IR 05000346/1985018

Insp Rept 50-346/85-18 on 850409-0531.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Notify Appropriate Personnel That Fire Detection Equipment Removed from Svc & Failure to Properly Implement License Condition Re Operation of Startup Feedwater Pump

ML20127C981
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/13/1985
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127C954	List: IR 05000346/1985018 ML20127C951
References
50-346-85-18, NUDOCS 8506240084
Download: ML20127C981 (4)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

o Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: April 9.through May 31, 1985 Enforcement Conference: May 24, 1985 Inspectors: W. Rogers D. Kosloff M. Ring M.YO /,[13 /8E Approved By: IP N. Jackiw, Chief Projects Section 28 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on April 9 through May 31, 1985 (Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Special inspection of the circumstances surrounding three events: removal of the security and fire protection computer from service without the shift supervisor being informed; exceeding the thermal power for the reactor coolant flow available and having one channel of the reactor protection system set lower than the allowable setpoint; and the discovery of a non-licensed operator asleep while implementing a condition of the licens The inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspector Results: Three items of noncompliance were identified (failure to notify appropriate personnel that fire detection equipment was removed from service; failure to perform the action statements of Technical Specification 3. associated with reactor power and reactor protection system setpoints; and failure to properly implement a condition of the license associated with operation of the startup feedwater pump).

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission S. Quennoz, Plant Manager W. O' Conner, Operations Superintendent L. Simon, Operations Supervisor J. Lingenfelter, Technical Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staf Enforcement Conference on May 24, 1985 Toledo Edison Personnel R. Crouse, Vice President, Nuclear Mission T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission S. Quennoz, Plant Manager R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager NRC Personnel J. Keppler, Administrator, Region III C. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects W. Shafer, Chief, Projects Branch 2 I. Jackiw, Chief, Projects Section 2B W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector M. Ring, Reacto.' Inspector M. McCormick-Barger, Reactor Inspector B. Berson, Legal Counsel W. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator 2. Inoperable Fire Protection Computer While reviewing the unit log on April 9, 1985 the inspector noted that the security and fire protection computer had been shutdown for maintenance from 0915 to 1120 and the Shift Supervisor had no knowledge of the shutdown. The Toledo Edison Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM) Section 14.0 requires that the plant manager establishes and maintains a program in which the operating status of equipment is known at all time Section 14.1.1.1 of the NQAM further requires that the shift supervisor grant permission to release equipment or systems for maintenance or test. Failure to inform the shift supervisor of the

! equipment status at all times is considered a violation (346/85018-01).

l A discussion of the occurrence with the shift supervisor revealed that although he had been informed that the security and fire protection computer was to be shutdown for maintenance that morning he was not notified at the time the computer was actually shutdown. He established

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fire watch patrols in accordance with existing plant procedures after his independent discovery that the computer had been shutdow During the enforcement conference the licensee stated that the areas in question were being patrolled due to fire protection equipment other than the fire detectors being out of service. The licensee further stated that the security supervisor has been designated as the individual to inform the shift supervisor when the computer is taken out of servic . Inaccurate Reactor Power Measurements The limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3. requires reactor coolant flow to be equal to or greater than a specific value. The action statement associated with this limiting condition requires that, within four hours, reactor power be reduced by 2% for every 1% that flow is less than the given value. From approximately 1720 on April 19, 1985 until approximately 0220 on April 20, 1985 thermal power was approximately 98%. At this time the limit for thermal power was between 96.42% and 95.8%. Failure to maintain proper reactor power for the indicated reactor coolant flow is considered an item of noncompliance (346/85018-02). The events surrounding this condition are discussed in Inspection Report No. 85009. During the enforcement confer-ence the licensee confirmed that for approximately twelve hours one of the four reactor power indicators was set less than actual reactor power by 2.2% during the same time period in question. This indicator provides an input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS). These examples were the result of the licensee's failure to recognize that a feedwater flow indicator that had failed a week before provided an input to the computer heat balance calculation which is the standard by which the reactor power indicators are calibrated and which is the operators' primary indication of reactor thermal powe . Startup Feedwater Pump Piping Monitoring While touring the startup feedwater pump / auxiliary feedwater pump (SUFP/AFWP) area on April 24, 1985 at approximately 1210 the inspector

! observed that the only other person in the room was a sleeping non-licensed operator. The plant was in hot standby and the SUFP was in operation. Paragraph 2.C.(3)(t) of the facility's operating license requires that the licensee station an individual in the SUFP/AFWP area during operation of the SUFP to monitor the SUFP/ turbine plant cooling water (TPCW) piping status in the room. In the event of SUFP/TPCW pipe leakage the operator is to trip the SUFP locally or notify the control

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room to trip the SUFP, and isolate the SUFP/TPCW piping. Failure to properly monitor the SUFP/TPCW piping status is considered an item of noncompliance (346/85018-03). Subsequently, another licensee employee entered the room and awakened the operator in the presence of the inspector. The inspector notified the operator's supervisors of the occurrenc The licensee took disciplinary action against the sleeping individua . Enforcement Conference An Enforcement Conference was held on May 24, 1985 in the NRC Region III office to discuss the circumstances surrounding the violations identified during the inspection that was initiated on April 9, 198 The meeting was opened by Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrato He described in general terms the violations that were identified during the inspection. The licensee representatives were informed that individually the three violations were not cause for serious concern; however, more importantly there was an apparent overall breakdown in communication between site and corporate management as well as between corporate manager The licensee representatives admitted they did not learn of the violations in a timely manner and were not directly involved in the corrective actions that were taken. The plant manager described corrective actions that had been taken to resolve each of the violation The NRC staff concluded that these actions addressed the specific problems but did not adequately deal with the root cause which was lack of manage-ment oversight and communication. The licensee representatives expressed their concern, said they understood the problem and would take immediate steps to ensure that Davis-Besse management would become more involved in plant operatio e