 90 0 0 238 0 0 0 1,049 5 786 35 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 875 6. 896 40 266 193 0 0 0 0 0 1,395 7 700 31 784 .0 0 0 0 0 0 1,515 8 720 32 0 O* .. 0 0 0 0 0 752 9 599 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 626 10 1,002 45 32 0 0 33 0 0 0 1,112 11 1,875 84 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,959 12 7,894 354 3,256 139 710 1,342 0 0 0 13,695 13 10,121 456 452 74. 262 2,904 0 0 0 14,269 14 193 9 434 0 0 0 0 0 0 636 15 1,104 50 778 0 9 0 0 0 0 1,941 16 1,585 71 0 0 24 1,759 0 0 0 3,439 17 587 26 0 0 6 446 0 0 0 1,065 18 1,021 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,067 i9 1,295 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,353 20 1,756 79 0 0 191 0 0 0 0 2,026 21 1,741 78 0 0 38 367 0 0 0 2,224 22 5,884 264 0 617 0 5,951 2,349 0 0 15,065 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shadow 0 0 0 0 0 255 0 5,869 0 6,124 ifilllM>il§" ""' .. ..*.*. ' '72 ft0'7.:,;?f I '" , 'j<: . Ji . *u* .. NOTE: Shadow Region has been reduced to 20%. Refer to Figure 2-1 for additional information. NOTE: Special Facilities include medical facilities and correctional facilities. NOTE: The Schools and Day Camp column includes 91 students for the Ontario Bible Conference. NMP/JAF 3-25 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 3-10. Summary of Vehicle Demand Schools Transit-Special and Day SUNY *Shadow External ERPA Residents Dependent Transients Employees Facilities Camp Oswego Region Traffic Total .1 91 2 0 634 0 4 0 0 0 731 2 243 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 245 3 175 2 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 177 4 361 2 42 0 ,, 0 8 0 0 0 413 5 407 2 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 430 6 464 4 85 177 0 0 0 0 0 730 *7 365 2 354 0 0 0 0 0 0 721 8 374 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 376 9 311 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 313 10 522 '*, 4 '24 0 0 2 0 0 0 552 il 973 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 979 12 4,098 28 1,426 ,' 127 222 46 0 0 0 5,947 13 5,253 38 338 68 116 108 0 0 0 5,921 14 104 2 174 0 0 0 0 0 0 280 15 570 4 433 0 2. 0 0 0 0 1,009 16 820 6 0 0 4 66 0 ,0 0 896 17 307 2 0 0 2 18 0 0 0 329 18 528 *.' 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 532 19 672 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 676 20 916 6 0 0 122 0 0 0 0 1,044 21 905 6. 0 0 4 16 0 0 0 931 22 3,053' 22 0 566 0 36 2,155 0 0 5,832 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 ' ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Shadow 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 3,051 5,036 8,095 ""21;Si2sv !,!T#,0"2;897 ' .. ;-/: .,. "', ii * ;;;o """' ,,, , I , , oLiffl\(t 1 ,,,, .. NOTE: Shadow Region has been reduced to 20%. Refer to Figure 2-1 for additional information. NOTE: Buses for schools and special facilities represented as two passenger vehicles. Refer to Section 8 for additional information. NOTE: The Schools and Day Camp column includes 2 buses (4 vehicles) for the Ontario Bible Conference. NMP/JAF 3-26 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 4 ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY The ability of the road network to service vehicle demand is a major factor in determining how rapidly an evacuation can be completed. The capacity of a road is defined as the maximum hourly rate at which persons or vehicles can reasonably be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a lane of roadway during a given time period under prevailing roadway, traffic and control conditions, as stated in the 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM, 2010). In discussing capacity,. different operating conditions have been assigned alphabetical designations, A through F, to reflect the range of traffic operational characteristics. These designations have been termed . "Levels of Service (LOS). For example, LOS A connotes free-flow and high-speed operatingconditions; LOS F represents a forced flow condition. LOS E describes traffic operating at or near capacity. Another concept, closely associated with capacity, is "Service Volume" (SV). Service volume is defined as "The maximum hourly rate at which vehicles, bicycles or persons reasonably can .be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a roadway during an hour under specific assumed conditions while maintaining a designated level of service." This definition is similar to that for capacity. The major distinction is that values of SV vary from one LOS to another, while capacity is the service volume at the upper bound of LOS E, only. This distinction is illustrated in Exhibit 11-17 of the HCM 2010: As indicated there, the SV varies with Free Flow Speed (FFS), and LOS. The SV is by the DYNEV II simulation model, based on the specified link attribl:ltes, FFS, capacity, control device and traffic demand. Other factors also influence capacity.These include, butare not limited to:
- Lane width
- Shoulder width
- Pavement condition
- Horizontal and vertical alignment (curvature arid grade)
- Percent truck traffic
- Control device (and timing, ifit is a signal)
- Weather conditions (rain, snow, fog, wind ke) * ' ' These fact.ors are* during the road survey .and in the capacity estimation. process; . some factors have greater influence on capaC:ity than others. For example, Jane and shoulder width have only a limited influence on Base Free Flow Speed (BFFS1) according to Exhibit 15-7 of the HCM. Consequently, lane and shoulder widths at the narrowest points* were observed during the road survey and these.observations were recorded, but no detailed meas_urements of lane or.shoulderwidth were taken. Horizontal and vertical alignment can influence both FFS and The* estimated FFS were measured using the survey vehitle's speedometer and observing local traffic, under free flow conditions. Capacity is estimated from the procedures of 1 A very rough estimate of BFFS might.be taken as the. posted speed limit plus 10 mph (HCl\/l 2010 Page 15-15) NMP/JAF Evacuation Tirne Estimate 4-:\: km Erigineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 the 2010 HCM. For example, HCM Exhibit 7-l(b) shows the sensitivity of Service Volume at the upper bound of LOS D to grade (capacity is the Service Volume at the upper bound of LOS E). As discussed in Section 2.3, it is necessary to adjust capacity figures to represent the prevailing conditions during inclement weather. Based on limited empirical data, weather conditions such as rain reduce the values of free speed and of highway capacity by approximately 10 percent. Over the last decade new studies have been made on the effects of rain on traffic *. capacity. These studies indicate a range of effects between 5 an.d 20 percent depending on wind speed and precipitation rates. As indicated in Section 2.3, we employ a reduction in free speed and in.highway capacity of 10 percent and 20 percent for rain and snow, respectively. Since congestion arising from evacuation may be significant, estimates of roadway capacity must be determined with great care. Because of its importance, a brief discussion of the major *factors that influence highway capacity is presented in this section. Rural highways generally consist of: (1) one or more uniform sections with limited access (driveways, parking areas) characterized by "uninterrupted" flow; and (2) approaches to grade intersections where flow can be "interrupted" by a control device or by turning or crossing traffic at the intersection. Due to these differences, separate estimates of capacity must be made for each section. Often, the approach to t.he intersection is widened by the addition of one or more lanes (turn pockets or turn bays), to compensate for the lower capacity of the approach due to the factors there that can interrupt the flow of traffic. These additional lanes are recorded during the field survey and later entered as input to the DYNEV II system. 4.1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections At-grade intersections are apt to become the first bottleneck locations under local heavy traffic volume conditions. This characteristic reflects the need to allocate access time to the respective
- competing traffic streams by exerting some form of control. During evacuation, control at critical intersections will often be provided by traffic control personnel assigned for that purpose, whose directions may supersede traffic control devices. The existing traffic management plans documented in the county emergency plans are extensive and were adopted without .change. *. The per-lane capacity of an approach to a signalized intersection can be expressed (simplistically) iri the following form: _ (3600) (G -L) _ (3600) . Qcap,m -h X C -h X Pm m m
- m where: Ocap,m Capacity of a single lane of traffic on an approach, whkh executes NMP/JAF 4-2
- KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016.
- hm = G = L = c = Pm = m = movement, m, upon entering the intersection; vehicles per hour (vph) Mean queue discharge headway of vehicles on this lane that are executing movement, m; seconds per vehicle Mean duration of GREEN time servicing vehicles that are executing movement, m, for each signal cycle; seconds Mean "lost time" for each signal phase servicing movement, m; seconds Duration of each signal cycle; seconds Proportion of GREEN time allocated for vehicles executing movement, m, from this lane. This value is specified as part of the control treatment. The movement executed by vehicles after they enter
- the intersection: through, left-turn, right-turn, and diagonal. The turn-movement-specific mean discharge headway, hm, depends in a complex way upon many factors: roadway geometrics, turn percentages, the extent of conflicting traffic streams, the control treatment, and others. A primary factor is the value of "saturation queue discharge headway", h50t, which applies to through vehicles that are not impeded by other conflicting traffic streams. This value, itself, depends upon many factors including motorist behavior. Formally, we can write, where: hsat F1,F2 fm(} = *---Saturation discharge headway for through vehicles; seconds per vehicle The various known factors influencing hm Complex function relating hm to the known (or estimated) values of h50t, F1, F2, ... The estimation of hm for specified values of hsat1 F11 F2t ... is undertaken within the DYNEV II simulation model by a mathernatical model2. The resulting values for hm always satisfy the condition: 2Lieberman, E.,. Lateral Deployment of Traffic oil. an Approach to an Intersection", McShane, W. & Lieberman, E., "Service Rates of Mixe.d Traffic .on the far Left Lane of an Approach"; Both papers appear in Transportation Research Record 772, 1980. Lieberman, E., Xin, W., "Macroscopic Traffic Modeling For Large-Scale Evacuation Planning'\ presented at the TRB 2012 Annual Meeting, January 22-26, 2012 NMP/JAF 4-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 201q .*
That is, the turn-movement-specific discharge headways are always greater than, or equal to the saturation discharge headway for through vehicles. These headways (or its inverse equivalent, "saturation flow rate"), may be determined by observation or using the procedures of the HCM 2010. The above discussion is necessarily brief given the scope of this ETE report and the complexity of the subject of intersection capacity. In fact, Chapters 18, 19 and 20 in the HCM 2010 address this topic. The factors, Fl, F2, ... , influencing saturation flow rate are identified in equation {18-5) of the HCM 2010. The traffic signals within the EPZ and Shadow Region are modeled using representative phasing plans and phase durations obtained as part of the field data collection. Traffic responsive signal installations allow the proportion of green time allocated (Pm) for each approach to each intersection to be determined by the expected traffic volumes on each approach during evacuation circumstances. The amount of green time (G) allocated is subject to maximum and minimum phase duration constraints; 2 seconds of yellow time are indi.cated for each signal phase and 1 second of all-red time is assigned between signal phases, typically. If a signal is timed, the yellow and all-red times observed during the road survey are used. A lost time (L) of 2.0 seconds is used for each signal phase in the analysis. 4.2 Capacity Estimatfon along Sections of Highway The capacity of highway sections --as distinct from approaches to intersections --is a function of roadway geometrics, traffic composition (e.g. percent heavy trucks and buses* in the traffic stream) and, of course, motorist behavior. There is a fundamental relationship which relates service volume (i.e. the number of vehicles serviced within a uniform highway section in a given time period) to traffic density. The top curve in Figure 4-1 illustrates this relationship. As indicated, there are two flow regimes: (1) Free Flow (left side of curve); and (2) Forced Flow (right side). In the Free Flow regime, the traffic demand is fully serviced; the service volume increases as demand volume and density increase, until the service volume attains its maximum value, which is ttie capacity of the highway section. As traffic demand and the resulting highway density increase beyond this "critical" value, the rate. at which traffic can be serviced (i.e. the service volume) can actually decline below capacity ("capacity drop"). Therefore, in order to realistically represent traffic performance during congested conditions (i.e. when demand exceeds capacity), it is necessary to estimate the service volume, VF, under congested conditions. The value of VF can be expressed as: VF = R x Capacity where: R = Reduction factor which is less than unity NMP/JAF 4-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- We have employed a value of R=0.90. The advisability of such a capacity reduction factor is based upon empirical studies that identified a fall-off in the service flow rate when congestion occurs at "bottlenecks" or "choke points" on a freeway system. Zhang and Levinson3 describe a research program that collected data from a computer-based surveillance system (loop detectors) installed on the Interstate Highway System, at 27 active bottlenecks in the twin cities metro area in Minnesota over a 7-week period. When flow breakdown occurs, queues are formed which discharge at lower flow rates than the maximum capacity prior to observed breakdown. These queue discharge flow (QDF) rates vary from one location to the next and also vary by day of week and time.of day based upon local circumstances. The cited reference presents a mean QDF of 2,016 passenger cars per hour per lane (pcphpl). This figure compares with the nominal capacity estimate of 2,250 pcphpl estimated for the ETE and indicated in Appendix K for freeway links. The ratio of these two numbers is 0.896 which translates into a capacity reduction factor of 0.90. Since the principal objective of evacuation time estimate analyses is to develop a "realistic" estimate of evacuation times, use of the representative value for this capacity reduction factor (R=0.90) is justified. This factor is applied only when flow breaks down, as determined by the simulation* model. Rural roads, like freeways, are classified as "uninterrupted flow" facilities. (This is in contrast with urban street systems which have closely spaced signalized intersections and are classified as "interrupted flow" facilities.) As such, traffic flow along rural roads is subject to the same effects as freeways in the event traffic demand exceeds the nominal capacity, resulting in queuing and lower QDF rates. As a practical matter, rural roads rarely break down at locations away from intersections. Any breakdowns on . rural roads are generally experienced at intersections where other model logic applies, or at lane drops which reduce capacity there. Therefore, the application of a factor of 0.90 is appropriate on rural roads, but rarely, if ever, activated. The estimated value of capacity is based primarily upon the type of facility and on roadway geometrics. Sections of roadway with adverse geometrics are characterize.d by lo.wer free-flow. speeds and. lane capacity. Exhibit 15-30 in the Highway Capacity Manual was referenced to estimate saturation flow rates. The* impact of narrow lanes and shoulders on free-flow speed and on capacity is not material, particularly when flow is predominantly in one direction as is . the case during an evacuation. . . . The procedure used here was to estimate "sectio11" capacity, VE, based on ob_servations made traveling over each section of the evacuation network, based on the posted speed limits and travel behavior of other motorists and by reference to the 2010 HCM. The bYNEV II simulation
- model determines for each highway section, represented as *a network link, whether its capacity w.ould be limited by the "section-specific" service volume, VE, or by the intersection-spedfic capacity. For each link, the mode.I selects the lower value of capacity. 3Lei Zhang and .David Levinson, "Some Properties of Flows at Freeway Bottlenecks/' Transportation Research Record 1883, 2004. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 4-5 . KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 4.3 Study Area As part of the development of the link-node analysis network for the study area, an estimate of roadway capacity is required. The source material for the capacity estimates presented herein is contained in: 2010 Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) Transportation Research Board National Research Council Washington, D.C. The highway system in the study area consists primarily of three categories of roads and, of course, intersections:
- Two-Lane roads: Local, State
- Multi-Lane Highways (at-grade)
- Freeways Each of these classifications will be discussed. 4.3.1 Two-Lane Roads Ref: HCM Chapter 15 Two lane roads comprise the majority of highways within the EPZ. The per-lane capacity of a two-lane highway is estimated at 1, 700 passenger cars per hour (pc/h). This estimate is essentiafly independent of the directional distribution of traffic volume except that, for extended distances, the two-way capacity will not exceed 3,200 pc/h. The HCM procedures then estimate Level of Service (LOS) and Average Travel Speed. The DYNEV II simulation model accepts the specified value of capacity as input and computes average speed based on the time-varying demand: capacity relations. Based on the field survey and on expected traffic operations associated with evacuation scenarios:
- Most sections of two-lane roads within the EPZ are classified as "Class I", with "level
- terrain"; some are "rolling terrain". * "Class II" highways are mostly those within urban and suburban centers. 4.3.2 Multi-Lane Highway Ref: HCM Chapter 14 Exhibit 14-2 of the HCM 2010 presents a set of curves that indicate a per-lane capacity ranging from approximately 1,900 to 2;200 pc/h, for free-speeds of 45 to 60 mph, respectively. Based on observation, the multi-lane highways, outside of urban areas within the EPZ, service traffic with free-speeds in this range. The actual time-varying speeds computed by the simulation model reflect the demand: capacity relationship and the impact of control at intersections. A NMP/JAF 4-6
- KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 conservative estimate of per-lane capacity of 1,900 pc/h is adopted for this study for multi-lane highways outside of urban areas, as shown in Appendix K. 4.3.3 Freeways Ref: HCM Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 (TRB, 2010) Chapter 10 of the HCM 2010 describes a procedure for integrating the results obtained in Chapters 11, 12 and 13, which compute capacity and LOS for freeway components. Chapter 10 also presents a discussion of simulation models. The DYNEV II simulation model automatically performs this integration process. Chapter 11 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacity and LOS for "Basic Freeway Exhibit 11-17 of the HCM 2010 presents capacity vs. free speed estimates, which are provided below. Free Speed (mph): 55 60 65 70+ Per-Lane Capacity (pc/h): 2,250 2,300 2,350 2,400 The inputs to the simulation model are highway geometrics, free-speeds and capacity based on field observations. The simulation logic calculates actual time-varying speeds based on demand: capacity relationships. A conservative estimate of per-lane capacity of 2,250 pc/h is adopted for this study for freeways, as shown in Appendix K. Chapter 12 of the HCM 2010 presents procedures for estimating capacity, speed, density and LOS for freeway weaving sections. The simulation model contains logic that relates speed to demand volume: capacity ratio. The value of. capacity obtained from the computational procedures detailed in Chapter 12 depends on the "Type" and geometrics of the weaving segment and on the "Volume Ratio" (ratio of weaving volume to total volume). Chapter 13 of the HCM 2010 _presents procedures for estimating capacities of ramps and of "merge" areas. There are three significant factors to the determination of capacity of a freeway junction: The capacity of the freeway immediately downstream of an on-ramp or immediately upstream of an off-ramp; the capacity of the ramp roadway; and the maximum flow rate entering the ramp influence area. In most cases, the freeway capacity is the controlling factor. Values of this merge area capacity are presented in Exhibit 13-8 of the HCM 2010, and depend on the number of freeway lanes and on the freeway free speed. Ramp capacity is presented in Exhibit 13-10 and is a function of the ramp free flow speed. The DYNEV II simulation model logic simulates the merging operations of the ramp and freeway traffic in accord with the procedures in Chapter 13 of the HCM 2010. If congestion results from an excess of demand relative to capacity, then the model allocates service appropriately to the . two entering traffic streams and produces LOS F conditions (The HCM does not address LOS F explic:itly). NMP/JAF 4-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate . February 24, 201.6. *
4.3.4 Intersections Ref: HCM Chapters 18, 19, 20, 21 (TRB, 2010) Procedures for estimating capacity and LOS for approaches to intersections are presented in Chapter 18 (signalized intersections), Chapters 19, 20 (un-signalized intersections) and Chapter 21 (roundabouts). The complexity of these computations is indicated by the aggregate length of these chapters. The DYNEV II simulation logic is likewise complex. The simulation model explicitly models intersections: Stop/yield controlled intersections (both 2-way and all-way) and traffic signal controlled intersections. Where intersections are controlled by fixed time controllers, traffic signal timings are set to reflect average evacuation) traffic conditions. Actuated traffic signal settings respond to the time-varying demands *of evacuation traffic to adjust the relative capacities of the competing intersection approaches. The model is also* capable of modeling the presence of manned traffic control. At specific locations where it is advisable or where existing plans call for overriding existing traffic control to implement manned control, the model will use actuated signal timings that reflect the . presence of traffic guides. At locations where a special traffic control strategy (continuous turns, contra-flow lanes) is used, the strategy is modeled explicitly. Where applicable, the location and type of traffic control for nodes in the evacuation network are noted in Appendix K. The characteristics of the ten highest volume signalized intersections are detailed in Appendix J. 4.4 Simulation and Capacity Estimation Chapter 6. of the HCM is entitled, "HCM and Alternative Analysis Tools." The. chapter discusses the use of alternative. tools such as simulation modeling to evaluate the operational performance of highway networks. Among the reasons cited in Chapter 6 to consider using. simulation as an alternative analysis tool is: "The system under study involves a group of different facilities or travel *modes with mutual interactions invoking several procedura/chapters of the HCM. Alternative tools are able to analyze these facilities as a single system. n This statement succinctly describes the analyses required to determine traffic operations across . *an area encompassing an. EPZ operating under evacuation conditions. The model utilized .for this study, DYNEV II, is further described in Appendix C. It is essential to recognize that simulation models do not replicate the methodology and procedures of the HCM -they replace these procedures by describing the complex interactions of traffic flow and computing Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) detailing the operational performance of traffic over time and by The DYNEV II simulation model includes some HCM 2010 procedures only for the purpose of estimating capacity.** All simulation models must be calibrated properly with field observations that quantify the performance parameters applicable to the analysis network. Two of the most important of NMP/JAF 4-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 these are: (1) Free flow speed (FFS); and (2) saturation headway, hsat. The first of these is estimated by direct observation during the road survey; the second is estimated using the concepts of the HCM 2010, as described earlier. These parameters are listed in Appendix K, for each network link. NMP/JAF 4-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Volume, vph Qmax -R Qmax-Drop .___--r---------r----------'------Density, vpm Flow ,Regimes Speed, mph I 1111 Free : Vf R Ve -kopt Figure 4-1. Fundame.ntal Diagrams NMP/JAF 4-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 5 ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME Federal Government guidelines (see NUREG CR-7002) specify that the planner estimate the distributions of elapsed times associated with mobilization activities undertaken by the public to prepare for the evacuation trip. The elapsed time associated with each activity is represented as a statistical distribution reflecting differences between members of the public. The quantification of these activity-based distributions relies largely on the results of the telephone survey. We define the sum of these distributions of elapsed times as the Trip Generation Time Distribution. 5.1 Background In general, an accident at a nuclear power plant is characterized by the following Emergency Classification Levels (see Appendix 1-of NU REG 0654 for details): 1. Unusual Event 2. Alert 3. Site Area Emergency 4. General Emergency At each level, the Federal guidelines specify a set of Actions to be undertaken by the Licensee, and by State and Local offsite authorities. As a Planning Basis, we will adopt a conservative posture, in accordance with Section 1.2 of NUREG/CR-7002, that a rapidly escalating accident will be considered in calculating the Trip Generation Time .. We will assume: l. The Advisory to Evacuate will be announced coincident with the siren notification. *Mobilization of the general population will commence within 15 minutes after the siren notification. 3. ETE are measured relative to the Advisory to Evacuate. We emphasize thatthe adoption of this planning basis is not a representation that these events will occur within the indicated time frame. Rather, these assumptions are necessary in order to: 1. Establish a temporal framework for estimating the Trip Generation distribution in the format recommended in Section 2.13 of NUREG/CR-6863. (NRC, 2005). 2. Identify temporal points of reference that uniquely define "Clear Time" and ETE. It is likely that a longer time will elapse between the various classes of an emergency. ' . . . For example, suppose one hour elapses from the siren alert to the Advisory to Evacuate. In this* case, it is reasonable to expect sonie degree of spontaneous evacuation by the public during this one-hour period. As a result, the population within the EPZ will be lower when the Advisory to Evacuate is announced, than at the time of the siren alert .. In addition, mariy will engage in preparation activities to evacuate, in anticipation that an Advisory will be broadcast. Thus, the time needed to complete the mobilization activities and the number of people remaining to evacuate the EPZ after the Advisory to Evacuate, will both be somewhat less than NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 5-1 *. _KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 the estimates presented in this report. Consequently, the ETE presented in this report are higher than the actual evacuation time, if this hypothetical situation were to take place. "f:he notification process consists of two events: .. 1. Transmitting information using the alert notification systems available within the EPZ (e.g. sirens, EAS broadcasts, loud speakers). 2. Receiving and correctly interpreting the information that is transmitted. The population within the EPZ is dispersed over an area of approximately 160 square miles and is engaged in a wide variety of activities. It must be anticipated that some time will elapse between the transmission and receipt of the information advising the public of an accident. The amount of elapsed time will vary from one individual to the next depending on where that person is, what that person is doing, and related factors. Furthermore, some persons who will be directly involved with the evacuation process may be outside the EPZ at the time the emergency is declared. These people may be commuters, shoppers and other travelers who* reside within the EPZ and who will return to join the other household members upon receiving notification of an emergency. As indicated in Section 2.13 of NUREG/CR-6863, the estimated elapsed times for the receipt of notification can be expressed as a distribution reflecting the different notification times for different people within, and outside; the EPZ. By using time distributions, it is also possible to distinguish between different population groups and different day-of-week and time-of-day scenarios, so that accurate ETE may be computed: For example, people at home or at.work within the EPZ will be notified by siren . Those well the EPZ will be notified by telephone, radio, TV and word-of-mouth, with potentially longer time lags. Furthermore, the spatial distribution of the EPZ population will differ with . time of day -families will be united in the evenings, but dispersed during the day. In this respect, weekends will differ from weekdays. As indicated in Section 4.1 of NUREG/CR-7002, the information required to compute trip*
- generation times is typically obtained from a telephone survey of EPZ residents. Such a survey was conducted in 2012 in support of a pervious ETE study for this site. Appendix F discusses the survey sampling plan and documents the survey instrument and survey results. It is important to note that the shape and duration of the evacuation trip mobilization distribution is important for regions where traffic congestion is not expected to cause the evacuation time estimate to extend in time well beyond the trip generation period. The remaining discussion will focus on the application of the trip generation data obtained from the telephone survey to the development of the ETE documented in this report. NMP/JAF 5-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016.
5.2 Fundamental Considerations The environment leading up to the time that people begin their evacuation trips consists of a sequence of events and activities. Each event (other than the first) occurs at an instant in time and is the outcome of an activity. Activities are undertake.n over a period of time. Activities may be in "series" (i.e. to undertake an activity implies the completion of all preceding events) or may be in parallel (two or more activities may take place over the same period of time). Activities conducted in series are functionally dependent on the completion of prior activities; activities conducted in parallel are functionally independent of one another. The relevant events associated with the public's preparation for evacuation are: Event Number 1 2 3 4 5 Event Description Notification . Awareness of Situation* Depart Work Arrive Home Depart on Evacuation Trip Associated with each sequence of events are one or more activities, as outlined below: Table 5-1. Event Sequence for Evacuation Activities i!."',, 'cl ** ,_,, " ' . . Event Sequence Activity Distribution 1-7 2 Receive Notification 1 2 -7 3 Prepare to Leave Work 2 2,3 -7 4 Travel Home 3 2,4 -7 5 Prepare to Leave to Evacuate 4 N/A Snow Clearance 5 These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 5-1.
- An Event is a 'state' that exists at a point in time (e;g., depart work, arrive home)
- An Activity is a 'process' that takes place over some elapsed time (e.g., prepare to leave work, travel home)
- As such, a completed Activity changes the 'state' of an individual (e.g. the activity, 'travel home' changes the state from 'depart work' to 'arrive home'). Therefore, an Activity can be described as an 'Event Sequence';the elapsed times to perform an event sequence vary from one person to the next and are described as statistical distributions on the following pages. An employee who lives. outside the EPZ will follow sequence (c) of Figure 5-1. A household
- NMP/JAF 5-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 .
within the EPZ that has one or more commuters at work, and will await their return before beginning the evacuation trip will follow the first sequence of Figure 5-l(a). A household within the EPZ that has no commuters at work, or that will not await the return of any commuters, will follow the second sequence of Figure 5-l(a), regardless of day of week or time of day. Households with no commuters on weekends or in the evening/night-time, will follow the applicable sequence in Figure 5-l(b). Transients will always follow one of the sequences of Figure 5-l(b). Some transients away from their residence could elect to evacuate immediately without returning to the residence, as indicated in th.e second sequence. It is seen from Figure 5-1, that the Trip Generation time (i.e. the total elapsed time from Event 1 to Event 5) depends on the scenario and. will vary from one household to the next. Furthermore, Event 5 depends, in a complicated way, on the time distributions of all activities preceding that event. That is, to estimate the time distribution of Event 5, we must obtain estimates of the time distributions of all preceding events. For this study, we adopt the conservative posture that all activities will occur in sequence. In some cases, assuming certain events occur strictly sequential (for instance, a commuter returning home before beginning preparation to leave, or removing snow only after the preparation to leave) can result in rather conservative (that is, longer) estimates of mobilization times. It is reasonable to expect that at least some parts of these events wil.1 overlap for many households, but that assumption is not made in this study. NMP/JAF 5-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Residents Residents Residents, Transients away from Residence Residents, Transients at Residence 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ACTIVITIES 1 ---+ 2 Receive Notification 2 ---+ 3 Prepare to Leave Work
- 2, 3 ---+ 4 Travel Home 3 5 4 3, 5 2, 4 ---+ 5 Prepare to Leave to Evacuate Activities Consume Time 5 4 5 EVENTS 1. Notification .2. Aware of situation 3. Depart work 4. Arrive home Households wait for Commuters 1 Households without Commuters and households who do not wait for Commuters Return to residence, then evacuate Residents at home; transients evacuate directly 5. Depart on evacuation trip # 1 Applies for evening and weekends also if commuters are at work. 2 Applies throughout the year for transients. . Figure 5-1. Events and Activities Preceding the Evacuation Trip NMP/JAF 5-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 5.3 Estimated Time Distributions of Preceding Event 5 The time distribution of an event is obtained by "summing" the time distributions of all prior contributing activities. (This "summing" process is quite different than an algebraic sum since it is performed on distributions -not scalar numbers). Time Distribution No. 1, Notification Process: Activity 1 2 Federal regulations (lOCFR 50 Appendix E, Item IV.D.3) stipulate, "[t]he design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes" (NRC, 2011b). Furthermore, Item 2 of Section B in Appendix 3 of NUREG/CR-0654/FEMA-REP-1 states that "special arrangements will be made to assure 100% coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ" (NRC, 1980b). Given the federal regulations and guidance, and the presence of sirens within the EPZ, it is assumed that 100% of the population in the EPZ can be notified within 45 minutes. The assumed distribution for notifying the EPZ population is provided in Table 5-2: NMP/JAF Evacuation nrrie Estimate Table 5-2. Time Distribution.for Notifying the Public Elapsed Time Percent of (Minutes)
- Population Notified 0 0% 5 7% 10 13% 15 27% 20 47% 25 66% 30 87% 35 -* -92% 40 97% 45 100% 5-6
- KLD Engineering, P.C. _ February 24, 2016 Distribution No. 2, Prepare to Leave Work: Activity 2 3 It is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of business enterprises within the EPZ will elect to shut down following notification and most employees would leave work quickly. Commuters, who work outside the EPZ could, in all probability, also leave quickly since facilities outside the EPZ would remain open and other personnel would remain. Personnel or farmers responsible for equipment/livestock would require additional time to secure their facility. The distribution of Activity 2 3 shown in Table 5-3 reflects data obtained by the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure Table 5-3. Time Distribution for Employees to Prepare to Leave Work t ***'* ;z-* !f 4---,,, "" * .. --. 0 --*t('.""'" 00 *_,-*-1 !<;" * ,,, * ** 'i. ">Gumulat1ve* . ,, * .. , , it t':umulative ' 1 Elapsed Time *, ' ' .,
- I d * * ,. . t' *-.*. Per.cpnt ;;; . T1m¥ _ __ .. L. . Leavintwork 0 0% 3S 94.50% s 51.10% 40 95.90% 10 70.60% 4S 96.20% lS 80.70% so 96.20% 20 85.90% SS 96.20% 2S 86.40% 60 100.00% 30 94.00% NOTE: The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response. that is, the sample was reduced in size to include only those households who responded to this question. The underlying assumption is that the distribution of this activity for the. "Don't know" responders, if the event takes plate, would be the same as those responders who provided estimates. NMP/JAF 5-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
Distribution No. 3, Travel Home: Activity 3 ---+ 4 These data are provided directly by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 5-2 and listed in Table 5-4. Table 5-4. Time Distribution for Commuters to Travel Home --Cumulative Cumulative
- Elapsed Time Percent Elapsed Time Percent* Returning Home (Minutes) Returning Home 0 0 40 89.6% 5 19.6% 45 94.3% 10 47.7% so 95.1% 15 63.2% 55 95.1% 20 75.5% 60 98.3% 25 77.4% 75 99.4% 30 85.1% 90 100.0% 35 87.0% NOTE: The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response NMP/JAF 5-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Distribution No. 4, Prepare to Leave Home: Activity 2, 4 5 These data are -provided directly by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 5-2 and listed in Table 5-5. Table 5-5. Time Distribution for Population to Prepare to Evacuate Cumulative Elapsed Time Percent Ready to (Minutes) Evacuate 0 0% 15 18.2% 30 68.9% 45 75.5% 60 89.6% 75 93.9% 90 95.0% 105 95.0% 120 98.6% 135 100.0% NOTE:The survey data was normalized to distribute the "Dori't know" response*-NMP/JAF 5-9 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. -February 24, 2016 Distribution No. 5, Snow Clearance Time Distribution Inclement weather scenarios involving snowfall must address the time lags associated with snow clearance. It is assumed that snow equipment is mobilized and deployed during the snowfall to maintain passable roads. The general consensus is that the snow-plowing efforts are generally successful for all but the most extreme blizzards when the rate of snow accumulation exceeds that of snow clearance over a period of many hours. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the highway system will remain passable -albeit at a lower capacity -under the vast majority of snow conditions. Nevertheless, for the vehicles to gain access to the highway system, it may be necessary for driveways and employee parking lots to be cleared to the extent needed to permit vehicles to gain access to the roadways. These clearance activities take time; this time must be incorporated into the trip generation time distributions. These data are provided by those households which responded to the telephone survey. This distribution is plotted in Figure 5-2 and listed in Table 5-6 . . Note that those respondents (53.0%) who answered that they would not take time to clear their driveway were assumed to be ready immediately at the start of this activity. Essentially they would drive through the snow on the driveway to access the roadway and begin their evacuation trip: Table 5-6. Time Distribution for Population to Clear 611-811 of Snow Cumulative Percent Elapsed Time Completing (Minutes) Snow*Removal 0 53.0% 15 . 65.5% 30 88.1% 45 *9i.1% 60 94.2% 75 97.4% 90 97.9% 105 .. 98.1% 120 98;9% 135 99.8% 150 100.0% NOTE: The survey data normalized to distribute the "Don't know" response* NMP/JAF 5-10 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD EJ"lgineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016 Mobilization Activities 100% 90% > .... *:;; *.;; 80% u ct c 0 +; "' 70% .!::! 1i 0 60% "° c +; -Notification QI a. 50% E -Prepare to Leave Work 0 u -Travel Home c 40% 0 *.;; -Prepare Home "' :I Q. 30% 0 -Time to Clear Snow a. -0 .... c 20% QI u ... QI a. 10% 0% 0 30 60 90 120 150 Elapsed Time from Start of Mobilization Activity (min) Figure 5-2. Evacuation Mobilization Activities NMP/JAF 5-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 5.4 Calculation of Trip Generation Time Distribution The time distributions for each of the mobilization activities presented herein must be combined to form the appropriate Trip Generation Distributions. As discussed above, this study assumes that the stated events take place in sequence such that all preceding events must be completed before the current event can occur. For example, if a household awaits the return of a commuter, the work-to-home trip (Activity 3 4) must precede Activity 4 5. To calculate the time distribution of an event that is dependent on two sequential activities, it is necessary to "sum" the distributions associated with these prior activities. The distribution summing algorithm is applied repeatedly as shown to form the required distribution. As an outcome of this procedure, new time distributions are formed; we assign "letter" designations to these intermediate distributions to describe the procedure. Table 5-7 presents the summing procedure to arrive at each designated distribution. Table 5-7. Mapping Distributions to Events Apply "Summing" Algorithm To: Distribution Obtained Event Defined Distributions 1 and 2 Distribution A Event 3 Distributions A and 3 Distribution B Event 4 Distributions Band 4 Distribution C Event 5 Distributions 1 and 4 Distribution D Event 5 Distributions C and 5 Distribution E Event 5 Distributions D and 5 Distribution F Event 5 Table 5-8 presents a description of each of the final trip generation distributions achieved after the summing process is completed. NMP/JAF 5-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 5-8. Description of the Distributions Distribution Description A B c D E F Time distribution of commuters departing place of work (Event 3). Also applies to employees who work within the EPZ who live outside, and to Transients within the EPZ. Time distribution of commuters arriving home (Event 4). Time distribution of residents with commuters who return home, leaving home to begin the evacuation trip (Event 5). Time distribution of residents without commuters returning home, leaving home to begin the evacuation trip (Event 5). Time distribution of residents with commuters who return home, leaving home to begin the evacuation trip, after snow clearance activities (Event 5). Time distribution of residents with no commuters returning home, leaving to begin the evacuation trip, after snow clearance activities (Event 5). 5.4.1 Statistical Outliers As already mentioned, some portion of the survey respondents answer "don't know" to some questions or choose to not respond to a question. The mobilization activity distributions are based upon actual responses. But, it is the nature of surveys that a few numeric responses are inconsistent with the overall pattern of results. An example would be a case in which for 500 responses, almost all of them estimate less than two hours for a given answer, but 3 say "four hours" and 4 say "six or more hours". These "outliers" must be considered: are they valid responses, or so atypical that they should be dropped from the sample? In assessing outliers, there are three alternates to consider: 1) Some responses with very long times may be valid, but reflect the reality that the respondent really needs to be classified in a different population subgroup, based upon special needs; 2) Other responses may be unrealistic (6 hours to return home from commuting distance, or 2 days to prepare the home for departure); 3) Some high values are representative and plausible, and one must not cut them as part of the consideration of outliers. The issue of course is how to make the decision that a given response or set of responses are to be considered "outliers" for the component mobilization activities, using a method that objectively quantifies the process. There is considerable statistical literature on the identification and treatment of outliers singly or in groups, much of which assumes the data is normally distributed and some of which uses non-NMP/JAF 5-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 parametric methods to avoid that assumption. The literature cites that limited work has been done directly on outliers in sample survey responses. In establishing the overall mobilization time/trip generation distributions, the following principles are used: 1) It is recognized that the overall trip generation distributions are conservative estimates, because they assume a household will do the mobilization activities sequentially, with no overlap of activities; 2) The individual mobilization activities (prepare to leave work, travel home, prepare home, clear snow) are reviewed for outliers, and then the overall trip generation distributions are created (see Figure 5-1, Table 5-7, Table 5-8); 3) Outliers can be eliminated either because the response reflects a special population (e.g. special needs, transit dependent) or lack of realism, because the purpose is to estimate trip generation patterns for personal vehicles; 4) To eliminate outliers, a) the mean and standard deviation of the specific activity are estimated from the responses, b) the median of the same data is estimated, with its position relative to the mean noted, c) the histogram of the data is inspected, and d) all values greater than 3.5 standard deviations are flagged for attention, taking special note of whether there are gaps (categories with zero entries) in the histogram display. In general, only flagged values more than 4 standard deviations from the mean are allowed to be considered outliers, with gaps in the histogram expected. When flagged values are classified as outliers and dropped, steps "a" to "d" are repeated. NMP/JAF 5-14 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- 5) As a practical matter, even with outliers eliminated by the above, the resultant histogram, viewed as a cumulative distribution, is not a normal distribution. A typical situation that results is shown below in Figure 5-3. 100.0% 90.0% -80.0% 70.0% RI ... 60.0% u ... 50.0% C1I 40.0% RI e 30.0% a 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% --LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ Lil LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ LI'\ N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... N ,..... ,..... N ,..... ..-i ..-i N N ("() l"f1 <:t" <:t" LI'\ LI'\ l.O 00 CJ') Center of Interval (minutes) -Cumulative Data --Cumulative Normal Figure 5-3. Comparison of Data Distribution and Normal Distribution LI'\ N ..-i ..-i 6) In particular, the cumulative distribution differs from the normal distribution in two key aspects, both very important in loading a network to estimate evacuation times: Most of the real data is to the left of the "normal" curve above, indicating that the network loads faster for the first 80-85% of the vehicles, potentially causing more (and earlier) congestion than otherwise modeled; The last 10-15% of the real data "tails off slower than the comparable "normal" curve, indicating that there is significant traffic still loading at later times. Because these two features are important to preserve, it is the histogram of the data that is used to describe the mobilization activities, not a "normal" curve fit to the data. One could consider other distributions, but using the shape of the actual data curve is unambiguous and preserves these important features; 7) With the mobilization activities each modeled according to Steps 1-6, including preserving the features cited in Step 6, the overall (or total) mobilization times are constructed. This is done by using the data sets and distributions under different scenarios (e.g. commuter returning, no commuter returning, no snow or snow in each). In general, these are additive, using NMP/JAF 5-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 weighting based upon the probability distributions of each element; Figure 5-4 presents the combined trip generation distributions designated A, C, D, E and F. These distributions are presented on the same time scale. (As discussed earlier, the use of strictly additive activities is a conservative approach, because it makes all activities sequential -preparation for departure follows the return of the commuter; snow clearance follows the preparation for departure, and so forth. In practice, it is reasonable that some of these activities are done in parallel, at least to some extent -for instance, preparation to depart begins by a household member at home while the commuter is still on the road.) The mobilization distributions that result are used in their tabular/graphical form as direct inputs to later computations that lead to the ETE. The DYNEV II simulation model is designed to accept varying rates of vehicle trip generation for each origin centroid, expressed in the form of histograms. These histograms, which represent Distributions A, C, D, E and F, properly displaced with respect to one another, are tabulated in Table 5-9 (Distribution B, Arrive Home, omitted for clarity). The final time period (15) is 600 minutes long. This time period is added to allow the analysis network to clear, in the event congestion persists beyond the trip generation period. Note that there are no trips generated during this final time period. 5.4.2 Staged Evacuation Trip Generation As defined in NUREG/CR-7002, staged evacuation consists of the following: 1. ERPAs comprising the 2 mile region are advised to evacuate immediately 2. ERPAs comprising regions extending from 2 to 5 miles downwind are advised to shelter in-place while the two mile region is cleared 3. As vehicles evacuate the 2 mile region, sheltered people from 2 to 5 miles downwind continue preparation for evacuation 4. The population sheltering in the 2 to 5 mile region are advised to begin evacuating when approximately 90% of those originally within the 2 mile region evacuate across the 2 mile region boundary 5. Non-compliance with the shelter recommendation is the same as the shadow evacuation percentage of 20% Assumptions 1. The EPZ population in ERPAs beyond 5 miles will shelter in place, with the exception of the 20% non-compliance. 2. The population in the Shadow Region beyond the EPZ boundary, extending to approximately 15 miles radially from NMP/JAF, will react as they do for all non-staged evacuation scenarios. That is 20% of these households will elect to evacuate with no shelter delay. NMP/JAF 5-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- 3. The transient population will not be expected to stage their evacuation because of the limited sheltering options available to people who may be at parks, on a beach, or at other venues. Also, notifying the transient population of a staged evacuation would prove difficult. 4. Employees will also be assumed to evacuate without first sheltering. Procedure 1. Trip generation for population groups in the 2 mile region will be as computed based upon the results of the telephone survey and analysis. 2. Trip generation for the population subject to staged evacuation will be formulated as follows: a. Identify the goth percentile evacuation time for the ERPAs comprising the 2 mile region. This value, Tscen *, is obtained from simulation results. It will become the time at which the region being sheltered will be told to evacuate for each scenario. b. The resultant trip generation curves for staging are then formed as follows: i. The non-shelter trip generation curve is followed until a maximum of 20% of the total trips are generated (to account for shelter non-compliance). ii. No additional trips are generated until time Tscen
- iii. Following time Tscen *,the balance of trips are generated: 1. by stepping up and then following the non-shelter trip generation curve (if Tscen
- max trip generation time) or 2. by stepping up to 100% (if Tscen *is> max trip generation time) c. Note: This procedure implies that there may be different staged trip generation distributions for different scenarios. NUREG/CR-7002 uses the statement "approximately goth percentile" as the time to end staging and begin evacuating. The value of Tscen *is 1:30 for non-snow scenarios and 2:00 for snow scenarios. 3. Staged trip generation distributions are created for the following population groups: a. Residents with returning commuters b. Residents without returning commuters c. Residents with returning commuters and snow conditions d. Residents without returning commuters and snow conditions Figure 5-5 presents the staged trip generation distributions for both residents with and without returning commuters; the goth percentile two-mile evacuation time is go minutes for good weather and between 110 and 120 minutes for snow scenarios. At the goth percentile evacuation time, 20% of the population (who normally would have completed their mobilization activities for an un-staged evacuation) advised to shelter has nevertheless departed the area. These people do not comply with the shelter advisory. Also included on the plot are the trip generation distributions for these groups as applied to the regions advised to evacuate immediately. Since the goth percentile evacuation time occurs before the end of the trip generation time, after the sheltered region is advised to evacuate, the shelter trip generation distribution rises to NMP/JAF 5-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 meet the balance of the non-staged trip generation distribution. Following time Tscen *, the balance of staged evacuation trips that are ready to depart are released within 15 minutes. After Tscen * + 15, the remainder of evacuation trips are generated in accordance with the un-staged trip generation distribution. Table 5-10 provides the trip generation histograms for staged evacuation. 5.4.3 Trip Generation for Waterways and Recreational Areas Procedure A Section 4.9 of the Oswego County Radiological Emergency Response Plan lists the clearing of water ERPAs as one component of Initial Precautionary Operations. In order to accomplish this, the County Director of Emergency Management (CDEM), in consultation with the Chairman of the Legislature, shall coordinate the activities of supporting County agencies. As indicated in Table 5-2, this study assumes 100% notification in 45 minutes. Table 5-9 indicates that all transients will have mobilized within 2 hours. It is assumed that this 2 hour timeframe is sufficient time for boaters, campers and other transients to return to their vehicles and begin their evacuation trip. NMP/JAF 5-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 5-9. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Un-staged Evacuation Percent of Total Trips Generated Within Indicated Time Period Residents Residents With Residents Residents with Without Commuters Without Time Duration Employees Transients Commuters Commuters Snow Commuters Snow Period (Min) (Distribution A) (Distribution A) (Distribution C) (Distribution D) (Distribution E) (Distribution F) 1 15 8% 8% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2 30 74% 74% 6% 40% 3% 24% 3 15 12% 12% 15% 28% 10% 23% 4 15 3% 3% 22% 13% 16% 17% 5 15 2% 2% 19% 9% 17% 13% 6 30 1% 1% 23% 4% 27% 12% 7 30 0% 0% 9% 4% 14% 5% 8 15 0% 0% 3% 1% 4% 2% 9 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 2% 10 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 0% 11 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 12 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 13 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 15 600 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% NOTE:
- Shadow vehicles are loaded onto the analysis network (Figure 1-2) using Distributions C and E for good weather and snow, respectively .
- Special event vehicles are loaded using Distribution A . NMP/JAF 5-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF 100 Q. *;: C 0 .. "' 80 ::I u "' > w b.O c 60 c c '60 Cll a::I c 0 40 +; ..!!! ::I Q. 0 Cl. 0 20 .... c Cll u ... Cll Cl. 0 Evacuation Time Estimate Trip Generation Distributions -Employees/Transients -Residents with Commuters -Residents with no Commuters -Res with Comm and Snow -Res no Comm with Snow 0 60 120 180 240 Elapsed Time from Evacuation Advisory (min) Figure 5-4. Comparison of Trip Generation Distributions 5-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 5-10. Trip Generation Histograms for the EPZ Population for Staged Evacuation Percent of Total Trips Generated Within Indicated Time Period* Residents Residents Residents with Without Residents With Without Time Duration Commuters Commuters Commuters Snow Commuters Snow Period (Min) (Distribution C) (Distribution D) (Distribution E) (Distribution F) 1 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 2 30 1% 8% 1% 5% 3 15 3% 6% 2% 5% 4 15 5% 2% 3% 3% 5 15 3% 2% 3% 3% 6 30 73% 77% 6% 2% 7 30 9% 4% 72% 77% 8 15 3% 1% 4% 2% 9 15 1% 0% 3% 2% 10 15 1% 0% 3% 0% 11 15 1% 0% 1% 1% 12 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 13 15 0% 0% 0% 0% 14 15 0% 0% 1% 0% 15 600 0% 0% 0% 0% *Trip Generation for Employees and Transients (see Table 5-9) is the same for Unstaged and Staged Evacuation. NMP/JAF 5-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Staged and Unstaged Evacuation Trip Generation -Employees I Transients -Residents with Commuters -Residents with no Commuters -Res with Comm and Snow -Res no Comm with Snow -staged Residents with Commuters -Staged Residents with no Commuters -Staged Residents with Commuters (Snow) Staged Residents with no Commuters (Snow) 100 c. 90 *;: I-c 0 80 +: IV :::J u 70 IV > w ti,() c 60 c c *;, Cl.I 50 a:i c 0 *z; .!!! 40 :::J c. 0 30 Q. .... 0 .... 20 c Cl.I u ... Cl.I 10 Q. 0 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180 195 210 225 240 255 Elapsed Time from Evacuating Advisory (min) Figure 5-5. Comparison of Staged and Un-staged Trip Generation Distributions in the 2 to 5 Mile Region NMP/JAF 5-22 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 6 DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS An evacuation "case" defines a combination of Evacuation Region and Evacuation Scenario. The definitions of "Region" and "Scenario" are as follows: Region Scenario A grouping of contiguous evacuating ERPAs that forms either a "keyhole" sector-based area, or a circular area within the EPZ, that must be evacuated in response to a radiological emergency. A combination of circumstances, including time of day, day of week, season, and weather conditions. Scenarios define the number of people in each of the affected population groups and their respective mobilization time distributions. A total of 29 Regions were defined which encompass all the groupings of ERPAs considered. These Regions are defined in Table 6-1. The ERPA configurations are identified in Figure 6-1. .Ea.ch keyhole sector-based area consists of a central circle centered at NMP/JAF, and three adjoining sectors, each with a central angle of 22.5 degrees, as per NUREG/CR-7002 guidance. The central sector coincides with the wind direction. These sectors extend to 5 miles from NMP/JAF (Regions R04 through RlO) or to the EPZ boundary (Regions Rll through R21). Regions ROl, R02 and R03 represent evacuations of circular areas with radii of 2, 5 and 10 miles, respectively; Regions R2.2 through R29 are identical to Regions R04 through RlO, and R02, respectively; however, those ERPAs between 2 miles and 5 miles are staged until 90% of the 2
- mile region (Region ROl) has evacuated. A total .of 14 Scenarios were evaluated for all Regions. Thus, there are a total of 29x14=406 evacuation q:ises. Table 6-2 is a description of all Scenarios. There are some instances when defining an Evacuation Region wherein a small "sliver" of an ERPA may be within the radial or keyhole Region. Figure 6-2 illustrates that a small portion of
- ERPAs 7 and 12 are within the 5-mile radius of NMP/JAF. Generally speaking, for a low population density site, a sliver ERPA is not included in the Region unless more than 10% of the ERPA population or 100 people (whichever is less) live* within the sliver. All potential ERPA slivers were discussed with Entergy, Exelon and Oswego County. The stakeholders decided to not include the sliver ERPAs, thereby explaining why ERPAs 7 and 12 are not included in any of the Evacuation Regions extending to 5 miles in Table 6-1. Note that 2010 Census data was used for the computations shown in Figure 6-2. Each combination of region and scenario implies a specific population to be evacuated. Table 6-3 presents the percentage of each population group estimated to evacuate for each Scenario. Table 6-4 presents the vehicle counts for each scenario for an evacuation of Region R03 -the entire EPZ. The vehicle estimates presented in Section 3 are peak values. These peak values are adjusted depending on the Scenario and Region being considered, using Scenario and Region specific
- percentages; such th.at the average population is considered for each evacuation case. The average Scenario percentages are presented in Table 6-3, while the regional percentages are NMP/JAF 6-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 20lf1 provided in Table H-1. The percentages presented in Table 6-3 were determined as follows: The number of residents with commuters during the week (when workforce is at its peak) is equal to the product of 56% (the percent of households with at least one commuter see Figure F-6) and 45% (the percent of households with a commuter that would await the return of the commuter prior to evacuating-see Section F.3.2) which equals 25% (the percent of households with returning commuters). See assumption 3 in Section 2.3. It is estimated for weekend and evening scenarios that 10 percent of households with returning commuters will have a commuter at work during those times. Employment is assumed to be at its peak (100%) during the winter, midweek, midday scenarios. Employment is reduced slightly {96%) for summer, midweek, midday scenarios. This is based on the estimation that 50% of the employees commuting into the EPZ will be on vacation for a week during the approximate 12 weeks of summer. It is further estimated that those taking vacation will be uniformly dispersed throughout the summer with approximately 4% of employees vacationing each week. It is further estimated that only 10% of the employees are working in the evenings and during the weekends. Transient activity is estimated to be at its peak {100%) during summer weekends and less (36%) during the week. As shown in Appendix E, there is a significant amount of lodging and campgrounds offering overnight accommodations in the EPZ; thus, transient activity is estimated to be higher during evening hours -39% for summer. Transient activity is less during the winter13% during the week, 31% on weekends and 14% during the evening. As noted in the shadow footnote to Table 6-4, the shadow percentages are computed using a base of 20% (see assumption 5 in Section 2.2); to include the employees within the Shadow Region who may choose to evacuate, the voluntary evacuation is multiplied by a specific proportion of employees to permanent residents in the Shadow Region. For example, using the values provided in Table 6-4 for Scenario 1, the shadow percentage is computed as follows: ( 1,509 ) 20% x 1+5,378+16,134 = 21 % One special event -Harborfest Fireworks -was considered as Scenario 13. Thus, the special event traffic is 100% evacuated for Scenario 13, and 0% for all other scenarios. As discussed in Section 7, schools are in session during the winter season, midweek, midday and 100% of buses will be needed under those circumstances. Considering the presence of day camps in the EPZ, it is estimated that summer school/day camp enrollment is approximately 10% of enrollment during the regular school year for summer, midweek, midday scenarios. Schools or day camps are not in session during weekends and evenings, thus no buses for school children are needed under those circumstances. The evacuation percentages for students commuting from outside the EPZ to SUNY Oswego are the same as the school evacuation percentages. NMP/JAF 6-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Transit buses for the transit-dependent population are set to 100% for all scenarios as it is assumed that the transit-dependent population is present in the EPZ for all scenarios. External traffic is estimated to be reduced by 60% ,during evening scenarios and is 100% for all *other scenarios . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 6-3 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016
. Table 6-1. Description of Evacuation Regions
- Region Description. ERPA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 29 R01 2-Mile Radius ROZ 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction ERPA Fro in 1 5 .6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 Ni A E, ESE, SE, SSE, S,
- Refer to R01 SSW, SW, WSW R04 w ROS WNW R06. NW, NNW R07 N ROS NNE R09 NE R10 ENE Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to EPZ Boundary Region Wind Direction ERPA From 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 '18 19 20 21 22 23 'R11 E, ESE, SE R12 SSE, S, SSW R13 SW R14 WSW R15
- w Ri.6 WNW R17 NW R18 NNW R19 N R20 NNE, NE R21 ENE NMP/JAF 6-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Staged -Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction From 3 4 5 6 1 2 ERPA 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 11 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 21 28 29 E, ESE,SE,SSE,S,SS\N,S\N, \NSW Refer to ROl
- R22 \N R23 \NN\llJ R24 NIN, NN\N R25 N R26 NNE R27 NE R28 ENE R29 5-Mile Radius ERPA Shelter-in-Place . NMP/JAF 6-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend
- NMP/JAF GJ ERPA '--::::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings Evacuation Time Estimate ;\ Oate:8/f9/2012 KlO Conndation Energy. Entersv Figure 6-1. ERPAs Comprising the NMP/JAF EPZ 6-6 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 I Region Ro2 I No. of People within ERPA 7 = 699 No. of People within Sliver= 48 Percent of Population within Sliver= 6.9% No. of People within ERPA 12 = 7960 No. of People within Sliver= 49 Percent of Population within Sliver= 0.6% Legend
- NMP/JAF (iJ ERPA .. Sliver Evacuate C.... -:. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundaries Figure 6-2. Example of an ERPA "Sliver" when Defining Evacuation Regions NMP/JAF 6-7 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 6-2. Evacuation Scenario Definitions 1 Summer Midweek Midday Good None 2 Summer Midweek Midday Rain None 3 Summer Weekend Midday Good None 4 Summer Weekend Midday Rain None Summer Midweek, Evening Good None 5 Weekend 6 Winter Midweek Midday Good None 7 Winter Midweek Midday Rain None 8 Winter Midweek Midday Snow None 9 Winter . Weekend Midday Good None 10 Winter Weekend Midday Rain None 11 Winter Weekend Midday Snow None Winter Midweek, Evening Good None 12 Weekend Summer Weekend Evening Good Special Event-Harborfest 13 Fireworks Summer Midweek Midday Good Roadway Impact -Lane 14 Closure on SR 481 SB 1 Winter means that school is in session (also applies to spring and autumn). Summer means that school is not in session. NMP/JAF 6-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Table 6-3. Percent of Population Groups Evacuating for Various Scenarios 25% 75% 96% 36% 21% 0% 10% 10% 100% 100% 25% 75% 96% 36% 21% 0% 10% 10% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 100% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 100% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 39% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 40% 25% 75% 100% 13% 21% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 2.5% 75% 100% 13% 21% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 25% 75% 100% 13% 21% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 31% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 31% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 31% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 3% 97% 10% 14% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 40% 3% 97% 10% 39% 20% 100% 0% 0% 100% 40% 25% 75% 96% 36% 21% 0% 10% 10% 100% 100% Resident Households with Commuters ......* Households of EPZ residents who await the return of commuters prior to beginning the evacuation trip. Resident Households with No Commuters .. Households of EPZ residents who do not have commuters or will not await the return of commuters prior to beginning the evacuation trip. Employees ********.****.*........* ******************...... EPZ employees who live outside the EPZ Transients ......**.**************...........*.*.************ People who are in the EPZ at the time of an accident for recreational or other (non-employment) purposes. Shadow .**.***.*****************....****.******************. Residents and employees in the Shadow Region (outside of the EPZ) who will spontaneously decide to relocate during the evacuation. The basis for the values shown is a 20% relocation of shadow residents along with a proportional percentage of shadow employees. Special Events *...******************.........* ; *.*.******* Additional vehicles in the EPZ due to the identified special event. School, Day Camp and Transit Buses .......... Vehicle-equivalents present on the road during evacuation servicing schools, day camp and transit-dependent people (1 bus is equivalent to 2 passenger vehicles). External Through Traffic ............................. Traffic on interstates/freeways and major arterial roads at the start of the evacuation. This traffic is stopped by access control approximately 2 hours after the evacuation begins. NMP/JAF 6-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 6-4. Vehicle Estimates by Scenario 1 5,378 16,134 1,509 1,043 3,203 0 216 31 152 5,036 32,702 2 5,378 16,134 1,509 1,043 3,203 0 216 31 152 5,036 32,702 3 645 20,867 157 2,897 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 32,805 4 645 20,867 157 2,897 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 32,805 s. 645 20,867 157 1,130 3,051 0 0 0 152 2,014 28,016 6* 5,378 16,134 1,572 377 3,203 0 2,155 312 152 5,036 34,319 7 5,378 16,134 1,572 377 3,203 0 2,155 312 152 5,036 34,319 8 5,378 16,134 1,572 377 3,203 0 2,155 312 152 5,036 34,319 9 645 20,867 157 898 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 30,806 10 645 20,867 157 898 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 30,806 11 645 20,867. 157 898 3,051 0 0 0 152 5,036 30,806 12 645 20,867 157 406 3,051 0 0 0 152 2,014 27,292 13 645 20,867 157 1,130 3,051 22,971 0 0 152 2,014 50,987 14 5,378 16,134 1,509 1,043 . 3,203 0 216 31 152 5,036 32,702 Note: Vehicle estimates are for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) NMP/JAF 6-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 7 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE) This section presents the ETE results of the computer analyses using the DYNEV II System described in Appendices B, C and D. These results cover 29 regions within the NMP/JAF EPZ and the 14 Evacuation Scenarios discussed in Section 6. The ETE for all Evacuation Cases are presented in Table 7-1 and Table 1-2. These tables present the estimated times to clear the indicated population percentages from the Evacuation Regions for all Evacuation Scenarios. The ETE for the 2-mile region in both staged and un-staged regions are presented in Table 7-3 and Table 7-4. Table 7-5 defines the Evacuation Regions considered. The tabulated values of ETE are obtained from the DVNEV II System outputs which are generated at 5-minute intervals. 7.1 Voh.mfary Evacuation and Shadow Evacuation "Voluntary evacuees" are people within the EPZ in ERPA for which an Advisory to Evacuate has not been issued, yet who elect to evacuate. "Shadow evacuation" is the voluntary outward movement of some people from the Shadow Region (outside the EPZ) for whom no protective action recommendation has bee_n issued. Both voluntary and shadow evacuations are assumed to take place over the same time frame as the evacuation from within the impacted Evacuation Region . . The ETE for the NMP/JAF EPZ addresses the issue of voluntary evacuees in the manner shown in Figure 7-1. . Within the EPZ, 20 percent of people located in ERPA outside of the evacuation region who are not advised to evacuate, are assumed to elect to evacuate. Similarly, it is *
- assumed that 20 percent of those people in the Shadow Region will choose to leave the area. Figure 7-2presents the. area identified as the Shadow Region. This region extends radially from NMP/JAF to cover a region between the EPZ boundary and approximately 15 miles .. The population and number of evacuating vehicles in the Shadow Region were estimated using the same methodology that was used for permanent residents within the EPZ (see Section 3.1). As discussed in Section 3.2,* it is estimated thi;it a total of 29,345 people reside in the Shadow Region; 20 percent of them would evacuate. *See. Table 6-4 for the number of evacuating vehicles from the Shadow Region. Traffic generated within this Shadow Region, traveling* away from the NMP/JAF site, has the potential for impeding evacuating vehicles from within the Evacuation Region. All ETE calculations include this shadow traffic movement. * * . 7 .2 Staged Evacuation
- As defined in NU REG/CR-7002, staged evacuation consists of the following: 1. ERPAs comprising the 2 mile region are advised to evacuate immediately. 2. ERPAs comprising regions exten.ding from 2 to 5 miles downwind are advised to shelter in-placewhile the 2-mile region is cleare,d. l'JMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 7-1 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016.
- 3. As vehicles evacuate the 2 mile region, people from 2 to 5 miles downwind continue preparation for evacuation while they shelter. 4. The pqpulation sheltering in the 2 to 5 mile region is advised to begin evacuating when approximately 90% of those originally within the 2 mile region evacuate across the 2 mile region boundary. 5. Non-compliance with the shelter recommendation is the same as the shadow evacuation percentage of 20%. See Section 5.4.2 for additional information on staged evacuation. 7 .3 Patterns Traffic Congestion during Evacuation Figure 7-3 through Figure 7-7 illustrate the patterns of traffic congestion that arise for the case when the entire EPZ (Region R03) is advised to evacuate during the winter, midweek, midday period under good weather conditions (Scenario 6). . . Traffic congestion, as the term is used here, is defined as Level of Servke (LOS) F. LOS F is defined as follows (HCM page 5-5): The HCM uses LOS F to define operations that have either broken down (i.e., demand exceeds capacity) or have exceeded a specified service measure value, or combination of service measure values, that most users would consider unsatisfactory. However, particularly for planning applications where different alternatives may be compared, analysts may be interested in knowing just how bad the LOS F condition is. Several are available to describe individually, or in combination, the severity of a LOS F condition: -* Demand-'to-capacity.ratios describe the extent to which capacity is exceeded during the analysis period (e.g., by 1%, 15%; etc.);
- Duration of LOS F describ_es how long the condition persists (e.g., 15 min, 1 h, 3 h); and *Spatio/extent measures describe the areas affected by LOS F conditions. These include measures such as the back of queue, and the identification of the specific intersection approaches or system elements experiencing LOS F conditions. All highway "links" which experience LOS F are delineated in these figures by a thick red line; all others are .lightly indicated. Congestion develops rapidly around concentrations of population -and traffic bottlenecks .. Figure 7-3 displays the developing congestion within the City of Oswego, which is southwest of NMP/JAF, just 40 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate (ATE). At this time, a majority of transients and employees have now begun their evacuation trips, as well as many residents and commuters. SR 48, SR 481, and CR 7 southbound, as well as SR 104 WB, which are servicing the City of Oswego, are displaying congested traffic conditions (LOS F) on roadway sections exiting the City of Oswego. Some congestion exists in Fulton due to the voluntary evacuation of vehicles _outside of the EPZ. NMP/JAF 7-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 At 1 hour, 30 minutes after the ATE, Figure 7-4 displays fully-developed congestion within the City of Oswego with LOS F along the major evacuating routes of CR 7, SR 104, SR 481, and SR 48 exiting the City of Oswego. At this time, over three-quarters of vehicles have begun their evacuating trips and just over 50% of vehicles have successfully evacuated the EPZ. The evacuation of vehicles within the southwestern portion of the EPZ traveling southbound is now being hindered voluntary evacuees from the shadow region. The two mile region is clear of congestion at this time. At 3 hours after the ATE, as shown in Figure 7-5, congestion is dissipating within the 5-mile area. At this time, 99% of vehicles have begun their evacuation trips and approximately 93% of vehicles have successfully evacuated the EPZ. Congestion in the heart of the City of Oswego has begun to clear as evacuees continue to vacate the area. The main exit routes of evacuation from within the EPZ (SR 104, SR 481, Rathburn Rd, Ridge Rd, and CR 7) remain fully congested (LOS F) as vehicles continue to evacuate. Vehicles evacuating from the SUNY Oswego campus and the western portion of the City of Oswego are constrained by the presence of heavy congestion along SR 104 westbound and CR 7 southbound. The 5-mile region is clear of congestion at this time. Congested ccmditions remain on SR 481, CR 7, SR 104, Rathburn Rd and Ridge Rd leaving the EPZ at 3 hours 30 minutes after the ATE (Figure 7-6). At this time, 100% of vehicles have begun their evacuation trips and nearly 99% of evacuating vehicles have successfully evacuated the EPZ. Congestion within the EPZ has almost. completely dissipated and the extent of the congestion has been reduced as seen by comparing Figure 7-6 with Figure 7-5. The main exit from the SUNY Oswego Campus is now clear and egress is unrestricted as congestion on SR 104 migrates further west. Over the next 20 minutes, at 3 hour and 50 minutes after the ATE, the EPZ is completely clear of *congestion as shown 'in Figure *.At this time, 100% of vehicles have successfully mobilized and evacuated from within the EPZ. Light traffic remains from within the shadow region while all areas within the EPZ are. free of congested conditions. All congestion inside the shadow region is cleared by 4 hours and 15 minutes after the ATE. 7 .4 Evacuation Rates Evacuation is a continuous process, as implied by Figure 7-8 through Figure 7-21. These figures indicate the rate at which traffic.fiows out of the indicated for the case of an evacuation of the full EPZ (Region. R03) under ttie indicated conditi.ons. One figure is presented for each scenario considered. As indicated in these figures, there is typically a long "tail" to these distributions for Regions ROl a.nd R02 caused by mobilization time. Vehicles begin to evacuate an area slowly at first, as people respond to. the ATE at different rates. Then traffic demand builds rapidly (slopes of curves increase). When the system becomes congested, traffic exits the EPZ at rates somewhat below capacity until some evacuation routes have cleared. As more routes clear, the aggregate rate of egress slows since many vehicles have already left the EPZ. Towards the end of the
- process, relatively few evacuation routes service the remaining demand . . NMP/JAF 7-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 This decline in aggregate flow rate, towards the end of the process, is characterized by these curves flattening and gradually becoming horizontal. Ideally, it would be desirable to fully saturate all evacuation routes equally so that all will service traffic near capacity levels and all will clear at the same time. For this ideal situation, all. curves would retain the same slope until the end -thus minimizing evacuation time. In reality, this ideal is generally unattainable reflecting the spatial variation in population density, mobilization rates and in highway capacity
- over the EPZ. 7.5 Results Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 *present the ETE values for all 29 Evacuation Regions and all 14 Evacuation Scenarios. Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 present the ETE values for the 2-Mile Region for both staged and un-staged keyhole regions downwind to 5 miles. The tables are organized as follows:
- Jable' Contents ' . ETE represents the elapsed time required for 90 percent .of the 7-1 population within a Region, to evacuate from that Region. All Scenarios are considered, as well as Staged Evacuation scenarios. . . ETE represents the elapsed time required for 100 percent of the 7-2 population within a Region, to evacuate from that Region. All Scenarios are considered, as well as Staged Evacuation scenarios. ETE represents the elapsed time required for 90 percent of the 7-3 population within the 2-mile Region, to evacuate from the 2-mile Region with both Concurrent and Staged Evacu*ations of additional ERPA downwind in the keyhole Region. ETE represents the elapsed time required for 100 percent of the 7-4 population within the 2-mile Region, to evacuate from the 2"mile Region with both Concurrent and Staged Evacuations of additional ERPA downwind in the keyhole Region. ., The animation snapshots described above reflect ETE statistics for the staged) evacuation scenarios and regions, which are displayed in Figure 7-3 through Figure 7-7. Most of the congestion is located in ERPAs 12and13.which are comprised of the eastern and . . western halves of the city of Oswego, respectively, and lie beyond the 5-mile area. This fact is reflected in the ETE statistics:
- The goth percentile ETE for: Region ROl (2-mile 'area) is 1:30 for good weather and rain andup to 3b minutes higher for snow cases. .
- The9Qth percentile ETE for Region R02 area) is. between 1:45 and 1:50 for good . . and rain weather (non-special event) scenarios. Sri ow conditions incre:ase the ETE by as much as 25 minutes. NMP/JAF . 7-4 . kLD Engineering, P.C. . **Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 *
- The goth percentile ETE for Region R03 (full EPZ) is between 2:20 and 2:55 for good weather (non-special event) scenarios. Rain increases the ETE by up to 15minutes. Snow has a larger impact and increases ETE by as much as 30 minutes.
- Generally, populous regions (which contain ERPA 12 and ERPA 13) resemble the pattern exhibited by R03. Rural regions which no not include either ERPA 12 or ERPA 13 more closely resemble ROl.
- The 10oth percentile ETE for all rural regions are governed by the mobilization times. This fact implies that the congestion within the EPZ dissipates prior to the end of
- mobilization.
- The 10oth percentile ETE for populous regions can exceed the mobilization times by as much as 15 minutes for non-special event scenarios.
- Comparison of Scenarios 5 and 13 in Table 7-1 indicates that the Special Event -Harborfest Fireworks-has a substantial impact on the ETE. for the goth and 10oth percentiles. Harborfest attracts a considerable number of transients from the greater Central New York region. The capstone of the Harborfest weekend celebration is a Saturday night fireworks display. This event is expected to draw go,ooo people, 61% of whom are from outside of the EPZ. The additional 22,g71 vehicles significantly increase congestion on all major evacuation routes exiting the city of Oswego. The goth and 10oth percentile ETE for regions containing the City of Oswego increase by as much as 2 hours and 55 minutes and 3 hours and 40 minutes, respectively. The impact on the 2-Mile and 5-Mile Region ETE is far less severe because the event is situated in the shadow. The special event does not impact these regions, as they are spatially removed from the event to the extent that no peripheral effects are experienced. Comparison of Scenarios 1 and 14 in Table 7-1 indicates that the roadway closure -one southbound lane closed on SR 481-does not have a material impact on goth percentile ETE due to the fact that the 1 lane section of SR 481 to the north of the lane closure forms a bottleneck upstream of the lane closure. 7 .6 Staged Evacuation Results To determine wheth.er the staged evacuation strategy is worthy of consideration, one must show that the ETE for the 2 Mile region can be reduced without significantly affecting the region between 2 miles and 5 miles. Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 present a comparison of the ETE compiled for the concurrent (un-staged) and staged evacuation studies. Note that Regions R22 through R28, and R2g are the same geographic areas as Regions R04 through 10, and R02, respectively. The times shown in Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 are when the 2 mile region is go% clear and 100% clear, respectively. As shown in these tables, the ETE for the 2-mile region is unchanged when a staged evacuation is implemented. The. reason for this is that the congestion within the 5-mile area does not extend upstream to the extent that it penetrates to within 2 miles of NMP/JAF. Consequently, the impedance, due to this congestion within the 5-mile area, to evacuees from within the 2-mile area is not suffieient to materially influence the goth or 1ooth percentile ETE for the 2:..mile NMP/JAF 7-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ; .
area. While failing to provide assistance to evacuees from within 2 miles of NMP/JAF, staging produces a negative impact on the goth percentile ETE for those evacuating from within the 2-to 5-mile area. A comparison of ETE between regions R22 through R28 with R04 through RlO and R02 with R2g, respectively, reveals that staging retards the goth percentile ETE for those in the 2 to 5-mile area by up to 40 minutes (see Table 7-1) and does not significantly impact the 10oth percentile ETE (see Table This extending of ETE is due to the delay in beginning the evacuation trip, experienced by those who shelter, plus the effect of the trip-generation "spike" (approximately 70 percent of the evacuating vehicles between 2 miles and 5 miles who have sheltered in place while residents within 2 miles evacuated, begin their evacuation trip over a 15 minute timeframe, shown in Figure 5-5) that follows their eventual ATE, in creating* congestion within the EPZ area beyond 2 miles. In summary, the staged evacuation protective action strategy provides no benefits and adversely impacts many evacuees located beyond 2 miles from NMP/JAF. 1.1
- Guidanc.e on Using ETE Tables The user first determines the percentile of population for which the ETE is sought (The NRC guidance calls for the goth percentile). The applicable value of ETE within the chosen table may then be identified using the following procedure: 1. Identify the applicable Scenario:
- Season
- Summer * . Winter (also Autumn and Spring)
- Day of Week
- Midweek
- Weekend
- Time of Day
- Midday
- Evening
- Weather Condition
- Good Weather.
- Rain
- Snow
- Special Event
- Harborfest Fireworks . . *. Road Closure (1 southbound lane on SR 481 from Churchill Rd to Cha lone Dr W)
- Evacuation Staging
- No, Staged *Evacuation is not considered
- Yes, Staged Evacuation is considered . ' . . . . . . . . While these.Scenarios are designed, in aggregate, to represent conditions throughout the year, some further clarification is warranted: NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 .. *
- The conditions of a summer evening (either midweek or weekend) and rain are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (2) and (4) apply.
- The conditions of a winter evening (either midweek or weekend) and rain are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (7) and (10) for rain apply,
- The conditions of a wintE:'.r evening (either midweek or weekend) and snow are not explicitly identified in the Tables. For these conditions, Scenarios (8) and (11) for snow apply.
- The seasons are defined as follows:
- Summer assumes that public schools are not in session.
- Winter (includes Spring and Autumn) considers that public schools are in session.
- Time of Day: Midday implies the time over which most commuters are at work or are travelling to/from work. 2. With the desired percentile ETE and Scenario identified, now identify the Evacuation Region:
- Determine the projected azimuth direction of the plume (coincident with the wind direction).
- Determine the distance that the Evacuation Region will extend from the nuclear power plants. The applicable distances and their associated candidate Regions are
- given below:
- 2 Miles (Region ROl)
- To 5 Miles (Regions R02, R04 through RlO)
- To EPZ Boundary (Regions R03, Rll through* R21}
- Enter Table and identify the applicable group of candidate Regions based on the distance that the selected Region extends from the NMP/JAF. Select the Evacuation . Region identifier in that row, based on the azimuth direction of the plume, from the first column of the Table. 3. Determine the ETE Table based on the percentile selected. Then, for the Scenario identified in Step 1 and the Region identified in Step 2, proceed as follows:
- The columns of Table 7-1 through Table 7-4 are labeled with the Scenario numbers. Identify the proper column in the selected Table using the Scenario number defined in Step 1.
- Identify the row in the table that provides ETE values for the Region identified in Step 2.
- The unique data cell defined by the column and row so determined contains the desired value of ETE expressed in Hours:Minutes. Example It is desired to identify the ETE for the following conditions:
- Sunday, January 24th at 9:00 PM.
- It is raining.
- Wind direction is from ENE.
- Wind speed is such that the distance to be evacuated is judged to be a 2-mile radius NMP/JAF 7-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
and downwind to 5 miles.
- The desired ETE is that value needed to evacuate 90 percent of the population from within the impacted Region.
- A staged evacuation is not desired. Table 7-1 is applicable because the goth percentile ETE is desired. Proceed as follows: 1. Identify the Scenario as winter, weekend, evening and raining. Entering Table 7-1, it is seen that there is no match for these descriptors. However, the clarification given above assigns this combination of circumstances to Scenario 10. 2. Enter Table 7-5 and locate the Region described as "Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to the 5 Miles" for wind direction from ENE and read Region RlO in the first column of that row. 3. Enter Table 7-1 to locate the data cell containing the value of ETE for Scenario 10 and Region RlO. This data cell is in column (10) and in the row for Region RlO; it contains the ETE value of 1:30. NMP/JAF 7-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 -----------------------
Table 7-1. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 90 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (S} (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good* Good Rain Snow Good Rain Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Snow Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ ROl 1:30 1:30 1:3Q 1:30 1:30 ' . 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00. 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROZ 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 R03 2:35 2:40 2:30 2:45 2:25 2:55 3:00 3:15 2:20 2:35 2:50 2:25 5:15 2:30 Z-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:35 1:35 ROS 1:40 '1:40 ' **, . 1:35 '1;35 .1:35 1:40. 1:40 . 2:00 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 i:35 1:40 ROG 1:45 1.:45 1:35 1:35 1:35. 1:45 1:45 . 2:10 1:35 1:35 2:05 1:35 1:30 1:45 R07 .. * .. '1:50 1:50 1::45' 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10' 1:45 1:45 ,. 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 ROS l:SO 1:50 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:45 1:40 1:50 R09 1:45 1:45 1:40 1:4o.** 1:40 1:45 1:45 2:05 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 R10 1:35. 1:35 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:35 1:35 1:55 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary R11 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .** 1:30 1:30
- 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R12 '1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R13 1:40 1:40. 1:30 1:30 1:35 1:40 1:40 2:05 1:35 1:35 '2:05 1:35 1:35 1:40 R14 1:45 1:45 1:40 ,1:50 1:35 1:50 1:50 2:10 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:45 RlS 1:50 1:50 1:45 2:00 1:35 1:50 1:55 2:15 1:35 1:40 2:05 1:40 1:35 1:50 R16 1:50 1:50 1:45 1:50 1:40 1:55 1:55 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 '1:35 1:50 R17
- l:SO " '1:40 1:55
- 1:50 1:35 1:40 1:50 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R18 1:50 1:50 1:40 1:40 1:40 1:50 1:50 2:15 1:40 1:40 2:10 1:40 1:45 1:50 R19 2:35 2:50 2:35 2:50 2:25 2:55 3:05 3:15 2:25 2:35 2:45 2:20 5:20 2:40 R20 2:40 2:45 . 2:35 2:45 2:25 2:50 3:05 3:20 2:30 2:35 2:50 2:25 5:15 2:35 R21 2:30 2:45 2:30 2:40 2:25 2:50 3:00 3:15 2:20 2:30 2:40 2:20 5:10 2:35 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:55' ' 1:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 1:55 2:25 1:55 1:55 2:30 1:55 1:55 1:55 R23. 1:55 2:00 2:00 . 2:00 2:00 1:55 2:00 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R24 :z:05 2:05 .* 2:05* '2:05 2:05 2:05 2:05 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:35 2:05 2:05 2:05 R25 2:15 2:20 2:15. 2:20 2:20 2:15 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:15 . R26 2:20 2:20' 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:20 2:25 2:40 2:20 2:20 2:45 2:20 2:15 2:20 RZ7 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:15 2:40 2:15 2:10 2:15 R28
- 1:55 1:55 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:55 1:55 2:25 2:00 2:00 2:30 2:00 2:00 1:55 R29 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:15 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:15 2:20 2:40 2:20 2:15 2:15 NMP/JAF 7-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Region R01 R02 R03 R04 ROS R06 ***R07. ROS R09 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15. R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 'R24 R25 R26 R27 R28 R29 NMP/JAF Summer Midweek Good Weather 3:30 3:35 3:40 .3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:4.0 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35. Rain 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 .3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Evacuation Time Estimate Table 7-2. Time to Clear the Indicated Area of 100 Percent of the Affected Population Summer Summer
- Winter Winter Weekend Midweek *Midweek Weekend Good Weather 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3;35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 .3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Rain 3:30 3:35 . 3:40 3:35 .Weather Good Weather* Rain Snow Good Weather Entire 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region, and EPZ 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:40 3:50 3:55 4:25 3:40 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 3:35 3:35' 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 . ' 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35* 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 . . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35. 3:35 3:35 2-Mile Region and Keyhole to EPZ Boundary 3:30. 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40. 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 4:25 3:40 4:25 3:40 . 4:25 3:40 4:25 3:40 4:25 3:40 3:55 3:55 3:45 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 . 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 *3:40 Rain 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 ' 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35. 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 . 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 7-10 4:20 4:20 4:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Snow 4:15 4:20 4:25 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20. 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:15 4:15 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:25 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 Winter Midweek Weather 3:30 3:35 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 '3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Weekend Event 3:30 3:35 7:20 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 7:20 7:10 . 7:10 3:35 3:35 3:35' 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 Summer Midweek Roadway Impact 3:30 3:35. 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:30 3:30 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:40 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 3:35 '3:35 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 7-3. Time to Clear 90.Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek .weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region and 5-Mile Region R01 *1:30 ** 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R02 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 Un-Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles
- R04 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30* 1:30 1:30. 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R06 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 ** R07 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 i:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:05 1:30 1:30 1:30 ROS 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 . 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R10 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R23 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R24 1:30 i:30 *.1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R25 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R26 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 .1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R27 1:30 1:30 1:30 *1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R28 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 R29 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:30 1:50 1:30 1:30 2:00 1:30 1:30 1:30 NMP/JAF . 7-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-4. Time to Clear 100 Percent of the 2-Mile Area within the Indicated Region Summer Summer Summer Winter Winter Winter Summer Summer Midweek Weekend Midweek Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Midweek Weekend Weekend Scenario: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) {9) {10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Midday Midday Evening Midday Midday Evening
- Evening Midday Region Good Rain Good Rain Good *Good Rain Snow Good Rain Snow Good Special Roadway Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather Event Impact Entire 2-Mile Region and 5-Mile Region R01 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15. 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3;30 -3:30 R02 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4.:15. 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 Un-Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R04 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:36 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3;30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 *ROG 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R07 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 ROS 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R09 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15. 3:30 3:30 3:30 R10 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 Staged Evacuation Mile Region and Keyhole to 5 Miles R22 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R23 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R24 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 . 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R25 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R26 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R27 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R28 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 R29 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 4:15 3:30 3:30 3:30 NMP/JAF 7-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 7-5. Description of Evacuation Regions Region Description R01 2-Mile Radius R02 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles Region Wind Direction ERPA From .1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 N/A E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, Refer to R01 SSW, SW, WSW R04 w ROS WNW ROG NW, NNW R07 N ROS NNE R09 NE .R10 ENE Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to EPZ Boundary Region Wind Direction ERPA From 5 6 7 8 9 10. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 R11 E,ESE,SE R12 SSE,S,SSW R13 SW R14 WSW R15 w R16 .WNW R17 NW R18 NNW R19 N R20 NNE, NE R21 ENE NMP/JAF 7-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Staged -Evacuate 2-Mile Radius and Downwind to 5 Miles 7 . 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Region Wind Direction From 2 1 3 4 5 6 ERPA N/A E, ESE, .sE; SSE, S, SSW, SW,: WSW Refer to ROl I. R22 w. I .R23 'WNW R24 NW,NNW R25 N R26 NNE R27 NE R28 ENE R29 NMP/JAF 7-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 15 Miles I 2-Mile Region I Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind Keyhole: 2-Mile Region & 10 Miles Downwind Staged Evacuation: 2-Mile Region & 5 Miles Downwind
- Plant Location
- Region to be Evacuated: 100% Evacuation D 20% Shadow Evacuation D Shelter. then Evacuate Figure 7-1. Voluntary Evacuation Methodology NMP/JAF 7-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend
- NMP/JAF (} ERPA l I 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate / /, :w IHS:"/*P O*t* I KLDEngineering,Constell11tlonErmgy,Entergy Figure 7-2. NMP/JAF Shadow Region 7-16 / ,**,/ '*,/' ,,/ .. / Lacona @ mar 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -s c D -E -F Legend NMP/JAF ERPA \ \ \ \ \ \ \..-:::, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate / ' 26 I I Figure 7-3. Congestion Patterns at 40 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-17 49' KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -B c D -E -F Legend NMP/JAF ERPA I I \ \ \ \.. _., 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate / ' 26 I I Figure 7-4. Congestion Patterns at 1 Hour, 30 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -a c D -E \ \ -F ,/r:i Legend NMP/JAF ERPA \ 1... _, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Figure 7-5. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-19 Square \ ;Copyright: ESRl Data and Maps 2014 ICLD Englneerlng, Exelon Enter&v KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF City of Oswego Extent LOS --A -s c D -E -F Legend I I NMP/JAF ERPA fJ 1... _,. 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate lokt: ( Jmario Figure 7-6. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, 30 Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-20 Lacona Square \ ;Copyricht ESRI Data ind MISH 2'014 ICLD Enclneerinc, Ealon Gener.i:lon, KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 10 Mites I NMP/JAF I I I LOS --A -s c D -E -F Legend NMP/JAF ERPA I \ I I I I I I \ \ \ \ \ \..-:::. 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate L.1k,*t>111al'io 28 /' 26 I I Figure 7-7. Congestion Patterns at 3 Hours, SO Minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate 7-21 Lacona 49' Square '!:o.1e1119/20t6 \ lOPYl"i(hl; £SRI 0.UI Ind M*ps 2014 ICLD Enclneerlng, Eielon Gener1tlon, Entugy KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 tl.O c 30 25 "fil -;;; 20 :::J "'C :;: c 15 :::J Ill 0 ..c !::. 10 ..c QI > 5 0 30 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 1) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-8. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 1 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 240 270
- 100% tl.O c 25 "fil -;;; 20 :::J "'C :;: c 15 :::J Ill 0 ..c !::. 10 ..c QI > 5 0 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-9. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 2 for Region R03 NMP/JAF 7-22 Evacuation Time Estimate 240 270 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 bl) c 30 25 Vi 20 :::J ,, c 15 :::J "' 0 ..c .!!! .t:. 10 ..c QI > bl) c 5 0 30 25 -20 :::J "' u ,, "' c 15 :::J "' 0 ..c .!!! .t:. 10 ..c QI > 5 0 NMP/JAF --------------------Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good {Scenario 3) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-10. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 3 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-11. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 4 for Region R03 7-23 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 QI) c 30 25 Vi' 20 ::s "C :;; c 15 ::s "' 0 .!! ..c .!::! !=. 10 ..c cu > 5 0 35 30 QI) c 25 Cit ::s "C :;: :; 20 > "' w ::s j! _g 15 u I--10 > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 5) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-12. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 5 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good {Scenario 6) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-13. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 6 for Region R03 7-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 35 30 11.D c 25 +:; RI -:I Ill u "'C 20 RI C > RI w Ill :I ] _g 15 u I-:c -10 Qj > 5 0 35 30 11.D c 25 RI Ill :I "'C :;: i; 20 > Ill w :I ] _g 15 u I--10 > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ
- 90% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-14. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 7 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ
- 90% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-15. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 8 for Region R03 7-25 Evacuation Time Estimate
- 100% 240 270
- 100% 240 270 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 a.o c 30 25 Vi 20 ::J "C c 15 ::J Ill 0 .!:! c. 10 > a.o c 5 0 30 25 20 ::J Ill u "C n:I c 15 ::J Ill 0 .!:! c. 10 > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 9) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-16. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 9 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-17. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 10 for Region R03 7-26 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 b.D c 30 25 iii 20 ::i 'tJ c 15 ::i "' 0 ..!!! ..c .!:! t:. 10 ..c (IJ > b.D c 5 0 30 25 iii 20 ::i 'tJ c 15 ::i "' 0 ..!!! ..c .!:! t:. 10 ..c (IJ > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow {Scenario 11) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-18. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 11 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good {Scenario 12) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-19. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 12 for Region R03 7-27 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 t>O c 60 50 40 ::I "'C c 30 ::I "' 0 ..r. .!::! !::. 20 ..r. cu > t>O c 10 0 30 25 -20 ::I "' u "'C "' c 15 ::I "' 0 ..r. .!::! !::. 10 ..r. cu > 5 0 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good, Special Event (Scenario 13) Mile Region Mile Region -Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100%
- 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 390 420 450 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-20. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 13 for Region R03 Evacuation Time Estimates Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) Mile Region Mile Region Entire EPZ
- 90%
- 100% 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 Elapsed Time After Evacuation Recommendation (min) Figure 7-21. Evacuation Time Estimates -Scenario 14 for Region R03 7-28 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 8 TRANSIT-DEPENDENT AND SPECIAL FACILITY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES This section details the analyses applied and the results obtained in the form of evacuation time estimates for transit vehicles. The demand for transit service reflects the needs of three . population groups: (1) residents with no vehicles available; (2) residents of special facilities such as scho"ols, -preschools, day camps, medical facilities, and correctional facilities; and (3) homebound special needs population. These transit vehicles mix with the general evacuation traffic that is comprised mostly of "passenger cars" (pc's). The presence of each transit vehicle in the evacuating traffic stream is represented within the modeling paradigm _described in Appendix D as equivalent to two pc's. This equivalence factor represents the longer size and more sluggish operating characteristics of a transit vehicle, relative to those of a pc. Transit vehicles must be mobilized in preparation for their respective evacuation missions. Specifically:
- Bus drivers must be alerted
- They must travel to the bus depot
- They must be briefed there and assigned to a route or facility _These activities consume time.
