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Forwards Supplemental Info Re Application for Amends 80 & 33 to Licenses NPF-14 & NPF-22,respectively,per 860428 Telcon Request.Srp Sections Re Design of Fifth Diesel Generator Facility Addressed
	ML18040B149
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	05/19/1986
From:	Keiser H; PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Adensam E; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	RTR-NUREG-0800, RTR-NUREG-800 PLA-2645, NUDOCS 8605280293
	Download: ML18040B149 (490)
	v • d • e

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (R IDS>

ACCESSION NBR: 8605280293 DOC. DATE: 86/05/f 9 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 FACIL: 50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Stations Unit fi Pennsglva 05000387 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Stations Unit 2. Pennsglva '05000388 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFl'LIATION KEISER> H. W. Pennsylvania Power 5 Light Co.

REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFlLIATION

DENSAMi E. BWR Pv object Div ectov ate 3

$ CG

SUBJECT:

Forwards supplemental info v e application fov Amends 80 5: 33 to Licenses NPF 14 Ct NPF 22i respectivei g> pev 860428 telcon request. SRP Sections v e design of fifth diesel genev'ator facilit Q essed COPIES RECEIVED: LTR SIZE:

addv'ISTRIBUTION CODE: A001D ENCL TITLE: OR Submittal: Qeneval Distribution NOTES:fcg NMSS/FCAF/PM. LPDR 2cg's Tv'anscv'ipts. 05000387 icy Nl"ISS/FCAF/PM. LPDR 2cgs Transcripts. 05000388 I

REC P IENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL BWR ADTS BWR EB BWR EICSB 1

2 BWR FOB jfo BWR PD3 PD 01 5 CAMPAQNONE 1 BWR PSB io BWR RSB f fo INTERNAL: ACRS 09 O *DM/LFMB ELD/HDS4 f NRR/ TSCB NRR/ORAS LE 04 RQNi 1 EXTERNAl 24X 1 fO EQSQ BRUSKE> S LPDR 03 2 2o NRC PDR 02 NSIC 05 1O NOTES:

gimn'es ~/5 J TOTAL NUl']BER OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 34 ENCL P5

Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Company Two North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215 i 770-5151 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 21 5/770-7502 NY 19 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Ms. E. Adensam, Project Director BWR Project Directorate No. 3 Division of BWR Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENT NO. 80 TO NPF-14 AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT NO. 33 TO NPF-22 Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-2645 FILES R41-2/A17-2 and 50-388

Dear Ms. Adensam:

The attached document is being provided in response to a request made during an April 28, 1986 telecon between your staff and PP&L. The telecon was held to discuss our proposed technical specification changes which reflect installation of a fifth diesel generator into the Susquehanna design.

Specifically your Staff requested we address how the civil/structural/seismic design of the fifth diesel generator facility and supporting components conforms to the acceptance criteria of appropriate Standard Review Plan (SRP) sections. The specific sections addressed are 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.5.1.4, 3.5.1.5, 3.7.1, 3.7.2, 3.7.3, 3.8.4 and 3.8.5.

We have formatted the attached as follows:

o The first page of each of the above listed SRP sections has been copied followed by the pages containing the acceptance criteria.

o Our responses to each criteria is typed on back of the page preceding the page containing the acceptance criteria.

o Some responses contain numbered references which are also provided in the enclosed document. Reference number 1 is a draft copy of the proposed changes to those FSAR sections on civil/structural/seismic design. Reference number 2 is a Design Description Report for the fifth diesel generator and Reference number 3 is a specification entitled "Design Criteria for Civil/Structural Work for New Emergency Diesel Generator Facility."

860M80293 860519 P

PDR ADOCK 05000387 PDR go> Py+

NY 19 1986 Page 2 SSES PLA-2645 Files R41-2/A17-2 Ns. E. Adensam If you have further questions, please contact D. J. Walters.

Very truly yours,

. W. Keiser ice President-Nuclear Operations cc: M. J. Campagnone USNRC R. H. Jacobs USNRC

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}'O'KC,.o K 2 Z IO4}'DSSO SECTION
. SECTION SUSOUKNANNA STKASC ELKCTRIC STATION UNITS I ANO K FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT E
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DIESEL QENEAATOQBLIILDINQ p NECTIOHS CNOOCO Illit NNNND CIRC COMCOIC llllt FIGURE SSO IO6 r!
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SS ES- FSAR Th BLg 3,9-16 LIST OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS USED IN BOP N EC!IAN IChL SYSTEMS AND COMPONFNTS .-
COMPUTER PROGRAM DOCUMENT vn. NAME TR ACEA P ILIT Y SYSTEM IISED ME101 Linear Elastic Bocht el Univac 1110 Analysis of Pipinq
,'IK ) 32 Piping System Bechtol Itoneyvell 6000 Analv is Univac 1110
'1~912 Thprmal Stress Bechtel Ilnivac 1110 Programs "E913 Nuclear Class 1 Bechtel Univac 1110 Piping S~re ss hnalvsis
'I R I/ST A R D YH ~ 3 CDC or CDC eorm mechanics Research, Tnc Los, Angeles CE79R ANSYS Svan.=on Ar a lysis Univac ] ll0 Systems, Tnc.
Elizabeth, PA 15037
~E351 PIPERIJP CDC or Quadrex CDC 175 Co n.
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Rev. 35, 07/84
e SSES-FSAR 3.10b.1.2.1 Functional Criterion Every instrumentation device shall be capable of performing its safety related function during plant operating conditions of startup, constant power operation, and normal or emergency shutdown without impairment of its safety related function while undergoing seismic and hydrodynamic excitation.
The safety related function of instrumentation devices can be either passive or active. Where one type of device is, used in both types of applications, the device is qualified for the worst-case application.
~ ~,
F rom the plant OBE, SSE, SRV, and LOCA conditions a family of acceleration required response spectra (RRS) were enerated for each building elevation for north-south, east-wes ~ ertical
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directions. The spectra for each elevation where nstrumentation is located were examined to establish the worst-case response spectra.
Pipe-mounted devices are qualified for 6g vertical and 6g lateral along the weakest axis simultaneously applied. Hangers and snubbers are added, if required, to limit piping response. This value is checked against the piping analysis to insure that the actual "g" valueggor that equipment
~ ~~
piping reponse does not exceed the qualification level. Where, equipment was not capable of meeting this standard value, the for qualification.
Were epe~Q'eJ Qr easel purchase. order For devices mounted in panels, the RRS used was derived from the panel analysis.
3.10b.1.2.3 Instrumentation Su orts Instrumentation devices, assemblies, and control panels shall be seismically qualified using the supports that will be used during in-plant installation. These items of equipment are required to maintain their functional capability while undergoing earthquake excitation at the equipment supports.
3.10b-2
SSES-FSAR s
a I ~~
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~ 3.10b.1.3
~ ~ ~ Device Qualification Test Criteria Devices that were qualified by test were tested in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1975. In general, test requirements and acceptance criteria are summarized as follows:
s a) Devices under test are mounted, in a manner that simulates intended use.
b) Devices are tested while in their normal operating condition (e.g., energized) to determine that vibratory conditions do not produce a malfunction or failure.
Seismic Category I devices shall not-fnalfunction during or after a safe shutdown earthquake.
c) Devices are tested in all three axes. Simultaneous excitation in all three axes is preferred; however, tests may be run one axis at a time and, then be repeated for the other two axes as an acceptable alternative.
Nhere appropriate a frequency sweep gJ.
d) ( arying the
~
frequency of excitation with time) is onducted at a low "g" value, e.g., 0.2g as noted in IEE 44. This test was= performed to identify resonant frequencies in the range of interest.
e) Devices that are floor- or panel-mounted are subjected to five OBEs and one SSE in each axis tested. Each BE and SSE consists of random input motion that envelop the RRS for that device.
I e f) Devices that are pipe-mounted are subjected to sine-beat tests over the frequency range of 1 to 100 Hz. Each I sine-beat test is performed at a peak acceleration of 6g
or to the peak acceleration for the specific mounting location.
g) The cr'.eria for mal unction or failure include as many of the following characteristics as are applicable to the safety related function of the device during and after testing:
1) Loss of output signal; e.g., open or short circuit
2) Output variations greater than +10 percent of full range
3) ,Spurious or unwanted output; e.g., relay contact bounce 3.10b-3
I'V 0
SSES-FSAR
4) Major calibration shift; e.g., greater than p10 percent of range
5) Structural failure; e.g., broken or loosened parts.
3.10be2 SEISMIC CATEGORY' EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION Detailed information about seismic qualification of Non-NSSS Supplied Seismic Category I Instrumentation is maintained in a central file within PP&L." A synopsis of this information was by SQRT forms previously submitted to the NRC.
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3.10'b.3 Methods and Procedures of Analysis or Testing of,
! Su orts of Instrumentation Instrumentation equipment was qualified by test using the support designed for that particular equipment as one of the test elements.
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3. 10b. 4 0 eratin License Review Results of tests and analyses were provided in individual SQRT
! Forms.
3.10b-4
0 E
0
SSES-CESAR functions of elec+rical equipment or components, which are necessary for the f unctional requirements o. the equipment, shal not he impaired when the equipment is subjected to the OBp. or l
SSE in con)unction with applicable electrical, mechanical, and "h"rmal loads.
SSB is defined as an earthquake that produces the maximum vibrato'rv ground motion "for which certain structures, systems, and components are designed to remain functional. These structures, systems, and,components are necessary to ensure the fol]owinq:
a) Integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary Capability to shut down the reactor and main+ain i'. in safe shutdovn condition
/
Capab'l:ty to prevent or mitiqate the consequences of acciden+s that could resul+ in po+ential offsite exposures +o. the radioac+ive material releasecl to the onvironment.
The load combirations include gravity loads and ope"a+ing loads.
Allovable stres..o.s in the structural portions may be increased to 150 percen+ of allowable working stress limits. The resultinq deflections, m'saliqnment or bindinq of parts, or effects on c lertrical performance fmicrophonics, contart bounce, etc) do not orevent .he operation of the equipment during or after the
."'.o ismic disturbance.
3,10c,1.5 Op~"atina Basis Earthauake (OBE) Conditions he load rombinatinns include gravity loads and opera+ion loads.
All~..'~bio stre- ~s in the st;uctural steel portions may be inr. eased to 125 percent of the allovable vorking stress limits
, as set forth in the appropriate design standards, that is, AISC Manual of Steel Cons+ruction, ANSI and o~her applicable industrial codes. The customary increase in normal allowabl.e working tress due to earthquake is used if
~npropriate code, i+ 5s less than 25 percent. The resul+ing acccrdinq to the deflections, misaliqnment or binding of. parts, or effects on electrical performance (microphonics, contact bounce, e+c); does not preve'nt continuous normal operation of the equipment during and after +he seismic disturbance.
T'o m r>c "i'" )a~'l-'4, ~ ~'4eva as'/ i~+~<< ~
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10c-2
o SSES-FS AH 7A 10c.1 6 Prevontior of Overturnina and 9 Slidina, Stationary electrical equipment is desiqned +o prevent
~verturnina or slidina by the use of anchor bolts, welding, or ot he" suitable mechanical a nchnraqe rle vices.
3.10r..2 WETHovs A~lP PROCEDURFS FOR OUALIPYING ELFCTRICAL EQUIPS EMT
3. 10c. 2.1 Seismic Analysis Nethod For the purpose of analysis, the equipment has been idealized as a mathematical model consisting of lumperl masses connected by massless elastic structural members. For dynamir. analysis, the frequoncies and morlo. shapes have heen determined for vibration in
+he vertical and two orthoqonal horizontal rlirections, termed alohal rlirnctions. The effects of couplinq between vthrations in all hree alobal directions have been considered. The spectral acceleration per mode has been obtained from the appropriate r~soonse spectrum curve, which has heen prcvided for the avpropriate dampinq value. For determini.ng the spectral acceleration from the response spectrum curves, the value chosen is the largest valuo on the curve when the frequency in question varies hy +10 percent. Seismic response in terms of inertia forces, shears, momonts, stresses, 'anrl do.flections are determined for response to seismic excitation. in each of the global lir~ctions for each mnde. (See Subsection 3.7b.3.7)
For .he consideration of stress or deflection at any point, tho.
total seismic loarl consists of the most severe seismic load in ono nf tho horizontal qlobal. directions combined by the sum of
+h~ ahsol ute values method vith the vertical seismic loarl. (See subsection 3.7h. 3.61 p
s l. 10c. 2. 2 Seismic Oualification for Electrical Equipment QL Og gabil' g UJ he seismic aualif-'ca+ion of Cateqo y I electrical equipment, u~. auinment supports, and material meets as a minimum the requirements of IEFE 344-1971 and project specification G-l0, "Gene al Projec+ Reauirement for Aseismic Desiqn and Analysis of
. lass I Fauimment anrl Fauipment Supports" and complemented hy pro '~ct Soecificaticn G-22>>Desi g n Assessment and Q ualification
~+ ~~ of Seismic Ca+eaory I Equipment 6 Equipment Supports for Seismic Ryrlrorlynamic Loads. >> Prefect. Specification G-10 is summarizerl in comparison tn IEEE-344-1975 and Regulatory Guide 1.100 in Ta b le 3. 9- 31.
3. 10c-3
SSES-FSAR
,";$ ec<rical ecuinmeni is qualified for functional oPerahility
)urinq and after an earthquake of magnitude up to and includinq
+he SSH according to at least one Of the folloving input
~xci~ation +es+s:
a) Single frequency sinusoidal motion or sine bea~ motions continuously inputed durinq the test at specified requencies to cover .he frequency range up to 33 Hz.
b) Random vavefo m, multifrequency tests.
1,1gc.2,~ Seismic T~st gego",t paralysis and Methods The analysis and test reports furnished by the supplier v ~Q demonstrate the ab'li+y of electrical eauipment to perfo m its required function durinq and after the time the forces resultinq from one SSE and a required number of OBE.
it is sub)ected to d) u4m b
L~ Four categories of reports are provided by the supplier of
~ electrical equipment and material applicable to Seismic Category Q X aualification; gp a) Flectrical equipment qualified by ".estinq me+hod
).) Electrical equipment support and material qualified by o Ul analysis a nd calcu lat i.on method c) Electrical equipment qualified by supplier's certification of Seismic Cateqory I requirements.
d) Combination of analysis and testing.
+~- ~
col p p 3.10c.2.3-1 Electrical Equipment Qualified by Testing cS rl and Combination of Testina and Analysis Nethorl g
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Elo.ctrica
'-,st la ig>
rator ipment es base li onted similarity belov vas tested by in desiqn
+he suppliers or ..
and assembly, and ropres ntiQ uipment shovh i r Tables 3. 10c-4,
~fc i 0 throuqh 3 ~ 10c-16:
Tndbct powcl +A~5 Ss ltj C ~ ) hi) 0 C.- (y S.foe,-8 a) Indoor secondary unit su s a ron see Ia e . c>>1) b) 480 V ac motor cont ol certers (see Table 3.10c-2) c) ~
Battery monitors and fuse boxes (see Table 3.10c-3) d) DC distribution panels (see Ta,hie 3.10c-4) e) Battery charger racks and cabinets (see Table 3.10c-8) i~~
Re v. 3. 10c-4
sses- psLR TABLE I-BOG=~ 5¹ZDLRX QIII~UySXLIILIItXs f I rlPGF.@ZAN,1(:.(e.
SQI)IPQENI IQSIiIIQ "In'( gocLIIoN UNIT sUPPLceR TEST CNG QULt.fPICLTION QOLLIPICLTION
'el" ITRN Nn. oescRcpTlnN educ. BesT Nn. Br.0".. pt.ey. Nn. PLCI LITIRS CRIT RR IL S IGNRD SI:
8856- -117- Si.nc le ended 18-210 :teactor 749 I I T e. V I IR Prospect Spec Report I 57654 Secondary ttnit 18-220 749 I Isperial laboratories G- 10 ~ 26340-2 Substattoa 18-2 30 719 I Corporation NOT n f Ieee-344- 26340-3 Conststino of: 1S-240 719 1 california 1975 26340-4
a. Tersinal 28-2 10 749 2 Bp:
Chasber ~ 28-220 749 2 G. Shipval b 750 kVL 2 8-2 3(i 719 2 Nore o Transforaer.28-240 719 2
c. L.N.
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~ > ster pdR Q 4 a(r'8 '.- ( Ss~'q)ac tt7 A( pig h..l)...'~ )
~ Nnyet Specif teat inn G-10 is cosplesen nd by Specif teat ton 0-22.
Ynr 0-10 Specification Sussary, SR e Table 1 9-11.
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88%6-t-I IS Rotor Control OS-136 Cont re I 781 Csan Cutler-Aaaaer Nyle prospect Spec Report 142966-1 Center OD-146 Control 781 Cssn Laboratories 0- 'IO ~ 6 IEEE 08-516 D.Oen. 677 Caen Buntssille, 344-1975 Sy: J. tore as n nB-517 67 '1 Llabaaa
)E-526 677 Cavan Ryle 0 8-527 677 Csan Report 145590-1 08-536 677 C ~ sn 45590- 2 00-546 67'I Casa By:
Vincent t. Kearns III 10-216 Reactor 683 18-217 7u9 C A Eaton 18-2 'l9 670 Report IDL57-3251 By:
18-226 683 Vincent t. Kearns III 18-227 749 ~ NOTE: Specification 0-IOg 18-229 '119 is cospleaented by I S-236 7l9 Specification 0-22 I 8-23'I 610 5PE~.r:roll I'> "o>IP-18-246 719 g go7'6:
IB-247 6'I 0 LEIhC.N r -"L F ~ Io2,+,28-216 Reactor 683 28-2 l7 7u9 28-226 683 28-227 749 28-236 7)9 28-23'1 670 28-246 71'I 28-247 670 O'1-216 Reactor 683 11-218 719 I I-226 683 11-236 719 1'I -2 46 719
'y-216 633 2 21-218 719 2 2r-226 683 2y-236 7'l9 21-246 fRoJEcg 5r'6c, og -5&5 O.gr-.u.Ci-;)ohL~ ~W I >
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Be56- -120 DC Ois> tibu>> ion 10-61>> Cont tnl 1 f>>T>> E uyle prefect Spec a>>poet 1263>>0-5 Panels 1D-615 I Ispecial Laboratories 0-10 ~ 6 IEEE- Sy: CD Shkpvay 125V 225L 10-62>> 1 Corporation Rovco, 3>>>>-1975 hain Sus 1D- 6 2!> 1 Cal itornta Report L263>>0-3 1D-6 3u 1 26340-6 By: G. Shiplray 771'~
1D-6 3'i 1 1D-6>>>> 1
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TABLE 3.10c-7 CABLE TRAYS "SAFEGUARD" III=" EQUIP))2..2~)'O.
TESTING FACI) ITIES QUALIFICATION QUALIFICATION CRITERIA "El" SIGNED BY:
ITEN NO. DESCR)PTJON BLDG. ELEV. hO.
v 8856-E-132 Cable Trays: Control Husky Product Husky Products, Project Spec 1-29-76'.
3"D x 24"W S9Nl-24-144 770'82 to 670'eactor Inc. Inc. 7405 G-10 )2 IEEE-Industrial Rd 344-1975 977-978 Test No.
3"D x 18"X S9Nl-18-'44 Florence, Load Test-Kentucky (Trays) 3"D x 1""W 59NI 144 By: T. O'ara B. Heinz 5"D x 24"W 59N1-24-144
b. Hold Down 5"D x 18"W 59N1-18-144 Test) 4 12 76 Test No. 1127-5"D x 12"W 59NI-12-144 L2H>V2 ~
5/14/76 1151)2 1152 7/21/76 1188 8/10/76 1196-H,V
c. Electric Test 12/~22 22 Harper-))orrez B. Schuster
d. Seisuic
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-36~-07/84 Rev.
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. 11. 2b. 1 Coep) iance vit h IEEE 323-1q71 for Non-HSSS Class 'IE Eggioa~g
. l 11 gh 1 1 Pgg-/AS"'ggiPII<Qi Lgcg~el&34igg gggfajMr 2g All, non-HSSS Class 1E equipment located inside containaent has heep aualified to IFFF 323-1971 gg-Ng$ 2 Eggs,gannt Jggyged ogtggdc c~oigggaent W11 non-HSSS Class 1L? eauipaent. located outside cont ainaent,
~rc~pt that listed 3 3-1971. APg/
t in Tahle 3.11-5
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&xoaent l isted in Tahle 3.11-5 is qualified to perform 's&+<~
safetv function in the environaent in vhich it is located.to tlovever, the vendors for the eauipaent vere not required certify coIIplinnce e'auipaentvith IEEF. 323. Tn lieu cf IEEE 323 certification he listed in Table 3.11-5 Ss qualifi~d hy' coot iration of analysis, siailarity, and prvious opo.ratinq ex'perience..The qualif ication docuaents are available for 1lPC qudit as'stated in suhsection 3.11.3.4. This qualification method is just(fled because the selected equipment sects a coehination of the fnllovinq conditions:
1 lean noraal operate.nq temperature is less than 404C Acci den~ ~nvironaen+ is not substantially acre severe tl.en a ~
~
t hn nc real environaen~. By this it is aeant, the equipcr nt vi1l continuo to satisfactorallv perfora its safety function in tho. accident environILent hovcver, its lenqth of
~
aualified life is reduced.
Fquipaont is sioilar to equipeent previously used in o.h~r r,<".impar plan-.;= and other =.ndustrial applications.
4. Desiqn and fabrication is in accordance vith an approvoh anR auditable nuclear quality a surance proqraa.
The eauipmert is tested (either in 'he shop or at the site) pr i or t n plant s+ ar ~-u p.
6~ The eauipeent 's used, or freauently tested, durina nor I'al opera t ion.
3~ 11-11
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~
~
SSFS-FS AP 1~3 a,] HS.S QQQ)KQmoBtM1og gad "QRffX1HL$9+u2aent Thir. paraqraph discusses the tost results for safety-related instrumentation and electrical.equipeent in the VASSS except vhich is supplied vith KSSS pumps and valves. The test results for GR safe+y related equipaent are maintained in a peraanen~
file by CF and car h~ readily audited. Zn all cases, tho
, oquipmant u ed in. Class 1E applications passed the prescribed tests. Table 3.11-1 shovs the plant environwental areas in vhic.h aSSs cia.,s tF compone nts are located. Tables 3.11-2 and 3.11-3
~hov the temporature, pressure and humidity environments and ab)e 3.11-4 shovs ha "adiation environments to vhich the componen'.N ar'e test< d.
11 g g,g NQSS Vy],vo %gyppedggecgZjcyg ggujpmept The electrical. equipment mounted on the safety/relief, SEC and rocirculation qate valves is tested to conditions vhich are at least as =evere as the temperature, pressure and humidity cenditions shovn in Tables 3.11-1 3.11-2 and 3.11-3. They are
~
alsn tasted to the radiation. environaent applicable 'to their plant loca.ion as shovn in Table 3.11-4. The equipment pertnrmed it required sa fety function under the extreme environmental cor.ditions specified. '34, 1.1p.i1~4pi ~l gaS .Qg~ggg
,hn KCCS pump motors listed in Table 3.11-3 are rested to the temneraturo ~ pre ssure and humidity conditions shcvn in .he table.
Thc v are a]so tested to the radiation environment applicablc tc thoir lo--.tion as;-.:ovn in Table 3.11-4. The equipment tested portcrmrea its requ.'red safety function unde" the ext erne
-~r! virnnmon+a 1 condit ions specif ied.
Soy-igSg Clasa 1E XltSXZXryl ggyggmggg f:nvironaental qualif ication documentation fcr ncn-NSSS Class 1K
~lactrical oquipmen~ is pre antly lncated at the Bechtel home office in San Francisco /c and is available for HRC audit ggC+~pN pp 7k+ C~$
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>47 CS 4oQ7~ 8z 7M PAvrN5$C VW(rf jbw~ C
<<A~vnwM A. W> 87 ~ ~y5ygggA<urf f SWM
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SSES-FSAR
2. If Equation 10 results in 2.4 <S <3,0 S for ferritic or austenitic steels, the cumulative usage factor, U, calculated on the basis of Equation 14 of NB"3653.6, must be <0.1.
3. If Equation 10 results in S >3.0 S for ferritic or austenitic steels, then the stress value in Equations 12 and
]3 of NB-3653e6 must not be <2.4 S Re ulator Guide'1.47 - BYPASSED AND INOPERATIONAL STATUS INDICATION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS (Ma 1973)
The design, as discussed in Subsections 7.1.2, 7.2.2.1.2.1.5g 7.3.2a.l.2.1.7, 7.3.2a.2.2.1.5, 7.4.2.1.2.1.7, 7.4.2.2.2.1.7, 7.4.2.3 and 7.6.2.8, complies with the provisions set forth in this regulatory guide.
Re ulator Guide 1.48 DESIGN LIMITS AND LOADING COMBINATIONS FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY I FLUID SYSTEM COMPONENTS (Ma 1973)
The design loading combinations for non-NSSS systems for ppsirjpns C.~lro+c>1? are geag~crrbe8 rnggple~3 9-gr~>gp-)<
Subsection 3.9.3.2.
GE practice is representative of industry practice and is in general agreement with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.48 with the following clarifications:
The probability of an OBE of the magnitude postulated for the Susquehanna SES is consistent with its classification as an Emergency Event. However, for design conservatism, loads due to the OBE vibratory motion have been included under upset conditions. Loads due to the OBE vibratory motion plus aszcc';.ted tran=-'. nts, such aa turbine trip, have been rons~uered in the equipment design under emergency conditions consistent with the probability of the OBE occurrence.
b. The use of increased stress levels for Class 2 components is consistent with industry practice as specified in ASME B6PV Code Section III.
For a comparison of NSSS compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.48 see Table 3.13'-1. This comparison reflects a GE practice on BWR 4's and 5's and therefore, is appli'cable to the Susquehanna SES (see Subsections 3.9.2 and 3.9.3).
Rev. 35, 07/84 3.13-19
SSES-FSAR Re ulator Guide 1.60 DESIGN RESPONSE SPEC'j.RA FOR SEISMIC DESIGN OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, December 1973)
The design response spectra used in the analysis of Susquehanna SES are different from those of the regulatory guide. A detailed discussion of the d sign response spectra is presented in Subsection 3.7b.l.
~~ ~'>p" g~Qg +Bc~ ~guJalin~ m Re ulator Guide 1.61
~ qogg4,grp q~A0-DAMPING VALUES FOR SEISMIC
~
DESIGN OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, @gs 0 (October 1973)
The damping values used in the seismic design of Susquehanna SES are different from tk>e regulatory guide. A detailed discussion o",
c"I:lir; damping values is presented in Subsection 3.7b.l.
I Re ulator Guide 1.62 MANUAL INITIATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS (October 1973)
The provisions for manual initiation of protective actions are cl>>scribed in Subsections 7.2.2.1.2.1.7, 7.3.2a.l.2.1.9, 7.3.2a.2.2.1.7, 7.3.2a.3.2.1.3, 7.4.2.1.2.1.9 and 7.4.2.2.2.1.9. cn, c4 Re ulator Guide 1.63 ELECTRIC PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES IN CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES FOR CS WATER COOLED NUCLEAR POWER I I
PLANTS (Re'vision 1, Ma 1977) $l Since tk>e construction permit for Susquehanna SES was issued in November 1973, the provisions of Revision 1 to thi" regulatory gu.i<)e (which supplements IEEE 317-1976) were not specifically EQ consi<lerod i>> the design of Susquehanna SES. The design of the Km