- Based on discussion with the offsite agencies, it is estimated that bus mobilization time will average approximately 90 minutes extending from the Advisory to Evacuate, to the time when buses first arrive at the facility to be evacuated. During this mobilization period; other mobilization activities are taking place. One of these is* the action taken by parents, neighbors, relatives and friends to pick up children from school prior to the arrival of buses, so that they may join their families. Virtually all studies of evacuations_ have concluded that this "bonding" process of uniting families is universally prevalent during emergencies and should be anticipated in the planning process. -The current public information disseminated to residents of the NMP/JAF EPZ indicates that schoolchildren and chHdren at daycares with an enrollment of 30 or larger may be evacuated to the reception center at the New York State Fairgrounds in Syracuse at emergency action levels of Alert or_ higher. As in Section 2, this study assumes a fast breaking general emergency." Therefore, children_ are evacuated to the reception center. Picking up children at school could add* to traffic congestion at the schools, delaying the departure of the buses evacuating schoolchildren, which may have-to return ina subsequent "wave" to the EPZ to evacuat_e the transit-dependent population. This report p_rovides estimates of buses under the assumption that no children will be picked up by their parents (in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002), to present an upper bound estim,ate of buses required. This study assumes that children at care centers with an enrollment of less than 30_ children are picked up by parents or guardians and thatthe time to perform this activity is included in the trip generation times discussed in Sections. NMP/JAF EvacuationTinie Estimate 8-l. -* _KLD Engineering, P.C. _ February 24, 2016 The procedure for computing transit-dependent ETE is to:
- Estimate demand for transit service
- Estimate time to perform all transit functions
- Estimate route travel times to the EPZ boundary and to the reception center 8.1 Transit Dependent People Demand Estimate The telephone survey (see Appendix F) results were used to estimate the portion of the population requiring transit service based on the percentage of households with no vehicles available. Table 8-1 presents estimates of transit-dependent people. Note:
- Estimates of persons requiring transit vehicles include schoolchildren. For those evacuation scenarios where children are at school when an evacuation is ordered, separate transportation is provided for the schoolchildren. The actual need for transit vehicles by residents is thereby less than the given estimates. However, estimates of transit vehicles are not reduced when schools are in session.
- It is reasonable and appropriate to consider that many transit-dependent persons will evacuate by ride-sharing with neighbors, friends or family. For example, nearly 80 percent of those who evacuated from Mississauga, Ontario who did not use their own cars, shared a ride with neighbors or friends (IES, 1981). Other documents report that approximately 70 percent of transit dependent persons were evacuated via ride sharing. We will adopt a conservative estimate that SO percent of transit dependent persons will ride share, in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002. The estimated number of bus trips needed to service transit-dependent persons is based on an estimate of average bus occupancy of 30 persons at the conclusion of the bus run. Transit vehicle seating capacities typically equal or exceed 60 children on average (roughly equivalent to 40 .adults). If transit vehicle evacuees are two thirds adults and one third children, then the number of "adult seats taken by 30. persons is 20 + (2/3 xlO) = 27. On this basis, the average load factor anticipated is (27 /40) x 100 = 68 percent. Thus, if the actual demand for service exceeds the estimates of Table 8-1 by 50 percent, the demand for service can still be accommodated by the available bus seating capacity. [20 + x 10 )]-:-40 x 1.5 = 1.00 Table 8-1 indicates that transportation must be provided for 1,860 people. Therefore, a total of 62 bus runs are required to transport this population to the reception center. This study will
- consider 76 buses to provide a minimum of one bus for each route specified in the county emergency plans, see section 8.4 for additional details. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 8-2
- KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 To illustrate this estimation procedure, we calculate the number of persons, P, requiring public transit or ride-share, and the number of buses, B, required for the NMP/JAF EPZ: n P = No.ofHH x L{(o/o HH with i vehicles) x [(Average HH Size) -i]} x Aici i=O Where, A= Percent of households with commuters C = Percent of households who will not await the return of a commuter p = 17,332 x [0.0646 x 1.75 + 0.297 x (1.83-1) x 0.56 x 0.55 +0.4747 x (2.57-2) x (0.56 x 0.55)2] = 17,332 x 0.21464 = 3,720 B = (0.5 x P) -:-30 = 62 These calculations are explained as follows: * * **.
- All members (1.75 avg.) of households (HH) with no vehicles (6.46%) will evacuate by public transit or ride-share. The term 17,332 (number of households) x 0.0646 x 1.75, accounts for these people. The members of HH with 1 vehicle away (29.7%), who are at home, equal (1.83-1) . The number of HH where the commuter will not return home is equal to (17,332 x 0.297 x 0.83 x 0.56 x 0.55), as 56% of EPZ households have a commuter, 55% of which would not .return home in the event of an emergency. The number of persons who will evacuate by public transit or ride-share is equal to the product of these two terms. The members of HH with 2 vehicles that are away (47.47%), *who are at home, equal (2.57 -2). The number of HH where neither commuter will return home is equal t<;> . 11;332 x 0.4747x 0.57 x (0.56 x 0.55)2* Thenumber of persons who will evacucite by public transit or ride-share is equal to the product of these two terms (the last term is squared tbrepresent the probability that neither commuter will return). Households with 3 or more vehicles are assumed to have no need for transit vehicles.
- The total number of persons requiring public transit is the sum of such people inHH with no vehicles, or with 1 or 2 vehicles that are away from home. . . The estimate of transit-dependent population in Table 8-1 far exceeds the number of registered transit-dependent persons in the EPZ as provided by the county (discussed below in Section 8.5). This is consistent with the findings of NUREG/CR-6953, Volume 2, in that a large majority of the population within the EPZs of U.S. nu dear plants does not register .* ., . . *. . .. . . with their local response agency. NMP/JAF 8-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Ti,me Estimate February 24, 2016 8.2. School, and Camp Population -Table 8-2 presents the school, preschool, and day cainp population and transportation requirements for the direct evacuation of all schools, preschools and day camps within the EPZ for the 2011-2012 school year. This information was provided by Oswego County Emergency Management. The column in Table 8-'2 entitled "Buses Required" specifies the number of buses required for each school1. preschool, or day camp under the following set of assumptions and estimates:
- No students will be picked up by their parents prior to the arrival of the buses. *
- While many high school students commute to school using private automobiles (as discussed in Section 2.4 of NUREG/CR-7002), the estimate of buses required for school evacuation do not consider the use of these private vehicles.
- Bus capacity, expressed in students per bus, is set to 70 for primary schools and 50 for middle and high schools.
- According to the county emergency plans, 18 buses will be dispatched to SUl\IV Oswego, each with a capacity of 40 students per bus, to evacuate the transit dependent population at the school.
- Those staff members who do not accompany the students will evacuate in their private vehicles.
- Children at day-care centers with an enrollment of less than 30 children are picked *up by parents or guardians
- No allowance is made for student absenteeism, typically 3 percent daily. It is recommended that Oswego County introduces procedures whereby the schools, preschools, and day camp are contacted prior to the dispatch of buses from the depot, to ascertain the current estimate of students to be evacuated. In this way, the number of buses dispatched tbthe schools, preschools, or day camps will reflect the actual number needed. The need for buses would be reduced by any high school students who have evacuated using private aut9mobiles (if permitted by school authorities). Those buses originally allocated to evacuate schoolchildren that are not needed due to children being picked up by their parents, can be gainfully assigned to service other facilities or those persons who do not have access to private vehicles or to ride-sharing. Table 8-3 presents a list of the reception centers for each school, preschool, and day camp in the EPZ. Children be transported to the reception center located at the *New York State Fairgrounds in Syracuse where they will be subsequently retrieved by their respective families. Demand Table 8-4 presents the census of medical facilities in the EPZ. A total of 1,080 people have been identified as living in, or being treated in, these The capacity and current census for each facility was provided by the county emergency management personnel. This data is presented in Table 8-4 .. The transportation requirements for the medical facility population are also presented in Table . NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 8-4. The number of ambulance runs is determined by assuming that 2 patients can be accommodated per ambulance The capacities of other vehicle classes were reduced to allow for medical staff, equipment and for other contingencies. It was assumed a bus can accommodate 30 persons, a wheelchair buses may transport 20 ambulatory and 2 wheelchair bound individuals and wheelchair vans can accommodate 7 ambulatory and 3 wheelchair bound persons. 8.4 Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Dependent People EPZ bus resources are assigned to evacuating children (if school is in session at the time of the ATE) as the first priority in the event of an emergency. In the event that the allocation of buses dispatched from the depots to the various facilities and to the bus routes is somewhat "inefficient", or if there is a shortfall of available drivers, then there may be a need for some buses to return to the EPZ from the reception center after completing their first evacuation trip, to complete a "second wave" of providing transport service to evacuees. For this reason, the ETE -for the transit-dependent population will be calculated for both a one wave transit evacuation and for two waves. Of course, if the impacted Evacuation Region is other than R03 (the entire EPZ), then there vitill likely be ample transit resources relative to demand in the impacted Region and this discussion of a second wave would likely not apply. When school evacuation needs are satisfied, subsequent assignments of buses to service the transit-dependent should be sensitive to their mobilization time. Clearly, the buses should be dispatched after people have completed their mobilization activities and are in a position to board the buses when they arrive at the pick-up points. Evacuation Time Estimates for transit trips were developed using both good weather and adverse weather conditions. Figure 8-1 presents the chronology of events relevant t.o transit operations. The elapsed time for each activity will now be discussed with reference to Figure 8-1. Activity: Mobilize Drivers (A-7B-7C) Mobilization is the eiapsed time from the :Advisory to Evacuate until the time the buses arrive at the facility to be evacuated.
- 1t is assumed that for a rapidly escalating radiological emergency with no observable indication before the fact, school bus drivers would likely require 90 minutes tc:i be contacted, to travel fo the depot, be briefed, and to* travel to the transit-. dependent facilities. Mobilization time is-slightly longer in adverse weather-100 minutes when raining, 110 minutes when snowing ...
- Activity: Board Passengers (C-7D) . .*-. . . . Based on discussions with offsite agencies, a loading time of 15 minutes (20 minutes for rain and 2.5 minutes for snow) for schoOI buses is used .. For multiple stops. along a pick-up route (transit-dependent bus routes) estimation of travel time must allow forthe delay associated with stopping and starting at each pick-up point. The time, t, required for a bus to decelerate at a rate, "a", in ft/sec/sec, from a spee.d, NMP/JAF 8-5 KLD Engineering, P.c: Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 "v", expressed in ft/sec, to a stop, is t = v/a. Assuming the same acceleration rate and final speed following the stop yields a total time, T, to service boarding passengers: T = t+ B + t = B + 2t = B + Zv, a Where B = Dwell time to service passengers. The total distance, "s" in feet, travelled during the deceleration and acceleration activities is: s = v2/a. If the bus had not stopped to service passengers, but had continued to travel at speed, v, then its travel time over the distance, s, would be: s/v = v/a. Then the total delay (i.e. pickup time, P) to service passengers is: v v P=T--=B+-a a Assigning reasonable estimates:
- B = SO seconds: a generous value for a single passenger, carrying personal items, to board per stop
- v = 2S mph = .37 ft/sec
- a = 4 ft/sec/sec, a moderate average rate Then, P ::: 1 minute per stop. Allowing 30 minutes pick-up time per bus run implies 30 stops per run, for good weather. It is assumed that bus acceleration and speed will be less in rain; total loading time is 40 minutes per bus in rain, SO minutes in snow. Activity: Travel to EPZ Boundary (D-7E) School, Preschool, and Dav Camp Evacuation Transportation resources available were provided by the EPZ county emergency management agencies and are summarized in Table 8-S. Also included in the table are the number of buses needed* to evacuate schools, preschools, day camp, medical facilities, transit-dependent population, homebound special needs population (discussed below in Section 8.5) and correctional. facilities (discussed below in Section 8;6). These numbers indicate there are sufficient resources available to evacuate everyone in a single wave. Given the safety factors employed, it is likely that only a single wave is. required so long as resources are deployed systematically. Should the need arise, mutual aid agreements would supply the necessary resources to address any shortfalls. The bus.es seniicing the schools, preschools, and day camp are ready to begin their evacuation trips at 10S minutes after the -advisory to evacuate """" 90 minutes mobilization time plus lS minutes loading time -in good we*ather. The UNITES software discussed-in Section 1.3 was used to define bus routes along the most likely path from a .school being evacuated to the EPZ
- boundary, traveling toward the appropriate reception center; This is done in UNITES by interactively selectingthe series of nodes.from the .school to the EPZ boundary. Each bus route is given an identification number and is written to the DYNEV II input stream. DYNEV computes the route length and outputs the average speed each S minute _interval, for each bus route.* The specified bus routes are documented in Table 8-6 (refer to the maps of the link-node . analysis network .in Appendix K for node locations). Data provided by DYNEV during the appropriate timeframe depending on the mobilization and loading times (i.e., 100 to lOS NMP/JAF 8-6 _ KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 minutes after the advisory to evacuate for good weather) were used to compute the average speed for each route, as follows:* * . (mi.) Average Speed hr Lf=1 length of link i (mi) '\'n {v l . z* k **c ** ) + length of link i (mi.) . 60 min.} .l..i=l . e ay on m i mm. . . mi x 1 h . current speed on link i (hr J r. 60min. x 1 hr. The average speed computed (using this methodology) for the buses servicing each of the schools, preschools, and day camp in the EPZ is shown in Table 8-7 through Table 8-9 for school, . . . preschool, and day camp evacuation, and in Table 8-11 through Table 8-13 for the transit vehicles evacuating transit-dependent persons, which are discussed later. The travel time to
- the. EPZ. boundary was computed for each bus using the computed average speed and the distance to the EPZ boundary along the most likely route out of the EPZ. Speeds were reduced in Table 8-7 through Table 8-9 and in Table 8-11 through Table 8-13 to SS mph (SO mph for rain -10% decrease, rounded to the nearest S mph -and 4S mph for snow -20% decrease, rounded to the nearest Smph) for those calculated. bus speeds which exceed SS mph, as the school .bus speed limit for state routes in New York is SS mph. The travel time from the EPZ boundary to the reception center was computed assuming an average speed of SS mph, SO mph, and 4S mph for good weather, rain, and snow, respectively. Table 8-7(good weather), Table 8-8(rain) and Table 8-9 (snow) present the following evacuation time estimates (rounded .. up tothe n.earest S minutes) for schools, preschool, and day camp in the EPz: (1) The elapsed time from the Advisory to Evacuate until the bu.s exits the EPZ; and (2) The elapsed time until the blls reaches the Reception Center (R.C.). The evacuation time out of the EPZ can be. computed as .the sum of associated with Activities A-7B-7C, C-7D, and D-7E (For
- example: 90 min. + 15 + S3.= 2:40 for Oswego High School, with good weather). The evacuation time to the reception center is determ.ined by adding the time associated with Activity E-7F (discussed below), to this EPZ evacuation time. Evacuation of Transit-Dependent Population The buses dispatched from the depots to service the transit-dependent evacuees will be scheduled so that they arrive at their respective routes after their passengers have completed their mobilization. As shown in Figure S-4 (Residents with no Commuters), approximately 90 percent of the evacuees will complete their mobilization when the buses. will begin their routes, approximately 90 minutes after the Advisory to Evacuate. Those buses servicing the transit-dependent evacuees will firsttravel along their pick-up routes, and then proceed out of the EPZ. pick-up locations are provided annually to EPZ residents* in the emergency preparedness brochure. The county emergency plans define . . NMP/JAF * . Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. .. February 24, 2016 bus routes to service these pick-up locations. Table 8-10 outlines the 76 General population bus routes outlined in the Oswego County Emergency Plans. It is assumed that residents will walk to and congregate at pre-designated pick-up locations, and that they can arrive at the stops within the 90 minute bus mobilization time (good weather). Detailed descriptions of each bus route are available in Procedure E of the Oswego County radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan, Table 2; maps of the pick-up points in each ERPA are contained in the EMO calendar. As previously discussed, a pickup time of 30 minutes (good weather) is estimated for 30 individual stops to pick up passengers, with an average of one minute of delay associated with each stop. Longer pickup times of 40 minutes and SO minutes are used for rain and snow, respectively. The travel distance along the respective pick-up routes within the EPZ is estimated using the UNITES software as well as the route lengths given in the County Emergency Plans. Bus travel
- times within the EPZ are computed using average speeds computed by DYNEV, using the*. aforementioned methodology that was used for school, preschool, and day camp evacuation. Table 8-11 through Table 8-13 present the transit-dependent population evacuation time estimates for each bus route calculated using the above procedures for good weather, rain and snow, respectively . . For example, the ETE for the bus route servicing Route 1 is computed as 90 + 80 + 30 = 3:20 for good weather (rounded up to nearest S minutes). Here, 80 minutes is the time to travel 18.S miles at 13.9 mph, the average speed output by the model for this route starting at 90 minutes. The ETE for a second wave (discussed below) is presented in the event there is a shortfall of available buses or bus drivers, as previously discussed.
- Activity: Travel to Reception Centers (E-Hl
- The distances from the EPZ boundary to the reception centers are measured using GIS software along the most likely route from the EPZ exit point to the reception center. The reception centers are mapped in Figure 10-1. For a one-wave evacuation, this travel time outside the EPZ does not contribute. to the
- ETE. For a two,-wave evacuation, the ETE for buses must be considered separately, since it could exceed the ETE for the general population. Assumed bus speeds of SS mph, SO mph, and 4S mph for good weather, rain, and snow, respectively, will be applied for this activity for buses servicing the transit-dependen.t population. . . Activity: Passengers Leave Bus (F-7G)
- A bus can empty within S minutes. The driver takes a 10 minute break.
- Activity: Bus Returns to Route for Seeond Wave Evacuation (G-7C) The buses assigned to return to the EPZ to perform a "second wave" evacuation of dependent evacuees will be those that have already evacuated transit-dependent people who mobilized more quickly. The first wave of transit-dependent people depart the bus, and the bus then. returns to the
- EPZ, travels to its route and* proceeds *to pick up more transit-.NMP/JAF 8-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016.
dependent evacuees along the route. The travel time back to the EPZ is equal to the travel time to the reception center. The second-wave ETE for Route 1 is computed as follows for good weather:
- Bus arrives at reception center at 3:49 in good weather (3:20 to exit EPZ + 29 minute travel time to reception center).
- Bus discharges passengers (5 minutes) and driver takes a 10-minute rest: 15 minutes.
- Bus returns to EPZ and completes second wave service along the route: 49.2 minutes (equal to travel time to reception center+ travel time to return to the beginning of the route)+ 21.0 minutes (18.5 miles @ 52.9 mph to traverse the route providing second wave bus service) = 70 minutes
- Bus completes pick-ups along route: 30 minutes.
- Bus exits EPZ at time 3:20 + 0:29 + 0:15 + 0:70 + 0:30 = 5:45 (rounded to nearest 5 minutes) after the Advisory to Evacuate. The ETE for the completion of the second wave for all transit-dependent bus routes are provided in Table 8-11 through Table 8-13. The average ETE for a two-wave evacuation of transit-dependent people exceeds the ETE for the general population at the goth percentile. The relocation of transit-dependent evacuees from the reception centers to congregate care centers, if the county decides to do so, is not considered in this study. Evacuation of Medical Facilities The evacuation of these facilities is similar to a school evacuation except:
- Buses are assigned on the basis of 30 patients to allow for staff to accompany the patien.ts.
- Wheelchair Buses are assigned on the basis of 20 ambulatory patients and 2 wheelchair bound patients. Again, this number is reduced from the average fleet capacity to allow for staff accompaniment.
- Wheelch.air vans are assigned on the basis of 7 ambulatory patients and 3 wheelchair bound patients
- Ambulances are assigned on the basis of 2 bedridden patients per ambulance.
- The passenger loading time will be longer at approximately one minute, 5 minutes, and 15 minutes per ambulatory, wheelchair bound, and bedridden patient, respectively, to account for the time to move patients from inside the facility to the vehicles. Table 8-4 indicates that 7 bus runs, 216 wheelchair bus runs and 14 ambulance runs are needed to service all of the medical facilities in the EPZ. According to Table 8-5, the county can provide 249 buses, 8 vans, 220 wheel-chair accessible buses, 21 wheelchair accessible vans and 30 ambulances. Thus, there are sufficient resources to evacuate the ambulatory, wheelchair .bound and bedridden persons from the medical facilities in a single wave. NMP/JAF. 8-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 As is done for the schools, it is estimated that mobilization time averages 90 minutes (100 in rain and 110 in snow). Specially trained medical support staff (working their regular shift) will be on site to in the evacuation of patients. Additional staff (if needed) could be mobilized over this same 90-minute timeframe. Table 8-14 through Table 8-16 summarize the ETE for medical facilities within the EPZ for good weather, rain, and snow. Average speeds output by the model for Scenario 6 (Scenario 7 for rain and Scenario 8 for snow) Region 3, capped at SS mph (SO mph for rain and 4S mph for snow), are used to compute travel time to EPZ boundary. The travel time to the EPZ boundary is computed by dividing the distance to the .EPZ boundary by the average travel speed. The ETE is the sum of the mobilization time, total passenger loading time, and travel time out of the EPZ. It is assumed that wheelchair capable vehicles are used to evacuate the ambulatory population at the med.ical facilities within the EPZ. This will allow the wheelchair bound patients to evacuate with the ambulatory patients and requires less transportation resources. Concurrent loading on multiple wheelchair buses/vans, and ambulances at capacity is assumed. All ETE are rounded to the nearest S minutes. For example, the calculation of ETE for Bishop Commons at St. Luke's .with 66 ambulatory residents during good weather is: ETE: 90 + 20 + 44 = 2:3S It is assumed that the medical facility population is directly evacuated to appropriate host medical facilities outside of the EPZ. Relocation of this population to permanent facilities and/or passing through the reception center before arriving at the host facility is not considered in this analysis. 8.5 Special Needs Population .. Oswego County Emergency has a combined registration for transit-dependent *and homebound special needs .persons. Based on dat.a provided by the county in 2012,. there are an estimated 208 . homebound special . needs people within the EPZ
- who require transportation assista*nce to.evacuate. There are lSl S7 wheelchair bound and no*. bedridden people which constitute this group. . ETE for Homebound Special Needs Persdns . *. . . -. . . . -. ' . Table 8-17summarizes the ETE for homebound special needs people .. The table is categorized by type of vehicle required and then broken down. by weather condition. The table takes into consideration the deployment of multi pie vehieles to .reduce the number of stops per vehicle . . It is assumed that ambulatory and wheelchair bound special needs households . ,. . are spaced 3)niles apart and bedridden households are spaced S miles apart. It is also assumed wheelchair vans will pick up both ambulatory and wheelchair bound people. Van speeds approximate . io mph between households (10% slower in rain, 20% slower in snow).
- Mobilization times of 90 minutes were used (100 minutes for rain, and l.10 minutes for snow). The last HH is to be s miles from the EPZ boundary, and the network-wide average *
- speed, capped at SS mph (SO mph for rain and 4S mph for snow), after the last pickup is used to * . compute travel time., ETE is by summing .mobilization time, loading* time at: fir:st NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate . 8-10 KLD Engineering; P.C February 24, .2016 household, travel to subsequent households, loading time at subsequent households, and travel time to EPZ boundary. All ETE are rounded to the nearest 5 minutes. Loading time is conservatively estimated as 5 minutes per stop. For example, assuming no more than one special needs person per HH implies that 208 households need to be serviced. If 19 wheelchair equipped vans are deployed to service these special needs HH, then each would require about 11 stops. The following outlines the ETE calculations: 1. Assume 19 wheelchair vans are deployed, each with about 11 stops, to service a total of 208 HH, 2. The ETE is calculated as follows: a. Buses arrive at the first pickup location: 90 minutes b. Load HH members at first pickup: 5 minutes c. Travel to subsequent pickup locations: 10 @ 9 minutes= 90 minutes d. Load HH. members at subsequent pickup locations: 10 @ 5 minutes = 50 minutes e. Travel to EPZ boundary: 15 minutes (5 miles@ 20.4 mph, rounded). ETE: 90 + 5 + 90 + 50 + 15 = 4:10 rounded to the nearest 5 minutes 8.6 Correctional Facilities As detailed in Table E-6, there is one correctional facility within the EPZ -Oswego County Correction Facility. The total inmate population at this facility is 160 persons. A total of 6 buses are needed to evacuate this facility, based on a capacity of 30 inmates per bus. Mobilization time is assumed to be 90 minutes (100 minutes in rain and 110 minutes in snow). The detailed evacuation plans for these facilities are confidential. So, it is assumed that it takes 60 minutes to load the inmates onto a bus, and that 6 buses can be loaded in parallel. Thus, total loading time is estimated at approximately 60 minutes. Using GIS software, the shortest route from the facility to the EPZ boundary, traveling away from NMP/JAF, is 5.5 miles. The travel time to traverse 5.5 is 23 minutes (14.68.mph at 2:30) in good weather, 20 minutes (16.65 mph at 2:40) in rain and 17 minutes (19.98 mph at 2:50) in snow. All ETE are rounded to the nearest 5 minutes. ETE: 90 + 60 + 23 = 2:55 RainETE: 100+60+ 20 =3:00 . . . sn*ow ETE: 110 + 60 + 17 = 3:10 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate . KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 (Subsequent Wave) * * ** Time Event A Advisory to Evacuate B Bus Dispatched from Depot C Bus Arrives at Facility/Pick-up Route D Bus Departs for Reception Center E Bus Exits Region F Bus Arrives at Reception Center/Host Facility G Bus Available for "Second Wave" Evacuation Service Activity Driver Mobilization Travel to Facility or to Pick-up Route Passengers Board the Bus Bus Travels Towards Region Boundary Bus Travels Towards Reception Center Outside the EPZ Passengers Leave Bus; Driver Takes a Break Figure 8-1. Chronology of Transit Evacuation Operations NMP/JAF 8-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 2015 EPZ Population 41,423 Survey Average HH Size with lndjcated No. o.f Vehicles 0 1 2 1.75 1.83 2.57 NMP/JAF EvacuationTirrie Estimate Estimated No. of !iouseholds 17,332 Table 8-1. Transit-Dependent Population Estimates Sur'vey Survey Percent"HH Survey Percent HH with Indicated No. of PercehtHH with Non* Vehicles W.ith Returning 0 1 2 *commuters ., -Commuters 6.46% .. 29.70% 47.47%. . 56% 55% 8-13 Percent Total People Population People Estimated Requiring Requiring Requiring Ridesharihg Public Public Transport Percentage Transit Transit . 3,720 50% 1,860 4.5% KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 8-2. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Population Demand Estimates Local Buses ERPA School, Preschool, or Day Camp Name Enrollment Required 1 Ontario Bible Conference1 91 2 4 New Haveri Elementary School 238 4 10 School Age Children Care Program 33 1 12 Charles E. Riley Elementary 497 8 12 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 416 6 12 Headstart of Oswego 80 2 12 Little Luke's Childcare Center 100 2 12 Oswego Community Christian School 76 2 12 Trinity Catholic School 173 3 13 Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 100 2 13 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 485 7 13 Kingsford Park Elementary 381 6 13 Oswego High School 1,281 26 13 Oswego Middle School 597 12 13 Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 60 1 16 Mexico Elementary School 358 4 16 Mexico High School 700 14 16 Mexico Middle School 701 15 Center for Instructional Technology and 17 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES)2 446 9 21 Minetto Elementary School 367 8 22
- SUNY Oswego3 8,300 18 *s.R. Palermo Elementary School4 255 4 . < *.. .; ; ,, p; .* > <<* . ;; *. &/f $.?ri3s, , ;, .... *. 1 According to Oswego County officials, Ontario Bible Conference, included in this table, is a summer camp program that requires 2 buses from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The rest of the year, the camp is open to retreats for family events for which they can furnish their own transportation. 2 Oswego County BOCES is now known as the Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Citi). 3 According to the county emergency plans, 18 buses will be dispatched to SUNY Oswego, each with a capacity of 40 students per bus, to evacuate the transit dependent population at the school. 4 Palermo Elemer]tary School is located in the Shadow Region, but will evacuate according to Oswego County emergency plans. NMP/JAF . 8-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-3. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Reception Centers School/Day Camp Reception Center Ontario Bible Conference New Haven Elementary School School Age Chil.dren Care Program Charles E. Riley Elementary Fitzhugh Park Elementary School Headstart of Oswego Little Luke's Childcare Center Oswego Community Christian School Trinity Catholic School Children's Center of SUNY Oswego Frederick Leighton Elementary School New York State Fairgrounds, Kingsford Park Elementary Syracuse, NY Oswego High School Oswego Middle School Oswego YMCA School's Out Program . Mexico Elementary School Mexico High School Mexico Middle School Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Minetto Element'ary School SUNYOswego Palermo Elementary School NMP/JAF 8-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table *Medical Facility Transit Demand I Wheel-Ca pa-2012 Ambul-chair Bed-WC Bus Bus Ambulance ERPA Facility Name Municipality city Census atory Bound ridden Runs Runs Runs 12 Bishop Commons at St Luke's Oswego 68 68 66 2 0 1 2 0 12 Ladies Home of Oswego Oswego . 21 ls lS 0 0 1 0 0 12. Oswego Hosptial Behavioral Health Services Oswego 28 17 lS 2 0 1 0 0 12
- Pontiac Nursing Home Oswego 80 80 2S SS 0 28 0 0 12 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Oswego 150 lSO lSO 0 0 8 0 0 12. * . S.t Health *services .* Oswego 200 192 S7 115 20 58 0 10 12 ... Valehaven Home. for Adults Oswego 35 28 28 0 0 0 1 0 <13 Morning Star Nursing Home Oswego 120 117 17 96 4 48 0 2 13 Oswego Hospital Oswego 100 6S 55 7 3 4 0 2 13 Pontiac Terrace Apts Oswego 80 80 72 8 0 4 0 0
- is. . Fravor Rd IRA Mexico 10 9 7 2 0 1 0 0
- 16. Parkview Manor Apts Mexico 24 24 23 1 0 1 1 0 . '*i7
- s*abill Drive IRA *Mexico 6 6 s 1 0 1 0 0 20 Springside atSeneca Hill Oswego 7S 7S 74 1 0 1 2 0 20 The Manor at Seneca Hill Oswego 120 116 0 116 0 S8 0 0 21 Minetto Senior Housing Oswego 38 38 37 1 0 1 1 0 .* * .. Totals 1,155 .. 1,080 '646 407 27 216 7 14 NMP/JAF 8-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-5. Summary of Transportation Resources Durham Transportation 0 13 3 0 0 Central Square Central School District 4 80 2 0 0 Central Square School District 0 48 2 0 0 City School District of Oswego 0 56 4 3 0 CNY CENTRO, Inc. 0 10 158 18 0 Center for Instructional Technology and 0 2 15 0 0 Innovation {Oswego County BOCES) Oswego County Opportunities 0 11 33 0 0 Phoenix Central School District 4 29 3 0 0 Oswego County Fire & Rescue 0 0 0 0 4 Oswego County EMS 0 ' Schools, Preschools, and Day Camp (Table 8-2): 156 0 0 0 Medical Facilities (Table 8-4): 7 216 0 14 Transit-Dependent Population (Table 8-10): 76 0 0 0 Correctional Facilities (Table 8-18) 6 0 0 0 Homebound Special Needs (Section 8.5): 0 0 19 0 NMP/JAF 8-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-6. Bus Route Descriptions Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 1 Transit Dependent Bus Route 1 181,203,202,191,604, 188,189,306,305,308,310, 309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,635 2 Transit Dependent Bus Route 2 205,181,203,202, 191,604,188, 189,306,305,308, 310,309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,635 3 Transit Dependent Bus Route 3 178,172, 154,149, 148, 199, 147, 146, 145, 183, 143, 628,238,236 4 Transit Dependent Bus Route 4 154,149, 148, 199, 147, 146,145, 183, 143, 628,238, 236 5 Transit Dependent Bus Route 5 190,145,183, 143,628,238,236 6 Transit Dependent Bus Route 6 149,148,199, 147,146, 145,183, 143,628,238,236 7 Transit Dependent Bus Route 7 152,153,89, 78; 79,80,200,81,82,83 8 Transit Dependent Bus Route 8 151,152,153,89, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 9 Transit Dependent Bus Route 9 355,627,144,698,83 10 Transit Dependent Bus Route 10 82,83, 129 11 Transit Dependent Bus Route 11 144,698,83 12 Transit Dependent Bus Route 12 138,632,215,221,213,212,211,637,214,243,219, 635 333,334,304,687,347,338,342,656,314,657,560, 13 Transit Dependent Bus Route 13 568, 567, 566, 525, 661, 346, 662, 549, 480, 479, 481, 482,214,243,219,635 305,308,334,304,687,347;338,342,656,314,657, 14 Transit Dependent Bus Route 14 560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479, 481,482,214,243,219,635 325,307, 705,305,308,334,304,687,347,338,342, 15 Transit Dependent Bus Route 15 656,314,657,560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662, 549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 202, 191,604,188, 189,306,305,308,334,304,687, 16 Transit Dependent Bus Route 16 347,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567,566,525, 661, 346, 662, 549, 480, 479, 481, 482, 214, 243, 219, 635. 17 Transit Dependent Bus Route 17 145, 183, 143,628,238,236 18 Transit Dependent Bus Route 18 145,183, 143,628,238,236 19 Transit Depe11dent Bus Route 19 101, 12, 13 *20 Transit Dependent Bus Route 20 607,85,86 21 Transit Dependent Bus Route 21 605,157,86 22 Transit Dependent Bu.s Route 22 . 89, 78, 79, 80, 200, 81, 82, 83 23 Transit Dependent Bus. Route 23 89, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 .. NMP/JAF 8-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. .Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 24 Transit Dependent Bus Route 24 607,85,86 336,337,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567,566, 25 Transit Dependent Bus Route 25 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, 219,635 304,687,347,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567, 26 Transit Dependent Bus Route 26 566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482, 214, 243,219,635 27 Transit Dependent Bus Route 27 550,303,553,313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482, 214,243,219,635 28 Transit Dependent Bus Route 28 314,657,560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549, 480,479,481,482,214,243,219 29 Transit Dependent Bus Route 29 303,553,313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214, 243,219,635 30 Transit Dependent Bus Route 30 313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 31 Transit Dependent Bus Route 31 313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 32 Transit Dependent Bus Route 32 219,635,699 33 Transit Dependent Bus Route 33 547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 34 Transit Dependent Bus Route 34 547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 35 Transit Dependent Bus Route 35 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, 219,635 36 Transit Dependent Bus Route 36 692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 37 Transit Dependent Bus Route 37 518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 38 Transit Dependent Bus Route 38 . 518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 39 . Transit Dependent Bus Route 39 519,502,468,469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 40 Transit Dependent Bus Route 40 513,517,518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 41 Transit Dependent Bus Route 41 541,543,504,512,505, 710,436,466,498;467,468, 469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473 42 Transit Dependent Bus Route 42 512, 505, 710, 436, 466, 498, '467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 483,484,485,474,473,701 532,529,521,511,533,544,512,505, 710,436,466, 43 Transit Dependent Bus Route 43 498,467,468,469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 44 Transit Dependent Bus Route 44 507,506,505, 710,436,466,498,467,468,469,470, 471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 45 Transit Dependent Bus Route 45 530,511,533,544,512,505, 710,436,466,498,467, 468,469,470,471,483,484,485,474,473, 701 NMP/JAF 8-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Bus -' Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 46 Transit Dependent Bus Route 46 S07,S06,SOS, 710,436,466,498,467,468,469,470, 471,483,484,48S,474,473, 701 47 Transit Dependent Bus Route 47 190,14S,183,143,628,238,236 48 Transit Dependent Bus Route 48 141, 194, 142, 143,628,238,236 49 Transit Dependent Bus Route 49 138,632,21S,221,213,212,211,637,214,243,219, 63S so Transit Dependent Bus Route SO 138,309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,63S Sl Transit Dependent Bus Route Sl 309,311,312,212,211,637,214,243,219,63S S2 Transit Dependent Bus Route S2 303,SS3,313,SS4,S47,664,480,479,481,482,214, 243,219,63S S3 Transit Dependent Bus Route S3 299,82,83, 129,2S9,3S9,130, 131,2S0,2S2 S4 Transit Dependent Bus Route S4 628,238,236 SS Transit Dependent Bus Route SS 631,23S,236 S6 Transit Dependent Bus Route S6 631,23S,236 S7 Transit Dependent Bus Route S7 631, 23S, 236 S8 Transit Dependent Bus Route S8 217,218, 700 S9 Transit Dependent Bus Route S9 216,217,218 60 Transit Dependent Bus Route 60 217,218, 700 61 Transit Dependent Bus Route 61 219,63S, 699 62 Transit Dependent Bus Route 62 217,218, 700 63 Transit Dependent Bus Route 63 484,48S,474,473, 701 64 Transit Dependent Bus Route 64 473, 701,42S 6S Transit Dependent Bus Route 6S 48S,426,42S 66 Transit Dependent Bus Route 66 469,499,SOO 67 Transit Dependent Bus Route 67 469,499,SOO 68 Transit Dependent Bus Route 68 469,499,SOO 69 Transit Dependent Bus Route 69 484,48S,474,473, 701 70 Transit Dependent Bus Route 70 436,466,498,467,468,469,470,471,483,484,48S, .474,473, 701 71 Transit Dependent Bus Route 71 .sos, 710,436,466,498,467,468,469,470,471,483, 484,48S,474,473, 701 72 Transit Dependent Bus Route 72 sos, 710,436,46S,464 73 Transit Dependent Bus Route 13 S08,679,463 74 Transit Dependent Bus Route 74 S09, 708,S08,679 7S Transit Dependent Bus Route 7S 309,311,312,212,211, 637,214,243,219,63S 76 Transit Dependent Bus Route 76 607,8S,86 NMP/JAF 8-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- Sus -Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPl Boundary 705,305,308,334,304,687,347,338,342,656,314, 77 657,560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480, Ontario Bible Conference 479,481,482,214,243,219,635 78 New Haven Elementary School 609, 198,190, 145, 183, 143,628,238,236 305,308,334,304,687,347,338,342,656,314, 657, 79 560,568,567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479, School Age Children Care Program 481,482,214,243,219,635 80 Charles E. Riley Elementary 664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 81 567,566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482, Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 214,243,219,635 82 566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, Headstart of Oswego 243,219,635 83 Little Luke's Childcare Center 554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243, 219, 635 687,347,338,342,656,314,657,560,568,567,566, 84 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, 243, Oswego Community Christian School 219,635 85 566,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, Trinity Catholic School 243,219,635 509,678,507,680,511,530,520,527,526,523, 707, 86 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 219,635 87 533,511,530,520,527,526,523, 707,525,661,346, Frederick Leighton Elementary School 662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 88 540,539,670,513,517,518,692,516,515,484,485, Kingsford Park Elementary 474,473, 701 89 530,520,527,526,523, 707,525,661,346, 662,549, Oswego High School .480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 90 Oswego Middle School 518,692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 91 669,524,539,670,513,517,518,692,516,515,484, Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 485,474,473, 701 92 Mexico Elementary School 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 93 Mexii::o High School 77, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 94 Mexico Middle School 89, 78,79,80,200,81,82,83 95 Center for Instructional Technology and 89, 78, 79,80,200,81,82,83 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES} 96 Minetto Elementary School 485,474,473, 701 510,509,678,507,680,511,530,520,527,526,523, 97 707,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214, SUNY Oswego 243,219,635 NMP/JAF 8-21 . KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Bus Route Number Description Nodes Traversed to EPZ Boundary 98 Bishop Commons at St Luke's 480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 99 548,566,525, 707,523,526,527,520,530,511,680, Ladies Home of Oswego 507,678,509, 708,508,679 100 313,554,547,664,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services 635 101 Pontiac Nursing Home 480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 102 661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, Simeon-Dewitt Apts. 635 103 St Luke Health Services 480,479,481,482,214,243,219,635 104 525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481,482,214,243, Valehaven Home for Adults 219,635 105 511,530,520,527,526,523, 707,525, 661,346, 662, Morning Star Nursing Home 549,480,479,481,482,214,243,219, 635 106 Oswego Hospital 527,520, 530,511,680,507,678,509, 708,508, 679 107 669,523, 707,525,661,346,662,549,480,479,481, Pontiac Terrace Apts 482,214,243,219,635 108 Fravor Rd IRA 89, 78, 77, 76,84,607,85,86 109 Parkview Manor Apts 78, 77, 76,610, 75, 74 110 Sabill Drive IRA 153,89, 78, 77, 76,610, 75, 74 111 Springside at Seneca Hill 479,481,482,214,243,219,635 112 The Manor at Seneca Hill 214,243,219,635 113 Minetto Senior Housing 692,516,515,484,485,474,473, 701 114 Oswego County Jail 479,481,482,214,243,219,635 NMP/JAF 8-22 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-7. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather .. Dist. *.* .. Travel ' Driver Loading To EPZ
- Average Time to Dist. EPZ Travel Time Mobilization Time Bdry Speed EPZ Bdry ETE Bdryto from EPZ Bdry ETEto H.S
- School, Pr.eschool, and Day Camp Time (min) (min*) . (mi) (mph) (tnin) , (hr:min) R.C: (mi.) to H.S. fmin) (hr: min) Ontario Bible Conference 90 15 13.0 14.7 53 2:40 26.9 30 3:10 New Haven Elementary School 90 15 7.4 47.0 10 1:55 28.9 32 2:30 School Age Children Care Program 90 15 11.7 13.8 51 2:40 26.9 30 3:10 Charles E. Riley Elementary 90 15 6.8 9.4 44 2:30 26.9 30 3:00 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 90 15 7.9 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Headstart of Oswego 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Little Luke's Childcare Center 90 15 7.3 9.4 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Oswego Community Christian School 90 15 9.2 11.1 so 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Trinity Catholic School 90 15 7.8 10.1 47 2:35 26.9 30 3:05 Children's Center of SUNV Oswego 90 15 9.7 10.3 57 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 90 15 9.1 9.8 57 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Kingsford Park Elementary 90 15 6.7 23.4 18 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Oswego High School 90 15 8.6 10.0 52 2:40 26.9 30 3:10 Oswego Middle School 90 15 5.2 23.6 14 2:00 26.8 30 2:30 Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 90 15 6.7 22.1 19 2:05 26.8 30 2:35 Mexico Elementary School 90 15 4.5 48.9 6 1:55 30.4 34 2:25 Mexico High School 90 15 4.8 47.3 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 Mexico Middle School 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 30.4 34 2:30 Center for Instructional Technology and 90 15 5.0 46.7 7 1:55 35 2:30 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) 31.4 Minetto Elementary School 90 15 2.2 45.6 3 1:50 26.8 30 2:20 SUNY Oswego 90 15 9.9 10.1 59 2:45 26.9 30 3:15 Palermo Elementary School 90 15 Located outside the EPZ 27.8 31 2:20 Maximum for EPZ: 2:45' Maximum: 3:15 Average for EPZ: IMw:, 2:20 Average: 2:55 .. : NMP/JAF 8-23 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-8. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain
- School, Preschool, and Day Camp Ontario Bible Conference Nevv Haven Elementary School Sch.ool Age Children Care Program Charles E. Riley Elementary Fitzhugh Park Elementary School Headstart of Oswego Uttle Luke's Childcare Center Oswego Community Christian School Trinity Catholic School Children's Center of SUNY Oswego Frederick Leighton Elementary School Kingsford Park Elementary Oswego High School Oswego Middle School Oswego YMCA School's Out Program Mexico Elementary School Mexico High School Mexico Middle School Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Minetto Elementary School SUNYOswego Palermo Elementary School NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate D.river Mobiliza.tion Time {min) II 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 '100 Dist. Loading to Ef>Z Time Btfry (min) (mi) 1111!11 7.4 11.7 20 6.8 20 7.9 20 7.8 20 7.3 20 9.2 20 7.8 20 9.7 20 9.1 20 6.7 20 8.6 20 5.2 20 6.7 20 4.5 20 4.8 20 5.0 20 5.0 20 5.0 20 2.2 20 8-24 Travel Average Time to Speed Ef>Z Bdry EtE (mph) (min) (hr:!llirl) 11 70 7.1 58 7.7 62 7.7 62 7.2 62 8.6 65 ., 1.,jJ 7.7 62 8.6 68 8.2 68 11.7 35 7.4 70 3.:iO.*. 10.9 29 *:2;30 12.1 34 ... 41.5 7 ".'.'.<:2:10 40.3 8 fr*1*2:10 40.0 8 '2:10 40.0 8 .*2:10 42.6 .8 2:10 6.3 21 2:2s Located outside the EPZ Maximum for EPZ: Average for EPZ: Dist. EPZ Travel Time Bdryto from EPZ Bdry ETE to H.S. R.C..(mi.) to H.S. (min) (hr:min) , I -' I 26.9 26.9 33 26.9 33 26.9 33' *. 3:35 26.9 33 .. 3:35 26.9 33 3,:40 26.9 33 3;35, 26.9 33 3+/-45 26.9 33 26.8 33 :*3:10 26.9 33 .. 3:45 26.8 33 '3:05 . ' 26.8 33 '3:10' 30.4 37 '.*2:45 30.4 37 **2:45 30.4 37 2:45 ,i" , 'r 31.4 38 *2:50 31.4 38 2:50 26.8 33 .i:55 27.8 34 Maximum: Average:. KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
- Table 8-9. School, Preschool, and Day Camp Evacuation Tirne Estimates -Snow Ontario Bible Conference 110 25 13.0 9.9 79 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 New Haven Elementary School 110 25 7.4 37.7 12 2:30 28.9 39 3:10 School Age Children Care Program 110 25 11.7 9.3 76 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 Charles E. Riley Elementary 110 25 6.8 6.4 64 3:20 26.9 36 3:55 Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 110 25 7.9 7.1 67 3:25 26.9 36 4:00 f:jeadstart of Oswego
- 110 25 7.8 7.1 67 . 3i25 26.9 36 4:00 Little Luke's Childcare Center 110 25 7.3 6.7 66 3:25 26.9 36 4:00 Oswego Community Christian School 110 25 9.2 7.8 71 3:30 26.9 36 4:05 Trinity Catholic School 110 25 7.8 7.1 67 3:25 26.9 36 4:00 Children's Center of SU NY Oswego 110 25 9.7 7.6 77 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 Frederick Leighton Elementary School 110 25 9.1 7.3 76 3:35 26.9 36 4:10 Kingsford Park Elementary 110 . 25 6.7 20.0 21 2:40 26.8 36 3:15 Oswego High School 110 25 8.6 7.1 74 3:30 26.9 36 4:05 Oswego Middle School 110 25 5.2 18.7 17 2:35 26.8 36 3:10 Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 110 25 6.7 18.8 22 2:40 26.8 36 3:15 Mexico Elementary School 110 25 4.5 39.8 7 2:25 30.4 41 3:05* Mexico High School 110 25 4.8 38.4 8 2:25 30.4 41 3:05 Mexico Middle School 110 25 5.0 38.1 8 2:25 30.4 41 3:05 Center for Instructional Technology and 110 25 5.0 38.1 8 2:25 31.4 42 3:05 Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Minetto Elementary School 110 25 2.2 13.2 10 2:25 26.8 36 3:05 SUNYOswego 110 25 9.9 7.5 80 3:35 26.9 36 4:15 Palermo Elementary School 110 25 Located outside the EPZ 27.8 38 2:55 Maximum for EPZ: 3;3511.vn Maximum: I 4:1511**1 Average for EPZ: Average: ... 3.:4.9. NMP/JAF 8-25 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-10. Summary of Transit-Dependent Bus Routes 1 1 1,2,5 9 4.2 2 1 2,4,5 5 2.2 3 1 2,4,7 12 6.75 4 1 4 4 1.4 5 1 4,7,8,9 7 2.9 6 1 . 4,9 6 2.1 7 1 7,8 8 4 8 1 7 6 2.4 9 1 7,8,9 17 8.1 . 10 1 8,18 13 6.1 11 1 8,18 17 9.2 12 1 5,6,10,11 7 3 13 1 6 4 1.9 14 1 3,5,6,10,11 12 5.4 15 1 1,3,6 10 3.7 16 1 . 4,5,9,10 10 3.4 17 1 9 7 2.8 18 1 4,9 11 6.1 19 1 14 13 7.5 20 1 14,15 16 7.5 21 1 14,15,16 28 14.4 22 1 7,15,16 15 7.1 23 1 7,8,15,16,17 8 3.3 24 1 15,16,17 14 5.5 25 1. 12 6 0.8 26 1 12 10 1.5 27 1 12 13 1.1 28 1 12 11 0.8 29 1 12 15 1.5 30 1 12 8 0.6 . 31 1* 12 13 1.2 32. 1 12 11 2.2 33 ..
- 1 12 10 0.8 .*34 1 12 13 0.9 35 1 . 12 12 0.8 *. 36 1 13 13 1.8 37 1 .13 22 4 38 1 13 16 1.25 NMP/JAF 8-26 .* . KLD Engineering; P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate *. February 24, 2016 39 1 13 16 1.75 40 1 13 7 0.6 41 1 13 15 0.4 42 1 13,22 9 1.3 43 1 13 9 0.5 44 1 13 22 1.35 45 1 13 13 0.7 46 1 22 3 0.7 47 1 9,10 7 2.6 48 1 10 8 3.9 49 1 10 6 2.6 so 1 10,11 4. 1.9 51 1 6,11 11 3.8 52 1 11,12 11 1.3 53 1 8,16,17 23 9.8 54 1 18 8 3.4 55 1 .18,20 15 7.3 56 1 10,19,20 15 7.3 57 1 20 8 3.4 58 1 10,11,19,20 15 7.2 59 1 19,20 10 4.6 60 1 19,20 12 5.7 61 1 12,19,20 11 6.2 62 1 12,19,20 14 5.4 63 1 13,21 8 2.8 64 1 21 10 4.2 65 1 21 9 4.1 66 1 21 5 2 67 1 21,22 10 2.2 68 1 13,22 8 3.7 69 1 2i,22 9 3.2 70 1 13,22 8 3.6 71 1 22 5 1.9 72 1 22 9 3.7 73 1 22 7 2.2 74 1 22 5 2 75 1 11,15,19 13 4.25 76 1 15,16,17 11 3.3 Total: . 7Q NMP/JAF. .* 8"27 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- I I . Ta.hie 8-11. Transit-Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R.C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 1 1. 90 18.5 I 13.9 80 30 3:20 I 26.9 29 5 10 70 30 5:45 2 1 90 16.6 I 14.0 71 30 3:15 I 26.9 29 5 10 66 30 5:35 3 .1 90 16.2 I 45.9 21 30 2:25 .. *) 28.9 32 5 10 69 30 4:55 4 1 90 9.7. I 46.4 13 30 2:15 'I 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30. 5 1 90 8.7 I 44.6 12 30 2:15 I 28.9 32 5 10 51 30 4:25 6 1 90 9.9 I 47.3 13 30 2:15 I 28.9 32 5 10 54 30 4:30 7. l 90 10.2 I 46.7 13 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 56 30 . 4:30 8 1 90 9.2 I 47.3 12* 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 54 30 4:30 g* 1 90 10.4 I 43.2 14 30 .2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 57 30 4:35 10 1 90 8.3 I 45.6 11 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 51 30 4:25 11 1 90 10.3 I 52.2 12 30 2:15. I 30.4 33 5 10 55 30 4:30 12 1. 90 11.1 I . 9.0. 74 30 3:15 I 26.9 29 5 10 54 30 5:25 i3 1 90 12.5 I 10.1 75 30 3:15 I 26.9 29 5 10 57 30 5:30 14 1 90 17.1 I 10.8 95 30 3:35 I 26.9 29 5 . 10 68 30 6:00 15 1 90 17.7 I 12.2 87 30 3:30 I 26.9 29 5 10 69 30 5:55 16 1 90 19.0 I 13.4 85 30 3':30 I 26.9 29 5 10 72 30 *6:00 17 1 90 7.1 I 47.4 9 30 28.9 32 5 10 48 30 '4:15 18 1 90 10.4 I 47.4 13 30 2:15 I 28.9 32 5 10 55 30 4:30 19 1 90 9.8 I 46.6 13 30 2:15 I 35.4 39 5 10 62 30 4:45 20 1 90 8.9 . I 48.4 11 30 2:15 I 35.4 39 5 10 59 30 4:40 21 1 90 16.3. I 36.6 27 30 2:30 I 35.4 39 5 10 80 30 5i15 22 1 90 12.1 I 45.0 16 30 2:20 . I 30.4 33 5 10 60 30 4:40 23 1 90 8.3 I 45.0 11 30 2:15 I 30.4 33 5 10 52 30 4:25 24 1 90 6.9 I 48.4 9 30 2:10 I 35.4 39 5 10 54 30 4:30 25 1 90 10.5 I 11.1 57 30 3:00
- I 26.9 29 5 10 53 30 5:10 NMP/JAF 8-28 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Tirrie Estimate February 24, 2016
-27 I 1 I 90 I 9.9 I 8.0 -I 74 28 I 1 I 90 I 8.2 I 14.2 I 3S -I -30
- I" 2:35 '.I 26.9 29 I 1 -I . 90 I .9.8 I 7.7 I -76 _ I -30 I -3:20 -. I 26.9 --30_---1 .1 I 90 I -8.2 -I 1.2
- 1 68-I 30 I 26.9 31 I 1 I 90 I 8.8 1-1.2 I 13 I 30 I> 26.9 32 I 1 I 90 I 3.4 I 8.4 I 24 I 30 111 -2:25!rl 26.9 33 1 -90 7.9 8.4 _S6 30 -26.9 34 1 90 8.0 8.4 S7 30 26.9 35 I 1 I 90 I 8.6 I 7.9 I 6S I 30 I .3:10. I 26.9 --36 I 1 I 90 I 6.S I 20.6 I 19 I 30 I 2:20 I 26.8 --37 I 1 -, 90 I 9.2 I 17.S I 32 30 I> 2:35. >.I 26.8 38 I 1 I 90 I 6.S I
- 11.s I 22 I 30 I 2:25 I 26.8 39 1 I 90 7.6 4.S I 102 I 30 I -,3:45-.. , .. I 26.8 40 I 1 I 90 6.6 I 19.0 I 21 I 30 2:25"-' I 26.8 41 I 1 I 90 I 8.3 I 4.6 I : 107 I 30 I .: 3:50 I 26.8 42 I 1 I 90 I 8.7 I 5.0 I 10S I 30 F' -3:45:ii;!Fi 26.8 -43 I 1 I 90 I 10.0 I 8.3 I 72 . I 30 1 .*. 26.8 44 I 1 I 90 I 9.9 I 20.1 I 29 I 30 26.8 45 I 1 90 9.8 I 10.6 I SS 30 26.8 46 I 1 90 I 9.2 I 20.1
- I 27 I 30 26.8 47 I 1 I 90 8.4 I 46.4 I 11 I 30 2:15 28.9 48 I 1 I 90 I 8.6 I 46.4 I 11 I 30 28.9 49 I 1 I 90 I 10.7 I 12.1 I S3 I 30 26.9 50 I 1 I 90 I 10.0 I 12.0 I so I 30 26.9 51 I 1 I 90 I 10.6 I 8.0 I 79 I 30 26.9 52 I 1 I 90 9.6 I 8.3 I 69 30 26.9 53 I 1 I 90 I 17.9 I 4S.1 I 24 30 ,:; \ *2:25;-30.4 NMP/JAF 29 Evacuation Time Estimate 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 -29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 -29 29 29 32 32 29 29 29 29 33 5 s s 5 s s s 5 s s s s s s s s s 5 5 s s s s 5 s s s 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 S2 47 Sl 47 48 36 46 46 48 44 so 44 46 44 49 49 S3 S2 S2 so Sl Sl S3 Sl S2 Sl 73 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 4:25 5:55 --*5:50 5:25 4:40 >5:i0 4:35,;:,* 4:25* 4:25 5:05 5:30 5:15 __ 5:00 --KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 I I Route Number 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 '63 .. 64'*' 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 ---i NMP/JAF Bus Number 1 1 1 -1 i-** 1 -i ,1 .1 1 1 l 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mobilization (min) "0 90_ 90 '*. *' .. 90 90 90 90 90 _90 90 90 90 90 90 90 i -90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 --Evacuation Time Estimate Route Length fmiles) 9.2 9.2 .** 5.31 8:5 6.5 7.0 7.4 6.7 5.2 5.2 7.6 "4.4 4.6 .6.1' 5.6 9.7 8.4 5.8 3.9 4.2 11.1-4.7 * . 1111 r:;i 47.7 -12 30 < '2:is 47.7 12. 30 .. -47J. 7 30 ,,.;' *2:10*Y';1' 39.0 13 30 l :Z:i,5 -39.9. 10 30 .:r2:_1Q,,,F1 39.0 11 30 <-'* ---. _,2:15 39.0 11 30 __ -.,2d51:c .. 39.0 10 30 < 2:'15 ,, .. , '*46.3 7 30 --'2:10:;;:) 45.'8 7 -. 30 i 40.3 11 30 *_2:15-. 40.3 7 . 30 ,_ 2:10::.r 40.3 7 30 1'. 2:l0 -:* .. _ ' ,, f\' *. 40.3 9 30 . 2:11'.f ... i* 46.3 .. 7 30 2:io --** ;;, y, 4.9 119 30 k'.4:00 -5.0 100 30 ,,, ,*. . '_3:45 3.0 117 30 .--_ 4:oo\i"; '. *'* / 6.7 35 30 6.3 40 30 r .. _2:40, 8.0 . 83 30 3:25 ,i 48.4. 6 30
- 2:1<i<v1* _,_:. -,. --Average ETE: 8-30 Two-Wave navel Route Time to Driver Travel Pickup R.C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE (min) (min) (min) (min) (rnin) (hr:min) .. , .. ' I 28.9 32 5 10 52 30 28.9 32 5 10 52 30 '28.9 32 5 10 44 30 26.9 29 .. 5 10 49 30 26.9 29 5 10 45 30 26:9 29 5 10 46 30 26.9 29 5 10 45 30 26.9 29 5 10 45 30 26.8 29 5 10 41 30 26.8 29 5 10 42 30 4:10; 26.8 29 5 10 51 30 * .. 4:2q 26.8 29 5 10 54 30 4:20-. '* 26.8 29 5 10 56 30 -4:20 26.8 29 5 10 55 30 --4!20 26.8 29 5 10 42 30 26.8 29 5 10 51 30 26.8 29 5 10 48 30 37.7 41 5 10 54 30 37.7 41 5 . 10 50 30 37.7 41 5 10 51 30 26.9 29 5 10 53 30 35.4 39 5 10 49 30 ---. --:: . *-*,,,., "*+"'"* '1 -(
- __ . --*. --.,_.:::-,:. * .... , ' "'II ---*:.*:, ** .. ** i .-Average:de: I:> -,,,,,\,,,.,,, ' *i '. KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 8-12. Transit-Depe!'ldent Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr: min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) II : ----, I . . .. .. . 1 . 100 16.6 10.4 96 40 .. 4:00 26.9 32 5* 10 40 6:4Q 3 1 100 16.2** 42.4 23 40 2i45 28.9 35 5 -10 75 40 5:35 4 1 100 9.7 42.9 14 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 .5:05 5 l 100 8.7 42.1 12 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 5:05 6 1 100 . 9.9 43.1 14 40 2:35 28.9 35 . 5 10 60 40 5:o5* 7 .*. 1 100 '10.2 43.1 . 14 40 2!35 . 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:10 .8 1 100. *. 9.2 43.5 13 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 58 40 . 5:05 9 1 ***ioo 10.4 . 38.9 16 40 '2:4Q 28.9 35 5 10 62 40 5:15 10. 1 100 8.3 . 42.4 12 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 55 40 5:00 11 1 100 10.3 46.9 13 . 40 .2:35 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:05 12 1 100 11.1 6.7 100 40 4:00 28.9 35 5 10 63 40 6:35 13 1 100 12.5 I 7.5 100 40 4:00
- I
- 28.9 35 5 10 66 40 6:40 14 1* 100 17.1 I 8.7 118 40 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 78 40 7:10 '. 15 1 100 17.7 I 10.0 107 40 4:.10 I 28.9 35 5 10 80 40 7:0Q 16 1 100 19.0 I .. 10.8 105 40 4:10* I 28.9 35 5 10 82 40 7:05 17 1 100 7.1 I 42.8 10 40 2:30
- I 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 4:55 18. 1 100 10.4 I 42.8 15 40 2:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:10. 19 1 100 9.8 I* 39.9 15 40 2:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 5:10 20 1 100 8.9 I 43.9 12 40 2:35 . I 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 5:05 21 1* 100 16.3 I 33.4 29 40 2:50 I 28.9 35 5 :lo 80 40 5:45 22' 1 100 12.1 I 41.4 18 40 2!40 28.9 35 5 10 65 40 5:20 23 1 100 I 41.4 12 40 2:35 28.9 35 5 10 40 5:05 24 1 100 6.9 I
- 43.9 9 40 2:30 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 4:55 25 1 '100 10.5
- I 7.0 90 40 '3:55 28.9 35 5 10 61 40 6:30 26 1 100 11.2 I 6.8 98 40 4:00 28.9 35 5 10 63 40 6:35 27. 1 100 9.9 I 4.5 132 40 4:35 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 7:05 NMP/JAF 8-31 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 28 1 100 8.2 8.4 I .. 59 40 I 3:20 ** I 28.9 35 5 10 55 40 5:50' 29. 1 100 9.8 4.4 I 134 . AO . I .4:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 7:05 30 1 100 8.2 4.1 I 120 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 55 40 6:50 31 1 100 8.8 4.1 I 129 40 I 4:30 I 28.9 35 5 10 '57 40 7:00 32 1 100 3.4 4.0 I 51 40 I .. 3:15 I 28.9 35 5 10 43 40 5:30 33 1 100 7.9 4.0 I 119 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 54 40 6:45 34 1 100 8.0 4.0 I 120 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 54 40 6:45 35 1 100 8.6 4.2 I 123 40 I 4:25 I 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 . 6:55. 36 1 100 6.5 21.2 I 18 40 I 2:40 I 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 *37 1 100 9.2 19.1 I 29 40 r .2:50 *** 1 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 5:20 38 1 100 6.5 19.1 I 20 40 1* 2:45 I
- 28.9 35 5 10 51 40 5:10 39 1 100 7.6 3.8 I 119 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 54 40 6:45 40 1 100 6.6 16.8 I . 24 40 I 2:45 I 28.9 35 5 10 52 40 5:10 41 1 100 8.3 3.7 135 40 I 4:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 7:05 42 1 100 8.7 4.1 127 . 40 I 4:3ll : I 28.9 35 5 10 58 40 1:00 43 1 100 10.0 4.1 .. I 146 40 I 4:50 I 28.9 35 5 10 61 40 7:25 44 1 100 9.9 5.3 I 112 40 I 4:15 I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 6:50 45 1 100 9.8 4.5 I 131 . 40 I , 4:35 ... I 28.9 35 5 10 60 40 7:10 46 1 100 9.2 5.3 I 104 40 I 4:05, >:I 28.9 35 5 10 59 40 47 1 100 8.4 40.7 I 12 40 I 2:35 . I 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 5:05 48 1 100 8.6 40.2 I 13 40 I . 2:35. I 28.9 35 5 10 56 40 5:05' 49 1 100 10.7 5.5 117 40 I 4:20 I 28.9 35 5 10 62 40 6:55 50 1 100 10.0 5.4 I 111 40 I *4:15 . I 26.9 32 5 .10 . 56 40 6:40 51 1 100 10.6 4.8 I 133 40 . I
- 4:35
- I 26.9 32 5 10 57 40 7:00 52 1 100 9.6 4.4 I 131 40 I 4:35 I 26.9 32 5 10 56 40 7:00 53 1 100 17.9 41.0 I 26 40 I 2:50 I 30.4 36 5 10 81 40 5:45 54 1 100 4.1 40.3 I . 6 40 I . 2:30 I 28.9 35 5 10 46 40 4:50 55 1 100 9.2 44.5 I 12 40 I .. 2:35 I 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 5:05 NMP/JAF 8-32 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min) (hr:min) (miles) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 56 1 100 9.2 44.5 12 40 28.9 35 5 10 57 40 5:()5 57 1 100 5.3 44.5 7 40 2:30 28.9 35 5 10 48 40 4:50 58 . 1 100 . 8.5 34.2 15 4Q. 2:35 26.9 32 5 10 54 40 *5:00 59 1* 100 6.5 33.5 12 40 '2:35 26.9. 32 5 10 49 40 4:55 . 60 . 1 100 7.0 34.2 12 40 . 2.:35 26.9 32 5 10 50 40 4:55 61 *1 100 7.4 34.2 13 40 2;35< 26.9 32 5 10 50 40 4:55 62 .1 100 6.7 . 34.2 12 *. 40 2:35 26.9 32 5 10 50 40 4:55 63 1 100 5.2 40.0 8 40 2!30*'* 26.8 32 5 10 45 40 4:45. 64 1 100 5.2 37.7 . 8 40 2:30 26.8 32 5 10 45 40 4:45 65 1 100 7.6 44.4 10 40 2:35 26.8 32. 5 10 53 40 4:55 66 1 100 4.4 44.4 6 40 2:30 26.8 32 5 10 43 40 4:45 67 1 100 4.6 44.4 . 6 40 2:30 . 26.8 32 5 10 44 40 4:45 68 1 100 6.1 44.4 8 40 2:30 26.8 32 5 10 48 40 4:45 69 1 100 5.6 40.0 8 40 2:30, 26.8 32 5 10 46 40 4:45 70 1 100 9.7 4.0 146 40 4:50 26.8 32 5 10 57 40 7:15 71 1 100 8.4 4.2 120 40 '4:20 26.8 32 5 10 53 40 6:45 72 1 100 5.8 4.2 83 40 3':45 37.7 45 5 10 59 40 6:25 73 1 100 3.9 6.8 34 40 .2:55 37.7 45 5 10 55 40 5:35 74 1 100 4.2 4.7 54 40 3:15 37.7 45 5 10 56 40 5:55 75 1 100 11.1 4.8 138 40 4i40 26.9 32 5 10 59 40 . 7:10 76 1 100 4.7 43.9 6 40 2:30 35.4 42 5 10 54 40 *5:05 Maximum ETE:
- 4:so***:; Maximum ETE: 7:25 . Average ETE: 3:20 ; , ,,.,,>;WO-\ Average ETE: NMP/JAF 8-33 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ----
Table 8-13. Transit Dependent Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow One-Wave Two-Wave Route Travel Route Route Travel Pickup Distance Time to Driver Travel Pickup Route Bus Mobilization Length Speed Time Time ETE to R. C. R. C. Unload Rest Time Time ETE Number Number (min) (miles) (mph) (min) (min.) (hr:min) (miles) (min') (min) (min) (min) (min) (hr:min) 1 1 110 18.S 8.7 I 128 so I 4:5.0 *1 26.9 36 5 10 87 50 8:00 2 1 110 16.6 8.7 I 114 50 I 4:35. I 26.9 36 s 10 82 50 7:40 3 1 . 110 16.2 38.6 I 2S 50 I 3:10
- I 28.9 39 5 10 84 50 6:20 4* 1 110 9.7 39.0 I 15 50 I 2:55 I 28.9 39 5 10 66 50 5:50 5 1 110 . 8.7 38.1 I 14 50 I 2:55'
- I 28.9 39 5 10 63 50 ;5:45 6 1 110 9.9 39.3 .* 1 15 50
- I 3:00 I 28.9 39 5 10 67 50 . 5:55 7 1 110 10.2 38.3 I. 16 50 I 3:00 I
- 30.4 41 5 10 69 50 6:00. 8 1 110 9.2 38.7 I 14 50 I 2:55 30.4 41 s 10 67 50 .5:50 9 1 110 10.4 3S.O I 18 50 I 3:00 .I 30.4 41 s 10 71 50 6:.00 10 1 110 8.3 37.7 I 13 50 I ** 2:55 .*
- 1 30.4 41 5 10 63 50 5:45 . 11 1 110 10.3 41.6 I 15 50 I 2:55 I 30.4 41 s 10 69 so 5:50 12 1 110 11.1 5.2 I 129 50 I 4:50 I 26.9 36 5 10 67 so 7:40 13 1 110 12.S 6.4 I 118 50 I 4:40 I 26.9 36 s 10 71 50 7:35 14 1 110 17.1 7.3 I 141 so I 5:05 I 26.9 36 s 10 84 50 8:15 15 1 110 17.7 8.3 I 127 50 I**. 4:50
- I 26.9 36 5 10 86 50 8:00 16 1 110 19.0 9.1 I 12S 50 I 4:50 I 26.9 36 5 10 89 50 8:05 17 1 110 7.1 38.8 I 11 50 I 2:55 I 28.9 39 5 10 59 so 18 1 110 10.4 38.8 I 16 50 I 3:00 I 28.9 39 5 10 68 50 5:55 19 1 110 9.8 37.1 I 16 50 I 3:00 I 35.4 47 5 10 75 50 6:10 20 1 110 8.9 39.3 I 14 so I 2:55 I 35.4 47 5 10 71 50 6:00 21 1 110 16.3 30.0 I 33 50 I 3:15 I 35.4 47. 5 10 98 50 6:45 22 1 110 12.1 37.2 I 20 50 1. 3:00.. I 30.4 41 5 10 75 50 6:05 23 1 110 8.3 37.2 I 13 50 I 2:55
- I 30.4
- 41 s 10 64 50 5:.50 24 1 110 6.9 39.3 I 11 50 I 2:55
- I 35.4 47 5 10 66 so 5:55 25 1 110 10.5 S.9 I 107 50 I 4:30 I 26.9 36 s 10 65 50 7:20 26 1 110 11.2 5.9 I 114 50 I 4:35 I 26.9 36 s 10 67 50 7:25. 27 1 110 9.9 5.6 I 106 50 I 4:30
- I 26.9 36 5 10 64 50 7:15 NMP/JAF 8-34 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 29 1 109 26.9 10 30 i: 110 s.o 98 I so 26.9 36 s 10 S8 so 31 1 110 8.8 s.o' 10s ** I so 26.9 36 s 10 60 50 32 ' *1 110 .* 3.4 4.8 43 I SO 26.9 36 s 10 4S so 33 1 110 7.9 *4.8* .99. I so 26.9 36 s 10 S7 so 34 1 110 8.0 4.8 100 I so 26.9 36 S. 10 S7 so 35 1 110 8.6 s.o 103 so ; 26.9 36 s 10 S9 so 7:10* .. >;'. 36 1 110 ' '6.S 11.9. 33 so 26.8 36 s 10 SS so s:ss 37 i ' 110
- 9.2 10.S S3 ' 'so' 26.8 36 s 10 62 so 6:20 38: ' 1 110 6:5 10.S 37 *so 26.8 36 s 10 S4 so 6:00 39 1 110 7.6 .7;0 6S so 26.8 36 s 10 S7 so 6:i'S . 40 1 110 6.6 10.7 37 so 26.8 36 s 10 SS so 6:00 1 110 .8.3 4.3 *' 117 so 26.8 36 s 10 60 so 7:25/ 42 1 110 8.7 S;O 104 so 26.8 36 s 10 61 so 1:i.tjr 43 1 110 10*.o S.3 ' 112 so 26.8 36 s 10 66 so I 7:25. 44 1 110 9.9 . 7.9' 7S so 26.8 36 s 10 64 so I: 6:45. 45 1 **110 9.8 S.2 112 so 26.8 36 s 10 64 so I. 46 1 110 9.2 ' 7.9 70 so 26.8 36 s 10 62 so I *6:4Q. 47 1 110 8.4 38.1 13 'so 28.9 39 s '10 62 so 48 1 110 8.6 '38.2 14 so 28.9 39 s 10 63 so 49 1 110 10;7 S.2. 124 so 26.9 36 s 10 66 so* so* 1 110 *10.0 S.3 114 so 26.9 36 s 10 63 so 51 1 110 10.6 4.6 139 so 26.9 36 s 10 6S so 52 1 110 '9.6 S.4 107 so 26.9 36 s 10 63 so 53. 1 110 17.9 37.1 29 so 30.4 41 s 10 91 so 54 1 110 4.1' 3S.9' 7 so I* : .. 2:50 ,,,',-'.' 28.9 39 s 10 S1 so 55 1 ' 110 9;2 ' 39.3 14 so
- I : .. 2*:55 *)) * < ' 28.9 39 s 10 64 so .*I. *5:45> NMP/JAF 8-3S KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Route Number Bus Number (min) Route One-Wave Route Travel Length Speed Time (min) (miles) (mph) . . Pickup Time (min) ... Travel Distance Time to ETE to .R. t. R. C . (lir:mi.h) (miles) (min) : . .
- 57 *. . .1 110 . . 39.3 8 50 .. 2.:5():,.:*'.. 28.9 39' 5 10 53 58 1 110 ' 8.5 17.7 29 50 ... 3:l;q\;f 26.9 36 5 10 61 . 50 59 1 110 6:5 ' 21.3 18 50 26.9 . 36 5 10 56 50 60 1 110 1.0 11.7 24 so 3:o5S:i 26.9 36 s 10 57 so .. 5:45 61 1 110 ' 7.4 . 17.7 25 50 i 3:10 . 26.9 36 5 10 56 50 5:50 ' 62 1 110 6.1 11.1 23 so , ** 26.9 36 s 10 s6 so .
- 5:45 J 63 1 ilO 5.2 36.2 9 50 ' 2:50.. ... .* 26.8 36 5 10 51 50 5:25 ' ' '"" ' ' 64 1 110 5.2 35.1 9 50 ' ' 'f'. 26.8 36 5 10 51 50 5:25: 65 1 110 , 7.6 38:5 12 so ' 2:55 ; 26.8 36 s 10 60 so ... *5:4.o ' . . . . . . . . . .. '*, ... , '66. 1 110 4.4 . 38.5 . 7 50 2:50 ;;,.. 26.8 36 5 ' 10 49 50 . 5:20 67 1 110 4.6
- 38:s 1 sb ... * )!5j};:"'r 26.8 36 s 10 49 so ' * *5:25 .. 68 1 110 6.1 38.s 10 so ' 'fi:59:*'. 26.8 36 s 10 53 so .
- 69 1 110 . 5.6 36.2 9 50 . 2:59.:.i::.J 26.8 36 5 10 52 50 10 . 1 1io 9. 1 6.9 8s so *:: ":C>s. * .* 26.8 36 s 10 64 so '," ',l"'>>li' : 71 1 .. 110 8o4 7.1 71 50 : .3:55 ;< 26.8 36 5 10 60 50 12 1 110 s:8 4.7 74 so .
- 37.7 so s 10 6S so 13 1 110 3.9 4.o s9 so * .. 3:4of:::i 37.7 so s 10 61 so I 6:40 * * ,, ,,,,' "l 74 1 110 4.2 . 4.4 57 so 3!40 37.7 so s 10 62 so 75 1 110 1i.1 4.6 14s so * . s:10 26.9 36 s 10 66 76 1 110 4.7 39.3 7. . . so ' 11i!;*t* 3S.4 47 5 10 60 . so 1V1ax1mum ETE:
- Maximum ETE: ! . I * * . , Average El;E: j'"):!C>ff . , Average ETE: I I. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 8.-36 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Table 8-14. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Good Weather Ambulatory 90 1 66 20 6.8 44 2:35 Bishop Commons at St Luke's Wheelchair bound 90 5 2 10 6.8 40 2:20 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 6.8 38 2:10 Ambulatory 90 1 15 15 4.5 66 2:55 Ladies Home of Oswego Wheelchair bound 90 5 0 0 4.5 75 2:45 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 4.5 75 2:45 Ambulatory 90 1 15 15 7.6 47 2:35 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services Wheelchair bound 90 5 2 10 7.6 48 2:30 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 7.6 46 2:20 Ambulatory 90 1 25 20 6.8 44 2:35 Pontiac Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 90 5 55 10 6.8 40 2:20 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 6.8 38 2:10 Ambulatory 90 1 150 20 7.7 43 2:35 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Wheelchair bound 90 5 0 0 7.7 43 2:15 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 7.7 43 2:15 Ambulatory 90 1 57 20 6.8 44 2:35 St Luke Health Services Wheelchair bound 90 5 115 10 6.8 40 2:20 Bedridden 90 15 20 30 6.8 38 2:40 Ambulatory 90 1 28 20 7.8 43 2:35 Valehaven Home for Adults Wheelchair bound 90 5 0 0 7.8 43 2:15 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 7.8 43 2:15 Ambulatory 90 1 17 17 8.9 53 2:40 Morning Star Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 90 5 96 10 8.9 59 2:40 Bedridden 90 15 4 30 8.9 48 2:50 Ambulatory 90 1 55 20 3.7 62 2:55 Oswego Hospital Wheelchair bound 90 5 7 10 3.7 64 2:45 Bedridden 90 15 3 30 3.7 58 3:00 Ambulatory 90 1 72 20 8.2 47 2:40 Pontiac Terrace Apts Wheelchair bound 90 5 8 10 8.2 51 2:35 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 8.2 50 2:20 NMP/JAF 8-37 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Ambulatory 90 1 7 7 2.9 4 1:45 Fravor Rd IRA Wheelchair bound 90 5 2 10 2.9 4 1:45 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 2.9 4 1:35 Ambulatory 90 1 23 20 2.3 3 1:55 Parkview Manor Apts Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 2.3 3 1:40 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 2.3 3 1:35 Ambulatory 90 1 5 5 3.4 5 1:40 Sabill Drive IRA Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 3.4 5 1:40 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 3.4 5 1:35 Ambulatory 90 1 74 20 5.5 39 2:30* Springside at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 5.5 33 2:10 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 5.5 28 2:00 Ambulatory 90 1 0 0 3.1 24 1:55 The Manor at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 90 5 116 10 3.1 29 2:10 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 3.1 24 1:55 Ambulatory 90 1 37 20 4.7 13 2:05 Minetto Senior Housing Wheelchair bound 90 5 1 5 4.7 12 1:50 Bedridden 90 15 0 0 4.7 11 1:45 Maximum ETE: 3:00 Average ETE: 2:20 NMP/JAF 8-38 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- Table Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Rain Travel Loading Time to Rate Total EPZ Mobilization (min per Loading Dist. To EPZ Boundary ETE Medical Facility Patient (min) person) People Time (min) Bdry (mi) (min) (hr:min) Ambulatory 100 1 66 20 6.8 58 3:00 Bishop Commons at St Luke's Wheelchair bound 100 5 2 10 6.8 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 6.8 58 2:40 Ambulatory 100 1 15 15 4.5 59 2:55 Ladies Home of Oswego Wheelchair bound 100 5 0 0 4.5 67 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 4.5 67 2:50 Ambulatory 100 1 15 15 7.6 62 3:00 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services Wheelchair bound 100 5 2 10 7.6 62 2:55 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 7.6 64 2:45 Ambulatory 100 1 25 20 6.8 58 3:00 Pontiac Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 100 5 55 10 6.8 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 6.8 58 2:40 Ambulatory 100. 1 150 20 7.7 60 3:00 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Wheelchair bound 100 5 0 0 7.7 62 2:45 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 7.7 62 2:45 Ambulatory 100 1 57 20 6.8 58 3:00 St Luke Health Services Wheelchair bound 100 5 115 10 6.8 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 20 30 6.8 59 3:10 Ambulatory 100 1 28 20 7.8 61 3:05 Va.lehaven Home for Adults Wheelchair bound 100 5 0 0 7.8 62 2:45 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 7.8 62 2:45 Ambulatory 100 1 17 17 8.9 65 3:05 Morning Star Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 100 5 96 10 8.9 73 3:05 Bedridden 100 15 4 30 8.9 63 3:15 Ambulatory 100 1 55 20 3.7 54 2:55 Oswego Hospital Wheelchair bound 100 5 7 10 3.7 60 2:50 Bedridden 100 15 3 30 3.7 53 3:05 Ambulatory 100 1 72 20 8.2 63 3:05 Pontiac Terrace Apts Wheelchair bound 100 5 8 10 8.2 64 2:55 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 8.2 67 2:50 Ambulatory 100 1 7 7 2.9 5 1:55 Fravor Rd IRA Wheelchair bound 100 5 2 10 2.9 5 1:55 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 2.9 5 1:45 NMP/JAF 8-39 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Ambulatory 100 1 23 20 2.3 4 2:05 Parkview Manor Apts Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 2.3 4 1:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 2.3 4 1:45 Ambulatory 100 1 5 5 3.4 5 1:50 Sabill Drive IRA Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 3.4 5 1:50 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 3.4 5 1:45 Ambulatory 100 1 74 20 5.5 49 2:50 Springside at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 5.5 47 2:35 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 5.5 47 2:30 Ambulatory 100 1 0 0 3.1 44 2:25 The Manor at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 100 5 116 10 3.1 45 2:35 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 3.1 44 2:25 Am.bulatory 100 1 37 20 4.7 25 2:25 Minetto Senior Housing Wheelchair bound 100 5 1 5 4.7 29 2:15 Bedridden 100 15 0 0 4.7 30 2:10 Maximum ETE: 3:15 Average ETE: 2:40 NMP/JAF 8-40 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-16. Medical Facility Evacuation Time Estimates -Snow Ambulatory 110 1 66 20 6.8 69 3:20 Bishop Cor:nmons at St Luke's Wheelchair bound 110 5 2 10 6.8 70 3:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 6.8 68 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 15 15 4.5 63 3:10 Ladies Home of Oswego Wheelchair bound 110 5 0 0 4.5 67 3:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 4.5 67 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 15 15 7.6 74 3:20 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services Wheelchair bound 110 5 2 10 7.6 74 3:15 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 7.6 72 3:05 Ambulatory 110 1 25 20 6.8 69 3:20 Pontiac Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 110 5 55 10 6.8 70 3:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 6.8 68 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 150 20 7.7 73 3:25 Simeon-Dewitt Apts. Wheelchair bound 110 5 0 0 7.7 71 3:05 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 7.7 71 3:05 Ambulatory 110 1 57 20 6.8 69 3:20 St Luke Healt.h Services Wheelchair bound 110 5 115 10 6.8 70 3:10 Bedridden 110 15 20 30 6.8 65 3:25 Ambulatory 110 1 28 20 7.8 73 3:25 Valehaven Home for Adults Wheelchair bound 110 5 0 0 7.8 71 3:05 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 7.8 71 3:05 Ambulatory 110 1 17 17 8.9 75 3:25 Morning Star Nursing Home Wheelchair bound 110 5 96 10 8.9 79 3:20 Bedridden 110 15 4 30 8.9 75 3:35 Ambulatory 110 1 55 20 3.7 59 3:10 Oswego Hospital Wheelchair bound 110 5 7 10 3.7 65 3:05 Bedridden 110 15 3 30 3.7 54 3:15 Ambulatory 110 1 72 20 8.2 70 3:20 Pontiac Terrace Apts Wheelchair bound 110 5 8 10 8.2 79 3:20 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 8.2 77 3:10 Ambulatory 110 1 7 7 2.9 6 2:05 Fravor Rd IRA Wheelchair bound 110 5 2 10 2.9 6 2:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 2.9 5 1:55 NMP/JAF 8-41 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Ambulatory 110 1 23 20 2.3 4 2:15 Parkview Manor Apts Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 2.3 4 2:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 2.3 4 1:55 Ambulatory 110 1 5 5 3.4 6 2:05 Sabill Drive IRA Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 3.4 6 2:05 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 3.4 6 2:00 Ambulatory 110 1 74 20 5.5 62 3:15 Springside at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 5.5 63 3:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 5.5 68 3:00 Ambulatory 110 1 0 0 3.1 64 2:55 The Manor at Seneca Hill Wheelchair bound 110 5 116 10 3.1 58 3:00 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 3.1 64 2:55 Ambulatory 110 1 37 20 4.7 14 2:25 Minetto Senior Housing Wheelchair bound 110 5 1 5 4.7 13 2:10 Bedridden 110 15 0 0 4.7 12 2:05 Maximum ETE: 3:35 Average ETE: 2:55 NMP/JAF 8-42 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 8-17. Homebound Special Needs Population Evacuation Time Estimates .. : , .. ". . : . . * .. """: ' . . " . 3:*"***** People 'time at Travei"to
- Total Time Travel Time to Requiring Vehicles Weather Mobilization 1st Stop Subsequent at Subsequent EPZ Boundary ETE Vehicle Type Vehfcle deployed Stops Conditions Time (min) (min) Stops (min) Stops (min) (min) (hr:min) Normal 90 90 15 4:10 Wheelchair Vans 208 19 11 Rain 100 5 100 50 15 4:30 Snow 110 110 16 4:55 Maximum ETE: 4:55 Average ETE: 4:35 Table 8-18. Correctional Facilities Evacuation Time Estimates Normal 90 23 2:55 Oswego County Correctional Facility Rain 100 6 2 160 60 5.5 20 3:00 Snow 110 17 3:10 Maximum ETE: 3:10 Average ETE: 3:05 NMP/JAF 8-43 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 9 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STRATEGY This section discusses the suggested traffic control and management strategy that is designed to expedite the movement of evacuating traffic. The resources required to implement this strategy include:
- Personnel with the capabilities of performing the planned control functions of traffic guides (preferably, not necessarily, law enforcement officers).