~ 1~.ctric penetration assemblies is therefore in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 dated October 1973 (which supplements IEEE 317-1972). Specifically, Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 5.1.6, 5.2.2, 6.2, 6.3.3, <<nd 6.4 nf IEEE 317,-1976 have not been incorporated.
The penet..:=;tion cab 1= protection iimitation curves ar'e shown together ~~th their respective protective device coordination curv~.s on Figures 3.13-1 to 3.13-7. The shnrt circuit curves (
apply for the condition when the electrical and mechanical seal i.ntegrity is maintained. The seal limitation curve.. apply when the mechanical seal integrity is sacrificed.
integrity is maintained and the electrical ,~g The penetration assemblies are type tested. There are nn provisions for 'periodic testing under simulated fault conditions Electrical penetration circuits are summarized as follows:
3.13-24
SSES-FSAR DESIGN RESPONSE SPECTRA FOR SEISMIC DESIGN OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, December 1973)
The design response spectra used in the analysis of Susquehanna SES are different from those of the regulatory guide. A detailed di.scussion of the d . ign response spectra is presented in Subsection 3.7b.l.
Rr~ulaturg Guide 1. 61 DAMPING VALUES FOR SEISMIC DESIGN OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (October 1973)
~
>he damping values used in the seismic design of Sgsq~epyppp )~S ar>> diiferent from the regulatory guide/'"A 8CPazleh x cussxon) of t hr <l~mping values is presented in Subsection 3. 7b. 1.
i'.:Vu)ati~>r 'uide 1.62 - MANUAL INITIATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS (October 1973)
'l'he prnvisions for manual initi.ation of protective actions are
<1r.sec ibud in Subsections 7. 2. 2. 1. 2. 1. 7, 7. 3. 2a. 1. 2. l. 9P 7.3.2a.2.2.1.7, 7;3.2a.3.2.1.3, 7.4.2.1.2.1.9 and 7.4.2.2.2.1.9.
IN CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES FOR WATER COOLED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, Ma 1977)
Since t.hc'onstruction permit for Susquehanna SES was issued in Nave mber 1973, the provi"ions of Revision 1 to this regulatory guic!e {which supplements IFEE 317-1976) were not specifically
..onE'dc red in the design of Susquehanna SES. The design of the I 16dctric )2enetration assemblies is therefore in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 dated October 1973 (which supplements IEEE 317-1972). Specifically, Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 5.1.6, 5.2.2, 6.2, 6.3.3, and 6.4 nf IEEE 317-1976 have not been incorporated.
The penetration cable protection limitation curves are shown together with their respective protective device coordination curve" on Figures 3.13-1 to 3.13-7. The short circuit curves apply for the condition when the electrical and mechanical seal integrity is maintained. The seal limitation curves apply when the tnechanical seal integrity is maintained and the electrical integrity is sacrificed.
The penetration" assemblies are type tested. There are no provisio>>s for periodic testing under simulated fault conditions.
ElecLrical penetration circuits are summarized as follows:
kev. 35, 07/84 3.13-24
0 SSES-FSAR Re ulator Guide 1.92 COMBINING MODAL RESPONSES AND
/ SPATIAL COMPONENTS IN SEISMIC RESPONSE ANALYSIS (Revision 1, Februar 1976)
Since the construction permit for the Susquehanna SES was issued in November 1973, the methods of combining modal responses and spatial components in seismic response analysis, as described in this regulatory guide, were not specifically considered in the design. The methods of design and analysis for structures, components, and piping systems that have been employed are Re ulator Guide 1.93 AVAILABILITYOF ELECTRIC POWER SOURCES (December 1974)
Compliance with this guide is discussed in Subsection 8.1.6.2.
~Re ulator Guide 1.94 QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTALLATION, INSPECTION/
AND TESTING OF STRUCTURAL CONCRETE AND STRUCTURAL STEEL DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ril t The SES (Revision 1, A 1976) quality assurance program for the construction of Susquehanna is described in the PSAR, Appendix D and amendments.
Compliance of the Operational Quality Assurance Program with this guide is described in Section 17.2.
Re ulator Guide 1.95 - PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWFR i PLANT CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS oi AGAINST AN ACCIDENTAL. CHLORINE RELEASE (Februar 1975)
The present design of the Susquehanna SES complies with the position statements of this regulatory guide. d Re ulatos Guide 1.96 DESIGN OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VJ VALVE I EAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS oJ FOR BOILING WATER REACTOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, June 1976)
Subject to the clarification indicated below, the provisions of this regulatory guide are met by the current plant design.
(1)
Reference:
Appendix A, Paragraph 6. The design and inspection of thi,s portion of the leakage control system is in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pzessure Vessel Code. The 100 percent volumetric inspection 3.13-37
'P 0
SSES-FSAR Rc ulator Guide 1.92 - COMBINING MODAL RESrONSES AND SPATIAL COMPONENTS'N SEISMIC RESPONSE ANALYSIS (Revision 1, Februar 1976)
Since the construction pc.rmit for the Susquehanna SES was issued in November 1973, the methods of combining modal responses and spatial components in seismic response analysis, as described in thi~requl t ~ujpg~ gg~ not specifically considered in the
~
de ign~ %Be mht'hocR of 3e'deign and analysis for structuresg components, and piping systems that have been employed are described in Sections 3.7a, 3.7b and 3.9.
Be ulator Guide 1.93 -* AVAILABILITYOF ELECTRIC POWER SOURCES (December 1974)
Compliance with this guide is discussed in Subsection 8.1.6.2.
~Re ulator Guide 1.94 QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTALLATION, INSPECTIONt AND TESTING OF STRUCTURAL CONCRETE AND STRUCTURAL STEEL DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, A ril 1976)
The cuality assurance program for the'onstruction of Susquehanna SES is described in the PSAR, Appendix D and amendments.
Compliance of the Operational Quality Assurance Program with this guide is described in Section 17.2.
R. aulatc'r . Guide 1.95 PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT- CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS AGAINST AN ACCIDENTAL CHLORINE RELEASE (Februar 1975)
The present design of the Susquehanna SES complies with the position statements of this regulatory guide.
Be ulator 'uide 1.96, DESIGN OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR BOILING WATER REACTOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, June 1976)
Subject to the clarification indicated below, the provisions of this regulatory guide are met by the current plant design.
(I)
Reference:
Appendix A, Paragraph 6. The design and inspection of this portion of the leakage control system is in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The 100 percent volumetric inspection Pev. 35, 07/84 3.13-37
SSES-FSAR Re ulator Guide 1.100 SEISMIC QUALIFICAT .N OF ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (March 1976)
The implementation paragraph of this regulatory guide states that the requirements of'he position statements will only be applied to plants that received construction permits after November 16, 1976. The Construction Permit for Susquehanna SES was issued in November 1973 and therefore the guidelines of this regulatory guide have not been utilized in the design of this nuclear power station.
qualification of the safety related electric equipment P
Seismic (non-NSSS scope of supply) has been conducted in"'accordance with the IEEE Standard 344-1971. Section 3.10 describes the complete qualification methods and procedures that have been utilized.
The safety-related electric equipment (NSSS scope of supply) meets IEEE 323-1971 and IEEE 344-1971.
Re ulator Guide 1.101 EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Withdrawn September 24, 1980.
Re ulatorv Guide 1.102 FLOOD PROTECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Revision 1, Se tember 1976)
The present design of the Susquehanna SES complies with the tA provisions of this regulatory guide. c Regulator Guide 1.103 POSTTENSIONED PRESTRESSING 3 SYSTEMS FOR CONCRETE. REACTOR VESSELS AND CONTAINMENTS (Revision 1, October 1976)
Not Applicable. ~
'+ . gg ~l 1
Re ulator Guide 1.104 OVERHEAD CRANE HANDLING SYSTEMS I FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Februar 1976}
S A
Subject to the clarifications and exceptions indicated below, the safety related overhead crane handling systems of this station comply with the provisions of this regulatory guide. I ~S (1)
Reference:
Position C. l.b(2) . The ni;1-ductility transition temperature for. 'the structural steel associated with the cranes was not determined as suggested by this position. Position Rev. M, 3.13-39
4 0
SSES-FSAR Re ulator 'uide 1.122 DEVELOPMENT OF FLO"~ DESIGN RESPONSE SPECTRA FOR SEISMIC DESIGN'F FLOOR-SUPPORTED EQUIPMENT OR'OMPONENTS (September 1976)
The methods.used for developing the floor design response spectra for Susquehanna SES are in compliance with the positions of this regulatory guide except as follows:
1. The frequencies used for the calculation of the response spectra are different and are described in Subsection 3.7b.2.5.
2. The procedure for smoothing the spectra (broadening of peaks) is different and is discussed in Subsection 3.7b.2.9.
ke ulator Guide l. 123 QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL OF PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS AND SERVICES FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS (Revision 1, Jul 1977)
The Susquehanna SES quality assurance program for the construction phase is detailed in PSAR Appendix D and amendments.
Compliance of the Operational Quality Assurance Program with this regulatory guide is discussed in Section 17.2.
~ II Re ulator Guide 1.124 - DESIGN LIM1TS, AND LOADING COMBINATIONS FOR CLASS 1 LINEAR-TYPE COMPONENT SUPPORTS (November 1976)
Since the construction permit for Susquehanna SES was issued in November 1973, this regulatory guide was not specifically considered in the design. The methods used to determine design loading combinations for Susquehanna SES are described in Sectionl 3 ~ 9 ~
Re ulator Guide 1.125 PHYSICAL MODELS FOR DESIGN AND OPERATION OF HYDRAULIC STRUCTURES UJ AND SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (March 1977)
No physical models were used during the design of Susquehanna SES.
3.13-45
SSHS-FSAR (1) Paragraph C.2 - The design basis event condi'ons meet the
~
~ ~
most severe postulated conditions for Susquehanna SES. Factors or margin given in Section 6.3.1.5 3 1. 5 of IEEE 323-1974 vere not
~ fW 8Pf FW gpg<Tge/> N~ c~g M4'47 /PLd'~A 5
~
A~so~ih<LP
~ WI TH
~ggf (2) paragraph C.4 - Only one aging data point (121 C) has been I-II-TM oi85~ +&A E uRu 7'aau<Syggyg Mrna+'.
jPjg DIP@ he ~g" Noj7joij FkP AT L~cAs7'aI AsjAjs DATA '<TP wM
(/j ParaprapÃ C.6 - Flame tests were done in accordance with IEEE
'VDAs-74 d> 'kF~Z'cF/hK'AN 4E'P~IPw, <<@SPCnFWT Addo i ~~ v~
)Hi 4
~cFw(TV Para ra h C.10 - Gas burner positron xs in accordance vith jr'k gjjFrw Cpp @4 ~ dong /c w'8A'8 4 wr%%dC, CASWS AH~47Ãb ~~rF ~
Djsssc. AM "8" wjjsxc Tjjd DA5 jdur<<sji jesjrjau ~As <<Accoso-Egpui~M~7 5 e/>> gi gu+7bZyujdd /./5/,
(5) panel internal wrres ar~ nay ggalrfjed to Regulatory curd~
exit SS /+ P~EL. N7
/ 0 C. , ii+'i ID @
$ D4ssjs 4~1 -Dj jjAcrolzDAjjcd wjrjj Tjjd idcoisirs&fkijTD DAEcccEBE-I' electric cables, Iield splices, and connections Ior the RESS scope of supply have not been evaluated against this regulatory guide.
3.13-47
PENNSYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATOR E FACILITY DESIGN DESCRIPTION REPORT,
C TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION ~Pa e 1.0 Design Approach 1-1 1.1 Purpose of Diesel Generator E 1-1 1.2 Control of Diesel Generator E 1-2 1.3 Substitution of Diesel Generator 1-2 2.0 Physical Description 3.0 Design 3-1 3.1 Mechanical Equipment 3-1 3.1.1 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 3-1
-3.1.2 Cooling Water System 3-2 3.1.3 Heating and Ventilation 3-2 k 3.1.4 Plumbing and Drainage 3-3 3.1.5 Fire .Protection/Detection 3-3 k 3. 1. 6 Diesel Generator Starting Air System 3-4 3.1.7 Lube Oil System 3-4
3. 1.8 Jacket Water System 3-5 3.l..9 Fuel Oil System 3-5 3.2 Structural Design 3-6 3.2.1 Civil Design 3-7 3.3 Electrical Design 3-7 3.3.1 Medium Voltage System 3-8 3.3.1.1 New Switchgear 3-8 3.3.1.2 Switching Points 3-9 3.3.2 480-Volt System 3-9 3.3.3 Class 1E 125-Volt D.C. System 3-9 3.3.4 Transfer Switching System 3-10 3.3.4.1 Transfer Panels 3-10 3.3.4.2 Local Engine-Generator Control Panels 3-10 3.3.4.3 Devices To Be Transferred 3-10 3.3.4.4 Bypassed ~ad Inoperable Status Panel 3-11 3.'-.4.5 Dedicated Devices 3-11 3.3.5 Lighting System 3-12 3.3.6 Grounding System 3-12 3.3.7 Communication System 3-13 3.3.& Security System 3-13 3.3.9 Test Facility 3-13 3.3.10 Mild Environment 3-14 3.4 Instrumentation and Controls 3-14 4.0 Studies 4- l.
5.0 Tie-In Description 5-1
i' Appendix A - Dravings Appendix B Codes, Standards, and Regulations Applicable to Diesel Generator E Faci.lity Appendix C Seismic Analysis Procedures and tiodels for The Diesel Generator E Building
1.0 DESIGN APPROACH The diesel generator E facility including the components contained thezejn is a nuclear safety related, Seismic Category I, Class 1E facility that wj,ll be used to provide emergency power to Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) when one of the four existing diesel generators is out of service.
The location of the diesel generator E facility is shown on drawing C-5003 "Plot Plan, Diesel Generator E Facility Site Development Plan" contained in Appendix A to this report. The location of the building was selected to satisfy the requirements listed below:
o Close to the existing diesel generator buildings.
o Close to the tie-in points for water, air and electrical.
o Clearance around the building for construction equipment.
o Clearance between the building and the security fence, both in its temporary and final positions.
o Clearance between the building and existing structures above ground and underground.
o Accessibility to the railroad for off loading the diesel generator and setting it on the pedestal.
o Close to the underground sound rock.
Codes, standards, and regulations applicable to this pro)ect are generally those in effect on September 22, 1983. A list of the applicable codes, standards, and regulations is contained in Appendix B to this report.
Diesel generator E uses the existing indications the place of an existing diesel generator.
and controls when it is in 1.1 Pur ose of Diesel Generator E The Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Technical Specifications state that a diesel zenerator sy be inoperable . or 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , after which a two unit shutdc.. must commence. The fifth diesel generator will be used as a replacement and will have the capability of supplying the emergency loading for any one'f the four existing diesel generators. As such, the main purpose of diesel generator E is to allo~ maintenance to be performed on any one of the four existing diesel generators without the necessity for a two unit outage.
After the existing diesel generator has been replaced by diesel generator E, testing and maintenance can be performed on the existing diesel generator for as long as required, within the limitation of mechanical maintenance and "no load" testing.
1-1
1.2 Control of Diesel Generator E Diesel generator E utilizes the same metering and controls used for the replaced diesel generator. A new control board is not required. The use of a transfer switching system minimizes costs, reduces electrical wiring separation problems, conserves space and minimizes changes in the main control room. Furthermore, the human factors value of the present arrangement are retained. Since diesel generator E is essentially,a replacement for any one of the four existing units, the presence of a fifth display could cause unnecessary confusion in a four-channel system.
1.3 Substitution of Diesel Generator The sequence for transferring control of an existing diesel to the E diesel is described below. The sequence described is for substituting diesel generator E for diesel generator A however the same sequence applies to the other diesels with the suffix letters changing for the diesel being substituted.
Place HS-00057A on OC512A in "Disable" position. This action removes auto start signal from diesel generator A. The operator must change the position of this switch as the first step in the switching sequence.
2~ Close the emergency service water valves for diesel generator A from OC-553 in the control room.
3. Place the located switches on OC512A to the diesel generator E position.
4. Trip and remove the 4.16Kv circuit breaker from OA510AOl.
5. Rack in and close 4.16Kv circuit breaker removed from OA510A01 into OA510A02. This completes switching in diesel generator A.
6. Open the emergency service water valves for diesel generator E from OC-553 in the Control Room.
7 ~ Place the listed switches on OC512E-A in the diesel generator A position.
8. remove the 4.16Kv circuit breaker from OA51007.
9. Rack in and close 4.16Kv circuit breaker removed from OA51007 into OA51001.
10. Place HS000571E-A on OC512E-A in the "ENABLE" position. This switch permits autostart of diesel generator E. The operator must change the position of this switch as the last step in the electrical switching sequence. This completes the electrical switching, diesel generator E is now aligned for diesel generator A.
ll. The alarm "Diesel Not in Auto" will sound in the control room when disabling a diesel generator for transfer to another diesel generator.
This alarm will cease when the alignment is complete.
1-2
12. The sequence for placing diesel generator A back into service would be the reverse of the steps discussed above.
1-3
2.0 PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION General arrangements of the diesel generator E building depicting location of major equipment are shown on drawing M-5200 contained in Appendix A to this report. The building is designed to Seismic Category I requirements and is protected from the effects of tornado missiles. It is a reinforced concrete two story structure with a penthouse and an additional level below grade, Reinforced concrete was selected for the walls and roof as being the most.
suitable material for protection against missiles, seismic loads and below grade construction. The floors of reinforced concrete are monolithically constructed with walls as a common practice. Entry to the building is at the grade elevation by doors protected from the effects of missiles with labyrinths.
The basement houses the 125-V dc battery room, battery charger, 4160-V switchgear, transfer panels, termination cabinets, building auxiliary services panel, non-class 1E auto transfer switch, non-class 1E MCC, 125-V dc switchboard, starting air compressors skids and, sump. Underground piping is brought into the building at this level.
In addition to the diesel generator and its skid mounted accessories, the floor at grade contains the air receiver skid and the diesel generator control room, consisting of a generator and engine control cabinet, Class 1E motor control centers, synchronizing panel and, a 4160/480 V transformer.
The second story contains the air intake filter, silencer, intake piping, exhaust muffler and piping, and ventilation supply and exhaust fans. The penthouse contains the exhaust chamber for the diesel generator exhaust and ventilation exhaust.
The combustion air and ventilation air intake is taken from one end of the building via an opening which is protected from tornado missiles. To minimize recirculation of engine exhaust into the combustion air and ventilation air intake, the combustion exhaust and ventilation exhaust are located in the penthouse at the opposite end of the building, and are protected from the effects of tornado missiles by a concrete'verhang. Tornado dampers have been provided for the ventilation air intake and exhaust openings. Both the intake and exhaust are located more than 30 feet above grade.
A port', of the nortn wall at grade elevation is removable to facilitate removal of the diesel or components on the auxiliary skid should this become necessary during the life of the facility. This portion of the wall is designed to withstand the effects of tornado missiles and seismic events. A 20 ton bridge crane is provided to permit handling of diesel generator and auxiliary skid components. The heaviest single piece (engine component) to be lifted during the maintenance is the turbo-charger which weighs approximately 5100 lbs.. Major equipment whose weight is less than the crane capacity includes the generator rotor, generator stator, generator shaft, flywheel, piston and connecting rod.
2-1
3.0 DESIGN 3.1 Mechanical E ui ment The mechanical equipment considered to be nuclear safety related includes the fuel oil storage and transfer system, combustion air intake and exhaust system, starting air system (from the receivers to the engine), the cooling water system, the jacket water system, and the lube oil system. The piping of pumps, tanks, and valves associated with these portions of the mechanical systems are designed as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I components in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26. As such, they are protected from tornado missiles, floods, and other natural phenomena. Mechanical equipment in both non-nuclear safety related parts 'of the systems discussed above and systems which are entirely non-nuclear safety related, such as potable water and service air, are designed to preclude damage to nuclear safety-related equipment during and after a safe shutdown earthquake by seismically supporting such piping and components. Piping is seismically supported using the equations of ASME Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1971 issue with all addenda issued through winter 1972. Piping which is not required to be Safety Class 3 is procured as 831.1, is seismically supported, and is in accordance with ANSI B31.1-1973.
The effects of moderate energy breaks in piping systems are considered. in. the design of the diesel generator E building. The piping generally has been designed with stress levels low enough to preclude the postulation of moderate energy breaks. Where this is not possible essential equipment is protected from the wetting effects of a pipe crack by physical separation or barriers.
Essential equipment is protected from flooding effects by mounting the equipment on pedestals, by barriers, or by operator action. A level alarm is provided to indicate the existence of a high water level in the building sump.
I 3.1.1 Fuel Oil Stora e and Transfer S stem The fuel oil storage and transfer system consists of an underground storage tank, a transfer pump, and associated piping, valves, and instrumentation.
The tank will be filled from a new fill station.'he storage tank is sized to contain 80,000 gallons of fuel oil which allows for approximately th'irty (30) hours of testing of the diesel generator and seven (7) days of continuous operation, all at full load. The fuel oil transfer pump is capable of filling the da~ "=ank for i:h= n w diesel gene"ator and (non-concurrently) the day tank on any une of the existing diesels. It can also fill,any of the existing diesel fuel oil storage tanks. The transfer pump is actuated automatically from its associated day tank. Filling of existing day tanks with the diesel generator E transfer pump is controlled manually.
The fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed as a Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I system, in accordance with, the requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.137 and ANSI Standard N-195.
The flow diagram for the fuel oil storage and transfer system serving diesel generator E is shown on drawing M-120, Sheet 2, in Appendix A.
Instrumentation and control diagrams are shown on drawing J-120, sheets 3,4, and 5, also in Appendix A.
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3.1.2 Coolin Water S stem The Emergency Service Water System (ESW) is used .to supply cooling water to the following components of diesel generator E:
o Lube Oil Cooler o Jacket Water Cooler o Fuel Oil Cooler o Intercoolers The existing emergency service water system has been extended to the diesel generator E building via four (4) 10 inch pipes. One each for loop A supply loop A return, loop B supply, and loop B return. A motor operated butterfly valve is provided on each of these lines. When diesel generator E is used to replace another diesel, loop A is the primary'ooling source, with either a manual or an automatic transfer'to loop B if loop A becomes unavailable.
The flow diagram for the emergency service water system serving diesel generator E is shown on drawing M-ill, sheet 3, in Appendix A.
Instrumentation and control diagrams are shown on drawing J-ill, sheets 10, ll, 13, 14, 14A and 15, also Appendix A.
3.1.3 Heatin and Ventilation The design temperature parameters and heat refection to the space by the diesel generator and other heat producing devices were used to sise the ventilation system for the diesel generator E bui'lding. The design parameters are detailed in Table 3.1.
The capacity of the ventilating system fans was selected to'andle the heat rejection to the space by diesel generator E and to maintain the space temperature below 120'F in summer when the diesel generator is operating.
Two (2) 50 percent capacity supply fans, two (2) 50 percent capacity exhaust fans and one (1) 100 percent capacity battery room and basement exhaust fan were selected to ventilate the building.
The first set of interlocked supply and exhaust fans maintain space temperature below 104'F by means of damper modulation and starting of fans from t~= space therostat. The second set of interlocked supply and exhaust fans start when the indoor temperature rises above 104'F. This arrangement of one (1) 50 percent capacity supply and one (1) 50 percent capacity exhaust fan running during the normal ventilation mode is furnished to conserve energy; No filtration or cooling is provided in the ventilation system. The modulating damper system controls temperature and is designed for fail safe operation to permit full ventilation.
I The exhaust fan for the battery room and basement is manually operated, runs continuously and was selected for explosion-proof construction. Ventilation air for the battery room/charger area and basement is transferred from the building space and leakage through dampers when the ventilation supply fan is not operating. The ventilating system is designed as safety related and Seismic Category I.
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The heating system for all areas consists of electric unit heaters and electric baseboard heaters. The heaters are not safety related and are designed to commercial industry standards. They are however, supported to Seismic Category I requirements to avoid II/I safety impact concerns. The heaters have built-in thermostats to automatically maintain space temperature in accordance with the design parameters listed in Table 3-1.
When diesel generator E is not operating, actuation of the fire detection.
system will automatically stop all the supply and exhaust fans and override the temperature controls.
flow diagram for the heating and ventilating I'he system serving diesel generator E is shown on drawing M-182, sheet 2> in Appendix A.
Instrumentation and control diagrams are shown on drawing V-182, sheets 7, 8, 8A, 9, 9A, 10, 11, 13, 13A, 14, 15, and 16, also Appendix A.
3.1.4 Plumbin and Draina e Plumbing and drainage systems for the diesel generator E facility are designed and sized to accommodate the various types of drainage in the building. Roof drains are piped to the storm sewer. Equipment and floor drains from elevations 675'-6" and 708'-0" are piped to an underground waste water storage tank located outside the diesel generator building. Equipment and floor drains from elevation 656'-6" (except floor drain from battery room) from the waste water storage tank are discharged by gravity to anand'ffluent oil/water separator located inside the building in a sump. The floor drain of the battery room discharges to an acid neutralizing sump, where waste is neutralized and discharged to the oil/water separator. The effluent of the oil/water separator discharges into the building sump. The building sump is equipped with duplex sump pumps of 100 GPM capacity each. Building sump contents (waste water) are pumped to the plant oily waste system. The oil separated in the oil/water separator is pumped and collected in a 550 gallon underground waste oil storage tank located outside the diesel generator E building.
The underground waste water storage tank is designed t'o contain fire protection water from the 10 minutes of operation of pre-action sprinkler system.
3.1.5 !".re Protect'on/Detection The design of the fire protection and detection system is in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G, J and 0; NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5.1, NFPA National Fire Codes, and FM standards.
The fire suppression system'ets its water from the plant yard loop. The sprinkler and fire sta'ndpipe systems are designed for a water supply from one 2500 gpm/125 psi fire pump delivering water through a yard main with the shortest route assumed to be unavailable.
The fire standpipe system and hoses are located so that all interior sections of the building can be reached per NFPA Class III requirements.
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The type, number, and location of portable fire extinguishers are in accordance with NFPA requirements.
Operation of the fire detection and protection systems is interlocked with the ventilation system so as to shut down those systems (except during emergency operation of the diesel generator) which will interfere with fire fighting, control, containment, and suppression of the fire.
In addition to the fire protection system, an early warning fire detection system is provided for the building. Detector spacing and types of detectors are consistent with the type of service required. The detection system is compatible and interfaces with the existing plant fire protection multiplexing system.
The fire protection panel is fed from a battery back-up package furnished by the smoke and temperature detection panel vendor.
The flow diagram for the fire protection system serving diesel generator E is show on drawing M-122, sheet 9, contained in Appendix A. The instrument and logic diagram for the system, indicating fire detectors, is shown on Figure F-1006 in Appendix A.
3.1.6 Diesel Generator Startin Air S stem As in the existing diesel generators, diesel generator E has a starting air system which supplies high pressure air sequentially to the diesel engine cylinders. The system (both loops) consists of air compressors (2), air receivers (4), air filters, air dryers, air precoolers moisture separators, and associated piping, valves and instrumentation.
Two redundant air starting systems are provided for diesel generator E to increase starting reliability. Additionally, a cross-tie is provided to allow either compressor to charge all 4 air receivers. Each air start loop is capable of performing a total of five (5) 10 second starts without recharging the air receivers.
All= equipment mounted in the air received skid is safety class 3, Seismic Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26. All equipment mounted on the air compressor skid is commercial grade.
The flow diagram for the Starting Air System serving diesel generator E is shown on drawing M-134 sheet 2, in Appendix A.
3.1.7 Lube Oil S stem The diesel generator E lube oil system is essentially identical to the existing diesel generators system and consists of an engine driven pump, standby A.C. motor driven pump, circulating pump, lube oil heater, lube oil heat exchanger'nd associated piping, valves and instrumentation.
The primary purpose of the lube oil system is to lubricate bearings and other moving parts in the engine. Additionally, this system is used to lubricate turbo-charger bearings, keep the engine warm in the standby mode to enhance r
immediate startup, cool the pistons, and maintain engine cleanliness by preventing rust and corrosion.
The engine driven pump provides the required lube oil pressure during normal operation. A standby A.C. motor driven pump will automatically start upon failure of the engine driven pump. A circulating pump and electric immersion type heater are used to maintain lube oil at a prescribed temperature during standby periods. A thermostatic control valve is used to maintain lube oil temperature during these periods.
All equipment mounted on the auxiliary skid is designed as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29. All equipment supplied by the engine manufacturer has been seismically qualified.
The flow diagram for the lube oil system serving diesel generator E is shown on drawing M-134 sheet 2, in Appendix A.
3.1.8 Jacket Water S stem The diesel generator E jacket water system is similar to the existing diesel's jacket water system and consists of a standpipe, engine driven pump, standby A.C. motor driven pump, circulation pump, jacket water heater, jacket water cooler and associated piping, valves, and instrumentation.
The jacket water system is a closed loop system which uses treated water to cool the engine cylinder jackets, turbo-charger, and the governor oil cooler.
This system circulates warm jacket water through the heater portion of the air intercoolers to heat the combustion air during startup.
The engine driven pump provides the required jacket water pressure during normal engine operation. An A.C. motor driven pump is provided in the event of engine driven pump failure. This pump will automatically turn-on upon loss of lube oil pressure. A circulating pump and electric immersion type heater are used to keep jacket water at around 120 0 F during stand-by periods to enhance immediate start-up. A thermostatic control valve is used to maintain jacket water temperature during these periods.
All equipment mounted on the auxiliary skid is designed as safety class 3, seismi :ategory 1 ~n accordance witn the requirements of U.S. Regulatory Guide 1.26. In addition, all equipment supplied by the engine manufacturer and mounted on the engine has been seismically qualified.
The flow diagram for the jacket water system serving diesel generator E is shown on drawing M-134, sheet 2, in Appendix A.
3.1.9 Fuel Oil S stem The diesel generator E fuel oil system is essentially identical to the existing diesel generators system and consists of an engine driven pump, D.C.
motor driven pump, twenty (20) injection pumps, fuel oil day tank, fuel oil heat exchanger, filters, strainers and associated piping> valves, and instrumentation.
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Flow from the day tank supplies fuel to the engine driven pump which in turn supplies fuel at 35 psig to the in)ection pumps. A relief valve is utilized at the discharge of the engine driven pump to maintain pressure at 35 psig.
The fuel oil cooler is used to cool the fuel oil which is bypassed by the relief valve back to the day tank. The filters and strainers are used to assure clean fuel to the high pressure injection pumps. A D.C. motor driven fuel oil pump is provided to replace the engine driven pump in the event of engine driven pump failure. This pump will automatically start upon loss of pressure at the discharge of the engine driven pump.
All equipment mounted on the auxiliary skid is designed as Safety Class 3, Seismic Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29. All equipment supplied by the engine manufacturer and mounted on the engine has been seismically qualified.
The flow diagram for the diesel generator E fuel oil system is shown on drawing M-134, Sheet 2, in Appendix A.
3.2 Structural Desi n The diesel generator E building is a Seismic Category 1, two-story structure with a penthouse and a basement consisting primarily of reinforced concrete walls, floor slabs, and roof. The diesel generator ped'estal is also constructed of reinforced concrete. A gap between the building floor and the pedestal at grade level is provided so that vibrations from the diesel generator are not transmitted to the building. A curb plate has been installed to prevent excessive water and oil from leaking down to the basement from the operating floor (el. 675'-6") through this'ap.
The foundation system was constructed by first removing the volume of soil from the existing grade down to the sound rock with the plan area slightly larger than that of the building. This volume was filled with lean concrete extending from the sound rock to a convenient elevation, which is'he bottom elevation of the building basement floor mat.
The foundation system for diesel generator support E is similar to that used for the existing diesel generators. It consists of a reinforced concrete block approximately 34'ong x 9'ide x 21'-6" high, with four very small openin," and is founded on the lean concrete which in turn is bonded to the bedrock. This type of foundation pedestal has a high rigidity and consequently its frequency of the lowest fundamental mode of vibration will be more than 1.5 times the speed of diesel engine (600 rpm). This will preclude any support related vibration problems.
The outer reinforced concrete walls and roof of the diesel generator E building have sufficient thickness to resist effects of tornado missiles. A portion of an outer wall is removable to facilitate diesel generator installation and/or emergency removal and maintenance operation. This removable wall portion is designed to resist the effects of tornado missiles and seismic loads. Since the high ground water level for design purpose is at elevation 665'-0", a waterproofing membrane is installed on the outside of the basement walls up to elevation 665'-0" and on the bottom surface of the 3-6
basement floor mat. Waterstops are provided at construction )oints below elevation 665'-0"..
A description of the seismic analysis procedure and models for the diesel generator E building is contained in Appendix C to .this report.
The site was reviewed and evaluated for existing conditions relating to soils and rock materials, drainage patterns, pavements and other ground covers, susceptibility to erosion, site accessibility, and controls for survey work; and to establish a basis for verifying the exact location of all above grade tie-in systems and all underground safety and non safety related systems that could impact design or construction activities. A licensed surveyor determined the horizontal and vertical locations of key points for these systems and the data was assembled on a single Composite Utility Plan, tied into the plant grid and datum. This Composite Plan was used throughout preliminary and final design to maintain control of the location of tie-in work and all new underground systems *(all piping systems, utilities, and structures including water and sanitary sewer lines, storm drainage lines, electric duct banks, fuel lines, and any other lines).
basis for defining the "as-built" conditions.
It also serves as a Based on a review of'vailable existing subsurface data, additional borings were recommended to establish a design basis for excavation and backfill operations. The results of these investigations including construction stage sheeting and bracing considerations, recommendations for excavation and backfill operations and dewatering are presented in Gibbs & Hill document 3544-SR-001 entitled "Report on Subsurface Investigations for Diesel Generator E Facility".
Erosion and sedimentation controls were imposed on construction activities based on guidelines stipulated in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resource Rules and Regulations, Chapter 102.
The site storm drainage system is designed to provide adequate drainage throughout the life of the facility. The building site is graded to drain away from the diesel generator E structure. The peak rate of stormwater runoff from the site was determined using the Rational Method of design based on pre(-i.itation va=u=s derived fro- criteria presented in Section 6.3.7.1 of Technical Specification G-1001. Surface runoff will be conveyed to a peripheral ditch for discharge through the existing storm drainage system.
3.3 Electrical Desi n Electrical separation of control and power circuits in the existing diesel building is as described 'in the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) sections 3. 12. 3.4.2, 8; 1.6. 1.h and 8.3. 1. 11.4.
For drawings and tables see the referenced FSAR sections.
Electrical separation of control and power circuits in diesel generator E building is as described in IEEE-384, 1981 and; Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2, 1978 as interpreted (FSAR)'ection 8.1.6.1.h. For drawings see E81-1, E81-2 and E81-3 of Appendix A.
3-7.
3.3.1 Medium Volta e S stem Diesel generator E is connected directly to the switchgear in the deisel generator E facility. The switchgear is Class 1E and consists of metal-clad, dead-front, free-standing steel structures, complete with buses, draw-out circuit breakers, current and potential transformers, control switches, instruments, and other equipment necessary for proper operation. The circuit breakers are rated 1200A, 250MVA, 4.16kV, with commensurate bus bracing. Each of the four empty positions in the switchgear is connected to a Class 1E switching point located at an existing diesel generator. Each switching point consists of a manual circuit breaker and an empty position. A manual circuit breaker is provided for insertion into only one of the four positions in the switchgear in the diesel generator E facility, and a manual circuit breaker is provided for insertion at each switching point located at an existing diesel generator. Proper alignment allows the spare diesel to be connected in place of any one of the existing diesels. When not in use, the manual circuit breakers are stored in a spare cubicle in the switchgear in the diesel generator 'E building. A circuit breaker is also provided for connection to the 4.15kV primary of the new indoor transformer. A cubicle is provided for auxiliary metering and/or instrumentation, and for connection to the test facility.
Changes to the diesel generator control panel located in the main control room have been minimized. A system for control transfer has been developed, with consideration to cable separation requirements and Human Factors Engineering.
The following are located at the new switchgear in the diesel generator E building:
Incoming line compartment Voltmeter Voltmeter switch Equipped space (total of four)
Ammeter Ammed ".
switch Local control switch with three indicating lights (breaker open, breaker closed, breaker in test)
Transformer feeder Circuit breaker Ammeter and ammeter switch 50/51 short circuit/overcurrent protective relays
'50G ground current protective relay Local control switch with three indicating lights (breaker open, breaker closed, breaker in test)
Key interlock, for disconnect switch on transformer -to preclude operating switch unless breaker is open 3-8
Lockout relay o Test Facility compartment o Breaker storage compartment 3.3.1.2 Switchin Points The following are located at each of the four new switching points in the existing diesel generator buildings.
o Circuit breaker compartment Manual, draw-out breaker Local control switch with three indicating lights (breaker open, breaker closed, breaker in test)
Ammeter Ammeter switch o Equipped space Voltmeter Voltmeter switch Ammeter switch Local control switch with three indicating lights (breaker open, breaker closed, breaker in test) 3.3.2 480-Volt S stem The secondary of the new indoor transformer is connectable to a Class 1E Motor Control Center (MCC), to supply the E diesel generator auxiliary loads. This Class 1E MCC is connected to a new non-Class 1E MCC via two shunt<<trip circuit breakers, each activated by an undervoltage or LOCA signal. The non-Class 1E MCC is normally powered via an automatic transfer switch from either a Unit 1 or Unit 2 non-Class 1E load center. Both MCC's are enclosed, free-standing cabinet-type with main and vertical buses, combination motor starters, feeder protection devices, and other equipment as required.
3.3.3 Class 1E 125-Volt DC S stem The Class 1E dc system supplies power for operation of the new 4.16kV switchgear lineup, ESW valves, diesel controls, field flashing, and similar requirements. It is composed of one battery, one charger, one switchboard, one MCC, and one distribution panel in the diesel generator E building. The components are suitably sized to meet the requirements of the system and are shown on the 125V DC one-line drawing E-ll, Sheet ll in Appendix A. The battery charger is capable of supporting the necessary loads while recharging the battery within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , as well as providing the battery float and equalizing charge.