- Traffic Control Devices to assist these personnel in the performance of their tasks. These devices should comply with the guidance of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) published by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of the U.S.D.O.T. All state and most county transportation agencies have access to the MUTCD, which is available on-line: http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov which provides access to the official PDF version.
- A plan t_hat defines all locations, provides necessary details and is documented in a format that is readily understood by those assigned to perform traffic control. The functions to be performed iri the field are: 1. Facilitate evacuating traffic movements that safely expedite travel out of the EPZ. 2. Discourage traffic movements that move evacuating vehicles in a direction which takes them significantly closer to .the power plant, or which interferes with the efficient flow of other evacuees. & We employ the terms "facilitate" and "discourage" rather than "enforce" and "prohibit" to indicate the need for flexibility in performing the traffic control function. There are always legitimate reasons for a driver to prefer a direction other than that indicated. For example:
- A driver may be traveling home from work or from another location, to join other family members prior to evacuating.
- An evacuating driver may be travelling to pick up a relative, or other evacuees.
- The drive*r may be an emergency worker en route to perform an important activity. The implementation of a plan must also be flexible enough for the application of sound judgment by the traffic guide. The traffic management plan is the outcome of the following process: 1. The existing TCPs and ACPs by the offsite agencies in their existing emergency plans serve as the basis of the traffic management plan, as per NUREG/CR-7002. 2. The existing TCPs and ACPs and how they were applied in this study are discussed in Appendix G. 3. Computer analysis. of the evacuation traffic flow environment (see Figures 7-3 through 7-7). As. discuss.ed in Section 7.3, congestion within the EPZ is clear by 4 hours after the ATE. The existing traffic management plans place emphasis on appropriate intersections and are adequate. No additional TCPs or ACPs are identified as a result of this study. 4. Prioritization ofTCPs and ACPs. NMP/JAF 9-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time EStimate February 24, 2016
- Application of traffic arid access control at some TCPs and ACPs will have a more pronounced influence on expediting traffic movements than at other TCPs and ACPs. For example, TCPs controlling traffic originating from areas in close proximity to the power plant could have a more beneficial effect on minimizing potential exposure to radioactivity than those TCPs located far from the power plant. These priorities should be assigned by state/local emergency management representatives and by law enforcement personnel. The use of Intelligent Transportation Systems {ITS) technologies can reduce manpower and equipment needs, while still facilitatingthe evacuation process. Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) can be placed within the EPZ to provide information to travelers regarding traffic conditions, route selection, and reception center information. DMS can also be placed outside of the EPZ to warn motorists to avoid using routes that may conflict with the flow of evacuees away from the power plants. Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) can be used to broadcast information to evacuees en route through their vehicle stereo systems. Automated Traveler Information Systems (ATIS) can also be used to provide evacuees with information. Internet websites can provide traffic and evacuation route information before the evacuee begins their trip, while on board navigation systems (GPS units), cell phones, and pagers can be used to provide information en route. These are only several examples of how ITS technologies can benefit the evacuation process.' Considerat . ion should be given that ITS technologies be used to facilitate the evacuation process, and any additional signage placed should consider evacuation needs. The ETE analysis treatedall controlled intersections that are existing TCP and ACP locations in the offsite agency plans as being controlled by actuated. signals. Appendix K, Table K-2 identifies those intersections that were modeled as TCPs. Chapters 2N and SG, and Part 6 of the 2009 MUTCD are particularly relevant and should be reviewed during emergency response training. The ETE calculations reflect the assumption that all "external-external" trips are interdicted and diverted after 2 hours have elapsed from the ATE. *All transit Vehi.cles and other responders entering the EPZ to support. the are assumed to be unhindered by personnel manning ACPs and TCPs. Study Assumptions 5 . and 6 in Section 2.3 discuss *ACP and TCP staffing schedules .and operations. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 9-2 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 10 . EVACUATION ROUTES Evacuation routes are comprised of two distinct components:
- Routing from an ERPA being evacuated to the boundary of the Evacuation Region and thence out of the EPZ.
- Routing of transit-dependent evacuees from the EPZ boundary to the reception center. Evacuees will select routes within the EPZ in such a way as to minimize their exposure to risk. This expectation is met by the DYNEV II model routing traffic away from the location of NMP/JAF, to the extent practicable. The DTRAD model satisfies this behavior by routing traffic so as to balance traffic demand relative to the available highway capacity to the extent possible. See Appendices B through D for further discussion. The routing of transit-dependent evacuees from the EPZ boundary to the general reception center or to medical host facilities is designed to minimize the amount of travel outside the EPZ from the points where these routes cross the EPZ boundary. The Oswego County radiological emergency plans identify the New York State Fairgrounds as the reception center for school and day camp children as well as the general population. Several host facilities are identified throughouJ the region to house those living or receiving treatment at various medical facilities and nursing homes within the EPZ. Figure 10-1 presents a map showing the general reception center as well as the medical host facilities for evacuees. The major evacuation routes for the EPZ are presented in Figure 10-2. It is assumed that .all school and day camp. evacuees will be taken to the New York. State Fairgrounds and subsequently picked up by parents or guardians. Transit-dependent evacuees are transported to the main Fairground location as well. This study does. not consider the transport of evacuees from reception centers to congregate care centers, if the county does make the decision to relocate NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 10-1
- KLD Engineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 General Reception Center and Medical Host Facilities Legend
- NMP/JAF
- General Reception Center D Medical Host Facility GJ ERPA \.. __, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region I / I Figure 10-1. General Reception Center and Medical Host Facilities NMP/JAF 10-2 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Major Evacuation Routes within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ Legend
- NMP/JAF GJ ERPA 28 > Evacuation Route \. _.,, 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Shadow Region Lako / 26 I I I 27 '\ \ Figure 10-2. Evacuation Route Map NMP/JAF 10-3 Evacuation Time Estimate Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 11 SURVEILLANCE OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS There is a need for surveillance of traffic operations during the evacuation. There is also a need to clear any blockage of roadways arising from accidents or vehicle disablement. Surveillance can take several forms.
- 1. Traffic control personnel, located at Traffic and Access Control points, provide fixed-point surveillance. 2. Ground patrols may be undertaken along well-defined paths to ensure coverage of those highways that serve as major evacuation routes. 3. Aerial surveillance of evacuation. operations may also be conducted using helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft, if available. 4. Cellular phone calls (if cellular coverage exists) from motorists may also provide direct field reports of road blockages. These concurrent surveillance *procedures are designed to provide coverage of the entire EPZ as well as the area around its periphery. It is the responsibility of the county to support an emergency response system that can receive messages from the field and be in a position to respond to any reported problems in a timely manner. This coverage should quickly identify, and expedite the response to any blockage caused by a disabled vehicle. Tow Vehicles In a low-speed traffic environment, any vehicle disablement is likely to arise due to a low-speed collision, mechanical failure or the exhaustion of its fuel supply. In any case, the disabled vehicle can be pushed onto the shoulder, thereby restoring traffic flow. Past experience in other emergencies indicates that evacuees who are leaving an area often perform activities such as pushing a disabled vehicle to the side of the road without prompting. While the need for tow vehicles is expected to be low under the circumstances described above, it is still prudent to be prepared for such a need. Consideration should be given that tow trucks With a supply of gasoline be deployed at strategic locations within, or just outside, the EPZ. These locations should be selected so that:
- They permit access to key, heavily loaded, evacuation routes.
- Responding tow trucks would most likely travel counter-flow relative to evacuating traffic. Consideration should also be given that the state and local emergency management agencies encourage gas stations to remain open during the evacuation. NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 12 CONFIRMATION TIME It is necessary to confirm that the evacuation process is effective in the sense that the public is complying with the Advisory to Evacuate. The Oswego County radiological emergency plans state that the County Sheriff is assigned the responsibility of traffic control and is tasked with patrolling the plume exposure EPZ for confirmation of evacuation and the provision of security in the evacuated area. This process takes place during the maintenance phase of the evacuation. In addition to this activity, the following complementary approach is suggested. The suggested procedure employs a stratified random sample and a telephone survey. The size of the sample is dependent on the expected number of households that do not comply with the Advisory to Evacuate. It is reasonable to assume, for the purpose of estimating sample size that at least 80 percent of the population within the EPZ will comply with the Advisory to Evacuate. On this basis, an analysis could be undertaken (see Table 12-1) to yield an estimated sample size of approximately 300. The confirmation process should start at about 2 hours after the Advisory to Evacuate, which is when approximately 90 percent of evacuees have completed their mobilization activities (see Figure 5-4). At fhis time, virtually all evacuees will have departed on their respective trips and the lqcal telephone system will be largely free of traffic. As indicated in Table 12-1, approximately 7Yz person hours are needed to complete the telephone survey. If six people are assigned to this task, each dialing a different set of telephone exchanges. (e.g., each person can be assigned a different set of ERPAs), then the confirmation process will extend over a timeframe of about 75 minutes. Thus, the confirmation should be completed before the evacuated area is cleared. Of course, fewer people would be needed for this survey if the Evacuation Region were only a portion' of the EPZ. Use of modern automated CO!TlpUter controlled dialing equipment or Other technologies (e.g., emergency . . . . notification system or equivalent if available) can significantly reduce the manpower requirements _and the t.ime required to undertake this type of confirmation survey. If this method is indeed used by the offsite agencies, consideration should be given to maintain * .a list of telephone. numbers within the EPZ in ttie EOC at all times. Such a list be purchased from vendors *and should b.e periodically updated. As indicated *above,. the confirmation process should. not begin until 2 hours after the Advisory to Evacuate, to ensure that households have had enough tfme to mobilize. This 2-hour timeframe will enable telephone operators to arrive attheir workplace, obtain a call list and prepare to make the necessary phone calls. Should the number of telephone responses (Le., people still at home) exceed 20 percent, then the telephone.survey should be repeated after an hour's interval until the confirmation process is completed.
- Other techniques could also be. considered. After traffic volumes decline, the personnel manning TCPs can be redeployed t.o travel through residential areas to observe and to confirm . evacuation activities. , NMP/JAF 12-1 . KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table 12-1. Estimated Number of Telephone Calls Required for Confirmation of Evacuation Problem Definition Estimate number of phone calls, n, needed to ascertain the proportion, F of households that have not evacuated.
Reference:
Burstein, H., Attribute Sampling, McGraw Hill, 1971 Given:
- No. of households plus other facilities, N, within the EPZ (est.)= 17,500
- Est. proportion, F, of households that will not evacuate = 0.20
- Allowable error margin, e: 0.05
- Confidence level, a: 0.95 (implies A= 1.96) Applying Table 10 of cited reference, Finite population correction: p = F + e = 0.25; q = 1 -p = 0.75 A2pq + e n = = 308 ez nN nF = = 303 n+N-1 Thus, some 300 telephone calls will confirm that approximately 20 percent of the population has not evacuated. If only 10 percent of the population does not comply with the Advisory to Evacuate, then the required sample size, nF = 213. Est. Person Hours to complete 300 telephone calls . Assume:
- Time to dial using touch tone (random selection of listed numbers): 3o seconds
- Time for 6 rings (no answer): 36 seconds
- Time for 4 rings plus short conversation: 60 sec.
- Interval between calls: 20 sec. Person Hours: . . . . . . 300[30 + 0.8(36) +*0.2(60) + 20] **. .* . . . . *= 7.6 -. . . 3600-. -' NMP/JAF 12-2 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 APPENDIX A Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms A. GLOSSARY OF TRAFFIC ENGINEERING TERMS Table A-1. Glossary of Traffic Engineering Terms Term Definition '-*:,, *. . . * ""
- Ille. 'i.\ Analysis Network Link Measures of Effectiveness Node Origin Prevailing Roadway and Traffic Conditions Service Rate Service Volume Signal Cycle Length Signal Interval NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate A graphical representation of the geometric topology of a physical roadway system, which is comprised of directional links and nodes. A network link represents a specific, one-directional section of roadway. A link has both physical (length, number of lanes, topology, etc.) and operational (turn movement percentages, service rate, free-flow speed) characteristics. Statistics describing traffic operations on a roadway network. A network node generally represents an intersection of network links. A node has control characteristics, i.e., the allocation of service time to each approach link. A location attached to a network link, within the EPZ or Shadow Region, where trips are generated at a specified rate in vehicles per hour (vph). These trips enter the roadway system to travel to their respective destinations. Relates to the physical features of the roadway, the nature (e.g., composition) of traffic on the roadway and the ambient conditions (weather, visibility, pavement conditions, etc.). Maximum rate at which vehicles, executing a specific turn maneuver, can be discharged from a section of roadway at the prevailing conditions, expressed in vehicles per second (vps) or vehicles per hour (vph). Maximum number of vehicles which can pass over a section of roadway in one direction during a specified time period with operating conditions at a specified Level of Service (The Service Volume at the upper bound of Level of Service, E, equals Capacity). Service Volume is usually expressed as vehicles per hour (vph). The total elapsed time to display all signal indications, in sequence. The cycle length is expressed in seconds. A single combination of signal indications. The interval duration is expressed in seconds. A signal phase is comprised of a sequence of signal intervals, usually green, yellow, red. A-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016.
Term Definition Signal Phase Traffic (Trip) Assignment Traffic Density Traffic (Trip) Distribution Traffic Simulation Traffic Volume Travel Mode Trip Table or Origin-* Destination Matrix Turning Capacity NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate A set of signal indications (and intervals) which services a particular combination of traffic movements on selected approaches to the intersection. The phase duration is expressed *in seconds. A process of assigning traffic to paths of travel in such a way as to satisfy all trip objectives (i.e., the desire of each vehicle to travel from a specified origin in the network to a specified destination) and to optimize some stated objective or combination of objectives. In general, the objective is stated in terms of minimizing a generalized "cost". For example, "cost" may be expressed in terms of travel time. The number of vehicles that occupy one lane of a roadway section *of specified length at a point in time, expressed vehicles per mile (vpm). A process for determining the destinations of all traffic generated at the origins. The result often takes the form of a Trip Table, which is a matrix of origin-destination traffic volumes. A computer model designed to replicate the real-world operation of vehicles on a roadway network, so as to provide statistics describing traffic performance. These statistics are c.alled Measures of Effectiveness. The number of vehicles that pass over a section of roadway in one direction, expressed in vehicles per hour (vph). Where applicable, traffic volume may be stratified by turn movement. Distinguishes between private auto, bus, rail, pedestrian and air travel modes. A rectangular matrix or table, whose entries contain the number of trips generated at each specified origin, during a specified time period, that are attracted to (and travel toward) each of its specified destinations. These values are expressed in vehicles per hour (vph) or in vehicles. The capacity associated with that component of the traffic stream which executes a specified turn maneuver from an approach at an intersection. A-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
- APPENDIX B DTRAD: Dynamic Traffic Assignment and Distribution Model B. DYNAMIC TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION MODEL This section describes the integrated dynamic trip assignment and distribution model named DTRAD (Qyna*mic Iraffic 8ssignment and .Qistribution) that is expressly designed for use in analyzing evacuation scenarios. DTRAD employs logit-based path-choice principles and is one of the models of the DYNEV II System. The DTRAD module implements path-based Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTA) so that time dependent Origin-Destination (OD) trips are "assigned" to routes over the network based on prevailing traffic conditions. To apply the DYNEV II System, .the analyst must specify the highway network, link capacity information, the time-varying volume of traffic generated at all origin centroids and, optionally, a set of accessible candidate destination nodes on the periphery of the EPZ for selected origins. DTRAD calculates the optimal dynamic trip distribution (i.e., trip destinations) and the optimal dynamic trip assignment (i.e., trip routing) of the traffic generated at each origin node traveling to its set of candidate destination nodes, so as to minimize evacuee travel "cost." Overview oflntegrated Distribution and Assignment Model .The underlying premise is that the selection of destinations and routes is intrinsically coupled in an evacuation scenario. That is, people in vehicles seek to travel out of an area of potential risk as rapidly as possible by selecting the "best" routes. The model is designed to identify these "best" routes in a manner. that realistically distributes vehicles from origins to destinations and routes them .over the highway network, in a consistent and optimal manner, reflecting evacuee behavior.
- For each origin, a set of "candidate .destination nodes;' is selected by the software logic and by the analyst to reflect the desire by evacuees to travel away from th.e power plant and to.access major highways. The specific destination nodes within this set that are selected by travelers and the selection of the connecting paths of travel are both determined by DTRAD. This determination is made by a legit-based path choice model in DTRAD, so as to minimize the trip *"cost", as discussed later. * . . : . ' . . " . . ' . . --. . The traffic *loading on the network and* the consequent operational traffic of the network (density, speed,. throughput on each link) vary over time as the evacuation takes
- The DTRAD model, which is iQterfaced*with the DYNEV simulation model, executes a succession of "sessions" wherein it computes the optimal routing and selection of destination nodes for the conditions *that exist at that time .. Interfacing the DYNEV Simulation Model with DTRAD . . -. The DYNEV II system reflects' guidance that evacuees will seek to travel in a general direction away from the location of tlie hazardous event. An algorithm was developed to support the DTRAD model in dynamically varying the Trip Table (0-0 matrix) over time from one DTRAD' session to the next. Another algorithm executes a "mapping from the specified "geometric". network analysis network) that represents the physical system, to a "path" network that represents the vehicle [turn] movements. DTRAD computations are performed oh the "path" net"lfbrk: DYNEV simulation mo,del, on*the "geometric" network. NMP/JAF ' . Evacuation Time Estimate B-1 KlD Engineering, P.C. .*.February 24, 2016 DTRAD Description DTRAD is the DTA module for the DYNEV II System. When the road network under study is large, multiple routing options are usually available between trip origins and destinations. The problem of loading traffic demands and propagating them over the network links is called Network Loading and is addressed by DYNEV II using macroscopic traffic simulation modeling. Traffic assignment deals with computing the distribution of the traffic over the road network for given 0-D demands and is a model of the route choice of the drivers. Travel demand changes significantly over time, and the road network may have time dependent characteristics, e.g., time-varying signal timing or reduced* road capacity because of lane closure, or traffic congestion. To consider
- these time dependencies, DTA procedures are required. The DTRAD DTA module represents the dynamic route choice behavior of drivers, using the specification of dynamic origin-destination matrices as flow input. Drivers choose their .routes through the network based on the travel cost they experience (as determined by the simulation model). This allows traffic to be distributed over the network according to the time-dependent conditions. The modeling principles of DTRAD include:
- It is assumed that drivers not only select the best route (i.e., lowest cost path) but some *also select less attractive routes. The algorithm implemented by DTRAD archives several "efficient" routes for each 0-D pair from which the drivers choose.
- The choice of one route out of a set of possible routes is an outcome of "discrete choice modeling". Given a set of routes and their generalized costs, the percentages of drivers that choose each route is computed. The most prevalent model for discrete choice modeling is the logit' model. DTRAD uses a variant of Path-Size-Logit model (PSL). PSL overcomes the drawback of the traditional multinomial logit model by incorporating an .*additional deterministic path size correction term to address path overlapping in the random utility expression.
- DTRAD executes the traffic assignment algorithm on an abstract network representation called "the path network" which is built from the actual physical link-node analysis network. This execution continues until a stable situation is reached: the volumes and travel times on the edges of the path network do not change significantly from one iteration to the next. The criteria for this convergence are defined by the user.
- Travel "cost" plays a crucial role in route choice. In DTRAD, path cost is a linear summation of the generalized cost of each link that comprises the The generalized cost for a link, a, is expressed as where ca is the generalized cost for link a, and a, fl, and ya re cost coefficients for link travel time, dista'nce, and supplemental cost, respectively. Distance and supplemental costs are defined as invariant properties of the* network model; while travel time is a . dynamic property dictated *by prevailing traffic conditions. The DYNEV simulation model .* NMP/JAF B-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 computes travel times on all edges in the network and DTRAD uses that information to constantly update the costs of paths. The route choice decision model in the next simulation iteration uses these updated values to adjust the route choice behavior. This way; traffic demands are dynamically re-assigned based on time dependent conditions. The interaction between the DTRAD traffic assignment and DYNEV II simulation models is depicted in Figure B-1. Each round of interaction is called a Traffic Assignment Session (TA session). A TA session is composed of multiple iterations, marked as loop B in the figure ..
- The supplemental cost is based on the "survival distribution" (a variation of the exponential distribution).The Inverse Survival Function is a "cost" term in DTRAD to represent the potential risk of travel toward the plant: Sa= -In (p), 0 p I ; >O dn p=-. do dn = Distance of node, n, from the plant do from the plant where there is zero risk factor The value of do 15 miles, the outer distance of the Shadow Region. Note that the supplemental cost, Sa, of link, a, is (high, low), if its downstream node, n, is (near, far from). the power plant . . NMP/JAF B-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Estimate . February 24, 2016, ..
Network Equilibrium In 1952, John Wardrop wrote: . Under equilibrium conditions traffic arranges itself in congested networks in such a way that no individual trip-maker can reduce his path costs by switching routes. The above statement describes the "User Equilibrium" definition, also called the "Selfish Driver Equilibrium". It is a hypothesis that represents a [hopeful] condition that evolves over time as drivers search out alternative routes to identify those routes that minimize their respective "costs". It has been found that this "equilibrium" objective to minimize costs is largely realized by most drivers who routinely take the same trip over the same network at the same time (i.e., commuters). Effectively, such drivers "learn" which routes are best for them over time. Thus, the traffic environment "settles down" to a near-equilibrium state. Clearly, since an emergency evacuation is a sudden, unique event, it does not constitute a term learning experience which can achieve an equilibrium state. Consequently, DTRAD was not designed as an equilibrium solution, but to represent drivers in a new and unfamiliar* situation, who respond in a flexible manner to real-time information (either broadcast or observed) in such a way as to minimize their respective costs of travel. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate
- KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 B . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Start of next DTRAD Session Set T0 = Clock time. Archive System State at T0 Define latest Link Turn Percentages Execute Simulation Model from time, T0 to T1 (burn time) Provide DTRAD with link MOE at time, T1 Execute DTRAD iteration; Get new Turn Percentages Retrieve System State at T0 ; . Apply new Link Turn Percents DTRAD i.teration converges? No Yes Next iteration Simulate from T0 to T2 (DTA session duration)* Set Clock to Figure B-1. Flow Diagram of Simulation-DTRAD Interface* B-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 J APPENDIX C DYNEV Traffic Simulation Model C. DVNEV TRAFFIC SIMULATION MODEL The DYNEV traffic simulation model is a macroscopic model that describes the operations of traffic flow in terms of aggregate variables: vehicles, flow rate, mean speed, volume, density, queue length, on each link, for each turn movement, during each Time Interval (simulation time step). The model generates trips from "sources" and from Entry Links and introduces them onto the analysis network at rates specified by the analyst based on the mobilization time distributions. The model simulates the movements of all vehicles on all network links over time until the network is empty. At intervals, the model outputs Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) such as those listed in Table C-1. Model Features Include:
- Explicit consideration is taken of the variation in density over the time step; an iterative procedure is employed to calculate an average density over the simulation time step for the purpose of computing a mean speed for moving vehicles.
- Multiple turn movements can .be serviced on one link; a separate algorithm is used to estimate the number of (fractional) lanes assigned to the vehicles performing each turn movement, based, in part, on the turn percentages provided by the DTRAD model.
- At any point in time, traffic flow on a link is subdivided into twodassifications: queued and moving vehicles. The number of vehicles in each classification is computed. Vehicle spillback, stratified by turn movement for each network link, is explicitly considered and
- quantified. The propagation ofstopping waves from link to link is computed within each time step of the simulation. There is no vertical stacking" of queues on a link.
- Any link can accommodate "source flow" from zones via side streets and parking facilities that are not explicitly represented. This flow represents the evacuating trips that are generated at the source.
- The relation between the number of vehicles occupying the link and its storage capacity >is monitored every time step for every link and. for every turn movement. If the . **available storage capacity on a link is exceeded by the demand for service, then the simulator applies a "metering" rate to the entering traffic from .both the upstream .. feeders and source n.ode to ensure that the available storage capacity is not exceeded.
- A "path network" that represents the specified traffic movements from each network
- link is constructed by the model; this path network is utilized by the DTRAD model.
- A two-way interface with DTRAD: (1) provides link travel times; (2) receives data that translates into link turn percentages.
- Provides MOE to animation software, EVAN
- Calculates ETE statistics NMP/JAF C-1 KLD Engineeririg, P.C. Evacuation nme Estimate February 24( 2016. *.*
All traffic simulation models are data-intensive. Table C-2 outlines the necessary input data elements. To provide an efficient framework for defining these specifications, the physical highway environment is represented as a network. The unidirectional links of the network represent roadway sections: rural, multi-lane, urban streets or freeways. The nodes of the network generally represent intersections or points along a section where a geometric property changes (e.g. a lane drop, change in grade or free flow speed). Figure C-1 is an example of a small network representation. The freeway is defined by the sequence of links, {20,21), {21,22), and {22,23). Links {8001, 19) and {3, 8011) are Entry and Exit links, respectively. An arterial extends from node 3 to node 19 and is partially subsumed within a grid network. Note that links (21,22) and {17,19) are grade-separated. Table C-1. Selected Measures of Effectiveness Output by DYNEV II < " 0 .. * 'Unl1l'° ' . \ :. '. ies to : * * * ... * :: *Measure -. . . .. " _.,., "" ,, ;': .. *"" .. ..... *< ' II *, Vehicles Discharged Vehicles Link, Network, Exit Link Speed Miles/Hours (mph) Link, Network Density Vehicles/Mile/Lane Link Level of Service LOS Link Content Vehicles Network Travel Time Vehicle-hours Network Evacuated Vehicles Vehicles Network, Exit Link Trip Travel Time Vehicle-minutes/trip Network Capacity Utilization Percent Exit Link Attraction Percent of total evacuating vehicles Exit Link Max Queue Vehicles Node, Approach Time of Max Queue Hours:minutes Node, Approach Route Statistics Length (mi); Mean Speed (mph); Travel Route Time (min) Mean Travel Time Minutes Evacuation Trips; Network NMP/JAF C-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table C-2. Input Requirements for the DYNEV II Model HIGHWAY NETWORK
- Links.defined by upstream and downstream node numbers
- Link lengths
- Number of lanes (up to 9) and channelization *
- Turn bays (1 to 3 lanes)
- Destination (exit) nodes *
- Network topology defined in terms of downstream nodes for each receiving link
- Node Coordinates (X,Y) *
- Nuclear Power Plant Coordinates (X,Y) GENERATED TRAFFIC VOLUMES
- On all entry links and source nodes (origins), by Time Period TRAFFIC CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS
- Traffic signals: link-spetific, turn movement specific
- Signal control treated as fixed time or actuated
- Location of traffic control points (these are represented as actuated signals)
- Stop and Yield signs
- Right-turn-on-red (RTOR)
- Route diversion specifications
- Turn restrictions * . Lane control (e.g. lane closure, movement-specific) DRIVER'S AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
- Driver's (vehicle-,specific) response mechanisms: free-flow speed, discharge headway
- Bus route designation. DYNAMIC TRAFFfCASSIGNMENT
- Candidate destination nodes for each origin. (optional) * .Duration of DTA sessions
- Duration of simulation "burn time"
- Desired number of destination nodes per origin INCIDENTS
- Identify and Schedule of closed lanes
- Identify and Schedule of closed links NMP/JAF C-3
- Eva.cuation Ti.me Estimate
- KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Entry, Exit Nodes*are numbered 8xxx . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate :_8 Figure Representative Analysi,s Network C-4 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016
C.1 Methodology C.1.1 The Fundamental Diagram It is necessary to define the fundamental diagram describing flow-density and speed-density relationships; Rather than "settling for" a "triangular representation, a more realistic representation that includes a "capacity drop", (1-R)Qmax, at the critical density when flow conditions enter the forced flow regime, is developed and calibrated for each link. This representation, shown in Figure C-2, asserts a constant free speed up to a density, kr, and then a linear reduction in speed in the range, kr:::; k:::; kc = 4S vpm, the density at capacity. In the flow-density plane, a quadratic relationship is prescribed in the range, kc < k :::; ks = 9S vpm which roughly represents the "stop-and-go" condition of severe congestion. The value of flow rate, Qs, corresponding to ks, is approximated at 0.7 RQmax. A *linear relationship between ks and ki completes the diagram shown in Figure C-2. Table C-3 is a glossary of terms. The fundamental diagram is applied to moving traffic on every link. The specified calibration values for each link are: (1) Free speed, Vf ; (2) Capacity, Qmax; (3) Critical density, kc = 4S vpm; (4) Capacity Drop Factor, R = 0.9; (5) Jam density, k1*. Then, Ve = Qmax , kr = kc -. . Setting k = k -k then Q = RQ -RQmax k2 for 0 < k < k = SO . It can be Qmax
- c ' max 8333 --s shown that Q = ( 0.98 -O.OOS6 k) RQmax for ks :::; k :::; ki, where ks = SO and k; = 17S. C.1.2 The.Simulation Mod.el The simulation model solves a sequence of "unit problems." Each unit problem computes the
- movement of traffic on a link; for each specified turn movement, over a specified time interval. (Tl) which serves as the simulation time step for all links. Figure C-3 is a representation of the unit problem in the.time-distance plane. Table C-3 is a glossary of terms that are referenced in the following description of the unit problem procedure. NMP/JAF Evacuation Tim*e Estimate C-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. .* February 24, 2016 Volume, vph Qmax -R Qmax-Capacity Drop .__--..-------.------;--------.........;:-----Density, vpm Flow Regimes I Speed, mph 111 Free Forced, Vf R Ve -L..----..------+-----T----------=.,._ ______ _. Density, vpm I kc Figure C-2. Fundamental Diagrams NMP/JAF C-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Distance Qoown L Up ----*Time I Ei. TI Ez Figure C-3. A UNIT Problem Configuration with ti> 0 NMP/JAF C-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Cap E G/C h k L LN M 0 NMP/JAF Table C-3 .. Glossary The maximum number of vehicles, of a particular movement, that can discharge from a link within a time interval. The number of vehicles, of a particular movement, that enter the link over the time interval. The portion, b1, can reach the stop-bar within the Tl. The green time: cycle time ratio that services the vehicles of a particular turn movement on a link. The mean queue discharge headway, seconds. Density in vehicles per lane per mile. The average density of moving vehicles of a particular movement over a Tl, on a link. The length of the link in feet. The queue length in feet of a particular movement, at the [beginning, end] of a time interval. The number of lanes, expressed as a floating point number, allocated to service a particular movement on a link. The mean effective length of a queued vehicle including the vehicle spacing, feet. Metering factor (Multiplier): 1. The number of moving vehicles on the link, of a particular movement, that are moving at the [beginning, end] of the time interval. These vehicles are assumed to be of equal spacing, over the length of link upstream of the queue. The total number of vehicles of a particular movement that are discharged from a link:over a time interval. The components of the vehicles of a particular movement that are discharged from a link within a time interval: vehicles that were Queued at the beginning of the Tl; vehicles that were Moving within the link at the beginning of the Tl; vehicles that Entered the link during the Tl. The percentage, expressed as a fraction, of the total flow on the link that executes a particular turn movement, x. C-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- R RCap Tl w-NMP/JAF The number of queued vehicles on the link, of a particular turn movement, at the [beginning, end] ofthe time interval. The maximum flow rate that can be serviced by a link for a particular movement in the absence of a control device. It is specified by the analyst as an estimate of link capacity, based upon a field survey, with reference to the HCM. The factor that is applied to the capacity of a link to represent the "capacity drop" when the flow condition moves into the forced flow regime. The lower capacity at that point is equal to RQmax . The remaining capacity available to service vehicles of a particular movement after that queue has been completely serviced, within a time interval, expressed as vehicles. Service rate for movement x, vehicles per hour (vph). -Vehicles of a particular turn movement that enter a link over the firstt1 seconds of a time interval, can reach the stop-bar (in the absence of a queue down-* stream) the same time interval. -The time interval, in seconds, which is used as the simulation time step. The mean speed of travel, in feet per second (fps) or miles per hour (mph), of moving vehicles on the link. The mean speed of the last vehicle in a queue that discharges from the link within the Tl. This speed differs frorii the *mean speed of moving vehicles, v. The width of the intersection in feet. This is the difference between the link --length which extends from stop-bar to stop-bar and the block length. -C-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 The formulation and the associated logic presented below are designed to solve the unit problem for each sweep over the network (discussed below), for each turn movement serviced on each link that comprises the evacuation network, and for each Tl over the duration of the evacuation.
- Given= Qb,Mb ,L, TI,E0 ;LN, G/c*,h,Lv,Ro ,Lc1E,M Compute = 0 , Qe , Me Define 0 = OQ + OM + OE ; . E = Ei + E2 1. For the first sweep, s = 1, of this Tl, get initial estimates of mean density, k0 , the R -factor, R0 and entering traffic, E0, using the values computed for the final sweep of the prior Tl. For each subsequent sweep, s > 1, calculate E == Li Pi Qi + S where Pi, Oi are the relevant turn from feeder link, i, and its total outflow (possibly metered) over this Tl; Sis the .total source flow (possibly metered) during the current Tl. Set iteration counter, n = 0, k = k0 , and E = E0 . 2. Calculate v (k) such that k ::::;; 130 using the analytical representations of the fundamental diagram. . . C 1 1 t. c . QmaxCTI) (G/ ) L.N * *h* *1 h *.... 1 b d d a cu a e ap = 3600 . *. C , m ve ic es, t is va ue may ere uce due to metering* Set R = 1.0 if G/c < 1 or ifk::::;; kc; Set R = 0.9 only if G/c = 1 and k > ke: . L Calculate queue length; Lb = Qb .
- L . t 3. Calculate, ti = TI -v : If ti < 0 , setti = Ei = OE = 0 ;
- Else; Ei ,;,,, E .
- 4.
- Then E2 = E-E1 ; . t2 = 1J -ti 5. If Qb then OQ =Cap,OM =OE =O
- If.*** ti > o , then . .. *.*.* == Qb +Mb Cap
- End if . *Calculate .Qe *and Me using Algorithm A 6 .. Else. {Qb < tap) OQ ='= Qti , *.* * . RCap = Cap -'-OQ 7. If Mb::::;; RCap ,then NMP/JAF C-10 Evacuatio.n Time Estimate . K_LD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
- 8. = Ei -OE If > 0 , then Calculate Qe , Me with Algorithm A Else Qe = 0 , Me = Ez . End if Else (t1 = O) OM = (v(TI)-Lb) Mb and OE = 0
- L-Lb Me = Mb -OM +E ; Qe = 0 End if 9. Else (Mb> RCap) OE= 0 If t1 > 0 , then OM= RCap, =Mb -OM+ E1 Calculate Qe and Me using Algorithm A 10. Else (t1 = O) End if Endif End if Md= Mb]. If Md > RCap, then *OM= RCap =Md -OM Apply Algorithm A to calculate Qe and Me
- Else OM= Md Me= Mb -OM +E and Qe = 0 End if 11. Calculate a new estimate of average density, kn = + 2 km + keJ , 4 where kb =density at the beginning of the Tl ke = density at the end of the Tl km = density at the mid-point of the Tl . All values of density apply only to the moving vehicles. If lkn* "-kn"-il > E and n < N where N. = max number of iterations, and E is a convergence criterion, then C-11
- KLD Engineering, P.C. February24, 2016. . NMP/JAF Time Estimate
- 12. set n = n + 1 , and return to step 2 to perform iteration, n, using k = kn . End if Computation of unit problem is now complete. Check for excessive inflow causing spill back. 13. If Q +M > (L-W) LN then e e Lv , The number of excess vehicles that cause spill back is: SB = Qe + Me -(L-W)
- LN , Lv where W is the width of the upstream intersection. To prevent spillback, meter the outflow from the feeder approaches and from the source flow, S, during this Tl by the amount, SB. That is, set SB M = 1 -(E + S) ;;:::: 0, where Mis the metering factor (over all movements). This metering factor is assigned appropriately to all feeder links and to the source flow, to be *applied during the next network sweep, discussed later. Algorithm A This analysis addresses the flow environment over a Tl during which moving vehicles can Q'e Qe v .I values ofl, Tl, v, E, t, Lv, LN, . When ti > 0 and Qb ::;; Cap: join a standing or discharging queue. For the case shown, Qb ::;; Cap, with ti > 0 and a queue of length, , *formed by that portion of Mb and E . that reaches the stop-bar within the Tl, but could not discharge due to inadequate capacity. That is, Qb +Mb+ Ei > Cap. This queue length, = Qb +Mb+ Ei '--Cap can be extended to Qe by traffic entering the approach during the current Tl, traveling at speed, v, and reaching the rear of the
- queue within the Tl. A portion of the entering vehicles, E3 == E t3 , will likely join the queue. This . TI .. analysis calculates t3 , Qe and Me for the input . . . Define: = -.. From the sketch, L3 = v(TI -ti -t3) = L -+ E3)-* * -* LN LN Substituting E3 = ii E yields: +ii E = L -v(TI -ti},.... . Recognizing that the first t\No terms on the;! right hand side cancel, solve for t3 to obtain: NMP/JAF C-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ....
such that 0 ::;; t3 ::;; TI -ti If the denominato.r, [v -:1 ::;; 0, set t3 = TI -ti . . t Then,Qe = +ET; , The complete Algorithm A considers all flow scenarios; space limitation precludes its inclusion, here. C.1.3 Lane Assignment The "unit problem" is solved for each turn movement on each link. Therefore it is necessary to calculate a value, LNx, of allocated lanes for each movement, x. If in fact all lanes are specified by, say, arrows painted on the pavement, either as full lanes or as lanes within a turn bay, then the problem is fully defined. If however there remain un-channelized lanes on a link, then an analysis is undertaken to subdivide the number of these physical lanes into turn movement specific virtual lanes, LNx. C.2 Implementation C.2.1
- Computational Procedure The computational procedure for this model is shown in the form of a flow diagram as Figure C-4. *As discussed earlier, the simulation .*model processes traffic flow for each link independently over Tl that the analyst specifies; it is usually 60 seconds or longer. The first step is to execute <rn,algorithm to define the sequence in which the network links are processed so that as many links as possible are processed after their feeder links are processed, within the same network sweep. Since a general network Will have many closed loops, it is not possible to guarantee that every link processed will have all of its feeder links processed earlier. The processing then continues as a succession of time steps of duration, Tl, until the simulation is completed. Within each time step, the processing performs a series of "sweeps" over all network links; this is necessary to ensure that the traffic flow is synchronous over the entire network. Specifically, the sweep ensures continuity of flow among all the network links; in the context of this model, this means that the values of E, M, and Sare all defined for each link such that they represent the synchronous movement of traffic from each link to all of its outbound links. These sweeps also serve to compute the metering rates that control spillback. Within each sweep, processing solves the "unit problem" for each turn movement on each link. With the turn movement percentages for each link provided by the DTRAD model, an algorithm NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate
- C-13 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016
,----1 allocates the number of lanes to each movement serviced on each link. The timing at a signal, if any, applied at the do'wnstream end of the link, is. expressed as a G/C ratio, the signal timing needed to define this ratio is an input requirement for the model. The model also has the capability of representing, With macroscopic fidelity, the actions of actuated signals responding to the time-varying competing demands on the approaches to the intersection. The solution of the unit problem yields the values of the number of vehicles, 0, that discharge from the link over the time interval and the number of vehicles that remain on the link at the end of the time interval as stratified by queued and moving vehicles: Qe and Me . The procedure considers each movement separately (multi-piping). After all network links are processed for a given network sweep, the updated consistent values of entering flows, E; metering rates, M; and source flows, S are defined so as to satisfy the "no Spillback" condition. The procedure then performs the unit problem solutions for all network links during the following sweep. Experience has shown thatthe system converges (i.e. the values of E, M and S "settle down" for all network links) in just two sweeps if the network is entirely under-saturated or in four sweeps in the presence of extensive congestion with link spillback. (The initial sweep over each link uses the final values of E and M, of the prior Tl). At the completion of the final sweep for a Tl, the procedure computes and ,stores all measures of effectiveness for each link and turn movement for output purposes. It then prepares for the following time interval by defining the values of Qb and Mb for the start of the next Tl as being those values of Qe and Me at the end of the prior Tl. In this manner, the simulation model processes the traffic flow over time until the end of the run. Note that there is. no space-discretization other than the specification of network links. . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate C-14 .. KLD Engineering, P.C. * .
- February 24, 2016 Sequence Network Links 01--Next Time-step, ofduration, Tl B Next sweep; Define E, M, Sfor all Links Next Link Next Turn Movement, x Get lanes, LNx Service Rate, Sx; (G/Cx) Get inputs to Unit Problem: Qb ,Mb IE Solve Unit Problem: Qe, Me, 0 Last Movement? No Yes Last Link? No Yes Last Sweep? No Yes Cale., s.tore all Link, MOE Set up next Tl : Last Time -step ? No Yes. DONE C-4. Flow of Simulation.Processing (See Glossary: Table C-3) NMP/JAF *Evacuation Time Estimate .KLD Engineering, P.C. .*February 24, 2016
- C.2.2 Interfacing with Dynamic Traffic Assignment (DTRAD) The DYNEV II system reflects NRC guidance that evacuees will seek to travel in a general direction away from the location of the hazardous event. Thus, an algorithm was developed to identify an appropriate set of destination nodes for each origin based on its location and on the expected direction of trayeL This algorithm also* supports the DTRAD model in dynamically varying the TripTable (0-D matrix) over time from one DTRAD session to the next. Figure B-1 depicts the .interaction of the simulation model with the DTRAD model in the DYNEV II system. As indicated, DYNEV II performs a succession of .DTRAD "sessions"; each such session computes the turn link percentages for each link that remain constant for the session duration, [T0 , T2] , specified by the analyst. The end product is the assignment of traffic volumes from each origin to paths connecting it with its destinations. in such a way as to minimize the network-wide cost function. The output of the DTRAD model is a set of updated link turn percentages which represent this assignment of traffic. As indicated in Figure B-1, the simulation model supports the DTRAD session by providing it with operational link MOE that are needed by the path choice model and included in the DTRAD cost function. These MOE represent the operatic:>nal state of the network at a time, Ti T2, which lies within the session duration, [T0, Tz] . This "burri time", Ti -T0, is selected by the analyst. For each DTRAD iteration, the simulation model computes the change in network operations over this burn time using the latest set of link turn percentages computed by the DTRAD model. Upon convergence of the DTRAD iterative procedure, the simulation mode.I accepts the latest turn percentages provided by the DTA model, returns to the origin time, T0 , and executes until it arrives at the end of the DTRAD session duration at time, T2. Atthis time the next DTA session is launched and the whole process repeats until the end of the DYNEV II run. Additional details presented in Appendix B. 'NMP/JAF *. c-i6 Evacuation Time Estimate *.* Engineering, P.C. *February 24, 2016.
APPENDIX D Detailed Description of Study Procedure D. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF STUDY PROCEDURE This appendix describes the* activities that. were performed to compute Evacuation Time Estimates. The individual steps of this effort are represented as a flow diagram in Figure D-1. Each numbered step in the description that follows corresponds to the numbered element in. the flow diagram. Step 1 The first activity was to obtain EPZ boundary information and create a GIS base map. The base map extends beyond the Shadow Region which extends approximately 15 miles (radially) from the power pla.nt location. The base map incorporates the local roadway topology, a suitable topographic background and the EPZ boundary. Step 2 2010 Census block population and Census population growth (using 20141 population estimates published by the US Census) information was obtained in GIS format. This information was used to project the resident population within the EPZ and Shadow Region to the year 2015 and to define the spatial distribution and demographic characteristics of the population within the study area. In 2012, employee and transient data were obtained from local emergency management agencies and from phone calls to transient attractions. Information concerning schools, day camp, medical and other types of special facilities within the EPZ was obtained from county and municipal sources.
- Step 3 A kickoff meeting was conducted, in 2012, with major stakeholders (state and local emergency managers, on-site and off-site utility emergency managers, local and state law enforcement agencies). The purpose of the kickoff meeting was to present an overview of the work effort, identify key agency personnel, and indicate the data requirements for the study. Specific requests for information were presented to local emergency managers. Unique features of the study a*rea were discussed to identify the local concerns that should be addressed by the ETE study. Step4 . In 2012, a physical survey of the roadway system in the study area was conducted to determine the geometric properties of the highway sections, the channelization of lanes on each section of roadway, whether there are any turn restrictions or special treatment of traffic at
- intersections, the type and functioning of traffic control devices, gathering signal timings for pre-timed traffic signals, and to make the necessary observations needed to estimate realistic values of roadway capacity. 1 The annual population estimates prepared by the Census Bureau for the entire U.S. involves an extensive data gathering process. As such, population estimates are a year behind -2014 data are released in 2015. The schedule . for release of Censu,s data is provided*on the Census website: http://www.census.gov/popest/schedule.html NMP/JAF D-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 * .. _..J Step 5 The data from the 2012 telephone survey of households within the EPZ was used to identify household dynamics, trip generation characteristics, and evacuation-related demographic information of the EPZ population. This information was used to determine important study factors including the average number of evacuating vehicles used by each household, and the time required to perform pre-evacuation mobilization activities. Step 6 A computerized representation of the physical roadway system, called a link-node analysis network, was developed using the UNITES software (see Section 1.3) developed by KLD. Once the geometry of the network was completed, the network was calibrated using the information gathered during the 2012 road survey (Step 4). Estimates of highway capacity for each link and other link-specific characteristics were introduced to the network description. Traffic signal timings were input accordingly. The link,-node analysis network was imported into a GIS map. 2010 Census. data (extrapolated to 2015 using annual growth rates based on 2014 Census population estimates) were overlaid in the map, and origin centroids where trips would be generated during the evacuation process were assigned to appropriate links. Step 7 The EPZ is subdivided into 29 ERPAs. Based on wind direction and speed, Regions (groupings of ERPAs) that may be advised to evacuate, were developed. The need for evacuation can occur over a range of .seasonal and weather-related conditions. Scenarios were developed to capture the variation in evac*uation demand, highway capacity and mobilization time, for different time of day, day of the week,
- time of year, and weather conditions. . . . . . . The input stre.am fort.he DYNEV II model, which integrates the dynamic traffic assignment and distribution model, DTRAD; with the evacuation simulation model; was created for a prototype evacuation case--. the evacuation .entire EPZ for a representative scenario. . *step 9 After creating this input syeam; *the DYNEV II System was executed on the prototype to compute evacuatir:ig*traffic routing patterns consistent with the appropriate NRC guidelines. DYNEV II contains an extensive* *suite of data* diagnostics. which check the completeness and consistency o(the input data specified. The analyst reviews all warning and error produced by the model. and then corrects the database to create an input stream that properly executes to completion. . . . . . The IT1odel. assigns destinations .to . all origin . centroids consistent with a (general) radial evacuation of.the .EPZ and Shadow* Region. The analyst may optionally supplement and/or **replace the.se model-'assigned destinations, based on professional judgment, after studying the topology of the **analysis highway. The model produces. link and network-wide measures of effectiveness as well as estimates of evacuation time. . .. . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate D-2. KlD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 Step 10 The .results generated by the prototype evacuation case are critically examined. The examination includes observing the animated graphics (using the EVAN software which operates on data produced by DYNEV II) and reviewing the statistics output by the model. This . is a labor-intensive activity, requiring the direct participation of skilled engineers who possess the necessary practical experience to interpret the results. and to determine the causes of any problems reflected in the results. Essentially, the approach is to identify those bottlenecks in the network that represent locations where congested conditions are pronounced arid to identify the cause of this congestion. This cause can take many forms, either as excess demand due to high rates of trip generation, improper routing, a shortfall of capacity, or as a quantitative flaw in the way the physical system Was represented in the input stream. This examination leads to one of two conclusions: *
- The results are satisfactory; or
- The input stream must be modified accordingly. This decision requires, of course, the application of the user's judgment and experience based upon the results obtained in previous applications of the model and a comparison of the results of the latest prototype evacuation case iteration with the previous ones. If the results are satisfactory in the opinion of the user, then the process continues with Step 13. Otherwise, proceed to Step 11. Step 11 There are* many "treatments" available to the. user in resolving apparent problems. These treatments range from decisions to reroute the traffic by assigning additional evacuation destinations for one or more sources, imposing tum restrictions where they can produce significant improvements in capacity, changing the control treatment at critical intersections so . as to provide improved service for one or more* movements, or in prescribing specific treatments for channelizing the flow so cis to expedite the movement of traffic along major roadway systems. Such "treatm'ents" take the form of modifications to the original prototype 'evacuation case input Alltreatments are designed to improve the representation of evacuation behavfor. -Step 12 *
- As noted above, the changes to the input :stream must be implemented to reflect the modifications undertaken in Step 11. At the com'pletion of this activity, the process returns to Step 9 where the DYNEV II System is again executed ..
- Step 13 Evacuation of transit-dependent evacuees and special facilities are included in the evacuation analysis: Fixed *ro_uting for transit buses andfor school/day camp buses, ambulances, and other *transit vehicles are introduced into the final prototype evacuation case data set. DYNEV II generates route-specific speeds over time for use in the. estimation of evacuation times for the '
- NMP/JAF _. Evacuation Time Estimate D-3
- KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 241 2016 transit dependent and special facility population groups; Step 14 The prototype evacuation case is used as the basis for generating all region and specific evacuation cases to be simulated. This process was automated through the UNITES 'user interface. For each specific case, the population to be evacuated, the trip generation distributions, the highway capacity and speeds, and other factors are adjusted to produce a customized case-specific data set. Step 15 All evacuation cases are executed using the DYNEV II System to compute ETE. Once results are available, quality control procedures are used to assure the results are consistent, dynamic routing is reasonable, and traffic congestion/bottlenecks are addressed properly. Step 16 Once vehicular evacuation results are accepted, average travel speeds for transit and special facility routes are used to compute evacuation time estimates for transit-dependent permanent residents, schools, day hospitals, and other special facilities. Step 17 The simulation results are analyzed, tabulated and graphed. The results arethen documented, as required by NUREG/CR-7002. Step 18. Following the completion bf documentation activities, the ETE criteria checklist (see Appendix N) is completed. An appropriate report reference is provided for each criterion provided in the checklist. ' NMP/JAF . . . KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24,2016 Step 1 Create GIS Base Map Step 2_ Gather Census Block and Demographic Data for Study Area. Project population to 201S. Step 3 Conduct Kickoff Meeting with Stakeholders Step4 Field Survey of Roadways within Study Area Step 5 Analyze Telephone Survey and Develop Trip Generation Characteristics Step 6 Create and Calibrate Link-Node Analysis Network Step7
- Develop Evacuation Regions and Scenarios Step 8 Create and Debug DYNEV II Input Stream Step9 Execute DYNEV II for Prototype Evacuation Case Ste 10 Examine Prototype Evacuation Case using EVAN and DYNEV II Output Results Satisfactory Step 11 Modify Evacuation Destinations and/or Develop Traffic Control Treatments Step 12 Modify Database to Reflect Changes to Prototype Evacuation Case Step 13 Establish Transit and Special Facility Evacuation Routes and Update DYNEV II Database Step 14 Generate DYNEV II Input Streams, for All Evacuation Cases Step 15 Execute DYNEV II to Compute ETE for All Evacuation Cases Step 16 Use DYNEV II Average Speed Output to Compute ETE for Transit and Special Facilicy Routes. . Step 17 Documentation* __ Step 18 Complete ETE Criteria Checklist .Figure D-1. Flow Diagram of Activities NMP/JAF D-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _
APPENDIX E Special Facility Data E. SPECIAL FACILITY DATA Based on conversations with Exelon and Entergy, the database of facility data from May 2012 was maintained. The name of Oswego County BOCES and the Holiday Inn Express in Oswego, scheduled to open in mid-2016, have been updated. The following tables list population information for special fadlities, transient attractions, recreational areas, and major employers that are located within the NMP/JAF EPZ. Special facilities are defined as schools, preschools, day camps, hospitals, other medical care facilities, and correctional facilities. Transient population data is included in the tables for recreati0nal areas and lodging facilities. Employment data is included in the tables for major employers .. The location of the fac:ility is defined by its straight-line distance (miles) and direction (magnetic bearing) from the center point of NMP/JAF. Maps of each school, preschools, day camp, medical facility, correctional facility, recreational area, lodging facility, and major employer are also provided . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate E-1 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016
.. Table E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ Distance ERPA (miles) Direction School Name Street Address Municipality Phone Enrollment Staff 1 1.1' WSW Ontario Bible Conference1 385 Lakeview Rd Oswego (315) 343-6111 91 12 4 5.2 ESE .*.New Haven Elementary School 4320SR104 New Haven (315) 963-8400 238 45 10 4.0 SSW. School Age Children Care Program 5495 SR 104E-Oswego (315) 342-6919 33 4 12 6.7 . SW Charles E. Riley Elementary 268 E 8th St Oswego (315) 341-2980 497 75 12 6.2 SW Fitzhugh Park Elementary School 195 E Bridge St Oswego (315) 341-2940 416 70 12 6.4 SW Headstart of Oswego 43 E Schuyler St Oswego (315) 342-0629 80 11 12 6.7 . SW Little Luke's Childcare Center 10 Burkle St Oswego (315) 342-4600 100 35 12 5.6 SW Oswego Community Christian School 400 E Albany St Oswego (315) 342-9322 76 20 12 6.5 SW Trinity Catholic School 115 E 5th St Oswego (315) 343-6700 173 30 13 8.0 SW Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 131 Sheldon Hall Oswego (315) 342-9322 100 16 13 7.7 **SW Frederick Leighton Elementary School .* 1 Buccaneer Blvd Oswego (315) 341-2970 485 80 .13 7.3 SW
- Kingsford Park Elementary 275 W 5th St Oswego (315) 341-2950 381 60 13. 7.6 SW Oswego High School 2 Buccaneer Blvd Oswego (315) 341-2920 1,281 150 13 7.9 SW *Oswego Middle School 100 Mark Fitzgibbons Dr Oswego (315) 341-2930 597 80 13 7.0 SW . Oswego YMCA School's Out Program 249W1st St Oswego (315) 343-1981 60 5 16 9.5** ESE Mexico Elementary School 26 Academy St Mexico (315) 963-8400 358 65 16 9.7 ESE Mexico High School 3338 Main St Mexico. (315) 963-8400 700 108 .16 9.0 ESE: Mexico Middle School 16 Fravor Rd Mexico (315) 963-8400 701 115 *Center for Instructional Technology and 17 ESE Innovation (Oswego County BOCES)2 176 CR 64 Oswego (315) 963-4481 446 100 21 9.4 SSW Minetto Elementary School 2411CR8 Minetto (315) 341-2960 367 78 22 8.0 . SW SUNY Oswego 7060SR104 Oswego (315) 312-2500 8,3003 1,721 S.R. 12.5 SSE Palermo Elementary School4 1638 CR 45 Fulton (315) 963-8400 255 60 . s:;>7. .. ... "*' 'll'.'" ***\'* i . * '. ** ***. .;,;\?:;;,;::' c,;",;0* ;Jtf:;*:'.: .J ':.: '*'-"'>':' . ****** ******:::\;*::ir>:n0; ' ' , , >)"""','N.V*\,*';, :15;.1735 ,,,,,, *,:,llH", *i *' ... .. ' . **** *i.1;r> *...* ': h' y .*. El>i TOTAL; '2,940 ** *.'*'* . . .. 1 According to Oswego County officials, Ontario Bible Conference, included in this table, is a summer camp program for which they need transportation assistance. The rest of the year, the camp is open to retreats for family events for which they can furnish their own transportation. 2 Oswego County BOCES is now known as the Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Citi). 3 All SUNY Oswego students including commuter students listed in Table E-4 . . 4 Palermo Elementary School is located in the Shadow Regi_on, but will be evacuated according to Oswego County Emergency Plans. NMP/JA.F E-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ..
Table E-2. Medical Facilities within the EPZ Ambula-Wheel-Bed-Distance Di rec-Ca pa-Current tory chair ridden ERPA (miles) ti on Facility Name Street Address _ Municipality Phone city Census Patients Patients Patients Bishop Commons at St .. 12 SW Luke's 4 Burkle St Oswego (315) 349-0798 68 68 66 2 0 12 6.7 SW Ladies Home of Oswego 43 E Utica St .Oswego (315) 343-6951 21 15 15 0 0 Oswego Hospital Behavioral ** 12 6.4 SW Health Services 74 Bunner St Oswego (315) 326-4100 28 17 15 2 0 12 6.8 SW Pontiac Nursing Home 303 E River Rd *Oswego (315) 343-1800 80 80 25 55 0 12 6.8 SW Simeon-Dewitt Apts. . 150 E 1st St Oswego (315) 343-0440 150 150 150 0 0 . 12 6.8 SW St Luke Health Services 299 E River Rd Oswego (315) 342-3166 200 192 57 115 20 12 6.7 SW Valehaven Home for Adults 24 E Oneida St Oswego (315) 342-3959 35 28 28 0 0 13 8.0 -SW Morning Star Nursing Home 17 Sunrise Dr Oswego (315) 342-4790 120 117 17 96 4 .13 7.2 SW Oswego Hospital* 110 w 6th St Oswego (315) 349-5526 100. 65 55 7 3 13 6.9 SW Pontiac Terrace Apts *225w1st st Oswego {315) 342c110l
- 80 80 72 8 0 .15: 8.9 . ESE Fravor Rd IRA 43 Fravor Rd Mexico (315) 963-3995 10 9 7 2 0 16 9.7 ESE Parkview Manor Apts 3313 Main St Mexico (315) 343-3167 24 24 23 1 0 17 ESE . Sabill Drive IRA 9 Sabill Dr Mexico (315) 963-8529 6 6 5 1 0 20 8.9 SSW Springside at Seneca Hill 10 CR45A Oswego . (315) 343-5658 75 75 . 74 1 0 20 9.0 SSW The Manor at Seneca Hill 20 Manor Dr Oswego (315) 349-5300 120 116 0 116 0 ... 21 SSW 12 Schu ler St Oswego (315) 343-2513 38
- 9.1 Minetto Senior Housing 38 . 37 1 0 . " ... .. 1 *:.t 4n:,j'""" ... .*. t:* . TOTltll:* . ..
- NMP/JAF E-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time.Estimate February 24, 2016 Table E-3. Major Employers within the EPZ Distance Di rec-Employees % Non-Employees ERPA (miles) ti on Facility Name Street Address Municipality Phone (max shift) EPZ (Non EPZ) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear 1 0.0 N/A Power Plant 268Lake Rd Oswego (315) 342-3840 450 57% 257 1 . 0.0. N/A *Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Lake Rd Oswego (315) 343-2i10 724 60% 434 6 3,1 SW Novelis Corporation 448CR1A Oswego (315) 342:0039 454 35% 159 (> 4.3 SW Oswego Wire Inc. 1Wire Dr Oswego (315) 343-0524 65 52% 34 12 SW Greatlakes Veneer 375 Mitchell St Oswego (315) 342-9178 47 52% 24 . 12 5.2 SW *Lowe's Home Improvement 445.SR 104 Oswego (315) 326-5030 77 52% 40 12 6.8 SW St Luke Health Services 299 E River Rd Oswego (315) 349-0700 131 52% 68 12 5.6 SW Walmart 341SR104 Oswego (315) 342-6210 . 70 10% 7 13 7.6 SW Oswego Harbor Power LLC . 261 Washington Blvd Oswego (315) 349-2200 53 52% 28 13 8.0 SW Sunrise Residential Healthcare 17 Sunrise Dr Oswego (315) 342-4790 88 52% 46 22 8.2 SW Eagle Co Inc. 1043 CR 25 Oswego (315) 343-9464 54 52% 28 22 8.3 SW SUNY Oswego 7060SR104 Oswego (315) 312-2500 1,132 52% 589 ; ' *< ' ,, EPZ TOT AL:. 3,345 1,714 ' .. , *. "** *, , *,' ;; ... ' ' ' ' ..... * -'C:'. ""' NMP/JAF E-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016.
Table E-4. Recreational Attractions and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ 4 4.4 E Catfish Creek Fishing Camps Campground 118 Chase Drive New Haven (315) 963-7310 68 24 4 4.4 E Catfish Creek Fishing Camps Mari.na Marina 118 Chase Drive New Haven (315) 963-7310 22 18 6 3.2 SW K & G Lodge Campground 1881CR1 Oswego (315) 343-8171 242 69 '6 3.8 SW Tamarak Golf Club Golf 2021CR1 Oswego (315) 315-3426 24 16 7 6.8 E Dowie Dale Campground Campground Dowie Dale Beach Rd Mexico (315) 963-7895 670 272 7 6.8 E Dowie Dale Marina Marina Dowie Dale Beach Rd Mexico (315) 963-7895 74 62 12 6.6 SW Oswego Marina Marina 3 Basin Street Oswego (315) 342"0436 71 59 12 5.8 SW Oswego Speedway Race Track 300 E Albany St. Oswego (315) 343-3829 2,440 1,021 13 7.2 SW Oswego Country Club Golf 610 W 1st Street Oswego (315) 343-4664 35 23 13 6.9 SW Oswego International Marina Marina 19 Lake Street Oswego (315) 343-0086 84 70 13 6.9 SW Wright's Landing Marina Marina Lake Street Oswego (315) 342-8186 191 160 14 10.9 E Bears Sleepy Hollow State Park Campground 7065 SR 3 Pulaski (315) 298-5560 121 43 14 10.3 E Chedmardo Campsite Campground 110 Patrick Dr Pulaski (315) 298-5739 188 75 14 10.9 E Selkirk Shores State Park Campground 7101SR3 Pulaski (315) 298-5737 34 11 15 7.7 E Mexico Point State Boat Launch Marina 245 CR 40 Mexico (315) 963-3656 66 55 15 8.0 E Mike's Marina Sales & Service Marina 266 SR 1048 Mexico (315) 963-3119 131 110 15 8.0 E Mike's Marina Sales & Service Campground 266 SR .1048 Mexico (315) 963-3119 10 3 Salmon Country Inc. Marina & 58 Mexico Point Dr 15 7.8 E Campground Campground West Mexico (315) 963-8049 102 36 Salmon Country Inc. Marina & 58 Mexico Point Dr 15 7.8 E Campground Marina West Mexico (315) 963-8049 109 91 15 7.6 E Yellow Rose Campground Campground 159 Ladd Rd Mexico (315) 963-2060 38 15 15 8.1 ESE Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Campground 601CR16 Mexico (315) 963-7096 300 105 15 8.0 ESE Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Marina 601CR16 Mexico (315) 963-7096 22 18 22 8.0 SW SUNY Oswego5 Commuter College 7060SR104 Oswego (315) 312-2500 2,349 2,155 . >er. ,, r "'.;rY:,,r r'Lr '. ... **. 11*:*:1;:., : *: .I, ' ,; .; ;llf"' 6?1* " r" .. r* EPZ TOTAL: , i \i"' <;,\'., ,"'" ., '7,391 4,511 5 See Section 3.1.1 for details on SUNY Oswego. NMP/JAF E-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 . Table E-5. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ Distance Di rec-ERPA ' (miles) ti on Facility Name Street Address Municipality Phone Transients Vehicles 5 3.9 s All Seasons Motel 5422SR104 Oswego (315) 342-9771 54 21 7 5.2 *. ESE ,* Sticks Sports Bar/Grill and Motel
- 3738 CR 6 New Haven (315) 963-3084 40 20 10 3.6 SSE Evergreen Motel 5047 SR 104 Oswego (315) 343-6880 32 24 12 6.7 SW Best Western Captain's Quarters
- 26 E 1st St Oswego (315) 342-4040 200 109 12 5.9 SW Holiday Inn' Express6 E 13th St & SR 104E . Oswego N/A 180 88 ,' 12 5.9 SW Knights Inn 101SR104E Oswego (315) 343-3136 135 44 12 6.2 SW Oswego Inn 180 ElOth St Oswego (315) 342-6200 30 13 12 6.7 SW Quality Inn and Suites 70E1st St Oswego (315) 343-1600 200 92 13 . SW Beacon Hotel 75 W Bridge St Oswego (315) 343-3300 42 14 13 8.0 ' SW The Thomas Inn 309 W Seneca St Oswego (315) 343-4900 100 71 ' 14 . '11.3 ENE **Port Lodge Motel 7351 SR3 Pulaski (315) 298-6876 91 45 .. . * .*.,r* *::z;L;,.,v: .* ;::r1.*;:*' .' * . : *.* *:' ',; . . .. ... ,, . .. .. . .. :;*. * . ... . .. .;,** 'i:*** . *' ... " . f", ',<<1ke'h!:;jfa1:11)-m@!Jti>ht ""i"11l4 ,, '"f"'i!!" ,7 :<< t .. . 0* EPZTOTAL: .541 ... " *. . .... . .... . ... *. ....... ... I , . . N/A =Not Available Table E-6. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ ** EPZ.TOJAL: 6 See Section 3.3 for details on the Holiday Inn Express, opening in mid-2016. NMP/JAF E-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate Februa,.Y 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Schools and Preschools within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ 0 28 "'-."' 29 2 <'.: 7 \ See Figure E-2 Legend NMP/JAF ,! School Mexico Hgh School Preschool/Day Camp 9 Mexico Berrentary School 10 Mexico Mddle School ' -_ ,1 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings 11 New Haven Berrentary School t:;J ERPA 12 Palermo Berrentary School 38 School Age Oiildren Care Program 105 Ontario Bible Conference Shadow Region 168 Center for Instructional Technology and Innovation (Oswego County BOCES) Figure E-1. Schools, Preschools and Day Camp within the EPZ E-7 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Schools within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ i.<Jk') Ontar;o 28 \ ii < ** , i l Rd : \ 22 Legend
- NMP/JAF (El Pre-School ! School I'_ 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings 0 ERPA Shadow Region "*, ,Copyright: ESRI / , ', Energy,-1Entergy \ 6 5 10 A 12 63 (El Map No.
- Facility Name 1 Oswego High School (.'\,, 2 Oswego Mddle School r , 4 Fitzhugh Park 8errentary School \i\1 ': 6 Kingsford Park 8errentary __ 13 OswegoCommunrty Christian School 53 Children's Center of SUNY Oswego 63 Little Luke's Childcare Center 14 7 Charles E Riley 8errentary 148 Frederick Leighton 8errentary School 152 Trinity Catholic School 155 Heads tart of Oswego 157 Oswego YMCA School's Out A-ogram 165 SUNY Oswego Io 2 I . *****====********-Miles Figure E-2. Schools and Preschools within the City of Oswego NMP/JAF E-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Medical Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ Map No.* Facility Name 16 Os w ego Hospital 132 Bishop Commons at St Luke's 133 Fravor Rd IRA 134 Ladies Horre of Oswego 135 Oswego Hospital Behavioral Health Services 136 R:mtiac Terrace Apts '""*"'\ 29 137 SabiU Drive IRA I 138 The Manor at Seneca HU / 27 \. 139 Sirreon-Dewitt Apts. 26 <{ $"' 140 St Luke Health Services "' 141 Morning Star Nursing Horre 142 Valehaven 1-brre for Adults 143 Fbntiac Nursing Horre 144 Springside at Seneca HU 145 Parkview Manor Apts \ \ Legend
- NMP/JAF r:J Hospital
- Medical Facility (' -_ .) 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings GJ ERPA Shadow Region Figure E-3. Medical Facilities within the EPZ NMP/JAF E-9 Evacuation Time Estimate /( Pm:ish 135 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
- NMP/JAF -illiit Major Employer I' -_ ./ 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings GJ ERPA Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate 127 Low e's Herre lrrproverrent 166 i Nine Mle Fbint Nuclear Station 167 i Novelis O:>rporation 10 ******c====:::i************Miles Figure E-4. Major Employers within the EPZ E-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 5 Recreational Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ 17 Salrron Country Inc. Marina & Carrpground s 18 IVexico A>int State Boat Launch 20 Oswego International Marina 22 Wright's Landing Marina 23 Salrron Country Inc. Marina & Carrpground 24 Oswego Marina 79 Oswego Speedway 85 Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park 87 Catfish 0-eek Fishing Carrps 88 I Catfish Oeek Fishing Carrps Marina 93 ())w ie O.ie Carrpground 94 ())w ie O.ie Marina 96 Mkes Marina Sales & Service 97 Mke's Marina Sales & Service 98 Selkirk Shores State Park 100 Yellow Rose Carrpground 101 Bears Sleepy 1-bllow State Park 102 Oiedrrardo Carrpsite 103 K & G Lodge 165 SUNY Oswego 169 Oswego Country Oub 170 I Tarrarak Golf Oub Legend * ' ,. L ( -.. __. 0 NMP/JAf Campground Golf Marina Speedway School 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings ERPA Shadow Region r 3' , />*: ' , ' , ' .,_.., r-"_,, ,, ; ' Due 9/7/2013_ , S,,opyn1ht: ESR,I OaQ .J .. KlD,En1ineeri,ng, Entergy Lake On:/ " I ( \ ., 10 ******=====:::11***********Miles Figure E-5. Recreational Facilities and Commuter Colleges within the EPZ NMP/JAF E-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Lodging Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & NMP/JAF / I v \ NMP/JAF Lodging I'_ -,I 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings 0 ERPA Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate 28 !Ai\eS Y'o' 26 La Onta I ,, ., .. f ( \ "' .. . ,*7 \ 1/25/2016 y 1 I )' or-J
- COPYl"ighr: ESRI BHem1p Dita / KLD E11elon Entergy 29 Figure E-6. Lodging Facilities within the EPZ E-12 29 30 31 32 80 81 84 90 171 Oswego Inn Beacon Hotel Best Western Captain's Quarters All Seasons Motel The Thorres Inn Knights Inn Quality Inn and Suites E/ergreen Motel R>rt Lodge Motel Sticks Sports Bar/Grin and Motel ft>liday Inn Express 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Correctional Facilities within the Nine Mile Point & James A. FitzPatrick EPZ NMP/JAF Correctional Facility I' -_ ,1 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings ERPA Shadow Region ' ' /' Figure E-7. Correctional Facilities within the EPZ NMP/JAF E-13 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIX F Telephone Survey F. TELEPHONE SURVEY F;1 Introduction The development of evacuation time estimates for the NMP/JAF EPZ requires the identification of travel patterns, car ownership and household size of th.e population within the EPZ.
- Demographic information can be obtained from Census data. The use of this data has several limitations when applied to emergency planning. First, the Census data does not encompass the range of information needed to identify the time required for preliminary activities (mobilization) that must be undertaken prior to evacuating the area. Secondly, Census data does not contain attitudinal responses needed from the population of the EPZ and consequently may not accurately represent the anticipated behavioral characteristics of the evacuating populace. These concerns are addressed by conducting a telephone survey of a representative sample of the EPZ population. The survey is designed to elicit information from the public concerning family demographics and estimates of response times to well defined events. The design of the survey includes a limited number of questions of the form"What would you do if ... ?" and other questions regarding activities with which the respondent is familiar ("How long does it take you to ... ?") NMP/JAP F-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 F.2 Survey Instrument and Sampling Plan Attachment A presents the final survey instrument used in this study. Following the completion of the instrument, a sampling plan was developed. A sample size of approximately 500 completed survey forms yields results with a sampling error of +/-4.5% at the 95% confidence level. The sample must be drawn from the EPZ population. Consequently, a list of zip codes in the EPZ was developed using GIS software. This list is shown in Table F-1. Along with each zip code, an estimate of the population and number of households in each area was determined by overlaying Census data and the EPZ boundary, again using GIS software. The proportional number of desired completed survey interviews for each area was identified, as shown in Table F-1. Note that the average household size computed in Table F-1 was an estimate for sampling purposes and was not used in the ETE study. The completed survey adhered to the sampling plan. The survey discussed herein was performed in 2012 for the Development of Evacuation Time Estimates Technical Report -KLD TR -521, dated November 2012 . .The EPZ population has decreased by about 1.11 percent (an estimated 464 people) between 2012, when the survey was conducted, and 2015. As such, demographics within the EPZ have not significantly changed since 2012 and consequently, the use of the 2012 telephone results can be justified on this basis. Table F-1. NMP/JAF Telephone Survey Sampling Plan Population within Required Zip Code .EPZ (2010) Househalds Sample 13036 84 36 1 13069. 1,640 621 20 13114 5;465 2,096 68 *13126 *34,515 . 12,620 408 13142 183 78 3 Average Household Size: 2.52 Total Sample Required: 500 The preliminary .determination of Whether a household was 16cated insi9e the EPZ was based on telephone listings with street Telephone surveys were then conducted using those numbers, seleded in random order; until the target level of surveys was completed, or the entire calling list was exhausted. or households outside the EPZ . were discarded; _Numbers with "no ahswer" were re-cycled up to ten attempts in different
- time windows . . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time E_stimate F KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 F.3 Survey Results The results of the survey fall into two categories. First, the household demographics of the area can be identified. Demographic information includes such factors as household size, automobile ownership, and automobile availability. The distributions of the time to perform certain evacuation activities are the second category of survey results. These data are processed to develop the trip generation distributions used in the evacuation modeling effort, as discussed in Section 5. A review of the survey instrument reveals that several questions have a "don't know" (DK) or "refused" entry for a response. It is accepted practice in conducting surveys of this type to accept the answers of a respondent who offers a DK response for a few questions or who refuses to answer a few questions. To address the issue of occasional DK/refused responses from a large sample, the practice is to assume that the distribution of these responses is the same as the underlying distribution of the positive responses. In effect, the DK/refused responses are ignored and the distributions are based upon the positive data that is acquired. F.3.1 Household Demographic Results Household Size Figure F-1 presents the distribution of household size within the EPZ. The average household contains 2.39 people. The estimated household size (2.52 persons) used to determine the survey sample (Table F-1) was drawn from 2010 Census data. The close agreement between the average household size obtained from the survey and from the Census is an indication of the reliability of the survey. NMP/JAF 50% Ill 40% ..c Cl) g 30% :I: . -. 2 20% c Cl) u 10% c.. 0% Evacuation Time Estimate 1 Household Size 2 3 People 4 Figure F-1. Household Size in the EPZ F-3 5+ KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 ---------------------------
Automobile Ownership The average number of automobiles available per household in the EPZ is 1.81. It should be noted that approximately 6.6 percent of households do not have access t9 an automobile. The distribution of automobile ownership is presented in Figure F-2. Figure F-3 and Figure F-4 present the automobile availability by household size. Note that the majority of households without access to a car are single person households. As expected, nearly all households of 2 or more people have access to at least one vehicle. . NMP/JAF 50% "' ::!:! 40% 0 .c Qj 30% 0 J: -2 20% c Qj u Qi 10% c.. 0% Evacuation Time Estimate 0 Vehicle Availability 1 2 Vehicles 3 Figure F-2. Household Vehicle Availability F-4 4+ KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF "' "1::J 100% 0 80% ..c Cll "' 5 60% :J: -0 40% .... c Cll 20% Cll Cl. "' "1::J 0 ..c Cll "' :::J 0 :J: -0 .... c Cll u ... Cll Cl. 0% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Evacuation Time Estimate Distribution of Vehicles by HH Size 1-5 Person Households
- 1 Person
- 2 People
- 3 People
- 4 People
- 5 People 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Vehicles Figure F-3. Vehicle Availability -1 to 5 Person Households Distribution of Vehicles by HH Size 6-9+ Person Households
- 6 People
- 7 People 8 People
- 9+ People 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Vehicles Figure F-4. Vehicle Availability -6 to 9+ Person Households F-5 9+ 9+ KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Ridesharing 89% of the households surveyed who do not own a vehicle responded that they would share a ride with a neighbor, relative, or friend if a car was not available to them when advised to evacuate in the event of an emergency. Note, however, that only those households with no access to a vehicle or refused to answer the question regarding vehicle availability -28 total responses were gathered out of the sample size of 500 -answered this question. Thus, the results are not statistically significant. As such, the NRC recommendation of 50% ridesharing is used throughout this study. Figure F-5 presents this response. Rideshare with Neighbor/Friend 100% "' 80% "C 0 ..c Cl.I "' 60% :::J 0 ::c .... 0 40% .... c Cl.I u ... Cl.I c.. 20% 0% Yes No Figure F-5. Household Ridesharing Preference NMP/JAF F-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Commuters Figure F-6 presents the distribution of the number of commuters in each household. Commuters are defined as household members who travel to work or college on a daily basis. The data shows an average of 0.98 commuters in each household in the EPZ, and 56% of households have at least one commuter. NMP/JAF 50% 40% Ci ..c QJ 30% 0 ::c: .... 20% c QJ u .... :. 10% 0% Evacuation Time Estimate Commuters Per Household 0 1 2 3 4+ Commuters Figure F-6. Commuters in Households in the EPZ F-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Commuter Travel Modes Figure F-7 presents the mode of travel that commuters use on a daily basis. The vast majority of commuters use their private automobiles to travel to work. The data shows an average of 1.09 employees per vehicle, assuming 2 people per vehicle -on average -for carpools. Commuter Evacuation Response 100% 80% "' ... Cll .. :J 60% E E 0 u .... 0 40% .. c Cll u ... Cll . c.. 20% 0% Bus Walk/Bike Drive Alone Carpool (2+) Figure F-7. Modes of Travel in the EPZ F.3.2 Evacuation Response Several questions were asked to gauge the population's response to an emergency. These are now discussed: "How many of the vehicles would your household use during an evacuation?" The response is shown in Figure F-8. On average, evacuating households would use 1.24 vehicles. "Would your family await the return of other family members prior to evacuating the area?" Of the survey participants who responded, 45 percent said they would await the return of other family members before evacuating and 55 percent indicated that they would not await the return of other family members. "If you had a household pet, would you take your pet with you if you were asked to evacuate the area?" Based on the responsesfrom the survey, 77 percent of households do have a family pet. Of the households with pets, 94 percent of them indicated that they would take their pets, as shown in Figure F-9. NMP/JAF F-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Evacuating Vehicles Per Household 100% 80% Ill "ti 0 .c* Cl.I 60% Ill :I 0 ::c .... 40% 0 .... c Cl.I u .... Cl.I 20% a.. 0% 0 1 2 3+ Vehicles Figure F-8. Evacuating Vehicles per Household Households Evacuating with Pets 100% Ill 80% "ti 0 .c Cl.I Ill 60% :I 0 ::c .... 0 40% .... c Cl.I u ... Cl.I 20% a.. 0% Yes No Figure F-9. Households Evacuating with Pets . NMP/JAF F-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016.