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3.3.4 Transfer Switchin S stem A system for transfer switching has been developed, with consideration to cable separation requirements, Human Factors Engineering, and to minimizing changes to the control boards in the main control room.
3.3.4.1 Transfer Panels The transfer switching system involves operation of transfer switches on panels located in the diesel generator E building and in the existing diesel generator buildings. Several grouping of controls, metering, and alarms will be transferred.
The transfer switches in the specific transfer panels in the diesel generator E building are used to select the path to the controls of the specific diesel generator to be replaced. The transfer switch at the individual transfer panel in each existing diesel generator building is used to transfer controls of the specific diesel generator to be replaced to diesel generator E. These two switches in series provide a double break in control circuits to preclude problems in the new building from being propagated into any 'of the existing diesel generator controls. This same principle applies to the two power circuit breakers in series; there are always two breaks between diesel generator E and an existing nonaligned diesel generator. Also, the diesel generators cannot be paralleled.
The location of the switchgear and transfer panels at Elevation 710'n the existing diesel generator buildings provides some protection from missiles.
If a fire or missile from an existing diesel generator were to occur at a switching point, it will disable the switching point in a manner such that repair would be required before diesel generator E could be used in place of the particular existing diesel generator.
3.3.4.2 Local En ine-Generator Control Panels The generator control panel for diesel generator E includes protective relaying, and is located in the diesel generator E building. This panel is similar to the panels provided for each of the existing diesel generators.
(Refer to Table 3-2).
The ne'~ 'ngine cont-.-'anel for the diesel generator E engine includes instrumentation, and is located in the diesel generator E building. This panel is similar to the panels provided for each of the existing diesel generators. (Refer to Table 3-3).
3.3.4.3 Devices to be Transferred The devices associated with the replaced diesel generator are used for diesel generator E, via the transfer switching system. (Refer to Table 3-3).
The new devices to be re-used, as above, on the main control board are:
o Alarms Diesel generator tripped High priority alarm 3>>10
Low priority alarm Diesel generator breaker trip Diesel generator fails to start Diesel generator at near full load Diesel generator not in automatic mode Room flooded Controls Start-Stop Synchronize Frequency adjustment Voltage ad)ustment Manual or automatic voltage regulator selection Isochronous and droop selection Ready to run>< ligh BIS 'signals (See Section 3.3.4.4)
Meters Voltage Current Frequency Kilowatt output 3.3.4.4 B assed and Ino erable Status (BIS) Panel For each of the systems listed below, the switches and indications for each of the existing diesel generators are used, via a switching transfer system, when diesel generator E is used in place of any one of the existing four diesel generators.
Diesel Generator Control System Diesel Generator Output System Diesel Generator Auxiliary System
'SW System Each of these systems exists for the existing diesel generators. Table 3-4 lists indicating lights in existing BIS panels.
3.3.4.5 Dedicated Devices The following new devices, located on the main control board, are dedicated to the diesel generator E facility:
o Alarms 4.16kV System for Diesel Generator E Facility-Trouble DC System for Diesel Generator E Facility-Trouble HVAC Failure in Diesel Generator E Facility Control Switches Not Properly Aligned Diesel Generator E Building Sump Level High 3-11
o Indicating Lights A series of five indicating lights are provided to status the replacement diesel generator E as follows:
Diesel Generator E not aligned as a replacement Diesel Generator E aligned as replacement for Diesel Generator A Diesel Generator E aligned as replacement for Diesel Generator B Diesel Generator E aligned as replacement for Diesel Generator C Diesel Generator E aligned as replacement for Diesel Generator D, o Local>>Remote Selector Switch This device is a dedicated switch, similar to the switches for the existing diesel generators.
o Emergency Service Water Valves Operation Individual open-closed indicating lights and control switches are provided on the existing main control board for each of the four emergency service water valves associated with diesel generator E. These valves are powered from existing Division I and Division II MCCs.
Lighting fixtures operate on 277-V ac (Security lights operate at 400v; explosion-proof lights operate at 120v). Indoor lighting is metal halide or
'fluorescent depending on the particular application. Outdoor lighting is high pressure sodium. In hazardous areas such as the battery room, incandescent explosion proof lighting is used. The lighting system is powered from diesel generator E's essential ac power di~tribution which is backed up by a diesel 'aerator in tne event of loss of off-site power. Additional fixtures, energized by the main plant's normal ac power distribution are also provided to augment the essential lighting to provide the minimum illumination levels.
Exit lighting is energized by diesel generator E's essential ac power distribution system, and is provided as required, this includes self-contained battery-powered lighting fixtures. The outdoor lighting system is powered from a source traceable to the existing security system emergency power supply. Lighting systems are in accordance with the National Electrical Code.
3.3.6'roundin S stem A bare copper ground loop consisting of 250-MCM bare copper cable embedded near the base of the foundation, perimeter is installed, and connected to the 3-12
applicable equipment with the existing station grid.
a 4/0-AWG bare copper wire. This is interconnected
~ 'o 3.3.7 Communications S stem The communications system is compatible with and connected to the existing main plant communications system. Sufficient speakers and public address system st'ations for paging/communications are provided, as well as Plant Maintenance/Test Jack system stations. The system is designed in accordance with the latest issue of the NEC. The PA system is designed so that alarm messages can be heard under all conditions of operation.
3.3.8 Securit S stem The diesel generator E facility is classified as a vital area, therefore the security system is designed to satisfy all the applicable requirements of 10CFR73. In addition, the intrusion alarm system design meets the criteria outlined in Regulatory Guide 5.44.
The existing security fence was temporarily relocated prior to construction to accommodate construction progress without endangering vital area plant security.
All security devices and equipment are designed to be compatible with, and connected to, the existing plant security system.
The purpose of the test facility is to provide a means for periodic testing of diesel generator E when diesel generator E is not aligned to the Class 1E distribution system.
r The diesel generator E test facility consists of an interconnection between the diesel generator E 4.16 kV Class 1E switchgear and the Non-Class 1E 13.8 kV switchgear (Bus 10) located in the existing turbine building. The connection to Bus 10 is via a splice tap to the Makeup Water Intake Structure 13.8 kV feeder.
The test facility interconnection consists of the following ma)or items:
o '16 kV switchgear compartment and associated controls, metering and protective devices.
o, 4.16 kV circuit breaker (this is the same circuit breaker which is also utilized in the substitution of diesel generator E for any one of the existing diesel generators.
o 4.16 kV/13.2 kV, 10.5/13.15 MVA OA/FA 55C, step-up transformer.
o 13.8 kV outdoor switchgear unit with associated control and pro'tective devices (used to deenergize 4.16 kV/13.2 kV transformer when test facility is not in use) o Synchronizing panel (for synchronizing D.G. E4.16 kV output to 13.8 kV Bus 10; synchronizing is across the 4.16 kV circuit breaker).
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3.3.10 Mild Environment The diesel generator E building environment will at no time be significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal power plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. It is therefore considered to be a "mild environment". Class lE equipment located in a mild environment is not required to be environmentally qualified by type test.
Adherence to the requirements of 10CFR Part 50, Appendices A and B, and the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 3, ensures adequate performance of the safety-related equipment located in the mild environment. The Class 1E equipment located in a mild environment is subject to the plant seismic requirements, except that preconditioning (aging) prior to seismic testing is not required.
3.4 Instrumentation and Controls The control logic for activating diesel generator E is based on a review diesel generator controls, discussions with the operating staff,'nd of'xisting consideration of the Human Factors involved in placing the E diesel generator in service.
3-14
Table 3>>2 PROTECTIVE RELAYS~ METERS AND CONTROL DEVICES ON THE GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL FOR DIESEL GENERATOR E The new generator control panel is located in the diesel generator E building and 'includes the following:
o Protective relays:
40/76 Field failure 64F Field Ground Sensor 60 Voltage balance 27V Undervoltage 50/51 Overcurrent, short circuit phases A, B, C 32 Reverse Power 51NF Generator Near Full Load 59 Overvoltage 81 Underfrequency 59N Neutral overvoltage 87GE Differential Protection, with lockout relay 86D The connected 87GE relay is switched via transfer .panels.
o Meters:
DC Field current DC Field voltage Generator amperes, with ammeter switch 7
Generator kilowatts Generator Kilovars Generator voltage, with voltmeter switch Generator frequency Generator kilowatt hours
Table 3-1 DIESEL GENERATOR E BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS Summer Winter Outdoor Ambient Conditions 92'Fd.B/78 F w.b. 50F Indoor Design Conditions o Elevation 675'-6" and 708'-0" with D/G 'E'On" 120'F (Max) 70 F (Min) p E] evat ion 675 s 6>i and 708 t Osi with D/G t Es siO ff 104'F (Max) 70'F (Min) 0 Elevation 656'-6" - Battery Room with D/G 'E'On" or "Off" 104'F (Max) 65'F (Min) o Elevation 656'-6" - Remaining Area with D/G 'E'On" 120'F (Max) 60'F (Min) o Elevation 656'-6" Remaining Area with D/G 'E'Off" 104'F (Max) 60'F (Min)
Table 3-2 (Cont'd) o Control Devices:
DC Control power White light Field Flash power White light Protective Relaying-reset - Pushbutton Volts/Vers - Selector switch Raise lower Field Flash - Manual Pushbutton Generator Breaker >> Lockout Relay 52GBT Reset-trip lights Voltage Regulator - Selector switch Manual-Auto Generator Field - Lockout Relay 86ESD Reset-trip lights Excitation Shutdown - Pushbutton Bridge Transfer Switch - Switch Test Block Metering-Current Test block Transformers Test Block Metering-Potential - Test block Transformers Transformers
Table 3-3 DEVICES, ALARMS AND SHUTDOWN SIGNALS ON THE ENGINE CONTROL PANEL FOR DIESEL GENERATOR E The new diesel engine control panel is located in the diesel generator E building and includes the following:
o Devices:
Jacket Water Press/After Cooler Press Dual Indicator Engine hours Meter Turbo-charger oil filter differential pressure Indicator Fuel oil supply/discharge pressure Dual Indicator Power Cylinder Exhaust Temperature Indicator Temperature Indicator Engine lubeoil press/turbo lubeoil press Dual Indicator Turbo-charger Air 6 Crankcase pressures - Indicator Power cylinder exhaust and turbo temp. Meter RTD temperature Meter Manifold pressure Indicator Turbo<<discharge press Air Manifold Left Bank/Right Bank - Dual Gauge Press.
Starting Air Pressure Receiver 1/
Receiver 2 Dual Indicator Engine Speed Governor Mode - Selector Switch Isochronous-Parallel Speed Control Selector Switch Raise-Off-Lower Master trip circuit - Trip Green light Master trip circuit - Reset Amber light Turbo exhaust outlet, turbo air in/breakcase - Dual gauge pressure Turbo charger speed - Meter
Table 3-3 (Cont'd)
Fuel oil day tank level Meter Fuel oil storage tank level - Meter Sequence indication - step - Red light Control Mode selector Selector switch Remote-off-local Local/remote White lights Engine Control - Pushbutton Start Stop Sequence Indication Crank - White light Sequence Indication Running idle - White light Sequence Indication - Running loaded White light Unit in Emergency mode White light Master trip circuit - Lockout relay (86)
Trip Reset Annunciator Selector switch Test<<Off-Reset Pushbutton Acknowledge DC power on circuit /Il - White light DC power on circuit f/2 White light DG available for Emergency White light Emergency stop - Pushbutton Stop-Reset Air Compressor I/1 Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Air Compressor //2 - Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Standby )acket water pump Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Jacket water circulating pump Selector Switch
Table 3-3 (Cont'd)
Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Jacket water heater - Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Standby lube oil pump .- Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Lube oil circulating pump - Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Lube oil heate'r - Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Fuel oil transfer pump Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights Standby Fuel oil pump - Selector Switch Hand-Off-Auto with G/R/A lights o Local Alarms and Shutdown Signals:
Engine lube oil pressure low Turbo lube oil pressure low'ain
& Conn. Rod Brg. high temp.
En,"~= Vibration Turbo thrust brg. failure Jacket water temp. high Engine overspeed Turbo overspeed Generator Brg. high temp.
Generator Reverse power Generator Loss of Field Generator Overexcitation
Table 3-3 (Cont'd)
Generator Differential Generator Underfrequency Generator Overvoltage Emergency Service Water Emergency shutdown Incomplete sequence o Local Alarms Engine lube oil pressure low Turbo lube oil pressure low Engine lube oil pressure high Engine crankcase pressure high Engine crankcase level low Fngine lube oil temp off normal Jacket water temp. off normal Jacket water pressure low Jacket water standpipe level low Jacket water standpipe level high Lube oil filter diff. press high FueI oil pressure low Fuel.oil pressure high Fuel oil filter diff. press. high Fuel oil strainer diff. press. high Aux. Standby Jacket water pump on E
Fuel oil day tank level low Fuel oil day tank level high Fuel oil storage tank level low
Table 3-3 (Cont'd)
Lube Oil circulating Prelube pump malfunction Lube oil heater malfunction Jacket water heater malfunction Jacket water circulating pump malfunction DG Bypasses or inoperable Generator field ground Generator voltage unbalance Generator neutral overvoltage Generator overcurrent Near full load Voltage reg. transfer to standby MCC not proper for auto operation Control switches not proper for remote auto operation Starting air pressure low or system malfunction Failure to start
Table 3-4 INDICATING LIGHTS ON EXISTING BIS PANELS A separate panel is provided for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for each of the four existing diesel generators. The following is provided on each panel.
o Diesel-Generator Control System Out-of-Service.
Selector switch, (normal-bypass) with green indicating light.
One (1) green indicating light for each of the following:
Diesel-generator, d-c control power loss.
Diesel-generator, field-flash and excitation power loss.
4-kV bus, transformer, circuit breaker disabled.
Diesel-generator, control switch in local.
Diesel>>generator, building cooling fan disabled.
One (1) green indicating light as common for all of the above signals.
o Diesel-Generator Output System Out-of-Service.
Selector switch (normal-bypass) with green indicating light.
Diesel-generator, circuit breaker racked out.
Diesel-generator, control power loss.
4-kV bus, transformer circuit breaker disabled.
o Diesel-Generator Auxiliary System Out-of-Service.
Selector Switch (normal-bypass), with green indicating light.
One. ,I) green indicating light for each of the following:
Diesel-generator auxiliary supply/control power loss.
Diesel-generator auxiliaries not in automatic.
Pump OP- disabled.
One (1) green indicating light as common for all of the above signals.
Table 3-4 (Cont'd) o ESW System Out-of-Service Selector Switch (normal-bypass), with green indicating light.
One (1) green indicating light for the following:
ESW valves control power loss
Table 3-5 SIGNALS TO BE TRANSFERRED FOR EACH OF THE FOUR EXISTING DIESEL GENERATORS Shown on Shown on
~Si nal Exist DG Dw No. DG E Dw . No.
Auto Start (Back Up Circuit) G5-553-109 Sh. 2 G5-553-243 Sh. 2 Circuit Breaker Control (52T1) G5-553-109 Sh. 1 G5-553-243 S}1. 1 Ready To Close Generator G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-143 Sh. 12 Breaker (Unit 2)
Generator Breaker Trip G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Signal (Unit 2)
SEVR Auto/Manual Switch 3-E12-03-B Sh. 1b G5-553-366 Sh. 4 Field Current To Computer Unit No. 1 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3a G5-253-366 Sh. 1 Field Current To Computer Unit No. 2 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3a G5-553-366 Sh. 1 Voltmeter 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3a G5-253>>366 Sh. 5 Frequency Meter 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3a G5-253-366 Sh. 5 Totalizer 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3b Not transferred Watt Meter 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3b G5-253-366 Sh. 5 VAR Meter 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3b G5-253-366 Sh. 5 Diesel Generator DC,Control G-5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Power Loss (BIS Unit 1)
Diesel Generator Field Flash 3-E12-03-B Sh. 2a G5-253-366 Sh. 5 and Ex . r Power L
~ '(BIS Un>t 1)
Diesel Generator Control G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Switch in Local (BIS Unit 1)
Diesel Generator Aux Supply/ E-259 Sh. 9 E-259 Sh. 23 ControlPower Loss (BIS Unit 1)
ESW Return Water J-411 Sh. 4 J-411 Sh, 4A Temperature Diesel Generator Aux Not E-259 Sh. 9 G5-553-243 Sh. 13 in Auto (BIS Unit 1)
Table 3-5 (Cont'd)
Oil Pump Disabled E<<257 E-257 Sh. 2 (BIS Unit 1)
Diesel Generator DC Control G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Power Loss (BIS Unit 2)
Diesel Generator Field Flash 3-E-12-03-B Sh. 2a G5-253-366 Sh. 5 and Exciter Power Loss (BIS Unit 2)
Diesel Generator Control G5-558>>109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Switch In Local (BIS Unit 2)
Diesel Generator Aux. Supply/ E-259 Sh 9 E-259 Sh. 23 Control Power Lose (BIS Unit 2)
Diesel Generator Aux. Not In E-259 Sh. 9 G5-553-243 Sh. 13 Auto (BIS Unit 2)
Oil Pump Disabled E-257 E-257 Sh. 2 (BIS Unit 2)
Auto Start Emergency G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Service Water Pump Synchronizing 3-E12-030B Sh. 3a G5-253-366 Sh. 2 Ammeter 3-E12-03-B Sh. 3b G5-253-366 Sh. 1 Diesel Generator Tripped G5>>553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Alarm High Priority Alarm G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Low Priority Alarm G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Diesel C~nerator fa4l.s to G5-" 3-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 start i ,.'omplete Sequence)
Alarm Diesel Generator Near Full 3-E12-03-B Sh. 2a G5-253-366 Sh. 5 Load Alarm Diesel Generator Not In Auto E-259 Sh. 9 G5-553-243 Sh. 13 Mode Alarm (Multiple Contacts of 74R3)
Auto Start (Primary Circuit) G5-553-109 Sh. 1 G5-553<<243 Sh. 1 Generator Breaker Open/Closed G5-553-109 Sh. 1 G5-553-243 Sh. 2 Manual Start G5-553-109 Sh. 1 G5-553-243 Sh. 3
Table 3-5 (Cont'd)
Manual Stop G5-553-109 Sh. 9 G5-553-243 Sh. 3 Governor Lower Raise G5-553-109 Sh. 6 G5-553-243 Sh. 8 Ready to Close Generator G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh.12 Breaker Unit 1 Ready to Close Generator G5-553-109 Sh. 10 G5-553-243 Sh. 12 Breaker - Unit 2 Isochronous/Droop E-259 Sh. 9 G5-553-243 Sh. 1 Overcurrent with Voltage 3-E12-03-B Sh. 2a G5-253-366 Sh. 5 Restraint Block 51V Unit 1 Overcurrent with Voltage 3-E12-03-B Sh. 2a G5-553-366 Sh. 5 Restraint Block 51V Unit 2 Diesel Generator Differential 3-E12-03-B Sh. G5-253-366 Sh. 1 Overcurrent Voltage Restraint E-23 Sh. 6 E-23 Sh. 10 51V ESW Valve HV-01112A,B,C,D E-146- Sh. 9 E-146 Sh. 17 Control Switch (close circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01112A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 9 E-146 Sh. 17 Control Switch (open circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01112A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 9 E-146 Sh. 17 Over Room Bypass ESW Valve HV-01112A,B,C,D E-146 Sh, 9 E-146 Sh. 18 Indicating Lights ESW Valve HV-01122A,B,C,D E-146 S. 9 E-146 Sh. 18 Control ~~itch {Clotho. Circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01122A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 9 E-'146 Sh. 18 Control Switch (Open Circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01122A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 9 W-146 Sh. 18 Overload Bypass ESW Valve HV-01122A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 9 E-146 Sh. 18 Indicating Lights ESW Valve HV-01110A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 19 Control Switch (close circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01110A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 19 Control Switch (Open Circuit)
Table 3-5 (Cont'd)
ESW Valve HV-01110A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 19 Overload Bypass ESW Valve HV-01110A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146, S 11. 19 Indicating Lights ESW Valve HV-01120A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 20 Control Switch (Close Circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01120A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 20 Control Switch (Open Circuit)