. "Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home in an emergency. Would you?" This question is designed to elicit information regarding compliance with instructions to shelter in place. The results indicate that 79 percent of households who are advised to shelter in place would do so; the remaining 21 percent would choose to evacuate the area. Note.the baseline ETE study assumes 20 percent of households will not comply with the shelter advisory, as per Section 2.5.2 of NUREG/CR-7002. Thus, the data obtained above is in good agreement with the federal guidance. "Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home now in an emergency and possibly evacuate later while people in other areas are advised to evacuate now. Would you?" This question is designed to elicit information specifically related to the possibility of a staged evacuation. That is, asking a population to shelter in place now and then to evacuate after a specified period of time. Results indicate that 70 percent of households would follow instructions and delay the start of evacuation until so advised, while the balance of 30 percent would choose to begin evacuating immediately. F.3.3 Time Distribution Results The survey asked several questions about the amount of time it takes to perform certain evacuation activities. These activities involve actions taken by residents during the course of . their day-to-day lives. Thus, the answers fall withiri the realni of the responder's experience. The mobilization distributions provided below are the result of having applied the analysis described in Section 5.4.1 on the component activities.of the mobilization. l\JMP/JAF F-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Eyacuation Time Estimate February 24,
"How long does it take the commuter to complete preparation for leaving work?" Figure F-10 presents the cumulative distribution; in all cases, the activity is completed by about 60 minutes. 85 percent can leave within 20 minutes. Time to Prepare to Leave Work 100% .,, .... 80% aJ .... ::i E E 60% 0 u -0 40% .... c aJ u .... 20% aJ Cl. 0% 0 10 20 30 40 so 60 Preparation Time (min) Figure F-10. Time Required to Prepare to Leave Work/School "How long would it take the commuter to travel home?" Figure F-11 presents the work to home travel time for the EPZ. About 90 percent of commuters can arrive home within about 40 minutes of leaving work; all within 90 minutes. Work to Home Travel 100% .,, .... 80% aJ .... ::i E E 60% 0 u -0 40% .... c aJ u .... 20% aJ Cl. 0% 0 20 40 60 80 Travel Time (min) Figure F-11. Work to Home Travel Time NMP/JAF F-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 "How long would it take the family to pack clothing, secure the house, and load the car?" Figure F-12 presents the time required to prepare for leaving on an evacuation trip. In many ways this activity mimics a family's preparation for a short holiday or weekend away from home. Hence, the responses represent the experience of the responder in performing similar activities. The distribution shown in Figure F-12 has a long "tail." About 90 percent of households can be ready to leave home within 60 minutes; the remaining households require up to an additional 75 minutes. Preparation Time with Everyone Home 100% .,, :E 80% 0 .s::. QI .,, 60% :J 0 ::c ..... 0 40% .... c QI u .. 20% QI Cl.. 0% 0 30 60 90 120 Preparation Time (min) Figure F-12. Time to Prepare Home for Evacuation NMP/JAF F-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I J "How long would it take you to clear 6 to 8 inches of snow from your driveway?" During adverse, snowy weather conditions, an additional activity must be performed before residents can depart on the evacuation trip. Although snow scenarios assume that the roads and highways. have been plowed and are passable (albeit at lower speeds and capacities), it may be necessary to clear a private driveway prior to leaving the home so that the vehicle can access the street. Figure F-13 presents the time distribution for removing 6 to 8 inches of snow from a driveway. The time distribution for clearing the driveway has a long tail; about 90 percent of driveways are passable within 45 minutes. The last driveway is cleared 150 minutes after the start of this activity. Note that those respondents (53%) who answered that they would not take time to clear their driveway were assumed to be ready immediately at the start of this activity. Essentially they would drive through the snow on the driveway to access the roadway and begin their evacuation trip. Time to Remove Snow from Driveway._ 100% BO% UI "D 0 .s::: Cl.I 60% UI :J 0 :I: ...,;...' ., 0 .... 40% c Cl.I u ... Cl.I Cl. 20% 0% 0 ' 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 . Time (min) Figure F-13. Time to Clear-Driveway of 611-811 of Snow F.4 Conclusions The telephone su'rvey provides relevant data associated with the EPZ. population, which have been used t6 quantify demographics specific to the EPZ, and "mobilization time" which can iri-fluence evacuation.time estimates. -NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate -* KLD Engineering, P.C. __ February 24, 2016 ATTACHMENT A Telephone Survey Instrument NMP/JAF F-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Telephone Survey Instrument Hello, my name is and I'm working on a survey for your county emergency management agency to identify local behavior during emergency situations. This information will be used for emergency planning and will be shared with local officials to enhance emergency response plans in your area for all hazards; emergency planning for some hazards may require evacuation. Your responses will greatly contribute to local emergency preparedness. I will not ask for your name or any personal information, and the survey will take less than 10 minutes to complete. COL. 1 COL. 2 COL. 3 COL. 4 COL. 5 Sex Unused Unused Unused Unused Unused COL. 8 1 Male 2 Female INTERVIEWER: ASK TO SPEAK TO THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OR THE SPOUSE OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD. (Terminate call if not a residence.) DO NOT ASK: lA. Record area code. To Be Determined lB. Record exchange number. To Be Determined 2. What is your home zip code? 3A. In total, how many running cars, or other vehicles are usually available to the household? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) 3B. In an.emergency, could you get a ride out of the area with a neighbor or friend? 4. How many people usually live in this household? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate COL. 9-11 COL. 12-14 COL. 15-19 COL. 20 SKIP TO 1 ONE Q.4 2 TWO Q.4 3 THREE Q.4 4 FOUR Q.4 5 FIVE Q.4 6 SIX Q.4 7 SEVEN Q.4 8 EIGHT Q.4 9 NINE OR MORE Q.4 0 ZERO (NONE) .Q. 3B x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED Q.3B COL.21 1 YES 2 NO x DON'T KNOW/REFUSED COL. 22 COL. 23 1 ONE 2 TWO 3 THREE 4 FOUR 5 FIVE 6 SIX F-15 0 1 2 3 4 5 TEN ELEVEN TWELVE THIRTEEN FOURTEEN FIFTEEN KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016
- 5. How many drivers in the household commute to a job, or to college on a daily basis? 7 SEVEN 8 EIGHT 9 NINE COL. 24 0 ZERO 6 SIXTEEN 7 SEVENTEEN 8 EIGHTEEN 9 NINETEEN OR MORE X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED SKIP TO Q.9 1 ONE Q. 6 2 TWO Q. 6 3 THREE Q. 6 4 FOUR OR MORE Q. 6 5 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED Q. 9 INTERVIEWER: For each person identified in Question 5, ask Questions 6, 7, and 8, 6. Thinking about commuter #1, how does that person usually travel to work or college? (REPEAT QUESTION FOR EACH COMMUTER) Commuter#l Commuter#2 Commuter#3 Commuter#4 COL. 25 COL. 26 COL. 27 COL. 28 Rail 1 1 1 1 Bus 2 2 2 2 Walk/Bicycle 3 3 3 3 Drive Alone 4 4 4 4 Carpool-2 or more people 5 5 5 5 Don't know/Refused 6 6 6 6 7. How much time.on average, would it take Commuter #1 to travel home from work or college? (REPEAT QUESTION FOR EACH COMMUTER) (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) COMMUTER#l COMMUTER#2 COL. 29 COL. 30 COL. 31 COL. 32 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT OVER 1 HOUR, BUT 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1HOUR15 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1 HOUR MINUTES 15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 30 MINUTES HOUR 30 MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR31 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 6 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 6 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 45 MINUTES HOUR 45 MINUTES . NMP/JAF . F-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation _Time E_stimate February 24; 2016 BETWEEN 1HOUR46 BETWEEN 1HOUR46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS (SPECIFY __ ) (SPECIFY __ ) 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 0 0 x DON'T KNOW x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED /REFUSED NMP/JAF F-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 COMMUTER#3 COMMUTER#4 COL. 33 COL. 34 COL. 35 COL. 36 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT OVER 1 HOUR, BUT 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 -LESS THAN 1 HOUR 15 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1 HOUR MINUTES 15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 30 MINUTES HOUR 30 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 BETWEEN 1HOUR31 6 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 6 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 45 MINUTES HOUR 45 MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR46 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS (SPECIFY __ ) (SPECIFY __ ) 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 0 0 x DON'T KNOW x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED */REFUSED 8. Approximately how much time does it take Commuter #1 to complete preparation for leaving work or college prior to starting the trip home? (REPEAT QUESTION FOR EACH COMMUTER) (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) COMMUTER#l COL. 37 COL. 38 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT. 4. 16-20MINUTES 4 LESSTHAN lHOUR 15 .MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR16 -5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR -30 MINUTES BETWEEN-i HOUR 31 6 26-30MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 45MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS _(SPECIFY_-___ ) 9-41-45 MINUTES 9 .o NMP/JAF F-18 Evacuation Time Estimate _ COMMUTER#2 COL. 39 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 2 6-10 MINUTES 3 _ 11-15 MINUTES 4 16-20 MINUTES 5 MINUTES 6 26-30 MINUTES 7 31-35 MINUTES 8 36-40 MINUTES 9 MINUTES COL. 40 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 46-50 MINUTES 51-55 MINUTES 56-1 HOUR OVER 1 HOUR, BUT LESS THAN 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 MINUTES AND 1 -HOUR 30 MINUTES -. BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 45 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 MINUTES AN_D 2 HOURS OVER2 HOURS (SPECIFY __ ) KLD Engineering, P.C. ' February 24, 2016
x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED COMMUTER#3 COMMUTER#4 COL. 41 COL. 42 COL. 43 COL. 44 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 1 5 MINUTES OR LESS 1 46-50 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 2 6-10 MINUTES 2 51-55 MINUTES 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR 3 11-15 MINUTES 3 56-1 HOUR -OVER 1 HOUR, BUT OVER 1 HOUR, BUT LESS 4 16-20 MINUTES 4 LESS THAN 1 HOUR 15 4 MINUTES 4 MINUTES THAN 1HOUR15 MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 16 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 5 21-25 MINUTES 5 MINUTES AND 1HOUR30 30 MINUTES MINUTES BETWEEN 1HOUR31 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 31 6 -26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1 HOUR 6
- 26-30 MINUTES 6 MINUTES AND 1HOUR45 45 MINUTES MINUTES BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 BETWEEN 1 HOUR 46 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 7 31-35 MINUTES 7 MINUTES AND 2 HOURS HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS 8 36-40 MINUTES 8 OVER 2 HOURS {SPECIFY (SPECIFY __ ) __ ) 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 9 41-45 MINUTES 9 0 0 x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED x DON'T KNOW /REFUSED
- 9. If you were_ advised by local authorities to evacuate, how much time would it take the household to pack clothing, medications, secure the house, load the car, and complete preparations prior to evacuating the area? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) OOL.% 1 LESS THAN 15 MINUTES 1 3 HOURS TO 3 HOURS 15 MINUTES. 2 15-30 MINUTES 2 3 HOURS 16 MINUTESTO 3 HOURS 30 MINUTES 3 31-45 MINUTES 3 3 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 3 HOURS 45 MINUTES 4* 46.MINUTES-1 HOUR 4 3 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 4 HOURS 5 1 HOUR TO 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES 5 4 HOURS TO 4 HOURS 15 MINUTES 6 1HOUR16 MINUTES TO 1HOUR30 MINUTES 6 4 HOURS 16 MINUTES TO 4 HOURS 30 MINUTES 7 1HOUR31 MINUTES TO 1HOUR45 MINUTES 7 4 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 4HOURS 45 MINUTES 8
- 1HOUR46 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 8 4 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 5 HOURS 9 2 HOURS TO 2 HOURS 15 MINUTES 9 5 HOURS TO 5 HOURS 30 MINUTES 0 2 HOURS 16 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 30 MINUTES 0 5 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 6 HOURS x 2 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 45 MINUTES x OVER 6 HOURS (SPECIFY y 2 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 3 HOURS z WILL NOT EVACUATE_ (Optional response) COL. 47 1 DONTKNOW/REFUSED NMP/JAF. F-19 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 10 If there is 6-8" of snow on your driveway or curb, would you need to shovel out to evacuate? If yes, how much time, on average, would it take you to clear the 6-8" of snow to move the car from the driveway or curb to begin the evacuation trip? Assume the roads are passable. (DO NOT READ RESPONSES) COL. 48 COL. 49 1 LESS THAN 15 MINUTES 1 OVER 3 HOURS (SPECIFY __ _ 2 15-30 MINUTES 3 31-45 MINUTES 4 46 MINUTES-1 HOUR 5 1 HOUR TO 1HOUR15 MINUTES 6 1HOUR16 MINUTES TO 1 HOUR 30 MINUTES 7 1HOUR31MINUTESTO1HOUR45 MINUTES 8 1HOUR46 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 9 2 HOURS TO 2 HOURS 15 MINUTES 0 2 HOURS 16 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 30 MINUTES x 2 HOURS 31 MINUTES TO 2 HOURS 45 MINUTES y 2 HOURS 46 MINUTES TO 3 HOURS z NO, WILL NOT SHOVEL OUT 11. Please choose one of the following (READ ANSWERS): A. I would await the return of household commuters to evacuate together. B. I would evacuate independently and meet other household members later. 2 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED COL. 50 1 A 2 B x DON'T KNOW/REFUSED 12. How many vehicles would your household use during an evacuation? (DO NOT READ ANSWERS) COL. 51 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *8 9 0 x NMP/JAF F-20 Evacuation Time Estimate
- ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN EIGHT NINE OR MORE ZERO (NONE) DON'T KNOW/REFUSED KLD Engineering, P.C February24, 2016 13A. Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home in an emergency. Would you: (READ ANSWERS) 13B. A. SHELTER; or B. EVACUATE Emergency officials advise you to take shelter at home now in an emergency and possibly evacuate later while people in other areas are advised to evacuate now. Would you: (READ ANSWERS) A. SHELTER; or B. EVACUATE COL. 52 1 A 2 B X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED COL. 53 1 A 2 B X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED 14. If you have a household pet, would you take your pet with you if you were asked to evacuate the area? (READ ANSWERS) COL. 54 1 DON'T HAVE A PET 2 YES 3 NO X DON'T KNOW/REFUSED Thank you very much.-------------(TELEPHONE NUMBER CALLED) IF REQUESTED: For additional information, contact your County Emergency Management Agency during normal business hours. County EMA Phone Oswego 1-800-962-2792 NMP/JAF F-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 APPENDIX G Traffic Management Plan
. -------G. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLAN NUREG/CR-7002 indicates that the existing TCPs and ACPs identified by the offsite agencies should be used in the evacuation simulation modeling. The traffic and access control plans for the EPZ were provided by Oswego County. These planswere reviewed and the TCPs were modeled accordingly. G.1 Traffic Control Points As discussed in 9, traffic control points at intersections (which are controlled) are modeled as actuated signals. If an intersection has a pre-timed signal, stop, or yield control, and the intersection is identified as a traffic control point, the control type was changed to an actuated signal in the DYNEV II system. Table K-2 provides the control type and node number for those nodes which are controlled. If the existing control was changed due to the point being a Traffic Control Point, the control type is indicated as "TCP-Actuated" or "TCP-Uncontrolled" in Table K-2. The TCPs within the study area are mapped in Figure G-1. G.2 Access Control Points It is assumed that Access Control Points (ACPs), also known as TCPs to Prohibit EPZ Ingress, will be established within 2 hours of the advisory to evacuate to discourage through travelers from using major through routes which traverse the EPZ. In this analysis, as discussed in Section 3.6,. external traffic was considered on the major through rqute which traverses the study area, 1-81. In the simulation, the generation of the external trips on 1-81 ceased at 2 hours after the advisory to evacuate due to the ACPs. Figure G-1 maps the ACPs identified in the county *emergency plans. These ACPS are concentrated on roadways giving access to the EPZ. Theses ACPs would be* manned during evacuation by traffic guides who would direct evacuees in the proper direction away from NMP/JAF and facilitate the flow of traffic through the intersections. This study did not identify any additional that should be identified as TCPs or ACPs. . -.. **, NMP/JAF Evacuation *Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 I Traffic and Access Control Points I NMP/JAF Lake Ontano Legend
- NMP/JAF Traffic Control Point
- Access Control Point (jl ERPA I '-/ 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings , ' Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate I I /, / / I / / Lake Ontano Figure G-1. Traffic and Access Control Points for NMP/JAF G-2 / / / 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIX H Evacuation Regions H EVACUATION REGIONS This appendix presents the evacuation percentages for each Evacuation Region (Table H-1) and maps of all Evacuation Regions (Figure H-1 through Figure H-29). The percentages presented in Table H-1 are based on the methodology discussed in assumption 5 of Section 2.2 and shown in Figure 2-1. Note the baseline ETE study assumes 20 percent of households will not comply with the shelter advisory, as per Section 2.5.2 of NUREG/CR-7002. NMP/JAF H-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Region Desaiption ROl 2-Mile Radius ROZ 5-Mile Radius R03 Full EPZ Region Wind Direction From N/A R04 ROS R06 R07 ROS R09 RlO E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW w WNW NW, NNW N NNE NE ENE Region Wind Direction From R11 E, ESE, SE Rl2 SSE,S, SSW Rl3 SW Rl4 WSW RlS w R16 WNW R17 NW RIB NNW R19 N R20 NNE, NE R21 ENE Region Wind Direction From N/A R22 R23 R24 R25 R26 R27 R28 R29 E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW w WNW NW, NNW N NNE NE ENE 5-Mile Radius Evacuation Time Estimate Table H-1. Percent of Sub-Area Population Evacuating for Each Region ERPA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 I 1003 10031 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 ERPA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Refer to ROl 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 I 1003 1003 203 I 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 ! 1003 1003 203 I 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 I 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 203 203 ERPA 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 1003 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 1003 1003 100311003 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% f 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% I 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 100% 100% 100% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 1003 1003 203 203 1003 1003 1003 203 1003 1003 100% 20% 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 29 Refer to ROl 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 203 1003 100% 203 203 20% 203 203 203 20% 20% 203 20% 203 203 203 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 20% 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 100% 1003 203 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 203 20% 20% 20% 100% 100% 20% I 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 203 20% 203 20% 20% 203 20% 203 203 100% 1003 203 20% ERPA Shetter-in-Place H-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \..-:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-1. Region ROl H-3 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate 1... _.,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 1 Date: 1/8/2016 Copyright: KtD Engineering, Generation, Enrer1v 10 Figure H-2. Region R02 H-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF ERPA 23, 24 & 25 Evacuate Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miies Figure H-3. Region R03 H-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '--:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miles Figure H-4. Region R04 H-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF I Region Ros I Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_., 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miles Figure H-5. Region ROS H-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF I Region ROG I Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 'l D*te: 1/8/'2016 ESRl 9ata and Maps 2014 l<LD£nglneerlng.helot1Generttlon,Entergy Figure H-6. Region ROG H-8 . 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \... _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-7. Region R07 H-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate 1...--:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-8. Region ROS H-10 KLD Engineering, P .C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \. __, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate \ Date: 1/8/2016 Copyrigh1; ESRI 9a1aandM1ps2014 KLDfnglneer!ng,EwelonGeneratlon.Entergv Miles Figure H-9. Region R09 H-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '--:, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '] Otte: 1/8/2016 KlOfnglneerlng,ExelonGenerttlon,Entergy I ERPA: 29 / ----Figure H-10. Region RlO H-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate I LV'>t'>'VXY'[/ vv....,v<<,,, // '\ Date: l/8/2016 ESRI Data and Maps 2014 KLD£ngin'eerin{.£Q!!onGeneratlon,Entergy Figure H-11 Region Rll H-13 Miles KLD Engineering, P,C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_., 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 'l Date: 1/8/2016 Copyright':ESRIDataarn:IMaps2014 KLO Exelon Generation, En!Hgy 10 Figure H-12 Region Rl2 H-14 KLD Engineering, P .C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \..-:::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-13 Region R13 H-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '\ 01te; lfB/2016 IClOEng!neerlng.EJGelonGener1tlon,Entergy Miles Figure H-14 Region R14 H-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 1 Date: 1/8/2016 Copyright': ESRID1t111'1dMaps2014 KLO Engirteerrri' E11tlon Getier1tlol'I, Entergy Figure H-15 Region RlS H-17 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_,, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings ---Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate *1 Date* 1/8/2016 ESRI and Map5 2014 KLDEnglnnrlng.[)(elonGener1tlon,Entergy 10 Figure H-16 Region R16 H-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. __, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate l Date: 1/8/2016 Copvrlght: £SRI D*ta Ind M1ps 2014 KLD £1111ri'eerin[ htlol'I Genet1tlol'I, E111ergv 10 Figure H-17 Region R17 H-19 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF GJ ERPA Evacuate \..--:::. 2* S, 10 Mile R. mgs NMP/JAF F;gu*e H-18 R . Evacuat;on r egoon R18 H-20 ime Estimate KLD E
- ngmeering p c February 24, NMP/JAF ERPA 23, 24 & 25 Evacuate Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-.; 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Miles Figure H-19 Region R19 H-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF ERPA 23, 24 & 25 Evacuate Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate '-_,. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '\ Copyr!gh1': ESRI Data and Maps 2014 KLO helon Gener11lon, Eniergv Figure H-20 Region R20 H-22 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF ERPA 23 Evacuates Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate \.. _, 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate ---10 Figure H-21 Region R21 H-23 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate t -::::. 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-22 Region R22 H-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate ( -::::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-23 Region R23 H-25 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate { -: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-24 Region R24 H-26 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate ( -:::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate l cnta 1MI M1pi 2014 l(lO Engineering, E11elon Gene,.llon. En!trgy -----i:=====:mm---------Miles Figure H-25 Region R25 H-27 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate -:::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-26 Region R26 H-28 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate -=:; 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate 10 Figure H-27 Region R27 H-29 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate <.. 21 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate Figure H-28 Region R28 H-30 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend NMP/JAF ERPA Evacuate Shelter, then Evacuate ( -:::: 2, 5, 10 Mile Rings --Sector Boundary Evacuation Time Estimate '\ O.te: tJBl2016 O.t.1 *nd M*pi 2014 KLO£nginuring.£xelonGener1tlon,£n1erav Figure H-29 Region R29 H-31 10 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIXJ Representative Inputs to and Outputs from the DYNEV II System J. REPRESENTATIVE INPUTS TO-AND OUTPUTS FROM THE DYNEV II SYSTEM This appendix presents data input to and output from the DYNEV II System. Table J-1 provides the volume and queues for the ten highest volume signalized intersections in the study area. A residual queue, existing at the start of the RED signal indication, indicates that the demand could not be entirely served by the GREEN phase. No residual queue indicates that the traffic movement is under-saturated (i.e., not congested) throughout the duration of evacuation. Refer to Table K-2 and the figures in Appendix K for a map showing the geographic location of each intersection. Table J-2 provides source (vehicle loading) and destination information for several roadway segments (links) in the analysis network: Refer to Table K-1 and the figures in Appendix K for a map showing the geographic location of each link. Table J-3 provides network-wide statistics (average travel time, average speed and number of vehicles) for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) for each scenario. As expected, Scenario 13; which is the special event, exhibits the slowest average speed and longest average travel times of all scenarios. Table J-4 provides statistics (average speed and travel time) for the major evacuation routes -SR 481, SR 104, SR 48, and .SR 3 -for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) under Scenario 1 conditions. As discussed in Section 7.3 and shown in Figures 7-3 through 7-7, SR 104 westbound and SR 481 southbound are congested for the first 3 hours of the evacuation, respectively. As such, the average speeds are comparably slower (and travel times longer) than other evacuation routes during these times. Table J-5 provides the number of vehicles discharged and the cumulative. percent of total vehicles discharged for each link exiting the analysis network, for an evacuation of the entire EPZ (Region R03) under Scenario 1 conditions. Refer to Table K-1 and the figures in Appendix K fora map showing the geographic location of each link. . .* . Figure J-1 through Figure J-14 plot the trip generation time versus the ETE for each of the 14 Scenarios considered. T.he distance between the trip generation and ETE is the travel time. Plots of trip generation versus ETE: are. indicative of the level of traffic congestion evacuation. For low population density sites, the curves are close together,, indicating short travel times and minimal traffic congestion. For higher population density sites, the curves are farther apart indicating longer travel times arid the presence of traffic congestion. As seen in Figure J-1 through Figure J-14, curves are spatially separated due to the presence o.f traffic congestionwithinOswego, which was discussed in detail ir:i Sedion .. NMP/JAF J-1 Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate .* February 24, 2016
- Table J-1. Characteristics of the Ten Highest Volume Signalized Intersections Approach Total Turn Intersection (Up Volume Queue Node Location .control Node} (Veh} 368 5,431 0 367 SR 481 and SR3 TCP -654 1,306 0 Actuated 371 2,415 0 TOTAL 9,152 42 653 1,863 1 366 SR 481 and Oneida St TCP -652 5,111 0 Actuated 651 2,069 0 TOTAL 9,043 -SR 481 and CR57 (S 1st 392 0 0 390 Actuated 393 7,569 0 St) TOTAL 7,569 42 397 1,233 3 387 SR 481 and Fay St Actuated 389 37 0 399 6,262 62 TOTAL 7,532 -530 2,221 383 TCP -521 1,474 149 511 SR 104 and Hillside Ave Actuated 533 1,205 44 546 226 10 TOTAL 2,156 42 346 2,805 91 669 1,228 77 524 W 1st St and W Utica St Actuated 539 0 0 538 2,854 46 TOTAL 6,887 -520 2,176 256 529 1,006 110 530 SR 104 and Liberty St Actuated 531. 529 13 511 2,893 157 TOTAL 6,604 -409 2,900 0 406 SR 3 and SR48 TCP-371 1,081 2 Actuated 644 2,569 0 TOTAL 6,550 -661 2,822 82 548 1,257 23 346 E 1st St and E Utica St Actuated 662 394 12 524 1,814 40 TOTAL 6,287 -526 1,885 87 689 493 80 527 SR 104 and W 5th St TCP-538 551 29 Actuated 520 3,303 178 TOTAL 6,232 -.* NMP/JAF.
- J-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table J-2. Sample Simulation Modellnput 3 I 4 I E I 8048 1,700 8282 1,575 138 I 72 I SE I 8298 6,750 8279 1,700 8282 1,575 1052 I 131 I SE I 8298 6,750 8279 1,700 8456 1,700 314 I 12 I s I 8730 1,700 8431 1,700 8431 1,700 457 I 35 I s I 8442 1,575 8391 1,575 8730 1,700 547 I 26 I s I 8431 1,700 8442 1,575 I I I 8457 1,700 645 0 SW I 8456 1,700 722 I 44 I SW I 8391 1,575 826 I 110 I SW I 8440 2,250 8457 1,700 986 I 241 I SW I 8456 1,700 8730 1,700 NMP/JAF J-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _I I I I Table J-3 .. Selected Model Outputs for the Evacuation of the Entire EPZ {Region R03} Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average* 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 5.6 2.8 Travel Time * (Min/Veh-Mi) Network-Wide Average 21.3 . 20.6 21.3 18.8 20.0 20.4 19.6 19.2 22.9 21.4 20.8 20.4 10.6 21.2 Speed (mph) Total Vehicles Exiting . 36,831 36,874 36,943 37,605 31,558 38,754* 38,922 38,716 34,657 35,088 34,630 30,702 58,473 36,680 Network NMP/JAF J-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table J-4. Average Speed (mph) and Travel Time (min) for Major Evacuation Routes (Region R03, Scenario 1) SR 481SB 7.4 15.9 28.0 5.0 88.6 22.2 20.0 57.2 7.8 SR 104 WB 9.6 11.4 50.9 10.0 57.7 43.8 13.2 44.7 12.9 SR 48 SB 6.1 33.9 10.7 26.4 13.7 46.5 7.8 48.0 7.6 SR 104 EB 10.4 48.0 12.9 47.9 13.0 47.0 13.2 49.5 12.6 SR 3 NB 4.6 42.1 6.6 5.7 49.2 5.6 50.6 5.5 NMP/JAF J-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- i. I I I i I. Table J-5. Simulation Model Outputs at Network Exit Links for Region R03, Scenario 1 27 37 so 53 66 74 85 94 360 393 397 399 543 554 588 593 631 632 637 639 ,640 . NMP/JAF ***Evacuation Time Estimate Cumulative Vehicles Discharged by the Indicated Time Cumulative Percent of Vehicles Discharged by the Indicated Time Interval 39 109 0.4% 0.5% 67 166 0.7% 0.7% 1,315 2,711 14.5% 11.6% 42 151 0.5% 0.7% 195 419 2.1% 1.8% 309 822 3.4% 3.5% 254 614 *2.8% 2.6% 110 300 1.2%. 1.3% 325 797 3.6% 3.4% 162 649 1.8% 2.8% 1,478 3,330 16.2% 14.2% 73 289 0.8% 1.2% 415 1,132 4.6% 4.8% 651 1,960 7.2% 8.4% 390 1,402 4.3%. .6.0% 224 1,002. 2.5%*' 4.3% 878 2,199 9.7% *. 9.4% 734 1,636 8.1% 7.0% -522 1,184 5.7% 5.1% ** 24 654 .0.3% 2.8% 896 1,928 9.6% 7.9% J-(i 124 0.4% 185 0.6% 3,189 9.8% 181 0.6% 472 1.5% 907 2.8% 688 2.1% 345 1.1% 894 2.8% 775 . 2.4% 3,934 12.1% 350 1.1% 2,104 6.5% 2,816 8.7% 2,174 6.7% .1,591 4.9% 3,388 10.4% i,192 . 6.7% 1,762 5.4% 1,733 5.3%' 2,745 8:1% 124 0.3% 185 b.5% 3,190 8.7% 183 0.5% 473 1.3% 909 2.5% 689 1.9% 347 0.9% 896 2.4% 780 .2.1% 3,943 10.7% 353 1.0% 2,356 6.4% 3,417 9.3% 2,566 *7.0% 1:;858 . '*5:0% 4;167 1).:3% 2;624 7.1%. 1,849 5.0% 2,028 5.5% . 3,893 10.6% KlD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 100% "' Cll :g 80% ..c Cll > (ij 60% ... 0 I-.... 40% 0 ... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 1) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-1. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 1) 100% "' Cll 80% ..c Cll > (ij 60% ... 0 I-.... 40% 0 ... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-2. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 2) NMP/JAF J-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' C1I 31 80% .s::. C1I > iQ 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c C1I 20% u .... C1I Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 3) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-3. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 3) 100% "' C1I 31 80% .s::. C1I > iQ 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c C1I 20% u .... C1I Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-4. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 4) NMP/JAF J-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% Ill ..c 80% > iii 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c 20% v ... 0.. 0% 0 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 5) -Trip Generation -ETE 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time (min) 240 270 Figure J-5. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 5) 100% Ill ..c 80% > Ill 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c 20% v ... 0.. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good (Scenario 6) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-6. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 6) NMP/JAF J-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' GJ .s::. 80% GJ > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c GJ 20% u ..... GJ Q. 0% 0 100% "' GJ .s::. 80% GJ > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c GJ 20% u ..... GJ Q. 0% 0 NMP/JAF 30 -------------ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-7. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Rain (Scenario 7) 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-8. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Midday, Snow (Scenario 8) J-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' (IJ ..c 80% (IJ > iQ 60% ... 0 I--40% 0 ... c (IJ 20% .... ... (IJ Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good (Scenario 9) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-9. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Good Weather (Scenario 9) 100% "' (IJ 80% ..c (IJ > iQ 60% ... 0 I--40% 0 ... c (IJ 20% .... ... (IJ Q. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-10. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Rain (Scenario 10) NMP/JAF J-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _J 100% "' QI ..c 80% QI > "iii 60% ... 0 ..... -40% 0 ... c QI 20% u ... QI 0.. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 Elapsed Time (min) 210 240 270 Figure J-11. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Weekend, Midday, Snow (Scenario 11) 100% "' QI 80% ..c QI > "iii 60% ... 0 ..... -40% 0 ... c QI 20% u ... QI 0.. 0% 0 30 ETE and Trip Generation Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good (Scenario 12) -Trip Generation -ETE 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time (min) 240 270 Figure J-12. ETE and Trip Generation: Winter, Midweek, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather (Scenario 12) NMP/JAF J-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 100% "' Cll u 80% :c Cll > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Cl. 0% 0 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good, Special Event (Scenario 13) -Trip Generation -ETE 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 390 420 450 480 Elapsed Time (min) Figure J-13. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Weekend, Evening, Good Weather, Special Event (Scenario 13) 100% "' Cll 80% ..c Cll > iij 60% .... 0 I--40% 0 .... c Cll 20% u ... Cll Cl. 0% 0 ETE and Trip Generation Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) -Trip Generation -ETE 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 Elapsed Time (min) 240 270 Figure J-14. ETE and Trip Generation: Summer, Midweek, Midday, Good Weather, Roadway Impact (Scenario 14) NMP/JAF J-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 APPENDIX K Evacuation Roadway Network K. EVACUATION ROADWAY NETWORK As discussed in Section 1.3, a link-node analysis network was constructed to model the roadway network within the study area. Figure K-1 provides an overview of the link-node analysis network. The figure has been divided up into 32 more detailed figures (Figure K-2 through Figure K-33) which show each of the links and nodes in the network. The analysis network was calibrated using the observations made during the field survey conducted in March 2012. Table K-1 lists the characteristics of each roadway section modeled in the ETE analysis. Each link is identified by its road name and the upstream and downstream node numbers. The geographic location of each link can be observed by referencing the grid map number provided in Table K-1. The roadway type identified in Table K-1 is generally based on the following criteria:
- Freeway: limited access highway, 2 or more lanes in each direction, high free flow speeds
- Freeway ramp: ramp on to or off of a limited access highway
- Minor arterial: 2 or more lanes in each direction
- Collector: single lane in each direction
- Local roadways: single lane in each direction, local roads with low free flow speeds The term, "No. of Lanes" Table K-1 identifies the number of lanes that extend throughout the length of the link. Many links have additional lanes on the immediate approach to an intersection (turn pockets); these have been recorded and entered into the input stream for the DYNEV II System. As discussed in Section 1.3, lane width and shoulder width were not physically measured during the road survey. Rather, estimates of these measures were based on visual observations and recorded images. Table K-2 identifies each node in the network that is controlled and the type of control (stop sign, yield sign, pre-timed signal, actuated signal, traffic control point) at that node. Uncontrolled nodes are not included in Table K-2. The location of each node can be observed by referencing the grid map number provided. NMP/JAF K-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NMP/JAF Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Node ,.. Link GJ ERPA c:.*_::: Index Grid ,-:: 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings tzZ:3 Shadow Region Evacuation Time Estimate Date:914f2012 Copyright. ESRJ Basemap Data KLO Enginetlfing, c0nstdatl0fl Energy, Entergy Figure K-1. Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick Link-Node Analysis Network K-2 Constantin 10 Miles KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 legend
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region
- Node --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings link Water 0 ERPA C":] Index Grid ; :( 0 °'1 I I Sana Pt NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-¢r* Grid 1 0.25 0.5 \ \ {---==----Miles __ <.or,...,_..,, _._.,. .. DJ0\1'-_I_,_ Figure K-2. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 1 NMP/JAF K-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures
- Node -=-2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 2 ... Link Water Q ERPA L .. J Index Grid 0.5 ---===----*Miles _,_,,. . .,.,.,u _,,_.. "'>"'"'-< ... --*-Figure K-3. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 2 NMP/JAF K-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
\ \ , ,i_. ------' J-,,..., \.Hi/Ion Rd I <S' ,'% ', \ * -r--'/ -,-, , ,' Legend
- NMP/JAF \ \ r J Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures \ \
- Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 3 ... Link Water !'.;? ERPA l .. J Index Grid ---====-----*Miles -* ... fjJ,J.1011 l .... lt*>*.,.._ .... D,,,llf_foo_l_IJ> 'n Figure K-4. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 3 NMP/JAF K-5 KLD Engineering, P,C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ERPA28 1-*-**-*-----*------*-*---*-**-l Legend
- NMP/JAF f,
- J Shadow Region
- Node ... Link G'.J ERPA "::-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water c:_l Index Grid Grid 4 Lek.e On la no ERPA 26 I Qr "' I I I I / / / NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 1 ---===----*Miles Grid 4 -.. c-,C..151.l>>ll ,_,..,.,.io*oA>l1.< ...... ""-*-.,.*-..-. Figure K-5. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 4 NMP/JAF K-6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 __ ....
Legend
- NMP/JAF I, ,'J Shadow Region Node -... Link GJ ERPA --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water C:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures ' 0.5 1 ---===----*Miles Grid 5 *-*-*lih' <IP1llll,<-. .. t.. b1"'"P Figure K-6. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 5 NMP/JAF K-7 KLD Engineering, P,C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _J
! i ERPA29 ! LDJ.(1 ! OntorlO "K-*-* -----*-**------------------*-------* -------*-* -----*-*------'--! ! =;\fl ! ! ! ! ! ! i i i ! ! i i i i i i ERPA27 i i i i i i i ! ! 1i i \ couniY Rte 1 Legend
- NMP/JAF ' Shadow Region Grid 6 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures
- Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 6 ... Link Water Q ERPA L __ J Index Grid 0.5 ---====-----Miles -(-u.."1 _c_..,. .. o ..... _,.. __ ,_,.. Figure K-7. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 6 NMP/JAF K-8 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures
- Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 7 Link Water (;l ERPA l-:-:_] Index Grid Figure K-8. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 7 NMP/JAF K-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 8 e Node --=--2, S, 10, lS Mile Rings ... Link Water 0 ERPA l ___ 1 Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate . o.s 1 ---====-----*Mites Figure K-9. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 8 K-10 11111 .. nJL>u.t_...t.t,..,,_..,,_,..,. KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 i i i i ! i i 1 I I \ t \ I I i i I ! i i i I ! ! ! ! ! ! ! i ! ! ! ! ! ! i i r----i i i ! Legend I 1 I I \ \ l 1 \ I I I \ *: NMP/JAF f J Shadow Region
- Node "::--2, S, 10, lS Mile Rings Link GJ ERPA Water Index Grid Grid 9 " "' 0. i i !"" i j 52!1; 521
- 5\'ll6 ,. 681 ' &' 680* ... i ,-"'"\ 1; _533
- Ave (I') * ' p-...-... 510-507 535 t 54!1 509* *-678 i"*
- 108 "i 542 "' I'-"' () g. ! C£l i , < "' c. ERPA' 13 , ... ' ** 505 " -?.,. 710 673 " NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 05 I ---===----*Miles Grid 9 --.c.,,,,,i.1lf.l10ll I .... \__,. *D.ol\l.f- ... 1 .... 'Q' Figure K-10. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 9 NMP/JAF K-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ERPi.\"28**-----*-------Legend
- NMP/JAF ' Shadow Region
- Node -=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings ... Link Water Q ERPA l__J Index Grid <l: -----*-:a;-------*------------------------------*--"' Grid l 0 343 * *.348 t,peedway I J NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures ' 0.25 0.5 ---===-----MUes Grid 10 -.:....-IY.UOl1 '°D.IOllJl-W ,..1--.. Figure K-11. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 10 NMP/JAF K-12 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend ' ERPA26 339 Lctkt> Omo no *
- 335 ERPA 12 "
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region
- Node --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings "" Link Water GJ ERPA L_ __ l Index Grid 331 Grid I I ERPA6 r :! ERPAJ ERP;AS Middf" Rd, NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *--<?-* Grid 11 0.2 0.4 --==----Miles ,PUlllJllU -!-""' O!OIG ... t ...... .,. __ I_"' Figure K-12. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 11 NMP/JAF K-13 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
\ Legend
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region
- Node "::' 2, 5, 10, lS Mile Rings .,. Link Water Q ERPA L .. J Index Grid \ NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures . 0.25 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 12 -... c-l>>JMI ,_,_-,p .. a1u1*-'--*-**-T< Figure K-13. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 12 NMP/JAF K-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
! i i i ute stale ,...o Legend 660 I I l I
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region I I )
- Node --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings ... link Water Q ERPA L.J Index Grid ERPA6 308 ------=---* fii...: 1 <>Drl ' ' \1 ' ' ...... -.f:t1nne<1y Dr ...... ...... \ ...... ERPA II 1V\J 'es Cs ,f I§ /l 0 " ,'! 311 ... I Cl -!' § cJ I ERPA 19 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *--</-* Grid 13 0.2 0.4 --==----Miles -<->PUll*IJ _,_.,...,g ................ __ , ... .. Figure K-14. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 13 NMP/JAF K-15 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Shadow Region
- Node -=-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,.. Link Water (;l ERPA c_:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 14 ) Figure K-15. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 14 NMP/JAF K-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Node _.,. Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF .J Shadow Region 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water [_._l Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 15 Figure K-16. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 15 K-17 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Node .... Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF [ *
- Shadow Region "'::' 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water [_J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 16 Figure K-17. Link-Node Analysis Network-Grid 16 K-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
' /' Legend
- NMP/JAF r-j Shadow Region
- Node .,.. Link GJ ERPA --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures . 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 17 ..._.,,.C....,!O<UlllJOU """'-il!o' *<>AlU<-i.. r.t-"h Figure K-18. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 17 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate K-19 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF [ 'J Shadow Region "' Node _.,..Link i:;'.;l ERPA -:=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 5 ---====-----Miles Grid 18 "'"°"""'.ihioJD'"'1}.t ...... t.._l_ ... ,_,IY Figure K-19. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 18 NMP/JAF K-20 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 512y, ' e ; ,,'-Legend 467 .... \
- NMP/JAF f, J Shadow Region
- Node .,. Link (;I ERPA --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water CJ Index Grid I ERPA 20 .... 239 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures ---===----*Mites Grid 19 -C-c.t'WlWJOU *-*-'¢' *DJl.llJ.l-.. lal ... 1-*p Figure K-20. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 19 NMP/JAF K-21 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 221 -; .. 215 216 county Route 45 .,.l 208 ... , 209 ... 210 327 ERPA 20
- 630 s:: i G 1) d "' 2JJ234 233 .* 631 " .. 142 ......__ -10*MiJes-----r legend
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region
- Node -=--2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,. link Water Q ERPA L_J Index Grid 247
- j i i i ! i i __ ) ___ _ ! i i -.i!' NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 ji I --r===----*Miles Grid 20 _,_.,. *llW\1,1-'-'**-... 1--.. Figure K-21. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 20 NMP/JAF K-22 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Node .. Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF [, J Shadow Region --=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water CJ Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5 1iO 1 ---===-----Miles Grid 21 -.. .. .:-.,.,._CAJ)l>J.J _,,_.. *P}l}IJ.1-'""-'-'"""-P Figure K-22. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 21 K-23 Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P,C February 24, 2016 __J Legend
- NMP/JAF ' ] Shadow Region Node .,.. Link GJ ERPA '::" 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid \ 616 _ .... \ 611* I 2641 267,, NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.5"' I ---====-----Miles Grid 22 __ C.,.,..,..l'\&'JlllJ ... Ol,Jl>>ll.C-U.--..1-Figure K-23. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 22 NMP/JAF K-24 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 i i ! i j j j ! j i i ! ! i *'> J1 I -ti' Hogsback I'-j f I 594 r r \ Legend
- NMP/JAF ' J Shadow Region
- Node --=-2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings ... Link Water Q ERPA [..-**11ndex Grid -* ( I Grid 23 ( / I I -{ I I J Cro""YRd I / NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures r' I Grid 23 0.5 I ---====-----*Miles ,,"' Figure K-24. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 23 NMP/JAF K-25 KLD Engineering, P .C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF J Shadow Region NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 24
- Node -=--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings *-<?' .... Link Water . 0.5 Q ERPA [_:-J 1ndex Grid ---===-----*Miles ......,_"-,...,...,,.,u ..... ,_.,... "-D_,,.,..,,. __ ,_ Figure K-25. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 24 NMP/JAF K-26 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 i -,i \ I I *:, ! ......... i i i ! ! i Peai Bed Rd ! -i fMuck Legend 414 "
- NMP/JAF . --\-. ----..._ / J Shadow Region Grid 25 ii NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures
- Node --=-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Grid 25 _.,. Link Water Q ERPA [.---1 Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate o.s I ---===-----Miles Figure K-26. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 25 K-27 .. JOll °""-"""' @,1)11.c-...... 1-... 1-llt KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
,' legend
- NMP/JAF '.<J Shadow Region e Node 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings _.,. Link Water 0 ERPA [..---! Index Grid ,",' , , ,' ,,:',' ',, ,' ',/',' ,' ,' ,' ,' NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-?-* 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 26 ..... ..,.Ptw.' .... l'll';Zl\J g,,,o.,c_.,.t<llUIJOU.C_.,..,.f,,,, .... _tl' Figure K-27. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 26 NMP/JAF K-28 KLD Engineering, P,C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
\ , , , ....,. ,, , , : \: ,_' .... , , -*-7*---:-: .... ,.., ,' , , , , , *9;.-Ffd "' >-/ , , r Legend
- NMP/JAF ' J Shadow Region
- Node .,. Link GJ ERPA --=--2, S, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water Index Grid ', '* ,' ,'/*' , , ,, , , Grid 27 ,' ,' ...... ,. ,' ,' , , , ,' , , , , ,' , , , , , , , -i ,' '! ., , ! ! ! i -! , ! ! ! NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures 0.25 0.5 --==::11---*Miles Grid 27 ---(-'f"ll .. ,.IDU _'-,,.... JDu.c ............ l>oo<,.1-n Figure K-28. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 27 NMP/JAF K-29 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 i i i 15*Miles* i Legend \ I I I
- NMP/JAF Shadow Region ---442 ., rsoll.._ .Z. \f'lgeor WhitcofflbRd g '\ o.. 8442 \ '!! C/I Patn<*. 0 Mccollum Ln (. Daisy <-Or \ G'r id \ 28 Daisy Ln
- Node "::--2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,. Link Water GJ ERPA C::.:.::.l Index Grid ,' Maple Av r* Ir ,. L i ! ',j r -I Owens Rd ! i NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-<!-* 0.5 ---===-----Miles Grid 28 _.._,_._, ..... ,, .. 11 ... ur-.. a.. ... 1 ...... ,_" Figure K-29. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 28 NMP/JAF K-30 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Node Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF ] Shadow Region 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water l-:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-<>-* 0.25' 0.5 ---===----*Miles Grid 29 Figure K-30. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 29 K-31 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF , j Shadow Region
- Node -::' 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings .,.. Link Water GJ ERPA C:::-:J Index Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures o.s 5 I ---====----*Miles Grid 30 .... IWJll!J .. l>Xlll.<_ ......... 1,,...,..1_., Figure K-31. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 30 NMP/JAF K-32 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Legend
- NMP/JAF
- Node ... Link Q ERPA NMP/JAF ,. ] Shadow Region 2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water c::.=.11ndex Grid NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures *-<?* 0.5' I ---===----*Miles Grid 31 Figure K-32. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 31 K-33 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
\,, legend
- NMP/JAF *' <J Shadow Region
- Node .,. Link (;I ERPA -=-2, 5, 10, 15 Mile Rings Water [_-:J Index Grid Q \ I \ I .-\ Grid 32 \ I \ \ \ \ Stats Hwy NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Link-Node Analysis Network Figures Grid 32 0.5 ---====-----*Miles Figure K-33. Link-Node Analysis Network -Grid 32 NMP/JAF K-34 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table K-1. Evacuation Roadway Network Characteristics Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 1 2 3 us 11 collector 13SS 1 12 0 13SO 30 .8 2 2 S99 ' us 11 Collector 1ss2* 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 8 3 2 683 SR 13 collector 2432 1 12 0 17SO 40 8 4 3 2 US11 collector* 13SS 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 s 3 4 us 11 collector 374 1 12 0 112S 2S 8 6 4 3 us 11 collector 374 1 12 0 112S 2S 8 7 4 6 us 11 coliector 277 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 8 s 2 SR 13 collector 1203 1 12 0 17SO 3S 8 9 5 4 S Jefferson St local 1861 1 10 0 13SO 30 7 roadway 10 6 4 us 11 collector 277 1 12 0 13SO 30 8 11 6 7 us 11 collector 389 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 12 7 6 us 11 collector 389 1 12 0 17SO 30 8 13 7 22 CR 2 collector 1060 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 8 14 7 27 us 11 collector S123 1 12 6 1S7S 3S 3 I lS 7 29 Park St collector 2S4 1 12 0 13SO 30 8 16 8 S98 CR S collector 4394 1 12 0 1700 so 2 17 9 8 CR S collector 1979 1 12 0 1700 so 2 18 10 9 CR S collector 2813 1 12 0 1700 so 2 19 11 12 SR 3 collector 208S 1 12 4 17SO SS 2 20 11 21 SR 3 collector 2966 1 12 4 1700 SS 2 21 11 721 CR S collector iS94 1 12 0 1700 so 2 *22 12 *11 SR 3 collector 208S 1 12 4 17SO SS 2 23 12 720 SR 13 collector 1794 1 12 3 1700 so 7 24 13 14 SR 13 collector 4691 1 12 3 1700 so 7 2S 14 lS SR 13 collector 2229 1 12 3 1700 so 7 26 lS s SR 13 collector 1440 1 12 3 1700 40 7 NMP/JAF K-35 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
, Saturation Free Up-Down-Roadway Roadway tength No. of Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 27 . . 16 17 . SR 3 collector . 2215 1 12 4 . 1700 55 2 ,., ,._ 28 *' : 16 .: 28 . tR 15 **collector 5550 1 12 0 1700 50 2 29 18 16 CR 15 collector 1952 1 12 0 1700 45 2 .* 30 :19 16 SR 3 collector 3886
- 1 12 4 1700 55 2 31 20' .19 SR 3 collector 12283" 1 12 4 1700 55 2 32-:_-21 11 3 collector . 2968 1 12 4 1750 . 55 2 33 21 20 SR 3 collector 4954 1 12 4 1700 55 2 34 * .. 22. ,23 *CR 2 collector 1091 1 12 0 1575 *'* 35 8 .. , ... 35. 23 24 *. CR2 collector 2121 1 12 0 1700 45 8 36. . . . . 24o 25 181_ -CR 2 -freeway 907 1 12 6 1700 50 8 **Ramp ramp 37 24 26 . CR 2 collector . 461 . 1 12 0 1700 45 8 38 25 47 *. . 181 freeway 6190 2 12 10 2250 75 8 39 25 . -589 181 freeway 10140 2. 12 10 2250 . 75 3 40 27 42 . ust"1 collector 15421 1 12 6 . 1700 55 3 . 41 28 16:. CR 15 collector 5550 1 12 0 1700 50 2 . 42" . 28 >38 Lake St collector 23i9 1 12 0 1700 45 2 43 29 7 Park St collector 254 1 12 0 1750 30 8 44' 29 30 . North St collector 1141 1 12 0 1575 35 3 45' 30 29 North St collector 1141 .1 12 0 1575 35 3 46 30 32
- North St collector 5623 1 12 0 1700 45 3 . 47.' 31 30 . Lincoln Ave local 438 1 12 4 1350 30 3 roadway 48 32 . 28 . North St collector 15394 1 12 0 1700 . 50 2 49 .* 33 34 181-CR 22A **freeway 1173 1 12 4 1700 50 1 Ramp ramp , 50 34 ' 43 181 freeway 900 2 12 10 2250 75 1 51
- 3.4 588 181 freeway . 5999 2 12 10 2250 75 3 . . __ NMP/JAF
- K-36 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Shoulder Saturation Free Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) . * :52 .. **35 .. ' 33 CR22A collector 2080 .. 1 12 0 1700 45 1 53_ 35 44 us 11 collector 805 1 12 0 1575 35 1 54 3Ei 35 US11 collector. 648 1 12 0 1575 35 1 55 37 36 .. CR 15 collector 912 1 12 0 1750 35 1 56 38 39 Lake st collector 3189 1 12 0 1700 50 3 57 39 40 Lake St
- collector
- 5795 1 12 0 1700 50 3 !, 58. 40 36 Lake St collector 2943 1 12 0 1750 45 1 59 41 . '.' 36 USll collector 2122 1 12 0 1750 35 1 '*60 42 ,'*-' 41 US11 collector 7375 1 12 6 1700 55 3 61 43 34 181. freeway 900 2 12 10 2250 75 1 62 45 51 CR 28 collector 1311 1 12. 0 1700 55 8' 63 45 116 us 11 collector 16298 1 12 10 1700 55 8 64 45 163 us 11 collector 9635 1 12 10 1700 . 55 16 65 46 47 . I Sl -SR 13 freeway 1650 1 12 3 1700 50 8 Ramp ramp 66 46 48 SR 13 collector -2821 l 12 0 1700 40 8 * .. ,' 67 47 25 181 freeway *6190 2 12 10 2250 *75 8 68 47 590 181 freeway 6688 2 12 10 2250 75 8 69 49 11 CR 5 local 1286 1 12 0 1750 35 2 roadway 70 50 '21
- Brennan local 2072' 1 12 . 0 1575 35 2 Beach Rd roadway 71 51 52 CR 28 collector 1001 1 12 o. 1700 55 8 72 51 54: I 81-CR28 *freeway 1225 1 12 6 1700 50 8 Ramp ramp 73 52 53 I 81-CR 28 freeway 1415 1 12 6 1700 50 8 Ramp ramp 74 52 55 CR 28 collector 2790 1 12 0 1700 55 8 75 53 54 181 freeway 2380 2 12 10 2250 75 *8 NMP/1AF K-37 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 76 53 590 181 freeway 8911 2 12 10 2250 75 8 77 54 53 181 freeway 2380 2 12 10 2250 75 8 78 54 591 181 freeway 7143 2 12 10 2250 75 17 79 56 57 SR 104 collector 6062 1 12 6 1700 55 16 80 56 163 us 11 collector 8900 1 12 10 1700 55 16 81 56 166 us 11 collector 13419 1 12 6 1700 55 16 82 57 58 SR 104 collector 1353 1 12 6 1700 55 17 83 57 60 181-SR 104 freeway 1084 1 12 6 1700 50 17 Ramp ramp 84 58 59 I 81-SR 104 freeway 941 1 12 6 1700 50 17 Ramp ramp 85 58 61 SR 104 collector 923 1 12 6 1700 55 17 86 59 60 181 freeway 1914 2 12 10 2250 75 17 87 59 591 181 freeway 8873 2 12 10 2250 75 17 88 60 59 181 freeway 1914 2 12 10 2250 75 17 89 60 592 181 freeway 5379 2 12 10 2250 75 17 90 62 63 SR 69 collector 1543 1 12 0 1575 35 23 91 63 64 SR 69 collector 1230 1 12 8 1700 40 23 92 63 71 I 81-SR 69 freeway 997 1 12 4 1350 30 23 Ramps ramp 93 64 65 CR 26 collector 1239 1 12 6 1700 60 23 94 64 67 SR 69 collector 853 1 12 8 1700 40 23 95 65 66 I 81-CR 26 freeway 810 1 12 4 1575 35 23 Ramp ramp 96 66 71 181 freeway 1453 2 12 10 2250 75 23 97 66 593 181 freeway 5464 2 12 10 2250 75 23 98 68 71 181 freeway 1591 2 12 10 2250 75 23 99 68 594 181 freeway 4172 2 12 10 2250 75 23 NMP/JAF K-38 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
. ' .. Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type {ft.} Lanes (ft.) {ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 100 -69 .70 US.11 collector 81S1 1 12 6 1700 SS 22 101 69 166 .* us .11 coilector
- S49 1 12 6 1700 -SS 22 102 *_. 69 686 SR 69 collector 3860 1. 12 8 1700 SS 22 103*. 70 617 us 11 collector 6284 1. 12 6 1700 SS 22 i04 71 66 181 *freeway 14S3 2 12 10 22SO 7S 23 lOS 71 68 181 freeway 1S91 2 12 10 22SO 7S . 23 106 72 73 SR 69 collector 6860 1 12 8 1700 SS 16 107 73 69 SR 69 collector 4887 1 12 8 1700 SS 22 108 74 72 SR 69 collector 3860 1 12 8 1700 SS 16 109 -7S 74 SR 69 collector 8464 1 12 8 1700 SS 16 110 7S 610. SR 69 collector 2S8 1 12 0 13SO 30 16 111 .. 76* 77 SR 104 collector 899 1 12 0 17SO 30 lS 112. 76 84 SR 104 collector 968 *. 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 16 113 76 610 SR69 collector 1379 1 12 0 13SO 30 16 114 77 76 SR 104 collector 899 1 12 0 13SO 30 15 11S 77 78 SR 104 .. collector 1390 1 12 0 17SO 30 lS 116 77 88 Scenic Ave collector 2212 1 12 8 1S7S 3S lS 117 78 77 SR 104 collector 1390 1 12 0 17SO 30 lS 118 78 79 SR 3 collector 979 1 12 8 1700 40 lS 119 79 78 SR3 collector 979 1 12 8 17SO 40 lS 120 79 80 SR 3 collector 3000 1 12 8 1700 4S lS. 121 . 80 79 SR 3 collector 3000 1 12 8 1700 4S lS 122 80 200 SR 3 collector 3091. 1 12 8 1700 SS lS 123 81 82 SR 3 collector 2606 1 12 8 17SO SS 21 i24 82 83 SR 3 collector S971 1 12 8 17SO SS 21 12S 83 128 CR4 collector 9S17 1 12 0 1700 so 21 126 83 129 SR 3 collector S603 1 12 8 1700 SS 21 127 84 169 Pulaski Dr local 1183 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 16 NMP/JAF K-39 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February i4, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type {ft.) Lanes {ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) roadway . 128 84 607 SR 104 *collector 186S 1 12 6 1700 40 *16 i29 8S 86 SR 104 *collector 4747 1 12 6 17SO SS 16 130 86 608 SR 104 . collector 107S7 1 12 6 1700 60 16 131 86 613 Rowe Rd* .local S96S 1 12 0 . 1S7S 3S 16 roadway 132 87 78 Academy St collector 1047 1 12 0 17SO 40 lS 133 88 77 Scenic Ave collector 2212 1 12 8 17SO 3S 1S 134 88 96 Scenic Ave collector 3876 1 12 8 1700 4S lS 135 89 78 SR104 collector 2673 1 12 6 17SO 40 lS 136 90 88 Liberty St local 629 1 12 0 1350 30 . 1S roadway 137 92 79 Spring St local 719 1 12 0 13SO 30 1S roadway 138 93 79 Spring St local 636 1 12 0 13SO 30 lS roadway 139 94 7S Munger Hill local 704 1 12 0 1700 40 16 Rd roadway 140 9S 80 Munger Hill local 1099 1 12 0 1700 40 lS Rd roadway 141 96 88 Scenic Ave collector 3876 1 12 8 1700 4S lS 142 96 120 SR 3 . collector 764S 1 12 4 1700 SS lS 143 97 98 SR 3 collector 3882 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 144 97 121 SR 3 collector 3873 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 14S 98 99 SR 3 collector 3761 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 146 99 100 SR 3 collector S296 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 147 100 102 SR 3 collector 1766 1 12 4 1700 SS 7 148 100 103 CR 28 collector 188S 1 12 0 1700 4S 7 149 101 12 SR 3 collector 483S 1 12 4 17SO 4S 7 NMP/JAF
- K-40 KLD Engineering, P.C. .Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
'. :*.* Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Node Node lSO *.102' iOl **isl '.103 *,.' 104 is2 104** . 161' 153 lOS *11S *. 1S4 106 694 lSS ' 107 110 1S6 108 109 1S7. 109 ,* 111 i 158 110 .,, ld9 *. 1S9' 111 *112 *, 160 112 113 161' 113 114' 162 113 118 163 114 '106 164 'llS .4S ' 16S' 116 4S' .166 116 S99 ' 167 117 116 '* 168' 118 602 " 169: 119 113 170 120 96 j71' 120' .** 121
- 172 121 ,97 173 121 120 174 122 97 i7S 123 122 176 124 .123 NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Roadway Length Name Type (ft.) SR3 collector. I
- 2740 . CR.28 coilector I 97S
- CR 28 collector' 1977 . CR 28 collector 1435 CR 28 . collector 3016 Salisbury Rd I collector 872 Salisbury Rd I collector '2099 CR 28 I collector 2778 sa'lisbury Rd I co.llector 193 CR 28 . * * *I collector 2331 CR28 I collector 1223 CR 28 I collector 1283 CR 41
- I collector 3988
- CR 28
- I* collector i467 CR28 collector I 18SS *US 11 us 11 CR41 CR41 CR41 , SR 3
- SR 3 SR 3 SR 3 SR 104B SR 104B Meixco Point *. DrW collector 1. 16298 collector I 23S2 . collector I
- 1990 . collector I 874S collector I 4S06 collector 764S collector 2927 *collector 3873 collector* 2902 collector 5895 collector 1499 collector 1891 K-41 No.of Lanes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Width Width Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 12 4 1700 SS 7 12 *o 1700 4S 7 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 0 1700 S5 7 12 0 1700 '40 7 12 0 1700 40 7 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1700 40 7 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1S7S 3S 7 12 0 1700 4S 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 0 1700 4S 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 10 1700 SS 8 12 6 1700 4S 8 12 0 1700 so 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 12 0 1700 SS 7 ' 12 4 1700 5S 15 12 4 1700 SS 6 12 4 1700 SS 7 12 4 1700 SS 6 12 6 1700 60 6 12 6 1700 so 6 12 0 1S7S 3S 6 KLD Engineering, P.C. Februar-Y 2412016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes Width Width Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 177. *12s* .* 122. CR40 collector . 2057. 1 0 1575 35 6 178 126 123 SR f04B collector 2146 1 12 .6 1700 50 6 179 127 126 SR 1048 collector 3254 1 12 6 1700 55 6 180 128 254 CR4 collector 6035 1 12 0 1700 50 21 . 181 129 259 SR3 collector 5232 1 12 8 1700 55 21 182 130 131 SR 3 collector. 5309 1 12 8 1700 50 21 183 136 .CR45
- collector 7245 12 0 1700 so 21 131 1.32 SR 3 collector *
- 3272 1 12 8 1700 55 30 . -185 . 131 ** '250 SR 264 .-collector 9748 1 12 6 1700. 55 30 . 186 132 131 SR 3. collector 3277 1 . 12 8 1700 55 30 187. 132 133 SR 3 collector 2718 1 12 8 1700 55 30 188 133 132 SR 3 . collector 2709 1 12 8 1700 55 30 189 133 134 SR 3 collector 6537 1 12 8 1700 55 30 190 134 i33 SR 3 collector 6538 1 12 8 1700 SS 30 191 134. 135 . SR 3 collector 1693 1 12 8 1700 SS 30 192 13S *134. SR 3 collector 169S 12 8 1700 SS 30 .193. 13S 237 SR 3 collector* 7.823 .1 12 8 1700 SS 27 194
- 13S 2S3 SR49 collector 779S 1 12 6 1700 so 30 136 301 CR4S collector 3794 1 12 0 1700 4S 21 196 137. 139 CR4 collector 2792 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 197 137 . 71S CR 176 collector 1278 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 198 138 632 Myers Rd collector 2304 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 199 138 .724 CR4 collector 1191 1 12 0. 1700 SS 14 . 200 * .. ** 138. 726 .CR4 *collector 1224 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 201 139 187 CR4 collector 3396 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 202 140 141 CR4 collector 4062 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 203 141 194 CR.4 collector 2312 1 12 0 1700 so 20 .204 142 143 CR4 collector S978 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 NMP/JA.F K-42 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Link# Stream Stream Node Node Name Type 20S 143 144 CR4 collector 206 143 628 . CR 6 collector 207 144 626 CR 3S collector 208 144 698. CR4 collector 209 14S 146 CR 6 collector 210 14S 183 CR 6 collector 211 146 14S .CR6 collector 212 146 147 CR 6 collector 213 147 146 CRG' collector* 214 147 199 CR 6 collector 21S 148 199 CR 6 collector 216 149 716 SR 104 collector . 217 149 728 CR 6 collector 218 lSO 363 SR 104 collector 219 lSl 1S2 SR 104 collector 220 lSl 363 . SR 104 collector 221 .* lSl 729 *Tollgate Rd . collector 222 1S2 1S3 SR 104 collector 223 1S3 89 SR 104 collector 224 1S4 149 CR6 collector 22S 1S4 717 SR104B collector 226 lSS 1S6 SR 104B collector 227 lSS 609 SR 104 . collector . 228 . 1S6 1S4 SR 104B collector 229 1S7 86 Smithers Rd collector . 230 1S7. 60S Spath Rd local roadway 231 1S8 1S7 .Tubbs Rd collector . NMP/}AF Evacuation Time Estimate Lane Length No. of Width (ft.) Lanes (ft.) 13490 1 12 10680 *. 1 12 198S 1 12 2817 1 12 206S 1 12 *3428 1 12 20SO 1 12 1480 1 12 1480 1 12 1221 1 12 2328 1 12 1109 1 12 1360 1 12 1790. 1 12 2906 1 12 1987 1 12 706 1 12 3317 1 12 2904 1 12 2776 1 12 809 1 12 1643 1 12 989 1 12 3S6S 1 12 48SS 1 10 4997 1 12 377 1 12 K-43 Shoulder Saturation Flow Width (ft.} Rate (pcphpl) 0 17SO 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 4 1700 0 1700 4 1700. 4 1700 4 1700' 4 1700 4 1700 6 1700 4 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 4 1700 6 1700 10 1700 6 1700 10 1700. 0 17SO 0 1700 0 17SO Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) SS 21 SS 20 so 21 SS 21 so lS SS lS so lS so lS so lS. so lS so lS SS lS so lS SS lS SS lS SS lS SS lS SS lS SS lS 4S . lS 60 lS SS 14 40 lS SS lS 40 16 4S 16 so 16 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Link# Stream Stream Node Node Name 232 159 *121 Fort leazier ****.*Rd . ' .. . . 233' 160 :161 S Daysville Rd 234 161 110
- CR 28 23S : 162 .. '163 Drybridge Rd . 236 163 4S us 11** ' 237 163 S6 US11 238 164 60S CR41 239 164 719, CR41 *.240 16S 119 CR41 241 166 56 us 11 242 166 69 us 11 243 .. 167 164 .. Sherman Rd 244 169 170 . Tubbs Rd 24S 170 is8 TubbsRd
- 246 171 1S7 Tubbs Rd 247 172 1S4 CR 6 248 172 718 .CR 1 249 174 127 SR 104B 2SO . 174 603 *. Tollgate Rd* 2s1* 17S 176 SR 104B 252 176 174 SR 104B 2S3 178 172 CR 6 2S4 179 172 CR 1 2SS 180 179 CR 1 NMP/JAF **Evacuation Time Estimate L __ --Lane Roadway Length No. of Width Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) collector 3172 1 . 12 local roadway 1726 1 12 collector 2298 1 12 collector* S44S 1 12 collector 963S 1 12 collector 8899 1 12 collector 3832 1 12 collector 791 1 12 collector 2048 1 12 collector* 13419 1 12 collector S49 1 12 local 2948 1 12 roadway . collector 1017 1 12 collector 4202 1 . 12 collector 4014 1 12 collector S379 1 12 collector 730 1 12 collector. 2600 1 12 collector 1066 1 12 collector 4017 1 12 collector 4129 1 12 local 793 1 12 roadway collector 7136 1 12 collector 30S6 1 12 K-44 Shoulder Saturation Flow Width (ft.} Rate (pcphpl} 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 10 1700 10 17SO 4 1700 4 1700 0 1700 6 17SO 6 1700 0 17SO 0 1700 0 1700 0 17SO 4 1700 0 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 6 1700 10 1700 0 1700 0 1700 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 40 7 40 7 so 7 40 16 SS 16 SS 16 SS 16 SS 16 SS 7 SS 16 SS 22 40 16 40 16 so . 16 so 16 so 1S SS 6 60 6 40 6 60 1S 60 6 40 6 SS s SS s KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No.of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 2S6 181 20S CRl collector 411 1 12 0 17SO SS 14 2S7 181 Dennis Rd local : 1700 714 *roadway 676 1 12 0 40 14 2S8 182 181 CR 1 collector 4S63 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 2S9. 182 706 CR 29 collect.or 868 1 12 0 1700 . SS . 14 260 183 143 CR 6 . collector 494S 1 12 0 1700 . SS 21 261 184 18S CR 29
- collector S084 1 12 0 1700 so 14 262 18S 186 CR 29 collector 2720 1 12 0 1700 so 14 263 186 187 CR 29 *collector 4063 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 264 187 140 CR4 collector 2348 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 26S 188 189 SR 104 collector 1164 1 12* 6 1700 SS 14 266 188 604 SR 104 collector 4497 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 267 189 184 CR 29 collector 3668 1 12 0 1700 so 14 268 189 188 SR 104 collector 1164 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 269 189 306 SR 104 collector .346S 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 270 190 14S. Darrow Rd local 7742 1 12 0 1700 so lS roadway 271 191 202 SR 104 collector 1177 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 272 191 604 SR 104 collector 1816 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 273 191 722 CR Sl collector 811 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 274 192 193 CR Sl collector 4493 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 27S 193 19S CRSl collector 1477 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 276 193 197 Mud Lake Rd collector 3477 1 10 0 1700 4S 14 277 194 142 CR4 collector 19SS 1 12 0 1700 so 20 278 19S 196 CR Sl collector 4168 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 279 196 14S CR Sl collector 3788 1 12 0 1700 4S lS 280 197 194 Mud Lake Rd collector 43S9 1 10 0 1700 4S 14 281 198 190 Darrow Rd local 7S73 1 12 0 1700 4S lS NMP/JAF K-45 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Roadway . Link# ... Nam*e Type:**. Node Node roadway 282 199 ' 147 CR 6 coilector 283 199 723 Hurlbut Rd local roadway 284 200 81 SR 3 collector 28S 201 80 Munger Hill local Rd roadway 286 201 200 Munger Hill local ., Rd roadway . 287 202 lSS SR 104 collector 288 202 191 SR 104 local roadway 289 203 202 Middle Rd collector 290 20S 180 CR 1 collector 291 205 181 CR 1 collector 292 206 20S Nine Mile local Point Rd roadway 293 207 208 CR 176 collector 294 208 209 CR 176 collector 29S 208 210 CR4S collector 296 209 327 CR4S collector 297 209 328' CR 176 collector 298 210 208 CRAS collector '299 210 216 CR4S collector 300 211 239 Kingdom Rd local roadway 301 211 637 CR4S collector 302 212 211 Kingdom Rd local roadway NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Lane Length . of (ft:) *:h lanes . (ft.) 1212 1 12 72S 1 10 8301 1 12 1431 1 12 1842 1 12 6970 1 12 1177 1 12 1082 1 12 4078 1 12 411 1 12 8924 1 12 S193 1 12 606 1 12 2980 1 12 1972 1 12 7600 1 12 2980 1 12 2040 1 12 SOS9 1 12 3731 1 12 426 1 12 K-46 Shoulder . Saturation Flow Width* .. : Rate (ft.) (pcphpl) 4 1700 0 1700 8 1700 0 1700 0 1700 6 1700 6 1700 0 13SO 0 1700 0 1700 0 1750 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 Free Flow Grid *Speed Numl>'er (mph) so lS so lS SS lS 40 lS 40 lS SS 14 SS 14 30 14 SS 14 55 14 40 s SS 20 SS 20 so 20 so 20 SS 20 so 20 so 20 40 19 4S 19 40 19 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016
..... CR4S collector 1 12 1700 so 30S .. 213 221 *CR4S collector 3040 1 12 0 1700 so 20 . ;* '. 306 2i4 243 SR 481 minor 786S 2* 12 12 1900 60 . 19 arterial 307 214 *. .47S CR4S collector. 2468. 1 12 0 1700 4S 19 214 637 *CR4S collector 462 1 12 0 1700. 4S 19 . 309 .* 21s**. 216 Rd* *collector 2SS7 1 12 0 1700 so 20 .* 310 21S. <221 CR4S collector 648 1 12 0 1S7S 3S . 20 311 216 **210 .CR4? .. collector 2040 1 12 0 i700 so 20 312 *. 216 .* 217 Myers Rd *collector 5917 1 12 0 '1700 4S 20 313 217 218 Myers Rd collector 437S 1 12 0 1700 *. 4S 20 314 218 700 .. CR57 collector 2339 1 12 0 1700 . so 20 31S 219 634 CR S7* collector 239 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 19 .*. 316 219 . 635
- SR 481 minor S233 2 12.
- 12 1900 60 19 . *arterial* . * '* 317 220 218 . CR S7 collector . 918 1 12 0 1700 so 20 '318 *.. 221 .. 213 . .CR4S collector 3031 1 12 0 1700 so 20 319 221 21S CR4S collector 649 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 20 320 222 224 CRS7 collector 1387 1 12 0 1700 4S 26 *321 223 .* 22S CR57 collector 192 1 12 0 1700 *so 26 .. * .. 322 224 223 CR S7 collector 4140 1 12 0 1700 4S 26 323 22S *. 384 SR481 collector iS34 1 12 12 1700 4S 26 324 226 223 '. Van Buren St **local 1216 1 12 0 13SO 30 26 . roadway*. 32S 227 231 SR 481. collector 1217 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 326 228 230 SR 481. collector '2182 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 327. 229 228 SR481 collector 2760 1 12 12 1700 SS 20 NMP/JAF K-47 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 328 230 227 SR 481 collector 1346 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 . 329 231 22S SR 481 collector 783 1 12 12 1700 SS 26 330 232 222 CRS7 collector 2984 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 331 232 711 Howard Rd local 4026 1 12 0 1700 40 20 roadway 332 233 234 .CR4S collector 14S1 1 12 0 1700 so 20 333 233 327 .CR4S collector 3066 1 12 0 1700 so 20 334 234 233 CR4S collector 14S1 1 12 0 1700 so 20 .. *_*33s 234 631 CR4S collector 467 1 12 0 1S7S . 3S 20 336 23S 236 CR4S collector 2279 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 337 236 237 CR 6 collector 12864 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 338 236 246 CR4S coUector 11S8 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 . 339 237 13S SR 3 collector 7823 1 12 8 1700 SS 27 340 237 329 CR6 .collector 6487 1 12 0 1700 SS 27 34i 237 383 SR 3 collector 6633 1 12 12 1700 SS 27 342. 238 236 CR 6 collector 2183 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 343 239 240 Kingdom Rd . local
- 2310 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 344 240 24S Kingdom Rd local S378 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 34S 240 636 March Rd*. local 1862 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 346 241 219 CR S7 collector 3694 1 12 0 1700 4S 19 347 241 243 March Rd local 616 1 12 0 1700 40 19 . roadway . 348 242 472 Minetto collector 1033 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 19 Bridge Rd 349 242 476 CR S7 collector 6S3S 1 12 0 1700 so 19 3SO 243 219 SR481 minor 3313 2 12 12 1900 60 19 NMP/JAF K-48 KLD Engineering, P.C. *Evacuation Time.Estimate February 24, 2016 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length. No. of Width Width Rate Speed Number Link# Stream Stream Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (mph) Node Node . arterial 3SL 243 241 March Rd* local 616 1 12 , 0 1700 40 19 . roadway 3S2 , 243* 636 March Rd local 467 1 12 0 1700 40 19 roadway 3S3 244 220 . CR S7 collector 3338 1 12 0 1700 so 19 .**3s4 24S 220 Kingdom Rd local SS3 .1 12 0 13SO 30 20 *roadway "(. 3SS 24Ei 247 CR4S 'collector 3472 1 12 0 1700 4S 20 3S6 247 248 CR4S collector 488S 1 12 0 1700 so 21 357 248 249 CR4S collector 3336 1 12 0 1700 so 21 3S8 249 130 CR4S collector 667S 1 12 0 1700 so 21 3S9 2SO 2S1 SR 49 collector S4S2 , 1 12 6 1700 so 30 360 2SO ', 2S2 , SR 264 collector 1643 1 12 6 1700 SS 30 361 2Sl , 62S SR 49 collector 3379 1 12 6 1700 so 30 , 362 2S3 2SO *sR49 collector 4367 1 12 6 1700 SS 30 363 2S4 2SS CR4 collector 4S39 1 12 0 1700 so 22 364 2S4 2S7 CR4S collector 4304 1 12 0 1700 so 21 36S 2S4 262 CR4S collector 2341 1 12 0 1700 4S 22 366 2SS 2S8 CR4 collector 4109 1 12 0 1700 so 31 .367 2S6 268 CR4 collector 760 1 12 0 1700 4S 31 368 2S7 2S4 CR4S collector 4304 1 12 0 1700 so 21 369 2S7 2S8 CR4S collector 6662 1 12 0 1700 4S 31 370 2S7 301 . CR4S collector 4007 1 12 0 1700 4S 21 371 2S8 256 CR4 collector 3002 1 12 0 1700 so 31 372 2S9 3S9 .. SR 3 collector 2360 l 12 8 1700 SS 21 373 260 263 CR4S collector 4838 1 12 0 1700 so 22 374 26,0 622 Graves Rd local S3SS 1 12 0 1700 4S 22 ; , NMP/JAF K-49 KLD Engineering, P.C .. . Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Link# 37S. 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 39S 396 397 398 . NMP/JAF. stream Node 260* 261 262 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 27S 276 277 277 278 278 .Evacuation Time Estimate stream Node 623 260 254. 623 265 267 616 263 288 269 292 270 271. 272 273 287 297 280 281 277 278 279 298 597 Roadway Name *cR4S * .* Paradise Rd CR4S CR4S
- CR45 us 11 .CR4S Villiard Rd us 11 CR 18 CR4 CR 33 . CR 33 CR33 SR49 SR 49 SR49 SR 49 us 11 *SR 49 . I 81-SR 49 Ramps SR 49 181 181 Roadway Length Type (ft.) roadway collector 2162* *local 2670 . roadway collector* *2361 collector 2632 collector 1370 :collector 1743 . collector 6S10 local 7199 roadway collector 10574 . collector 3749 collector 4993 collector 4522 collector 7832 collector 1377 collector 256S collector 3203 collector 7603 collector* 2680
- collector 1073 collector 1247 freeway 973 ramp collector 523 freeway 797 freeway S884 K-50 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid No. of Width Width Speed Number Rate Lanes (Jt.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (rnph) 1 12 0 1700 4S 22 1 12 .0 1700 40 22 . 1 12 .. a* . 1700 . 4S 22 1 12 0 1700 45 .22 1 12 0 1700 50 22 1 12 12 1700 40 22 1 12 0 1700 50 22 1 12 0 1575 35 22 1 12 10 1700 55 . 22 1 12 0 1700 50 31 1 12 a* 1700 so 31 1 12 0 1700 50 31 1 12 0 1700 so 31 1 12 0 1700 so. 31 1 12 6 1700 50 31 1 12 6 1700 50 31 1 12 6 1700 55 30 1 12 6 1700 40 31 1 12 0 1S7S 35 31 1 12 6 1750 40 32 1 12 .4 1700 50 32 1 12 6 1750 40 32 3 12 10 2250 7S 32 2 12 10 2250 7S 32 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
.. * :-* Up-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Down-Roadway Roadway Length No.of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph} 399 279 :7l3. SR49 collector 612 1 12 6 -1700 45 32 -* 400 .280' *-** 276 : SR49 collector 1978 1 12 6 1750 40 31 401 282 275*. SR49 collector 2194 1 12 0 1750 35 31 402 283 282 ,* . SR49 col.lector 1075 1 12 6 1700 45 31 403 284 283 SR49 collector 831 1 12 6 1700 45 31 *_ -404' ,285 284 SR 49. collector 1406 .* 1 12 6 1700 ' 50 31
- 4o5 286 285 SR49 .** collector 2748 1 12 '6 1700 50 31 406 287 SR 49 collecto*r. 4298 1 12 6 1700 50 31 . .407 288 289 ' us 11 collector 8665 1 12 10 1700 55 31 408** 289 290 us 11 ,' . collector 4425-1 12 10 1700 55 31 409 290 295 ** USll collector 2656 1 12 10 1700 55 31 ,, 410 291 290 CR4 collector 4120' 1 12 0 1700 50 31 411 292 .'293 -CR4 collector 3869 1 12 0 1700 so 31 412 293 294. CR4 collector 5308 1 12 o* 1700 so 31 413 294 291 CR4 collector 1293 1 12 0 1700 40 31 414 295 275' us 11* collettor 3879 1 12 10 1750 40 31 415 -296 ' 272 SR49 *collector 2554 1 12 6 1700 50 31 416 297 296 . SR49 collector '988 1 12 6 1700 45 31 -. ,' 417' 298 2,78 ' > 181 freeway 797 3 12 10 2250 75 32 ' 4i8 299 82 Pople Ridge local 5708 1 10 0 1750 40 21 Rd roadway " local 419*.*., 300 73 St 2747 1 10 0 1700 40 22 roadway .\ 420 301 _257 *.CR45 collector 4006 1 12 0 1700 45 21 421 . 301 624 Winks Rd collector 2485 1 12 0 1700 45 30 422 302 274 Winks Rd collector 8255 1 12 0 1700 45 30 423 303 309 CR4 collector 7829 1 12 0 1700 55 13 424: ,' 303 553 ' EasfAve collector 2645 1 12 0 1700 40 12
- NMP/JAF K-51 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 42S *.304 . sso City Line Rd , local 2S27 1 12 0 1S7S 3S. 13 . roadway 426 304 687 SR 104 collector 2616 1 12 0 17SO 40 11 'i, 427 . 30S. ns.* SR 104 collector 13Sl 1 12 6 1700 so 11 428 . 30S 727 Kloc ks collector .1682 1 12 0 1700 4S 11 Corners Rd 429 3d6 189 SR 104 collector 346S 1 12 6 1700 SS 14 *.430 30fr -JOS. SR104 * .. *collector 8434 1 12 6 1700 so 14 ; 431 *. 3d7 ' 633 CR 1 collector 3737 1 12 o* 1700 SS 11 432 307 70S collector 1094 1 12 0 1700 4S 11 433. 308 . 310 CR S3 collector 3371 1 12 0 1700 4S 13 434 308 334 SR 104 collector 602S 1 12 6 1700 so 11 43S 138 CR4 collector 6S60 1 12 0 1700 SS 13 436 309 303 CR4 collector 7829 1 12 0 1700 SS 13 437 309 311 .. CR S3 collector 2798 l 12 0 1700 so 13 438 310* 309 CRS3 .collector 4491 1 12 0 1700 SS 13 .* .... 439 311 312 CR. S3 collector 88SS 1 12 0 1700 SS 19 440 312 212 .CR S3 collector 3411 1 12 0 1700 SS 19 441 313 . 344 E 10th St collector 1178 1 12 0 13SO 30 12 442 313 SS3 East Ave collector 1392 1 12 0 1700 40 12 ,. local 443 313. SS4 Church St roadway 1334 1 12 0 13SO 30 12 ..
- 444 314 .570 E 10th St collector 1406 1 12 0 . 17SO 30 12 .44S .314 6S7 SR104 minor SS3 2 12 0 17SO 4S 12 arterial 446 31S 331 Lake Rd collector 1870 1 12 0 1700 so 11 447 316 31S Lake Rd collector 179S 1 12 0 17SO so 11 448 317 3SO Lake Rd collector 1646 1 12 0 1700 so 4 NMP/JA.F K-52 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph)
- 449 318 317 Lake Rd colle.ctor 2027 1 '12 0 1700 50 5. 450 319 318 ' * *Lake Rd collector 3481 1 12 0 1700 50 5 451 320 695 Lake Rd collector 954 1 12 0 1700 40 5 452 321 206 Lake Rd collector 4452 1 12 0 1700 40 5 453 321 ' 322 CR29 collector 6581 1 12 0 1700' 55 5 454 322 182 .CR 29 collector* 3955 1 12 0 1700 50 14' 455 323 206 Ni.ne Mile local 1589 1 12 0 1700 40 5 Point Rd roadway 456 324 182 CRl collector 3727 1 12 0 1700 55 14. 457 324 325 CR 1 collector 4246 1 12 0 1700 55 14 458 325 307 CR 1 col.lector 4503 1 12 0 1700 55 14 459 327 209 CR45 collector 1972 1 12 0 1700 50 20 '460 327 233 CR45 collector 3066 1 12 0 1700 50 20 461 328 364 CR 176 . collector 4495 1 12 0 1700 55 20 462 329 380 CR9. collector 2506 1 12 0 1700 55 27 463 329 381 CR 6 collector 2799 .1 12 0 1700 55 27 464 330 315 Novel is collector 785 1 12 0 1750 35 11 Driveway 465 331 333 Lake Rd collector 5146 1 12 0 1700 50 11 4.66 332 331 Novelis collector 1338 1 12 0 1575 35 11 Driveway. 467 333 334 CR E 63 collector 4541 1 12 0 1700 50 11 468 333 335 Lake Rd** . collector 1021 1 '12 0 1700 50 11 469 334 304 SR104 collector 659 1 12 0 1750 45 11 470 335 337 E Seneca St collector 4002 1 12 0 1750 50 10 471 335 339 Mitchell St collector 203 1 12 8 1700 50 11 472 336 337 St Paul collector 1405 1 12 0 1750 40 10 473 336 340 Mitchell Si: collector 3816 1 '12 8 1700 40 10 . NMP/JAF K-53 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway length No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Node Node Name Type fft.) Lanes Width Width Flow Flow Grid {ft.) {ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 474' .* 337 336 St Paul collector 1405 1 12 0 1700 40 10 475 337 338 E 4th St collector 2312 1 12 0 1750 *40 10 476 '337 552 E Seneca St collector 3892 1 12 0 1575 35 10 477 338 342 SR104 collector 1286. 1 12 0 1750 40 12 478 33Q 336 M.itchell St .collector 3842 1 12 8 . 1700 50 10 479 340 584 .* E. 10th St collector* 987 . 1 12 0 1350 30 10 '480 341 340 Mitchell St *collector 581 1 12 8 1350 30 10 481 342 571 E 13th St local 560 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 482 342 656, SR 104 collector 930 1 12 0 1700 40 .12 483 343 345 E Albany St collector 1057 1 12 0 1575 35 12 .. 484 344 313 E 10th St collector 1178 1 12 0 1350 30 12 485 344 563 .E Albany St collector 1138 1 12 0 1350 30 12 486 . 344 570 E 10th St collector 445 1 12 0 1750 30 12 487 345 344 . E Albany St collector 1857 1 12 0 1575 35 12 488 346 524 E Utica St . collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 12 489 346 661 E 1st St local 1237 2 12 0 1900 30 12 roadway 490 346 662 E 1st St local 213 2 12 0 1900 30 12 roadway 491 347 338 SR 104 . collector 610 1 12 0 1750 40 12 Jim local 492 347 348 Shampine roadway* 1004 1 12 0 1700 40 .12 Blvd 493 ,348 343 E Albany St collector 334 1 12 0 1575 35 12 494 349 316 ..
- Lake Rd collector 3092 1 12 0 1700 50 11 495 350 349 Lake Rd . collector 2642 1 12 0 1700 50 4 496 351 319 Lake Rd .collector 2356 1 12 0 1700 50 *5 497 351 320 Lake Rd collector* 1012 1 12 2 1700 50 5 NMl'/JAF . K-54 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
'498 3S2 3S1 Driveway . roadway 698 1 12 0 1S7S 3S s .. local 499 3S3 306 Duke Rd roadway
- 3269 1 12 0 1700 4S 14 soo 3S4 3S7' CR3S collector 3083 1 12 0 1700 so lS SOl 3S4 361 Hurlbut Rd local 2S41 1 10 0 1700 so lS roadway S02 3SS 627 CR 35 collector 2037 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 21 S03 3S7 3SS CR.3S *collector 7703 1 12 0 1700 SS lS S04 3S8 3S9 CR 3S collector* S033 . 1 12 0 1700 so 21 sos 3S9 130 SR 3 collector 1371 1 12 8. 1700 4S 21 . S06 360 3S8 CR3S collector 2097 1 12 0 1700 so 21 S07 361 201 Hurlbut Rd local 11S07 1 10 0 1700 4S lS roadway S08 361 3S4 Hurlbut Rd local 2S41 1 10 0 1700 so lS roadway S09 362 612 CR44 collector 4847 1 12 0 1700 so lS SlO 363 1S1 SR 104 collector 1987 1 12 6 1700 SS lS Sll 363 362 CR44 collector 4277 1 12 0 1700 so is S12 364 40S CR 176 collector .9141 1 12 0 1700 SS 26 S13 36S 374 CR 176 local. S21 1. 12 0. 13SO 30 26
- roadway S14 36S 376 Oneida St collector 173S 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 ,SlS 36S 6S3 Oneida St collector 20S9 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 S16 366 368 SR 481 minor 816 2 12 0 17SO. 3S 26 arterial S17 366 6S1 Oneida St collector 188 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 S18 366 6S3 Oneida St collector 3SS 1 12 0 1S7S 3S 26 S19 367 371 SR 3 *minor 4SS 2 12 0 1750 3S 28 NMP/JAF K-55 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
.. "-!lin'k .#f. lJp.: Down,. * ;. .. .' ..
- Node * * ** *i\!Ctd . *
- Name'" * * . . .. e . ,.,.;*'i ____ "'"" arterial 520 I 367 I 399 I SR 481 minor I arterial 521 I 367 654 SR 3 collector 522 . I 368 367 SR 481 minor arterial 523 I 369 368 Rochester St collector 524 I 370 371 1st St collector minor 525 I 371 367 SR 3 arterial 526 371 406 I SR 3 I minor I arterial 527 372 371 1st St collector 528 373 377 CR 9 collector 529 373 386 SR3 collecto*r 530 I 374 375 CR 176 local roadway 531 375 386 SR 3 collector 532 375 395 SR 3 collector 533 376 365 Oneida St collector 534 376 373 SR 3 collector 535 377 373 CR 9 collector 536 377 378 CR 9 collector 537 378 377 .CR 9 collector 538 378 319 CR 9 collector 539 379 378 CR 9 collector 540 379 380 CR 9 collector 541 380 329 CR 9 collector 542 380 379 CR 9 collector NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate :;;:Nb .. o.i . La.ne : shoulder :* Saturation* * : .. (.ft.;f * ..
- Wi.i;f,t.b Width*** i;;:.' *flow ., * >> " * ( f:f.} * '(tt.J" ,.. : (pcphpl) 1432 I 2 12 I 0 1900 313 1 12 0 1575 1852 2 12 0 1750 1377 1 12 0 1750 983 1 12 0 1750 455 2 12 0 1750 1325 I 2 I 12 0 1750 442 1 12 0 1750 1122 1 12 0 1575 1067 1 12 0 1575 1451 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1350 1107 1 12 0 1575 1204 1 12 0 1750 1735 1 12 0 1575 1415 1 12 0 1750 1122 1 12 0 1750 2318 1 12 0 1700 2335 1 12 0 1700 4565 1 12 0 1700 4565 1 12 0 1700 1276 1 12 0 1700 2502 1 12 0 1700 1249 1 12 0 1700 K-56 free 'Flow : *.speed: . J_i)'tph) 35 35 35 ' 30 30 35 I 35 30 35 35 I 30 35 35 35 35 35 50 50 55 55 50 55 50
- 28 26 I 26 I 26 I 26 I 28 28 28 26 26 I 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 27 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder* Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid link#* Stream Stream Name Type (ft.) 'tanes Width Width Rate Speed Number Node Node (ft.) (ft.) ' *' ., ' (mph) 543 . ' 381 .' 704 CR6 *
- collector '4048 1* 12 .. 0 1700 55 29. 544 382 *.*. 376. SR 3 collector 2521 1 12 12 '1700 45 26 . ' 545. . 383 382 SR 3 collector 3876 1 12 12 1700 55 26 546 384 '402'* SR481 collector 1769 1 12 12 1700 40 26 547 '385' 365 CR 176 local 1172 1 12 0 .* 1350 30 26 '. . roadway .. '548' 385 404 Ontario St local 1163 1 12 0 1350' 30 26 ,'. *roadway . ; .. *' 549** 386 :*373 SR 3 .*collector 1070 l 12 0 1750 35 26 550 386. 375 SR 3 collector 1107 1 12 0 1575 35 26 551
- 387 393 *. SR 481 *minor 2736 2 12 0 1900 40 28 .. arterial 552 388. 397 *.Fay St collector 2429 1 12 0 1700 40 28 553 ..
- 389 387 Fay St collector '680 1 12 0 1750 40 28 '554 390 391 CR 57 collector 2232*. 1 12 0 1575 35 28 ... .. 555 390 .* -439* SR481 minor '3684 *2 12 12 1900 60 28. ' arterial 556 *.. 392 390 Driveway . collector 500 1 12 0 1750 30 28 557 393 390 SR 481 minor 644 2 12 0 1750 35 28 arterial ' 558 394 393 .** Pierce Dr* collector 1237 1 12 0 1575 35 28 559 395 375 SR 3 **collector 1204 1 12 0 1575 35 26 *' local 560. ,395 '397 .4th St . roadway 2480 1 12 o* 1350. 30 28 561 395 654 SR 3
- collector* 558 1 12 0 1575 35 26 562 396 395 4th St local 790 1 12 0 1750 30 26 roadway 563 397 387 Fay St collector* 138 1 12 0 1750 40 28 564 398 377 S 12th St local 629 1 12 0 1350 30 26 NMP/JA.F K-57 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 link# 565 566 567 568 569 . . 570 571 572 . 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 NMP/JAF Up* Stream Node 399 400 401 401 401 402 403 404 405 405 406 406. 406 407 407 408 409 410 410 411 411 411 *Evacuation Time Estimate Down* Stream Node 387 . 368 409 410 650 . 652 . .* 402 402 382 385 371 441 644 420 641 409 406 401 411 419 641 643 Roadway Roadway Name Type rmn SR 481 minor arterial Rochester St collector SR48 collector SR48 colfector .. Oneida St collector SR 481 collector Ontario St local roadway Ontario St local roadway Gillespie Rd local roadway CR 176 collector SR 3 minor arterial SR 48 collector SR 3 collector SR 3 collector SR 3 collector Phillips local roadway* SR 48 .collector SR48 *Collector Hannibal St ,collector SR 3 collector SR 3 collector CR3 collector Length., No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free (ft.) lanes Width Widtli Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number fpcphpl) (mph) .. 1273 2 12 0 1750 .35 28 335 1 12 0 1750 30 26 1397 1 12 0 1750 35 26 790 1 12 O* 1575 35 26 1231 1 12 0 1575 35 26 775 1 12 12
- 1700 45 26 474 1 12 0 1350 30 26 980 1 12. 0 1350 30 26 1996 . 1 12 0 1575 35 26 *2494 1 12 0 1700 45 26. 1325 2 12 0 1750 35 28 3454 1 12 0 1575 35 28 1014 2 . 12 0 1750 35 28 3177 1 12 10 1700 45 . 25 3255 1 12 6 1750 45 25 669 1 12 0 1750 30 26 1943 1 12 0. 1750 35 39 790 1 12 0 . 1750 35 26 5759 1 12 0 1750 35 25 2558 1 12 12 1700 55 25 990 1 12 6 1750 45 25 1303 1 12 0 1700 45 25 KLD Engineering, P .c: February 24, 2016 Y. Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Link# Stream Stream Name Type Node Node 587 412 413 CR 3 collector 588 412 431 collector 589 *. . 413 .414 CR3 collector
- 590* 413 489 Rathburn. Rd collector 591 414 415 . CR 3. collector 592 415 432 .. CR 7 collector* . 593 415 730 CR 7. collector 594 417 453 SR 104
- collector 595 417 638 SR 3 collector 596 418 412. CR8 collector 597 418 419 SR 3 collector 598 418 489 SR 3 collector 599 . 419 411 SR3 collector 600 . 419 418. SR 3 collector 601 420 407 SR 3 collector 602 420 644 SR 3 .collector 603 421 407 Phillips St collector 604. 422 410 SR48 collector 605 423 422 SR48 collector 606 424 423 SR48 collector 607 425 424 SR 48 . collector 608 425 426 .CR 85 collector 609 426 42S CR 8S collector 610 426 428
- CR 8 . collector 611 426 SOl CR 8S
- collector 612 427 494 Rathburn Rd collector 613 427 67S CR 8S collector 614 427 676 CR 8S. collector NMP/JAF ..