ESW Valve HV-01120A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 20 Overload Bypass ESW Valve HV-01120A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E-146 Sh. 20 Indicating Lights ESW Valve HV-01110A,B,C,D E-146 S}1. 10 E-146 Sh. 1.9 Auto Loop Transfer ESW Valve HV-01120A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 10 E>>146 Sh. 20 Auto Loop Transfer ESW Valves loop "A" E-146 Sh. 33 E-146 Sh. 33A BIS Indication ESW Valves loop "B" E-146 Sh. 33 E-146 Sh. 33B Bypass Indication ESW Valves HV-01110A,B,C,D E-146 Sh. 11 E-146 Sh. 1 Auto Loop Transfer HUAC Vent Supply Fan E-193 Sh. 1 E-193 Sh. 6 Control Switch (Start)
HVAC Velac Supply Fan E-193 Sh. 1 E-193 Sh. 6 Control Switch (Auto)
HVAC Vent Supply Fan E-193 Sh. 1 E-193 Sh. 6 Indicating Lights
4.0 STUDIES A gas bottle missile analysis (Gibbs & Hill Calculation No. MC-HI-001) was performed to determine the maximum velocity which could be achieved by a gas bottle due to the postulated failure of the gas relief valve.
The analysis assumed a sudden opening of one (1) inch diameter occurred, in the bottle thereby maximizing the 'gas exit mass flow rate and causing the gas bottle to become a missile.
Calculation results for the gas cylinders of the type and size used at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station showed that the most severe impact is due to the 143 pound oxygen bottle with a maximum velocity of 262 fps while the 70 pound zero gas bottle reached the highest velocity (342 fps). These calculated maximum velocities are significantly less than the 900 fps discussed in Susquehanna Susquehanna Electric Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR} Section 3.5.1.5 and consequently the missile characteristics as described in the FSAR (i.e. missile weight and velocity) can be modified to conform to the calculated worst case conditions.
Structural analyses evaluating the effects of these identified worst case missiles were incorporated into the final design calculations for the diesel generator E building.
5.0 TIE-IN DESCRIPTION The tie-in of the diesel generator E facility with the operating plant is planned in such a way as to minimize the effect on plant opera-tions. Insofar as it is possible, the tie-in systems are designed so that most of the piping and cabling can be installed without actually connecting to the existing plant services.
The exact location of all above-ground tie-in systems as well as under-ground safety-related and critical non safety-related system that may impact design or construction activities was established. Although every effort is being made to minimize exposure of safety and critical non-safety related systems to potential damage from construction acti-vities, specific protective measures were taken including the following:
o Excavation was staged to minimize exposure of critical areas.
o Hand excavation methods were employed when excavations were within three to four feet of critical utilities or facilities.
o Maximum effective cover was maintained by using steel plate or an equivalent composite of earth and steel plate (or steel casing pipe).
o Temporary supports and/or concrete encasement were utilized where required.
The detailed tie-in description considers but is not limited to, the following:
o Relocation of existing systems o Relocation of existing systems encountered in areas where tie-ins are required.
Tie<<in connections also can be performed during the outages'rom the existing plant systems up to an isolation device such as a circuit breaker or valve; the balance of the system would be instai'ad later in'the construction. This would allow continued construction without disturbing plant operation. These isolation devices will serve as the "plug-in" interface between the additional diesel and the existing systems.
The following is a list of systems which require tie-in connections:
o Storm drainage systems o Power supply systems o Control room panel interface system 5-1
V o Computer system o Emergency Service water system o Fuel oil system o Sump Effluent disposal system o Potable water system o Demineralized water system o Station air system o 'ire protection and detection system o Plant security system 5-2
APPENDIX A DRAWINGS
This Appendix contains the following drawings:
Drawin Number Title C>>5003 Diesel Generator E Facility Site Development Plan M-5200, Sheet 1 Diesel Generator E Building General Arrangement Plans M-5200, Sheet 2 Diesel Generator E Building General Arrangement Sections M-120, Sheet 2 Flow Diagram Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer Diesel Generator E Building J-120, ICD Sheets 3, 4, 5 Diesel Generator E Building Diesel Oil and Storage System M-ill, Sheet 3 Flow Diagram Emergency Service Vater System Diesel Generator E Building J-ill, ICD Sheets 10, ll, 13, 14, Diesel Generator E Building 14A, 15 Emergency Service Mater System M-182, Sheet 2 Diesel Generator E Building Air Flov Diagram V-182, ICD Sheets 7, 8, 8A, Diesel Generator E Building 9, 9A, 10, 11, 13, Air Flow System 13A, 14, 15, 16 M-122, Sheet 9 Flov Diagram Fire Protection Diesel Generator E Building Fig. F-1006 Emergency Diesel E Generator Instrument and Logic Flov Diagram Fire Protection System M-134, Sheet 2 Flov Diagram Diesel Auxiliaries Diesel Generator E Building E5, Sheet 5 Single Line Meter & Relay 4.16 kV diesel generator E
Drawin Number Title E9, Sheet 77 One Line Diagram 480 V MCC OB565 Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E9, She'et 78 One Line Diagram 480 V MCC OB566 Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 Ell, Sheet 11 125V dc One Line Diagram Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E23, Sheet 10 4.16 kV Three Line Diagram Diesel Generator E E23, Sheet 12 , Schematic Diagram Switch Contact Development Transfer Panels OC512 E-A, E-B, E-C & E-D E23, Sheet 6A Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Diesel Generator A, B; C & D Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E23, Sheet 7 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Diesel Generators A, B, C & D Transfer Control - Diesel Generator'E Units 1 & 2 E23, Sheet 8 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Diesel Generator A, B, C &,D Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E23, Sheet 8A Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Diesel Generator A, B, C & D Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E26, Sheet 13 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 125 DC Diesel Generator E E102, Sheet 38 13.8 kV Breaker Connection Diagram.
E105, Sheet 13 4.16 kV Breaker Schematic Diagram E105, Sheet 18 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510 Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 51006 Control Common E23, Sheet 9 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Diesel Generator A, B, C & D Transfer Control - Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 A-4
Drawin Number Title E23, Sheet ll Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram 4.16 kV Diesel Generator A, B, C & D Transfer Control - Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E103, Sheet 25 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Buses Auxiliary Relay Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Units 1 & 2 E105, Sheet 27 Schematic Diagram 4.16. kV Bus Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 1 E105, Sheet 28 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 1 E105, Sheet 29 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus "1A, 1B, 1C, 1D" & "2A, 2B, 2C, 2D" Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker - Trip Interlock With Diesel Generator "A, B, C, D, & E" Transfer Units 1 & 2 E105, Sheet 30 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus "1A, 1B, 1C, 1D" & 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker Trip Interlock With Diesel Generator A, B, C, .D, & E Transfer Units 1 & 2 E146, Sheet 9A Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop A HV-01112 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 9B Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop A HV-01112 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, S,"oet 9C Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop A HV-01112 A, B, C, D &
Transfer Common E146, Sheet 9D Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop A HV-01122 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 9E Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop A HV-01122 A, B, C, D, & E Transfer Common A-5
Drawin Number Title E146, Sheet 9F Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop A HV-01122 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 10A Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop B HV-01110 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 10B Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop B HV-01110 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 10C Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop B HV-01110 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 10D Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop B HV-01120 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 10E Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Loop B HV-01120 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet 10F Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves I'chematic Loop B HV-01120 A, B, C, D & E Transfer Common E146, Sheet llA Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Auto Loop Transfer HV-01110A, B, C, D &
E Common E146, Sheet 21 Schematic Diagram ESW Diesel Cooler Valves Auto Loop Transfer HV-01110A, B, C, D &
E Common E184, Sheet 15 Schematic Diagram Diesel GeneratorAuto Start (Primary) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E184, Sheet 16 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Auto Start (Back-up). Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E185, Sheet 12A Schematic Diagram Bypass Indication System (BOP) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 1 E185, Sheet 12B Schematic Diagram Bypass Indication System (BOP) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 1 A>>6
Drawin Number Title E185, Sheet 12C Schematic Diagram Bypass Indication System
'(BOP) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 1 E185,- Sheet 26A Schematic Diagram Bypass Indication System (BOP) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 2 E185, Sheet 26B Schematic Diagram Bypass Indication System (BOP) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 2 E185, Sheet 26C Schematic Diagram Bypass Indication System (BOP) Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Unit 2 E185, Sheet 33A Schematic Diagram ESW Loop A Bypass Indication System (BOP) Common E185, Sheet 33B Schematic Diagram ESW Loop A Bypass Indication System (BOP) Common E193, Sheet 1A Schematic Diagram HVAC Diesel Generator Building. Vent System Vent Supply Fans Transfer Scheme - Common E193, Sheet 1B Schematic Diagram HVAC Diesel Generator Building Vent System Vent Supply Fans Transfer Scheme - Common E259, Sheet 1A Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Excitation Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E259, Sheet,9A Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Engine Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E259, Sheet 9B Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Engine Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E259, >.aeet 9C Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Engine Transfer Control <<
Diesel Generator E Common E259, Sheet 29 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "A"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication Common E259, Sheet 30 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "B"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication Common A-7
Dravin ,Number Title E259, Sheet 31 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "C"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication Common E259, Sheet 32 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "D"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication Common E331, Sheet '13 Schematic Diagram - Annunciator Plant Operating Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E331, Sheet 14 Schematic Diagram << Annunciator Plant Operating Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E331, Sheet 14 Schematic Diagram - Annunciator Plant Operating Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control Diesel Generator E Common E332, Sheet 4A Schematic Diagram Annunciator HVAC Control Board OC681 Transfer Scheme-Common E105, Sheet 31, 40 4.16 kV Breaker Connection Diagram E146, Sheet 17 ESW Motor Operated Valve No. 1 Schematic and Connection Diagram E146, Sheet 18 ESW Motor Operated Valve No. 2 Schematic and Connection Diagram E146, Sheet 19 ESW Motor Operated Valve No. 3 Schematic and Connection Diagram E146, Sheet 20 ESW Motor Operated Valve No. 4 Schematic and Connection Diagram E259,:"- ~at 13 Diesel Generator Standby Jacket Water Pump Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 14 Diesel Generator, Jacket Water Circuit Pump Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 15 Diesel Generator Jacket. Water Heater Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 16 Diesel Generator Standby Lube Oil Circuit Pump Schematic and Connection Diagram A-8
Drawin Number Title E259, Sheet 18 Diesel Generator Lube Oil Heater Schematic and Connection Diagram E257, Sheet 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 19 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries-Air Compressor No. 1 Schematic &
Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 20 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries-Air Compressor No. 2 and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 21 Diesel Generator Standby Fuel Oil Pump (DC) Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 22 Diesel Generator Generator Auxiliary Miscellaneous Systems Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 17 Diesel Generator Preventative Lube Pump Schematic and Connection Diagram E193, Sheet 6 H&V Supply Fan Schematic and Connection Diagram E193, Sheet 7 H&V Supply Fan Schematic and Connection Diagram E193, Sheet 9 Dampers Schematic and Connection Diagram E193, Sheet 8 H&V Exhaust Fan, Schematic and Connection Diagram E193, Sheet 10 H&V Exhaust Fan Schematic and Connection Diagram E193, Sheet 5 H&V Battery Room Exhaust, Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 23 Miscellaneous Equipment and Devices Schematic and Connection Diagram E259, Sheet 27 Miscellaneous Equipment and Devices Schematic and Connection Diagram E259,'heet 28 Miscellaneous Equipment and Devices Schematic and Connection Diagram A-9
Drawin Number Title E326, Sheet 22 Annunciator, Alarms PNL OC577E Schematic Diagram E301, Sheet 105 Computer Inputs Schematic and Connection Diagram E81, Sheet 1 Diesel Generator E Building Tray and Conduit Plan.
E81, Sheet 2 Diesel Generator E Building Tray and Conduit Plan.
E81, Sheet 3 Diesel Generator E Building Tray and Conduit Plan.
E-105, Sheet 19 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510P Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510A02 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 20 Schematic Diagram .4.16 kV Bus'A510A Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510AOl Control-Common E-105, Sheet 21 Schematic Diagram 9.16 kV Bus OA510B Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510B02 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 22 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510B Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510B01 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 23 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510C Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510C02 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 24 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510C Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker. 510C01 Control Common E-105, Sheet 25 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510D Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510D02 Control-Common E-105, Sh 26 Schematic Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510D Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510D01 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 37 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510A Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510A02 Control-Common
Title E-105, Sheet 38 Connection Diagram 4.17 kV Bus OA510A Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510A01 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 39 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510B Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510B02 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 40 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510B Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510B01 E-105, Sheet 41 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510C Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510C02 Control-Common E-105, Sheet 42 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510C Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510COl Control Common E-105, Sheet. 43 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OA510D Diesel Generator Circuit 510D02 Control << Common E-105, Sheet 44 Connection Diagram 4.16 kV Bus OP510D Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker 510D01 Control-Common E-259, Sheet 29A Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "A"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication Common E-259, Sheet 30A Schematic Diagram Diesel Gnerator "B"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication Common E-259, Sheet 31A Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "C"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication-Common E-259. ..eet 32A Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "D"
-Diesel Generator E Transfer Alignment Indication-Common E-331, Sheet 14 Schmetic Diagram Annunicator Plant Operating Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control Diesel Generator E - "A" Common.
,E-331, Sheet 14A Schematic Diagram Annunciator Plant Opera-ting Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control Diesel Generator E - "A" Common
Drawin Number Title E-331, Sheet 14B Schematic Diagram Annunciator Plant Operating Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control Diesel Generator E "C" Common E>>331, Sheet 14C . Schematic Diagram Annun. Plant Operating Bench Board OC653 Transfer Control-Diesel Generator E "D" Common A-12
APPENDIX B Codes Standards, and Regulations Applicable to Diesel Generator E Facility
This general document presents a partial listing of codes, standards, regulations applicable to the Diesel Generator E Facility at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 and Unit 2. This listing is segregated'y issuing organization, and provides the code, standard> or regulation identification, title, and effective date. Where the effective date is not given, the most recent issue in effect on September 22, 1983 will apply.
B-2
1. AMERICAN CONCRETE INSTITUTE (ACI) STANDARDS
a. ACI-211.1 'tandard Practice for Selecting 1981 Proportions for Normal and Heavyweight Concrete
b. ACI-214 Recommended Practice for Evaluation of 1977 Compression Test Results of Field Concrete
c. ACI-301 Specifications for Structural Concrete 1981 for Buildings
d. ACI-304 Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing, '978 Transporting, and Placing Concrete
e. ACI-305R Hot Weather Concreting 1977 ACI-306R Cold Weather Concreting 1978
g. ACI-308 Standard Practice for Curing Concrete 1981
h. ACI-309 Recommended Practice for Consolidation 1972 of Concrete ACI-315 ACI Detailing Manual 1980
~
(SP-66)
j. ACI-318 Building Code Requirements of Reinforced 1977 Concrete
k. ACI-347 Recommend Practice for Concrete Formwork 1978
1. ACI-349 Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related 1980 Safety-Related Concrete Structures,
m. SP-2 ACI Manual of Concrete Inspection 1981 B-3
2. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF STEEL CONSTRUCTION (AISC)
a. AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication 1978 and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings
b. of Standard Practice for Steel Buildings
'976 AISC Code and Bridges
c. AISC Manual of Steel Construction 1980 AISC Specification for Structural Joints Using 1978 A'STM A325 or A490 Bolts B-4
3. AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE (AISI)
a. C 1008 Standards Steels Specification
b. Cold Formed Steel Design Manual 1977
4. AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE (ANSI)
a. A 380 Recommended Practice for Cleaning and 1978 Descaling Stainless Steel Parts, Equipment and Systems
b. ANS-52. 1 American National Standard Nuclear Safety 1983 Criteria for the Design of Stationary Boiling Water Reactor Plants
c. Bl.l Unified Inch Screw Threads (UN and UNR Thread 1982 Form)
d. 82.1 Pipe Threads (Except Dryseal) 1973
e. 816.1 Cast Iron Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings 1975
f. 816.3 Malleable Iron Screwed Fittings, 150 lbs. and -1977 300 lbs.
g. 816.5 Steel Nickel Alloy and Other Special Alloys 1981 Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings
h. 816.9 Steel Buttwelding Fitting 1973 816.10 Face-to-Face and End-to-End Dimensions of 1973 Ferrous Valves 816.11 Socket-Welding and Threaded Forged Steel Fittings 1980
k. 816.21 Nonmetallic Flat Gasket for Pipe Flanges 1978
1. 816.25 Buttwelding Ends 1979
m. 816.34 Flanged and Buttwelding End Valves, Steel, 1981 Nickel Alloy, and Other Special Alloys
n. 830.2.0 Overhead and Gantry Cranes 1976
o. 831.1 Power Piping 1980 (Use 831.1 )967 for pipe supports for nuclear piping, with allowable stresses per 831.1 1973.
Use 831.1 - 1973 for pipe supports for non-nuclear piping.)
p. 836.10 Welded and Seamless Wrought Steel Pipe 1979 pl. 836.19 Stainless Steel Pipe 1979
q. Cl-NEC Specification of General Requirements for 1968 a Quality Program 8-6
r. C37.04 Rating Structure for AC High-Voltage Circuit 1982 Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical. Current Basis
s. C37.06 Preferred Ratings and Related Required 1979 capabilities for AC High-Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis C37.09 Test Procedures for AC High-Voltage Circuit 1979 Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis
u. C37.11 Requirements for Electrical Control for AC 1979 High-Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis and a Total Current Basis
v. C37.010 Application Guide for AC High-Voltage Circuit 1982 Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis
w. C37. 20 Switchgear Assemblies, Including Metal-Enclosed 1969 Bus (IEEE 27} [includes ANSI/IEEE supplements C37.20a-1970, C37.20b-1972, and C37.20c-1974]
x. C37.98 Seismic Testing of Relays 1978
y. C37.100 Definitions for Power Switchgear 1980
z. C57.12.80 Terminology for Power and Distribution 1978 Transformers aa. C57.13 Requirements for Instrument Transformers 1978 bb. C533 Specification for Calcium Silicate Block 1980 and Pipe Thermal Insulation cc. H35.1 Alloy and Temper Designation System for 1982 Aluminum dd. MC96.1 Temperature Measurement Thermocouple 1982 ee N18.7 Administrativ= Controls and Quality Assurance 1976 for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants ff. N42.2 High-Voltage Connectors for Nuclear Instruments 1971 gg.'45.2 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for 1977 Nuclear Facilities hh. N45.2.2 Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and 1978 Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants (During the Construction Phase) ii. N45.2.5 Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for 1974 Installation, Inspection and Testing of Structural B-7
Concrete and Structural Steel During the Construct-tion Phase of Nuclear Power Plants gg. N45.2.6 Qualifications of Inspection, Examination, and 1978 Testing Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants kk. N45.2.9 Requirements for Collection, Storage and 1974 Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Power Plants ll. N45.2.10 Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions 1973 mm. N45.2.11 Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design 1974 of Nuclear Power Plants nn. N45.2.12 Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance 1977 Programs for Nuclear Power Plants oo. N45.2.13 Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of 1976 Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants pp. N45.2.23 Qualifications of Quality Assurance Program 1978 Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants qq. N101.4 Quality Assurance for Protective Coatings 1972 Applied to Nuclear Facilities.
rr. N195 Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel- 1976 Generators ss. N626.3 Qualifications and Duties of Personnel 1979 Engaged in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1 and 2, Certifying Activities.
B-8
5. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS (ASTM)
a. Standards of the American Society for Testing and Materials B-9
6. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS (ASCE)
a. Paper No. 3269 Wind forces on Structures - Final Report 1961 of the Task Committee on Wind Forces, Committee on Loads and Stresses, Structural Division B-10
7. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS (ASME)
a. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components 1971 Edition Through and including Winter 1972 Addendum
b. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II, 1971 or later Edition, Material Specifications, as referenced by Section III
c. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX, Edition, 1983 Welding Qualifications, as referenced by Section III.
d. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition, 1980 through and including Winter 1980 Addendum, Rules for In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components Reactor Coolant Systems
8. AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION (AWWA)
a. D 1OO Standard for Welded Steel Tanks for Water Storage 1979
b. M 11 Steel Pipe Manual 1964 B-12
9. AMERICAN WELDING SOCIETY (AWS)
a. Welding Handbook Six and Seventh Editions
b. A2'. 4 Symbols for Welding and Nondestructive Testing 1979 Including Brassing
c. A5.1 Spec. for Covered Carbon Steel Arc Welding 1981 Electrodes
d. A5.2 Specification 6 Steel Oxyfuel Gas Welding 1980 Rods
e. A5.3 Specification for Aluminum and Aluminum Alloy 1980 Covered Are Welding Electrodes
f. A5.4 Specification for Covered Corrosion Resisting 1981 Chromium Nickel Steel Welding Electrodes
g. A5. 5 Specification Low Alloy Stud Covered Arc Welding 1981 Electrodes
h. A5. 6 Specification for Cooper and Copper<<Alloy Covered 1976 Electrodes A5.7 Specification for Copper and Copper-Alloy Bare 1977 Welding Rods and Electrodes A5.8 Specification for Brazing Filler Metal 1981
k. A5.9 Specification for Corrosion Resisting Chromium 1981 and Chromium Nickel Steel Bare and Composite Metal Cord and Stranded Welding Rods
1. A5.10 Specification for Aluminum and Aluminum Alloy 1980 Bare Welding Rods and Electrodes
m. A5.11 Specification for Nickel and Nickel Alloy Covered 1976 Welding Electrodes n.,8. 12 Specification for Tungstem Arc Welding Electrodes 1980
o. A5. 13 Specification for Solid Surface Welding Rods and 1980 Electrodes
p. A5.14 Specification for Nickel and Nickel Alloy Bare 1976 Welding Rods and Electrodes
q. A5.15 Specification for Welding Rods and Covered 1982 Electrode's for Cast Iron
r. A5. 16 Specification for Titanium and Titanium Alloy 1970 Bare Welding Rods 6 Electrodes
s. A5,17 Specification for Carbon Steel Electrodes and 1980 Fluxes for submerged Arc Welding
t. A5. 18 Specification for Carbon Steel Filler Metals 1979 for Gas Shielded Arc Welding
u. A5.19 Specification for Magnesium Alloy Welding Rods 1980 and Bare Electrodes
v. A5. 20 Specification for Carbon Steel Electrodes for 1979 Flux Covered Arc Welding A5.21 Specification for Composite Surfacing Welding 1980 Rods and Electrodes
x. A5. 22 Specification for Flux Cord Corrosion-Resisting 1980 Chrominum and Chromium-Nickel Steel Electrodes
y. A5. 23 Specification for Low Alloy Steel Electrodes 1980 and Fluxes for submerged Arc Welding
z. B3.0 Standard Qualification Procedure 1977 aa. Dl.l Structural Welding Code 1983 B-14
l
10. CONCRETE REINFORCED STEEL INSTITUTE (CRSI)
a. Manual of Standard Practice 1981 B-15
11. INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL 6 ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (IEEE)
a. IEEE-4 Standard Techniques for High Voltage 1978 Testing (ANSI C68.1
b. IEEE-93 Guide for Transformer Impulse Tests 1968
c. IEEE-279 Criteria for Protection Systems for 1971 Nuclear Power Generating Systems IEEE-308 Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power 1980 Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
e. IEEE-323 Standard for Qualifying Class 1E 1974 Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE-334 Standard for Type Test of Continuous 1974 Duty Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
g. IEEE-336 Installation, Inspection, and Testing 1980 Requirements for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment During the Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations (ANSI N45.2.4)
h. IEEE-338 Standard Criteria for the Periodic 1977 Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems
i. IEEE-344 IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic 1975 Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
5. IEEE-378 Trial Use Criteria for the Periodic 1971 Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems
k. IEEE-379 Standard Application of the Single- 1977 Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Class 1E .Systems IEEE-381 Standard Criteria for Type Tests of 1977 Class 1E Modules Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations
m. IEEE-.382 Standard for Qualification of Safety- 1980 Related Valve Actuators
n. IEEE-383 Standard for Type Test of Class 1E 1974 Electric Cables, Field Splices, and
Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
o. IEEE-384 Standard Criteria for Independence of 1981 Class 1E Equipment and Circuits
p. IEEE-387 Standard Criteria for Diesel-Generator 1977 Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Generating Stations
q. IEEE-415 Guide for Planning of Pre-Operational 1976 Testing Programs for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations r ~ IEEE-420 Standard Design and Qualification of- 1982 Class 1E Control Boards, Panels and Racks used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations s ~ IEEE-450 Recommended Practice for Maintenance, 1980 Testing, and Replacement of Large Load Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations IEEE-467 Quality Assurance Program Requirements 1980 for the Design and Manufacture of Class 1E Instrumentation and Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations u~ IEEE-484 Recommended Practice for Installation 1981 Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations Ve IEEE-485 Recommended Practice for Sizing and 1978 Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations Wo IEEE-494 Standard Method for Identification of 1974 Documents Related to Class lE Equipment .
and Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations X~ IEEE-498 Standard Requirements for the Calibration 1980 and Control of Measuring and Test Equip-ment Used in the Construction and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE-535 Standard Qualification of Class 1E 1979 Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Generating Stations B-17
z. IEEE-603 Standard Criteria for Safety Systems 1980 for Nuclear Power Generating Stations aa. IEEE-622 Recommended Practice for the Design 1979 Installation of Electric Pipe Heating Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations bb. IEEE-627 Standard for Design Qualification of 1980 Safety Systems Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations cc. IEEE-649 Standard for Qualifying Class lE 19&0 Motor Control Centers for Nuclear Power Generating Stations dd. IEEE-650 Qualifications of Class 1E Static 1979 Battery Chargers and Inverters for Nuclear Power Generat'ing Stations B-18
12. INSTRUMENT SOCIETY OF AMERICA (ISA)
a. .55.1 Instrumentation Symbols 1973
b. RP 18.1 Specification and Guides for 1965 the Use of General Purpose Annunciators
c. RP 42.1 Nomenclature for Instrument 1965 Tubing Fittings B-19
13. INSULATED CABLE ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION (ICEA)
P-46-426 Power Cable Ampacities, Copper Conductors (IEEE S-135-1)
b. P54<<440 Ampacities << Cables in Open Top Cable Trays (NEMA WC-51)
C ~ S-19-81 Rubber-Insulated Wire & Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy (NEMA WC-3)
d. P-32-382 Short-Circuit Characteristics of Insulated Cables
e. S-66-524 Cross-Linked-Thermosetting-Polyethylene- Insulated Wire &
Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy (NEHA WC>>7)
S-68-516 Ethylene<<Propylene Rubber Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electric Energy (NEMA WC-8)
B-20
14. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS
a. Uniform Building Code B-21
15. NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE (NEC)
a. National Electric Code 1981 B-22
16. NATIONAL ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (NEMA)
a. AB1 Molded Case Circuit Breakers 1975
b. DC-10 Temperature Limit Controls for Electric 1977 Base Board Heater
c. DC-13 Line Voltage Integrally Mounted 1979 Thermostats for Electric Heaters
d. FUI Low-Voltage Cartridge Fuses 1978
e. ICS Industrial Controls and Systems 1978 ICS 6 Enclosures for Industrial Controls and 1978 Systems
g. MG1 Motors and Generator 1978
h. PB-1 Panelboards 1977
i. PB-2 Deadfront Distribution Switchboard 1978
5. SG3 Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers 1981
k. SG4 Alternating Current High Voltage Circuit 1975 Breakers
1. SG5 Power Switchgear Assemblies 1981
m. SG6 Power Switching Equipment 1974
n. TR27 Commercial, Institutional and Industrial 1965 Dry-Type Transformers
o. VE1 'able Tray Systems 1979 B-23
17. NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NEPA)
a. NEC National Fire Codes 1981
b. NEPA 13 Sprinkler Systems 1983
c. NPFA 15 Water Spray Fixed Systems 1982
d. NEPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 1981
e. NEPA 37 Installation and Use of Stationary 1979 Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines
f. NFPA 72A Local Protective Signaling Systems 1979
g. NFPA 72D Proprietary Protection Signaling Systems 1979
h. NFPA 72E Automatic Fire Detectors 1982 B-24
18. UNDERWRITERS LABORATORY (UL) a~ Fire Protection Equipment Directory 1983
b. UL>>50 Cabinets and Boxes 1980
c. UL-58 Steel Underground Tanks for Flammable 1976 and Combustible Liquids
d. UL-67 Panelboards 1979
e. UL-499 Safety Standards for Electric Heating 1978 Appliances
f. UL-507 Electric Fans 1976
g. UL-845 Standard for Motor Control Centers 1980
h. UL-883 Safety Standards for Fan Coil Units and Room Fan Heater Units
i. UL-1025 Electric Air Heaters 1980 UL-1042 Electric Base Board Heating Equipment 1978 B<<25
19. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (US NRC)
a. 10 CFR 21 Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance
b. 10 CFR 50 Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities C~ 10 CFR 50 Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Appendix B Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants
d. 10 CFR '50 Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Appendix R Power Facilities Operating Prior to Sections III.G January 1, 1979 and III.J
e. BTP 9.5<<1 Guidelines for Fire Protection for Appendix A Nuclear Power Plants NUREG 0588 Interim Staff Position on Environmental Rev. 1 Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment B-26
20. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (US NRC) REGULATORY GUIDES a~ 1.6 , Independence Between Redundant Standby , 3/71 Rev. 0 (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems 1.9 Selection, Design and Qualification of 12/79 Rev. 2 Diesel-Generator Units Used As Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants c~ 1.17 Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Against 6/73 Rev. 1 Industrial Sabotage
d. 1. 22 Periodic Testing of Protection System 2/72 Rev. 0 Actuation Functions
e. 1.26 Quality Group Classifications and 2/76 Rev. 3 Standards for Water, Sean, and Radio-Active-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants
l. 28 Quality Assurance Program Requirements 3/78 Rev. 1 (Design & Construction) ge 1.29 Seismic Design Classification 9/78 Rev. 3
h. 1.30 Quality Assurance Requirements for the 8/72 Rev. 0 Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment 1.31 Control of Ferrite Content in Stainless 4/78 Rev. 3 Steel Weld Metal 1
., 1.32 Criteria for Safety Related Electric 2/77 Rev. 2 Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants
k. 1.33 Quality Assurance Program Requirements 2/78 Rev. 2 (Operation)
l. 1.36 Nonmetallic Thermal Insulation for 2/73 Rev. 0 Austenitic Stainless Steel
m. 1. 37 Quality Assurance Requirements for Cleaning 3/73 Rev. 0 of Fluid Systems and Associated Components of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants B-27
n. 1.38 Quality Assurance Requirements for 5/77 Rev. 2 Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling of Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 0~ l. 39 Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled 9/77 Rev. 2 Nuclear Power Plants pe 1.41 Preoperational Testing of Redundant On-Site 3/73 Rev. 0 Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments 1.47- Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication 5/73 Rev. 0 for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems 1.48 Design Limits and Loading Combination for 5/73 Rev. 0 Seismic Category I Fluid System Components s ~ 1.50 Control of Preheat Temperature for Welding 5/73 Rev. 0 of Low-Alloy Steel 1.53 Application of the Single-Failure Criterion 6/73 Rev. 0 to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems u~ 1.54 Quality Assurance Requirements for Protec- 6/73 Rev. 0 tive Coatings Applied to Water>>Cooled Nuclear Power Plants ul. 1.58 Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant 9/80 Rev. 1 Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel v ~ 1.60 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design 12/73 Rev. 1 of Nuclear Po~er Plants
w. 1. 61 Dampling Values for Seismic Design of 10/73 Rev. 0 Nuclear Power Plants Xo l. 62 Manual Initiation of Protective Actions 10/73 Rev.
l. 64 Quality Assurance Requirements for the 6/76 Rev. 2 Design of Nuclear Power Plants Z~ 1.68 Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled 8/78 Rev. 2 Reactor Power Plants aa ~ l. 74 Rev.
0'uality Assurance Terms and Definitions 2/74 B-28
bb. 1. 75 Physical Independence of Electric Systems 9/78 Rev. 2 cc. 1. 76 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power 4/74 Rev. 0 Plants dd. 1. 81 Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric 1/75 Rev. 1 Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants ee. l. 84 Design and Fabrication Code Case Accepts- 4/82 Rev. 19 bility ASME Section III Division I
1. 85 Materials Code Case Acceptability ASME 4/82 Rev. 19 Section III Division I gg. 1.88 Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of 10/76 Rev. 2 Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Records hh. 1.89 Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for 11/74 Proposed Rev. 1 Nuclear Power Plants 1.92 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial 2/76 Rev. 1 Components in Seismic Response Analysis 5j. 1.93 Availability of Electric Power Sources 12/74 Rev. 0 kk. 1.94 Quality Assurance Requirements for -4/76 Rev. 1 Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Structural Concrete and Structural Steel During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants ll. 1.100 Seismic Qualification of Electric Equipment 8/77 Rev. 1 for Nuclear Power Plants mm. 1.105 Instrument Setpoints 11/76 Res.
nn. 1.106 Thermal Overload Protection for Electric 3/77 Rev. 1 Motors on Motor-Operated Valves oo. 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units 8/77 Rev. 1 Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants pp. 1.115 Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine 7/77 Rev. 1 Missiles B-29
1. 116 Quality Assurance Requirements for 6/76 Rev. 0 Installation, Inspection> and Testing of Equipment and Systems
l. 117 Tornado Design Classification 4/78 Rev. 1 ss ~ 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric Power and 6/78 Rev. 2 Protection Systems
l. 122 Development of Floor Design Response 2/78 Rev.,l Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components uu ~ 1.123 "
Quality Assurance Requirements for Control 7/77 Rev. 1 of Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants VV~ 1. 128 Installation Design and Installation of 10/78 Rev. 1 Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants 1.129 Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of 2/78 Rev. 1 Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants C
XX+ 1. 131 Qualification Tests of Electric Cables, 8/77 Rev. 0 Field Splices, and Connections for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
1. 132 Site Investigations for Foundations of 3/79 Rev. 1 Nuclear Power Plants ZZ ~ 1.137 Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel 10/79 Rev. 1 Generators aaa. 1. 142 Safety-Related Concrete Structures for 10/81 Rev. 1 Nuclear Power Plants (other than Reactor Vessels and Containments) aaal. 1.144 Auditing of Quality Assurance Programs 1/79 Rev. 0 for Nuclear Power Plants aaa2. 1.146 Qualification of Quality Assurance 8/80 Rev. 0 Program Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants bbb. 1. 147 Inservice Inspection Code Case Accepta- 6/83
.Rev. 2 bility ASME Section XI Division I B-30
ccc. 1.148 Functional Specification for Active 3/81 Rev. 0 Valve Assemblies in Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants MEi. 1. 151 Instrument Sensing Lines 7/83 Rev. 0 B-31
APPENDIX C Seismic Analysis Procedure and Models for The Diesel Generator E Building
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE
1. Introduction C-3
2. Dynamic Models C<<3 2.1 Generation of Stiffness Matrices 2.2 Computation of Mass Matrices
3. Modal Frequencies and Participation Factors of C-6 the Models
4. Structural Damping Values C-6
5. ,Seismic Input C-6 5.1 Ground Design Response Spectra 5.2 Ground Motion Time Histories
6. Seismic Analysis by Modal Response Spectrum Method C-7
7. Development of Floor Response Spectra C-7 7.1 Time History Analysis of Dynamic Models 7.2 Development of Floor Response Spectral Curves
8. Computer Programs C-8
9. Rex ences C-9
10. Figures C-2
1. Introduction This document describes the procedure for the development of the mathematical models of the Diesel Generator E Building and the Diesel Generator Pedestal. It also describes the procedure for the seismic analysis of the models and the development of the floor response spectral curves.
2. Dynamic Models Two mathematical models (one horizontal and one vertical) for the Diesel Generator E Building and one mathematical model for the diesel generator pedestal are constructed for the seismic analysis purposes. The model, sketches are shown in Figures 1 to 3.
The horizontal Diesel Generator E building model consists of four lumped masses (1,2,3 and 4) located at the mass centers of the penthouse roof, the main roof and the two lower floor elevations. The model has six degree-of-freedoms (DOF's) per node. This model has been used for the dynamic analyses of earthquake in two perpendicular horizontal dir'ections.
Since the model established reflects the eccentricity effect of the asymmetrical building configuration, it is capable of producing torsional response due to a horizontal earthquake.
The vertical Diesel Generator E building model is essentially the same as the horizontal model, except that is has four additional lumped masses (5,6,7 and 8) representing the flexible floors, connected by vertical springs to the four lumped masses of the building to form an eight lumped mass system. This model has been used for the vertical analysis only.
The diesel generator pedestal model has three lumped masses (1,2 and 3) located at the mass center of the diesel generator, and the top and the midpoint of the pedestal. This model has six DOF's per node and has been used for the dynamic analysis of earthquake in three perpendicular directions.
The Diesel Generator E building models and the diesel generator pedestal model were fixed at the bases in the seismic analysis. This was considered because the structures are supported on the rock foundation (Re ~rence 1, '2S NRC Standard R :iew Plan 3.7.2) which has a relatively hip.. young's modulus of elasticity of approximately 3 million psi.
Consequently, the soil-structure interaction effect and the interaction effect between th'e two structures can be ignored. The two models can therefore be analyzed separately for their dynamic responses.
2.1 Generation of Stiffness Matrices A. Horizontal Diesel Generator E Building Model The'tiffness of the horizontal Diesel Generator E building model has been generated from a finite element model constructed for the building swalls C-3