- Evacuation Time Estimate Lane Length No.of Width (ft.) Lanes (ft.) 8607 1 12 6797 1 12 6522 1. 12 1245 1. 12 4741 1 12 1075 1 12 1743 1 12 779 1 12 3035 1 12 910 1 12 3095 1 12 8613 1* 12 2569 1 12 3095 1 12 3165 1 12 681 2 12 119S 1 12 1413 1 12 S373 1 12 6377 1 12 232S 1 12 7134 1 12 7134 1 12 S325 1 12 2SS2 1 12 4951 1 12 SS60 1 12 1S78 1 12 K-59 Saturation Shoulder Flow Width Rate (ft.) (pcphpl) 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1575 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 4 1700 0 1700 12 1700 12 1700 12 1750 12 1750 6 1700 0 17SO 0 1575 0 1S7S 3 1700 3 1700 3 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 0 1700 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 50 25 55 25 45 25 35 25 45 24 45 24 45 24 55 24 40 24 55 25 55 25 60 25 55 25 55 25 45 25 3S 28 3S 2S 3S 26 50 26 50 2S 50 19 so 19 so 19 SS 19 55 19 40 25 SS 19 so 19 KLD Engineering, P.C. . February 24, 2016 I, I I Link# 0.L[] :617 618 619 ,, 620 621 622 623 624 62S ' 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 63S 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 NMP/JAF .' Up* Stream Node stream Node I , 428 , I 429 429 430 430 418 432 41S 432 4S9 432 489 433 432 433 446 433 677 434 433 43S 437 436 438 436 46S 436 466 437 434 438 703' 439 440 441 442 443 460 444 443 44S 444 446 44S ', 447 4S2 4S3 4S8 4SS 4S6 4SS 4S7 4S8 4SS 4S9 417 Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Name [] 8 CR 8 CR 8 CR 7 SR3. SR 3 , CR 7 CR 8S CR 8S CR 7 CR 7 CR 7 CR 20 CR 20 CR 7 CR 7 1481 SR48 SR104 CR 8S CR 8S CR8S SR 104A SR104 CR 34 SR 104 SR 104 SR 3 Roadway Type
- 1 **collector* .. I 2S68 .*collector 1808 *collector **3460 collector 107S collector. ' 43S9 collector 10770 collector 10664 collector 1890 collector 4366 collector 'S363 collector 3193 collector 3669 collector S2S7 collector 1490 collector 4219 collector 2830 *freeway .2422 collector 1772. collector 8242 collector 3860 collector 1S16 collector 1014 collector 1370 collector 3234 collector 2119 collector 1299 collector 3724 collector 37S7 K-60 1* No. of Lanes 1 *1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 Larie Width (ft.) 12' 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 Shoulder Width (ft.,} *-0 0 0 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 8 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 12 Saturation Flow Rate (pcphpl) 1700.] 1700 17SO 1700 1700 1700-1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 *1100 1700 1700 1700 1700 2250 1S7S 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 17SO Free Flow Speed (mph) SS SS 4S 60, 60 SS so ', so 50' so so so so so so 7S 3S 60 so 40 40 SS SS SS SS SS SS -2S 2S 24 . 24 2S 24 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 29 28 24 18 18 18 18 24 24 24 24 24 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016
.,, ' .... " Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl} (mph} .* 643 460 4i7 SR 104 collector 2799 1 12 8 1750 55 24 644 -** 461 *-' 443 : SR 104 collector -16427 1 12 s 1700 60, 18 645 462 461 SR 104 collector' 4337 1 12 8 1700 55 18 646 462 486 SR104A .collector 3776 1 12 4 1700 50 18 ', 647 463 .. 462 SR104 collector 1245 1 12 0 1700 50 18 648 .** 464 463 CR 20. collector 2758 1 12 0 1700 ' 50 18 *. 649 465 464 CR20** collector 363.1 ', ' 1 ' 12 0 1700 50 18 ... 650 466 436 CR 20 collector 1490 i 12 0 '1700 50 18 .-, : 466 .****498 .-. CR 20 collector ' ' ',', 1276 1 12 0 1700 50 19 '.** '652* *_*** __ * -467 , 468* CR20 *collector
- 2572 1 12 0 1700 50 **. 19 . **., 653 467 ., -498 -***tR20 ' collector .3096 1 12 0 1700 50 19 654 468 -467 CR20 collector 2572 1 12 0 1700 50 19 655 468. .469 .CR 25 collector *3625 1 12 0 1700 50 19 656 469 *, 468 CR25 collector .. 3625 1 12 o* 1700 so 19 ' 657 '469' 470
- CR24. collector *1245 1 12 0 1700 '45 19 **658 469 * .. .. -CR 25 -collector 1919 1 12 0 1700 45 19 659 470 469 CR24 ;. collector 1245 1 12 0 170,0 45 19 660 470 471 '* CR 24 .collector '1655 1 12 0 1700 45 19 -, 661 471 .4.70 ' , .. *CR24 collector 1655 1 12 0 ' 1700 45 19 ' ,' 662' 471 483 CR 24. collector ' 4245 1 12 0 1700 50 19' -663 472 483 Minetto
- collector 519 1 12 ' 0 1125 25 19 . Bridge Rd ' ' 664 473 701 SR48
- collector 3181 1 12 3 1700 50 19 ' 665 474 473 ***SR48 collector 4865 1 12 3 1700 50 19 666 475 :242 *CR 57 colledor
- 957 1 12 0 1700 45 19 667 476 241 CR 57 collector 1575 1 12 0 1700 45 19 668 477 475 CR 57 collect.or 6336 1 12 0 1700 50 19 669 ,. 478 477' CR 57 colledor 670 1 12 0 1700 50 19 _.NMP/JAF
- K-61 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I I.*. .. ) . Up-Link# Stream Node 670 .*.* 479* 671 479 672 *.480 673 . 481
- 674 482 . 675. 483 '.679 .. 483 . 677 484 678. *, 484 679 485 680 4.85 681 486 . . 682 487. 683 488 .684 *.. .. 489 . 685 489 686 490 687 491 .* .... 688 492 689 493 690'* . 494 .. 691 *495 692 495 693 496 NMP/JA_F Evacuation Time Estimate Down-Roadway Stream Node Name *. 478 ' CR 57 481 SR 481 479. E River Rd* *. 482 SR 481 . *.*. *214* SR 481 ,471 .*CR24 .' 484 CR24 483 . CR 24 '485
- 48 426 CR 8 474 .. SR48 447 :' '* SR 104A 463 CR 20 447 CR 96 418 SR 3 432. SR 3 489. Rathburn Rd 490 Rathburn Rd 491 Rathburn Rd .492 Rathburn Rd .* '493 . Rathburn Rd 427 Rathburn Rd 712 Phillips Rd 495 Rathburn Rd Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Width Width Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpi) (mph) .
- collector. 4757 . 1 12 0
- 1100 50 12 collector 2638 1 12 12 1700 55 12 collector 6776 1 12. 12 1700 55 12 minor 1618 2* 12 12 1900 60 13 arterial minor 8439 2 12 12 1900 60 19 arterial *collector . 4245 1 12 0 1700 50 19 . collector 312 1 12 0 1575 35 19 collector . 312 1 . 12 0 1575 35 19 *collector 1072 1 12. 12 1700 40 19* collector 11458 1 12 0 1700 50 19 collector 3321 1 . . 12 3 1700 50 19 collector 15063 1 12 4 1700 55 18 collector 7757 1 12 0 1700 50 . 18. *local 4098 1 12 0 1700 40 18 roadway
- collector 8613 1 12 12 1750 60 25 collector 10771 1 12 12 1700 60 25 collector 3704 1 12 0 1700 40 25 collector 1390 1 12 0 1700 40 25 collector 574 1 12 0 1350 30 25 .*collector 1537 1 12 0 1700 40 25 *collector 414 1 12 0 1350 30 25 collector 3556 1 12 0 1700 45 19 local 4796 i 12 0 1575 35 19 roadway collector 6733 1 12 0 1700 45 19 K-62 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Up-Dowo-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Node Node Name Type 694 497 673 Rathburn Rd collector . 695 498 466 CR20 collector 696 *. 498 467 CR 20. collettor 697 498 702 Rathburn Rd collector 698 499 500 CR 25* collector 699 500 . 501
- CR 25 *collector 700 501 426 CR85 collector 701 501 . . 675 CR 85
- collector .. 702 502 468 . , CR 25 collector 703 503 514 Ellen St local* roadway 704 503 519 W 5th St collector . {OS 503 537 W 5th St local roadway 706 503 543 Ellen St local roadway 707 504 512 Liberty St local roadway 708 505 710 CR7
- collector 709 506 505 CR 7 collector 710 507 506 CR 7 collector 711 507 678 SR104 minor .arterial .* 7i2 507 680
- S.R 104 minor arterial 713 508 679 SR 104 .collector 714 509 678 SR 104 collector 715 509 708 SR 104 collector 716 510 . 509 Sweet Rd collector NMP/JAF Evacuation Time.Estimate Lane Shoulder Length No. of Width Width (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) 4538 1 12 0 1275 1 12 0 3095 1 12 0 . 7455 1 12 0 10918 1 12 0 2010 1 12 0 2553. 1 12 0 2736 1 12 0 5776 1 12* 0 163.1 1 12 0 5338 1 . 12 0 991 1 12 0 2153 1 12 0 4044 1 12 0 5.85 1 12 0 3113 1 12 0 7214 1 12 0 620 2 12 0 1572 2* 12 0 4550 1 12 4 888 1 12 0 645 1 12 4 1282 2 12 0 K-63 Saturation Flow Rate (pcphpl) 1700 1700 1700 . 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1350 1700 1350 1350 1700 1700 1700 1700 1900 1750 1700 1700 1700 . 1750 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 45 19 50 19 50 19 45 . 19 50 19 50 19 55 19 55 55 19 30 12 40 12 30 12 30 12 40 12 55 18 55 9 45 9 40 9 . 40 9 50 *9 45 9 50 9 40 9 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016
- .. *. '*' ..... * ". /' ... ,*r:**,.:*.* . . .'. .. * **-.; * ... ; S'aturatian Fr.ee *
- Up... *. *Down-* * * * ***. ** ' *** *
- Lane **Shoulder * * " ** **." .& *: * .. "i, -""'",,", "': ,,,.!f >$ : 'I>. *: ""' ** *
- Grid
- L" *k # . . . St . . . . .. St .. : '. , *.. ,. Roaaway. . . Roa .wa:Y: * *,No. of
- W'B h. *w*ci h : .. E;low Flow m . . .. re.all)* .. , ream ..... ,,, *** **<$. ... _.,,,, * .*, :*.,,.. ... 1 :t ..* , 1 t . *. . ** ... Number ' * '* N .d. , .N d"* .* Narng**.. .:*-.:* *. (ft.).,* .' ... (f *) .... * :*(tt*) . : *.*Rate. : . Speed * . . . o e . o ti! . . . :-* ., . . * * . . . * . * . *. t.. * , . ( .. 'l'i 'I) { h} * * * * * * * * * ** * . .,: * * * .. ;: ,, * * * .*. J:, * . .. .. . *: . . PGP. P *. *. mp
- 717 511 530 SR 104 major 1446 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 718 511 533 Hillside Ave collector 1475 1 12 0 1750 35 12 719 511 680 SR104 minor 1277 2 12 1750 arterial 0 40 9 720 512 505 Gardenier local 4983 1 12 0 1700 40 9 Hill Rd roadway 721 513 514 Ellen St local 863 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 722 513 517 SR 48 collector 1901 1 12 3 1700 40 12 723 513 670 W 1st St collector 851 1 12 0 1575 35 12 724 514 503 Ellen St local 1631 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 725 514 513 Ellen St local 863 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 726 515 484 SR48 collector 4100 1 12 3 1700 45 19 727 516 515 SR48 collector 3027 1 12 3 1700 50 19 728 517 518 SR 48 collector 2461 1 12 0 1700 45 12 729 518 692 SR 48 collector 2985 1 12 3 1700 45 12 730 519 497 Rathburn Rd collector 2824 1 12 0 1700 45 12 731 519 502 CR 25 collector 1326 1 12 0 1700 50 12 732 520 527 SR 104 major 1087 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 733 520 530 SR 104 minor 908 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 734 521 511 W Seneca St local 1031 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 735 522 523 W 1st St collector 956 1 12 0 1750 30 12 736 522 668 W Seneca St local 275 1 12 0 1350 30 12 NMP/JAF K-64 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Shoulder Saturation Free Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) {mph} roadway 737 *'* 523 522 W 1st St. * .*collector 956 1 12. 0 1350 30 12 '. *. minor .* '.738 523 5'26 SR 104 arterial 246 2 12 0 1750 *35 12 739 523 669 W 1st St collector. 1212 1 12 0 1350 30 . ,12 740 523 707 SR 104 minor 859 2 12 0 1900 35 12 arterial 741 524 346 E Utica St collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 12 742 524 538. W Utica St collector 1200 2 12 0 1750 35 12 ". 743 524 539 W lst St collector* .1014 .2 12 0 1750 35 12 744 524 669 W 1st St collector . 267 2 12 0 *1900 30 12 745 525 . 661 E 1st St local 265 2 12 0 1900 30 12 roadway 746 . 525 707 . SR 104 minor 206 2 12 0 1900 35 12 arterial . 747 526 523 .*. SR 104 minor 245 2 12 0 1750 35 12 " arterial 748 526 527 SR 104
- minor 878 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 749 526 666 W 2nd St local 483 1 12 0 1125 25 12 roadway 750 527 520 SR 104 minor 1087 2 12 0 1900 35 12 arterial 751 527 526 SR 104 minor 878 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 752 527 538 W 5th St local 1472 1 12 0 1750 35 12 roadway 753 527 689 W 5th St local 541 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway . NMP/JAF K-65 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) . 754 528 *-522.
- W 1st St collector. 1094 1 12. *o 1350 30 12 ' ' *focal 755 529 521. W Seneca St 399 1 12 0 1350 30 12 **-.. roadway 756 529 530 liberty St lac.al 710 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway . 757* 530 . 511 SR104 minor .1446 2 12 0 1750 ' 35 12 arterial 758.' '. 530 520 ,SR 104 minor 909 2 12 0. 1900 35 12. . ' .. arterial . ' . 759, .. * '530 529 Liberty St local. 710 . 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 760 ,* 531 Liberty St local 1544 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 761 ' 531 . '* 530 Liberty St local 1544 1 12 0 1750 30 12 *. r. ro.adw(ly 762 531 533 . W Utica St
- collector '1469 1 12 0 1750 35 12 763 . _531 534 W Utka St .collector 888 1 12 0 1575 35 12 .* . local 764 531 665 Liberty St* roadway 1041 1 12 0 1350 30 12 . ' local *. 765 532 529 Liberty St roadway 1831 1 12 0 1350 30 12 766 533 511 Hillside Ave
- collector 1475 1 12 ' 0 1750 35 12 767' 533 531 W .Utica St collector ' 1469 1 12 0 1575 35 12 768 533 544 Hillside Ave collector .740 1 12 0 1575 35 12 769 534 531 W Utica St collector 889 1 12 0 1575 35 12 770 534 538 W Utica St collector 1574 2 12 0 1750 35 12 .. 771 535 ' 533 W Utica St collector* 596 1 12 0 1750 35 9 772 .. 536 529 . wseneca st local 1930 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway
- NMP/JAF. K-66 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type {ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) ' *'.* ***.local 773 *.' 536 .** 689 .w 5th St 455 1 12 0 1350 30 12' *roadway 7}4. 537 '503' WSth St . local 991 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' roadway )75 537 '540 WSthSt
- local 859 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' . roadway*. 776
- 538 524 WUtica St*. collector 1199 2. 12 0 1750 35 12 ' local .777* 5_38 ' *., .527 '*, WSth St* . roadway 1472 l 12 0 1750' '* 35 12 ' ' 778 538 ' ' *534 W Utica St collector 1574 2 ' 12 0 1900 35 12 " local 779 538 540 . WSth St roadway 996 1 12 0 1350 30 12 780 . ', ' 539 524' W 1st St collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 12 ., local 781' 539 540 .Erie St roadway 1254 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ,' 782 539 *. *.670 ' . Wlst St collector 1466 1 '12 0 1575 35 ,. 12 ' -.. local 183 : 540 537 ...* WSth St roadway 859 1 12 0 1350 30 12 784 540 538 W 5th St local .996 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 785 '540 ' .539 Erie St . local 1254' 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway s4o " local 786 *69,1 Erie St roadway* 1173 1 12 0 1350 30 12 787 541 543 Hawley St local 1075 1 12 0 1350 30 12 , ' roadway 788 541 665 Erie St local 870 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 789 541 691 Erie St local 785 1 12 0 1350 30 12 NMP/JAF . K-67 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
, .. **;._': .. Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) ,:._.,, d roa way 790 542 544 Erie St local* ' 393 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' roadway 791 542 665 Erie St local 1190 1 12 0 1575 35 12 ,* roadway 792 543 '503 Ellen St local 2153 1 12 0 1350 30 12 ,'
- roadw'ay ' 793 543 504 Ellen st local 632 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 794 544 512 Hillside Ave collector* 5150 1 12 0 1700 45 12 795 544 533 H.illside Ave colleC:tor 740 1 12 0 1750 35 12 796 544 542 Erie St local 393 1 ' 12 0 1350 30 12
- roadway 797. 545 536 . W 5th St local ' 514 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 798 546 511 Washington *collector 1631 1 12 0 1750 35 9 Blvd 799 547 586 Syracuse St local 1102 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 800 547 664 Syracuse St local 1686 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 801 548 346 E UtiC:a St collector 339 2 12 0 1750 30 12 802 548 566 E 2nd St. local 1479 1 12 0 1750 30 12 ' roadway ' local 803 548 572 E 2nd St roadway 533 1 12 0 '1350 30 12 '804 549 480 SR 481 collector 3201 1 12 4 1700 45 12 805 549 662 E 1st St local 322 1 12 0 1350 *30 12 roadway NMP/JAF K-68 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
. '* .::-.-** . Link# 806 . 807.* 808 809
- 810 811 812 813 814 815 . 816 817 818 . 819 820 821 822 NMP/JAF .. Stream Node stream Node 550. .... . 550 348 551 342 552 565 552 582 553 303 553 313 554 547' 554 563 555 553 556 525 557 556 557 566 558 556 559 557 560 568 560 569
- Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Name City Line Rd
- E Alban_y St E 13th St .E Seneca St E 10th St East Ave East Ave
- Church St E 7th St Bunner St E 1st St E Cayuga St
- E 2nd st E 1st St E .2nd St SR 104 E 7th St Roadway Type .. roadway
- collector local roadway collector collector **collector collector local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway local roadway minor arterial ..
- local roadway Length (ft.) 2404 2370 314 1177 493 2645 1392 877 1107 1001 505 265 526 711 929 932 1457 K-69 No. of Lanes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 Lane Width (ft.) 12 12. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 Shoulder Width (ft.) 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a* 0 0 0 0 0 0 Saturation Flow Rate (pcphpl) . 1575 1575 1575 1750 1350 1350 1700 1700 1350 1350 1350 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 1350 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 35 13 ... 35 12 30 12 30 10 30 10 40 12 40 . 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 35 12 30 12 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Roadway Roadway Length No. of Flow Flow Grid Link# Stream Stream Width Width Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.} Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 823 561 578 E Schuyler St local 870 1 12 0 *1350 30 .10 . roadway
- 824 563 554 E 7th St Iota I 1107 1 12. 0 1350 30 12 roadway 825 563 569 E7th St :local 517 1 12 0 . 1350 30 . 12 roadway 826 563 663 E Albany St collector 919 1 12 *0 1350 30 *12 827 565 580 E Seneca St collector 885 1 12 0 1350 30 10 828 565 581 . E 7th St local 482 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 829 566 525 SR 104 minor 303 2 12 0 1750. 35 12 arterial 830 566 548 E 2nd St local 1479 1 12 0
- 1350 30 . 12 roadway minor .* 831 567 566 SR 104 arterial 290 2 12 0 1750 35 12 832 568 567 SR 104 minor 276 2 12 0 1750 35 12 arterial 833 568 577 E 4th St local 1499 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 834 569 560 E 7th St local 1457 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 835 569 563 E 7th St -local 516 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 836 569 577 E Utica St collector 888 1 12 0 1750 30 12 837 570 314 E 10th St collector 1406 1 12 0 . 1750 30 12 838 570 344 E 10th St collector 445 1 12 0 1350 30 12 839 570 569 E Utica St collector 1192 1 12 0 1350 30 12 840 571 570 E Utica St collector 1781 1 12 0 1750 30 12 . NMP/JAF K-70 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time* Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes Width Width Flow Flow Grid (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 841 _.,. 572 548 roadway ' 5,33 **,.1 12 0 1350 30 12 ' 842 572 '549, E Albany St collector 281. 1 12. 0 1350 30 12 843 573 572 E 2nd St
- local 463 1 12 0 . 1350 30 12 roadway * .. .
- 557 local . 844. ,. 574 E*Cayuga st .304 1 12 0 1750 30 12 .. roadway .84s: 574 *. ,' 567, E 3rd St
- local * '496 1 12 0 1750 30 12. i,,.*.*. **i roadway 846. 575 568 .. E4th St local*. 471 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 847' 575 *574 .. E_Cayuga St local 290 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 848 577 548 E Utica St collector 578 1 12 0 1350 30 12 849 577 568 E 4th St local. .1499 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway I, 850 577 " .663 E 4th St local 508 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 85J'* ,. E Schuyler St
- local 1750 3d . 578 . *, . 559 584 1 12 0 10 ..... *( roadway 852 578 580 E 4th St local 496 1 12 0 1350 30 10 -roadway . 853.' 579 578 E4th St local 385 1 12 0 1350. 30 10 roadway 854 ,580 575 E 4th St local 495 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 855 581 560 . E 7th St local
- 531 1 12c 0 1350 30 12 roadway 8,56 ... 581 575 '
- E*Cayuga St local 911 1 12 0 1350 30 12 NMP/JAF -K-71 KLD Engineering, P.C Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- . Saturation Free Up-Down-.. Lane Shoulder . Roadway .. No. of* W"d *h W"d h* Flow Flow Grid Stream ... Name fft.} *\.;"Lanes * * *
- Rate* :Speed
- Number Nod'e Ni,>de (pcphpl) (mph} roadway 857 582 314 E 10th St collector 662 1 12 0 1750 30 12 858 582 658 E Cayuga St local 524 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 859 583 582 E Cayuga St local 645 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 860 584 552 E 10th St collector 462 1 12 0 1350 30 10 861 584 561 E Schuyler St local 1177 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 862 585 584
- E Schuyler St local 629 1 12 0 1350 30 10 roadway 863 586 547 . Syracuse St local 1102 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 864 586 572 E Albany St collector 282 1 12 0 1350 30 12 865 587 554 E 7th St local 423 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 866 588 34 81 freeway 5999 2 12 10 2250 75 3 867 . 588 589 81 freeway 14746 2 12 10 2250 75 3 868 589 25 81 freeway 10128 2 12 10 2250 75 3 869 589 588 81 freeway 14802 2 12 10 2250 75 3 870 590 47 81 freeway 6696 2 12 10 2250 75 8 871 590 53 81 freeway 8881 2 12 10 2250 75 8 .872 591 54 81 freeway 7136 2 12 10 2250 75 17 873. 591 59 81 .freeway 8848 2 12 10 2250 75 17 874 592 60 81 freeway 5379 2 12 10 2250 75 17 875 592 593 81 freeway 6219 2 12 10 2250 75 17 876 593 66 81 freeway 5464 2 12 10 2250 75 23 877 593 592 81 freeway 6219 2 12 10 2250 75 17 878 594 68 81 freeway 4172 2 12 10 2250 75 23 NMP/JAF K-72 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- . *' .*,.. ,: . Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.} Lanes (ft.} (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 879 594 595 181 . freeway 5778 2 12 10 .2250 75 23 880 595 594 181 freeway 5778 2 12 10 2250 75 23 881 '595 615 181 freeway 3430 2 12 10 2250 75 23 882 596 597' 181 freeway '12349 2 12 10 2250 75 32 883 596 615 181 freeway 11581 2 12 10 2250 75 32 884 597 278 181 freeway 5884 2 12 10 2250 75 32 885 597 596 181 freeway 12339 2 12 10 2250 75 32 886 598 6 CR 5 collector 2614 1 12 0 i750 35 7. ' 887 599 ' 2 us 11 collector 1552 1 12 0 1750 35 8 888 599 116 us 11 collector 2352 1 12 6 1700 45 8 889 600 12 Sharoun Dr local 739 1 10 0 1750 30 7 ., roadway '890 601 117 CR41 collector 1229 1 12 0 1700 50 7 891 602 601 CR41 .collector 1865 1 12 0 1700 55 7 892 603 151 *Tollgate Rd collector 9721 1 12 6 1700 55 15 893 603 174 Tollgate Rd collector 1065 1 12 6 1700 40 6 894 604 188 SR104 collector 4495 1 12 6 1700 55 14 895 604 191 SR 104 collector 1816 1 12 6 1700 55 14 896 605 157 Spath Rd local 4997 1 12 0 1750 45 16 roadway 897 605 164 CR41 collector 3832 1 12 4 1750 55 16 " 898 606 605 CR41. collector 4799 1 12 0 1700 50 16 899 607 85 SR 104 collector 2527 1 '12 6 1700 50 16 900 607 697 Sandpipe Rd collector '3227 1 12 0 1700 45 16 901 608 56 SR 104 collector 1484 1 12 6 1750 50 16 902 609 149 SR 104 collector 3361 1 12 6 1700 40 15 903 609 198 Soper Mills local 745 1 12 0 1350 30 15 Rd roadway NMP/JAF K-73 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
. _:{. Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) {ft.) Rate Speed Number {pcphpl) (mph) 904 610 . 75 SR 69 . collector 258 1 12 0 1350 30 16 905 610 76 SR 69 coilector 1379 1 12 0 1350 30 16 906**. 611. 610 Madison Ave local. 685 1 10 0 1350 30 16 roadway 907 612 361 *CR44 collector 2106 1 12 0 1700 45 15 908 613 166 Rowe Rd local 9085 1 12 0 . 1700 50 16 roadway 909 ' 614 62. SR69 collector 2273 1 . 12 8 1575 35 23 910 . 615 595 181 freeway 3430 2 12 10 2250 75 23 911 615 596 181 . freeway 11581 2 12 10 2250 75 32 912 616 264 CR45 collector 2155 1 12 0 1700 40 22 913 617 264 us 11 colleetor 2524 1 12 6 1700 40 22 914 618 277 I 81-SR 49. freeway 612 1 12 4 1750 50 32 Ra nips . ramp 915 619 276 Driveways local 621 1 12 0 1750 30 32 roadway 916 620 276 Driveways local 393 1 12 0 1750 30 32 roadway 917 621 279 I 81-SR 49 freeway 671 1 12 4 1750 50 32 Ramps ramp 918 622 255 Pangborn Rd. local . 261 1 12 0 1700 40 22 roadway 919 .623 260 CR45 collector 2142 1 12 0 1700 45 22 920 623 262 . CR45 collector 2632 1 12 0 1700 45 22 921 624 302 Winks Rd collector 7207 1 12 0 1700 45 30 922 625 274 SR49 collector 2905 1 12 6 1700 50 30 923 626 360 CR 35 collector 3325 1 12 0 1700 50 21 924 627 144 CR 35 collector 4149 1 12 0 1750 50 21 925 628 238 CR6 collector 1622 1 12 o* 1700 45 20 . NMP/JAF K-74 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate '**-* February 24, 2016 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Speed Number Rate Link# Stream Stream Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (mph) Node Node 926 I 629 I 320 I JAF Driveway local -I 676 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1575 I 35 I 5 *roadway 9i7 630 234 . Mt Pleasant-local I 5678 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I 40 I 20 Rd roadway 928 631 235 CR45 collector 7487 1 12 -0 1700' 55 20 929 632 215 Myers Rd collector 11859 1 12 0 1700 45 20 930 633 315 CR 1 collector 919 1 12 0 1750 55 11 931 634 244 CR57 collector 417 1 12 0 1575 35 19 932 635 699 SR 481 collector 1049 1 12 4 1700 60 20 933 I 636 240 March Rd local I 1862 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I 40 I 19 roadway 934 636 I 243 I March Rd local I 467 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I 40 19 roadway 935 637 211 CR45 collector 3730 1 12' 0 1700 45 19 936 637 214 CR45 collector 461 1 12 0 1700 _45 19 937 638 455 CR 34 collector 5517 1 12 4 1700 40 24 938 641 407 SR 3 collector 3255 1 12 6 1700 45 25 939 641 411 SR3 collector 990 1 12 6 1750 45 25 940 642 641 Driveway collector 453 1 12 0 1750 30 25 941 643 412 CR 3 collector 4005 1 12 0 1700 45 25 942 644 406 SR 3 collector 1014 2 12 0 1750 35 28 943 644 420 SR 3 collector 681 2* 12 0 1900 35 28 944 645 644 W 4th St -local I 813 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1750 I 30 I 28 roadway 945 I 646 I 644 I W 4th St I local 674 1 12 0 1750 30 28 roadway 946 647 650 Oneida St collector 250 1 12 0 1575 35 26 947 647 651 Oneida St collector 189 2 12 0 1900 35 26 948 648 647 1st St local 264 1 12 0 1750 30 26 NMP/JAF --K-75 KLD Engineering, P.C. _Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Link# Stream Stream Roadway Node Node Name 949 649. : 647. . 1st St 950 650 401 Qneida St '951 650 647 Oneida St 952 .. 651 .* 366 Oneida St 953 651 647 Oneida St* 954:, 652 *. 366 .. .SR 481 . : 955 653 365 .. Oneida st* 956 653 366 Oneida St 957 (554 367 SR 3 958 654 395 SR 3 959 655
- 559 E 2nd St 960 . 656 ,* 314 SR 104 961 657 . 560
- SR104 .*. 962 658 581 E Cayuga St ,. 963 .. 658 *.*.657' E 9th St I I 964 659 657 E 9th St 965 660 304 Driveway 966 .. 661 346 E 1st St . NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Length No. of Type (ft.) Lanes roadway. local 271 1 roadway collector 1240 1 . collector 253 2 collector 188 1 *collector 188 1 minor '410 2 -.arterial . collector 2059 1
- collector 354 1 minor 313 2 arterial collector 558 1 local. 305 1 roadway *collector 1004 2 minor 644 2 arterial
- local 647 1 roadway local 564 1 roadway local 396 1 roadway local 395 1 roadway local 1237 2 roadway* K-76 Lane Shoulder Saturation Width Width Flow (ft.) (ft.) Rate (pcphpl) ' . 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1575 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1900 12 0 1350 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) . 30 26 35 26 35 26 . 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 35 26 30 10 40 12 45 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 11 30 12 KLD Engineering, P.C. . Februar¥ 24, 2016 Up-Down-Roadway Link# Stream Stream Node Node Name 967 661 ,' 525 E ist St '968' 662 346. E 1st St ' . 969 662 549 * . E 1st St ,, 970-,. 6_63 .,**' 577 E4th St ' ,: 663 586 E Albany St 972 664 480 Syracuse St '* 973 665 531' Liberty St -' 974 665 54,1 ** * .. Erie St ,, 975 665' *' 542 * Erie St -: ' -976 ',*, 666 526 W2nd St 977 666 668 \Al 2nd St ' 978 667 526 W 2nd St 919 *, 668 '536 w Seneca St . 980 668 666 W2nd St 981 669 523 W 1st St '982' 669 524 W 1st St NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Roadway Length No. of Type (ft.) lane's . .local 265 1 *roadway . local 213 2 roadway *local 322 1 . roadway. *' local 508 1 'roadway collector 290 .1 local* 174 1 *roadway local 1041 1 roadway local 870' 1 roadway local 1190 1 **.* roadway local *. 483 1 roadway local 477 1 roadway local roadway 519 1 local 881 .1 *roadway .. local 477 1 roadway collector 1212 1 collector 266 1 . K-77 Lane Shoulder Saturation Flow Width Width (ft.) (ft.) Rate (pcphpl) 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 i2 0 1350 12 0 1750 ' 12 0 1350 ' 12 0 1350 12 0 1350 i2 0 1350 . 12 0 1575 12 0 1750 12 0 1125 12 0 1750 12 0 1350 12 0 1125 12 0 1750 12 0 1750 Free Flow Grid Speed Number (mph) 30. 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 30 12 35 12 25 12 25 12 25 12 30 12 25 12 30 12 30 '12 KLD Engineering, P.C February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder
- Saturation free Link# Stream .. Stream Roadway RoadWC!Y length No.of Widtljt : Width ' i:. flow Flow Grid Na*Me *TY,pi:<" . (ft.) . *Lanes " .. ' ' " . :speed Number *Node* ., (ft.) (ft.) {pcphpl) (mph) 983 670 513 W 1st St collector 851 1 12 0 1575 35 12 984 670 514 Murray St local 966 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 985 670 539 W 1st St collector 1466 2 12 0 1750 35 12 986 671 514 Murray St local 2374 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 987 672 539 Birdie Cir local 226 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway . 988 673 674 Rathburn Rd collector 244 1 12 0 950 20 19 989 674 498 Rathburn Rd collector 1064 1 12 0 1700 45 19 990 675 427 CR85 collector 5560 1 12 0 1700 55 19 991 675 501 CR 85 collector 2737 1 12 0 1700 55 19 992 676 427 CR 85 collector 1578 1 12 0 1350 30 19 993 676 677 CR85 collector 2278 1 12 0 1700 40 19 994 677 433 CR 85 collector 4366 1 12 0 1700 50 18 995 677 676 CR 85 collector 2285 1 12 0 1700 40 19 996 678 507 SR 104 minor 620 2 12 0 1900 40 9 arterial 997 678 509 SR 104 minor 888 1 12 0 1750 45 9 arterial 998 679 463 SR 104 collector 4562 1 12 4 1700 45 18 999 680 507 SR 104 minor 1571 2 12 0 1900 40 9 arterial 1000 680 511 S.R 104 minor 1277 2 12 0 1750 40 9 arterial 1001 681 680 5th Ave local 255 1 12 0 1750 30 9 roadway 1002 682 680 5th Ave local 372 1 12 0 1750 30 9 roadway NMP/JAF K-78 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type (ft.) Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 1003 683 46 SR13. collector 956 1 12 0 1700 40 8 1004 684 683 Driveway local 256 1 12 0 1750 30 8 roadway 100,5 685 614 SR 69. collector 2851 1 12 8 1700 55 22 1006 686 685 SR 69 collector 1584 1 12 8 1700 45 22 1007 687 347 .. SR 104. collector 444 1 12 0 1700 40 10 .**ioo8 688 687 Driveway local 279 1 12 0 1750 30 10 roadway 1009 689 527 W 5th St local 541 1 12 0 1750 30 12 roadway 1010 689 536 W 5th St local 455 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 1011 690 528 Lake collector 937 1 12 0 1350 30 10 1012. 691 . 540 Erie St local 1173 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway .*. *.**1013 691 541 E.rie St local 784 1 12 0 1350 30 12 roadway 1014 692 516 SR48 collector 5010 1 12 3 1700 55 19 1015 693 105 CR 28 collector 767 1 12 0 1700 55 7 1016 694 693 CR 28 colledor 709 1 12 0 1700 40 7 1017 695 321 Lake Rd collector 2280 1 12 0 1700 . 40 5 1018 696 695 JAF Driveway local 596 1 12 0 1350 30 5 roadway 1019 697 613 Sandpipe Rd collector* 8866 1 12 0 1700 45 16 1020 698 83 CR4 collector 3233 1 12 0 1750 55 21 1021 699 229 SR 481 collector 1204 1 12 4 1700 60 20 1022 700 232 CR 57 collector 729 1 12 0 1700 so 20 1023 700 699 Van Bruen local 904 1 12 0 1700 40 20 roadway.* . NMP/JAF K-79 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free Link# Stream Stream Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Flow Flow Grid Node Node Name Type {ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) Rate Speed Number (pcphpl) (mph) 1024 701 42S SR48 collector 2284 1 12 3 1700 so 19 102S 702 496 Rathburn Rd. collector 3S03 1 12 0 1700 4S 19 . 1026 703 43S CR7 *collector 3142 1 12 0 1700 50 18 1027 70S 305 Creamery Rd collector 6719 1 12 0 1700 4S 11 1028 706 188 CR29 collector 4946 1 12 0 1700 SS . 14 1029 707 523 SR 104 minor 8S7 2 12 0 17SO 3S 12 arterial 1030 707 S25 SR 104 minor 20S 1 12 0 17SO 35 12
- arterial 1031 708 508 SR 104 collector 6S98. 1 12 4 1700 50 9 1032 708 709 Thompson local 6186 1 12 o* 1700 40 9 Rd roadway 1033 709 710 Thompson local 4006 1 12 0 1700 40 18 Rd roadway 1034 710 436 CR 7 collector 1772 1 12 0 1700 55 18 103S 711 364 Howard Rd local 3011 1 12 0 1700 40 20 roadway 1036 712 67S Ridge Road local 1604 1 12 0 157S 3S 19 roadway 1037. 714 203 Dennis Rd local 49S4 1 12 0 1700 40 14 roadway 1038 71S 207 CR 176 . collector 8167 1 12 0 1700 SS 20 1039 716 lSO SR.104 collector S6S1 1 12 6 1700 SS lS 1040 717 17S SR 104B collector 261S 1 12 6 1700 60 lS 1041 718 174 CR 1 collector 9429 1 12 0 1700 SS 6 1042 719 16S CR41 collector 4344 1 12 4 1700 SS 16 1043 720 13 SR 13 collector S281 1 12 3 1700 so 7 1044 721 10 CR S collector 2916 1 12 0 1700 so 2 104S 722 192 CR Sl collector 698S 1 12 0 1700 SS 14 )\JMP/JAF K-80 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Saturation Free Lane Shoulder Flow Flow Grid Up-Down-Roadway Roadway Length No. of Width Width Speed Number Rate Link# Stream Stream Name Type {ft.} Lanes (ft.) (ft.) (pcphpl) (mph) Node Node -1046 723 -: 3S4 . Hurlbut-Rd_ -local--.3187 1 -10 0 1700 so lS I I .*.**. -roadway I 1047 724' * '309_-_ . CR4 collector S369 1 12 0 1700 55 14 1048 _--_ 72S 308 SR104 collector 2765 1 12 6 1700 so 11 -_1049 726 137 CR4 collector 4637 1 12 0 -1700 55 14 lOSO ' -727 138 -collector I 8S49 I 1 I 12 I 0 I 1700 I -4S I 13 Corners Rd lOSl 728 --148 CR 6 collector ,9631 1 12 4 1700 so 15 __ ,-, -I i052 729. '.,603 TollgateRd . collector 901S 1 12 6 1700 SS 15 ---10S3 8043 43 181 -_freeway -4SO -2 12 10 22SO 7S 1 1054 --8298 298 ---181 freeway 837 3 12 10 22SO 7S 32 (exit link) -17 8017 SR 3 collector 519 -1 12 4 1700 SS 2 (exit link} 26 8026 CR 2 collector 343 1 12 0 1700 45 8 (exit link) 43 -8043 1_81 *freeway 4SO 2 12 10 2250 7S 1 (exit link} -44 '8044 ' us 1l collector 351. 1 12 6 1700 55 1 (exit l_ink) 48 8048 -SR 13 collector 1422 1 12 0 1700 -SS 8 -(exit link) SS 80S6 CR 28 :collector 11S7 1 12 0 1700 SS 8 (exit link)
- 61 8061 ' -SR 104 collector -*8Sl 1 12 6 1700 55 17 (exit link} 67 **8067 SR 69 colleC:tor S06 1 12 8 1700 4S 23 (exit link} 252 -82S3 -SR264 collector 771 1 12 6 1700 5S 30 (exit link) 281 8282 us 11 collectar 428 1 12 0 1S75 3S 31 (exit link) 298 -8298-181 -freeway 837 3 12 10 22SO 7S 32 (exit link} 391 8391 CR-57 * . collector 416 1 12 0 1700 SS 28 (exit link) 431 8431 _CR 8 collector 511 1 12 0 1700 SS 2S .(exit link} . 440 8440 1481 -_freeway 1002 1 12 12 22SO 75 29 (exit link)' 442 8442 SR48 collector 443 1 12 0 1700 40 28 (exit link) 4S2 84S2 SR 104A collector 8S4 1 12 4 1700 S5 18 (exit:link) 4S6 84S6 CR 34 collector 400 1 12 4 1700 5S 24 NMP/JAF K-81 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Up-Down-Lane Shoulder Saturation Free * '.Unk# Stream S .... , . . Roadway Length *. No. of WidtH :. Width . " Flow Flow Grid ..* tream . N r -. . ,. (ft.) : . * *:*
- Rate Speed N.umoer Node ; . * .
- ame . * * (ft.) (ft.) *. (pcphpl) (mph) . ' (exit link) 457 8457 SR104 collector 320 1 12 4 1700 60 24 (exit link) 704 8381 CR 6 collector 420 1 12 0 1700 55 29 (exit link) 713 8279 SR 49 collector 704 1 12 6 1700 45 32 (exit link) 730 8730 CR 7 collector 2022 1 12 0 1700 45 24 NMP/JAF K-82 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 Table K-2. Nodes in the Link-Node Analysis Network which are Controlled Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate Control Grid Map 2 941271 1298261 Actuated 8 4 940930 1299861 Stop 8 6 941048 1300112 Actuated 8 7 941255 1300442 Actuated 8 11 925344 1301924 TCP-Actuated 2 12. 925125 1299850 Actuated 7 16 934094 1324086 Stop 2 21 926839 1304437 Stop 2 28 939456 1322649 Stop 2 29 941023. 1300546 Stop 8 30 940891 1301680 Stop 3 36 951731 1328340 Actuated 1 45 940947 1278062 Stop 8 56 936666 1260028 Actuated 16 69 933064 1246560 Stop 22 73 928256 1247247 Stop 22 75 914525 . 1259199 Stop 16 76 914481 1260838 Stop 16 77 913582 1260863 Actuated 15 . 78 912195 1260959 *TCP-Actuated 15 79 912262 125998:2 Stop 15 80 912448 1256987 . Stop 15 82 908817 1243723 21 83 907028 . 1238025. TCP-Actuated 21 86 924440 1259431 TCP-Actuated . 16 88 913432. 1263070 Stop 15 97 915707 1280562 . Stop 7 100 923651* 1290773 TCP-No 7 Control 109 928226 1285485 Stop 7 110 928072 1285367 Stop 7 113 931858 1280655 Stop 7 116 941293 1294356 Stop 8 121 913605 1277309 Stop 6 122 909823 1280195 Stop 6 123 908324 1280150 Stop 6 130 900208 1226118 Stop 21 131 900361 1221043 Stop 30 138 861928 1252649 Stop 14 143 888473 12.44027 Stop 21 . NMP/JAF . Estimate K-83
- KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 . . . . . 1*
Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate 144 901122 1239335 ** 145 889941 1252116 149 891534 1268011 151 901715 1266098 154 891321 1270778 157 921457 1263262 161 926672 1287191 163 938764 1268677 '164 925842 1270925 165 928194 1275491 166 933037 1247109 172 890969 . *1276146 174 901103 1276869 182 872828 1271246 187 873533 1249694 188 873121 1265439 . , 194 881683 1247475 200 911076 1254216. 201 911379 . 1256034 202 880221 1267564 205 877259 1273111 206 876741. 1282021 . 208. 8.69066 1236599*. 209 869228 1236014 211 856881 1239881 . 212 856997 1240291 214 852712 1239430 215 863943 . . 1238651 216 864072 *1236097 218 862216 1226917 . 219 858651 1229960 220 861864 1227765 223 865177 1216054 225*. 864990 1216007 . 234 874743 1234306 .. ... 235 882118 1231515 i36. 884137 1230458 ";'. *. 23? .. * *880195 1218213 . NMP/JAF . K-84 , * .* * .* Evacuation Time. Est.imate Control TCP-Actuated Stop Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated Stop Stop TCP-Actuated TCP-No Control Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated Stop Stop Stop *Stop Stop Stop Stop . Stop Stop** Stop .. Stop Stop Stop Stop TCP-No Control* . Stop Stop Grid Map 21 15 15 15 15 16 7 16 16 7 22 6 6 14 14 14 20 15 15 14 14 5 20 20 19 19 19 20 20 20 19 20 26 26 20 20 20 . 27 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016 ...
Node 240 241 243 250 254 255 257 258 260 "263 264 268 272 274 275 276 277 279 290 303 304 _305 306 309 313 314 315 *318 321 325 328 329 331 334 336 --_ 337 NMP/JAF ----Evacuation Time Estimate X Coordinate Y Coordinate 859087 1232917 856157 1232611 856768 1232691 898907 1211404 914627 1225262 918597 1223060 913366 1221146 919716 1219130 920477 122806Ei 925223 1229006 934909 1229749 921470 1215939 919353 1202669 908648 1205098 936517 1198091 940772 1198035 941992 1_197777 942503 1197658 934852 1204362 848269 1257175 849930 1261818 860678 1262784 869i05 -1263135 855677 1254640 844355 1258167 -_ 843118 1260922 855859 -1270694 863061 1279014 872316 1281770 864864 1270844 869986 1228451 -879785 1211823 854424 1269495 -850590 *1261818 845702 1264709 846269 1263423 K-85 Control Grid Map Stop 19 Stop 19 Stop 19 Stqp 30 Stop 22 Stop 22 Stop 30 Stop 31 Stop -22 Stop 22 Stop 22 Stop 31 Stop 31 Stop 30 Actuated 31 Actuated 32 Actuated 32 Actuated 32 Stop 31 Stop 13 Actuated 11 Stop 11 Stop 14 Stop 13 Stop 12 Actuated 12 TCP-Actuated 11 TCP-No 5 Control TCP-No 5 Control TCP-No 14 Control TCP-No 20 Control Stop 27 Stop 11 Stop 11 Stop 10 Actuated 10 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate 338 846327 1261111 342 845052 1260939 344 843766 1259188 346 840837 1258531 . 348 846790' 1260232 351 868096 1281568 359 900177 1227447 364 869991 1223956 365 866945 1212165 366 864609 1211553 367 865692 1209119 368 864872 1210780 371 865305 1208880 373 868889 1211588 374 867004 1211647 375 867428 1210258 377 869987 1211822 382 870451 1214539* 387 867662 1207388 390 870077 1205031 393 869558 1205414 395 866414 1209608 397 867733 . 1207507 401 862777.. 1211339 402 864595 .. 1212738 406. . 864122. 1208281 407 . ..
- 1208944 .. *. 409 863.356' .** **.1210061 411 856759 1211930 412 8S152o 1212127* 415 832159. *' . 1211130' 417 . 824249 1210851. 418 .. 851481 1213036 .*425 857193* 1226028 426 850061 1225866 .. *. 427. 839710 1223155 432 .. ... B321lS. 1212192' 433 831535 1222840 436 8333.34. 1244195 443. 823622 1221874 NMP/JAF K-86
- Evacuation Time Estimate Control TCP-Actuated Actuated Stop Actuated Stop Yield Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated TCP-Actuated TCP-Actuated Actuated Actuated Stop Stop Stop Stop Actuated Actuated Stop Actuated Stop TCP-Actuated Stop TCP-Actuated Stop TCP-Actuated *Actuated Stop ,Stop -. . *Actuated . Actuated .. Stop ., .Stop Stop *Stop Stop Stop " Stop Grid Map 12 12 12 12 12 5 21 20 26 26 28 26 28 26 26 26 26 26 28 28 *28 26 28 26 26 . 28 25 26 . 25 . 24 24 25 19 19 19 24 18. 18 18 . . KLD Engineering, P.C. *, * . February 24, 2016 I Node X Coordinate V Coordinate 447 809615 1228096 455 821190 1204555 463 821704 1243558 465 828086 1243868. 468 841538 1242849 469 842615 1239387 475 850256 1239192 480 843361 1255918 483 849168 1238265 484 849480 1238278 489 842877 1212630 498 836046 1243772 501 847508 *1225854 503 839570 1255007 505 833318 1246553 509 831360 1255984 511 834930 1258482 512 835299 1251126 513 841870 1255583 514 841201 1255037 523 *839315 1259512 524 839896 1258151 525 840293 1259932 526 . 8390S3 1259431 527 838278 '. 1259080 528 838580 1261426 529 836117 1259264 . 530 836372 . 1258600 ..
- 531 836443. 1257057. 533 834974 1257007. 536 .. 1260002 537 839530 .1255998 538 838785* 1257698 539 *. 840347 1257242 540 1256783 54i 837366 1256042 543.* . 837417 *. 1254968 . 547 842271** *1257428 548 841147 1258670 NMP/JAF
- K-87 *Evacuation Time Estimate Control Yield Stop Stop TCP-No Control Stop Stop Stop Yield Stop Stop Stop Stop .Stop Stop Stop TCP-Actuated Stop Stop . Actuated Actuated TCP-Actuated . TCP-Actuated Stop Stop . Ac.tuated . Stop Attuated . Stop _Stop Aduated Actuated . Stop **Stop Stop Stop .Stop* Grid Map 18 24 18 18 19 19 19 12 19 19 25 19 19. 12 18 9 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 12 12 . t2 12 . 12 . 12 12 12 12 12 . 12 . 12 li *
- KLD Engineering, P.C. *.February 24, 2016 Node X Coordinate Y Coordinate Control Grid Map 549 841083 1258055 Stop 12 552 842654 1261981 *Stop 10 553 845708 1257840 Stop 12 554 843094 1257731 *Stop 12 556 840126 1260409 Actuated 12 557 840368 1260518 Actuated 12 559 840048 1261390 Actuated 10 560 841969 1260599 Stop 12 563 842708 1258769 Stop 12 565 841566 1261529 Stop 10 566 840578 1260035 Actuated 12 567 840841 1260162 Actuated 12 568 841094 1260278 Actuated .12 569 842498 1259241 Stop 12 570 843631 1259612 Actuated 12 572 841339 1258172 Stop 12 575 840928 1260719 Stop 12 577 841679 1258897 Actuated 12 *. . 578 840574 1261646 Stop 10 580 840751 1261182 Stop 12 . 581 841761 1261089 Stop 12 582 842848 1261527 Stop 10 584 842475 1262408 Stop 10 586 . 841593 1258298 Stop 12 605 923915 1267613 Stop 16 610 914514 1259458 *. Stop 16 613 977486. 1254302 Stop 16 622 . 918841 1222967 Stop 22 628 885332 1233819 TCP-No 20 *Control 634 858890 1229979 Stop 19 636 857234 1232726 Stop 19 637 853170 1239492 Stop 19 641 857444 1211215 Actuated 25 644 863191 1207876 Actuated 28 647 864233 1211581 Actuated 26 657 842581 1260802. Actuated 12 658 842364 1.261324 Stop 10 663 841857 1258420 Stop 12 .664 8.43244 1256050 Stop 12 * .. NMP/JAF * . K-88
- KLD Engineering, P.C. EvacuationTime Estimate
- February 24, 2016. **
- Node x Y Coordinate Control 665 836496 1256016 Stop 12 666 838897 1259878 Stop 12 668 838722 1260323 Stop 12 675 844817 1225354 Stop 19 679 823063 1247913 TCP-No 18 Control 680 833865 1257776 Actuated 9 683 943294 1296923 Actuated 8 687 847359 1261333 Actuated 10 689 838068 1259579 Stop 12 691 838089 1256348 Stop 12 695 870037 1281825 Stop 5 697 919801 1258551 TCP-No 16 Control 698 903888 1238801 TCP-No 21 Control 699 861844 1224569 Stop 20 701 856309 1228134 TCP-No 19 Control 702 836516 1236331 TCP-No 19 Control 703 832160 1237968 TCP-No 18 Control 710 833267 1245970 Stop 18 712 844181 1226826 Stop 19 1Coordinates are in the North American Datum of 1983 New York Central Plane Zone NMP/JAF K-89 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 _j APPENDIX L ERPA Boundaries L. ERPA BOUNDARIES ERPA 1 Lake Ontario on the North; Nine Mile Point, and Parkhurst Rds. to the East; Miner Rd. to the South; Bayshore, and Lakeview Rds. to the_ West. ERPA 2 Lake Ontario on the North; Shore Oaks Drive to the East; County Rte. 1 on the South; and to just west of County Rte. 29 between Miner and North Rds. to the West. ERPA 3 Lake View and Miner Rds. on the North; just east of County Rte. 29 to the East; to County Rte. 1 on the South; corner of County Rtes. 1 and lA to the West. ERPA 4 Lake Ontario on the North; Dempster Beach Drive, County Rte 6 and 6A to the East; US Rte 104 on the South; Shore Oaks Dr., County Rte. 1, and to just west of Woolson and Dennis
- Rds. to the West. ERPA 5 Rte. 1 on the North; just west of Woolson and Dennis Rds. to the East; U.S. Rte: 104 on.the South; and Creamery Rd. to the West. ERPA 6 The road just east of the Alcan Plant and Co. Rte. lA on the North; Creamery Rd. to the East; U.S. Rte. 104 on the South; and County Rte. 63 to the West. ERPA 7 Lake Ontario on the North; just west of Mexico Pt. between County Rte. 43 and Ladd Rd. to the East; U.S. Rte. 104 on the South; and.County Rte. 6 and Dempster Beach Drive to the West. ERPA 8 U.S. Rte. 104 on the North; just east of and Green Rd. to the East; the intersection of Johnson and Craw Rds. in Vermillion on the South; and County Rte. 6 to the West. . . ERPA 9 lj.S. Rte. 104 on the North; County Rte. 6 to the East; just. North of Tapian Drive on the South; and to just west of Co. Rte. 51 to the West.
- ERPAlO U.S. Rte. io4 on the North; just east bf co, Rte. 51 fo the County Rte. 4 on the South; . and Klocks Corners Rd. to the West. . ' . .. . . . ERPA 11 U.S; Rte. 104 on the North; Klocks Corners Rd. to the East; CountyRte. 4 on .. the South; and City line Rd. to the West. . . . . ERPA12 TheCity of Oswego, east of.the ERPA 13 The City of Oswego, west'ofthe Oswego River. ERPA.14 County Rte. 5 (just past the bridge ih'Port on the North; N.Y. Rte. 3,. Manwaring Rd . . and just east of s: Daysvi!le Rd. to. the East; Sherman Rd. on the South; and Lake Ontario to -,-, .. . . . -the West. ERPA 15 Just north of the intersections of 104B, N.V. Rte. 3 and Sherman Rd. on the North; Sherman, Spath and Smithers Rds. to the East; U.S. Rte. 104, excluding the Village of on the South; the intersection of George.Rd. and U.S. Rte. 104, just west of Mexico Pt., and . County 43._and Ladd Rd. to the West ... * --**. ERPA 16 . The Village of Me.xico. , Nl\'IP/JAF L-1
- KLD Engineering; P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ERPA 17 U.S. Rte. 104 and the southern boundary of Village of Mexico, on the North; Emery, Stone, Larson and Pumphouse Rds. to the East; Gillette Rd. on the South; and just east of and Green Rd. to the West. ERPA 18 Just below County Rte. 51, just above Tapian Dr and the intersections of Johnson and Craw Rds. on the North; N.Y. Rte. 3, County Rte. 4, and County Rte. 35 to the East; Clifford Rd. on the South; Baldwin, Silk, and just east of O'Connor Rds. to ERPA 19 County Rte. 4 on the North; just east of Silk Rd. to the East; just above County Rte. 45 (intersecting with County Rte. 53), Myers, Black Creek, and Paddy Lake Rds. on the South; the Oswego River to the West. ERPA 20 Just above Co. Rte. 45 (intersecting with County Rte. 53), Myers, Black Creek, and Paddy Lake Rds. on the North; Silk, and Baldwin Rds. to the East; Hawk and Rowlee Rds. on the South; the Oswego River to the West. ERPA 21 Oswego City Line on the North; the Oswego River to the East, Hickory Grove Rd. ERPA 22 Lake Ontario on the North; County Rte. 7, Byer Rd., and County Rte. 25 to the East; Furniss and Tug Hill Rds. on the South; Bunker Hill Rd. and Maple Ave. to just west of Crestwood Dr. to the West. ERPA 23 Oswego River within the Oswego City limits. ERPA 24 Oswego River south of the Oswego City limits to Lock #5 in Minetto. ERPA 25 Oswego River south of Lock #5 in Minetto north to Hickory Grove Rd. ERPA 26 Portion of Lake Ontario within 5 miles and west of the plants. ERPA 27 Portion of Lake Ontario within 5 miles and west of the plants. ERPA 28 Portion of Lake Ontario between 5 and 10 miles west of the plants. ERPA 29 Portion of Lake Ontario between 5 and 10 miles east of the plants. NMP/JAF L-2 *Evacuation Time Estimate KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 APPENDIX M Evacuation Sensitivity Studies M. EVACUATION SENSITIVITY STUDIES This appendix presents the results of a series of sensitivity analyses. These analyses are designed to identify the sensitivity of the ETE to changes in some base evacuation conditions. M.1 Effect of Changes in Trip Generation Times A sensitivity study was performed to determine whether changes in the estimated trip generation time have an effect on the ETE for the entire EPZ. Specifically, if the tail of the mobilization distribution were truncated (i.e., if those who responded most slowly to the Advisory to Evacuate, could be persuaded to respond much more rapidly), how would the ETE be affected? The case considered was Scenario 6, Region 3; a winter, midweek, midday, with good weather evacuation of the entire EPZ. Table M-1 presents the results of this study. Table M-1. Evacuation Time Estimates for Trip Generation Sensitivity Study Tdp Evacuation Time Estimate for Entire.EP.Z: ** .. -':."" *--. . ., GeneratiPI'! **** . .. : " Period .. 901h Percentile ' . '---, .. 2 Hours 30 Minutes 2:50 3:45 3 Hours 2:55 3:45 3 Hours 30 Minutes (Base) 2:55 3:50 As discussed in Section 7.3, for Scenario 6, Region 3, traffic congestion persists within the EPZ for about 3 hours and SO minutes. As such, the ETE for the 10oth percentile is not affected by the trip generation time (at most 5 minutes), but by the time needed to clear the congestion within the EPZ. The goth percentile ETE are also not sensitive to truncating the tail of the mobilization time distribution. NMP/JAF M-1 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 M.2 Effect of Changes in the Number of People in the Shadow "'"'"'""'""' Who Relocate A sensitivity study was conducted to determine the effect on ETE of changes in the percentage of people who decide to relocate from the Shadow Region. The case <;:onsidered was Scenario 6, Region 3; a winter, midweek, midday, with good weather evacuation of the entire EPZ. The movement of people in the Shadow Region has the potential to impede vehicles evacuating . from an Evacuation Region within the EPZ. Refer to Sections 3.2 and 7.1 for additional information on population within the Shadow Region. Table M-2 presents the evacuation time estimates for each of the cases considered. The results show that reducing the shadow percentage from 20 percent to 0 percent will reduce the' goth percentile by 5 minutes and 10 minutes in the 10oth percentile ETE. Reducing the shadow percentage of the base care by 5 percent will reduce the goth and 1ooth percentile ETE by 5 minutes. Tripling the shadow percentage from 20 percent to 60 percent results in no change in the goth percentile ETE and increases the 10oth percentile. ETE by 15 minutes. Evacuating 100 percent of the shadow region will increase the goth percentile ETE by 5 minutes increase the 1ooth percentile ETE by 25 minutes. The telephone survey results presented in Appendix F indicate that 21 percent of households* would elect to evacuate if advised to shelter, which differs from assumption of 20 percent Compliance suggested in NUREG/CR-7002. The difference in percentage is minimal, thus, the base assumption of 20 percent is valid and a sensitivity study for 21. percent was not performed. Table Time Estimates for Shadow Sensitivity Study " ** < ** : .. . . Evacuation Time Estimate for£ntirel:Pz:: ** . * . Percent Shadow Shadow ;<-<:_:-,"': '""""* *r. 4 , * , . .. ,.. " Evacuation goth.Percentile . . 'rpotii Pei:centile * ".. ', . Vehicles *' 0 0 2:50 3:40 15 2,402 2:50 3:45 ., 20 (Base) 3,203. 2:55 3:50 " 60 9,609 2:55 4:05 100 16,015 3:00 4:15 . NMP/JAF M-2 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- M.3 Effect of Changes in EPZ Resident Population A sensitivity study was conducted to determine the effect on ETE of changes in the resident population within the study area (EPZ plus Shadow Region). As population in the study area changes over time, the time required to evacuate the public may increase, decrease, or remain the same. Since the ETE is related to the demand to capacity ratio present within the study area, changes in population Will cause the demand side of the equation to change and could impact the ETE. As per the NRC's response to the Emergency Planning Frequently Asked Question (EPFAQ) 2013-001, the ETE population sensitivity study must be conducted to determine what percentage increase in permanent resident population causes an increase in the goth percentile ETE of 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less. The sensitivity study must use the scenario with the longest goth percentile ETE (excluding the roadway impact scenario and the special* event scenario if it.is a 1 day per year special event). Thus, the sensitivity study was conducted using the following parameters*: 1. The percent change in population within the study area was increased by up to 30 percent.* Changes in population were applied to permanent residents only (as per federal guidance), in both the EPZ area a'nd in the Shadow Region. The transportation infrastructure remainedfixed; the presence of new roads or highway capacity improvements wcisnot considered. 3. The study was performed for the 2-Mile Region (ROl), the 5-Mile Region (R02) and the *entire EPZ (R03}. . 4. The scenario (excluding rocidway impact an.d spe.cial event) with the highest goth percentile ETE values was selected as the case fo be considered in this sensitivity study (Scenario 8 -winter, midweek, midday, with snow). Table M-3 presents the results oft.he sensitivity study. Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO {lOCFRSO), and NUREG/CR-:7002, Section 5.4,. require licensees to provide an updated ETE analysis to the NRC when a increase within the EPZ causes ETE values (for the 2-Mile Region, 5-Mile Region or en'iire EPZ) to increase by 25 perteht or 30 minutes, whichever is less. : All ETE for the region, are greater than 2 hours;. 25 percent of these base ETEs is always greater than 30 minutes .. Therefore, 30 minutes is the lesser and is the criterion for Twenty 'percent of the goth percentile ETE 'for the 2-mile region . (1:50) is 28 which is .less 30 minu!es an*d is the criterion for .updating fo'rthis region .. .. Those percenfpopulation changes whic.h result in the goth percentile ETE changes greater. than 30. minutes (or 28 minutes for the 2-,mile region) are highlighted in red in Table ETE Variation with P'opulation Change -a, population increase of 22 percent or niorewould require a full ETE update .. Exelon will haveto estimate the EPZ population on an annual basis. If the EPZ population 22 percent or more, an updated ETE analysis will be needed. . . NMP/JAF M-3. KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation Time Estfrnate February 24, 2016 *!,'.
Table M-3. ETE Variation with Population Change Region Population Change Base 20% 21% 22% 2-Mile 1:50 1:50 1:50 1:50 5-MILE 2:10 2:15 2:15 2:15 FULL EPZ 3:15 3:40 3:40 3:50 Region Base Population Change 20% 21% 22% 2-Mile 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5-MILE 4:20 4:20 4:20 4:20 FULL EPZ
- 4:25 4:25 4:40 5:00 M.4 Enhancements in Evacuation Time This appendix documents sensitivity studies on critical variables that could impact ETE.
- Reducing trip generation time does not significantly impact the goth and 1ooth percentile ETE since congestion continues beyond the trip generation (Section M.1). Nonetheless, public outreach should be considered to inform people within the EPZ to mopilize quicker.
- Shadow evacuation can have a marginal impact on ETE (Section M.2). If the evacuating shadow vehicles drop below 15%, it will drop the goth percentile ETE by 5 minutes and not affect the moth percentile ETE. If a full shadow evacuation were to occur, then the goth percentile ETE would increase by 5 mimites and the moth percentile ETE would increase by 25 minutes. Nonetheless, public outreach could be considered to inform those people within the EPZ (and potentially beyond the EPZ) that if they are not advised to evacuate, *they should not.
- Population growth results in more evacuating vehicles which could significantly increase ETE (Section M.3). If the population were to increase by 22% or more; then a new ETE
- study will need to be condu.cted. Public outreach t6 inform those people within the EPZ to evacuate as a family in a single vehicle would reduce the number of evacuating vehicles . . and reduce ETE or offset the impact of population growth. NMP/JAF M-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 APPENDIX N ETE Criteria Checklist N. ETE CRITERIA CHECKLIST. Table N-1. ETE Review Criteria Checklist NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis LO lntrodudion a. The emergency planning zone (EPZ) and surrounding area Yes Section 1 should be described. b, A map should be included identifies primary features Yes Figure 1-1 of the site, including major roadways, significant topographical features, boundaries of counties, and population centers within the EPZ. c. A comparison of the current and previous ETE should, be Yes Table 1-3 provided and includes similar information as identified in Table 1-1, "ETE Comparison," of NUREG/CR-7002. 1.1 Approach a. A discussion of the approach and level of detail obtained Yes Section 1.3 during the field survey of the roadway network should be provided. b. Sources of demographic data for schools, special facilities, Yes Section 2.1 large employers, and special events should be identified. Section 3 c: Discussion should be presented on use of traffic control Yes Section 1.3, Section 2.3, Section 9, plans in the analysis. Appendix G d. Traffic simulation models used for the analyses should be Yes Section 1.3, Table 1-3, Appendix B, C and identified by name and version. D NMP/JAF KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis e. Methods USE;!d to address data uncertainties should be Yes* Section 3 -avoid double counting described. Section 5, Appendix F -4.5% sampling error at 95% ,confidence interval for telephone survey 1.iAssumptions a. The planning basis for the ETE includes the assumption Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption 1 that the evacuation should be ordered promptly and no Section 5.1 . early protective actions have been implemented .. b .. Assumptions consistent with Table 1-2, "General Yes Sections 2.2, 2.3
- Assumptions/' of NUREG/CR-7002 should be provided and include the basis to support their use. 1.3 Scenario Development . a. The ten scenarios in Table 1-3, Evacuation Scenarios, Yes Tables 2-1, 6-2 should be developed for the ETE analysis, ora reason . should be provided for use of other scenarios. L3.1 Staged Evacuation a. A discussion should be provided on the approach used in Yes Sections 5.4.2, 7 .2 development of a staged evacuation. 1.4 Evacuation Planning Areas a. A map of EPZ with emergency response planning areas Yes Figure 6-1 (ERPAs) shou,ld be included. b. A table should be provided identifying the ERPAs Yes Table 6-1 considered for each ETE calculation by downwind direction in each sector. NMP/JAF N-2 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 I
.: *,". NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis c. A table s.ir:nilar to Table 1-4, "Evacuation Areas for a Staged Yes Table 7-5
- Keyhole," of NUREG/CR-7002 should be* ... : :provided *and: the complete* evacuation of the 2, 5; .*. arid 10 mile and forthe 2 mile area/Smile keyhole evacuations . . , *. Demand Estimation a. Demand estimation should be developed for the four Yes Permanent residents, employees, population groups, including permanent of the transients -Section 3, Appendix E .. *.* EPZ, transients, special facilities, ahdschools: . Special facilities, schools -Section 8, *. . . *'. Appendix E 2.1 Permanent Residents Population
- a. . The US Census should be the source ofthe population Yes Section 3.l values; or another cred,ible source be provided . .
- b . . Population values should be adjusted_ as necessary for .. Yes Used 2010 US Census data to project out **1.* growth tp reflect population estimates to the year of the to 2015 using 2014 growth rates. ETE. c. *:A sector diagram should be included, similar to. Figure 2-1, Yes Figure 3-3 . . . ' . . . . . "Po_pulation by Sector/' of NU REG/CR-7002, showing the* population distribution for permanent residents. 2.1.1 Permanent Reside'nts with Vehicles a . The persons per vehicle value should be between 1 and 2 . Yes 1.93 persons per vehicle -'-Table . or justification should be provided for other values. b. Major employers should be listed. Yes Appendix E -Table E-3 *. NMP/JAF N-3 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis ... 2.1.2 Transient PopU,l,ation, a. . A list of facilities which attract transient populations Yes Sections 3.3, 3.4, Appendix E should be induded, and peak and average attendance for .* these facilities s.hould be listed. The source of information t1Sed to develop attendance values should be provided. b. The average population during the season should be used, . Yes Tables 3-6, 3-::7 and Appendix E itemize the itemized and totaled for eacb scenario. transient population and employee estimates. These estimates are multiplied *,. by the scenario specific percentages provided in Table 6-:3 to estimate transient . --population by scenario . c. . The percent of permanent assumed to be at Yes Sections 3.3, 3.4 facilitie;!s should be estimated. d. The number.of people per vehicle should be provided. Yes Sections 3.3, 3.4 . . . Numbers may vary by scenario, an*9 if sci, discussion on why values vary should be provided. e. Asector diagram should b.e included, similar to Figure 2-1 Yes Figure 3 transients of NUREG/CR-7002, showing: the population distribution * .* Figure 3 employees for the transient population. 2.2 Transit Dependent Permanent Residents a. The methodology used to qetern:iine the number of transit Yes Section 8.1, Table 8-1 dependent residents should be discussed. b. Transportation resources needed to evacuate this group Yes Section 8.1, Tables 8-5, 8-10 should be quantified. c.
- The county/local evacuation plans for transit dependent. Yes Sections 8.1, 8.4, Table 8-6 residents should be used in the analysis. NMP/JAF N-4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time* Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments * .... in ETE Analysis d; The methodology used to determine the number of* Yes Section 8.5 .people With disabilities and those with access and functic>nal needs who inay need assistance and do not reside in special facilities should be provided. Data from local/county registration programs should be used in the. estimate, but should not bethe only set of data. e. Capacities should be provided for all types of Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption :I.a transportation resources. Bus seating :capacity of 50% Sections 3.5, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 should be used or justification should be provided for
- higher values. f. An estimate of this population should be provided and Yes Table 8-1 :-transit dependents information should be provided that the existing Sections 8-1, 8.4 registratioh programs were used iri developing thE;? estimate. g . A summary table of the total number of buses, Yes Section 8.3, 8.4 . ambulances, or other transport needed to support evacuation should be provided and the quantification of Table 8-5 resources should be detailed enough to*assu.re double counting has not occurred. 2.3 Special Facility Residents a. A list of special facilities, including the type of facility, Yes Appendix E, Tables E-2, E list facilities, location, and average population should be provided. type, location, and population Special facility staff should be included in th.e totaLspecial facility population. b. A discussion should be provided on how special facility Yes Section 3.5 data was obtained. ,* ** NMP/JAF N-5 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 -------------------
NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis ". . . c. The number of wheelchair and bed-bound individuals Yes Section 3.5 and Table 8-4
- shouldbe provided. ..* d. An estimate of the nurnber and capacity of vehicles* Yes Section 8.3
- needed to support the ofthe facility should be Tables 8-4, provided. e. *The logistics for mobilizing specially trained staff (e.g., . Yes Sections 3.5, 8.3 medical support or security supportfc:ir prisons, jails, and .. . other correctional facilities) should be discussed when appropriate .. 2.4 School$ a. A list of schools including name, location, student Yes Table 8-2, E-1 pdpulatlon, and trc:insportation resources required to Section 8.2 -. -supportthe evacuation, should be provided. The source _of this information should be provided. b. Transportation resources for elementary and middle Yes Table 8-2 schools should be based bn 100% of the school capacity. _c. The estimate of high school students who will use their Yes Section 8.2 discusses it is conservatively personal vehicle to evacuate should be provided and a assumed no students will evacuate in their basis for the values used should be discussed. personal vehicles. d; The need for return trips should be identified if necessary. Yes There are sufficient resources to evacuate schools in a single wave. However, Section 8.4 and Figure 8-1 discuss the potential for a multiple wave evacuation. NMP/JAE: KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ET.E.Analysis " .. . . . . . 2.5.1 Special Events a. A complete list of special events should be provided and Yes Section 3.7 ineludes information on the population, estimated duration, and season of the event. b. The special event that encompasses the peak transient Yes Section 3.7 population should be analyzed inthe ETE. c. The percent of permanent residents attending the event Yes Section 3.7 should be estimated. 2.5.2 Shadow Evacuation a. A shadow evacuation of 20 percent should be included for Yes Section 2.2 -Assumption 5
- areas outside the evacuation area extending to 15 miles Figure 2-1 from the NPP. Section 3.2 b. Population estimates for the shadow evacuation in the 10 Yes Section 3.2 to 15 mile area beyond the EPZ are provided by sector. Figure 3-5 Table 3-5 c. The loading of the shadow evacuation onto the roadway Yes Section 5 -Table 5-9 footnote network should be consistent with the trip generation time generated for the permanent resident population. NMP/JAF
- N-7 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis 2.5.3 Background and PassThrough Traffic * . a. . The v.olume of background traffic and. pass through,traffic .* Yes . Section.3.6 *,**. * 'isb.ased on, the average daytime traffic. Values maybe . 'reduced for nighttime scenarios. Table 3-8 . . Section 6 .; Table 6-3, 6-4 * b. . eass'through traffic is assumed to stopped entering Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption s* ' th*e EPZ abouttwo* hours afterthe.initial _notification.
- Section 3.6 2;6 s*umniary of Demand Estir,Tlation . a. t:.. summary*table shduldbe provided that identifies the Yes total populations a11d totalvehicles used in analysis for* Section 3.8 perma_nent residents, transients, dependent Tables 3-9, 3-10
- residents, special facili't:ies1.schools, shac;low population, ; , and pass-through demand used in each scenario, . .
- 3.0 Roadway Capacity * *, *a .. The niethod(s) used to assess roadway capacity should be Yes Section 4 discussed:* * .. 3.1 Roadway Characteristics a. Afield survey of key routes within the EPZ has been Yes Section 1.3 ..conducted. b. ,. Information should be provided describing the extent of Yes Section 1.3 the survey, and types of information g'athered and used in . the analysis. *
- N-8 KLD Engineering, P.C.
- Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
- NRC Review criteria . *; 4.* . .. ;. Crit"ericmAClltressed .. : , *cc>>mm*ents *: .. *. '" g" " "' *' . in ETE " ,. .. . .. . ""'* c. A table similar to that in Appendix A, "Roadway Yes Appendix K,Table K-1 Characteristics," of NUREG/CR-7002 should be provided. . . . d. Calculations for a representative roadway segment should Yes Section 4 b.e provided. e. A legible ma*p of the roadway system that identifies node Yes Appendix K, Figures K-1 through K-33 numbers and segments used to develop the ETE should be present the entire link-node analysis provided and should be simHar to Figure 3-1, "Roadway network at a scale suitable to identify all
- Network Identifying Nodes and Segments," of NU REG/CR-links and nodes 7002. 3.2 Capacity Analysis .a. The approach used to calculate the roadway capacity for Yes Section 4 the transportation network should be described in detail and identifies factors that should be expressly used in the modeling. b. The capacity analysis identifies where field information Yes Section 1.3, Section 4 should be used in the ETE calculation. 3.3 Intersection Control a. A list of intersections should be provided that includes the Yes Appendix K, Table K-2 total number of intersections modeled that are unsignalized, signalized, or manned by response . personnel. b. Characteristics for the 10 highest vo'lume intersections Yes Table J-1 within the EPZ are provided including the location, signal cycle length, and turn lane queue capacity . c. . Discussion should be provided on how signal cycle time is Yes Section 4.1, Appendix C used in the calculations. NMP/JAF N-9 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments in ETE Analysis 3.4 Adverse Weather a. The adverse weather condition should be identified and Yes Table 2-1, Section 2.3 -Assumption 9 the effects of adverse weather on mobilization time Mobilization time -Table 2"2, Section 5.3 should be considered. (page 5-10) b. The speed and capacity reduction factors identified in Yes Table 2 based on HCM 2010. The Table 3-1, "Weather Capacity of NUREG/CR-7002 factors'provided in Table of should be used or a basis should be provided for other NUREG/CR-7002 are from HCM 2000. values. c. The study identifies assumptions for snow rel'!loval on Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption 9 streets and driveways, when applicable. Section 5.3:.... page 5-10 Appendix F-Section F.3.3 4.0 Development of Evacuation Times 4.1 Trip Generation Time a. The process used to develop trip generation times should Yes Section 5 be identified. b. When telephone surveys are used, the scope of the Yes Appendix F survey, area of survey, number of participants, and statistical relevance should be provided .. , . c. Data obtained from telephone surveys should be Yes . Appendix F summarized. d. The trip generation time for each population group should Yes Section 5, Appendix F be developed from site specific information. , NMP/JAF N-10 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 NRC Reyiew. Crite,ria : Criterion Addressed Comments in Analysis . 4.1.1 Permanent Residents and Transient Population a. Permanent residents are assumed to evacuate from their Yes Section 5 discusses trip generation for homes but are not assumed to be at home at all times. households with and without returning Trip generation time includes the assumption that a commuters. Table 6-3 presents the percentage of residents will need to return home prior to percentage of households with returning evacuating. commuters and the percentage of households either without returning commuters or with no commuters. Appendix F presents the percent households who will await the return of commuters. b. Discussion should be provided on the time and method Yes Section 5.4.3 used to notify transients. The trip generation time discusses any difficulties notifying persons in hard to reach areas such as on lakes or in campgrounds. c. The trip generation time accounts for transients Yes Section 5, Figure 5-1 potentially returning to hotels prior to evacuating. d. Effect of public transportation resources used during Yes Section 3.7 special events where a large number of transients should be expected should be considered. e. The trip generation time for the transient population Yes Section 5, Table 5-9, Figure 5-4 should be integrated and loaded onto the transportation network with the general public. NMP/JAF N-11 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
'. NRC Rev:iew Criteria "*' . , *. , .. * .Criterion Addressed *"'" r. * " ***.Comments *., " . ,: . " . ..-... " Analysis .... . .. . . . '* ... * .iii 4.1.2 Transit Dependent Residents a. If available, existing plans and bus routes should be used Yes Section 8.4. 76 pre-established bus routes in the ETE analysis. If new plans should be developed with were used in the ETE analysis -see Table the ETE, they have been agreed upon by the responsible 8-6. authorities. b. Discussion should be included on the means of evacuating
- Yes Section 8.3, 8.5 ambulatory and non-ambulatory residents. c. The number, location, and availability of buses, and other Yes Section 8.4 resources needed to support the demand estimation Table 8-5 should be provided. d. Logistical details, such as the time to obtain buses, brief Yes Section 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 drivers, and initiate the bus route should be provided. Figure 8-1 e. Discussion should identify the time estimated for transit Yes Section 8.4, 8.5 dependent residents to prepare and travel to a bus pickup point, and describes the expected means of travel to the pickup point. f. The number of bus stops and time needed to load Yes Section 8.4 passengers should be discussed. g. A map of bus routes should be included. Yes Maps of the bus pick-up routes in each ERPA are contained in the EMO calendar. h. The trip generation time for non-ambulatory persons Yes Section 8.5 includes the time to mobilize ambulances or special vehicles, time to drive to the home of residents, loading time, and time to drive out of the EPZ should be provided. NMP/JAF N-12 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
,,:* . , ,* .. _'. NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Comments i. Information shoulq be provided to supports analysis of return trips, if necessary. . ': 4.1.3 Special Facilities a.
- Information on evacuatipn logistics and mobilization times should be provided. b, Dis.cussi.ori should be provided on the inbound and oUtbounq speeds. . . .. . .* .. c The number of wheelchair and bed-bound individuals sho.uld be provided, and the logistics of evacuating these residents should be discussed . . * .d. Time for loading of residents should beprovided e.*
- Information should be provided that indicates whether the evacu(!tion can in a single trip or if
- additional trips should be needed;* in ETE Analysis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes t If frips should oe needed; the destination of Yes vehicles should be provided. g. Discussion should be provided onwhethe.r special facility Yes residents are expected to pass through the reception center prior to being evacuated to thefr final destination. h. Supporting information should be provided to quantifythe Yes .* time elem.ents for the return trips. * .. NMP/JAF N-13 Evacuation Time Estimate Sections 8.4 Figure 8-1 Tables 8-11 through 8-13 Section 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, Tables 8-4, 8-14 through 8-16, Table 8-17 Sections 8.4, 8.6 Section 8.3 Tables 8-4, 8-14 through 8-16 Section 8.4, 8.6 Section 8.4, Table 8-4, 8-5 Section 8.4 Figure 10-1 Section 8.4 Section 8.4 KLD Engineering, P.C. Februar\f 24, 2016 NRC Review criteria Criterion Addressed Comments .. in Ef:E Analysis 4.1.4 Schools a. lnformatioil on evacuation logistics and mobilization time Yes Section 8.4 should be provided. Tables 8-7 through 8-9 b. Discussion should be provided on the inbound and Yes School bus routes are presented in Table outbound speeds. 8-6. School bus speeds are presented in Tables 8-7 (good weather), 8-8 (rain) and 8 (snow). Outbound speeds are defined as the minimum of the evacuation route speed and the State school bus speed limit. Inbound speeds are limited to the State school bus speed limit. c. Time for loading of students should be provided. Yes Tables 8-7 through 8-9, Discussion in Section 8.4 d. Information should be provided that indicates whether Yes Section 8.4 -page 8-8 the evacuation can be completed in a single trip or if Table 8-5 additional trips are n.eeded. e. If return trips are needed, the destination of school buses Yes Return trips are not needed should be provided.* f. If used, reception centers should be identified. Discussion Yes Table 8-3. Students are evacuated to should be provided on whether students are expected to reception center where they will be picked *pass through the reception center prior to being up by parents or guardians. evacuated to their final destination. NMP/JAF N-14 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
. NRC.Review Criteria , . *.. '* . Cr.i:terio.n* Addressed * . Comments , . . . . -"" . in ETE Analy,sis. "' j * * *
- g. Supporting information should be provided to quantify the .time elements for the return trips. 4.2 ETE Modeling a. General information about the model should be provided and demonstrates its use in ETE studies. b. If a traffic simulation model is not used to conduct the ETE caiculation, sufficient detail should be provided to validate the analytical approach used. All criteria elements should have been met, as appropriate. 4.2.1 Traffic Simulation Model Input a. Traffic simulation model assumptions and a representative . set of model inputs should be provided. . b. A glossary of terms should be provided for the key performance measures and parameters used in the analysis. NMP/JAF Evacuation Time Estimate Yes Yes No Yes Yes N-15 Return trips are not needed. Tables 8-7 through 8-9 provide time needed to arrive at reception center, which could be used to compute a second wave evacuation if necessary DYNEV II (Ver. 4.0.19.2). Section 1.3, Table 1-3, Appendix B, Appendix C. Not applicable as a traffic simulation model was used. Appendices Band C describe the simulation model assumptions and algorithms Table J-2 Appendix A Tables C-1, c..:2 KLD Engineering, P.C. February 24, 2016 "NRC Review Criteria Criterion Addressed Cpmments : , , " in ETE Analysis . 4.2.2 Traffic Simulation Model Output a. A discussion regarding whether the traffic simulation Yes Appendix B model used must be in equilibration prior to calculating the ETE should be provided. b. The minimum following model outputs should be provided Yes 1. Table J-5. to support review: 2. Table J-3. 1. Total volume and percent by hour at each EPZ exit 3. Table J-1. node.*. 4. Table J-3. 2. Network wide average travel time. 5. Figures J-1 through J-14 (one plot . 3. Longest queue length for the 10 intersections with the for each scenario considered) . highest traffic volume. 6. Table J-4. Network wide average 4. Total vehicles exiting the network. speed also provided in Table J-3. 5. A plot that provides both the mobilization curve and evacuation curve identifying the cumulative percentage of evacuees who have mobilized and exited the EPZ. 6. Average speed for each major evacuation route that exits the EPZ. c. Color coded roadway maps should be provided for various Yes Figures 7-3 through 7-7 times (i.e., at 2, 4, 6 hrs., etc.) during a full EPZ evacuation scenario, identifying areas where long queues exist including level of service (LOS) "E" and LOS "F" conditions, if they occur. 4.3 Evacuation Time Estimates for the General Public a. The ETE should include the time to evacuate 90% and Yes Tables 7-1, 7-2 100% of the total permanent resident and transient \ population NMP/JAF . N-16 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016
.,. .. , .. ,NRC Review Griteria .. " ** * **
- it. ' * ' .. ' ' . ' . b. The ETE for 100% of the general public should include all members of the general public. Any reductions or truncated data should be explained. c. Tables should be provided for the 90 and 100 percent ETEs similar to Table 4-3, "ETEs for Staged Evacuation Keyhole," of NUREG/CR-7002. d. ETEs should be provided for the 100 percent evacuation of special facilities, transit dependent, and school populations. 5.0 Other Considerations 5.1 Development of Traffic Control Plans a. Information that responsible authorities have approved the traffic control plan used in the analysis should be provided. b. A discussion of adjustments or additions to the traffic control plan that affect the ETE should be provided. 5.2 Enhancements in Evacuation Time a. The results of assessments for improvement of evacuation time should be provided. b. A statement or discussion regarding presentation of enhancements to local authorities should be provided. NMP/JAF
- Evacuation Time Estimate Criterian A:ddressed .* ., *" "***" . ' .. .. in Analysis. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N-17 . ' ; ' Section 5.4 -truncating survey data to eliminate statistical outliers Table 7 1ooth percentile ETE for general public Tables 7-3, 7-4 Section 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 Tables 8-7 through 8-9 Tables 8-11 through 8-18 Section 9, Appendix G Appendix G Appendix M No recommended enhancements. ETE results were reviewed by local authorities in the draft report and were accepted. KLD Engineering, P.C.
- February 24, 2016
......-----NRC Review Criteria .. trite.ii . "' " ' Comments . ,; "* ,, in:ETE'.Analysis * * . ""' "'" . .:--.: ***. .* ,., ... ' *. 5.3 State and Local.Review a. A list of agencies contacted and the extent of interaction Yes Table 1-1. ETE results were reviewed by with these agencies should be discussed.
- local authorities in the draft report and were accepted. -b. lnformatibn should be provided on any unresolved issues Yes There are no outstanding issues. that may affect the ETE .. 5.4 Reviews and Updates a'.*, A.discussion of when an ETE analysis is required Yes Appendix M, Section M.3 *to' be performed and to the NRC. 5.5 Reception Centers and Congregate Cc:1re Center a. A map of congregate care centers and reception centers Yes Figure 10-1 should be provided. b. If return trips are required, assumptions used to estimate Yes Section 8.4 discusses a multi-wave return times for buses should be provided. evacuation procedure. Figure 8-1 c. It should be clearly stated if ft is assumed that passengers Yes Section 2.3 -Assumption 7h are left at the reception center and are taken by separate Section 10
- busesto the congregate care center. NMP/JAF N-18 KLD Engineering, P.C. Evacuation Time Estimate February 24, 2016 ATTACHMENT 4 Emergency Plan Annex Revision EP-AA-1006, Revision 38, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station" Exelon Generation EXELON NUCLEAR ' EP-AA-1006 Revision 38 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX FOR QUAD CITIES STATION Table of Contents Section Page SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... QC 1-1 1.1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION .............................................................................. QC 1-1 1.2 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES .................................................................. QC 1-1 1.3 STATE OF IOWA ........................................................................................ QC 1-2 SECTION 2:0RGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES .................................................. QC 2-1 2.1 SHIFT ORGANIZATION STAFFING ................................................................ QC 2-1 2.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION BLOCK DIAGRAM ........................... QC 2-1 2.3 NON-EXELON NUCLEAR SUPPORT GROUPS ................................................ QC 2-1 SECTION 3: CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES .................................................................. QC 3-:1 SECTION 4: EMERGENCY MEASURES ................................................................................. QC 4-1 4.1 NOTIFICATION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ..................................... QC 4-1 4.2 ASSESSMENT ACTIONS ............................................................................. QC 4-1 4.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THE 0FFSITE PUBLIC ......................................... QC 4-1 4.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR ONSITE PERSONNEL ......................................... QC 4-2 SECTION 5: EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ......................................................... QC 5-1 5.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES .......................................... , ................ QC 5-1 5.2 ASSESSMENT RESOURCES ........................................................................ QC 5-1 5.3 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ................................................... QC 5-4 5.4 FIRST AID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES ........................................................... QC 5-4 5.5 LAW ENFORACEMENT AGENCIES ................................................................ QC 5-5 5.6 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANIZATIONS AND EMS SUPPORT .................................. QC 5-5 APPENDIXES Appendix 1: NUREG-0654 Cross-Reference Appendix 2: Station Letters of Agreement AD DEN DU MS Addendum 1: On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis
- Addendum 2: Evacuation Time Estimates for Quad Cities Generating Station Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone Addendum 3: Emergency Action Levels for Quad Cities Station November 2016 ii EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38)
REVISION HISTORY Revision O; 04/BO Revision BN; 01/9B Revision 34, 12/12 Revision 1; 07/BO Revision BP; 07/9B . Revision 35, 6/13 Revision 2; 04/B1 Revision 9; 05/99 Revision 36, 6/14 Revision 3; 04/B2 Revision 10; 01/00 Revision 37, 12/14 Revision 4; 04/B3 Revision 11; 01/01 Revision 3B, 11/16 Revision 5; 12/B4 Revision 12; 10/01 Revision SA; 03/BS Revision 13; 10/01 Revision 6; 03/B6 Revision 14; 01/02 Revision 7; 02/B7 Revision 15; 07/02 Revision 7A; 12/B7 Revision 16; 09/02 Revision 78; OB/BB Revision 17; 06/03 Revision 7C; 05/B9 Revision 1 B; OB/03 Revision 70; 12/B9 Revision 20, Canceled Revision B; 09/94 Revision 21, 10/05 Revision BA; 01 /95 Revision 22, 12/05 Revision B8; 03/95 Revision 23, 04/06 Revision BC; 09/95 Revision 24, 04/07 Revision BO; 12/93 Revision 25, 10/07 Revision BE; 12/93 Revision 26, 03/0B Revision BF; 01/94 Revision 27, 12/0B Revision BG; 04/94 Revision 2B, 03/10 Revision BH; 10/94 Revision 29, 06/10 Revision Bl; 12/95 Revision 30, 01/11 Revision BJ; 12/95 Revision 31, 03/11 Revision BK; 04/96 Revision 32, 06/12 Revision BL; 05/96 Revision 33, 11/12 November 2016 iii EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section* 1: Introduction As required in the conditions set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the operating licenses for the Exelon Nuclear Stations, the management of Exelon recognizes its responsibility and authority to operate and maintain the nuclear power stations in such a manner as to provide for the safety of the general public. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Program consists of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan (Emergency Plan), The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Annex, Exelon emergency plan implementing procedures, and associated program administrative documents. The Emergency Plan .outlines the basis for response actions that would be implemented in an emergency. This document serves as the Quad Cities Station Annex and contains information and guidance that is unique to the station. This includes facility geography location for a full understanding and representation of the station's emergency response capabilities. The Station Annex is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the Emergency Plan. 1.1 Facility Description The Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2, is located in Cordova Township of Rock Island County in northwestern Illinois. The station is located on the east bank of the Mississippi River three miles north. of Cordova, Illinois. Cooling water for the plant is provided by the Mississippi River, with the water being returned to the river by diffuser pipes. The plant consists of two boiling water reactors (BWR), nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS), and turbine generators furnished by General Electric Company. The steam supply system is designed for a power output of 2957 MWt for each of the two units. The Quad Cities Station area consists of approximately 126 acres (with a radius of about 1/4-mile about the Units 1/2 chimney) and is owned and controlled by Mid American Energy Company and Exelon Nuclear as tenants in common. For more specific site location information, refer to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2. 1.2 Emergency Planning Zones The Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for Quad Cities Station is an area surrounding the station with a radius of about ten miles, (exact boundaries are determined by the States of Illinois and Iowa). Refer to Figure 1-1. The Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for Quad Cities Station is an area surrounding the Station with a radius of about 50 miles. November 2016 QC 1-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 1.3 State of lovva Much of the Plume Exposure EPZ for the Quad Cities Station lies within the State of Iowa. The State of Iowa has developed an "Iowa Emergency Plan." This section provides a summary of the essential elements of the Iowa Emergency Plan, outlining the specific responsibilities of certain "key" Iowa State Agency players in a response operational mode. Basic descriptions for the Iowa State agencies responsible for actions in the event of a nuclear power station are as follows: 1.3.1 Iowa Emergency Management Division (IEMD) IEMD coordinates all activities of State agencies and departments, all local governments, and the utility in support of emergency response activities.* These activities are coordinated from the Iowa State EOC in Des Moines. 1.3.2 The Iowa Commissioner of Public Health The Iowa Department of Public Health alerts the State Hygienic Lab when emergency action conditions are reported by a commercial nuclear power reactor, which impacts upon the public health and safety in Iowa, and when emergency team response has been determined to be necessary or imminent. They perform necessary calculations and evaluate the impact of existing and projected radioactivity releases in terms of public health risk. They translate the evaluation of existing and projected environmental contamination and resulting dose into terms of alternative protective actions. They recommend appropriate protective actions to the Governor's Office, IEMD and other State agencies as appropriate. 1.3.3 University Hygienic Lab (UHL) The UHL, located in Iowa City, Iowa conducts and coordinates all field surveillance and monitoring activities directed toward measuring radiation exposure and radioactivity contamination in the environment resulting from an accident at a commercial nuclear power reactor; provides and coordinates laboratory support of all environmental sampling and radiological monitoring activities-during a nuclear emergency; communicates all relevant data and protective action recommendations to the State Department of Public Health; provides radiological laboratory support for environmental samples analysis; and
- provides recommendations for decontamination of contaminated area. 1.3.4 Clinton County Clinton County will provide a coordinated local government response in conjunction with the State of Iowa, from the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Clinton, IA. 1.3.5 Scott County Scott County will provide a coordinated local government response in conjunction with the State of Iowa, from the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Davenport, IA. November 2016 QC 1-2 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38)
Quad Cities Annex Figure 1-1: Quad Cities Station Location And 10 Mile EPZ 0 -N 0 SCALE s tO I I Exelon Nuclear s s t5 ll0--I 1 November 2016 QC 1-3 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 2: Organizational Control of Emergencies This section describes the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and its key positions. It outlines the staffing requirements which provide initial emergency response actions and provisions for timely augmentation of on-shift personnel when required. It also describes interfaces among Exelon Nuclear emergency response personnel ctnd specifies the offsite support available to respond to the nuclear generating stations. 2.1 Shift Organization Staffing Initial response to any emergency is by the normal plant organization present at the site. This organization includes positions that are onsite 24 hours perday and is described in Section B.1 of the Emergency Plan. The Normal Shift Organization will be augmented, in an emergency, with designated/additional Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel within 60 minutes of classification as specified under EP-QC-1000 Table QDC B-1. ERO activation is described in Section H.4 of the Emergency Plan. EP-QC-1000 Table QDC B-1 outlines ERO positions required to meet minimum staffing and full augmentation of the on-shift complement at an Alert or higher classification, and the major tasks assigned to each position. Responsibilities for each position are described in Section 8.5 of the Emergency Plan. 2.2 Emergency Response Organization Block Diagram Figures 8-1 a through 8-1 d *of the Emergency Plan illustrates the overall emergency response organization. 2.3 Non-Exelon Nuclear Support Groups Exelon Nuclear has contractual agreements with several companies whose services would be available in the event of a radiological emergency. These agencies and their available services are listed in Appendix 3 of the Emergency Plan.
- Emergency response coordination with governmental agencies and other support organizations is discussed in Part II, Section A of the Emergency Plan. Agreements exist on file at Quad Cities Station with several support agencies. These agencies and their support roles are listed in Appendix 2, Station Letters of Agreement. November 2016 QC 2-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38)
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 3: Classification of Emergencies 3.1 General The Quad Cities Emergency Action Levels and supporting information are located in EP-AA-1006, Addendum 3. November 2016 QC 3-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 4: Emergency Measures 4.1 Notification of the Emergency Organization Standard NARS notifications for the Quad Cities Station are made to the State of Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), the State of Iowa Emergency Management Division (IEMD), Scott County Sheriffs Office, and Clinton County Sheriff's Office. At the Quad Cities Generating Station, if a General Emergency is the initiating event, the Emergency Director is responsible for notifying the following additional Illinois, Iowa and local agencies:
- Rock Island Communications Center
- Whiteside County Sheriff 4.2 Assessment Actions Throughout each emergency situation, continuing assessment will occur. Assessment actions at Quad Cities Station may include an evaluation of plant conditions; in-plant, onsite, and initial offsite radiological measurements; and initial estimates of offsite doses. Core damage information is used to refine dose assessments and confirm or extend initial protective action recommendations. Quad Cities Station utilizes NEDC-33045P-A, Revision 0, (2001) as the basis for the methodology for post-accident core damage assessment. This methodology utilizes real-time plant indications. In addition, Quad Cities Station may use samples of plant fluids and atmospheres as inputs to the CDAM (Core Damage Assessment Methodology) program for core damage estimation. 4.3 Protective Actions for the Offsite Public To aid the Emergency Response Organization during a developing emergency situation, EP-AA-111, "Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations" has been developed based on Section J.1 O.m of the Emergency Plan. 4.3.1 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Sirens This ANS consists of a permanently installed outdoor notification system within a ten-mile radius around the station. The ten-mile radius around the station is primarily an agricultural area with a population density below 2000 persons per square mile. The ANS, as installed, consists of mechanical and electronic sirens that will cover this entire area with a minimum sound level of 60 db. Additionally, the ANS will cover the heavily populated areas within ten-mile radius around the station with a minimum sound level of 70 db to ensure complete coverage. Backup means of notification is achieved through Route Alerting, which is contained within the State and respective counties' Radiological Emergency Response Plans and procedures. The means consists of utilizing vehicles with public address (PA) systems in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable. The backup method has the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within a reasonable time, but does not need to meet the 15-November 2016 QC 4-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38)
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. -4.3.2 Evacuation Time Estimates The ETE study used population data from the 2010 census which includes parts of two counties in Iowa (Clinton, Scott) and two counties in Illinois (Rock Island and Whiteside). The evacuation times are based on a detailed consideration of the EPZ roadway network and population distribution. The ETE Study, contained in EP-AA-1006 Addendum 2, Evacuation Time Estimates for the Quad Cities Generating Station Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone, presents evacuation times for daytime and nighttime scenarios under various weather conditions for the evacuation of various areas around the Quad Cities Station, once a decision has been made to evacuate. 4.4
- Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel Quad Cities Station has a siren system to warn personnel of emergency conditions. Upon hearing a continuous two (2) minute siren, all personnel not having emergency assignments have been instructed to assemble in predesignated assembly areas. Refer to Figure 4-1. If a site evacuation of non-essential personnel is required, personnel will be released to their homes or relocated and monitored at one of the following designated relocation centers for Quad Cities: -Morrison Relocation Cen_ter, Morrison, Illinois -Byron Station, Byron Illinois For evacuation routes, refer to EP-AA-113-F-21. Traffic control for onsite areas will be handled by the Quad Cities Station security force, if necessary. When a site evacuation is imminent, the TSC Security Coordinator notifies by phone or dispatches a security guard to notify those personnel in buildings outside the .protected* area (Training Building, Warehouse, Wastewater Treatment Plant, etc.). These personnel are evacuated using the prescribed route to the designated relocation center. Personnel in the warehouses, sewage treatment plant, wastewater treatment plant, and training building will assemble at their present location and await further instructions (e. g. evacuation). Equipment and personnel would be available at the Morrison Relocation Center and Byron Station for monitoring and decontamination of evacuated personnel. If major decontamination and follow-up or bioassay samples are necessary, those persons would be sent to Byron Station. November 2016 QC4-2 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) J z 0 < CD 3 O'" CD ..., N 0 _,. O') 0 () I (,.) m "'U I _,. 0 0 O') -:;u CD < (jj" ,,. :::J (,.) (X) .......,. QUAD CITIES STATION MACHINE SHOP &BREAKROOM ooo OCC/OSG D RAD WASTE BUILDING DO TURBINE BUlLDING Meetlng Room & 3rd Floor REACTOR BUILDING [j TSC D Caf,eteria I -l *, "-, I ' ' I I ' ' I I I I I I I .......... ,* ..... , l . ....._ '-......._ I I Ii ; ' ' Protected Area Fence line ' ' Outage Support z .. .PREDESlGNATEO ASSEMBLY AREAS Sc1'eening ..... Facility.'-.,, ce* c: CD I 1J .... (?) a. (?) C/I :::::s I>> -(?) a. C/I (?) 3 C"' )> CD I>> C/I 0 c: I>> a. (') :!: (?) C/I )> :::::s :::::s (?) >< m >< (?) 0 :::::s z c: 0 (?) I>> ....
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Section 5: Emergency Facilities and Equipment 5.1 Emergency Response Facilities Refer to Figure 5-1 for the location of the Quad Cities Station Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Operations Support Center (OSC) within the Station's Protected Area boundary. 5.1.1 Station Control Room The Quad Cities Station Control Room shall be the initial onsite center of emergency control. The Control Room is located on the 620-foot elevation of the Service Building. 5.1.2 Technical Support Center (TSC) Quad Cities Station has established a Technical Support Center (TSC) in a building located south of the Service Building. The TSC fully meets the requirements of Section H.1.b of the Emergency Plan. 5.1.3 Operational Support Center (OSC) Quad Cities Station has designated an Operational Support Center. The OSC is located on the ground floor in the Service Building in a space designated as the Outage Control Center. The OSC conforms to the requirements of Section H.1.c of the Emergency Plan, and is the location to which operations support personnel will report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments in support of emergency operations. 5.1.4 Alternative Facility The Alternative Facility maintains the capability for staging the TSC/OSC emergency response organization personnel in the event of a hostile action. This alternative facility has the capability for communications with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security and the capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation. Consistent with NRC EPFAQ No. 2013-005, the EOF will satisfy the offsite notification responsibilities for the Alternative Facility. The Alternative Facility is located at 14439 Crosby Road, Morrison Illinois. (CM-1, ref. AR 1362747.44) 5.2 Assessment Resources 5.2.1 Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation The meteorological tower, located 1623 meters SSE of the plant, is 300 ft. high and is instrumented at three levels. The 33 ft., 196 ft. and 296 ft. levels correspond to the elevations of the possible points of airborne effluent release. Wind speed and wind direction are measured at all three elevations. Ambient temperature is measured at 33 ft. and differential temperatures referenced to 33 ft. are measured at 196 ft. and 296 ft. Precipitation is measured nearby. November 2016 QC 5-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear The onsite meteorological monitoring program is covered in the contractor specification and vendor procedures of the meteorological monitoring contractor. These data are used to generate wind roses and to provide estimates of airborne concentrations of gaseous effluents. 5.2.1.1 Instrumentation The meteorological tower is instrumented with equipment that conforms with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 and ANSI/ANS 2.5 (1984). The equipment is placed on booms oriented into the general prevailing wind at the site. Equipment signals are brought to the process computers and to an instrument building with controlled environmental conditions. The building at the base of the tower houses the recording equipment, signal conditioners, etc., used to process and re-transmit the data to the end point users. 5.2.1.2 Meteorological Measurement Program During a Disaster Cooperation between the corporate office and the meteorological contractor assures that a timely restoration of any outage can be made. Emergency field visits to the site are made as quickly as possible after detection of a failure. Should a disaster of sufficient magnitude occur to destroy the tower structure, a contract is maintained to have a temporary tower erected within 72 hours, weather conditions permitting. Further, the meteorological contractor maintains two levels of sensors (wind speed, wind direction and temperature) in a state of readiness for use on the temporary tower. Additionally, Exelon Nuclear's existing instrumented towers at other nuclear sites provide a high density measurement network with multiple backup opportunities. Meteorological data are available to the station Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Emergenqy Operations Facility for use in the Dose Assessment Computer Model for estimating the environmental impact of unplanned releases of radioactivity from the station. 5.2.2 Onsite Radiation Monitoring Equipment Sections 2.7, 7.6 and 9.5 of the UFSAR for Quad Cities Station, Unit 1 and 2, describe in detail the radiation monitoring systems and equipment. The modified off-gas treatment system is described in Section 9.2 of the UFSAR. In addition to the dedicated systems described here, chemistry and health physics personnel are trained and equipped to perform radiological monitoring and sampling. The radiation monitoring and equipment can be categorized into four (4) groups: November 2016 QC 5-2 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 5.2.2.1 Radiological Noble Gas Effluent Monitoring: A wide-range monitoring system is installed in the effluent stream in the main chimney and in the effluent stream of the reactor building vent stack. Methods for converting instrument readings to release rates have been developed and are incorporated into Station procedures. 5.2.2.2 Radioiodine and Particulate Effluent Monitoring: Effluent sampling media are analyzed in the Station counting room using a HPGe isotopic system. 5.2.2.3 High-Range Containment Radiation Monitors: Two high range containment radiation monitors are installed on each of Quad Cities Station's units. The range of these monitors is from 1 R/hr to 108 R/hr. 5.2.2.4 In-plant Iodine Instrumentation: Quad Cities Station has the capability to sample and determine iodine concentrations in the plant using Silver Zeolite or charcoal cartridges and gamma ray spectroscopy. Monitors may be used to measure increasing levels of iodine during emergency conditions (e.g. a portable gamma ray spectroscopy system). 5.2.3 Onsite Process Monitors Adequate monitoring capability exists to properly assess the plant status for all modes .of operation. The operability of the post-accident instrumentation ensures information is available on selected plant . parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. Instrumentation is available to monitor the parameters and ranges given in Technical Specifications. Station procedures have been developed which would aid personnel in recognizing inadequate core cooling using applicable instrumentation. 5.2.4 Onsite Fire Detection Instrumentation Quad Cities Station has a fire protection system that is designed to quickly detect any fires, annunciate locally and in the Control Room, and initiate the appropriate automatic action. The station fire protection system is described in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report. The detection instrument minimum requirements and further system description are contained in QCAP 1500-1 (Administrative Requirements for Fire Protection). In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, contingency actions are taken as defined in the above. 5.2.5 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring Consult Part II, Section q of the station specific Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) for the most current location for fixed continuous air samplers and Dosimeter of Legal Record (DLR) locations. November 2016 QC 5-3 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 5.2.6 Site Hydrological Characteristics Assessments covering the hydrological aspects of the site (i.e., effects of the Mississippi River) are made as follows: a. Onsite: River level gauge located in the intake bay. b. Offsite: The U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers will provide information regarding river levels and other conditions of importance. (Flood information can be obtained from the U.S. National Weather Service.) 5.3 Protective Facilities and Equipment The onsite assembly areas for Quad Cities Station are shown in Figure 4-1. These areas are suitable because: 1) They are large open areas suitable for assembling a large number of people in a short time; 2) They are relatively close to the Security Gatehouse; and 3) They have a low probability of being affected by a serious accident involving the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS). The offsite evacuation assembly areas for Quad Cities Station are discussed in Section 4.4 of this annex. These areas are suitable because they are easily accessible. The relocation routes to these facilities would be determined by the actual wind direction at the time of evacuation. 5.4 First Aid and Medical Facilities Quad Cities Station has a aid room on the ground floor of the Service Building near the entrance to the plant. This room is provided with a sink, showers, and supply cabinet. First aid kits, stretchers, sinks, eyewashes, and emergency showers have been placed in strategic locations throughout the station. Medical treatment given to injured persons at the station is of a "first aid" nature. When more professional care is needed, injured persons are transported to a local hospital or clinic. Genesis Medical Center Illini Campus in Silvis, Illinois, is the Quad Cities Station primary supporting medical facility. Trinity Medical Center West Campus in Rock Island, Illinois is the backup medical facility. Presence St. Joseph Medical Center in Joliet, Illinois, is an additional backup medical facility. All three hospitals agree in the event of an emergency, including a hostile action based event, to ensure the medical treatment of contaminated injured/ill personnel and to ensure the capability for the evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including assurance that persons providing these services are adequately prepared to handle contaminated individuals and capable of providing medical support for any contaminated injured individual. November 2016 QC 5-4 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear 5.5 Law Enforcement Agencies A Letter of Agreement is established for Local Law Enforcement, to support Quad Cities Station to respond to a Radiological Event including a Hostile Action Based Event, in conjunction with the National Incident Management System upon notification by the station in accordance with the established communications protocol. ' 5.6 Fire Fighting Organizations and EMS Support A Letter of Agreement is established with the Local Fire Protection District to respond to a Radiological Event, including a hostile action based event, in conjunction with the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System as requested via the established notification protocol. The Genesis Medical Center, Illini Campus Hospital/Emergency Medical System (EMS) agrees to assist Quad Cities Station as requested by transporting injured/ill personnel, including radiologically contaminated injuries, from the Quad
- Cities Station in Cordova, Illinois and subsequent medical treatment of injured/ill personnel at Illini Campus hospital via the established notification protocol. November 2016 QC 5-5 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38)
Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Figure QCA 5-1: Location Of Onsite Area Emergency Response Facilities I 0 I I -Control Turbine Room Building -Reactor Building Service Building D osc )N TSC November 2016 QC 5-6 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Appendix 1: NUREG-0654 Cross-Reference Annex Section NUREG-0654 1.0 Part I, Section A 1.1 Part I, Section C 1.2 Part I, Section D 1.3 Part II, Section A.1 Figure 1-1 Part I, Section D 2.0 Part II, Section A.4 2.1 Part II, Section A.3 3.0 Part II, Section D 4.1 Part II, Section E.1 & J.7 4.2 Part II, Section 1.2 & 3 4.3 Part II, Section J.10.m 4.3.1 Part II, Section E.6 4.3.2 Part II, Section J.8 4.4 Part II, Section J.1-5 EP-AA-111 Part II, Section J.1 O.m Figure 4-1 Part 11, Section J.5 4.4 Part II, Section J.2 & 3 EP-AA-1006, Part II, Section J.8 Addendum 2 EP-AA-1006, Part II, Section J.1 O.b Addendum 2 5.1 Part 11, Section H.1 & G.3 5.2.1 Part II, Section H.5.a & 8 5.2.2 Part II, Section H.5.b & 1.2 5.2.3 Part II, Section H.5.c 5.2.4 Part II, Section H.5.d 5.2.5 Part II, Section H.6.b & 7 5.2.6 Part II, Section H.5.a & 6.a 5.3 " Part 11, Section J .1-5 5.4 Part 11, Section L.1 & 2 Figure 5-1 Part II, Section H.1 November 2016 Appendix 1-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) Quad Cities Annex Exelon Nuclear Appendix 2: Station Letters of Agreement 1. The Illinois State Police -law enforcement 2. The Rock Island County Sheriffs Office -law enforcement 3. Genesis Medical Center Illini Campus in Silvis, Illinois -medical treatment and ambulance services 4. Trinity Medical Center West Campus -medical treatment. 5. Cordova Fire Department -fire protection 6. Presence St. Joseph Medical Center of Joliet, Illinois . November 2016 . Appendix 2-1 EP-AA-1006 (Revision 38) J ATTACHMENT 5 Emergency Plan Revision EP-QC-1000, Revision 0, "Quad Cities Radiological Emergency Plan"
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- Exelon Generation@ EP-QC-1000 Revision 0 EXELON NUCLEAR QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN November 2016 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
Part I: INTRODUCTION
- Section A: Purpose .............................................................................................. Part 1, 1 Section B: Background**********************************************************:***************************** Part 1, 2 Section C: Scope ................................................................................................. Part 1 , 2 Section D: Planning Basis .................................................................................... Part 1, 2 Section E: Contiguous -Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning ........... Part 1, 3 Section F: Integrated Emergency Planning ............................ : ............................ Part 1, 3 Section G: Funding and Technical Assistance ..................................................... Part 1, 3 Section H: Emergency Response Organization ................................................... Part 1, 3 Section I: Federal Response .............................................................................. Part 1 , 3 Section J: Form and Content of Plan .................................................................. Part 1, 4 Part II: PLANNING STANDARDS AND CRITERIA Section A: Assignment of Responsibility .................................................................... 1 1 . Concept of Operations ............................................................................................. 1 2. State and County Functions and Responsibilities .................................................... 8 3. Agreements in Planning Effort ................................................................................. 8
- 4. Continuous Coverage .............................................................................................. 8 Section B: Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Organization ............................... 1 1 . On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Assignments .................................... 1 2. Authority Over the Emergency Response Organization .......................................... 2 3. Criteria for Assuming Command and Control (Succession) .......................... ; ......... 2 4. Non-Delegable Responsibilities ............................................................................... 3 5. Emergency Response Organization Positional Responsibilities ............................. .4 6. Exelon Emergency Response Organization Block Diagram .................................. 33 7. Exelon Corporate Emergency Response Organization ......................................... 33 8. Industry/Private Support Organizations ................................................................. 34 9. Supplemental Emergency Assistance to the ERO ................................................. 37 Section C: Emergency Response Support and Resources ....................................... 1 1. Federal Response Support and Resources ............................................................. 1 2. Liaisons ................................................................................................................... 1 3. Radiological Laboratories ........................................................................................ 2 4. Other Assistance ..................................................................................................... 2
- November 2016 ii EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- Section D: Emergency Classification System ............................................................. 1 1. Emergency Classification System ............................................................................ 1 2. Emergency Action Level Technical Bases ............................................................... 5 3. Timely Classification of Events ................................................................................ 6 4. Off site Classification Systems ................................................................................. 7 5. Offsite Emergency Procedures ................................................................................ 7 Section E: Notification Methods and Procedures ....................................................... 1 1 . Bases for Emergency Response Organization Notification ..................................... 1 2. Notification and Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel. .......................... 1 3. Initial Notification Messages .................................................................................... 3 4. Follow-up Messages ................................................................................................ 4 5. State and County Information Dissemination ......................................................... .4 6. Notification of the Public ......................................................................................... .4 7. Messages to the Public ............................................................................................ 5 Section F: Emergency Communications ..................................................................... 1 1 . Communications/Notifications ................................................................................. 1 2. Medical Communications ......................................................................................... 4 3. Communications Testing ......................................................................................... 4
- Section G: Public Education and lnformation ............................................................. 1 1. Public Information Publication ................................................................................. 1 2. Public Education Materials ...................................................................................... 1 3. Media Accommodations .......................................................................................... 1 4. Coordination of Public lnformation ........................................................................... 3 5. Media Orientation .................................................................................................... 3 Section H: Emergency Facilities and Equipment. ....................................................... 1 1. Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center ............ 1 2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ..................................................................... 3 3. Emergency Operations Centers .............................................................................. 4 4. Activation ................................................................................................................. 5 5. Monitoring Equipment Onsite .................................................................................. 6 6. Monitoring Equipment Offsite .................................................................................. 9 7. Off site Monitoring Equipment Storage ................................................................... 10 8. Meteorological Monitoring ...................................................................................... 10 9. OSC Capabilities ................................................................................................... 11 10. Facility and Equipment Readiness ........ ; ............................................................... 11 11 . General Use Emergency Equipment ..................................................................... 11 12. Collection Point for Field Samples ......................................................................... 11
- November 2016 iii EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- Section I: Accident Assessment ................................................................................... 1 1 . Plant Parameters and Corresponding Emergency Classification ............................ 1 2. Onsite Accident Assessment Capabilities ............................................................... 1 3. Source Term Determination ..................................................................................... 1 4. Effluent Monitor Data and Dose Projection .............................................................. 3 5. Meteorological Information ..................................................................................... .4 6. Unmonitored Release .............................................................................................. 4 7. Field Monitoring ....................................................................................................... 4 8. Field Monitoring Teams ........................................................................................... 4 9. Iodine Monitoring ..................................................................................................... 5 10. Dose Estimates ........................................................................................................ 5 11. State Monitoring Capabilities ................................................................................... 5 Section J: Protective Response ... ............................................................................... 1 1 . Notification of On site Personnel .............................................................................. 1 2. Evacuation Locations ............................................................................................... 1 3. Radiological Monitoring of Evacuees ....................................................................... 1 4.
- Evacuation ............................................................................................................... 2 5. Accountability ............................................. : ............................................................. 2 6. Provisions for Onsite Personnel .............................................................................. 3 7. Mechanism for Implementing Protective Action Recommendations ........................ 3
- 8. Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) ........................................................................ .4 9. Capability of Implementing Protective Action Recommendations ............................ 5 10. Implementation of Protective Action Recommendations ......................................... 5 11. Ingestion Pathway Protective Measures .................................................................. 7 12.
- Monitoring of Evacuees ........................................................................................... 7 Section K: Radiological Exposure Control .................................................................. 1 1. Emergency Exposure Guidelines ............................................................................. 1 2. Emergency Radiation Protection Program: .............................................................. 2 3. Personnel Monitoring .......... ; .................................................................................... 2 4. Non-Exelon Personnel Exposure Authorization ....................................................... 3 5. Contamination and Decontamination ....................................................................... 3 6. Contamination Control Measures ............................................................................ 3 7. Decontamination of Relocated Personnel .............................................................. .4 Section L: Medical and Public Health Support ........................................................... 1 1. Offsite Hospital and Medical Services ..................................................................... 1 2. Onsite First Aid Capability ....................................................................................... 1 3. Medical Service Facilities ......................................................................................... 2 4; Medical Transportation ............................................................................................ 2
- November 2016 iv EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- Section M: Reentry and Recovery Planning ................................................................ 1
- 1 . Reentry and Recovery ............................................................................................. 1 2. Recovery Organization ............................................................................................ 4 3. Recovery Phase Notifications .................................................................................. 7 4. Total Population Exposure ....................................................................................... 7 Section N: Drill and Exercise Program ........................................................................ 1 1. Exercises ................................................................................................................. 2 2. Drills .......................................................................................... : .............................. 3 3. Conduct of Drills and Exercises ............................................................................... 5 4. Critique and Evaluation ............................................................................................ 5 5. Resolution of Drill and Exercise Findings ................................................................ 6 Section 0: Emergency Response Training ................................................................. 1 1. Assurance of Training ..................................................................................... .-........ 1 2. Functional Training of the ERO .................................................. : ............................ 1 3. First Aid Response .................................................................................................. 2 4. Emergency Response Organization Training Program ............................................ 2 5. General, Initial, and Annual Training Program Maintenance ................................... 6 Section P: Responsibility for the Maintenance of the Planning Effort ...................... 1
- 1. Emergency Preparedness Staff Training ................................................................. 1 2. Authority for the Emergency Preparedness Effort ................................................... 1 3. Responsibility for Development and Maintenance of the Plan ................................. 1 4. E-Plan and Agreement Revisions ........................................................................... .4 5. E-Plan Distribution ................................................................................................... 5 6. Supporting Emergency Response Plans ................................................................. 5 7. Implementing and Supporting Procedures .............................................................. 6 8. Cross Reference to Planning Criteria ...................................................................... 6 9. Audit/Assessment of the Emergency Preparedness Program ....... : ......................... 6 10. Maintenance of Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory' ......... ?
- November 2016 v EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
Part Ill: APPENDICES
- Appendix 1 : References ............................................................................................. 1-1 *
- Appendix 2: Procedure Cross-Reference to NUREG-0654 ........................................ 2-1 Appendix 3: List of Corporate Letters of Agreement .................................................. 3-1 Appendix 4: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms .......................................................... 4-1 STATION ANNEX The Station Annex subject to the requirements of this plan is as follows: EP-AA-1006: Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Quad Cities Station REVISION HISTORY REVISION EFFECTIVE DATE 0 TBD 2016 November 2016 vi EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Section A: Purpose As required in the conditions set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the operating licenses for the Exelon Nuclear Stations, the management of Exelon recognizes its responsibility and authority to operate and maintain the nuclear power stations in such a manner as to provide for the safety of the general public. This document describes the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Program. The philosophy that guides the development and maintenance of this program is the protection of the health and safety of the general public in the communities around Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and the personnel who work at the plant. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan (E-Plan) establishes the concepts, evaluation and assessment criteria, and protective actions that are necessary in order to limit and mitigate the consequences of potential or actual radiological emergencies. It has been prepared to establish the procedures and practices for management control over unplanned or emergency events that may occur at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. It also provides the necessary pre-arrangements, directions and organization so that all nuclear emergencies can be effectively and efficiently resolved. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Program consists of the E-Plan, Station Annex, emergency plan implementing procedures, and associated program administrative documents. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station E-Plan outlines the basis for response actions that would be implemented in* an emergency.
- This document is not intended to be used as a procedure. The Quad Cities Station Annex contains information and guidance that is unique to the station. The annex addresses site-specific criteria, including:
- Emergency Action Levels (EALs) located in Addendum 3 to the Annex,
- Deviations from the E-Plan (such as station specific on-shift staffing, unique aspects of ERO augmentation, and so forth).
- Facility geography and location for a full understanding and representation of the station's emergency response capabilities. *
- Plant specific facilities and equipment associated with the Emergency Preparedness Program. The Station Annex and it's Addendums become a part of the plan and is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the plan. In the areas where a Station Annex deviates from the general requirements of the E-Plan, the Station Annex shall serve as the controlling document. Detailed E-Plan implementing procedures are maintained separately and are used to guide those responsible for implementing emergency actions. November 2016 Part I Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Section B: Background The primary hazard consideration at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is the potential unplanned release of radioactive material resulting from an accident. The probability of such a release is considered very low due to plant design and strict operational guidelines enforced by the NRC. Notwithstanding, federal regulations require that a solid emergency preparedness program exist for each commercial nuclear power station. A detailed description of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is given in the Updated Final-Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR). In order to minimize the number of ad-hoc decisions made during an emergency and to ensure that necessary equipment, supplies, and essential services are available to meet the needs of an emergency, Exelon Nuclear has developed this E-Plan for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The E-Plan considers the consequences of radiological emergencies, as required by 10 CFR 50, Paragraph 50.47 and Appendix E. Additionally, the E-Plan addresses guidance and adheres to the intent of the criteria established and provided within NUREG-0654. The E-Plan also considers the consequences of non-radiological emergencies. Section C: Scope This document describes actions to be taken in the event of a radiological accident that . may impact the health and safety of the general public or station employees. It also serves to limit the damage to facilities and property, and provide for the restoration of such facilities in the event of an emergency. If such an accident were to occur, the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) would be put in place and maintained until such time where the plant is returned to a stable condition and the threat to the general public or station personnel no longer exists. This plan describes the functions and operation of the ERO, including assignments of authority and responsibility. It does not, nor is it intended to, provide guidance for actual plant equipment manipulations. These instructions are contained in site-specific normal and emergency operating procedures as required by Technical Specifications and other regulatory guidance. The E-Plan provides for: identification and evaluation of emergency situations, protective measures, communications, coordination and notification of governmental authorities, document review and control, emergency preparedness assessment, and training of all *emergency personnel. An emergency recovery phase is also described in this E-Plan. Section D: Planning Basis The E-Plan, in conjunction with the Station Annex and implementing and administrative procedures, documents the methods by which the Exelon Emergency Preparedness Program meets the planning standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. Development of the E-Plan was based on NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" . November 2016 Part I Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Acceptable alternate methods, which deviate from NUREG-0654, are allowed under Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors." However, deviations will be documented in the Station Annex and evaluated as continuing to meet the Planning Standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 under the 10 CFR 50.54(q) process to ensure the continued effectiveness of the E-Plan and Station Annex. Other applicable regulations, publications, and guidance were used (see Appendix 1, "References") along with site-specific documents to ensure consistency in the planning effort. Section E: Contiguous-Jurisdiction Governmental Emergency Planning The E-Plan recognizes the state, in cooperation with the local EPZ communities, as the overall authority responsible for protective action directives in order to protect the health and safety of the general public. Section F: Integrated Emergency Planning State and local (county level) emergency response plans were utilized in the development of this plan to ensure a consistent and integrated response to a classified event. Section G: Funding and Technical Assistance Exelon Nuclear is dedicated to providing the level of support necessary, as dictated by federal regulation, to ensure appropriate integration of the state, county, and utility radiological emergency programs. Section H: Emergency Response Organization Exelon Nuclear acknowledges its primary responsibility for planning and implementing emergency measures within the site boundary and for overall plant accident assessment. These emergency measures include corrective actions, protective measures, and aid for personnel onsite. To accomplish these responsibilities, advance arrangements have been made with offsite organizations for special emergency assistance such as ambulance, medical, hospital, fire, and police services. Section I: Federal Response Provisions are made within the E-Plan for the integration of appropriate elements of the federal assistance activities. Arrangements have been made to accommodate a federal response organization presence at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station as well as support communications between utility and federal emergency facilities. NRG response as described in NUREG-1471, "Concept of Operations: NRG Incident Response", was used in the development of the E-Plan as guidance to ensure coordination between Exelon Nuclear and NRG EROs . November 2016 Part I Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Section J: Form and Content of Plan As required by federal regulations, the E-Plan is governed by and contained (or referenced) in the Station UFSARs. The E-Plan is administratively maintained as a separate document. The E-Plan has been formatted similar to REP-1 , Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." The use of this format lends itself to uncomplicated comparison with the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. Appendix 2, "Procedure Cross-Reference to NUREG-0654", provides a cross-reference between the NUREG-0654 evaluation criteria and the E-Plan implementing procedures and applicable administrative documents . November 2016 Part I Page 4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Part I: Introduction Exelon Nuclear Required Content of the Station Annex Information that is in the plan need not be restated in the Annex. The Annex shall address what means, methods, and resources are used to satisfy the requirements and responsibilities set forth in the E-Plan. Annex Format and Specific Content: As a minimum, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Annex shall address the areas described as follows: 1. Section 1: Introduction The station and surrounding area are described by the inclusion of maps, drawings and/or diagrams. A summary statement describes the Annex's interface with the Plan. 2. Section 2: Organizational Control of Emergencies The agencies with which the station has independent agreements for support during an emergency are provided. 3. Section 3: Classification of Emergencies The Classification levels are described in this Section. Note that the Site Specific EALs are located in Addendum 3 to the Annex and are included for all emergency classes for the purpose of event classification . 4. Section 4: Emergency Measures Maps indicating the location of Assembly Areas, site evacuation routes, and centers for the monitoring of evacuated nonessential personnel are included. Roadway/traffic control measures of roads under control of the station are addressed. 5. Section 5: Emergency Facilities and Equipment
- Descriptions of the station Control Room, Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center are provided.
- A description of the specific equipment is provided.
- _ A description of the capability and resources available to categorize accidents . November 2016 Part I Page 5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section A: Assignment of Responsibility This section describes the primary responsibilities and organizational control of Exelon, federal, state, county, and other emergency response organizations within the Plume Exposure Pathway and the Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs). Various supporting organizations are also described as well as staffing for initial and continuous response. 1. Concept of Operations The relationships and the concept of operations for the organizations and agencies who are a part of the overall ERO are as follows: a. Identified below are federal, state, and county organizations that are involved in a response to an emergency at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. 1) Federal Agencies: The National Response Framework (NRF), Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex outlines the statutory and regulatory responsibilities. The primary federal response for supporting an emergency at an Exelon station include: a) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): The NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and materials and for conducting research in support of the licensing and regulatory process. These responsibilities include protecting the public health and safety, protecting the environment, protecting and safeguarding materials and plants in the interest of national security and assuring conformity with antitrust laws. The NRC Regional Office has the responsibility for auditing of nuclear power stations. It is responsible for ensuring that such activities are conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of such NRC licenses and that as a result of such operations, there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, performs licensing functions associated with the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and with the receipt, possession, ownership, and use of special nuclear and byproduct materials used at reactor facilities. With regard to emergency preparedness, the NRC shall:
- Assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy;
- Review the* Federal Emergency Management Agency findings and determinations on the adequacy and capability of implementation of state and local plans; and
- Make decisions with regard to the overall state of emergency preparedness and issuance of operating licenses. November 2016 A-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The NRC shall respond to incidents at licensed facilities or vehicular accidents involving licensed materials, including radionuclides, in transit. The NRC shall act as the lead Federal agency with regard to technical matters during a nuclear incident including radiological assistance. The NRC shall be prepared to recommend appropriate protective actions for the public and technical actions to the licensee. FEMA shall act as the lead Federal agency for offsite, non-technical concerns. During an incident, the Chairman of the Commission is the senior NRC authority for all aspects of a response. The Chairman shall transfer control of emergency response activities to the Director of Site Operations when deemed appropriate by the Chairman. All NRC Regions as well as Headquarters are prepared to respond to potential emergencies. All Regions and Headquarters have developed plans and procedures for responding to radiological incidents involving NRC licensees. Headquarters has developed the NRC Incident Response Plans and Implementing Procedures. Each NRC Region has developed Regional Supplements that detail how the Region will fulfill all of the responsibilities assigned in the NRC Incident Response Plan. All NRC organizations are responsible for maintaining an effective state of preparedness through periodic training, drills and exercises. Each Region and Headquarters has established and maintains an Incident Response Center designed to centralize and coordinate the emergency response function. Adequate communications are established to link the licensee, Headquarters and the Region. The NRC has established lines of communications with local government, state government, other Federal agencies, Congress and the White House. Public information will be disseminated in a timely manner and periodically. Each Region is prepared to send a team of qualified specialists to the scene expediently. All of the necessary supplies and equipment needed for emergency response will be provided and maintained by the NRC. The NRC Incident Response Plan objectives are to provide for protection of the public health and safety, property, and the environment, from the. effects of radiological incidents that may occur at licensed facilities or which involve licensed materials, including radio-nuclides in transit. The objectives of the agency plan set forth the organizational and management concepts and responsibilities needed to assure that NRC has an effective emergency response program. The plan is intended to ensure NRC preparedness: November 2016 A-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- To receive and evaluate notification information of incidents, accidents and unusual events and determine the extent of NRC response necessary to meet NRC responsibilities for mitigating the consequences of these events;
- To determine the cause of incidents, accidents, and unusual events in order to ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken by the licensee to minimize the consequences of these events;
- To provide onsite expertise in a timely manner, to evaluate the nature and extent of the incident, ascertain plant status (for reactors and fuel facilities), monitor licensee activities, determine compliance, make recommendations, and, if necessary, issue orders relative to the event;
- To inform the public and others of plant status and technical details concerning the incident;
- To recommend adequate protective .actions to the responsible local and/or state agencies;
- To provide technical assistance;
- To ensure the plant is returned to a safe condition; and
- To return the NRC Headquarters and Regional office to normal operations. b) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): Per the National Response Framework (NRF), FEMA is responsible for the overall coordination of a multi-agency Federal response to a significant radiological incident. The primary role of FEMA is to support the state by coordinating the delivery of Federal non-technical assistance. FEMA coordinates state requests for Federal assistance, identifying which Federal agency can best address specific needs. If deemed necessary by FEMA, it will establish a Federal Response Center from which it will manage its assistance activities. c) Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC): The FRPCC consists of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which chairs the Committee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and where appropriate and on an ad hoc basis, other Federal departments and agencies. The FRPCC shall assist FEMA in providing policy direction for the program of Federal assistance to state and local governments in their radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. November 2016 A-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear d) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): The Department of Energy (DOE) has extensive radiological monitoring equipment and personnel resources that it can assemble and dispatch to the scene of a radiological incident. The Department of Energy (DOE) local operations office can assist Exelon Nuclear following a radiological incident as outlined in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP). If Exelon Nuclear, the NRC or the affected states deem that assistance from DOE is necessary or desirable, the affected state(s) would notify the appropriate DOE office. e) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Assists with field radiological monitoring/sampling and non-plant related recovery and reentry guidance. f) The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): The USCG patrols and ensures the safety of navigable waterways in the United States. The USCG is promptly notified of any oil or hazardous substance discharges into rivers or lakes or radioactive contamination of rivers or lakes under its jurisdiction at levels requiring assistance to effect protective actions. The USCG is contacted by the appropriate state agencies in the event of an incident at an applicable nuclear power plant. The USCG is responsible for officially closing the waterways to all commercial traffic [Refer to the appropriate State Plan]. g) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers control barge and boat traffic at locks and dams on navigable waterways in the United States. The Corps of Engineers will be contacted by the appropriate state agencies in the event of an incident at an applicable nuclear power plant. The Corps will be responsible for closing their locks and dams to all waterway traffic leading to the affected area, allowing only traffic leaving the area [Refer to the appropriate State Plan]. h) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Support from the FBI is available through its statutory responsibility based in Public Law and the US code, and through a memorandum of understanding for cooperation with the NRC. Notification to the FBI of emergencies in which they would have an interest will be through provisions of the Nuclear Station's Security Plan, or by the .NRC. i) National Weather Service (NWS): Provides meteorological information during emergency situations, if required. Data available will include existing and forecasted wind directions, wind speed, and ambient air temperature . November 2016 A-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2) State Agencies a) The State of Illinois: The State of Illinois has the statutory responsibility and authority for protecting the health and safety of the public in Illinois. The State of Illinois has developed an "Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents" (IPRA). This plan was developed in accordance with the guidance suggested by NUREG-0396 and NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP;.1, Rev. 1. The IPRA has received 44 CFR 350 unconditional approvals from FEMA for all Exelon Nuclear's generating stations in the state of Illinois. Basic descriptions for the Illinois state agencies responsible for actions in the event of a nuclear power station are as follows:
- Governor of the State of Illinois: The Governor of the State of Illinois has overall command authority for both the radiological and radiological aspects of a nuclear incident. The Governor shall make the final recommendation for protective actions and shall serve as the state's primary spokesperson.
- Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA): IEMA coordinates the operational response and recovery functions of all State agencies. IEMA proposes Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the Governor. IEMA also coordinates the implementation of the Go.vernor's PARs. November 2016 IEMA has both the command authority for radiological aspects of a nuclear incident and the responsibility for performing various radiological functions. These functions include milk, water and food control, radiation exposure control for state emergency workers, and confirmatory accident assessment. During an emergency situation, IEMA shall make protective action recommendations to the Governor. The IEMA response to a nuclear incident utilizes two functional subgroups. They are the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) and the Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT). -Radiological Emergency Assessment Cente*r (REAC): IEMA has established REAC in Springfield Illinois. REAC will serve as the command location for all (State related) radiological aspects of a nuclear incident. The Manager of the Office of Nuclear Facility Safety, or his/her designated alternate, is in command of REAC. -Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT): RAFT has been organized to perform the field radiological functions of confirmatory accident assessments during a nuclear emergency. RAFT includes a Mobile Command Center, a Mobile Nuclear Laboratory, and monitoring and sampling teams . A-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b) The State of Iowa: Much of the Emergency Planning Zone for the Quad Cities Nuclear Station lies within the State of Iowa. The State of Iowa has developed an "Iowa Emergency Plan". This section provides a summary of the essential elements of the Iowa Emergency Plan, specifically outlining the specific responsibilities of certain "key" Iowa State Agency players in a response operational mode. Basic descriptions for the Iowa state agencies responsible for actions in the event of a nuclear power station are as follows: *
- Iowa Emergency Management Division (IEMD): IEMD coordinates all activities of State agencies and departments, all local governments, and the utility in support of emergency response activities. These activities are coordinated from the Iowa State EOC in Des Moines.
- The Iowa Commissioner of Public Health, or his/her designee, from the Iowa Department of Public Health: The Iowa Department of Public Health shall alert the State Hygienic Lab when emergency action conditions are reported by a commercial nuclear power reactor, which impacts upon the public health and safety in Iowa, and when emergency team response has been determined to be necessary or imminent. They shall perform necessary calculations and evaluate the impact of existing and projected radioactivity releases in terms of public health risk. They shall translate the evaluation of existing and projected environmental contamination and resulting dose into terms of alternative protective actions. They shall recommend appropriate protective actions to the Governor's Office, the Iowa Emergency Management Division and other State agencies as appropriate.
- University Hygienic Lab (UHL): The UHL, located in Iowa City, Iowa, conducts and coordinates all field surveillance and monitoring activities directed toward measuring radiation exposure and radioactivity contamination in the environment resulting from an accident at a commercial nuclear power reactor. They also communicate all relevant data and protective action recommendations to the State Department of Public Health, provide radiological laboratory support for environmental samples analysis, and provide recommendations for decontamination of contaminated area. 3) County Government Agencies Exelon and the surrounding communities that comprise the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZs have developed integrated emergency response programs that call upon the resources of their community. The community organizations are responsible for implementing and coordinating the community response to an emergency. November 2016 A-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) serve as the primary coordinating center for local government response within the county's jurisdiction and for coordination between counties. b. During an event classified as an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ERO replaces the normal plant organization. The ERO consists of three major response sub-organizations: 1) The Station Organization, directed by the Station Emergency Director, provides for:
- Control and operation of the plant.
- Mitigation of the emergency condition.
- Protection of station personnel.
- Emergency event classification.
- Notification of the appropriate individuals and agencies prior to EOF taking Command and Control. ,
- Emergency support for operations, engineering, maintenance, firefighting, material acquisition, security, and first aid . 2) The Corporate Organization, directed by the Corporate Emergency Director, provides for:
- Emergency notifications to Federal, state and local agencies.
- Offsite radiological accident assessment and Protective Action Recommendations to offsite authorities.
- The primary interface between Exelon Nuclear and outside organizations responsible for the protection of the public. 3) The Public Information Organization, directed by the Corporate Spokesperson, coordinates with public information officers from other organizations to provide information to the public through the news media. c. Interrelationships between major Exelon Nuclear organizations and organizations in the total response effort are illustrated in a block diagram in Figures A-1 and A-2. For a more detailed diagram of the Exelon Nuclear ERO, see Figures B-1 a to B-1 d. d. The Corporate Emergency Director is a senior Exelon employee with overall responsibility for coordinating emergency response actions in support of the affected Exelon Nuclear station, Emergency Public Information Organization, and affected state(s) and local agencies. November 2016 A-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exe.Ion Nuclear e. Procedures for training and maintenance of the emergency organization are in place to ensure 24-hour per day staffing for emergency response, including established communication links. 2. State and County Functions and Responsibilities The state and counties have emergency response plans that specify the responsibilities and functions for the major agencies, departments, and key individuals of their emergency response organizations. This information is located in their respective plans. 3. Agreements in Planning Effort Written agreements establishing the concept of operations developed between Exelon Nuclear and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the EPZs have been developed. These agreements identify the emergency measures to be provided, the mutually accepted criteria for implementation, and the arrangements for exchange of information. Agreement letters are not necessary with Federal Agencies who are legally required to respond based on Federal law; however, agreements are necessary if the agency was expected to provide assistance not required by law. Letters of Agreement with private contractors and others who provide services in support of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station shall be obtained by the station. Letters of Agreement are referenced in the Station Annex and the actual letters are maintained on file at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. Letters of Agreement, as a minimum, state that the cooperating organization will provide their normal services in support of an emergency at the affected station. A contract/purchase order with a private contractor is considered acceptable in lieu of a Letter of Agreement for the specified duration of the contract. 4. Continuous Coverage Exelon Nuclear maintains 24-hour emergency response capability at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The normal on-shift complement provides the initial response to an emergency. This group is trained to handle emergency situations (e.g. initiate implementation of the E-Plan, make initial accident assessment, emergency classification, notifications, communications, and protective action recommendations) until the augmented ERO arrives. The ERO is composed of a broad spectrum of personnel with specialties in operations, maintenance, engineering, radiochemistry, health physics, material control, fire protection, security, and emergency planning and are available and trained to augment on-shift personnel in an emergency. Procedures for training and maintenance of the emergency organization are in place to provide the capability of continuous (24-hour) operations. The Corporate Emergency Director, located in the EOF, has the authority and responsibility for assuring continuity of resources (technical, administrative, and material) in the event of the activation of the ERO . November 2016 A-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure A-1: Exelon Emergency Response Organization Interrelationships Station Emergency Response Technical Support Center (TSC) -Corporate Emergency Response November 2016 ... Operations Support Center (OSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Joint Information Center (JIG) News Media/ Public A-9 Control Room .H H EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure A-2: Agency Response Organization Interrelationships
- FEMA Governor's ,---Office t---US NRC Emergency Mgt. --Headquarters Agency I *r " US NRC Exelon State -Region Agencies DOE --State Police ,, Field Monitoring FBI Teams Agriculture I Fish --& Wild Life
- USCG -Other Agencies --U.S. Army Corp of Engrs Hospitals --NWS Fire -Department ,. ,, County Medical Agencies Support -Municipal -Local Law Enforcement
- November 2016 A-10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section B: Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Organization This section describes the Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Organization (ERO), its key positions and associated responsibilities. It outlines the staffing requirements which provide initial emergency response actions and provisions for timely augmentation of on-shift personnel when required. It also describes interfaces among Exelon Nuclear emergency response personnel and specifies the offsite support available to respond to Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. 1. On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Assignments The normal plant personnel complement is established with the Station Vice President having overall authority for station operations. The Station Vice President directs the site organization in the management of the various departments while the Shift Manager retains the responsibility for actual operation of plant systems. Emergency Preparedness must consider the capabilities of the normal plant organization, the Station and Corporate Emergency Response Organizations of Exelon Nuclear, and the non-Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response agencies. The initial phases of an emergency situation at a nuclear station will most likely involve a relatively small number of individuals. These individuals must be capable of (1) determining that an emergency exists; (2) providing initial classification and assessment; and (3) promptly notifying other groups and individuals in the emergency organization. The subsequent phases of the emergency situation may require an increasing augmentation of the emergency organization . Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has personnel on shift at all times that can provide an initial response to an emergency event. ERO staffing tables, contained within this document, outline the plant on-shift emergency organization and its relation to the normal staff complement. Members of the on-shift organization are trained on their responsibilities and duties in the event of an emergency and are capable of performing all response actions in an Unusual Event or the initial actions of higher classifications. On Shift Personnel Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has the capability at all times to perform detection, mitigation, classification, and notification functions required in the early phases of an emergency. Shift augmentation and further ERO involvement will be determined by the extent and magnitude of the event. When a transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) is initiated, the shift crew assumes the duties and responsibilities of the SAMG Implementers. Shift Manager: While acting as Shift Emergency Director, will take immediate action during an emergency and will activate the Station ERO, as appropriate. In the Shift Manager's absence or incapacitation, the line of succession is defined by Station p raced u res . November 2016 8-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Shift Technical Advisor (STA): During normal plant operations, the Senior Reactor Operators report to the Shift Manager and directly supervise the licensed Reactor Operators and all activities in the Control Room. During an abnormal condition, the Shift Manager assumes direct supervision of personnel and all activities in the Control Room while a qualified individual steps back and assumes an overview role as an STA with the specific responsibility of monitoring the maintenance of core cooling and containment integrity. An individual assigned the duty as the ST A shall be available to the Control Room at all times. Radiation Protection: The Station Radiation Protection personnel are responsible for the handling and monitoring of radioactive materials. Included in this organization are Health Physicists, Radiation Protection Supervisors and Technicians. Chemistry: The Station Chemistry personnel are responsible for sampling of system effluents, and the chemical and radio-analytical analysis of those samples. Included in this organization are Chemists, Chemistry Supervisors and Technicians. Security: The Station Security personnel are responsible for the physical security of the site. Included in this organization are Security Supervisors and Security Guards. 2. Authority Over the Emergency Response Organization The Emergency Director in Command and Control is the designated Exelon Nuclear individual who has overall authority and responsibility, management ability, and technical knowledge for coordinating all emergency response activities at the nuclear power station.
- Control Room: Shift Emergency Director (Shift Manager)
- TSC: Station Emergency Director
- EOF: Corporate Emergency Director 3. Criteria for Assuming Command and Control (Succession) Emergency personnel assume responsibility for their positions upon receiving notification to activate. The responsibility for initial assessment of and response to an emergency rests with the Shift Manager. The Shift Manager is the Shift Emergency Director and has the Station Emergency Director's responsibilities and authority until relieved by a qualified Station Emergency Director. The Station Emergency Director, once having relieved the Shift Manager of the Emergency Director responsibilities, is responsible for continued assessment of the severity of the emergency and for the necessary functions as described in the E-Plan, the Station Annex, and the emergency implementing procedures. Final succession is achieved when the Corporate Emergency Director assumes overall Command and Control, and directs Exelon Nuclear:s Emergency Response activities . November 2016 B-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The Shift Emergency Director is relieved of Command and Control as soon as possible after the declaration of an Alert (or higher classification if Alert not declared). Command and Control may be transferred directly to the Corporate Emergency Director, or transferred to the Station Emergency Director on an interim basis. Command and Control does not transfer until the following criteria have been met:
- Adequate staff levels are present in support of the non-delegable responsibilities.
- The staff has been fully briefed as to the status of the event and the currently proposed plan of action.
- A turnover between the Emergency Director relinquishing Command and Control and the Emergency Director assuming Command and Control has been made. Although Exelon Nuclear's ERO fulfills all regulatory requirements for emergency response, it may be altered by the Emergency Director. This type of alteration will be based upon identified within the ERO, event dependent criteria, and identified needs of the company as* a whole. 4. Non-Delegable Responsibilities Non-delegable responsibilities include the following functions:
- Event classification.
- Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the general public .
- Notification of offsite authorities (approval of state/local and NRC notifications).
- Authorization of emergency exposure controls in excess of 5 Rem TEDE and the issuance of potassium iodide (Kl), for Exelon Nuclear emergency workers per EPA-400. . . The Shift Manager is responsible for the initial classification of an event and assumes the position as Shift Emergency Director. In this capacity, the Shift Manager has responsibility for performing the non-delegable responsibilities until relieved. The Station Emergency Director will assume overall authority and responsibility for performing all of the non-delegable duties from the Shift Manager. The Corporate Emergency Director (EOF) will subsequently relieve the Station Emergency Director (TSC) of overall Command and Control and assume the non-delegable responsibilities for PAR determination and notifications to offsite authorities . November 2016 8-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Transition of "Non-Delegable" Responsibilities . Control Room TSC EOF (Shift Emergency Director) (Station Emergency Director) (Corporate Emergency Director) Classification--------PARs --------* Notifications Emergency Exposure Controls ----* Classification PARs---------PARs Notification Notifications Emergency Exposure Controls 5. Emergency Response Organization Positional Responsibilities ERO staffing tables contained within this document outline ERO positions required to meet minimum staffing and full augmentation of the on-shift complement at an Alert or higher classification, and the major tasks assigned to each position. The full augmentation staffing levels are used as a planning basis to cover a wide range of possible events. For extended events (one which lasts for more than 24 hours), actual staffing will be established by the Emergency Director based on the event and personnel availability. However, additional staffing or reduced staffing will only occur after discussion concerning the impact on plant operations and emergency response. In addition to maintaining adequate documentation of the event, responsibilities for each position are as follows: a. Station Emergency Response Organization: The Station ERO is the onsite group that is activated during an emergency. It functions under the Station Emergency Director, who is responsible for organizing and coordinating the emergency efforts at and within the immediate vicinity of the station (including carrying out all onsite emergency efforts and the initial offsite environs monitoring efforts necessary to assess plant releases). The Station ERO consists of station personnel who are involved with emergency response efforts necessary to control the plant during an incident. This organization operates out of the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support Center (OSC). Collectively, members of the Station ERO provide for the following activities during an emergency:
- Plant systems operations
- Radiological survey and monitoring (including Environs Monitoring)
- Firefighting
- Rescue operations and First Aid
- Decontamination
- Security of plant and access control
- Repair and damage control
- Personnel protection including Assembly, Accountability and Evacuation November 2016 B-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Communications
- Initial Liaison responsibilities with Federal, state and local authorities When plant conditions warrant entry into the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs), the Station Emergency Director or other qualified individual (e.g., Operations Manager) assumes the role of Decision-Maker. The Technical Manager and/or another qualified individual(s) assumes the role of Evaluator (at least 2 are required), and the Control Room staff assumes the role of Implementers. Control Room personnel will perform mitigating actions for severe accidents per EOPs prior to TSC activation. All Station ERO personnel shall have the authority to perform assigned duties in a manner consistent with the objectives of this plan. 1) Shift Manager (Shift Emergency Director) Control Room A Shift Manager is on duty 24 hours a day and is the Shift Emergency Director in a declared emergency until relieved of this function. While serving in this capacity the Shift Manager is responsible for:
- Activating the ERO (as deemed appropriate or as procedurally required).
- Performing those duties outlined in Section 8.5.a.2 for the Station Emergency Director. The responsibilities described for the Station Emergency Director applies to either the Shift Emergency Director or the Station Emergency Director depending on which individual is in Command and Control. The on-duty Shift Manager directs the activities of the operating crew and is responsible for the safe operation of the plant in compliance with the station NRC operating license and the station operating procedures. The Shift Manager, after relinquishing Command and Control, functionally reports to the Operations Manager in the TSC. The Shift Manager's responsibilities, when not in Command and Control, are described below:
- The authority and responsibility to shut down the reactor when determined that the safety of the reactor is in jeopardy or when operating parameters exceed any of the reactor protection circuit set-points and automatic shutdown does not occur;
- To ensure a review has been completed to determine the circumstance, cause, and limits under which operations can safely proceed before the reactor is returned to power following a trip or an unscheduled or unexplained power reduction; November 2016 8-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- The responsibility to be present at the plant and to provide direction for returning the reactor to power following a trip or an unscheduled or unexplained power reduction;
- The responsibility to adhere to the station Technical Specifications and to review routine operating data to assure safe operation;
- The responsibility to identify applicable EALs and emergency classifications; and
- The responsibility to adhere to plant operating procedures and the requirements for their use. During an emergency, operations personnel may depart from approved procedures where necessary to prevent injury to personnel, including the public, or damage to the facility consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y).
- Supervise the activities of the Control Room Crew, Operations Communicator and Damage Control Communicator in the Control Room. 2) Station Emergency Director TSC The Station Emergency Director reports to the Corporate Emergency Director and supervises and directs the Station ERO. The Station Emergency Director's responsibilities include organizing and coordinating the onsite emergency efforts. Additionally, the Station Emergency Director has the requisite authority, plant operating experience and qualifications to implement in-plant recovery operations. a) Station Emergency Director Responsibilities while in Command and Control:
- Perform all non-delegable responsibilities as the Emergency Director in Command and Control until relieved by the EOF.
- Conduct personnel assembly/accountability and evacuation of non-essential personnel at Site Area Emergency, General Emergency or as conditions warrant.
- If the emergency involves a hazardous substance and/or oil discharges, ensure that appropriate notifications and responses have been made.
- Determine if the OSC is to remain activated at the Alert Classification. b) Station Emergency Director Responsibilities while not in Command and Control:
- Event classification.
- Emergency exposure controls. November 2016 B-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Protective actions for all onsite personnel.
- Supervision of the Station ERO.
- Inform the Corporate Emergency Director and onsite NRC as to the status of the plant.
- Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in the acquisition of information for the state/local notifications, N RC notifications and offsite agency updates.
- Provide information and recommendations to the Corporate Emergency Director.
- Implement plans, procedures and schedules to meet emergency response objectives as directed by the Corporate Emergency Director.
- Request from the Corporate ERO any additional material, personnel resources or equipment needed to implement response plans and operations.
- Assume the duties and responsibilities of Decision-Maker when a transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) is initiated. This responsibility can be delegated to the Operations Manager if qualified. 3) TSC Director TSC The TSC Director reports to the Station Emergency Director and is responsible for the content of information transmitted from the TSC to other agencies (or facilities) and for documenting information received at the TSC in coordination with the Station Emergency Director. Responsibilities include:
- Verify that qualified individuals are filling Communicator positions in the Control Room, TSC and OSC.
- Supervise the activities of the Logistics Coordinator and state/local Communicator.
- Ensure that communications are established with appropriate parties as directed by the Station Emergency Director.
- Ensure that all required notifications to offsite governmental agencies (state/local and NRC) are timely and accurate.
- Act as the Exelon Nuclear Liaison to any NRC Site Team Representatives .
- Ensure that the NRC Site Team Representatives are directed to their appropriate counterparts. November 2016 B-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _J
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in the acquisition of information for off-site agency updates.
- Record and relay inquiries to the Station Emergency Director. In addition, record responses to such inquiries prior to transmission.
- Assist the Station Emergency Director in maintaining proper records. 4) Communicators CR/TSC/OSC The Communicators are responsible for transmitting/receiving information to and from the TSC, OSC and Control Room. General responsibilities assigned to all Communicators include:
- Establish communications with appropriate parties as directed.
- Transmit information that has been reviewed and/or approved by the responsible Manager or Coordinator.
- Document time, date and information being transmitted or received on appropriate forms.
- Record and relay inquiries and the responses to those inquiries.
- Assist appropriate Managers and Coordinators in maintaining proper records and logs of emergency related activities.
- Gather, record and post appropriate information. a) Specific responsibilities assigned to the State/Local Communicator include:
- Communicate and receive information via the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) circuit or commercial telephone line with appropriate agencies prior to the EOF accepting Command and Control.
- Monitor NARS communications until released by the TSC Director. b) Specific responsibilities assigned to the Damage Control Communicator include:
- Relay requests from the Control Room and TSC for the dispatching of OSC Teams.
- Apprise the station emergency response facilities of the status of OSC Team activities . November 2016 8-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c) Specific responsibilities assigned to the Operations Communicator include:
- Apprise the TSC and EOF staff of the overall plant condition and significant changes to system and equipment status.
- Inform the Control Room, TSC, and EOF of significant changes in event status (e.g. changes in classification, command and control, initiation of station assembly, accountability, evacuation, etc.). d). Specific responsibilities assigned to the TSC Technical Communicator include:
- Establish and maintain contact with the EOF Technical Advisor.
- Provide EOF with updates on technical support activities and priorities. e) Specific responsibilities assigned to the ENS Communicator include:
- Notify the NRC of changes in event classification, prior to the EOF accepting Command and Control, and assist the EOF ENS Communicator in completing the NRC Event Notification Worksheet and responding to NRC inquiries .
- Provide real time updates of significant changes to plant and system status and responses to NRC inquiries.
- Maintain continuous communications with the NRC, if requested, via the NRC ENS phone or commercial telephone line. f) Specific responsibilities assigned to the HPN Communicator include:
- Maintain continuous communications with the NRC, if requested, via the NRC Health Physics Network (HPN) phone or commercial telephone line.
- Communicate current Health Physics information to NRC representatives, as requested.
- Coordinate the communications of radiological information to the NRC with the EOF HPN Communicator (onsite vs. environmental data) . November 2016 B-9 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 5) Operations Manager TSC The Operations Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director. Major functions include determining the extent of station emergencies, initiating corrective actions, and implementing protective actions for onsite personnel. In the event that the Station Emergency Director becomes incapacitated and can no longer fulfill the designated responsibilities, the Operations Manager will normally assume the responsibilities until relieved by another qualified Station Emergency Director. Responsibilities include:
- Coordinate TSC efforts in determining the nature and extent of emergencies pertaining to equipment and plant facilities in support of Control Room actions.
- Initiate immediate corrective actions to limit or contain the emergency invoking the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(x) if appropriate, and specifically when addressing Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG).
- Recommend equipment operations checks and miscellaneous actions to the Control Room in support of restoration and accident mitigation.
- Approve emergency special procedures, and implement as required under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(x) .
- Assist the Maintenance Manager in determining the priority assigned to OSC activities.
- Organize and direct medical response efforts for injured personnel.
- Ensure adequate staffing of the Control Room and TSC subordinates.
- Ensure the Shift Manager is informed of OSC staffing utilization and activities.
- Identify steps or procedures that the Operations staff should be utilizing to properly respond to the emergency condition.
- Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating changes in event classification.
- Supervise the activities of the Operations Communicator and the ENS Communicator in the TSC.
- Act as the TSC liaison with the appropriate NRG Site Team Representative.
- At the direction of the Station Emergency Director, assume the duties and responsibilities of the Evaluator, or Decision-Maker if qualified, when transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) is initiated. November 2016 B-10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 6) Technical Manager TSC The Technical Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director and directs a staff in performing technical assessments of station emergencies and assists in recovery planning. Responsibilities include:
- Accumulate, tabulate and evaluate data on plant conditions.
- Evaluate plant parameters during an emergency to determine the overall plant condition.
- Coordinate core damage assessment activities. *
- Identify data points and control parameters that the Operations staff should monitor.
- Ensure that current and adequate technical information is depicted on status boards.
- Identify and direct staff in the development of special procedures needed to effect long-term safe shutdown or to mitigate a release.
- Supervise the total onsite technical staff effort.
- Act as the TSC liaison with state and appropriate NRC Site Team representatives.
- Assist the Radiation Protection Manager for onsite radiological/technical matters.
- Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating plant based PARs (prior to Corporate Emergency Director accepting command and control) and changes in event classification.
- Supervise the activities of the TSC Technical Communicator.
- Assume the duties and responsibilities of an Evaluator when transition to Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) is initiated and supervise the activities of the SAMG Evaluator Team 7) Technical Support Staff The TSC Technical Support Staff consists of the following minimum staff engineering positions: -Electrical Engineer -Mechanical Engineer TSC -Core/Thermal Hydraulic Engineer -serves as Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) Evaluator, as applicable. November 2016 B-11 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear In addition, station Engineering support will be augmented on an as needed basis to support accident assessment and mitigation activities. 8) Logistics Coordinator TSC The Logistics Coordinator reports to the TSC Director and provides administrative services in support of emergency/recovery operations. Responsibilities include:
- Coordinate shift relief and continual staffing of the station.
- Arrange for clerical staff at the TSC, OSC and Control Room.
- Assist the Security Coordinator in coordinating ERO and station activities in support of on-going security contingency, accountability or site/area evacuation efforts.
- Support the processing of special procedures and interim reports during an emergency.
- Ensure that event status and priority logs are being maintained in the TSC.
- Coordinate record-keeping efforts at the station .
- Arrange for food, sleeping facilities and other necessary accommodations for onsite emergency workers.
- Arrange for specialized training of Emergency Response personnel as needed. 9) Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) TSC The Radiation Protection Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director and supervises the activities of the Radiation Controls Coordinator and Radiation Controls Engineer. The TSC RPM directs a staff in determining the extent and nature of radiological or hazardous material problems onsite. Responsibilities include:
- Accumulate, tabulate and evaluate data on plant conditions such as meteorological and radiological monitoring readings, and other pertinent data.
- Act as the TSC liaison with the appropriate NRC Site Team representative.
- Ensure use of protective clothing, respiratory protection, and access control within the plant as deemed appropriate to control personnel exposures. November 2016 B-12 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Ensure that appropriate bioassay procedures have been implemented for onsite personnel when a radioactivity incident has occurred.
- Ensure that personnel are decontaminated, if necessary.
- Authorize personnel exposures below 5 Rem TEDE (EPA-400 lower limit).
- Assist the Station Emergency Director in determining if exposures in excess of the 5 Rem TEDE (EPA-400 lower limit) are necessary.
- Advise the Station Emergency Director of situations when the use of Kl should be considered.
- Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating dose-based PARs (prior to Corporate Emergency Director accepting command and control) and changes in radiological event classification.
- Advise the Station Emergency Director and EOF Radiation Protection Manager of changes in radiological release status.
- Assist the Operations Manager in planning rescue operations and provide monitoring services as required, including the transfer of injured and/or contaminated personnel.
- Coordinate with the Security Coordinator to determine the routes to be used for evacuation of non-essential personnel.
- Assure additional radiation protection personnel and/or equipment is arranged for, as necessary. 10) Radiation Controls Engineer (RCE) TSC The Radiation Controls Engineer reports to the Radiation Protection Manager and coordinates the radiological and chemistry interface between the technical support engineering efforts. Responsibilities include:
- Monitor area and process radiation monitors to identify trends and potential hazards within the station.
- Evaluate plant environmental factors regarding radiological and other hazardous material conditions.
- Evaluate radiological and hazardous material surveys and chemistry sample results as appropriate.
- Direct the performance of sampling activities through coordination with the OSC Chemistry Lead in support of operations and core damage estimates as necessary. November 2016 B-13 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Coordinate radiological and chemistry information with the Core/Thermal Hydraulic Engineer in support of core damage assessment. 11) Radiation Controls Coordinator (RCC) TSC The Radiation Controls Coordinator reports to the Radiation Protection Manager. The RCC coordinates site and in-plant Radiation Protection response activities through the OSC Radiation Protection Lead. Responsibilities include:
- Support the OSC Radiation Protection Lead in the dispatching of OSC Teams.
- Assist the Operations Manager in planning radiological controls for personnel dispatched from the Control Room.
- Ensure the proper use of protective clothing, respiratory protection, and access controls in the plant as appropriate to control personnel exposure.
- Monitor habitability concerns impacting access to plant and site areas.
- In coordination with the OSC Radiation Protection Lead, assemble and dispatch the Field Monitoring Teams as required.
- Supervise the activities of the HPN Communicator in the TSC .
- Request additional Radiation Protection personnel and/or equipment, as necessary in support of station activities and staff relief.
- Prior to EOF Protective Measures Group staffing: -Perform dose assessments and provide appropriate dose-based PARs. -Coordinate Field Monitoring Team activities. -Monitor meteorological conditions and remain cognizant of forecast data.
- Following EOF Protective Measures Group staffing: -Transfer control of the Field Monitoring Teams to the EOF Environmental Coordinator when appropriate. -Transfer responsibility of dose assessment activities to the EOF Dose Assessment Coordinator . -Assist the EOF Environmental Coordinator in the acquisition of information for the off-site agency updates. November 2016 B-14 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 12) Maintenance Manager TSC The Maintenance Manager reports to the Station Emergency Director and directs a staff in providing labor, tools, protective equipment and parts needed for emergency repair, damage control and recovery efforts to place the plant in a safe condition or return the plant to its pre-accident status. Responsibilities include:
- Direct the total onsite maintenance and equipment restoration effort.
- Request additional equipment in order to expedite recovery and restoration.
- Supervise the activities of the OSC Director and the TSC Damage Control Communicator.
- Ensure the Operations Manager is informed of OSC staffing utilization and activities.
- In coordination with the Operations Manager, determine the priority assigned to OSC activities.
- Ensure adequate staffing of the OSC .
- Assist in rescue operations.
- Identify required procedures that need to be written or implemented in support of the response efforts. 13) Security Coordinator TSC The Security Coordinator reports to the Station Emergency Director and maintains plant security and personnel accountability at the nuclear station. Responsibilities include: *
- Maintain plant security and account for all personnel within the protected area.
- Assist the Station Emergency Director in evaluating changes in security related threats and event classifications.
- Identify any non-routine security procedures and/or contingencies that are in effect or that require a response.
- Expedite ingress and egress of emergency response personnel.
- Coordinate with the Radiation Protection Manager in controlling ingress and egress to and from the Protected Area if radiological concerns are present. November 2016 B-15 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Provide for access control to the Control Room, TSC and OSC, as appropriate.
- Expedite entry into the Protected Area, as necessary, for the NRC Site Team.
- Act as the TSC liaison with the appropriate NRC Site Team representative.
- Assist the Radiation Protection Manager in determining personnel evacuation routes as necessary.
- Coordinate the evacuation of station non-essential personnel with the appropriate Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEAs). 14) Operations Support Center Director osc The OSC Director reports to the Maintenance Manager and supervises the activities of OSC personnel. Responsibilities include:
- Assign tasks to designated Leads as available: -Operations -Mechanical Maintenance -Electrical/l&C Maintenance -Radiation Protection -Chemistry
- Coordinate with the OSC Operations Lead in the dispatch of Operations personnel to support Control Room and OSC Team activities.
- Notify the Control Room and TSC prior to dispatch of any OSC teams into the plant.
- Maintain OSC resources including personnel, material, and equipment.
- Maintain accountability for all individuals dispatched from the OSC.
- Conduct periodic briefings on the overall plant status, emergency response activities, and station priorities . November 2016 B-16 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 15) Assistant Operations Support Center Director OSC The Assistant OSC Director reports to the OSC Director and supports the OSC Director in supervising the activities of personnel reporting to the OSC. The Assistant OSC Director may be filled by an OSC Lead, normally the Radiation Protection Lead. Responsibilities include:
- Assist the OSC Director in supervising personnel assigned to the OSC.
- Assist in formation of Field Monitoring Teams as directed by the TSC.
- Assist in formation of sampling teams.
- Ensure that records of in-plant survey information and radiochemistry results are maintained.
- Ensure that accumulated exposure records for all essential onsite personnel are maintained.
- Coordinate with the OSC Leads to organize in-plant teams to support station priorities.
- Ensure that in-plant team dispatch briefings include expected activities and radiological hazards .
- Ensure that periodic facility briefings are conducted on plant radiological conditions. 16) OSC Leads osc OSC Leads report to the OSC Director and are assigned from the following station departments:
- Mechanical Maintenance
- Electrical I Instrument and Control
- Radiation Protection
- Chemistry
- Operations (on-shift Supervising Operator or designated Operations representative) The OSC Lead assigned to an OSC team is responsible at all times for the safety of team personnel and to keep the OSC Director apprised of team status. Specifically, the OSC Leads are responsible for the managing and supervising OSC team personnel, including:
- Conduct of adequate pre-dispatch briefings. November 2016 B-17 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Ensuring adequate protective equipment and measures have been identified.
- Tracking of OSC team activities while dispatched.
- Debriefing of team personnel upon return to the OSC. b. Corporate Emergency Response Organization 1) Nuclear Duty Officer (NDO) The NDO is the Exelon Nuclear individual who acts as the initial Corporate contact for declared events. Responsibilities include: a) Actions for all classified events:
- Contact the affected station to verify and obtain updated information concerning emergency response actions and event status.
- Notify Exelon Nuclear Executives of event.
- Provide information on the event to State Duty Officers, if requested.
- Notify the on-call Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Representative .
- Prior to EOF activation, review any news releases for accuracy. b) Actions for Alert classifications and above:
- Complete all actions as listed above.
- Notify American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) prior to being transferred to the EOF. 2) Corporate Emergency Director EOF a) When the Station Emergency Director has Command and Control, the ongoing responsibilities include:
- Coordinate all Exelon Nuclear activities involved with the emergency response.
- Ensure off-site agency updates are periodically communicated as required/requested.
- Coordinate Exelon Nuclear press releases with the Nuclear Duty Officer and Exelon Communications and Public Affairs .
- Request assistance from non-Exelon Nuclear emergency response organizations, as necessary. November 2016 B-18 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b) Following assumption of Command and Control, the additional responsibilities assigned to the Corporate Emergency Director include:
- Assumes overall Command1 and Control of emergency response activities and the non-delegable responsibilities for PAR determination and the notification of offsite authorities.
- Ensure that Federal, state and local authorities and industry support agencies remain cognizant bf the status of the emergency situation. If requested, dispatch informed individuals to offsite governmental Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs).
- Approve the technical content of Exelon Nuclear press releases prior to their being released to the media. 3) EOF Director EOF The EOF Director reports to the Corporate Emergency Director and has the authority, management ability and technical knowledge to assist the Corporate Emergency Director in the management of Exelon Nuclear's offsite ERO. . In the event that the Corporate Emergency Director becomes incapacitated, the EOF Director shall assume the responsibilities of the Corporate Emergency Director until a transfer of Command and Control can be affected either back to the station or to another qualified Corporate Emergency Director. Responsibilities include:
- Direct and coordinate the activation and response efforts of the EOF staff in support of the Corporate Emergency Director.
- Evaluate the need to augment the EOF staff based on events in progress.
- Assess the effectiveness of ongoing EOF working relationships.
- Monitor information flow within the EOF to ensure that facility activities remain coordinated.
- Prepare state/local notification forms with the assistance of the EOF Radiation Protection Manager and the Technical Support Manager.
- Coordinate services as necessary to support EOF operations.
- Coordinate with the Administrative Coordinator for continual shift staffing requirements.
- Assist in the conduct of Corporate Emergency Director duties . November 2016 B-19 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Act as the designated alternate for approval of the technical content of Exelon Nuclear Press Releases and information released to the News Media.
- Act as purchasing agent in support of the TSC for contract negotiation/administration. 4) Technical Support Manager EOF The Technical Support Manager reports to the EOF Director and directs the activities of the Technical Support Group. Responsibilities include:
- Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in monitoring changes in event classification.
- Assist the Corporate Emergency Director in determining plant-based PARs when necessary.
- Provide information to the EOF Director for completing the state/local notification form.
- Provide the Corporate Emergency Director information concerning the status of plant operations, and recommendations for mitigating the consequences of the accident.
- Coordinate the overall Exelon Nuclear engineering support from corporate staff and unaffected stations.
- Interface with Industry and contractor engineering support organizations.
- Ensure that the EOF Radiation Protection Manager is informed of -changes in plant status that impacts or potentially impacts the offsite environment or PARs.
- Provide technical on facility and system design.
- Assist in the development of post-accident recovery measures. 5) Operations Advisor EOF The Operations Advisor reports to the Technical Support Manager, directs the ENS Communicator, and is responsible for obtaining and analyzing plant status information and ensuring that it is disseminated. Specific responsibilities include:
- Monitor the Operations Status Line to keep apprised of: -Control Room activities including progress on Emergency Operating Procedures. November 2016 B-20 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear -Significant changes in plant system/equipment status and critical parameters. -Possible changes in event classification.
- Identify and track critical parameters for the identification and trending of current plant status information.
- Assist the station in identifying Operations resources from corporate staff or unaffected stations for direct support of plant shift operations personnel.
- Assist the ENS Communicator in the completion of the NRC Event Notification Worksheet and in responding to NRG inquiries.
- Ensure that the EOF Radiation Protection Manager is informed of changes in plant status that impact or potentially impact the offsite environment or PARs. 6) ENS Communicator EOF The ENS-Communicator reports to the Operations Advisor. Specific responsibilities include:
- Notify the NRG of changes in event classification. Generally, the TSC ENS Communicator focuses on real time plant operations and the EOF ENS Communicator focuses on notifications following changes in event classification and overall changes in event response or status.
- Establish and maintain continuous communications with the NRC, if requested, via the NRG ENS phone or commercial telephone line.
- Coordinate NRG communications with the ENS Communicator in the TSC. 7) Technical Advisor EOF The Technical Advisor reports to the Technical Support Manager and is responsible for obtaining and analyzing technical support information, accident mitigating activities and priorities and ensuring that it is disseminated. Responsibilities include:
- Monitor the Technical Conference Line to remain aware of TSC technical support activities, strategies and priorities.
- Assist the Dose Assessment Coordinator in acquiring technical information pertaining to release pathway and core damage assessment.
- Supervise the activities of the Events Recorder. November 2016 B-21 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 8) Events Recorder EOF The Events Recorder reports to the Technical Advisor. Responsibilities include:
- Gather/record approved information on status boards as requested.
- Maintain an event chronology/status log. 9) Radiation Protection Manager EOF The Radiation Protection Manager reports to the EOF Director and directs the activities of the EOF Radiation Protection staff. Specific responsibilities include:
- Recommend changes in event classification and PARs based upon effluent releases or dose projections.
- Assist the EOF Director in the evaluation of the significance of an emergency with respect to the public.
- Notify the EOF Director of meteorological changes that may impact identification of downwind areas.
- Advise the Corporate Emergency Director of protective actions taken by the station for plant personnel.
- Assist the TSC in the planning and coordination of activities associated with the evacuation of non-essential personnel.
- Advise the Corporate Emergency Director on the need for emergency exposures or for issuance of Kl to the Field Monitoring Teams or Exelon personnel required to enter the plume.
- Determine the need for and contact Occupational Health/Industrial Safety Services personnel for assistance.
- Monitor plant radiological conditions and advise the TSC Radiation Protection Manager of any adverse trends or potential release pathways that may impact existing event classification.
- Assist in the completion and review of the state/local notification form.
- Maintain cognizance of environmental sampling activities.
- Ensure state authorities are provided information pertaining to Exelon Field Monitoring Team activities and sample results .
- Assist the affected station in the following areas: November 2016 B-22 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _j
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear -Planning and coordination of activities associated with the evacuation of non-essential personnel. -* Acquisition of additional instrumentation, dosimetry, protective equipment and radiological support personnel.
- Assist and interface with the EOF Technical Support Group and the station in the development of plans for plant surveys, sampling, shielding, and special tools in support of waste systems processing and design modification activities.
- Upon request, provide in-plant health physics data to Emergency Public Information personnel and the HPN Communicator. 1 O) Environmental Coordinator EOF The Environmental Coordinator reports to the EOF Radiation Protection Manager and directs the Field Team Communicator, Field Monitoring Teams and the State Environs Communicator. Responsibilities include:
- Coordinate the transfer of control of the Field Monitoring Teams if initially under the direction of the TSC Radiological Controls Coordinator.
- Ensure communications are established with the TSC to obtain information on the accident conditions, meteorological conditions and estimates of radioactive material releases.
- Maintain cognizance of Field Monitoring Team exposure. When warranted, ask the Dose Assessment Coordinator to initiate an evaluation of the need for administering Kl to Exelon nuclear workers.
- Determine needs of the Dose Assessment Coordinator, the Dose Assessor, the HPN Communicator and the State Environs Communicator(s) for updates on Field Monitoring Team data and ensure distribution of new data to them in accordance with those needs. *
- Upon request, provide environmental data to Emergency Public Information personnel.
- Evaluate and coordinate additional equipment and personnel as necessary from unaffected stations to augment and/or relieve station Field Monitoring Teams . November 2016 B-23 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 11) State Environs Communicator EOF The State Environs Communicator is staffed as requested by the applicable state agencies. The State Environs Communicator reports to the Environmental Coordinator. Responsibilities include:
- As needed, obtain release and dose assessment data from the Dose Assessment Coordinator and Field Monitoring Team data from the Environmental Coordinator.
- Coordinate activities and information flow between the EOF Protective Measures Group and the affected state(s) environmental authorities, including periodic updates on meteorological conditions, Field Monitoring Team activities and survey/sample results.
- Ensure that the Environmental Coordinator is aware of state environmental activities and sample results. 12) Field Team Communicator EOF The Field Team Communicator reports to the Environmental Coordinator. Responsibilities include:
- Establish and maintain contact with the dispatched Field Monitoring Teams .
- Document the Environmental Coordinator's instructions and then relay this information to the Field Monitoring Teams.
- Document environmental data reported by the Field Monitoring Teams.
- Periodically obtain and document information on Field Monitoring Team radiological exposure.
- Promptly report new environmental or Field Monitoring Team exposure data to the Environmental Coordinator.
- Document questions and answers directed to and received from the Field Monitoring Teams. Ensure the Environmental Coordinator is cognizant of these information requests and relay replies to these requests. 13) Dose Assessment Coordinator EOF The Dose Assessment Coordinator reports to the EOF Radiation Protection Manager and directs the activities of the Dose Assessor and the HPN Communicator. Responsibilities include:
- Interpret radiological data and provide PARs based upon dose projections to the EOF Radiation Protection Manager. November 2016 B-24 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) J
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- Advise the EOF Radiation Protection Manager of changes in event classification based on effluent releases or dose projections.
- Initiate evaluation of the need for administering Kl to Exelon nuclear workers when requested by the Environmental Coordinator.
- Remain cognizant of forecast and meteorological data and ensure the status is updated periodically.
- Notify the EOF Radiation Protection Manager of meteorological changes that may impact identification of downwind areas.
- Upon request, provide release and dose assessment data to Emergency Public Information personnel, the HPN Communicator, and the State Environs Communicators. 14) Dose Assessor EOF The Dose Assessor reports to the Dose Assessment Coordinator. Responsibilities include:
- Perform dose projections using the Dose Assessment computer models as directed by the Dose Assessment Coordinator.
- Monitor meteorological and plant effluent conditions .
- Notify the Dose Assessment Coordinator of meteorological changes that may impact identification of downwind areas.
- Evaluate the need for administering Kl to Exelon nuclear workers when requested by the Dose Assessment Coordinator. 15) HPN Communicator EOF The HPN Communicator reports to the Environmental Coordinator. Responsibilities include:
- Provide updates and respond to inquiries from the NRG on offsite environmental data, release status, dose projections and changes to PARs for the general public.
- Obtain release and dose assessment data from the Dose Assessment Coordinator and Field Monitoring Team data from the Environmental Coordinator.
- Maintain continuous communications with the NRG, if requested, via the NRG HPN phone or commercial telephone line .
- Communicate current Health Physics information to NRG representatives, as requested. November 2016 B-25 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 16) Logistics Manager EOF The Logistics Manager reports to the EOF Director and directs the activities of the administrative, security and liaison personnel. Responsibilities include:
- Ensure contact is made and communications are maintained with appropriate Non-Exelon Nuclear personnel whose assistance may be required to terminate the emergency conditions and to expedite the recovery.
- Advise the' EOF Director concerning the status of activities relating to governmental interfaces.
- Obtain support from Human Resources, the Comptroller's Office, the Legal Department, Accounting Department and others as required.
- Coordinate with the Nuclear Duty Officer to maintain communications with ANI and INPO.
- Ensure that access to the EOF is limited to Emergency Responders and authorize admittance to non-Exelon personnel.
- Implement the Exelon Nuclear Fitness for Duty Program.
- Ensure that NRC Site Team Representatives are directed to the Regulatory Liaison upon arrival at the EOF.
- Ensure that updates and information are provided to the EOC Liaisons and to offsite officials present in the EOF.
- Assist in obtaining and coordinating additional equipment/materials.and /or technical expertise to support station requests, including Exelon Corporate staff, unaffected stations and vendor/contractors.
- Coordinate maintenance of EOF equipment as necessary.
- Ensure shift relief and continual staffing for the EOF. 17) Administrative Coordinator EOF The Administrative Coordinator reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include:
- Direct the activities of the Computer Specialist.
- Direct the clerical staff and ensure the clerical requirements for the other EOF and JIC staff are met.
- Obtain clerical support for the EOF and JIC. November 2016 B-26 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Coordinate shift relief and continual staffing for the EOF .
- Obtain services as appropriate to support operation of the EOF. I 18) Computer Specialist EOF The Computer Specialist reports to the . Administrative Coordinator. Responsibilities include:
- Assist any personnel in logging in, initializing or using a desired computer program.
- Investigate and repair problems encountered with communications equipment and computer equipment/applications. 19) Security Coordinator EOF The Security Coordinator* reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include:
- Provide and interpret information on security events.
- Assist with access control activities at the EOF and JIC.
- Perform the following in support of the TSC Security Coordinator: -Provide assistance in resolving security events. Assist as a liaison for local, state and federal law enforcement agencies during security related events. -Serve as the primary contact to the security force for additional support, if necessary, during a security event.
- Obtain additional resources to support access control measures needed at the EOF and JIC. 20) State/Local Communicator EOF The State/Local Communicator reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include:
- Communicate and receive information via the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) circuit or commercial telephone line with appropriate state and county agencies.
- Ensure that the Logistics Manager is made aware of issues and questions raised by offsite agencies and then relay the replies to these requests . November 2016 B-27 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 21) EOG Communicator EOF The EOG Communicator reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include: *
- Coordinate and dispatch EOG Liaisons as needed or requested.
- Establish and maintain periodic contact with each location where Exelon Nuclear EOC Liaisons have been dispatched.
- Ensure EOG Liaisons are provided event information and notifications.
- Ensure that the Logistics Manager is made aware of issues and questions raised by offsite agencies and then relay the replies to these requests. 22) County EOG Liaison(s) County EOCs The County EOG Liaison(s) will be dispatched to County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) based on established agreements with the counties. The County EOG Liaisons use the EOG Communicator as their contact at the EOF. Responsibilities include:
- Monitor and report County EOC activities to the EOF.
- Conduct briefings and answer questions .
- Provide simplified explanations to EOG personnel of technical details distributed through approved channels.
- Assist with confirmation/verification of information distributed through approved channels.
- Provide media at the EOG with approved Exelon Nuclear press releases.
- Assist Emergency Public Information personnel in rumor control and media monitoring. 23) State EOG Liaison(s) State EOCs At the request of state officials and/or at the discretion of the Corporate Emergency Director, Exelon Nuclear will provide Liaison personnel to state Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs). The state EOG Liaisons use the EOC Communicator as their contact at the EOF. Responsibilities include:
- Monitor and report state EOG activities to the EOF.
- Conduct briefings and answer questions as requested.
- Assist Emergency Public Information personnel in rumor control and media monitoring . November 2016 B-28 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 24) Regulatory Liaison EOF The Regulatory Liaison reports to the Logistics Manager. Responsibilities include:
- Coordinate interfaces between Exelon Nuclear personnel and governmental agencies within the EOF.
- Obtain necessary equipment and supplies to support activities of governmental agencies located in the EOF.
- Act as the Exelon Nuclear Liaison to the NRC Site Team representatives. c. Public Information Emergency Response Organization 1) Corporate Spokesperson JIC The Corporate Spokesperson reports to the Corporate Emergency Director and is responsible for directing the Exelon Emergency Public Information Organization and providing news information to the media. Responsibilities include:
- Maintain command and control of the Joint Information Center.
- Coordinate with Federal, state and local agencies, as well as with other organizations involved in the emergency response, to maintain factual consistency of information to be conveyed to the news media/public.
- Conduct periodic briefings with the news media.
- Interface with the Public Information Director.
- Coordinate and direct responses to media inquiries.
- Ensure that the composition and timeliness of Exelon News Releases are adequate.
- Provide for timely exchange of information between other spokespersons. 2) Technical Spokesperson JIC The Technical Spokesperson reports to the Corporate Spokesperson. Responsibilities include:
- Assist in development of technical and plant status information for use in news releases and media briefings.
- Assist the Events Recorder in the preparation of a chronological event description log . November 2016 B-29 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Prepare briefing papers which contain additional detail and background not found in the news releases.
- Provide answers as soon as possible to media questions.
- Provide a follow-up explanation that corrects misinformation as soon as practicable. 3) Radiation Protection Spokesperson JIC The Radiation Protection Spokesperson reports to the Corporate Spokesperson. Responsibilities include.
- Assist in development of environmental and health physics information for use in news releases and media briefings.
- Assist the Events Recorder in the preparation of a chronological event description log.
- Prepare briefing papers which contain additional detail and background not found in the news releases.
- Provide answers as soon as possible to media questions.
- Provide a follow-up explanation that corrects misinformation as soon as practicable. 4) JIC Director JIC The JIC Director reports the Corporate Spokesperson to ensure the operability of and to supervise the activities in the JIC. Responsibilities include:
- Maintain cognizance of conditions of the plant and environment, and the actions of Exelon Nuclear and governmental support personnel.
- Coordinate with Federal, state and local agencies, as well as with other organizations involved in the emergency response, to maintain factual consistency of information to be conveyed to the news media/public.
- Participate, as needed, in rumor control activities.
- Ensure that adequate information flow between the EOF and the JIC is coordinated through the Public Information Director.
- Authorize admittance of non-Exelon Nuclear officials to the JIC . November 2016 8-30 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 5) JIC Coordinator JIC The JIC Coordinator reports to the JIC Director and supervises the facilities support staff. Responsibilities include:
- Ensure the JIC is activated and operational. This includes the availability of communications and visual aids.
- Ensure that access to the JIC areas occupied by Exelon personnel is controlled.
- Establish a minimum frequency for addressing news media/public representatives and ensure that some form of communication occurs within that time frame (i.e., an update at least hourly).
- Ensure that approved News Releases and Chronological Event Description Logs are made available in the JIC.
- Document unanswered questions and serious public misinformation issues. Follow-up on these questions and issues to ensure that they are being adequately addressed.
- Coordinate the interface between Exelon Nuclear and the news media/public, including, as necessary, briefings, news conferences, interviews and responses to information requests. 7) Administrative Coordinator JIC The Administrative Coordinator reports to the JIC Director. Responsibilities include:
- Coordinate with the EOF Administrative Coordinator to ensure the clerical requirements for the other JIC staff are met.
- Coordinate shift relief and continual staffing for the JIC.
- Obtain services as appropriate to support operation of the JIC . November 2016 B-31 EP-QC-1000 (Revision .o)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 8) Access Controller JIC The Access Controller reports to the JIC Director and is responsible for controlling facility access and obtaining authorization prior to admitting Exelon Nuclear officials into the JIC. 9) Public Information Director (PIO) JIC When the Emergency Public Information Organization is activated, the Public Information Director reports to the Corporate Spokesperson and is responsible *tor all emergency event related information intended to be conveyed from Exelon Nuclear to the news media/public. The Public Information Director supervises the activities of the News Writer, Events Recorder and media monitoring and rumor control personnel. Responsibilities include:
- Provide the Corporate Emergency Director with an overview of the public and media impacts resulting from the Exelon Nuclear and governmental activities.
- Participate with the Corporate Emergency Director regarding information to be released to the public.
- Authorize the issuance of news releases .
- Interface with the Corporate Spokesperson at the JIC.
- Act as a liaison between the ERO and Exelon Nuclear's corporate executives.
- Maintain cognizance of conditions of the plant and environment, and the actions of Exelon Nuclear and governmental support personnel.
- Coordinate information flow between the EOF and the JIC.
- Coordinate with the Media Monitoring Staff to review and access media coverage of the emergency event. 10) News Writer JIC The News Writer reports to the Public Information Director. Responsibilities include:
- Compose draft news releases with assistance from the Technical Spokesperson and the Radiation Protection Spokesperson.
- Provide the drafted news releases to the Corporate Emergency Director for technical review prior to Public Information Director approval. November 2016 8-32 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 11) Events Recorder JIC The Events Recorder reports to .the Public Information Director. Responsibilities include:
- Develop a chronological event description log. 12) Media Monitoring Staff JIC The Media Monitor reports to the Public Information Director. Responsibilities include:
- Ensure that the media is being monitored and that Exelon Nuclear personnel review the information detailed or contained in media releases.
- Inform the Public Information Director of all media reports and of actions taken to correct any misinformation or rumors.
- Direct the activities of the Rumor Control Staff with respect to the function of monitoring rumors from sources other than the media. 13) Rumor Control Staff JIC The Rumor Control Staff reports to the Public Information Director and acts in support of the Media Monitors. Responsibilities include:
- Ensure that rumors are reviewed, documented and responded to by Exelon Nuclear personnel as deemed appropriate.
- Until the JIC is fully activated, document and respond to rumors as quickly as possible, through the Exelon Communications and Public Affairs.
- Inform the Media Monitors when rumors representing serious misinformation are encountered. 6. Exelon Emergency Response Organization Block Diagram ERO staffing tables list the key positions of the ERO and the supporting positions assigned to interface with federal, state, and county authorities. Figures B-1 a through B-1 d illustrates the overall emergency response organization. Section B.5 discusses specific responsibilities and the interrelationships for key positions. 7. Exelon Corporate Emergency Response Organization The Corporate ERO consists of the EOF Organization and the Emergency Public Information Organization. Personnel staffing these corporate organizations are covered in detail in Section B.5 of this plan . November 2016 B-33 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The Corporate Emergency Response Organization is staffed by Exelon personnel, and operates out of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the Joint Information Center (JIC). The Corporate ERO is supported by News Media Spokespersons, environmental assessment staff and monitoring teams that provide long-term support to the affected station. Additionally, the Corporate ERO has long term liaison responsibilities with federal, state, and local authorities. The Emergency News Center (ENC) function is responsible for the collection and analysis of event information and status, and development of Company news statements. This information is then communicated to the JIC Spokespersons. The ENC function is located at the EOF. The Corporate ERO is activated at an Alert. The EOF Organization is responsible for evaluating, coordinating and directing the overall company activities involved in the emergency response. Within the EOF, the Corporate Emergency Director shall assume Command and Control from the Station Emergency Director when classification escalates to an Alert or higher, unless the EOF capabilities are limited such that the overall control and responsibility for PARs and offsite notifications cannot be assumed. The EOF may also function in a supporting role to the station when the Station Emergency Director maintains Command and Control. 8. Industry/Private Support Organizations Exelon Nuclear retains contractors to provide supporting services to nuclear generating stations. A contract/purchase order with a private contractor is acceptable in lieu of an agreement letter for the specified duration of the contract. Among services currently provided are the following: a. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO): Experience has shown that a utility may need resources beyond in-house capabilities for the recovery from a nuclear plant emergency. One of the roles of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is to assist affected utilities by quickly applying the resources of the nuclear industry to meet the needs of an emergency. INPO has an emergency response plan that enables it to provide the following emergency support functions:
- Assistance to the affected utility in locating sources of emergency personnel, equipment and operational analysis. '
- INPO, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) maintain a coordination agreement on emergency information with their member utilities.
- INPO provides the "Nuclear Network", or its replacement, electronic communications system to its members, participants, NEI, and EPRI to coordinate the flow of media and technical information about the emergency.
- Exelon Nuclear may obtain utility industry information and assistance from any party to this agreement through the coordination of INPO.
- November 2016 B-34 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear To support these functions, INPO maintains the following emergency support capabilities:
- A dedicated emergency call number.
- Designated INPO representative(s) who can be quickly dispatched to the utility emergency response organization to coordinate INPO support activities and information flow.
- The 24-hour per day operation of an Emergency Response Center at INPO headquarters. Exelon Nuclear will notify INPO (via the designated emergency call number) for all situations involving an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency declaration per the Exelon Nuclear Reportability Manual. , INPO has coordinated the preparation of a Voluntary Assistance Agreement for Transportation Accidents. Exelon Nuclear has signed this agreement which establishes the rights and responsibilities of electric utilities in requesting or providing assistance for response to a nuclear materials Transportation Accident. b. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI): In early 1982, ANI issued Bulletin #58 (1981) "Accident Notification. Procedures for Liability Insurers" which provides revised criteria for the notification of the Pools in the event of a nuclear emergency at one of the liability insured nuclear power reactor sites. This-revision brings the ANl/MAELU (Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters) notification criteria into alignment with the standard emergency classification system adopted by the nuclear industry. This document also identifies a suitable channel for follow-up communication by ANI after initial notification.
- ANl/MAELU Emergency Assistance: In the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence (as defined in the Price-Anderson Law) ANI and MAELU (the insurance pools) have plans prepared to provide prompt emergency funding to affected members of the public.
- ANl/MAELU Emergency Assistance (Claims Handling Procedures): The pools' emergency assistance arrangements contemplate the mobilization and dispatch of emergency claims teams to directly dispense. emergency assistance funds to affected members of the public. The pools should be notified in the event of a nuclear emergency requiring notification of state or Federal governmental agencies, or if the insured believes that offsite persons may be affected and financial assistance of a nature discussed may be required. In these instances, ANI expects notification as soon as possible after the initiation of the emergency. Exelon notification to the pools in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency will be in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear Reportability Manual. November 2016 *s-35 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O}
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Even if it appears to be remote that offsite persons will be affected, the pools should be notified in order that response plans can be initiated to the point of alerting teams of adjusters to stand by. Response activity can be discontinued if it proves less severe and does not require pool response. All nuclear occurrences of an emergency or non-emergency nature that fall under the nuclear liability policy should be reported formally in writing to ANI by the Exelon Nuclear Insurance Administrator.
- Emergency Notification and Follow-up Procedures: Pre-established lines of communication exist between each utility and ANI in order to exchange all required information during a developing emergency situation. ANI maintains 24-hour coverage of an emergency notification number. During normal office hours (8:00 am -4:00 pm) their number will be answered by the receptionist who will transfer an incoming emergency call to an appropriate individual in the office. Outside of normal office hours, this telephone line is covered by an answering service. The answering service will intercept the call and obtain the name, affiliation and telephone number of the caller. They will then notify a designated ANI staff member who will in turn call back the utility to obtain appropriate information regarding the nuclear accident. In order that follow-up information is available to the Insurance Pool Exelon Nuclear has established the Corporate Emergency Director or their designee as a Point of Contact that ANI personnel may use to update themselves regarding the status of the emergency. NOTE: For the below listed support services, the specific contractors may change but the functions are maintained. c. Environmental Monitoring Services: Environmental Inc.: Environmental Inc. provides emergency Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) services for all Exelon Nuclear Stations. These services include:
- Sample collection
- Handling, packaging and, storage of test samples
- Sample shipment
- Chain of Custody-The Environmental Inc. Midwest Laboratory in Northbrook, Illinois would analyze the environmental samples for their radioactivity content and report results to Exelon Nuclear. November 2016 B-36 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear d. Teledyne Brown Engineering: Teledyne Brown Engineering provides bioassay analysis and radiochemical analysis services. e. Department Of Energy (DOE) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS): DOE REAC/TS provides services of medical and health physics support. REAC/TS advises on the health physics aspects of situations requiring medical assistance. f. Murray and Trettel. Inc.: Murray and Trettel, Inc. provide meteorological monitoring services, including weather forecasts. Murray and Trettel maintain *all Exelon Nuclear station meteorological facilities. Murray and Trettel have computer capability to poll remotely the meteorological facilities to ascertain local conditions and to detect instrument failure. g. Landauer. Inc.: Landauer provides extremity dosimetry services. In an emergency Landauer would provide additional dosimetry to the affected nuclear station and EOF, if needed. h. Manufacturer Design and Engineering Support: Under established contracts, the following will provide available engineering expertise, specialized equipment and other services identified as needed and deemed appropriate to assist in an emergency situation:
- General Electric (GE) Nuclear Energy
- Westinghouse Electric Company 9. Supplemental Emergency Assistance to the ERO Agreements are maintained with outside support agencies who do not take part in the organizational control of the emergency that provide assistance when called on
- during an emergency or during the recovery phase. These agreements identify the emergency measures to be provided, the mutually accepted criteria for implementation, and the arrangements for exchange of information. These support agencies (named in the Station Annex) provide services of: a. Law enforcement; b. Fire protection; c. Ambulance services; d. Medical and hospital support Support groups providing transportation and treatment of injured station personnel are described in Section L of this plan . November 2016 B-37 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Table QDC B-1 Minimum Staffing Requirements Minimum Staffing Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions Minimum *60 Minute Other Full Shift Size Augmentati On-Augmentati on Call on 1. Plant Operations/Safe -Control Room Staff Shift Manager 1 Shutdown and Assessment Shift Supervisor 2 of Operational Aspects Nuclear Station Operator 4 Non-Licensed Operator 4 2. Emergency Direction and Command and Control Shift Emergency Director (CR) 1 \a) Control Station Emergency Director (TSC) 1 Corporate Emergency Director (EOF) 1 3. Notification & Emergency Plant Shift Personnel 1 Communication Communications TSC Director (TSC) 1 EOF Director (EOF) 1 State/Local Communicator 1 (EOF) 1 (TSC) ENS Communicator 1 (TSC) 1 (EOF) HPN Communicator 1 (EOF) 1 (TSC) Plant Status OPs Communicator (CR/TSC) 2 Operations Advisor (EOF) 1 In-Plant Team Control Damage Control Comm. (CR/TSC/OSC) 3 Technical Activities Technical Communicator (TSC) 1 Technical Advisor (EOF) 1 Governmental State Environs Communicator (EOF) (b) EOC Communicator (EOF) 1 State EOC Liaison (State EOC) (b) County EOC Liaison (County EOC) (b) Regulatory Liaison (EOF) 1 4. Radiological Assessment Offsite Dose RP Personnel 1 Assessment Dose Assessment Coordinator (EOF) 1 Dose Assessor (EOF) 1 Radiation Controls Coordinator (TSC) 1 Offsite Surveys Environmental Coordinator (EOF) 1 Field Team Communicator (EOF) 1 Offsite Field Team Personnel 4 (b) Onsite Surveys Onsite Field Team Personnel 2 (b) In-plant Surveys RP Personnel 1 2 (b) Chemistry Chemistry Personnel 1 1 (b) RP Supervisory Radiation Protection Manager(TSC/EOF) 2 November 2016 B-38 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Table QDC 8-1 Minimum Staffing Requirements (Cont'd) Minimum Staffing Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions Minimum *60 Minute Other Full Shift Size Augmentati On-Augmentati on Call on 5. Plant System Engineering, Technical Support STA I Incident Assessor (CR) 1 Repair, and Corrective Technical Manager (TSC) 1 Actions Core Thermal/Hydraulic Engineer (TSC) 1 Mechanical Engineer (TSC) 1 Electrical Engineer (TSC) 1 SAMG Decision-Maker (TSC) 1 (a) SAMG Evaluator (TSC) 2(a) Operations Manager (TSC) 1 Radiation Controls Engineer (TSC) 1 Technical Support Manager (EOF) 1 Repair and Corrective Mechanical Maintenance (OSC) 1 (a) 2 (b) Actions Electrical/l&C Maintenance (OSC) 1 (a) 3 (b) Maintenance Manager (TSC) 1 OSC Director (OSC) 1 Assistant OSC Director .(OSC) 1 OPs Lead & Suooort Personnel (OSC) (b) 6. In-Plant Protective Actions Radiation Protection RP Personnel 2\a) 4 (b) 7. Fire Fighting --Fire Brigade1c1 5 8. 181 Aid and Rescue --Plant Personnel 21a1 (b) Operations 9. Site Access Control and Security & Security Team Personnel (d) (d) Personnel Accountability Accountability Security Coordinator (TSC) 1 EOF Security Security Coordinator (EOF) 1 10. Resource Allocation and Logistics Logistics Manager (EOF) 1 Administration Logistics Coordinator (TSC) 1 Administration Administrative Coordinator (EOF) 1 Clerical Staff (TSC/EOF/JIC) (b) Inter Facility Logs Events Recorder (EOF/JIC) 2 Facility Support
- Computer Specialist (EOF) 1 November 2016 8-39 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) l
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Table QDC B-1 Minimum Staffing Requirements (Cont'd) Functional Area Major Tasks Emergency Positions 11. Public Information Media Interface Corporate Spokesperson Rad Protection Spokesperson Technical Spokesperson Information Public Information Director Development News Writer Media Monitoring and Media Monitoring Staff Rumor Control Rumor Control Staff Facility Operation and JIG Director Control JIG Coordinator Administrative Coordinator Access Controls Facility Support Staff
- Response time is based on optimum travel conditions. (a) May be provided by personnel assigned other functions. (b) Personnel numbers depend on the type and extent of the emergency. (c) Fire Brigade per USAR/Technical Specifications, as applicable. (d) Function performed by on-shift security personnel. November 2016 B-40 (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) (JIG) TOTAL:
- Exelon Nuclear Minimum Staffing Minimum *60 Minute Other Full Shift Size Augmentati On-Augmentati on Call on 1 1 1 1 1 (b) (b) 1 1 1 1 (b) 21 37 3 321111 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Figure 8-1 a: Overall ERO Command Structure EOF Director Shaded/Bold Boxes indicate minimum staffing positions. November 2016
- Corporate Emergency Director Station Emergency Director B-41 Corporate Spokesperson
- Exelon Nuclear EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear F" . 8 1b E 0 "t 0 f 1gure -. mergencll ns1 e rgamza ion . Station Emergency Director* I I Security TSC Coordinator Director I I State/Local Logistics Communicator Coordinator Clerical L__ Support I I Rad Protection Maintenance Operations Technical Manager Manager Manager* Manager* I I I I Technical Rad Controls Rad Controls osc Damage Control Operations -Communicator ENS Coordinator Engineer Director Communicator Communicator Communicator (TSC) (TSC) {TSC) l Core!Thermal HPN Asst OSC Damage Control Control Room -Engineer -f-Communicator Director Communicator Shift Manager (OSC) Mechanical -Engineer I I I I Control Room >-----Mechanical Electrical/l&C Rad Protection Chemistry Operations Shift Staff Pool (2) Pool (3) Pool (8) Pool (1) Pool Electrical Operations -Engineer Communicator s haded/Bold Boxes indfcate minimum staffing positions. (in CR) ERO response pool personnel do not include the on-shift complement. Damage Cont Communicator SAMG functions may be assigned to other qualified personnel. Minimum staffing (in CR) .. -requires 1 Dec1s1on Maker and 2 Evaluators.
- November 2016 8-42 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear gure B-1 c: Offsite Organization Director Fi I I Rad Protection Technical Logistics Manager Support Manager Manager I I I I I I Environmental Dose Assmt Operations Technical >-----Security -State/Local Coordinator Coordinator Advisor Advisor Coordinator Communicator I I ENS Events Administrative -Regulatory -State Environs -Dose Communicator Records Coordinator Liaison Communicator Assessor -Computer -EOG -Field Team -HPN Specialist Communicator Communicator Communicator -Clerical Field Monitoring Support -State EOG -Teams (2) Liaisons -County EOG Liaisons Shaded/Balded Boxes indicate minimum staffing positions. November 2016 B-43 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure 8-1 d: Emergency Public Information Organization Corporate Spokesperson I I I I JIG Technical Rad Protection Public Info Director Spokesperson Spokesperson Director I I I Administrative JIG Access News Coordinator Coordinator Controller Writer Events Facility Support Recorder Staff Media Monitoring Staff Rumor Control Staff Shaded/Balded Boxes indicate minimum staffing positions. November 2016 B-44 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section C: Emergency Response Support and Resources This section describes the provisions for requesting and effectively utilizing support resources and for accommodating offsite officials at the Exelon Nuclear emergency response facilities. 1. Federal Response Support and Resources Assistance is available from federal agencies through the National Response Framework (NRF). The lead federal agency who provides direct assistance to Exelon during an emergency is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Other federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Energy (DOE), provide assistance to the state through implementation of the NRF. a. Sections A and B of this plan identify the specific individuals by title who are authorized to request federal assistance. b. Federal agencies that may provide assistance in direct support of Exelon Nuclear in the event of an accident are identified in Section A of this plan. If needed, federal resources are made available to Exelon Nuclear in an expeditious and timely manner. c. Each emergency response facility has the equipment and communications capability necessary for a continuous high level of response, interaction, and communication among key personnel during emergency conditions. The emergency facilities are able to accommodate federal representatives with working areas provided for their use. Accommodations for the expected NRC site response team assume the following approximate numbers for each facility: EOF TSC CR JIC Initial Full Activation Activation (minimum) 9 3 1 1 16 5 1 10 The Exelon Emergency Response Organization will provide senior management support for site response teams and communications over a Management Counterpart Link to federal response headquarters. 2. Liaisons a. The NRC, FEMA, and the state(s) may dispatch representatives to the EOF where accommodations have been provided. b. At the Alert level and above, Exelon Nuclear personnel may be assigned as liaisons to the requesting state's and/or county Emergency Operations Center (EOC). These representatives act as technical liaisons to interpret emergency action levels and protective action recommendations made by Exelon. November 2016 C-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 3. Radiological Laboratories Support of the radiation monitoring and analysis effort is provided by an onsite laboratory. The onsite laboratory is the central point for receipt and analysis of all onsite samples and includes equipment for chemical analyses and for the analysis of radioactivity. The equipment and analytical capabilities for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station's laboratories are listed in the station's E-Plan Annex. Additional facilities for counting and analyzing samples can be provided by the other Exelon Nuclear generating stations, state, federal or contracted laboratory services. These laboratories can act as backup facilities in the event that the plant's counting room and laboratory become unusable or the offsite radiological monitoring and environmental sampling operation exceeds the capacity or capability of the station laboratory during an emergency. Additional outside analytical assistance may be requested from contracted vendors or state and federal agencies. The state, federal and contract laboratories maintain independent evaluation and certification processes and have the capability of quantitative analysis of terrestrial, marine and air samples. 4. Other Assistance Any unaffected Exelon Nuclear Generating station is available to provide certain types of assistance and support, including engineering, design, consultation, whole body counting, and dosimetry evaluation and equipment. Additional facilities, organizations, and individuals, as listed in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory, are available and may be used in support of emergency response. In addition, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) provides insurance to cover Exelon legal liability up to the limits imposed by the Price-Anderson Act, for bodily injury and/or property damage caused by the nuclear energy hazard resulting from an incident at the plant. Written agreements which describe the level of assistance and resources provided to Exelon Nuclear by external sources are included in Appendix 3 as applicable . November 2016 C-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section D: Emergency Classification System This section describes the classification and emergency action level scheme used to determine the minimum response to an abnormal event at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This scheme is based on plant systems, effluent parameters, and operating procedures. The initial response of federal, state, and county agencies is dependent upon information provided by the ERO. Exelon works closely with the state and county agencies to ensure consistency in classification schemes and procedural interfaces. 1. Emergency Classification System The E-Plan provides for classification of emergencies into five (5) categories or conditions, covering the postulated spectrum of emergency situations. The first four (4) categories: Notification of Unusual Event (referred to as Unusual Event), Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency, are characterized by Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or event initiating conditions and address emergencies of increasing severity. The fifth, the Recovery classification, is unique in that it may be viewed as a phase of the emergency requiring specific criteria to be met and/or considered prior to its declaration. Recovery is that period when the emergency phase is over and activities are in progress to return the situation to a normal state (acceptable condition). a. Unusual Event -Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. This is the least severe of the four (4) levels. The purpose of this classification is to bring response personnel and offsite agencies to a state of readiness in the event the situation degrades and to provide systematic handling of information and decision making. The Shift Manager, as Shift Emergency Director will classify an Unusual Event. Required actions at this classification include:
- Notifications to station management and the NDO.
- Notification, within 15 minutes, of the state and local communities.
- At the discretion of the Emergency Director, station management or the Nuclear Duty Officer (NDO), full or selective staffing of the TSC, OSC and EOF may be initiated.
- Notification of the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State and local agencies and not later than 60 minutes of classification .
- Assessment of the situation and response as necessary, which may include escalating to a higher classification if conditions warrant. November 2016 D-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear *
- When the event is terminated, close-out is performed over communication links to offsite authorities participating in the response (i.e., NRC, state, county), followed by formal transmission of a state/local notification form within 24 hours. b. Alert -Events are in process or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. The purpose of this classification is to ensure that emergency response personnel are readily available and to provide offsite authorities with current status information. An Alert will be classified as the initiating event or as escalation from an Unusual Event. In either case, the classification will most likely made by the Shift Manager (Shift Emergency Director) prior to the transfer of Command and Control. Required actions at this classification include:
- Notifications to station management and the NDO.
- Notification, within 15 minutes, of the state and local communities. The EOF will assume state update responsibilities .
- Activation of the TSC, OSC, EOF, and the JIC organizations.
- Transfer of Command and Control.
- Notification of the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State and local agencies and not later than 60 minutes of classification.
- Notification of INPO and ANI.
- Assessment of the situation and response as necessary, which may include escalating to a higher classification if conditions warrant.
- On-site and off-site Field Monitoring Teams are sent to staging areas or dispatched to monitor for releases of radiation to the environment.
- Keeping offsite authorities informed of plant status by providing periodic updates to include meteorological and radiological data.
- When the event is terminated, notification is performed over communication links followed by an Initial Incident Report to offsite authorities participating in the response (i.e., NRC, state, county) within 8 hours . November 2016 D-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c. Site Area Emergency -Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. The purpose of this classification, in addition to those of the Alert level, is to ensure that all emergency response centers are staffed and provisions are made for information updates to the public through offsite authorities and the news media. The classification will most likely be made by the Station Emergency Director following activation of the TSC. Required actions at this classification, in addition to those listed under the Alert level, include:
- If not previously performed, Assembly/Accountability shall be performed and Site Evacuation of non-essential personnel shall be initiated.
- Keeping offsite authorities informed of plant status by providing periodic updates to include meteorological data and projected or actual doses for any releases that have occurred . d. General Emergency -Event(s) are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. The purpose of this classification, in addition to those of the Site Area Emergency level, is to initiate predetermined protective actions for the public and provide continuous assessment of information from monitoring groups. The classification will most likely be made by the Station Emergency Director following activation of the TSC. Required actions at this classification, in addition to those listed under the Alert and Site Area Emergency, include:
- A Protective Action Recommendation will be determined.
- Assessment of the situation and response as necessary . November 2016 D-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear e. Recovery: That period when the emergency phase is over and activities are being taken to return the situation to a normal state (acceptable condition). The plant is under control and no potential for further degradation to the plant or the environment is believed to exist. Recovery will be classified by the Station Emergency Director after obtaining authorization from the Corporate Emergency Director. Required actions at this classification include:
- The affected state(s) and the NRC should be consulted prior to entry into Recovery.
- Notifications will be made to station management, the NDO, state(s) and NRC.
- A Recovery organization will be established to manage repairs to return the Unit to an acceptable condition, and support environmental monitoring activities as requested in coordination with Federal and state efforts.
- INPO and ANI are notified of Recovery classification. f. Classification Downgrading: Exelon Nuclear policy is that emergency classifications shall not be downgraded to a lower classification. Once declared, the event shall remain in effect until no Classification is warranted or until such time as conditions warrant classification to Recovery. g. Guidance for Termination of an Emergency: The purpose of terminating an emergency is to provide an orderly turnover of plant control from the Emergency Response Organizations to the normal Exelon Nuclear plant organization. Termination of the emergency is authorized by the Emergency Director in Command and Control. The considerations provided in . the Recovery/Termination Checklist in the emergency implementing procedures must be performed prior to exiting the emergency event. Consultation with governmental agencies and other parties should be conducted prior to termination of an event classified as Site Area or General Emergency. Notifications shall be transmitted to appropriate agencies to terminate an event. h. Station Nuclear Security Plan: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has a Security Plan that complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 73. The interface between the E-Plan and the Security Plan is one of parallel operation. The plans are compatible. The E-Plan response measures, once initiated, are executed in parallel with measures taken in accordance with the Security Plan . November 2016 D-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Threats made to Exelon Nuclear facilities are evaluated in accordance with established threat assessment procedures, and the respective Security Plans. The Security Plan, Appendix C, Contingency Events, identifies situations that could be initiating conditions for EAL classifications. Contingency events include bomb threats, attack threats, civil disturbances, protected area intrusions, loss of guard/post contact, vital area intrusions, bomb devices discovered, loss of guard force, hostages, extortion, fire/explosions, internal disturbances, security communications failure, and obvious attempts of tampering. The Security Plan provides guidance for decisions and actions to be taken for each security contingency event. As guidance, the Security Plan allows for differing responses depending upon the assessment of the actual situation within each contingency event classification. The assessment of any security contingency event and the decision to initiate, or not to implement the E-Plan, will be the responsibility of the Shift or Station Emergency Director. All identified security contingency events have the potential of being assessed as initiating conditions for a radiological emergency declaration. Determination of a credible security threat may require the staffing of emergency response facilities based on the classification of an Unusual Event per the Emergency Action Levels (EALs). 2. Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Addendum 3 to the Station Annex includes Site Specific Emergency Action Levels (EALs) consistent with the general class descriptions and provided in NEI guidance documentation in accordance with Regulatory, Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors." Where possible, these EALs will be related to plant instrumentation readings. Emergency classifications are characterized by Emergency Action Levels (EALs). The Threshold Values are referenced whenever an Initiating Condition is reached. An Initiating Condition is one of a predetermined subset of unit conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency, or such an emergency has occurred. Defined in this manner, an Initiating Condition is an emergency condition, which sets it apart from the broad class of conditions that may or may not have the potential to escalate into a radiological emergency. Initiating Conditions are arranged in one of the Recognition Categories. EALs are for unplanned events. A planned evolution involves preplanning to address the limitations imposed by the condition, the performance of required surveillance testing, and the implementation of specific controls prior to knowingly entering the condition. Planned evolutions to test, manipulate, repair, perform maintenance or modifications to systems and equipment that result in an EAL Threshold Value being met or exceeded are not subject to classification and activation requirements as long as the evolution proceeds as planned. However, these conditions may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. November 2016 D-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear An emergency is classified after assessing abnormal plant conditions and comparing them to EAL Threshold Values for the appropriate Initiating Conditions. Classifications are based on the evaluation of each unit. Matrix tables organized by recognition categories are used to facilitate the comparison. The matrix tables are used when the unit is in the Technical Specification defined modes of Power Operations, Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown (for classifications purposes, startup evolutions are included in the Power Operations mode) and Cold Shutdown or Refueling (for classification purposes a defueled plant will be considered in the Refueling mode). All recognition categories should be reviewed for applicability prior to classification. The initiating conditions are coded with a letter and/or number designator. All initiating conditions, which describe the severity of a common condition (series), have the same initial designator. 3. Timely Classification of Events Classification of an emergency condition occurs within 15 minutes after the availability, of indications from plant instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that an EAL has been exceeded and, is then promptly made upon identification of the appropriate EAL. The 15-minute period encompasses all assessment, classification, and declaration actions associated with making an emergency declaration from the first availability of a plant indication or
- receipt of a report up to and including the declaration of the emergency.
- Validation or confirmation of plant indications or reports of the condition are to be accomplished within the 15-minute period as part of the assessment. Since this validation or confirmation is being performed to determine the validity of an alarm, indication, or report, the 15-minute period starts with the availability of the alarm, indication, or report, and not the completion of the validation or confirmation, because the former is the time that the information was first available. The 15-minute criterion is not to be construed as a grace period in which atternpts to restore plant conditions are taken to avoid declaring an EAL that has already been exceeded. This statement does not preclude taking actions to correct or mitigate an off-normal condition, but once an EAL has been recognized as being exceeded, the emergency declaration shall be made promptly without waiting for the 15-minute period to elapse. The 15-minute criterion shall not prevent the implementation of response actions deemed necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in the declaration would not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety. For EAL thresholds that specify duration of the condition, the emergency declaration process runs concurrently with the specified threshold duration. Once the condition has existed for the duration specified in the EAL or it is determined that the duration time will likely be exceeded, no further assessment is necessary-the EAL has been exceeded. November 2016 D-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 4. Offsite Classification Systems Exelon Nuclear works with the state to ensure consistency between classification schemes. The content of the EALs is reviewed with the state and county authorities on an annual basis. 5. Offsite Emergency Procedures Exelon Nuclear works with the state and county authorities to ensure that procedures are in place that provide for emergency actions to be taken which are consistent with the protective actions recommended by Exelon accounting for local offsite conditions that exist at the time of the emergency . November 2016 D-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section E: Notification Methods and Procedures This section describes the notification of state and county response organizations and Exelon emergency response personnel. It outlines the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). 1. Bases for Emergency Response Organization Notification Exelon Nuclear, in cooperation with state and county authorities, has established mutually agreeable methods and procedures for notification of offsite response organizations consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme.
- Notifications to offsite agencies include a means of verification or authentication such as the use of dedicated communications networks, verification code words, or providing call back verification phone numbers. Notification/Classification for Dual Unit Emergencies: when the classification involves both units (i.e., tornado or earthquake), the classification shall be reported as affecting both units. In situations when both units are affected by emergency events, but the events are not related or the classification for each unit is different, notification will be made for the highest classification. Clarification of the relationship between the classification levels determined for the units should be provided in the periodic state updates and the NRC Event Notification Worksheet. In situations when one unit is affected by unrelated events, notification will be made for the highest classification via the state/local notification and the second event information provided in the periodic state updates. Notification for Transportation Accidents: A Transportation Accident is defined in 49 CFR 171.15 and 49 CFR 171.16. If a Transportation Accident involving material in the custody of an Exelon facility occurs, Exelon Nuclear will notify the appropriate internal and offsite agencies in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear Reportability Manual. 2. Notification and Mobilization of Emergency Response Personnel Emergency implementing procedures are established for notification and mobilization of emergency response personnel as follows: a. Onsite: When an emergency is declared, reclassified, or terminated an announcement is made (over the plant public address system or by other means) that includes the emergency classification declared and response actions to be taken by site personnel. At the Unusual Event classification, select ERO augmentation personnel are notified and requested to remain available to respond. At an Alert classification or higher ERO augmentation personnel are notified for activation of the TSC, OSC, EOF, and JIC using the ERO Notification System. November 2016 E-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b. Offsite: Notifications are promptly made to offsite emergency response organizations as follows: 1) State/Local Agencies: A notification shall be made within fifteen (15) minutes of:
- The initial emergency classification.
- Classification escalation.
- The issuance of or change to a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for the general public.
- Changes in radiological release status, occurring outside of an event classification or PAR notification, based on an agreement with the state(s). The emergency warning points are simultaneously notified using the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), or a commercial telephone line as backup. A notification will also be initiated to cognizant state/local government agencies as soon as possible but within one hour of the termination of an event classification, or entry into Recqvery Phase . 2) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): An event will be reported to the NRC Operations Center immediately after notification of the appropriate state or local agencies but not later than one (1) hour after the time of initial classification, escalation, termination or entry into the Recovery Phase. The NRC is notified by a dedicated telephone system called the Emergency Notification System (ENS). If the ENS is inoperative, the required notification is made via commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone service, or any other method that shall ensure that a report is made as soon as practical. An NRC Event Notification Worksheet should be utilized to transmit initial information to the NRC. If a continuous communication is requested and established, a log is used in lieu of the ENS Worksheet. Specific requirements for the notifications to the NRC for classified emergency events are detailed in 10 CFR 50.72 with guidance provided in the Exelon Reportability Manual. The computerized data link to the NRC, referred to as the Emergency Response Data System (EROS), continuously supplies specified plant data to the NRC. Mobilization of federal, state, and county response organizations is performed in accordance with their applicable emergency plan and procedures. At a minimum, mobilization of federal response organizations and activation of state and county EOCs is expected to occur at the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. November 2016 E-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The state and county authorities are responsible for the process of notification of the general public. c. Support Organizations: When an emergency is initially classified, escalated or terminated, notifications are promptly made to the following support organizations:
- Medical, rescue, and fire fighting support services are notified for assistance as the situation dictates.
- The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is notified at an Alert or higher classification with requests for assistance as necessary.
- The American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) are notified at an Alert or higher classification with requests for assistance as necessary.
- Vendor and contractor support services are notified for assistance as the situation dictates. 3. Initial Notification Messages Exelon Nuclear, in conjunction with state and county authorities, has established the contents of the initial notification message form transmitted during a classified emergency. The contents of the form include, as a minimum:
- Designation ("This is a Drill" or "Actual Event").
- Identity of site.
- Event classification.
- EAL number (as agreed upon with state authorities).
- Non-technical event description (as agreed upon with state authorities).
- Date and time of declaration (or entry into Recovery or Termination).
- Whether a release is taking place (Note: "Release" means a radiological release attributable to the emergency event.)
- Wind direction and speed.
- Whether offsite protective measures may be necessary.
- Potentially affected Subareas (or Sectors as applicable) when a General Emergency is declared. Notification approval, transmittal date and time, and offsite agencies contacted are recorded on the notification form. November 2016 E-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 4. Follow-up Messages For all emergency classifications, update messages to state authorities will be provided at the time of the notification on a prearranged frequency. The facility in Command and Control is responsible for ensuring that the updates are completed. State updates contain the prearranged information plus any additional information requested at the time of the notification. Follow-up notifications are provided to the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible, but not later than one (I) hour after significant new information is available involving: a. The results of evaluations or assessments of plant conditions. b. The effectiveness of response or protective measures taken. c. Information related to plant behavior that is not understood. If requested by the NRC, an open, continuous communications channel will be maintained with the NRC Operations Center over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and/or Health Physics Network (HPN) Circuits. 5. State and County Information Dissemination The state and county emergency response plans describe procedures for state and county officials to make a public notification decision promptly (within about 15 minutes) on being informed by the plant of an emergency. The system for disseminating information to the public includes notification by pre-scripted messages through appropriate broadcast media such as the Emergency Alert System (EAS). 6. Notification of the Public The capability exists for the prompt notification of the general public within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This notification capability consists of two principal elements: (1) the Alert and Notification Systems (ANS) and (2) the Emergency Alerting System (EAS) radio stations.
- The Alert and Notification System (ANS) consists of fixed sirens used as a primary means of notification. Activation of the ANS sirens by the civil authorities will alert the public to turn on their radios to a local EAS radio station for detailed information on the emergency situation. A backup means of notification is provided and is described within the station Annex.
- The Emergency Alerting System (EAS) is a network of local radio stations prepared to transmit or relay emergency information and instructions from the civil authorities to the general public November 2016
- E-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The ANS is operated by local governmental agencies and maintained by Exelon Nuclear. To assure the ANS is maintained in an operational readiness posture, the local agencies have agreed to test the system (by sounding the sirens) on a periodic basis that meets or exceeds FEMA guidance and to report inoperable equipment to EP-designated maintenance personnel. The goal of the testing and maintenance program is to identify inoperable equipment in a timely manner and to restore equipment to a functional status commensurate with FEMA operability requirements as referenced in the FEMAREP Manual, "Alert and Notification Systems" Part V. In addition to this routine test and repair program, preventive maintenance of the ANS will be performed on an annual basis. A more site-specific description of the various prompt public notification systems is presented in the station annex to the E-Plan. The activation of the ANS sirens, deployment of emergency service vehicles and operation of the Emergency Alerting System is discussed in detail in the state specific response plans. 7. Messages to the Public The respective States have developed EAS messages for the public consistent with the classification scheme. These draft messages are included as part of the States' Emergency Plan and contain instructions with regard to specific protective actions to be taken by occupants and visitors of affected areas. Messages may include instructions such as: take shelter and go indoors, close windows and doors, turn off ventilation systems; directions given for evacuation; directions to stay tuned to specific stations for further information, ad-hoc respiratory protection, (e.g. handkerchief over mouth, etc.). Exelon will provide support for the content of these messages when requested. The States control the distribution of radioprotective drugs to the general public . November 2016 E-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section F: Emergency Communications This section describes the provisions utilized for prompt communications among principal emergency response organizations, communications with the ERO and communications with the general public. 1. Communications/Notifications Exelon Nuclear has extensive and reliable communication systems installed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and the offsite Emergency Response Facilities. Examples of the communications network include systems such as normal and dedicated telephone lines on *landlines, fiber-optic voice channels, cell phones, satellite phones, mobile radio units, handi-talkies and computer peripherals. This network provides:
- Voice communication through normal telephone, dedicated line and automatic ring-down between selected facilities, conference call capability, speaker phones, and operator assistance where required.
- Communications between selected Exelon vehicles and appropriate fixed locations, as well as with state mobile units and fixed locations.
- Facsimile, network, and modem transmission. Figure F-1 depicts the initial notification paths and the organizational titles from the Exelon Nuclear Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) to federal, state and local emergency response organizations, and industry support agencies. The Exelon primary and alternate methods of communication, and the NRC communications network, are illustrated on Figures F-2 and F-3. a. Exelon Nuclear maintains the capability to make initial notifications to the designated offsite agencies on a 24-hour per day basis. The offsite notification system, referred to as the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) provides . communications to state and county warning points and Emergency Operations Centers from the CR, TSC, and EOF. Backup methods include facsimile and commercial telephone lines. State and county warning points are continuously staffed. b-d. Exelon Nuclear has established several dedicated communication systems that ensure reliable and timely exchange of information necessary to provide effective Command and Control over any emergency response; (1) between Exelon and state and local agencies within the EPZs, (2) with federal emergency response organizations, (3) between the plant, the EOF, and the state and county EOCs, and (4) between Emergency Response Facilities and Field Monitoring Teams. A general description of the systems is as follows: November 2016 F-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) .
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 1) Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS): The t-:JARS is a dedicated communications system that has been installed for the purpose of notifying state and local authorities of declared nuclear emergencies. This system links together the station Control Rooms, the EOF, TSCs and state and local authorities as appropriate. 2) Damage Control Line: A dedicated telephone link called the Damage Control Line that enables communication between the Control Room, the TSC and the OSC to coordinate the dispatching of emergency damage control teams from the OSC (see Figure F-2). 3) Operations Status Line: A dedicated telephone link called the Operations Status Line that enables communication between the Control Room, the TSC and the EOF to monitor the activities of the Control Room staff (see Figure F-2). 4) Technical Conference Line: A dedicated telephone line called the Technical Conference Line between the TSC and the EOF to communicate mitigating activities and priorities for the station to the EOF (see Figure F-2). 5) Director's Hotline: A dedicated telephone link called the Director's Hotline that enables direct Emergency Director communication between the Control Room, TSC, and the EOF (see Figure F-2) .
- 6) Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System: The PBX telephone system provides communication capability between telephones located within the plant. The PBX is used to connect the CR, TSC, EOF, and OSC. The PBX telephone system also provides for outside communications through interconnections with the corporate telephone communications system and commercial telephone lines. 7) Local Commercial Telephone System: This system provides standard commercial telephone service through the public infrastructure, consisting of central offices and the wire line and microwave carrier. The commercial telephone system includes connections to PBX, emergency telephone system, dedicated lines to emergency facilities, and lines to the JICs. The commercial vendor provides primary and secondary power for their lines at their central office. 8) Emergency Response Data System (EROS): EROS will continuously supply the NRC with selected plant data points on a near real time basis. The selected data points are transmitted automatically to the NRC at approximately 1-minute intervals . November 2016 F-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 9) Field Monitoring Team (FMT) Communications: A separate communications system has been installed to allow coordinated environmental monitoring and assessment during an emergency. This system consists of the necessary hardware to allow communication between the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and mobile units in Exelon Nuclear vehicles. Though direct communications between the Control Room and the FMTs is not required per the prescribed methods of FMT coordination, the FMTs can be contacted from equipment in *the Control Room if required. Commercial cell phones or other means are available as back up to the primary field team communications system. In addition, station communication links exist to ensure appropriate information transfer capabilities during an emergency. The station may also utilize its Public Address System, station radios and notification devices to augment its emergency communications. e. ERO Notification System: Exelon Nuclear utilizes an automated ERO Notification System to rapidly notify members of the ERO. The system consists of a network of physical infrastructure capable of initiating and receiving contact via multiple notification devices. When activated, the system contacts the notification devices (e.g., through commercial and cellular phone, email, text message) belonging to members of the ERO. The System includes redundant activation methods via the internet, call-centers, or direct telephone activation, as well as redundant, geographically separated call centers and data centers, with redundant power sources. Implementing procedures specify the course of action to be taken if the primary ERO Notification System activation path fails to respond. The ERO Notification System provides primary and back-up notification functions. f. NRC Communications (ENS and HPN) Communications with the NRC Operations Center will be performed via the NRC ENS and HPN circuits or commercial telephone line. Information is normally communicated from an approved NRC Event Notification Worksheet prior to establishing an open ENS and/or HPN line. Installation and use of these NRC telephones is under the direction of the NRC (see Figure F-3). Emergency Notification System (ENS): Dedicated telephone equipment is in place between the Control Room and the NRC, with an extension of that line in the TSC. A separate line is available in the EOF with the capability of being patched with the station through the NRC: This line is used for NRC event notifications and status updates. Health Physics Network (HPN): There also exists a separate dedicated telephone between the NRC, the TSC, and EOF for conveying health physics information to the NRC as requested or as an open line . November 2016 F-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2. Medical Communications Communications are established with the primary and backup medical hospitals and transportation services via commercial telephone that is accessed by station personnel. 3. Communications Testing Communications equipment is checked in accordance with Section H.10. Communications drills between Exelon Nuclear and state and county government facilities are conducted in accordance with Section N.2.a. In addition, minimum siren testing is performed in accordance with the site specific siren Design Report . November 2016 F-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) ' -j
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Figure F-1: Exelon Notification Scheme (For Full Augmentation) Control Room (Shift Manager) TSC ENS NRC Headquarters NRC Region (ENS/HPN Comm) (Duty Officer) ,__-----<_ (Duty Officer) (TSC Director) EOF (ENS/HPN Comm) (State/Local Comm) Nuclear Duty Officer Initial (NARS) Updates (Commercial) November 2016 State Warning Points/EOCs (Dispatcher/comm) F-5 As appropriate Local Warning Points/EOCs (Dispatcher/comm) EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Figure F-2: ERF Communications Matrix Control Room osc I ................... ! TSC D E EOF _J*-1 0-------_ _j .----Dedicated Line (Independent or PBX) ______. Station Line (PBX or Commercial) .............. . Exelon Nuclear A= Damage Control Line between the OSC, TSC, and Control Room. B =Directors Hotline line between the Control Room, TSC and EOF. C =Operations Line between the TSC, Control Room and EOF. D =Technical Conference Line between the TSC and EOF. E = Station telephone line . November 2016 F-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Figure F-3: NRC Communications for Nuclear Response NRC Headquarters NRC Region patch Commercial only Exelon Nuclear Control Room TSC NOTE: ENS a.nd HPN circuits may use the Federally maintained system, company tie lines or PBX as dedicated primary communications systems and have commercial backups . November 2016 F-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section G: Public Education and Information
- This section describes the Exelon Nuclear public education and information program. It outlines the methods for distributing public information materials on an annual basis and describes how the public is informed in the event of an emergency. *
- 1. Public Information Publication The state has overall responsibility for maintaining a continuing disaster preparedness public education program. The emergency public information publication for the Exelon Nuclear generating stations is updated annually, in coordination with state and county agencies, to address how the general public is notified and what their actions should be in an emergency. Exelon distributes the publication on an annual basis by mail to all residents within the ten-mile plume exposure EPZs and to appropriate locations where a transient population may obtain a copy. The public information publication includes the following information: a. Educational information on radiation. b. A description of the times that require public notification (what to do if a take-shelter or evacuate recommendation is given). c. A map of major evacuation routes. d. A list of communities likely to serve as host shelter areas and instructions on how to obtain additional information, especially for the disabled or their caretakers and those without transportation. 2. Public Education Materials Public information publications instruct the public to go indoors and turn on their radios when they hear the ANS sirens operating. These publications also identify the local radio stations to which the public should tune in for information related to the emergency. 3. Media Accommodations a. The Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Department is notified when an Unusual Event or higher Emergency condition exists. They will handle public and media inquiries in the early stages of the event (until the JIG is activated) by distributing background information, news releases, and providing information to corporate management. 1) The Emergency Public Information Organization: The Emergency Public lnformation_Organization is part of the Corporate ERO. It may be activated at any time at the discretion of the Nuclear Duty Officer. However, when there is a procedural requirement to activate the EOF, the Emergency Public Information Organization shall also be activated . November 2016 G-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The primary purpose of the Emergency Public Information Organization is to disseminate information from Exelon Nuclear's ERO about the emergency events to the public, via the news media. However, the authority for issuance of news releases for the classification of an Unusual Event or prior to ERO activation will always reside with the Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Department. Upon activation, the Emergency Public Information Organization has the responsibility and authority for issuance of news releases to the public. The Emergency Public Information Organization is comprised of senior managers from Exelon Nuclear who will function as spokespersons, and other Exelon Nuclear individuals including personnel from the Governmental Affairs and Human Relations areas. Exelon Nuclear's spokespersons disseminate information to the news media/public concerning the emergency events out of a Joint Information Center (JIG). 2) The Joint Information Center (JIG): The JIC is the facility *in which media personnel gather to receive information related to the emergency event. The JIG is the location where approved news releases will be provided to the media for dissemination to the public. News releases are coordinated between the EOF and JIG personnel and state and/or Federal representatives in the JIG. Exelon public information personnel operate from the EOF and the JIC, which is under the direction of the Corporate Spokesperson and functions as the single point contact to interface with Federal, state, and local authorities who are responsible for disseminating information to the public. The JIG is equipped with appropriate seating, lighting and visual aids to allow for public announcements and briefings to be given to the news media. Additionally, the JIG is equipped with commercial telephone lines for making outgoing calls. The Emergency Public Information Organization functions from the JIG and EOF in preparing and releasing utility information about the emergency event. The JIC is activated at the declaration of an Alert or higher classification. Functions of the JIG include:
- Serving as the primary location for accumulating accurate and current information regarding the emergency conditions and writing news releases.
- Providing work space and phones for public information personnel from the state, counties, NRG, FEMA, and industry-related organizations.
- Providing telephones for use by the news media personnel. ;
- Providing responses to media inquiries through Media Monitoring Staff telephones that the media can call for information about an emergency . . b. The news media is not permitted into the EOF during an emergency. November 2016 G-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 4. Coordination of Public Information a. The JIC is staffed by Exelon and government public information representatives who will be the source of public information during an emergency at the station. The Corporate Spokesperson is the primary spokesperson for Exelon Nuclear. The Corporate Spokesperson has direct access to all necessary information (see Section B.5). b. The JIC is staffed by federal, state, county, and utility personnel to assure timely, periodic exchange and coordination of information. Representatives coordinate information prior to conducting news briefings. c. Rumors or misinformation are identified during an emergency by the media/rumor control monitors. They respond to public and news media calls and monitor media reports. d. The JIC for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is located west of Chicago, in Warrenville IL, in the Exelon Nuclear Cantara facility. 5. Media Orientation Emergency Preparedness, in conjunction with Exelon Communications and Public Affairs Department, offers training (at least annually) to acquaint news media with the E-Plan, information concerning radiation, and points of contact for release of public information in an emergency. Training is provided for those media agencies that accept the training offer . November 2016 G-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) . I
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section H: Emergency Facilities and Equipment Onsite and offsite facilities are available for emergency assessment, communications, first aid and medical care, and damage control. Of particular importance are the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs); the Control Room (CR), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Joint Information Center (JIG). This section describes the emergency facilities and equipment used by the Emergency Response Organization and outlines the requirements which aid in timely and accurate -re-sponse a-ction-s.---1t also--describes-th_e_ su-rveillance-ptograms--1.:rsea--10-mcfnitor ------------ensure that these facilities and equipment are maintained in a high degree of constant readiness. 1. Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center Exelon Nuclear has established a TSC and an on-site OSC, which are activated upon declaration of an Alert or higher classification. Until they become operational, required functions of these facilities are performed in the Control Room. Under certain adverse conditions for Security-Based Events, personnel may be assembled in an Alternative Facility prior to being dispatched to one of the facility ERFs. a. Station Control Room: The Control Room is the centralized onsite location from which the Nuclear Station's reactors and major plant systems are operated. The Control Room is equipped with instrumentation to supply detailed information on the reactors and major plant systems. The Control Room is continuously staffed with qualified licensed operators. The Control Room is the first onsite facility to become involved with the response to emergency events. Control Room personnel must evaluate and effect control over the emergency and initiate activities necessary for coping with the emergency until such time that support centers can be activated. These activities shall include:
- Reactor and plant control.
- Initial direction of all plant related operations.
- Accident recognition, classification, mitigation and initial corrective actions.
- Alerting of onsite personnel.
- Notification of appropriate individuals.
- Activation of emergency response facilities and ERO notification.
- Notification of offsite agencies .
- Continuous evaluation of the magnitude and potential consequences of an incident. November 2016 H-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) i
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Initial dose projections .
- Recommendations for immediate protective actions for the public. As other ERFs become activated, they will supply support to the Control Room, although overall Command and Control of the emergency will transfer to the SEO (TSC) or the CED (EOF). Throughout all emergencies, the Control Room maintains its emergency activation status until its normal operational status may be resumed. b. Technical Support Center (TSC): Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has established a TSC for use during emergency situations by station management, technical, and engineering support personnel. The TSC is activated for all emergencies classified as Alert or higher. Activation for other events is optional. When activated the TSC functions include:
- Support for the Control Room's emergency response efforts.
- Support the SEO with assigned Command & Control functions.
- Continued evaluation of event classification.
- Assessment of the plant status and potential offsite impact.
- Coordination of emergency response actions.
- Notification of appropriate corporate. and station management.
- Notification and update of the NRC via Emergency Notification System (ENS). The TSC is the onsite location utilized to support the Control Room for . assessment of plant status and potential offsite impact, and for implementation of emergency actions. TSC provides technical data and information to the EOF. Figure B-1 b illustrates the staffing and organization of the TSC. The TSC provides reliable voice communications to the Control Room, the OSC, the EOF, the NRC, and state and local Emergency Operations Centers. In addition, they provide facsimile transmissions capability (see Section F.1 ). The TSC is sized to accommodate a minimum of 25 spaces and supporting equipment. This includes provisions for five NRC representatives. Adequate space is also available for the appropriate state representative(s) . November 2016 H-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O} I I
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Personnel in the TSC shall be protected from radiological hazards, including direct radiation and airborne contaminants under accident conditions with similar radiological habitability as Control Room personnel. To ensure adequate radiological protection, permanent radiation monitoring systems have been installed in the TSC and/or periodic radiation surveys are conducted. These systems indicate radiation dose rates and airborne radioactivity inside the TSC while in use. In addition, protective breathing apparatus (full-face air purifying respirators) and Kl are available for use as required. The TSC has access to a complete set of as-built drawings and other records, including general arrangement diagrams, P&IDs, and the electrical schematics. The TSC has the capability to record and display vital plant data, in real time, to be used by knowledgeable individuals responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations, and for implementation of emergency procedures. c. Operations Support Center (OSC): Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has established an OSC. The OSC is the onsite location to where station support personnel report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments or duties in support of emergency operations. The OSC shall be activated whenever the TSC is activated, but need not remain activated at the Alert level if its use is judged unnecessary by the Station Emergency Director. At the Site Area and General Emergency levels, the OSC or an alternate OSC shall be activated at all times (except in the case of a Hostile Action Event when site access is restricted). Activation for other events is optional. Station disciplines reporting to the OSC include, but are not limited to:
- Operating personnel not assigned to the Control Room,
- Radiation Protection Personnel,
- Chemistry Personnel,
- Maintenance Personnel (mechanical, electrical and l&C). Figure 8-1 b illustrates the staffing and organization for the OSC. Each OSC is equipped with communication links to the Control Room, the TSC and the EOF (see Section F). A limited inventory of supplies will be kept for the OSC. This inventory will include respirators, protective clothing, flashlights and portable survey instruments. 2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) The EOF is the location where the Corporate Emergency Director will direct a staff in evaluating and coordinating the overall company activities involved with an emergency. Activation of the EOF is mandatory upon declaration of an Alert or higher classification. The EOF provides for:
- Management of overall emergency response. November 2016 H-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Coordination of radiological and environmental assessments .
- Determination of recommended public protective actions.
- Management of recovery operations.
- Coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies. The EOF for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is located west of Chicago, in Warrenville IL, in the Exelon Nuclear Cantara facility. The facility is des.igned with the following considerations:
- The location provides optimum functional and availability characteristics for carrying out overall strategic direction of Exelon Nuclear onsite and support operations, determination of public protective actions to be recommended to offsite officials, and coordination with Federal, state and local organizations.
- It is well engineered for the design life of the plant and is of sufficient size to accommodate about 50 people.
- It is equipped with reliable voice communications capabilities to the TSC, the OSC, the Control Room, NRC, and state and local emergency operations centers. In addition, the EOF has facsimile transmission capability.
- Equipment is provided to gather, store, and display data needed in the EOF to analyze and exchange information on plant conditions with the Station. The EOF technical data system receives, stores, processes, and displays information sufficient to perform assessments of the actual and potential onsite and offsite environmental consequences of an emergency condition.
- The EOF has ready access to plant records, procedures, and emergency plans needed for effective overall management of Exelon Nuclear emergency response resources. 3. Emergency Operations Centers EOCs operated by the state and local communities have been established to perform direction and control of emergency response functions. The Illinois and Iowa state EOCs are capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted period. These centers contain sufficient communications (radio, telephone and teletype) equipment, maps, emergency plans, and status boards to provide the necessary interfaces with other federal, state, county, and Exelon emergency facilities . November 2016 H-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The county EOCs serve as Command and Control headquarters for local emergency response activities as well as a center for the coordination of communications to field units and to the state EOCs. These EOCs have the equipment necessary, (such as facsimile machines, telecommunications equipment, radio gear, photocopiers, wall maps, etc.) to carry out their emergency responsibilities. 4. Activation NOTE: NUREG-0654 Criterion 11.B.5 states that the "licensee must be able to augment on-shift capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency". It further defines that short period as 30 and 60 minutes. The time frames for rapid augmentation of a nuclear power plant staff in the event of an emergency are not rigid inviolate requirements but rather goals. It is Exelon Nuclear's intent to expend its best efforts to meet the augmentation criteria goals regarding staffing Emergency Response Facilities with sufficiently skilled individuals capable of handling an emergency. Both the NRC and Exelon Nuclear realize that due to diversity of normal residential patterns for the stations' staff, possible adverse weather conditions, road congestion and site access restrictions, these time frames might be exceeded. Exelon Nuclear has put into place plans and procedures to ensure timely activation of its emergency response facilities. The Shift Manager (as Shift Emergency Director) will initiate a call-out in accordance with the implementing procedures. The ERO augmentation process identifies individuals who are capable of fulfilling the specific response functions that are listed in ERO staffing tables contained within this document. This table was developed based on the functions listed in NUREG-0654, Table B-1. Although the response time will vary due to factors such as weather and traffic conditions, a goal of 60 minutes for minimum staffing, following the. classification of an Alert or higher emergency classification, has been established for the ERO personnel responding to the station emergency facilities and the EOF. Additionally, plans have been developed to ensure timely functional activation and staffing of the JIC when the classification of Alert is declared . November 2016 H-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear It is the goal of the organization to be capable of activating the applicable Emergency Response Facility upon achieving minimum staffing. The facility can be declared activated when the following conditions are met: a. Minimum staffing has been achieved. b. The facility is functional. Although the minimum staffing criteria applies to the JIC, the activation time is not applicable. Public Information personnel must first coordinate the decision to activate the JIC with the appropriate offsite authorities. The Director in charge may elect to activate their facility without meeting minimum staffing; if it has been determined that sufficient personnel are available to fully respond to the specific event (this would not constitute a successful minimum staff response). 5. Monitoring Equipment Onsite Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is equipped with instrumentation for seismic monitoring, radiation monitoring, fire protection and meteorological monitoring. Instrumentation for the detection or analysis of emergency conditions is maintained in accordance with station Technical Specifications, if applicable, or commitments made to the NRC. Descriptions of the equipment appear below. Additional description may be found in the Station Annex. This equipment includes but is not limited to the following: -a. Geophysical Monitors 1) Meteorological Instrumentation: A permanent meteorological monitoring station is located near each station for display and recording of wind speed, wind direction, and ambient and differential temperature for use in making offsite dose projections. Meteorological information is presented in the CR, TSC, and EOF by means of the plant computer system. This information is remotely interrogated using a computer or other data access terminal. With regard to Exelon Nuclear's meteorological monitoring program, there has been a quality assurance program adopted from 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. However, since the meteorological facilities are not composed of structures, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and are not "safety related," not all aspects of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix B, apply. Those aspects of quality assurance germane to supplying good meteorological information for a nuclear power station were adopted into the meteorological quality assurance program. The meteorological program is also subject to the requirements of the QATR, Section 19, Augmented Quality . November 2016 H-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The National Weather Service (NWS), or regional weather forecast providers, may be contacted during severe weather periods. These providers analyze national and local weather in order to provide localized weather forecasts for the system or for the station area as appropriate. 2) Seismic Monitoring: The seismic monitoring system measures and records the acceleration (earthquake ground motion) of the structure. Earthquakes produce low frequency accelerations which, when detected by the remote sensing devices, are permanently recorded as information which defines the response spectrum. The system remains in a standby condition until an earthquake causes the remote unit(s) to activate the recording circuits. It also provides signals for immediate remote indication that specific preset response accelerations have been exceeded. 3) Hydrological Monitors: The design basis flood, probable maximum precipitation, and other improbable, conceivable extremes in hydrologic natural phenomena are well below any design limits for the stations as detailed in the UFSAR. b. Radiological Monitors and Sampling 1) The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS): In-plant radiological measurements provide information that may help determine the nature, extent and source of emergency conditions. The RMS is available to give early warning of a possible emergency and provides for a continuing evaluation of the situation in the Control Room. Radiation monitoring instruments are located at selected areas within the facility to detect, measure, and record radiation levels. In the event the radiation level should increase above a preset level, an alarm is initiated in the Control Room. Certain radiation monitoring. instruments also alarm locally in selected areas of the facility. The RMS is divided into 3 subsystems: a) Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) are used for the direct measurement of in-plant exposure rates. The ARM readings allow in-plant exposure rate determinations to be made remotely without requiring local hand-held meter surveys. This information may be used, initially, to aid in the determination of plant area accessibility. In addition to permanent monitors, portable Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) measure airborne particulate and airborne iodine activities at various locations within the operating areas. b) Process Radiation Monitors (PRMs) are used for the measurement of radioactive noble gas, iodine, and particulate concentrations in plant effluent and other gaseous and fluid streams . November 2016 H-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c) The accident, or high range, radiation monitoring system monitors radiation levels at various locations within the operating area. These are high range instruments used to track radiation levels under accident or post accident conditions. These instruments include the Containment/Drywall Radiation Monitors. The RMS provides the necessary activity or radiation levels required for determining terms in dose projection procedures. Key RMS data is linked to the plant computer, which allows information to be passed to the TSC and EOF. The isotopic mix, including isotopes such as those in Table 3 of NUREG-0654, is based upon a default accident mix. Refer to t.he Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station UFSAR for further detail on the RMS capabilities and design. 2) Liquid and Gaseous Sampling Systems: The process sampling system consists of the normal sampling system and additional sampling panels located throughout the plant. Sampling systems are installed or can be modified to permit reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling even under severe accident conditions. The sampling systems use a number of manual sampling techniques to enable reactor coolant and containment sampling operations over a wide range of plant conditions. It is capable of providing information relative to post-accident plant conditions to allow operator actions to be taken to mitigate and control the course of an accident. Refer to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station UFSAR for further detail on sampling capabilities. 3) Portable Radiation Monitoring Equipment: Portable radiation survey instruments are available for a wide variety uses such as area, sample, and personnel surveys and continued accident assessment. Instruments are stored throughout the plant and in the emergency facilities. c. Process Monitors: The Control Room and applicable redundant backup locations are equipped with extensive plant process monitors for use in both normal and emergency conditions. These indications include but are not limited to reactor coolant system pressure and temperature, containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, status or lineup of equipment components. This instrumentation provides the basis for initiation of corrective actions. 1) Plant Monitoring/Information System: A plant monitoring/information system provides the data acquisition and database capability for performing plant monitoring and functions. The system is designed to scan, convert to engineering units, make reasonability and alarm limit checks, apply required transformations, store for recall and analysis, and display the reading of transformed data from plant instrumentation. The system scans flows, pressures, temperatures, fluid levels, radiation levels, equipment, and valve status at required frequencies. Scanned variables are quality tagged. The system provides for short and mid term storage of data for on-line retrieval and fast recall, and long term storage to appropriate media. November 2016 H-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2) Safety Parameter Display (SPDS) & Plant Parameter Display (PPDS) Systems: SPDS and PPDS provide a display of plant parameters from which the safety status of operation may be assessed in the Control Room, TSC and EOF. The primary function of the SPDS and PPDS is to help operating personnel in the Control Room make quick assessments of plant safety status. SPDS and/or PPDS displays in the TSC and EOF promote the exchange of information between these facilities and the Control Room and assists the emergency organization in the decision making process. d. Fire Detection System: The Fire Detection System is designed to quickly detect visible or invisible smoke (o'r other products of combustion) and/or heat in designated areas of the plant. The fire alarm communication systems and subsystems are located at strategic points throughout the plant to warn personnel of a nuclear incident or other emergency conditions. Existing plant alarm systems are sufficiently audible to alert personnel in the event of a fire or need for assembly. These alarm communication systems consist of warning sirens and lights (in high noise areas) and the PA system. Refer to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station UFSAR for further description of the station's fire protection system. 6. Monitoring Equipment Offsite Exelon has made provisions to acquire data from and have 'access to the following offsite sources of monitoring and analysis equipment: a. Geophysical Monitors: In the event that the onsite meteorological tower or monitoring instrumentation becomes inoperative and the contracted weather provider cannot be contacted, meteorological data may be obtained directly from the National Weather Service or the internet. A considerable array of seismometers are located in the region. A central point of contact to obtain information about a seismic event is the National EarthquakE! Information Service in Golden, Colorado. Exelon Nuclear Corporate Offices can coordinate hydrology and seismology expertise in the event onsite information becomes unavailable. b. Radiological Environmental Monitors and Sampling: Exelon Nuclear has contracted with a company to conduct an extensive offsite environmental monitoring program to provide data on measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials in the environs. The program (described fully in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual), includes:
- Fixed continuous air samplers.
- Routine sampling of river water; milk and fish .
- A fixed dosimeter monitoring network. The dosimeter program consists of the following elements: November 2016 H-9 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- A near-site ring of dosimeters covering the 16 meteorological sectors .
- A 16-sector ring of dosimeters placed in a zone within about 5 miles from the plant.
- Dosimeters placed at each of the normal fixed air sampler locations (typically about 8-15 air samplers per nuclear station). c. Laboratory Facilities: External facilities for counting and analyzing samples can be provided by the other Exelon Nuclear stations, state, federal or contracted laboratories. These laboratories can act as backup facilities in the event that the affected station's counting room and laboratory become unusable or the offsite radiological monitoring and environmental sampling operation exceeds the capacity or capability of the station laboratory during an emergency. It is estimated that these laboratories will be able to respond within several hours from initial notification. Outside analytical assistance may be requested from state and federal agencies, or through contracted vendors. The state maintains a mobile radiological laboratory that provides the primary means of analyzing off-site environmental samples. The NRC mobile laboratory may be made available for Site Area and General Emergencies. The DOE, through the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) has access to any national laboratory with a Bell Lab contract (e.g., Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore, etc.) . A general description of the laboratory capabilities is provided in Section C.3. 7. Offsite Monitoring Equipment Storage Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains a sufficient supply of emergency equipment (such as portable survey, counting, and air sampling instrumentation and other radiological monitoring equipment and supplies) that may be used for environmental monitoring. These supplies meet the initial requirements of two environmental Field Monitoring Teams. During subsequent phases of an emergency, additional equipment is available from other Exelon Nuclear generating stations, vendors and offsite response organizations. 8. Meteorological Monitoring The station has installed and maintains a meteorological tower equipped with instrumentation for continuous reading of the wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and delta air temperature. Additional capabilities are available to obtain representative current meteorological information from other sources, such as the National Weather Service. A full description of the onsite meteorological capabilities is given in Section H.5.a of this Plan . November 2016 H-10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 9. OSC Capabilities The OSC provides area for coordinating and planning of OSC activities and the staging of personnel. Further space is available in adjacent offices and locker rooms to accommodate additional personnel as may be required. Alternate locations are available. The onsite storeroom maintains a supply of parts and equipment for normal plant maintenance. These parts, supplies and equipment are available for damage control use as necessary. Sufficient radiation protection equipment (i.e., protective clothing, respiratory protection gear, Kl, and other health physics equipment and supplies) is stored and maintained near the OSC (as well as the other emergency response facilities). Damage Control Team equipment is available near the OSC as well as in the maintenance shops. This equipment includes items such as a camera, portable lighting, and additional portable communications equipment. The OSC is stocked with an assortment of first aid and medical treatment equipment and supplies. The OSC maintains reliable voice communications with the CR, TSC, and EOF. For a complete description of communications equipment, refer to Section F. When an emergency condition exists at one station, additional supplies can be obtained from other unaffected stations and Exelon resources upon request. 10. Facility and Equipment Readiness Emergency facilities and equipment are inspected and inventoried in accordance with emergency preparedness procedures. These procedures provide information on location and availability of emergency equipment and supplies. An inventory of all emergency equipment and supplies is performed on a quarterly basis and after each use in an emergency or drill. During this inventory, radiation monitoring equipment is checked to verify that required calibration period and location are in accordance with the inventory lists. Inspections include an operational check of instruments and equipment. Equipment, supplies, and parts which have a shelf-life are identified, checked, and replaced as necessary. Sufficient reserves of instruments and equipment are maintained to replace those which are removed from emergency kits or lockers for calibration or repair. The station is responsible for maintaining a supply of Kl at the site. 11. General Use Emergency Equipment Inventory procedures identify the equipment that makes up kits used in an emergency situation available within each emergency facility. 12. Collection Point for Field Samples The onsite chemistry lab has been designated as the central point for the receipt of radiological field monitoring samples. Sampling and analysis equipment is available for quantitative activity determination of marine and air samples, and qualitative activity determination of terrestrial samples. Sufficient field monitoring equipment is maintained at the station for initial sampling. Instrumentation and equipment utilized for sample activity determination are routinely calibrated to ensure timely availability. Additional facilities as described in C.3 and H.6.c are available for sample and analysis of environmental samples. November 2016 H-11 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Refer to the Station Annex for further description of contracted environmental
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- November 2016 H-12 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _J PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exeio*n Nuclear Section I: Accident Assessment
- To effectively coordinate and direct all facets of the response to an emergency situation, diligent accident assessment efforts are required throughout the emergency. All four emergency classifications have similar assessment methods, however, each classification requires a greater magnitude of assessment effort dependent upon the plant symptoms and/or initiating event(s). *
- 1. Plant Parameters and Corresponding Emergency Classification Plant system and effluent parameter values are utilized in the determination of accident severity and subsequent emergency classification. Environmental and meteorological events are also determining factors in emergency classification. An emergency condition can be the result of just one parameter or condition change, or the combination of several. The specific symptoms, parameter values or events for each level of emergency classification are detailed in the emergency implementing procedures. Specific plant system and effluent parameters that characterize a classifiable event (EALs) are presented in Addendum 3 to the Station Annex. In order to adequately assess the emergency condition, each emergency facility has the necessary equipment and instrumentation installed to make available essential plant information on a continuous basis. Evaluation of plant conditions is accomplished through the monitoring of plant parameters both from indication in the Control Room and within the plant. Some of the more important plant parameters to be monitored in the Control Room are assembled into a single display location, which is entitled the "Safety. Parameter Display System" (SPDS). The SPDS monitors such parameters as: reactor coolant system pressure, reactor or pressurizer water level, containment pressure, suppression pool water level and temperature, reactor power, safety system status, containment radiation level and effluent monitor readings. The instrumentation and equipment capabilities available for each emergency facility are described in Section H. 2. Onsite Accident Assessment Capabilities The resources available to provide initial and continuing information for accident assessment throughout the course of an event include plant parameter display systems, liquid and gaseous sampling system, Area and Process Radiation Monitoring Systems, and Accident Radiation Monitoring Systems (which includes the high range containment radiation monitors). Descriptions of these systems are given in Section H.5.b. 3. Source Term Determination Source term (or core damage) estimations serve several roles within the Exelon Emergency Preparedness Program. For planning purposes, core damage considerations are used as the bases for several of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) 'Initiating Conditions and as the threshold for the declaration of a General Emergency (the definition of a General Emergency specifies conditions which involve 'substantial' core degradation or melting as one of the bases for classification). November 2016 1-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) _J
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear From an implementation perspective, core damage estimations provide a means of realistically differentiating between the four core states (no damage, clad failure, and fuel melt, and vessel melt-through) to:
- Evaluate the status of the fuel barriers and how their status relates to the risks and possible consequences of the accident.
- Provide input on core configuration (coolable or uncoolable) for prioritization of mitigating activities.
- Determine the potential quality (type) and/or quantity(%) of source term available for release in support of projected offsite doses and protective action recommendations.
- Provide information that quantifies the severity of an accident in terms that can be readily understood and visualized.
- Support the determination of radiological protective actions that should be considered for long term recovery activities. The assessment methodologies utilized by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station are intended to provide a rapid best estimate of core damage which, when evaluated together, help to develop an overall picture of the extent of core damage. The methods used to estimate the amount or type of core damage occurring under accident conditions includes the following:
- Containment Radiation Monitors: An indirect method used to determine the amount of core damage. Applicable to Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenarios. Based upon an end-of-life source term and static nuclide ratio assumptions yielding a limited accuracy. Valid any time following an accident.
- Core Temperatures: Methods such as Core Exit Thermocouple (CET), Peak Core Temperatures and Hot Leg Temperatures provide indirect methods used to indicate the type and/or amount of core damage. Applicable for all types of accidents. Valid any time following an accident.
- Core Uncoverv: Methods such as Core Uncovery Time, RVLIS Level and Source Range Monitor count rate provide indirect methods used to indicate the type of core damage (clad failure or fuel melt). Applicable for all types of accidents. Provides a relatively accurate estimate of the state of the core early in the event. Valid any time following an accident.
- Containment Hydrogen Concentration: An indirect method used to establish the type of core damage. Applicable to LOCA type accidents where all the hydrogen generated by the metal-water reaction is released into containment. Valid any time following an accident.
- Sample Analysis -Isotopic Ratio Comparison: A direct method used to establish the type of core damage. Compares expected isotopic ratios with a sample to determine a general core state. Applicable under all types of accidents. Valid any time following an accident. November 2016 1-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- Sample Analysis -Presence of Abnormal Isotopes: A direct method used to provide a go/no go indication of fuel melt by the presence of unusually high concentrations of the less volatile fission products. Applicable under all types of accidents. Valid any time following an accident.
- Sample Analysis -Concentration Evaluation: A direct method that yields the most accurate numerical estimations of the amount of core damage. Applicable for all types of accidents.* Requires the sampled system(s) be in a steady state that usually prevents its use until the plant is in a stable condition. 4. Effluent Monitor Data and Dose Projection Dose assessment or projection represents the calculation of an accumulated dose at some time in the future if current or projected conditions continue. During an accident, the Plant Parameter Display System and personal computers will provide the ERO with the timely information required to make decisions. Radiological and meteorological instrumentation readings are used to project dose rates at predetermined distances from the station, and to determine the integrated dose received. Dose assessment methods used by Exelon personnel to project offsite doses include: A. Monitored Release Points -This method utilizes the plant's effluent radiation monitors and system flow rates. Effluent release points are used to directly calculate a release rate. The point of the release determines the way the source term is affected and is adjusted by the dose assessment process . B. Containment Leakage/Failure -This method uses a variety of containment failures or leak rates in conjunction with available source term estimations to develop a release rate to the environment. A direct vent of containment can be modeled as a failure to isolate. C. Release Point Samples -This method uses a sample at the release point and an estimated flow rate to develop a release rate at the point of release. D. Field Monitoring Team Data -This method uses a field survey or sample and the atmospheric model to back calculate a release rate and ratio concentrations of radioactive material at various points up and downwind of plume centerline. The computer applications used to provide dose calculations are evaluated against the EPA-400 plume exposure Protective Action Guides (PAGs) applicable for the early phase of an accident. These evaluations place an emphasis on determining the necessity for offsite protective action recommendations. Dose assessment actions will be performed in the following sequence: First: Onset of a release to 1 hour post-accident: Shift personnel will rely on a simplified computerized dose model to assist them in developing offsite dose projections using real time data from effluent monitors and site meteorology. November 2016 1-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- * * --------------------PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Second: 1 hour post-accident to event termination: Estimates of off-site doses based on more sophisticated techniques are provided. Dedicated ERO personnel will analyze the offsite consequences of a release using more complex computerized dose modeling. These additional methods are able to analyze more offsite conditions than the simplified quick method, as well account for more specific source term considerations. 5 .. Meteorological Information Local meteorological data is available from an onsite meteorological tower. The data available includes wind speed, wind direction, temperature, and delta temperature. These data are used by the utility, state, and NRC to provide near real-time predictions of the atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion. Meteorological data from the tower is available in the CR, TSC, and EOF. A full description of the onsite meteorological capabilities is given in Section H.5.a. 6. Unmonitored Release Dose projections can be made during a release through use of actual sample data in situations where effluent monitors are either off-scale or inoperative or the release occurs by an unmonitored flow path. In the absence of effluent sample data, a dose projection can be performed simply by specifying the accident category as a default. The selection of a default accident category defines the mix, the total curies, and the release pathway(s). The total number of curies from a default mix for each isotope is used to provide an upper bound for release concentration, and hence, an upper bound for the dose rate and dose to the public. 7. Field Monitoring In addition to the capabilities and resources described in Section H.6.b and H.7, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains the ability to take offsite air samples and to directly measure gamma dose rates the event of an airborne or liquid release. The capability to take offsite soil, water, and vegetation samples is also provided by either the Field Teams or a contracted vendor. The environmental monitoring equipment, as described in Section H, contain portable survey, counting, and air sampling instrumentation and other radiological monitoring equipment and supplies to be used by the Field Monitoring Teams. Samples are taken at predetermined locations as well as those specified both during and after a release. Environmental measurements are used as an aid in the determination and assessment of protective and recovery actions for the general public. 8. Field Monitoring Teams Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to perform a variety of functions during conditions that may involve significant releases of radioactive materials from the plant. Radiological survey and sample data is used to define affected area boundaries, verify or modify dose projections and protective action recommendations, and assess the actual magnitude, extent, and significance of a liquid or gaseous release. November 2016 1-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear In addition to contamination and dose rate measurements, the change out of dosimeters and air sampler cartridges can be performed. Other actions may include soil, water and vegetation sampling. The initial environmental surveys involve simple-to-perform measurements to quickly confirm or modify the dose projections based on plant parameters. Subsequent environmental monitoring efforts will be aimed at further defining the offsite consequences including instituting an expanded program to enable prompt assessments of any subsequent releases from the plant. The expertise necessary to conduct limited offsite environmental survey and sampling exists onsite 24 hours a day. A minimum of two offsite Field Monitoring Teams are notified and activated at an Alert or higher classification. Teams composed of two individuals are assembled at the station to test and inventory dedicated survey and sampling equipment. Teams are then dispatched in company or personal vehicles into the surrounding area when a release is or is expected to occur. Radiological survey and sample data is transmitted to the emergency facilities. Vendor/contractor support can be used to perform collection, shipment and analysis of environmental sample media as described in Section 8.8.c. 9. Iodine Monitoring Field monitoring equipment has the capability to detect and measure airborne radio iodine concentrations as low as 1 x 10-7 µCi/cm3 in the presence of noble gases. Interference from the presence of noble gas and background radiation will be minimized by ensuring that monitoring teams move to areas of low background prior to analyzing the sample cartridge. The collected air sample is measured by hand held survey meter as an initial check of the projection derived from plant data to determine if significant quantities of elemental iodine have actually been released (the chemical form that would pose a health hazard). 10.Dose Estimates Specific procedures exist for the correlation of air activity levels to dose rate for key isotopes. Provisions have been established for estimating integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates and for the comparison of these estimates with the protective action guides. 11. State Monitoring Capabilities The states have the ability to dispatch their own field monitoring teams to track the airborne radioactive plume. The states also have the ability and resources to coordinate with federal and utility monitoring teams to compare sample results . November 2016 1-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section J: Protective Response Protective response consists of emergency actions, taken during or after an emergency situation, which are intended to minimize or eliminate hazards to the health and safety of the public and/or station personnel. A range of protective actions has been developed for emergency workers and the general public in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. Additionally, guidelines have been established to aid in choosing protective actions during an emergency that are consistent with federal guidance. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is responsible for onsite actions, while the responsibility for offsite actions rests with the state, county, and other offsite response agencies. 1. Notification of Onsite Personnel For all emergency classifications, all personnel within the Protected Area are notified within 15 minutes of the initial classification or escalation of an emergency by recognizable alarms and/or verbal announcements over the plant Public Address (PA) System. Announcements include the emergency classification and response actions to be taken by personnel onsite (such as ERO, non-ERO, contractor personnel, and visitors). Provisions are made to alert personnel in high noise areas and outbuildings within the Protected Area as applicable. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has identified locations where people might be expected to be present outside the Protected Area but within the Owner Controlled Area. Accountability of persons within the Owner Controlled Area but outside the Protected Area is not required. However, provisions are established for notification of personnel within the Owner Controlled Area any time a Site Evacuation has been initiated, or as otherwise deemed appropriate. 2. Evacuation Locations If a Site Evacuation is required, nonessential personnel are directed to either assemble within designated Assembly Areas or to immediately evacuate the site. Personnel will be directed to either proceed to their homes or to reassemble at designated offsite locations. Visitors to the station will assemble with and follow the instructions of their escorts. Nonessential personnel within the Protected Area will normally exit through the security building. Personal transportation (if available) will normally be used and established evacuation routes will be followed. Personnel without transportation will be identified and provided transportation as necessary. 3. Radiological Monitoring of Evacuees Personnel evacuating the site will be monitored for contamination by the portal monitors as they exit the Protected Area, with portable friskers in Assembly Areas, or sent to offsife monitoring locations on an as needed basis . November 2016 J-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria -Exelon Nuclear 4. Evacuation Evacuation is the primary protective action anticipated for onsite personnel not having immediate emergency response assignments. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has identified locations that serve as Assembly Areas and offsite locations for non-essential personnel when they are not instructed to proceed home. The specific locations of these areas are shown in the Station Annex. Implementing procedures describe equipment, supplies and general operation of these facilities. The Station Emergency Director will designate personnel within the Site Boundary as essential or nonessential. Evacuation of non-essential personnel is usually conducted immediately after accountability if a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency has been declared and conditions permit. Evacuation shall commence in accordance with station procedures as directed by the Station Emergency Director or his/her designee, unless one of the following conditions exist: a. Severe weather conditions threaten safe transport. b. A significant radiological hazard would be encountered. c. There is a security threat occurring, which would have an adverse impact on the personnel while leaving the site. d. A condition similar to the above in magnitude, which in the opinion of the Station Emergency Director would adversely affect the site personnel.
- Security forces will be dispatched, when available, to access road(s) to control entry to site facilities. Unauthorized and non-ERO personnel will be denied entry.
- The initiation of a site evacuation will be reported to the appropriate state/local agency. Exelon has established the implementation of alternate onsite protective actions for security-based events that are more appropriate than the actions for radiological emergencies. These alternate protective actions could include taking immediate cover, immediate protected area evacuation, immediate owner controlled area evacuation, and dispatch of the ERO to their alternative facility. 5. Accountability The purpose of Accountability is to determine the locations of all personnel inside the Protected Area and to muster emergency personnel at prearranged locations. When Accountability of onsite personnel is determined to be necessary by the Station Emergency Director, all personnel within the protected area shall be accounted for and the names of missing individuals (if any) are determined within thirty (30) minutes of the announcement. Accountability is usually performed in conjunction with Assembly, and is required to be initiated whenever a Site Area Emergency or higher classification is declared . The movement of personnel for the purposes of Accountability may be delayed if their health and safety could be in jeopardy, such as severe weather or for security concerns. November 2016 J-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- * * . PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear If it is determined that the prearranged Assembly Area is unfit for personnel, the Station Emergency Director may designate an alternative Assembly Area and direct personnel using appropriate communication systems that are available. Once established, Accountability within the Protected Area is maintained throughout the course of the event. Should missing personnel be identified, search and rescue operations are initiated. 6. Provisions for Onsite Personnel Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains an inventory of respiratory protection equipment, anti-contamination clothing, and Kl that is made available to emergency workers remaining onsite should conditions warrant. During the course of emergency, protective actions are considered to minimize radiological exposures or contamination problems associated with all onsite personnel. For those who must work within the restricted area of the affected site, measures that are considered are: a. Use of Respirators: On-shift and emergency response personnel use respiratory protection in any environment involving exposure to high level gaseous activity or oxygen deficient atmosphere, or where air quality is in doubt. In the presence of airborne particulates, emergency response personnel may be directed by health physics personnel to use full-face filter type respirators. The criteria for issuance of respiratory protection are described in Radiation Protection procedures . b. Use of Protective Clothing: Anti-contamination clothing, located in the TSC, OSC and station dress out areas is available for use by onsite personnel. The criteria for issuance of protective clothing are described in Radiation Protection procedures. c. Use of Potassium Iodide (Kl): The use of Kl may be recommended when a projected dose of 50 Rem Committed Dose Equivalent (COE) is exceeded for an emergency worker's thyroid. This is the value specified in EPA 400-R-92-001, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.". Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station is responsible for maintaining a supply of Kl on site. The Station Emergency Director has the responsibility for approval of issuing Kl to Exelon Nuclear emergency workers. 7. Mechanism for Implementing Protective Action Recommendations Plant conditions, projected dose and dose rates, and/or field monitoring data are evaluated to develop PARs for the purpose of preventing or minimizing exposure to the general public. PARs are provided to the offsite agencies responsible for implementing protective actions for the general public within the 10-mile EPZ. PARs are approved by the Emergency Director in Command and Control. In an emergency that requires immediate protective actions be taken prior to activation of the offsite emergency facilities, PARs are provided directly to the state and county 24 hour warning points by the Emergency Director. November 2016 J-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 8. Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) The evacuation time estimates (ETE) were developed in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002, Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies. Section IV of Appendix E to 1 OCFR50 requires that an analysis of the time required to evacuate be provided for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent residents which includes special facilities schools, nursing homes, hospitals, and recreational areas The evacuation time estimate (ETE) is a calculation of the time to evacuate the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), which is an area with a radius of about 10 miles around the station. The ETE study used population data from the 2010 census. The evacuation times are based on a detailed consideration of the EPZ roadway network and population distribution. The ETE Study is contained in an addendum to the station Annex and presents evacuation times, for daytime and nighttime scenarios under various weather conditions for the evacuation of various areas around the station. Within 365 days of the availability of each decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau, each station shall develop an ETE analysis using this decennial data and submit it under 1 OCFR50.4 to the NRC. The ETE analysis shall be submitted to the NRC at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies . During the years between decennial censuses, EPZ permanent resident population changes are estimated once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the currently NRC approved or updated ETE, the ETE analysis will be updated to reflect the impact of that population increase. These estimates are available for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and will be submitted to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis under 1 OCFR50.4 no later than 365 days after the determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies . November 2016 J-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 9. Capability of Implementing Protective Action Recommendations The responsibility for implementing protective measures based on protective action guides for the offsite population at risk is the responsibility of the state and local governments. Detailed procedures for public protective actions are contained in the state and other local radiological emergency response plans as appropriate. The state agencies are responsible for evaluation of Exelon Nuclear recommended protective actions and preparing a recommendation to the Governor, or his/her appointed agent. Only when the state acts under the Governor's order does a recommended protective action become a directed protective action. If the plant conditions are stable and offsite radiological conditions are such that the public health and safety are not endangered, then return to evacuated areas may be discussed with the affected state(s). State authorities are responsible for actually recommending return and transmitting this recommendation. 1 O. Implementation of Protective Action Recommendations The utility, state, and county emergency plans used to implement the protective measures for the plume exposure pathway take numerous factors into consideration as stated in NUREG-0654 11.J. Among these considerations are: a. Most of the public evacuees are expected to travel in their own vehicles, leaving the EPZ via designated evacuation routes. The Station Annex shows the evacuation routes, EPZ Subareas and pre-selected sampling/monitoring points. The state and county plans contain official maps and information on the locations of off-site centers. b. The population distribution around the station. Population distribution for the plume exposure EPZ is illustrated in the Station Annex. c. As indicated in Section E, offsite agencies are notified in the event the E-Plan is activated. State and county agencies have the capability to notify all members of the transient and resident population within the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. d-1. NUREG-0654 11.J.1 O.d-1 items are addressed separately in state and county emergency plans. November 2016 J-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear m. At a General Emergency classification, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station will provide the state with recommendations for protective actions for the public. For incidents involving actual, potential, or imminent releases of radioactive material to the atmosphere, EPA 400-R-92-001, the NRC Response Technical Manual (RTM-96) and NUREG-0654, Supp. 3, Revision 1 are used as the basis for the general public PARs. 1) Plant Based PARs Station specific PAR Flowcharts have been developed to aid Exelon Nuclear personnel providing PARs based on the above. Station specific PAR Flowcharts with Subarea or Sector tables are documented in the Exelon EP Implementing Procedures, including station-specific requirements regarding PAR determination. These flowcharts and tables provide technically based Protective Action Recommendations based on plant conditions and core damage indicators as applicable to the Exelon site and described within the implementing procedures. Possible plant based PARs issued by Exelon Nuclear, in support of NUREG-0654 Supp. 3, at a General Emergency could include as appropriate for the Station:
- Response to a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident.
- Utilization of the staged evacuation concept as determined by station ETE's .
- Shelter of the general public in response to but not limited to; a controlled containment vent lasting less than 1 hour in duration less than PAGs, impediments to evacuation, or Hostile Action event.
- Evacuation of the general public. In addition to the above actions to minimize or prevent potential exposure to radiation, a recommendation of "monitor and prepare" will be issued for the remainder of the EPZ. 2) Dose Based PARs Evacuation is recommended if projected doses reach the minimum EPA PAGs 1 Rem EPA TEDE1 or 5 Rem COE Thyroid) . 1 EPA TEDE is defined as the sum of the doses from external exposure and inhalation from the plume, and from 4 days of external exposure to deposited materials. November 2016 J-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Many assumptions exist in dose assessment calculations, involving both source term and meteorological factors, which make computer predictions over long distances highly questionable. However, in the event dose assessment results indicate the need to recommend actions beyond the outer EPZ boundaries, which is past 10 miles, Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched to downwind areas to verify the calculated exposure rates prior to issuing PARs outside the EPZ. Exelon personnel normally do not have the necessary information to determine whether off site conditions would require sheltering instead of evacuation. External factors (such as road conditions, traffic/traffic control, weather, or offsite emergency response capabilities) are determined by the state. 11. Ingestion Pathway Protective Measures The responsibility for specifying protective measures to be used for the ingestion pathway rests with the state. These measures include the methods for protecting the public from consumption of contaminated water and foodstuffs. 12. Monitoring of Evacuees The state and county organizations have the capability to register and monitor evacuees at designated reception centers. This capability includes personnel and equipment capable of monitoring residents and transients evacuating from the plume exposure EPZ and arriving at the reception centers, in accordance with FEMA guidelines . November 2016 J-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section K: Radiological Exposure Control This section of the plan describes the means for controlling emergency worker radiological exposures during an emergency, as well as the measures that are used by Exelon to provide necessary assistance to persons injured or exposed to radiation and/or radioactive materials. Exposure guidelines in this section are consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides described in EPA 400-R-92-001. 1. Emergency Exposure Guidelines Being licensed by the NRC, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains personnel exposure control programs in accordance with 1 O CFR 20 under normal operating conditions. The Station Emergency Director is assigned the non-delegable responsibility for authorizing personnel exposure levels under emergency conditions per EPA-400. In emergency situations, workers may receive exposure under a variety of circumstances in order to assure safety and protection of others and of valuable property. These exposures will be justified if the maximum risks or costs to others that are avoided by their actions outweigh the risks to which the workers are subjected. The Emergency Worker Dose Limits are as follows: Dose Limit Activity *Condition (Rem TEDE) 0-5 All Personnel should be kept within normal 10 CFR 20 limits during bona fide emergencies, except as authorized for activities as indicated below. 5-10 Protecting valuable Lower dose not practicable. property 10-25 Lifesaving or protection of Lower dose not practicable. large population!? > 25 Lifesaving or protection of Only on a voluntary basis to persons fully large populations aware of the risks involved. Limit dose to the lens of the eye to 3 times the above va!ues and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) to 10 times the above values. Whenever possible, the concurrence of the Station's Radiation Protection (Department) Manager should be secured before exposing individuals to dose equivalents beyond the EPA-400 lower limit. November 2016 K-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 2. Emergency Radiation Protection Program The TSC Radiation Protection Manager is the individual responsible for the implementation of the radiation protection actions during an emergency. Radiation protection guidelines include the following: -* Volunteers over forty-five years of age are considered first for any emergency response action requiring exposure greater than normal limits. Routine dose limits shall not be extended to emergency* dose limits for declared pregnant individuals. As in the case of normal occupational exposure, doses received under emergency conditions should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable.
- Persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 Rem TEDE should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects.
- In the context of the emergency limits, exposure of workers that is incurred for the protection of large populations may be considered justified for situations in which the collective dose avoided by the emergency operation is significantly larger than that incurred by the workers involved.
- Exposure accountability is maintained and proper personnel radiological
- monitoring equipment is provided for all personnel during emergency conditions.
- Access to high radiation areas is only permitted with prior approval of the applicable Radiation Protection Manager. Personnel are not allowed to enter known or potential high radiation areas unless their exposure has been properly evaluated.
- Periodic habitability surveys of emergency facilities are performed during an emergency. If the facility is determined to be uninhabitable, the facility is evacuated in order to prevent or minimize exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Alternate assembly areas are established, as necessary, to relocate and monitor evacuated personnel. 3. Personnel Monitoring a. Emergency workers will receive DLR badges and personal* self-reading dosimeters capable of measuring expected exposures on a real time basis. The capability exists for the emergency processing of DLRs on a 24-hour per day basis, if necessary. b. Emergency worker dose records are maintained by the Radiation Protection Managers (as appropriate) in accordance with the emergency and radiological protection procedures. Emergency workers are instructed to read their
- dosimeters frequently. DLRs may be processed with increased periodicity. November 2016 K-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision O)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria *Exelon Nuclear 4. Non-Exelon Personnel Exposure Authorization The responsibility for authorizing non-Exelon emergency workers (i.e. state and local agency emergency workers) to receive exposures in excess of the EPA General Public Protective Action Guides rests with the state and county organizations, except when such emergency workers are onsite. Authorization of exposures in excess of EPA General Public Protective Action Guides, in this latter instance, rests with the Station Emergency Director. 5. Contamination and Decontamination During an emergency, the Station Emergency Director is responsible for preventing or minimizing personnel exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other surfaces. Special consideration should be given to setting up contamination control arrangements for personnel entering the OSC after completion of assigned activities. a. During emergency conditions, normal plant contamination control criteria will be adhered to as much as possible. However, these limits may be modified by the applicable Radiation Protection Manager per existing Radiation Protection procedures, should conditions warrant. b. Contamination Control Means: Personnel found to be contaminated will normally be attended to at decontamination areas located onsite. Temporary decontamination areas can also be set up inside at various locations . Decontamination showers and supplies are provided onsite with additional personnel decontamination equipment and capabilities. Shower and sink drains in the controlled area are routed to the miscellaneous waste processing system where the liquid is processed and monitored prior to discharge. Potentially contaminated emergency vehicles will be surveyed before they are allowed to leave the plant or offsite assembly area. If the survey area is not suitable for monitoring and decontamination due to radiological or other concerns, vehicles will be surveyed at an alternate location. 6. Contamination Control Measures Controls are established 24 hours per day to contain the spread of loose surface radioactive contamination . November 2016 K-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear a. Contaminated areas are isolated as restricted areas with appropriate radiological protection and access control. Personnel leaving contaminated areas are monitored to ensure they and their clothing are not contaminated. If contamination above acceptable levels is found, they will be decontaminated in accordance with plant procedures. If normal decontamination procedures do not reduce personnel contamination to acceptable levels, the case will be referred to a competent medical authority. Supplies, instruments, and equipment that are in contaminated areas or have been brought into contaminated areas will be monitored prior to removal. If found to be contaminated, they will be decontaminated using normal plant decontamination techniques and facilities or
- may be disposed of as radwaste. Contaminated vehicles will be decontaminated before being released. b. Measures will be taken to control onsite access to potentially contaminated potable water and food supplies. Under emergency conditions when uncontrolled releases of activity have occurred, eating, drinking, smoking, and chewing are prohibited in all station emergency response facilities until such time as habitability surveys indicate that such activities are permissible. c. Restricted areas and contaminated items will be returned to normal use when contamination levels have been returned to acceptable levels. Contamination control criteria for returning areas arid items to normal use are contained in the plant procedures.
- 7. Decontamination of Relocated Personnel
- Nonessential onsite personnel may be evacuated to an offsite relocation center or assembly area, as discussed in Section J. Radiological controls personnel at that location monitor evacuees and determine the need for decontamination. Existing and temporary facilities to limit contamination and exposure will be utilized and established at the site as necessary during an emergency situation. In the event that decontamination of. evacuees locally is not possible, personnel will be sent to designated locations for monitoring and decontamination. Provisions for extra clothing are made and suitable decontamin.ates are available for the expected type of contaminations, particularly with regards to skin contaminations . November 2016 K-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section L: Medical and Public Health Support This section describes the arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals sent from the station. 1. Offsite Hospital and Medical Services Hospital personnel have been trained and hospitals are equipped to handle contaminated or radiation injured individuals. Specifically, training of medical support personnel at the agreement hospitals will include basic training on the nature of radiological emergencies, diagnosis and treatment, and follow-up medical care. Station personnel are available to assist medical personnel with decontamination radiation exposure and contamination control. Arrangements, by letter of agreement or contract, are maintained by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station with a qualified hospital located in the vicinity for receiving and treating contaminated or exposed persons with injuries requiring immediate hospital care. Exelon Nuclear shall provide medical consultants to aid in any special care necessary at these facilities. Arrangements are also maintained by the corporate office with a qualified medical facility well equipped and staffed for' dealing with persons having radiation injuries and whenever necessary, such persons will be transferred to this hospital facility for extended specialized treatment. Exelon Nuclear will have available to the staff of this hospital, medical consultants who will provide the direction of the special care necessary for the treatment of persons having radiation injuries . These agreements are verified annually. Refer to section 11.P.4 for details. 2. Onsite First Aid Capability Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station maintains onsite first aid supplies and equipment necessary for the treatment of contaminated or injured persons. In general, physicians or nurses are not staffed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, and as such, medical treatment given to injured persons is of a "first aid" nature. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station has an industrial hygiene advisor. Additionally, the Radiation Protection Technicians at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station are experienced in control of radioactive contamination and decontamination work. Station personnel are also trained and qualified to administer first aid. At least two of these individuals are available on shift at all times. The functions of station personnel in handling onsite injured people are: 1) Afford rescue; 2) Administer first aid including such resuscitative measures as are deemed necessary; 3) Begin decontamination procedures; and 4) Arrange for suitable transportation to a hospital when required . November 2016 L-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Primary attention shall be directed to the actual factors involved in the treatment of casualties, such as: control of bleeding, resuscitation including heart and lung, control of bleeding after resuscitation, protection of wounds from bacterial or radioactive contamination and the immobilization of fractures. Station personnel provide an initial estimate of the magnitude of surface contamination of the injured and preliminary estimates of total body dose to the injured. Primary rapid and simple decontamination of the surface of the body (when possible and advisable) before transportation to a designated hospital may be carry out as directed or performed by Radiation Protection personnel. When more professional care is needed, injured persons are transported to a local clinic or hospital. Contaminated and injured persons are transported to a dedicated specified facility. 3. Medical Service Facilities Because of the specialized nature of the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injuries, Corporate Emergency Preparedness maintains an agreement with REAC/TS. REAC/TS is a radiological emergency response team of physicians, nurses, health physicists and necessary support personnel on 24-hour call to provide consultative or direct medical or radiological assistance at the REAC/TS facility or at the accident site. Specifically, the team has expertise in and is equipped to conduct: medical and radiological triage; decontamination procedures and therapies for external contamination and internally deposited radionuclides, including chelation therapy; diagnostic and prognostic assessments or induced injuries; and radiation dose estimates by methods that include cytogenetic analysis, bioassay, and in vivo counting. In addition to REAC/TS, the Station Annex may identify additional medical consultants, based on agreements with local hospitals, to support personnel training and medical response. 4. Medical Transportation Arrangements are made for prompt ambulance transport of persons with injuries involving radioactivity to designated hospitals. Such service is available on a 24-hour per day basis and is confirmed by letter of agreement. Radiation monitoring services shall be provided by Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station whenever it becomes necessary to use the ambulance service for the transportation of contaminated persons. A qualified Radiation Protection person shall accompany the ambulance to the hospital. Additional Radiation Protection personnel may be contacted and dispatched to local hospitals to assist in the monitoring and decontamination of the injured victim and hospital and ambulance facilities and personnel. November 2016 L-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section M: Reentry and Recovery Planning This section describes the measures to be taken for reentry into the areas of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station which have been evacuated as a result of an accident. It also outlines the Exelon Nuclear Recovery Organization and its concepts of operation. 1. Reentry and Recovery a. Evaluating Reentry Conditions During an emergency, immediate actions are directed toward limiting the consequences of the accident to afford maximum protection to station personnel and the general public. Once corrective measures have been taken and effective control of the plant has been re-established, a more methodical approach to reentry is taken. This E-Plan divides reentry into two separate categories:
- Reentry during the emergency phase of an accident is performed to save a life, control a release of radioactive material, prevent further damage to plant equipment or restore plant equipment. If necessary, this category of reentry may be performed using emergency exposure limits. Briefings, rather than written radiation protection procedures, may be used when making these entries. All reentry activities conducted during the emergency are authorized by the Station Emergency Director and coordinated by the OSC Director and the Radiation Protection Manager.
- Reentry during the recovery phase of an accident is performed using normal exposure limits. Either normal procedures or procedures that consider existing as well as potential conditions inside affected areas are developed specifically for each reentry. Reentry activities during the recovery phase are authorized by the Recovery Director and coordinated by the recovery organization managers in charge of personnel making the reentry. The following items are considered when planning for any reentry:
- Review of available radiation surveillance data to determine plant areas potentially affected by radiation and/or contamination.
- Review of radiation exposure history of personnel required to participate in the accident mitigation or recovery operations.
- Determination of the need for additional personnel and the sources of these additional personnel.
- Review of adequacy of radiation survey instrumentation and equipment (types, ranges number, calibration, etc.). November 2016 M-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Review of non-radiological hazards and required protective measures (e.g., fire, electrical, Hazmat).
- Pre-planning of activities and briefings for the reentry team that include the following: -Personnel knowledge requirements. -Methods and procedures that will be employed during the entry. -Specific tasks to be performed. -Anticipated radiation and contamination levels. -Radiation survey equipment and types and ranges of dosimetry required. -Shielding requirements and availability. -Appropriate communications. -Protective clo'thing and equipment requirements. -Access control procedures . -Decontamination requirements. -De-briefing requirements. Respiratory protection.
- A review of security controls to prevent unauthorized or unintentional entry into hazardous areas. b. Evaluating Entry into Recovery The Recovery Phase is that period when major repairs are being performed to return the plant to an acceptable condition and the possibility of the emergency condition degrading no longer exists. Once the plant has been stabilized, contained and controlled, the Recovery Phase may be entered. It is the responsibility of the Station Emergency Director to classify Recovery after obtaining authorization from the Corporate Emergency Director . November 2016 M-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Establishment of Recovery can be conducted from any emergency classification level. However, it is possible that the lower classifications of Unusual Event and Alert will conclude with the event being terminated. There may be cases where certain EAL initiating conditions remain exceeded, but the station is under control and no further danger of degradation exists. In such a case, it may be appropriate to enter Recovery. Site Area and General Emergencies will require a Recovery Phase to be established prior to event termination. Exelon Nuclear may consult with/notify cognizant governmental agencies prior to declaring Recovery or event termination. Termination/Recovery considerations are contained in the implementing procedures to provide guidance for evaluating the risk of entering RecoverY without alleviating the intent of the Initiating Condition. The purpose of Recovery is to provide the necessary personnel to handle the long-term activities and to return the plant to an acceptable condition. The following conditions are guidelines for the determination of establishing Recovery (this is not intended to be a complete list and additional criteria may apply, depending on the specifics of the event):
- The risk to the health and safety of the public has been mitigated.
- Plant parameters and equipment status have been established and controlled .
- In-plant radiation levels are stable or decreasing, and acceptable, given the plant conditions.
- The potential for uncontrolled releases of radioactive material to the environment has been eliminated.
- Environmental monitoring has been established.
- The radioactive plume has dissipated and plume tracking is no longer required (the only environmental assessment activities in progress are those necessary to assess the extent of deposition resulting from passage of the plume).
- Exelon Nuclear workers have been protected.
- Any security threat has been neutralized, and/or plant security is under the direction of Exelon Nuclear personnel.
- Adequate plant safety systems are operable.
- The reactor is in a stable shutdown condition and long-term core cooling is available November 20.16 M-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- The fuel pool damage has been mitigated, or spent fuel damage has been contained and controlled.
- Primary and/or secondary containment integrity has been established.
- Plant systems and equipment are restored and/or replaced such that plant conditions are stable highly unlikely to degrade further.
- Conditions that initiated the emergency have been contained, controlled, eliminated or stabilized such that the classification is no longer applicable.
- The operability and integrity of radioactive waste systems, decontamination facilities, power supplies, electrical equipment and of plant instrumentation including radiation monitoring equipment.
- Any fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition or threat to security no longer exists.
- All required notifications have been made.
- Discussions have been held with federal, state and county agencies and agreement has been reached to terminate the emergency.
- At an Alert or higher classification, the ERO is in place and emergency facilities are activated.
- Any contaminated injured person has been treated and/or transported to a medical care facility.
- Offsite conditions do not unreasonably limit access of outside support to the station and qualified personnel and support services are available. It is not necessary that all conditions listed above be met; however, all items must be considered prior to entering the recovery phase. For example, it is possible after a severe accident that some conditions remain that exceed an Emergency Action Level, but entry into the Recovery Phase is appropriate. 2. Recovery Organization Once plant conditions have been stabilized and the Recovery Phase has been initiated, the Emergency Director may form a Recovery Organization for long-term operations. These types of alterations will be discussed with the NRC prior to implementation.
- For events of a minor nature, (i.e. for Unusual Event classifications) the normal on shift organization is normally adequate to perform necessary recovery actions . November 2016 M-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- For events where damage to the plant has been significant, but no offsite releases have occurred and/or protective actions were not performed, (i.e. for Alert classifications) the station Emergency Response Organization, or portions thereof, should be adequate to perform the recovery tasks prior to returning to the normal station organization.
- For events involving major damage to systems required to maintain safe shutdown of the plant and offsite radioactive releases have occurred, (i.e. for Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classifications) the station recovery organization is put in place. The specific members of the station recovery organization are selected based on the sequence of events that preceded the recovery activities as well as the requirements of the recovery phase. The basic framework of the station recovery organization is as follows: a. The Recovery Director: The Corporate Emergency Director is initially designated as the Recovery Director. The Recovery Director is charged with the responsibility for directing the activities of the station recovery organization. These responsibilities include:
- Ensuring that sufficient personnel, equipment, or other resources from Exelon and other organizations are available to support recovery .
- Directing the development of a recovery plan and procedures.
- Deactivating any of the plant Emergency Response Organization which was retained to aid in recovery, in the appropriate manner. Depending upon the type of accident and the onsite and offsite affects of the accident, portions of the ERO may remain in place after initiation of the recovery phase.
- Coordinating the integration of available federal and state assistance into onsite recovery activities.
- Coordinating the integration of Exelon support with federal, state and county authorities into required offsite recovery activities.
- Approving information released by the public information organization which pertains to the emergency or the recovery phase of the accident.
- Determining when the recovery phase is terminated. b. The Recovery Plant Manager: The Station Manager or a designated alternate will become the Recovery Plant Manager. The Recovery Plant Manager reports to the Recovery Director and is responsible for:
- Coordinating the development and implementation of the recovery plan and procedures. November 2016 M-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Ensuring that adequate engineering activities to restore the plant are properly reviewed and approved.
- Directing all onsite activities in support ofthe station recovery effort.
- Designating other Exelon recovery positions required in support of onsite recovery activities. c. The Recovery Offsite Manager: A senior Corporate Emergency Preparedness or Regulatory Affairs individual, or a designated alternate, is the Recovery Offsite Manager. The Recovery Offsite Manager reports to the Recovery Director and is responsible for:
- Providing liaison with offsite agencies and coordinating Exelon assistance for offsite recovery activities. *
- Coordinating Exelon ingestion exposure pathway EPZ sampling activities and the development of an offsite accident analysis report.
- Developing a radiological release report.
- Designating other Exelon recovery positions required in support of offsite recovery activities . d. The Company Spokesperson: A senior Exelon management individual is designated as the Company Spokesperson .. The Company Spokesperson reports to the Recovery Director and is responsible for:
- Functioning as the official spokesperson to the press for Exelon on all matters relating to the accident or recovery.
- Coordinating non-Exelon public information groups (federal, state, county, etc.).
- Coordinating media monitoring and rumor control.
- Determining what public information portions of the ERO will remain activated. The remainder of the recovery organization is established and an initial recovery plan developed at the end of the emergency phase or just after entry into the recovery phase. Consideration is given to recovery activity needs and use of the normal station organizations. Individual recovery supervisors may be designated in any or all of the following areas:
- Training *
- Radiation Protection
- Chemistry November 2016 M-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning *standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Technical/Engineering Support
- Nuclear Oversight
- Operations
- Security
- Maintenance
- Special Offsite Areas (Community Representatives, Environmental Samples, Investigations, etc.) 3. Recovery Phase Notifications When the decision is made to enter the recovery phase, all members of the Exelon ERO are informed of the change. All Exelon personnel are instructed of the Recovery Organization and their responsibilities to the recovery effort. 4. Total Population Exposure Total population exposure calculations are performed and periodically updated during the recovery phase of an accident. A method has been developed for estimating the total population exposure resulting from the accident from data collected in cooperation with the state and other federal agencies. Total population exposure is determined through a variety of procedures including: *
- Examination of pre-positioned dosimeters.
- Bioassay. *
- Estimates based on release rates and meteorology.
- Estimates based on environmental monitoring of food, water, and ambient dose rates. The state will be the lead agency in the collection and analysis of environmental air, soil, foliage, food, and water samples and for the generation of radiation monitoring reports. Exelon Nuclear environmental sampling activities will be coordinated with state efforts, as requested, and results shared with cognizant agencies . November 2016 M-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section N: Drill and Exercise Program This section describes the Drill and Exercise Program that Exelon Nuclear has implemented to:
- Verify the adequacy of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
- Develop, maintain, and evaluate the capabilities of the ERO to respond to emergency conditions and safeguard the health and safety of station personnel and the general public.
- Identify deficiencies in the E-Plan and the associated procedures, or in the training of response personnel, and ensure that they are promptly corrected.
- Ensure the continued adequacy of emergency facilities, supplies and equipment, including communications networks. The Exercise Cycle is defined as an eight year period of time. During each eight calendar year exercise cycle, the site shall vary the content of scenarios during exercises to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following scenario elements:
- hostile action directed at the plant site, *
- no radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release that does not require public protective actions, *
- an initial classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency,
- implementation of strategies, procedures, and guidance developed under § 50.54(hh)(2), and integration of offsite resources with onsite response. Exelon uses drill and exercise scenarios that provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses do not result from preconditioning of participants. Such scenarios include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action November 2016 N-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) J PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 1. Exercises
- a. Biennial Exercises *
- Federally prescribed exercises are conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station in order to test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods; to test emergency equipment and communication networks; and to ensure that emergency personnel are familiar with their duties. Exercises involving offsite agency participation, required under Section F.2.c & d to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, are conducted based on FEMA REP Manual guidance and the respective state and local emergency response plans. Partial participation means appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in the exercise sufficient to test direction and control functions to include protective action decision making related to Emergency Action Levels and communication capabilities among affected state and local authorities and Exelon Nuclear. Full participation exercises will include appropriate offsite local and state authorities and Exelon personnel physically and actively taking part in testing the integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at the plant. Additionally, full participation exercises will includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of state, local, and Exelon personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario . Where partial or full participation by offsite agencies occurs, the sequence of events simulates an emergency that results in the release of radioactivity to the offsite environs, sufficient in magnitude to warrant a response by offsite authorities. b. Off-Year Exercises An Off-Year Exercise is conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station during the calendar year when an NRG Evaluated Exercise is not scheduled. An Year Exercise shall involve a combination of at least two facilities in order to demonstrate at least two of the functions of management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision-making, or plant system repair and corrective actions. For Off-Year Exercises involving no or limited participation by offsite agencies, emphasis is placed on development and conduct of an exercise that is more mechanistically and operationally realistic. Players will be able, by implementing appropriate procedures and corrective actions, to determine the outcome of the scenario to a greater extent than when core damage and the release of radioactivity are prerequisites for demonstration of all objectives . November 2016 N-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear c. Pre-Exercises Pre-Exercise Drills should be conducted prior to a Biennial Exercise where Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluation of state and local performance is expected. Pre-Exercise Drills may be conducted prior to Off-Year Exercises that only involve the utility. The Pre-Exercise is a training and experience tool for the participants to sharpen awareness a:nd practice skills necessary to accomplish specific E-Plan duties and responsibilities. Exercises provide an opportunity to evaluate the ability of participating organizations to implement a coordinated response to postulated emergency conditions. Exercises are conducted to ensure that all major elements of the E-Plan and preparedness program are demonstrated at least once in each exercise cycle. Each station shall conduct at least one off-hours exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. every exercise cycle. Weekends and holidays are also considered off-hours periods. Provisions will be made for qualified personnel from Exelon, federal, state, or local governments to observe and critique each exercise as appropriate. 2. Drills In addition to the exercises described above, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station conducts drills for the purpose of testing, developing, and maintaining the proficiency of emergency responders. Drills are scheduled on the Emergency Preparedness annual events plan, which contains provisions for the following drills: a. Communication Drills
- Monthly -The capability of the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) to notify the state and local government warning points and EOCs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ are demonstrated. Also, the capability to notify the NRC is demonstrated using the Emergency Notification System (ENS) and the Health Physics Network (HPN) where available.
- Quarterly -The capability to notify the NRC Region, FEMA Region, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and federal emergency response organizations as listed in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory are demonstrated from the EOF. Also, computer and critical communications equipment shall be functionally tested. Communications between states outside the 10 mile EPZ but within the 50-mile EPZ are tested by the host state.
- Annually -The emergency communications systems outlined in Section F are fully tested. This includes (1) communications between the plant and the state and local EOCs and Field Monitoring Teams, and (2) communications between the CR, the_TSC, and the EOF . Each of these drills includes provisions to ensure that all participants in the test are able to understand the content of the messages. November 2016 N-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear b. Fire Drills: Fire drills shall be conducted at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station in
- accordance with Station Technical Specifications and/or Station procedures. *
- c. Medical Emergency Drills: A medical eme_rgency drill, involving a simulated contaminated individual, and containing provisions for participation by local support services organizations (i.e., ambulance and support hospital) are conducted annually. The offsite portions of the medical drill may be performed as part of the required biennial exercise. d. Radiological Monitoring Drills: Plant environs and radiological monitoring drills (onsite and offsite) are conducted annually. These drills include collection and analysis of all sample media (such as, water, vegetation, soil, and air), and provisions for communications and record keeping. e. Health Physics Drills: Health Physics Drills involving a response to, and analysis of, simulated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements within the plant are conducted semi-annually. At least annually, these drills shall include a demonstration of the sampling system capabilities, or the Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) objectives as applicable. f. Augmentation Drills: Augmentation drills serve to demonstrate the capability of the process to augment the on-shift staff with a TSC, OSC and EOF in a short period after declaration of an emergency. These drills are conducted using the following methods:
- Quarterly, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station will initiate an unannounced off-hours ERO augmentation drill where no actual travel is required. The Midwest region's Corporate ERO shall also perform an unannounced hours ERO augmentation drill that may be conducted independent of, or in conjunction with, a station drill.
- At least once per exercise cycle, an off-hours unannounced activation of the ERO Notification System with actual response to the emergency facilities is conducted by the station. The Midwest region's Corporate ERO need only participate once per cycle. g. Accountability Drills: Accountability drills are conducted annually. The drill includes identifying the locations of all individuals within the protected area . November 2016 N-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon-Nuclear 3. Conduct of Drills and Exercises Advance knowledge of the scenario will be kept to a minimum to allow "free-play" decision making and to ensure a realistic participation by those involved. Prior to the drill or exercise, a package will be distributed to the controllers and evaluators that will include the scenario, a list of performance objectives, and a description of the expected responses. For each emergency preparedness exercise or drill conducted, a scenario package is developed that includes at least the following: a. The basic objective(s) of the drill or exercise and the appropriate evaluation criteria. b. The date(s), time period, place(s), and participating organizations. c. The simulated events. d. A time schedule of real and simulated initiating events. e. A narrative summary describing the conduct of the scenario to include such things as simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities . f. A description of the arrangements for and advance materials to be provided to official observers. Prior approval by the appropriate station management is obtained for all drills and exercises conducted in support of the Emergency Preparedness Program. 4. Critique and Evaluation Drill and exercise performance objectives are evaluated against measurable demonstration criteria. As soon as possible following the conclusion of each drill or exercise, a critique is conducted to evaluate the ability of the ERO to implement the E-Plan and procedures. A formal written critique report is prepared by Emergency Preparedness following a drill or exercise involving the evaluation of designated objectives or following the final simulator set with ERO participation. The report will evaluate the ability of the ERO to respond to a simulated emergency situation. The report will also contain corrective actions and recommendations. Biennially, representatives from the NRC observe and evaluate the licensee's ability to conduct an adequate self-critical critique. For partial and full offsite participation exercises both the NRC and FEMA will observe, evaluate, and critique . Critique comments identified by participants during a training drill where objectives are not formally being evaluated will be reviewed and dispositioned by Emergency Preparedness, but do not require a formal report. November 2016 N-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 5. Resolution of Drill and Exercise Findings The critique and evaluation process is used to identify areas of the Emergency Preparedness Program that require improvement. The Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for evaluation of recommendations and comments to determine which items will be incorporated into the program or require corrective actions, and for the scheduling, tracking, and evaluation of the resolution to the items. Whenever exercises and/or drills indicate deficiencies in the E-Plan or corresponding implementing procedures, such documents will be revised as necessary. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during the Biennial Exercise, such that NRC, in consultations with FEMA, cannot find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises . November 2016 N-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section 0: Emergency Response Training This section describes the emergency response training that is provided to those who may be called upon in an emergency. It outlines the training provided by Exelon Nuclear to both its employees and offsite support personnel requiring site access. 1. Assurance of Training The E-Plan Training Program assures the training, qualification, and requalification of individuals who may be called on for assistance during an emergency. Specific emergency response task training, prepared for each E-Plan position, is described in lesson plans and study guides. The lesson plans, study guides, and written tests are contained in the ERO Training Program. Responsibilities for implementing the training program are contained in plant procedures, A description of the content of the training courses is given in TQ-AA-113. Exelon personnel who are assigned an E-Plan position will receive retraining per TQ-AA-113 at a frequency of once per calendar year not to exceed 18 months between training sessions. Offsite training is provided to support organizations that may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency. The following outlines the training received by these organizations: a. Emergency Preparedness shall annually train, or document an annual written offer to train, those non-Exelon Nuclear organizations referenced in the Station Annex that may provide specialized services during a nuclear plant emergency (e.g., local law enforcement, fire-fighting, medical services, transport of injured, etc.). The training made available is designed to acquaint the participants with the special problems potentially encountered during a nuclear plant emergency, notification procedures and their expected roles. Those organizations that must enter the site shall also receive site-specific emergency response training and be instructed as to the identity (by position and title) of those persons in the onsite organization who will control their support activities. b. Training of offsite emergency response organizations is described in their respective radiological emergency plans, with support provided by Exelon *Nuclear as requested. 2. Functional Training of the ERO In addition to general and specialized classroom training, members of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ERO receive periodic performance based emergency response training. Performance based training is provided using one or more of the following methods:
- Familiarization Sessions: A familiarization session is an informal, organized tabletop discussion of predetermined objectives . November 2016 0-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Walk Throughs: Consists of a facility walk through to familiarize plant ERO personnel with procedures, communications equipment, and facility layout. Walk throughs also provide the opportunity to discuss facility activities, responsibilities and procedures with an instructor.
- Drills: A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. Drills described in Section N of this plan are a part of training. These drills allow each individual the opportunity to demonstrate the ability to perform their assigned emergency functions. During drills, on-the-spot correction of erroneous performance may be made and a demonstration of the proper performance offered by the Controller. 3. First Aid Response Selected station personnel are trained in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear approved First Aid Program. First-Aid Teams will likely be augmented with additional personnel such as Fire Brigade Members and other personnel qualified to assist in the rescue. 4. Emergency Response Organization Training Program Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ERO personnel who are responsible for implementing this plan receive specialized training. The training program for emergency response personnel is developed based on the requirements of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E and position specific responsibilities as defined in this document. On-Shift emergency response personnel perform emergency response activities as an extension of their normal duties and are trained annually as part of their duty specific training. Additional Emergency Preparedness information is provided as part of the Station Nuclear General Employee Training. New ERO personnel receive an initial overview course that familiarizes them with the E-Plan by providing basic information in the following areas as well as specific information as delineated in the sections below:
- Planning Basis
- Emergency Classifications
- Emergency Response Organization and Responsibilities
- Call-out of Emergency Organization
- Emergency Response Facilities
- Communications Protocol/Emergency Public Information
- Offsite Organizations November 2016 0-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Emergency response personnel in the following categories receive knowledge and/or performance based training initially and retraining thereafter once per calendar year not to exceed 18 months between training sessions. a. Directors, Managers and Coordinators within the station and corporate ERO: Personnel identified by the Emergency Response Organization Telephone Directory as Directors, Managers and Coordinators for the station and corporate EROs receive training appropriate to their position in accordance with the approved ERO Training Program. These personnel receive specialized training in the areas of:
- Notifications
- Emergenc;y Classifications
- Protective Action Recommendations
- Emergency Action Levels
- Emergency Exposure Control Selected Directors, Managers, Coordinators and Shift Emergency Directors receive training in accordance with the approved ERO Training Program. Training in accident assessment sufficient to classify an event and to mitigate the consequences of an event are also covered . b. Personnel Responsible for Accident Assessment: The skills and knowledge required to perform plant stabilization and mitigation are a normal function of operations specific positions, as identified in Section B of this plan. Power changes and planned and unplanned reactor shutdowns are handled on a normal operation basis. Subsequent plant stabilization and restoration is pursued utilizing normal operating procedures. Licensed Operators receive routine classroom and simulator training to ensure proficiency in this area. 1) Active Senior Licensed Control Room Personnel shall have training conducted in accordance with the approved ERO Training Program such that proficiency is maintained on the topics listed below. These subjects shall be covered as a minimum on an annual basis.
- Event Classification.
- Protective Action Recommendations.
- Radioactive Release Rate Determination.
- Notification form completion and use of the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS).
- Federal, state and local notification procedures as appropriate. November 2016 0-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) I __J
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Site specific procedures for activating the onsite and offsite ERO . To remove peripheral duties from the Operations shift, the following group of positions responsible for accident assessment, corrective actions, protective actions, and related activiti,es receive the training listed below: 2) Core Damage Assessment Personnel: During an emergency when core/cladding damage is suspected, a specialized group of trained individuals perform core damage assessment. At a minimum, personnel responsible for core damage assessment receive classroom and hands-on training in the following areas:
- Available Instrumentation and Equipment
- Isotopic Assessment and Interpretation
- Computerized Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM) and/or proceduralized assessment methods. c. Radiological Monitoring Teams and Radiological Analysis Personnel 1) Offsite Radiological Monitoring: Offsite radiological monitoring is performed by trained individuals who provide samples and direct readings for dose assessment calculations and dose projection comparisons . Personnel identified as members of Field Monitoring Teams receive training in accordance with the approved training program. Field Monitoring Team members receive classroom and hands-on training in the following areas:
- Equipment and Equipment Checks
- Communications
- Plume Tracking Techniques 2) Personnel Monitoring: Personnel monitoring is performed by trained individuals who monitor station personnel and their vehicles for contamination during an emergency. Personnel Monitoring Team members receive classroom and hands-on training in the following areas:
- Personnel Monitoring Equipment and Techniques
- Decontamination Techniques for Personnel
- Decontamination Techniques for Vehicles November 2016 0-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- .,
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear 3) Dose Assessment: Dose Assessment training includes the skills and knowledge necessary for calculation and interpretation of an offsite release and its impact on the environment under varying meteorological conditions. Individuals responsible for performing dose assessment are trained in the following areas:
- Computerized Dose Assessment
- Protective Action Recommendations
- Field Monitoring Team Interface
- Protective Action Guidelines associated with offsite plume exposure doses
- Basic Meteorology d. Police, Security, and Fire Fighting Personnel 1) Local Police and Fire Fighting Personnel: The local Police and Fire Departments are invited to receive training as outlined in Part 1 .a of this section. 2) Security Personnel: Station security personnel are trained in accordance with training defined by the Nuclear General Employee Training (NGET) and Exelon Nuclear Security Program. 3) Fire Control Teams (fire brigades): Station fire brigades are trained in accordance with training defined by the Exelon Nuclear Fire Protection Program. Fire Brigade personnel are considered the primary members of rescue teams and will receive the appropriate EP training as part of their training program. Training also includes rescue of personnel from hazardous environments. e. Repair and Damage Control Teams: Operations, Maintenance and Radiation Protection personnel are trained as part of their normal job specific duties to respond to both normal and abnormal plant operations. Operations personnel are trained to: (1) recognize and to mitigate degrading conditions in the plant, (2) mechanically and electrically isolate damaged or malfunctioning equipment, (3) isolate fluid leaks, and (4) minimize transients. Maintenance personnel are trained to troubleshoot and repair damaged or malfunctioning electrical, mechanical, or instrumentation systems as appropriate to their job classification . November 2016 0-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Radiation Protection personnel are trained to assess the radiological hazards associated with equipment repair and instruct personnel as to the appropriate protective clothing requirements, respiratory protection requirements, stay times, and other protective actions specific to the conditions present. At least 50% of personnel from those departments, who are potential responders to the OSC as Damage Control Team members, are required to be qualified in the use of respiratory protection equipment. This includes in-plant supervision and craft/technicians for the following departments:
- Operations
- Radiation Protection
- Chemistry
- Maintenance (mechanical, electrical and l&C) f. First Aid and Rescue Personnel: First aid and rescue team members receive training as outlined in Part 3 of this section. g. Local Support Service Personnel: Local support service personnel providing assistance during an emergency are invited to receive training as outline in Parts 1.a and 1.b of this section.
- h. Medical Support Personnel: Onsite medical personnel receive specialized training in the handling of contaminated victims and hospital interface. Offsite ambulance and hospital personnel are offered annual training in accordance with a program provided by Emergency Preparedness. i. Public Information Personnel: Corporate and station personnel responsible for disseminating emergency public information and responding to media and public information requests receive specialized public information training. j. Communications Personnel: ERO personnel receive training on communications protocol as a part of the initial Emergency Response Overview Course. Personnel using specialized communications equipment that is not part of their normal daily function receive initial and requalification training on the equipment. Personnel involved in notifications to offsite agencies receive specialized training in the notification process. 5. General, Initial, and Requalification Training Program Maintenance a. Station Departments and Emergency Preparedness share the responsibility for ensuring that the ERO receives all necessary training and retraining. In order to carry this out, responsibilities are assigned as follows: Corporate Responsibilities for Corporate ERO Personnel
- Scheduling and conducting initial, retraining, and make-up classes. November 2016 0-6 EP-QC,-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear *
- Acting as the sole contact point for ensuring attendance . Record keeping for the training courses, including dates of scheduled classes and non-attendance information.
- Verifying that all emergency response personnel training records are current.
- Ensure instructional materials are prepared and reviewed every two years. Station Responsibilities for Station ERO Personnel * *
- Station management shall ensure the attendance of onsite personnel for training, including required E-Plan courses. The Station shall conduct onsite emergency personnel initial and retraining for station Emergency Response Personnel using approved lesson plans. The Station Training Department shall provide those shift personnel included in a continuing, training program an annual review of the following items as a minimum: -Assembly Areas -Emergency Response Facility assignment -Potential Hazards (radiological and non-radiological) -Anticipated actions including assembly requirements, protective equipment requirements (clothing, masks, SCBA, etc.), the use of Kl, emergency exposure limits and accountability requirements. b. Initial and Requalification ERO Training: The proficiency of emergency response personnel (as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E) is ensured by the following means:
- Assigning persons to emergency duties that are similar to thqse performed as a part of their regular work assignment or experience.
- Initial training and annual retraining on applicable generic and site-specific portions of the E-Plan and the corresponding implementing procedures. Individuals not demonstrating the required level of knowledge in initial or retraining classes receive additional training on the areas requiring improvement. Annual retraining is conducted once per calendar year not to exceed 18 months between training sessions.
- Training on E-Plan changes shall be completed within one hundred twenty (120) days of implementation of the change. November 2016 0-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Participation in exercises and/or drills as developed or authorized by the Emergency Preparedness Department and designed to sharpen those skills that they are expected to use in the event of a nuclear emergency. All personnel assigned position specific responsibilities in the ERO are documented by inclusion in the Emergency Response Organization Telephone directory listing of positions and personnel. c. Nuclear General Employee Training (NGET): All personnel with unescorted station access are provided with initial orientation training on the notification and instruction methods used in the event of an emergency. Additionally, all badged individuals also receive initial orientation on the basic principles of radiological safety including the effects of radiation and the theory and use of radiation detection devices. Appropriate actions for escorted individuals shall be the responsibility of the escort. NGET provides initial and annual requalification training on the basic elements of the E-Plan for all personnel working at the plant. Specifically, these elements include:
- Station emergency alarms and their meaning
- Assembly areas
- Site and Exclusion Area Evacuation procedures
- Special precautions and limitations during an emergency
- Purpose of the E-Plan November 2016 0-8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Section P: Responsibility for the Maintenance of the Planning Effort This section describes the responsibilities for development, review and distribution of the E-Plan and actions that must be performed to maintain the emergency preparedness program. It also outlines the criteria for insuring that personnel who perform the planning are properly trained. 1. Emergency Preparedness Staff Training The Emergency Preparedness staff is involved in maintaining an adequate knowledge of state of the art planning techniques and the latest applications of emergency equipment and supplies. At least once each calendar year each member of the Emergency Preparedness staff is involved in one of the following activities:
- Training courses specific or related to emergency preparedness.
- Observation of or participation in drills and/or exercises at other stations.
- Participation in industry review and evaluation programs.
- Participation in regional or national emergency preparedness seminars, committees, workshops or forums.
- Specific training courses in related areas, such as systems, equipment, operations, radiological protection, or Problem Identification & Resolution (Pl&R) . 2. Authority for the Emergency Preparedness Effort The Site Vice President is responsible for the safe and reliable operation of the generating station. The issuance and control of this plan and the activities associated with emergency preparedness at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station shall be the overall responsibility of the Vice President, Fleet Support. This individual is assigned the responsibility for overall implementation of the E-Plan and station Annex. 3. Responsibility for Development and Maintenance of the Plan Each regional Emergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for the overall radiological emergency preparedness program associated with the operation of the nuclear power station and to administer the program to ensure availability of resources in the event of an emergency. The regional Emergency Preparedness Managers report to an EP Director who in turn reports to the Vice President, Fleet Support . November 2016 P-1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- * *-----PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The Emergency Preparedness Manager is assisted by regional corporate and Station Emergency Preparedness staff. Specific responsibilities include the following: Program Administration
- Develop and maintain the E-Plan, Station Annex, implementing procedures and administrative documents.
- Develop and maintain 50.54(q) evaluations for changes to EP documents.
- Coordinate and maintain the EP Activities Schedule.
- Develop and maintain working relationships and coordinate meetings with Federal, state and local agencies.
- Ensure integration of plans between Exelon and offsite agencies.
- Provide an opportunity to discuss Emergency Action Levels and the availability of Nuclear Oversight audit results relating to interface with governmental agencies.
- Coordinate, negotiate and maintain agreements and contracts with offsite agencies and support organizations .
- Obtain Letters of Agreement with medical facilities, and medical consultants specifically skilled in the medical aspects of radiation accidents and other medical consultants as might be necessary for the case of a person involved in a radiation incident.
- Coordinate the development and annual distribution of the station's public information publication.
- Coordinate and administer the Self Evaluation Program to monitor and evaluate the adequacy of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
- Coordinate and support EP Self-Assessments, Audits and Inspections.
- Ensure the documentation and resolution of adverse conditions in the emergency preparedness program discovered through drills, audits, etc. in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear Corrective Action Program.
- Coordinate and develop Operational Experience responses.
- Coordinate, document and review Performance Indicator data and reports.
- Provide oversight of Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) evaluations during License Operator Requalification (LOR) Training. * ----Coordinate and conduct EP Event reviews and reports. November 2016 P-2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Maintain adequate documentation/files to support EP activities .
- Develop and manage the EP budget.
- Maintain the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) Telephone Directory. Drills and Exercises
- Coordinate and maintain the EP Drill and Exercise Schedule.
- Coordinate and conduct exercises and drills.
- Coordinate N RC, FEMA, state, and local exercise scheduling and development activities.
- Coordinate drill and exercise scenario development activities.
- Develop and publish drill and exercise scenario manuals.
- Coordinate and perform controller and evaluator functions for drills and exercises.
- Coordinate response cells for drills and exercises. *
- Develop and issue drill and exercise reports.
- Facilities and Equipment
- Provide maintenance and administration of the Alert and Notification System (ANS).
- Provide maintenance of the ERO call-out system.
- Ensure the Emergency Response Facilities are maintained in a constant state of readiness.
- Coordinate and review the EP equipment inventories.
- Coordinate and conduct maintenance and testing of the communications systems.
- Maintain the EP computer applications. ERO Qualification and Administration
- Develop and maintain ERO Lesson Plans, Examinations, and Qualification Cards .
- Maintain EP NGET training content. November 2016 P-3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- Coordinate, schedule and conduct ERO qualification and requalification training .
- Oversee the maintenance of ERO training records.
- Maintain and coordinate publishing of the ERO Duty Rosters.
- Provide adequate oversight and support for the training of offsite response personnel.
- Coordinate conduct of Emergency Medical Assistance Program training.
- Coordinate annual training for the media. The Plant Manager is responsible for implementation of the E-Plan at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The Plant Manager has the following responsibilities for maintenance of the Emergency Preparedness Program:
- Ensure the adequate staffing and training of station ERO members.
- Schedule and conduct drills and exercises to maintain the state of readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
- Ensure the operational readiness of station facilities and communication systems for use during an emergency .
- Ensure the operational readiness of station emergency equipment and supplies is maintained.
- Ensure the emergency response procedures and the training and retraining of Station Emergency Response personnel are maintained. 4. E-Plan and Agreement Revisions The E-Plan, its' Annex, and supporting Agreements are reviewed on an annual basis. This review may also include applicable state and local emergency response agencies based on established agreements. The annual E-Plan review/update includes required changes identified during audits, assessments, training, drills, and exercises. The Emergency Preparedness Director is responsible for determining which recommended changes are incorporated into a plan or emergency procedure revision. In those years when the review does not warrant a revision, a letter to that affect will be issued. * .* ---** -. *-November 2016 P-4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- * *-----PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear The E-Plan and its Annex shall be revised as needed and the most current approved revisions shall remain in effect so long as they are certified as current. Revisions to the E-Plan are reviewed by the Stations' Plant Operational Review Committee (PORC) prior to approval. Changes to the plan are made without NRC only if such changes do not result in a reduction in effectiveness of the plan per 10 CFR 50.54(q), and the plan as changed continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E. Proposed changes that reduce or have a potential to reduce the effectiveness of the approved plan are not implemented without prior approval by the NRC.
- Proposed revisions to the E-Plan and Station Annex shall be completed in accordance with the Exelon Nuclear review and approval processes.
- E-Plan and Station Annex changes shall be categorized as (1) minor/ administrative or (2) significant programmatic changes. Minor/administrative changes shall be implemented within 30 days of approval. Significant programmatic changes shall be implemented as soon as practical and within 60 days of final approval.
- After review and approval, the E-Plan and Station Annex shall be: a) Reviewed by the Emergency Preparedness Manager and EP Director, or designee(s), and b) Approved for use by the Vice President, Fleet Support or designee.
- The Implementing Procedures shall be developed and revised concurrent with the E-Plan and Annex, and reviewed every two years. Annually, each Letter of Agreement is reviewed and certified current in order to assure the availability of assistance from each supporting organization not already a party to the individual State Plan for Radiological Accidents. 5. E-Plan Distribution E-Plan manuals, the Station Annex and implementing procedures are distributed on a controlled basis to the Emergency Response Facilities. All controlled documents holders are issued revision changes upon approval. Selected Federal, state, and local agencies, and other appropriate locations requiring them are also issued copies. Procedures in place that control the revision of the E-Plan and require the use of revision bars and individual page identifications (i.e. section of plan, revision number, etc.). 6. Supporting Emergency Response Plans Other plans that support this E-Plan are:
- NU_REG-1471, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Concept of Operations: ______ NR_C _Incident ___ ___ -------November 2016 P-5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- * --*--PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear
- National Response Framework (NRF), Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex .
- Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA).
- The Iowa Emergency Plan.
- Department of Energy, Region 5, "Radiological Assistance Plan"
- INPO Emergency Resources Manual.
- Nuclear Station Security Plans -Note: The Station Security Plan contains industrial security information that must be withheld from public disclosure under provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d). 7. Implementing and Supporting Procedures Appendix 2 of this plan contains a listing, by number and title, of those procedures that implement this plan during an emergency (EP-ANMW-11X series procedures). Additionally, administrative procedures that outline the steps taken to maintain the Exelon Emergency Preparedness Program have been developed (EP-AN MW-12X series procedures) and are listed in Appendix 2. 8. Cross Reference to Planning Criteria The Plan is formatted in the same manner as NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1 , "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants." The use of this format lends itself to uncomplicated comparison of the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1. 9. Audit/Assessment of the Emergency Preparedness Program To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), Exelon Nuclear Oversight shall coordinate an independent review the Emergency Preparedness Program to examine conformance with 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.54, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. lneluded in the audit/assessment are the following:
- The E-Plan and associated implementing procedures.
- The Emergency Preparedness Training Program including drills and exercises.
- The readiness of the station Emergency Response Organization to perform its function.
- The readiness of facilities and equipment to perform as outlined in the plan and p raced u res.
- The interfaces between Exelon, the state, and county governmental agencies pertaining to the overall Emergency Preparedness Program. November 2016 P-6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- * --*--PART II: Planning Standards And Criteria Exelon Nuclear Results of this audit are submitted for review to Corporate Management and the Station Vice President. The Emergency Preparedness Manager ensures that any findings that deal with offsite interfaces are reviewed with the appropriate agencies. Written notification will be provided to the state and counties of the performance of the audit and the availability of the audit records for review at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. Records of the audit are maintained for at least five years. 10. Maintenance of Emergency Organization Telephone Directory Names and phone numbers of the Emergency Response Organization and support personnel shall be reviewed and updated at least quarterly . November 2016 P-7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- -* PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Appendix 1: References References consulted in the writing of this E-Plan are listed in this section. With exception of regulatory requirements, inclusion of material on this list does not imply adherence to all criteria or guidance stated in each individual reference. 1. 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans 2. 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors 3. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants 4. 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities 5. 6. 7. 8 . 9. 10. 11. 12. 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation 10 CFR 70, 73, and 100. 33 CFR 153. 40 CFR 110, 112, 116, 118, 302 and 355. 44 CFR 350. 44 CFR 401. 49 CFR 171 and 172. NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1 , November, 1980. 13. NUREG-0654, Supplement 1, "Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and Preparedness." 14. NUREG-0654, Supplement 3, "Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents." 15. NUREG-0396, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," Dec. 1978. 16. NUREG-0578, "TMl-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Term Recommendations." 17. NUREG-0696, Revision 1, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities November 2016 Appendix 1 Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear 18 . 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, dated October 1980. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability, December 1982. NUREG 0728 -"Report to Congress: NRC Incident Response Plan." U.S. NRC Response Technical Manual {RTM-96) NEI 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels. EPA 400-R-92-001, October 1991, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents." 24. Exelon Nuclear Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR), NO-AA-10 25. INPO Emergency Resources Manual 26. "Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Manual," dated December, 1996 INPO 96-009. 27. "Federal Bureau of Investigation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation Regarding Threat, Theft, or Sabotage in U.S. Nuclear Industry," Federal Register, Vol. 44, p. 75535, December 20, 1979. 28. Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, Title 32, Chapter II, Subchapter b, Part 340, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." 29. "Voluntary Assistance Agreement By and Among Electric Utilities involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials," dated November 1, 1980. 30. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. 31. American Nuclear Insurers Bulletin #5B (1981 ), "Accident Notification Procedures for Liability Insureds". 32. Letter from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, NRC, to Dr. Donald F. Knuth, President KMC, Inc. dated October 26, 1981. 33. INPO Coordination agreement on emergency information among USCEA, EPRI, INPO, NUMARC and their member utilities, dated April {1988). 34. ANl/MAELU Engineering Inspection Criteria For Nuclear Liability Insurance, Section 6.0, Rev. 1, "Emergency Planning." ---*------__ 3?._ NRC RIS 2006-12, Endorsement of lnstit11te Gu_idanqe __ _ -"Enhancement-to Emerge-ncy Prep-are-dness Programs for Hostile Action." November 2016 Appendix 1 Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear 36. NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for
- Security-Based Events." 37. NRC Information Notice 2009-01, National Response Framework *
- November 2016 Appendix 1 Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear
- Appendix 2: Procedure Cross-Reference to NUREG-0654 Criteria Planning Standard Procedure/Document NUREG-0654.11.A Assignment of Responsibility EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration (Organization Control) Letters of Agreement NUREG-0654.11.B Onsite Emergency Organization EP-AA-112, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) I Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-100, Control Room Operations EP-AA-112-200, TSC Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-300, Operations Support Center Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-400, Emergency Operations Facility Activation and Operation EP-AA-112-500, Emergency Environmental Monitoring EP-AA-112-600, Public Information Organization Activation and Operations EP-AA-112-700, Alternative Facility Operation EP-AA-130, 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, On-Shift Staffing Assessment NUREG-0654.11.C Emergency Response Support EP-AA-112-400, Emergency Operations Facility
- and Resources Activation and Operations NUREG-0654.11.D Emergency Classification EP-AA-111 , Emergency Classification and System Protective Action Recommendations NUREG-0654.11.E Notification Methods and EP-AA-114, Notifications Procedures EP-MW-114-100, Midwest Region Offsite Notifications NUREG-0654.11.F Emergency Communications EP-AA-114, Notifications EP-MW-114-100, Midwest Region Offsite Notifications EP-AA-124, Inventories and Surveillances EP-MW-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests NU REG-Public Education and Information EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration 0654.11.G NUREG-0654.11.H Emergency Facilities and EP-AA-112, Emergency Response Organization Equipment (ERO) I Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Activation and Operation EP-AA-121, Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Readiness -*--EP-AA-121-1001, Automated Call-Out System --------------Maintenance -----------------------------November 2016 Appendix 2 Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Criteria Planning Standard Procedure/Document
- EP-MW-121-1003, Mazon and Morrison Fire Alarm System Notification EP-MW-121-1004, Siren Change Documentation EP-AA-120-1006, EP Reportability-Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities EP-MW-121-1006, Contracted Siren Maintenance Oversight EP-AA-123, Computer Programs EP-AA-124, Inventories and Surveillances EP-MW-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests EP-AA-125-1004, Emergency Response Facilities & Equipment Performance Indicators Guidance NUREG-0654.11.1 Accident Assessment EP-AA-110, Assessment of Emergencies EP-AA-110-200, Dose Assessment EP-AA-110-201, On Shift Dose Assessment
- EP-AA-110-301, Core Damage Assessment (BWR) EP-MW-110-1001, Data Point Tables EP-AA-123, Computer Programs NU REG-0654.11.J Protective Response EP-AA-113, Personnel Protective Actions EP-AA-113-F-07, MW Emergency Director -Site Assembly, Accountability And Evacuation EP-AA-123, Computer Programs EP-AA-113-F-03, Thyroid Blocking Agent Authorization. NUREG-0654.11.K Radiological Exposure Control EP-AA-110, Assessment of Emergencies EP-AA-113, Personnel Protective Actions NUREG-0654.11.L Medical and Public Health EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration Support UREG-0654.11.M Recovery and Reentry Planning EP-AA-115, Termination and Recovery and Post-Accident Operations EP-AA-120-1002, Offsite Readiness Evaluation NUREG-0654.11.N Exercises and Drills EP-AA-122, Drills & Exercises Program EP-AA-122-100, Drill and Exercise Planning and ----*--Scheduling ---------------------------EP-AA-122-.1 OO_-F_-01 through_F-21-,_ [Drill and Exercise Planning and Scheduling Forms] November 2016 Appendix 2 Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear
- Criteria Planning Standard Procedure/Document EP-AA-122-200, Drill & Exercise Execution EP-AA-122-200-F-01 through F-05, [Drill & Exercise Execution Forms] EP-AA-122-300, Drill and Exercise Evaluation EP-AA-122-300-F-01 through F-04, [Drill and Exercise Evaluation Forms] EP-AA-125-1001, EP Performance Indicator Guidance EP-AA-125-1002, ERO Performance-Performance Indicators Guidance EP-AA-125-1003, ERO Readiness -Performance Indicators Guidance NU REG-Radiological Emergency TQ-AA-113, ERO Training And Qualification 0654.11.0 Response Training NUREG-0654.11.P Responsibility for the Planning EP-AA-1, Emergency Preparedness Effort: Development, Periodic EP-AA-1 O, Emergency Preparedness Program Review and Distribution of Description Emergency Plans EP-AA-11, Operating Stations Emergency Preparedness Process Description
- EP-AA-1101, EP Fundamentals EP-AA-1102, ERO Fundamentals EP-AA-120, Emergency Plan Administration EP-AA-120-1001, 1 OCFR50.54( q) Change Evaluation. EP-AA-125, Emergency Preparedness Self Evaluation Process
- EP-AA-125-1001, EP Performance Indicator Guidance Emergency Response Facilities Telephone Directory
- November 2016 Appendix 2 Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
- PART Ill: Appendices . Appendix 3: List of Corporate Letters of Agreements Organization/ Agreement Type Department Of Energy (DOE) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site, REAC/TS (Letter on File) Medical Consultant Environmental, Inc. (P.O.) Radiological Environmental Monitoring GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, BWRs (Letter on File) BWR Emergency Support Landauer, Inc. (P .0.) Emergency Dosimetry INPO (Letter on File) Emergency Event Support Murray & Trettel, Inc. (P .0.) Meteorological Support Presence St. Joseph Medical Center (Letter on File)
- Back-up Emergency Medical Facility
- Teledyne Brown Engineering (P.O.) Bioassay Analysis/Radiochemical Analysis Fulton Technologies (P.O.) Emergency Met Tower National Foam, Inc. (P.O.) Fire Foam Supply November 2016 Appendix 3 Page 1 Exelon Nuclear EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Appendix 4: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Accident Assessment Activation Annual Acciqent assessment consists of a variety of actions taken to determine the nature, effects anq severity of an accident and includes evaluation of reactor operator status reports, damage assessment reports, meteorological observations, seismic observations, fire reports, radiological dose projections, in plant radiological monitoring, and environmental monitoring. (1) "ERO Activation" is the process of initiating actions to notify and mobilize Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel following an event classification under the emergency plan. (2) "Facility Activation" refers to the decision to consider a facility fully operational based on the minimum staffing required in the ERO staffing tables contained within the Emergency Plan and the ability of facility staffing and equipment to perform its designed function(s). Frequency of occurrence equal to once per calendar year, January 1 to December 31 . Assembly/Accountability A procedural or discretionary protective action taken for all persons within the security "Protected Area", which involves the gathering of personnel into pre-designated areas, and the subsequent verification that the location of these personnel is known. Assessment Actions Biennial Biennial Exercise November 2016 Those actions taken during or after an emergency to obtain and process information that is necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures. Frequency of occurrence equal to once per two calendar year periods. An event that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within an emergency plan. An exercise usually* involves participation of personnel from state and local governments, utility personnel, and may involve participation of Federal government personnel. Appendix 4 Page 1 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Classification Command and Control Committed Dose Equivalent (COE) Corrective Action Damage Assessment Damage Control Decontamination Dedicated Communications November 2016 The classification of emergencies is divided into FIVE (5) categories or conditions, covering the postulated spectrum of emergency situations. The first four (4) emergency classifications are characterized by Emergency Action Levels (EALs) or event initiating conditions and address emergencies of increasing severity. The fifth, the Recovery classification, is unique in that it may be viewed as a phase of the emergency, requiring specific criteria to be met and/or considered prior to its declaration. When in Command and Control, the designated Emergency Director (Shift, Station or Corporate) has overall responsibility for Exelon Nuclear's emergency response efforts, including the nondelegable responsibilities of Command and Control. The Dose Equivalent to organs or tissues of reference that will be received from an intake of radioactive material by an individual during the 50-year period following the intake. Those emergency measures taken to lessen or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem, to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, or to reduce the magnitude of a release. Corrective actions include equipment repair or shutdown, installation of emergency structures, fire fighting, repair, and damage control. Estimates and descriptions of the nature and extent of damages resulting from an emergency or disaster; of actions that can be taken to prevent or mitigate further damage; and of assistance required in response and recovery efforts based on actual observations by qualified engineers and inspectors. The process of preventing further damage from occurring and preventing the increase in severity of the accident. The reduction or removal of contaminated radioactive material from a structure, area, material, object, or person. Decontamination may be accomplished by (1) treating the surface so as to remove or decrease the contamination; (2) letting the material stand so that the radioactivity is decreased as a result of natural decay; and (3) covering the contamination. A communications link between two or more locations, access to which is limited to designated locations, and used only for the purpose intended. The communications link may be either telephone or radio. Appendix 4 Page 2 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Deep Dose Equivalent (DOE) Dose Dose Equivalent (DE) Dose Projection Dose Rate Dosimeter Dosimeter of Legal Record (DLR) Drill Early Phase November 2016 Exelon Nuclear The dose equivalent at a tissue depth of 1 cm (1000 mg/cm2); applies to external whole body exposure . A generic term that means absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent, deep dose equivalent, committed dose equivalent, committed effective dose equivalent, or total effective dose equivalent. The product of the absorbed dose in tissue, quality factor, and all other necessary modifying factors at the location of interest. The unit of dose equivalent is the Rem. The calculated estimate of a radiation dose to individuals at a given location (normally off-site), determined from the source term/quantity of radioactive. material (Q) released, and the appropriate meteorological dispersion parameters (X/Q). The amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation to which an individual would be exposed per unit of time. As it would apply to dose rate to a person, it is usually expressed as rems per hour or in submultiples of this unit, such as millirems per hour. The dose rate is commonly used to indicate the level of radioactivity in a contaminated area . An instrument such as a Dosimeter of Legal Record (DLR), self-reading pocket dosimeter (SRPD), or electronic dosimeter (ED) for measuring, registering, or evaluating total accumulated dose or exposure to ionizing radiation. Specific station type dosimeters used for monitoring personnel and the environment. A supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. The period at the beginning of a nuclear incident when immediate decisions for effective use of protective actions are required and must be based primarily on predictions of radiological conditions in the environment. This phase may last from hours to days. For the purposes of dose projections it is assumed to last four days . Appendix 4 Page 3 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Emergency Action A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold for a
- Levels (EALs) plant Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL can be an instrument reading; an equipment status indicator; a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency class. Emergency Alert A network of broadcast stations and. interconnecting facilities System (EAS) which have been authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate in a controlled manner during a war, state of public peril or disaster, or other national or local emergency. In the event of a nuclear reactor accident, instructions/notifications to the public on conditions or protective actions would be broadcast by state or local government authorities on the EAS. Emergency Director Individual in Command and Control. One of the following: the Shift Emergency Director (Control Room), Station Emergency Director (TSC) or the Corporate Emergency Director (EOF). Emergency Notification The NRC Emergency Notification System hot line is a System (ENS) dedicated telephone system that connects the plant with
- NRC headquarters in White Flint, Maryland. It is directly used for reporting emergency conditions to NRC personnel. Emergency Operations Designated location from which the Licensee Emergency Facility (EOF) Response Organization conducts the company's overall emergency response in coordination with Federal, State and designated emergency response organizations. Emergency Operating EOPs are step-by-step procedures for direct actions taken by Procedures (EOPs) licensed reactor operators to and/or correct an off normal plant condition through the control of plant systems. Emergency Operations A facility designed and equipped for effective coordination Center (EOC) and control of emergency operations carried out within an I organization's jurisdiction. The site from which civil I government officials (municipal, county, state, and Federal) exercise direction and control in a civil defense emergency. I Emergency Personnel Those organizational groups that perform a functional role during an emergency condition. Within Exelon Nuclear, emergency personnel include the Managers and Directors of the Emergency Response Organization, accident assessment personnel, radiological monitoring teams, fire
- brigades, first aid teams and security personnel. November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 4 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) Emergency Preparedness Emergency Response Data System (EROS) Environmental Monitoring Essential Personnel Evacuation Exclusion Area Exercise Exercise Cycle November 2016 That area surrounding a nuclear station in which emergency planning is conducted for the protection of the public. With respect to protecting the public from the plume exposure resulting from an incident, the EPZ is usually an area with a radius of about 10 miles surrounding the facility. With respect to the ingestion exposure pathway, the EPZ is usually an area with a radius of about 50 miles. A state of readiness that provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken upon implementation of the E-Plan in the event of a radiological emergency. EROS is a continuous direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. The use of radiological instruments or sample collecting devices to measure and assess background radiation levels and/or the extent and magnitude of radiological contamination in the environment around the plant. This may be done in various stages such as pre-operational, operational, emergency, and post operational. Essential personnel are those needed to achieve the goals and tasks as deemed necessary by the Station Emergency Director. The urgent removal of people from an area to avoid or reduce high level, short-term exposure usually from the plume or from deposited activity. An Exclusion Area is an area specified for the purpose of reactor site evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 100. It is an area of such size that an individual located at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated release would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure. An event that tests the integrated capability of a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency -preparedness plans and organizations. An eight-year period of time. Appendix 4 Page 5 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Fission Product Barrier The fuel cladding, reactor coolant system boundary, or the containment boundary. Hazardous Material Health Physics Network (HPN) Line High Radiation Sampling System Imminent Ingestion Exposure Pathway Initiating Condition Integrated Drill Intermediate Phase November 2016 A substance or material which has been determined by the United States Secretary of Transportation to be capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in commerce, and which has been so .* designated in 49 CFR 172. In the event of a Site Area Emergency, the NRC HPN line will be activated by the NRC Operations center in White Flint, Maryland. This phone is part of a network that includes the NRC Regional Office and the NRC Operations Headquarters in White Flint, Maryland. This system is dedicated to the transmittal of radiological information by plant personnel to NRC Operations Center and the Regional office. HPN phones are located in the TSC and EOF. Post-accident sampling *capability to obtain and perform radioisotopic and chemical analyses of reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples. Mitigation actions have been ineffective and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur within 2 hours. The potential pathway of radioaCtive materials to the public through consumption of radiologically contaminated water and foods such as milk or fresh vegetables. Around a nuclear power plant this is usually described in connection with the 50-mile radius Emergency Planning Zone (50 mile EPZ). A predetermined UNIT condition where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency or such an emergency has occurred. A drill conducted in the year that a Biennial Exercise is not scheduled including at least two Emergency Response Facilities in order to demonstrate at least two of the functions of management and control of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision-making, or plant system repair and corrective action. The period beginning after the source and releases have been brought under control and reliable environmental measurements are available for use as a basis for decisions on additional protective actions . Appendix 4 Page 6 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Joint Information Center A Corporate Emergency Facility activated by Exelon and staffed by Exelon, state, and Federal Public Information personnel. This facility serves as the single point of contact for the media and public to obtain information about an emergency. Late Phase Local Evacuation Low Population Zone (LPZ) Main Control Room Monthly Non-Essential Site Personnel Notification, Public November 2016 The period beginning when recovery action designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable levels for unrestricted use are commenced and ending when all recovery actions have been completed. This period may extend from months to years (also referred to as the recovery phase). The evacuation of personnel from a particular area, such as a room or building. As defined in 10 CFR 100.3, the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which contains residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious accident. The operations center of a nuclear power plant from which . the plant can be monitored and controlled. Frequency of occurrence equal to once per calendar month. Those personnel not needed for the continuing existence or functioning of the ERO. They are personnel not required to fill certain positions in the ERO. Identification of non-essential personnel is circumstance-oriented as determined by the Station Emergency Director. Public notification means to communicate instructions on the nature of an incident that prompted the public alerting/warning and on protective or precautionary actions . that should be .taken by the recipients of the alert. A state and local government process for providing information promptly to the public over radio and TV at the time of activating the alerting (warning) signal (sirens). Initial notifications of the public might include instructions to stay inside, close windows, and doors, and listen to radio and TV for further instructions. Commercial broadcast messages are the primary means for advising the general public of the conditions of any nuclear accident. (See Emergency Alert System.) Appendix 4 Page 7 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Off-Site The area around a nuclear generating station that lies outside the station's "site boundary". Offsite Dose Calculation The ODCM presents a discussion of the following: Manual (ODCM) 1. The ways in which nuclear power stations can affect their environment radiologically 2. The regulations which limit radiological effluents from the nuclear power stations; and 3. The methodology used by the nuclear power stations to assess radiological impact on the environment and compliance with regulations. On-Site The area around a nuclear generating station that lies within the station's "site boundary". Owner Controlled Area Company owned property on which a Nuclear Station is located and may include Exelon Nuclear leased lands adjacent to that Nuclear Station. Operations Support Center (OSC) Personnel Monitoring Plume Exposure Pathway Population-at-Risk Potassium Iodide November 2016 An emergency response facility at the Plant to which support personnel report and stand by for deployment in an emergency situation. The determination of the degree of radioactive contamination on individuals, using standard survey meters, and/or the determination of dosage received by means of dosimetry devices. The potential pathway of radioactive materials to the public through: (a) whole body external exposure from the plume and from deposited materials, and (b) inhalation of radioactive materials. Those persons for whom protective actions are being or would be taken. In the 10-mile EPZ the population-at-risk consists of resident population, transient population, special facility population, and industrial population. (Symbol Kl) A chemical compound that readily enters the thyroid gland when ingested. If taken in a sufficient quantity prior to exposure to radioactive iodine, it can prevent the thyroid from absorbing any of the potentially harmful radioactive iodine-131 . Appendix 4 Page 8 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Potential Projected Dose Protected Area Protection Factor (PF) Protective Action Protective Action Guide (PAG) Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) Public Alerting/Warning Puff Release November 2016 Mitigation actions are not effective and trended information indicates that the parameters are outside desirable bands and not stable or improving. That calculated dose that some individuals in the population group may receive if no protective actions are implemented. Projected doses are calculated to establish an upper limit boundary. That onsite area within the security boundary as defined in each station's Security Plan. The relation between the amount of radiation that would be received by a completely unprotected person compared to the amount that would be received by a protected person such as a person in a shielded area. PF = Shielded dose rate I Unshielded dose rate. Those emergency measures taken for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures to affected population groups. Projected radiological dose values to individuals in the general population that warrant protective action. Protective Action Guides are criteria used to determine if the general population needs protective action regarding projected radiological doses, or from actual committed (measured) dose values. Recommended actions to the States for the protection of the offsite public from whole body external gamma radiation, and inhalation and ingestion of radioactive materials. Access control and other recommendations concerning the safeguards of affected food chain processes may be issued by the States as PARs. The process of signaling the public, as with sirens, to turn on their TV's or radios and listen for information or instructions broadcast by state or local government authorities on the Emergency Alert System (EAS). A controlled containment vent that will be terminated prior to exceeding 60 minutes in duration and is less than the limit as defined in the Station Annex . Appendix 4 Page 9 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Quarterly Recovery Release Restricted Area Restricted Area Boundary Safety Analysis Report, Updated Final (UFSAR) Frequency of occurrence equal to once in each of the following four periods: January 1 through March 31; April 1 through June 30; July 1 through September 30; October 1 through December 31. The process of reducing radiation exposure rates and concentrations of radioactive material in the environment to levels acceptable for unconditional occupancy or use. A 'Release in Progress' is defined as ANY radioactive release that is a result of, or caused by, the emergency event. Any area, access to which is controlled by Exelon for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. For classification and dose projection purposes, the boundary is a 400-meter (1/4-mile) radius around the plant. The actual boundary is specified in the ODCM. The UFSAR is a comprehensive report that a utility is required to submit to the NRC as a prerequisite and as part of the application for an operating license for a nuclear power plant. The multi-volume report contains detailed information on the plant's design and operation, with emphasis on related matters. Semi-Annual Frequency of occurrence equal to once in each of the following periods: January 1 through June 30; July 1 through December 31. Shall, Should, and May The word "shall" is used to denote a requirement, the word "should" to denote a recommendation and the word "may" to denote permission, neither a requirement nor a recommendation. Shielding Any material or barrier that attenuates (stops or reduces the intensity of) radiation. Site Boundary The Nuclear Station's Site Boundary is described in detail in the ODCM. Site Evacuation The evacuation of non-essential personnel from the plant site. Source Term November 2016 Radioisotope inventory of the reactor core, or amount of radioisotope released to the environment, often as a function of time. Appendix 4 Page 10 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
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- PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear Technical Support Center (TSC) Threshold Value Thyroid Blocking Agent Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) Unrestricted Area Vital Areas Vital Equipment Weekly A center outside of the Control Room in which information is supplied on the status of the plant to those individuals who are knowledgeable or responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations in the event of an emergency, and to those persons who are responsible for management of the on-site emergency response. Measurable, observable detailed conditions which must be satisfied to determine an EAL applicability. An agent which when properly administered to an individual will result in sufficient accumulation of stable iodine in the thyroid to prevent significant uptake of radioiodine. Potassium Iodide is such an agent. The sum of the deep dose equivalent (for external exposure) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposure) and 4 days of deposition exposure. Any area to which access is not controlled by the licensee for protecting individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, and any area used for residential quarters . Areas within the station security fence which contain vital equipment. Examples include Control Rooms, Containment/Reactor Buildings, Turbine Buildings and Electrical Equipment Rooms.
- Any equipment, system, device or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Equipment or systems which would be required to function to protect public health and safety following such failure, destruction, or release are also considered to be vital. Frequency occurrence equal to once per calendar week: Monday through Sunday. Any abbreviation followed by a lower case's' denotes the plural form of the term . November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 11 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear ACRONYMS
- ALARA ........................................................................... as low as reasonably achievable ANI .......................................................................................... American Nuclear Insurers ANS ..................................................................................... Alert and Notification System ARM .............................................................................................. Area Radiation Monitor BWR ................................................................................................. boiling water reactor COE ...................................................................................... Committed Dose Equivalent CFR ..................................................................................... Code of Federal Regulations CR ........................................................................ ....................................... Control-Room DEP ................................................................................. Drill and Exercise Performance DLR ........................................................................................ Dosimeter of Legal Record DOE ....................................................................................... U. S. Department of Energy
- DOT ........................................................................... U. S. Department of Transportation EAL ............................................................................................. Emergency Action Level EAS ....................................................................................... Emergency Alerting System EMA .............................................................................. Emergency Management Agency ENC ........................................................................................... Emergency News Center ENS ................................... .................................. Emergency Notification System (NRC) EOC ........................................................... Emergency Operations (or Operating) Center EOF .................................................................................. Emergency Operations Facility EOP .............................................................................. Emergency Operating Procedure EPA ..................................................................... U. S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ ......................................................................................... Emergency Planning Zone ERF .................................................................................... Emergency Response Facility
- FEMA ............................................................... Federal Emergency Management Agency FR MAP ........................................ Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 12 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear
- FRPCC ................ , ............. Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee FSAR .................................................................................... Final Safety Analysis Report GET ....................................................................................... General Employee Training HPN .................................................................................. Health Physics Network (NRC) IDPH ........... : ................................................................ Iowa Department of Public Health IEMA .................................................................. Illinois Emergency Management Agency IEMD .................................................................... lowa Emergency Management Division INPO ...................................... ............................... Institute of Nuclear Power Operations JIC ............................................................................................ .-. Joint Information Center LOCA ......................................................................................... Loss of Coolant Accident LPZ ................................................................. : ................................ Low Population Zone MAELU ......................................................... Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters
- mR .................................................................................................... ' ............. mi Iii roentgen NARS ..................................................................... : .. Nuclear Accident Reporting System NRC ...................................................................... U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRF .................................................................................. National Response Framework NWS ......................................................................................... National Weather Service OSC ........................................................................................ Operations Support Center PAG ............................................................................................. Protective Action Guide PAR ........................................................................... Protective Action Recommendation QATR. .......................................................................... Quality Assurance Topical Report R ................................................................................ * .......................................... roentgen RAFT ...................................................... Radiological Assistance Field Team (ILLINOIS) RAP ................................................................... Radiological Assistance Plan (ILLINOIS)
- REAC ........................................ Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (ILLINOIS) RERP ................................................................. Radiological Emergency Response Plan November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 13 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0)
PART Ill: Appendices Exelon Nuclear RMS ..................................................................................... Radiation Monitoring System
- SAMG .............................................................. Severe Accident Management Guidelines SCBA ....................................................................... Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SHL. ..................................................................... , ...... State Hygienic Laboratory (IOWA) SPDS ........................................................................... Safety Parameter Display System STA ............................................................................................... Shift Technical Advisor TEDE ............................................................................... Total Effective Dose Equivalent TSC .......................................................................................... Technical Support Center UFSAR ................................................................... Updated Final Safety Analysis Report *
- November 2016 Appendix 4 Page 14 EP-QC-1000 (Revision 0) *
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