consisting of plate and beam elements, and condesned to the lumped mass locations at floor elevations. In generating this condensed stiffness, the floor was considered to be rigid in the horizontal directions.
The computation of the model stiffness was carried out by using the MSC version of the NASTRAN program (Gibbs & Hill Program No. 3030).
The model stiffness obtained above represents the gross stiffness of the building. This model does not include additinal DOF's to represent the lateral vibrations of the wall panels. The amplification effect due to the lateral flexibility of a wall panel was therefore separately evaluated.
using a single DOF system as described in Section 7.2.
B. Vertical Diesel Generator E Building Model The stiffness of the vertical Diesel Generator E building model consists of two parts. The first part is contributed from the building walls and is identical to that of the horizontal model described above. The second part is the stiffnesses of the floor slabs in the vertical direction which are represented by the vertical springs attached to the lumped mass points at the floor elevations (see Figure 2).
In order to derive the vertical spring for a floor, a separate finite element model of the floor is constructed by using beam and plate elements and the floor frequencies are analyzed. The spring constant is then computed based on the floor frequency and the vertical effective floor mass derived in Section 2.2B.
C. Diesel Generator Pedestal Model The stiffness of the Diesel Generator pedestal model was computed based on the elastic beam theory. The diesel generator is connected to the top of pedestal by an equivalent beam. The equivalent beam properties were evaluated such that the vibrational frequencies of the diesel generator model itself in the horizontal and vertical directions are equal to the given frequencies of 29 Hz and 33 Hz, respectively (Reference 8).
2.2 Computation of Mass Matrices A. Horizontal =.'el Generator E Building Model The masses and mass moments of inertia of the horizontal Diesel Generator E building model were evaluated at the four lumped mass points (1,2,3 and
4) located at the mass centers on the four floor elevations. Described below is the information which has been considered in the computation of these lumped masses:
A.l The structural mass of the buil'ding including floors and walls A.2 The masses of ma)or equipment on each floor
A.3 The effective masses for the line loads considered to be one-eighth of the full live loads (L) listed below (Reference 2):
On Roof L 30 psf to account for snow and ice On elevated floors L~200 psf (excluding 50 psf as described below in Item A.4)
A.4 The mass equivalent to the uniform load of 50 psf on concrete floors to account for piping, electrical trays and ducts (Reference 2)
The masses on each floor as described above in Items A.2 to A.4 and the structural mass of the floor in Item A.l were lumped to the mass center on that floor. The structural mass of the walls between the two floor elevations was divided and lumped to the mass centers on the two ad)scent floor.
The full live loads (L) described above are not expected to occur simultaneously with the design earthquakes, and most of them will be absent during the plant operation. One-eighth of these loads considered as effective and included in the modeling is intended to simulate the dynamic characteristics of'he structure (frequencies and mode shpaes) so that the overall dynamic responses (accelerations and response spectra) can be realistically predicted.
The masses and mass moments of inertia (at lumped mass points 1,2,3 and 4) of the vertical Diesel Generator E building model are the same as those of the horizontal model described above, except that the vertical mass compoents were reduced by the amounts of effective floor masses described below. These effective floor masses were attached to the top of the springs (at lumped mass points 5,6,7 and 8) mentioned above in Section 2.1B.
The effective mass for each floor was evaluated by equating the kinetic energy of the fundamental mode of vibration of the entire floor in the vertical direction to the kinetic energy of the equivalent one-mass system consisting of the effective mass. This statement can be formulated as fo'ws:
in which m are the nodal masses, v wxd, v ~ wxd, and w is the fundamental frequency of the floor. d are the components of the fundamental eigenvector and d, is the maximum value of d . The above equation can be simplified to:
C-5
from which the equivalent mass M was evaluated, C. Diesel Generator Pedestal Model The diesel generator mass was lumped to the nodal point located at the mass center of the diesel generator. Appropriate structural masses were computed and lumped to the two nodal points (2 and 3) representing the pedestal.
The mass associated with the upper portion of the pedestal was lumped to the top of pedestal. This will slightly lower the frequencies of the diesel generator pedestal system, and is therefore considered to be a conservative approach from the seismic analysis point of view.
3, Modal Frequencies and Participation Factors of the Models Free vibration analyses have been separately performed on the Diesel Generator E building models and diesel generator pedestal model to obtain the natural frequencies and modal participation factors. The MSC/NASTRAN program was used to carry out the computation. =
4. Structural Damping Values The percents of critical damping considered for the reinforced concrete structure (Reference 6) are:
4 % for Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) case 7 % for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) case
5. Seismic Input 5.1 Ground Design Response Spectra The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations'onsidered are O.l g for SSE and 0.05 g for OBE. The horizontal and vertical design response spectral curves used in the analysis are based on the spectral curves defined in the US NRC.Regulatory Guide 1.60 (Reference 3) scaled down to match the above maximum ground accelerations.
5.2 Ground Motion Time Histories One horizontal and one vertical synthetic ground motion time histories compatible with the ground design response spectra were generated for the time history analysis of the models in order to develop floor response spectra. Response spectra at the damping values of 1%, 2%, 5%, 7% and 10%
were developed using these time histories and compared with the ground design response spectra (Reference 7).
C-6
6. Seismic Analysis by Modal Response Spectrum Method The lumped mass models of the Diesel Generator E building and the diesel generator pedestal have been separately analyzed for the following earthquake cases by employing the modal response spectrum method to determine the structural responses.
~
SSE X earthquake SSE Y earthquake SSE - Z earthquake OBE X earthquake OBE Y earthquake OBE - Z earthquake where X and Z are along the N'S and E-W directions respectively, and Y is along the vertical direction.
The analyses have been performed by using the computer program MSC/NASTRAN (Gibbs & Hill Program Nos. 3030). The ground response spectral curves described in Section 5 were used as input loads. The program computed structural responses (accelerations and relative displacements) mode by mode and combine the modal responses by means of the SRSS method according to the US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.92 (Reference 4). The analysis results obtained were used for the seismic design of the structures.
7. Development of Floor Response Spectra 7.1 Time History Analyses of Dynamic Models ln order to develop response spectra, time history analyses were first performed on the dynamic models. The input to the analysis are the modal shapes, frequencies, participation factors (see Section 3), and the ground motion time histories described in Section 5. The resulting time histories were obtained at each lumped mass location of the models.
Ada~tional time histories were generated at the crane runway girder location by using a separate local crane runway model that includes the flexibilities of the runway girders and supporting columns, The input loads to this model are the time history responses of the upper supporting floor. The resulting time histories generated at the runway girder locations were used to develop response spectra for the crane design.
The above analyses have been performed for the same earthquake cases as mentioned 'in Section 6. The time step size of 0.005 seconds was used in the numerical integration.
C-7
7.2 Development of Floor Response Spectral Curves The acceleration time history responses generated from the time history analysis described in Item 7.1 above were used to develop floor response spectra. The maximum time step siz used in this analysis is 0.005 seconds.
The floor response spectra were generated at sufficient discrete frequency points obtained in accordance with the requirements of the US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.122 (Reference 5), and at the damping values (percents of critical damping) listed below:
for OBE: 0.5X, 1X, 2X, 3X, 4X, and 5X SSE: 1X, 2X, 3X, 4X, 5X, and 7X I
The computer program RESPECT (Gibbs & Hill Program No. 3914) was used to carry out the numerical computation.
The response spectra developed at each floor elevation in a specific direction for the three orthogonal earthquakes were combined by the SLSS method.
As mentioned in Section 2.1A, the horizontal Diesel Generator E building model does not reflect the local lateral flexibilities of the wall panels.
The horizontal response spectrum of a wall in the lateral direction was therefore separately analyzed by using a single DOF system and the time history at the upper supporting floor elevation as input. The maximum response was then obtained by enveloping the horizontal response spectra developed from both the wall and the building models.
The resulting response spectra obtained above were then smoothened and broadened by 15% on each side of the response spectral peaks to become the final response spectral curves. These final spectral curves were used for the analysis and design of the piping and equipment inside the building.
8. Computer Programs The computer programs, briefly described below, have been used in the abo~- seismic ar";-.Iyses.
A. MSC/NASTRAN (Gibbs & Hill Program No. 3030), from Macneal-Schwendler Corporation, is a general purpose finite element computer program for the solution of static, dynamic, transient, stability, and heat transfer problems in structural engineering and other allied fields. Current version number for IBM machine is 61.
B. RESPECT (Gibbs & Hill Program No. 3914), by Gibbs & Hill, Inc., is a response s'pectra generation program. It can be used to generate response spectral values, plot spectral curves on linear or semi-logarithemic scales, smooth and broaden the curves on each sides of spectral peaks.
C-8
The above mentioned Gibbs & Hill documented in accordance with Gibbs &
in-house programs have been verified and Hill QA procedure. The verification includes checking of basic formulation, comparison of the analysis results
~,
from a few sample runs with the results from either hand computation or the analyses based on other verified computer. programs.
9. References
1. US NRC Standard Review Plan, Section 3.7.2 Seismic System Analysis, Rev. 1, July 1981
2. PP&L Specification G-1001 - Design Input Technical Specification for New Emergency Diesel Generator Facility, Rev. 1, September 22, 1983
3. US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, December 1973
4. US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.92 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, Rev. 1, February 1976 5 ~ US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.122 Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components, Rev. 1, February 1978
6. US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973
7. US NRC Standard Review Plan, Section 3.71 Seismic Input, June 1975
8. PP&L Letter G&H/EDG-132, "Natural Frequency of the E Diesel Generator", dated February 28, 1984 C-9
Elev. 741'- 6" Elev. 726'- 0" Elev. 708'- 0" Elev. 675'- 6" Elev. 656'- 6" FIGURE 1 HORIZONTAL DIESEL GENERATOR E BUILDING MODEL
Vertical Spring (typical)
Elev. 741'- 6" Elev. 726'- 0" Elev. 708'- 0" Elev. 675'-6" Elev. 656'-6" FIGURE 2 VERTICAL DIESEL GENERATOR E BUILDING MODEL
0 r Elev. 680'- ll" Elev. 676'- 0" Elev. 666'- 3" Elev. 656'- 6" FIGURE 3 DIESEL GENERATOR E PEDESTAL MODEL
'N SUSQUEHANNA STEAM El,ECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 PENNSYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY GIBBS 6i HIIL PROJECT 3544 THIS DOCUMENT COVERS NUClEAR SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES DESIGN CRITER1A FOR CIVIL/STRUCTURAL WORK FOR NEW EMERGENCY DIESEI GENERATOR FACILITY 3544-SDC-001 ISSUE NO. 0 JANUARY 1984 GIBBS Ec HILL, INC.
ENGINEERS, DESIGNERS, CONSTRUCTORS NEW YORK, NEW YORK
CONTENTS Section Pacae 1.0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 2.0 CIVIL AND SITE WORK DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 P lant Datum and Or ientation
2. 2 Design Depth for Frost Protection 2.3 Design Elevation of Ground Water 2.4 Roadways 2.5 Site Drainage 2.6 Earthwork Slopes 3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR CATEGORY I STRUCTURES 3.1 Design Loads Loading Combinations-
'.2 Reinforced Concrete Structures 3.3 Loading Combinations-Structural Steel 10 3.4 Factor of Safety 3.5 Methods of Analysis and Design 12 3.6 Materials 12 4.0 APPLICABLE CODES, STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS 13 5.0 QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES 13
Gzbbs 6 Hall, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 1 GENERAI DESCRIPTION The design cri teria presented herein are intended to cover the structural design and civil design woxk associated with the construction of the new Emergency Diesel Genex'ator (EDG) Facility of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.
Specifically. the criteria cover the design of the following major components of the new.EDG facility.
a. Emergency Diesel Generator building structure
b. Foundation and the manhole cover for the underground diesel fuel oil'torage tank.
cd Underground electrical duct banks.
d. Site civil work consisting of access and patrol xoads, paved areas, storm drainage system and final grading.
e. Any other seismic Category I structural components.
All of the above components except. item elated.
'd're safety Description of Safety Related Structures Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Building:
The EDG building is a Seismic Category 1, two-story structure with a basement, consisting primarily of re inforced concrete walls, floor slabs, and roof. The diesel genexator pedestal is also of reinfoxceed concrete. The building togethex with the pedestal is founded on sound rock. A gap between the building floor and the pedestal at grade level is provided so that no vibrations fxom the diesel generator are transmitted to the building.
A portion of outer wall shall be designed to be removable in order to facilitate the diesel generator installation and/or emergency xemoval of DG for maintenance.
Gibbs & Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 2 1.1 ~ 2 Underground Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Support Structure:
The foundation slab and the cover for the tank manhole are of reinforced concrete construction.
2.0 CIVIL AND SITE WORK DESIGN CRITERIA 2.1 Plant Datum and Orientation
a. Plant datum corresponds to U. S. Geological Survey Mean Sea Level (MSL) datum. Approximate plant grade is 675 above MSL.
b. Plant North corresponds to true north.
c. Horizontal control shall conform to the Pennsylvania State Grid System currently in use at the site.
2 2 Design Depth for Frost Protection Bottoms of all foundations shall be located at a minimum depth of 4 feet below the grade. All water piping shall have a- minimum cover of 4 ft. 6 in.
2.3 i De s gn Elevation o f Ground Water At plant structures 665 ft. above MSL.
2.4 Roadways
a. Minimum lane width 10 b.'aximum grade 9 0/
c ~ Road alignment and geometry shall be based on the turning movements of expected operations and maintenance vehicles, but not smaller than standard AASHTO 50 feet long semitrailer.
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 3 2.5 Site Drainage 2.5.1 Design Flow Runoff flow shall be calculated by the rational formula: Q = C i A where the precipitation intensity, i shall be determined as follows:
a ~ For drainage ditches and culverts, precipitation intensity shall be derived from rainfall intensity-duration curves for Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1903-1951, Technical Paper No. 25, published by the U. S. Department of Commerce.
Return period of 25 years shall be assumed for all culverts.
b. For yard storm sewers, precipitation intensity shall be assumed as 6 in. per hour on building roofs.
2.5.2 Design Velocity and Size
a. Minimum diameter of main yard storm sewers - 8 in.
b. Minimum diameter of laterals - 4 in.
c. Minimum design velocity 2 fps.
2.5.3 External Loads Culverts and storm sewers beneath roads shall be designed for H20-S16 live loading.
2.6 Earthwork Slopes
a. Maximum earth embankment 1/2 Horiz. to 1 Vert.
slopes
b. ~
Recommended rock slopes - 1 Horiz. to 4 Vert.
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 4 3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR CATEGORY I STRUCTURES 3.1 Design I.oads The following loads shall be considered in the design of seismic Category I structures:
3. 1.1 D = Dead load of structure and any permanent equipment.
Hydrostatic loads shall, be considered as dead loads.
3.1.2 I = Zive Toads live loads are conventional floor or roof live loads, including live loads resulting from moving of equipment components, snow, etc. Soil pressure loads due to fluctuations of ground water elevation .and due to surcharge, shall be considered as live loads. An allowance of 50 pounds per square foot (lbs./ft. ~) is included in the floor live loads specified below,'to account for the support of hung loads such as piping, electrical conduits and trays and heating, ventilation
'and air conditioning (HVAC) ducts.
3. 1.2. 1 The following values of live load shall be used unless more realistic uniform or concentrated'oads are determined after equipment information has been evaluated:
Roof 30 psf Ground and elevated floors 250 psf Exhaust pipe enclosu e room 150 psf Grating and checkered plate floors and platforms 100 psf Stairways and walkway 100 psf Stair hand rails and guard rails 25 pounds/linear foot applied at top of railing or 200 pounds concentrated load applied in any di rec-
Gibbs .Ec Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 5 tion at top of railing Surcharge outside and adjacent to structures 250 psf 3.1.2.2 Supplementary Concentrated Live Loads:
a ~ In addition to the specified uniform live loads, the beams and girders shall be designed for the concentrated load of 5 kips. This load shall be applied at points of maximum moment and shear.
However, it is not cumulative and is not carried to columns and shall not be considered in access control areas.
b. The slabs shall be designed for a concentrated load of 5 kips distributed over an area of 3 square feet at the points of maximum .moment and shear, or uniform live loads specified in Section 3.1.2.1, whichever is greater. The concentrated load is not cumulative and is not carried to columns and shal'1 not be considered in control access areas.
3.1.2.3 Nhen designing floor members in areas where fixed.
equipment will be located and where the operating weight-.
of the equipment will be larger than the floor design.
live load, the floor members shall be designed taking into consideration the floor area covered by the equipment to be loaded by the equipment weight, and the surrounding floor area to be loaded by the design live load.
3.1.2.4 Impact Loads and Dynamic Loads Crane lifted load shall be increased 25 percent to account for impact. The crane girder shall be designed to carry the dead load and lifted load as well as a lateral load of 20 percent of the combined weight of the lifted load and the weight of the crane trolley applied one-half on each side of the runway and at the top of rail. 'he crane girder shall also be designed for a longitudinal load of 10 percent of the maximum wheel load applied at the top of the rail. Supports for hoists and monorails shall be designed assuming the nominal vertical load capacity increased by 15 percent
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 6 to allow for impact. The above noted impact loads shall not be assumed to act concurrently with seismic loads.
3. 1.3 Wind and Tornado Loading The structural components of new EDG facility shall be designed for wind and tornado loading with appropriate load combinations specified in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1.3.1 W = Wind Load The design wind velocity for the EDG Building is 80 miles per hour for a 100 year recurrence interval.
The corresponding wind pressure with considerations for height variations and shape coefficients shall be calculated in accordance with American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Paper No. 3269, "Wind Forces on Structures - Final Report of the Task Committe on Wind Forces, Committee on Loads and Stresses, Structural Division".
The vertical wind velocity distribution and corresponding effective wind pressures to be used on building walls are as shown on the following table:
Wind Load on Structures Heigh-'" .Basic Dynamic: WIND LOADS Wind Windward Leeward Total Des. Suction Zone Velocit Pressure Pressure Suction Pressure on Roof Feet q (+sf) 0.8q 0. Sq 1. 3q 0. 6q 0-50 80 . 20 16 10 26 12 50-150 95 30 24 15 39 18 3.1.3.2 W = Tornado load:
t The structural components of EDG facility shall be designed to withstand the effect of the Design Basis Tornado as outlined in Reg. Guide 1.76. Tornado loading shall include (a) Dynamic Wind, (b) Differential
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 7 Pressure and (c) Tornado Generated Missiles. Total tornado loading shall be determined using the following design parameters:
a ~ W = Dynamic wind loading w
Wind speeds corresponding to tornado conditions shall be as follows:
Maximum wind speed - 360 mph Rotational wind speed - 290 mph Translational wind .speed - 70 mph (maximum) 5 mph (minimum)
W = Differential pressure loading p
The differential pressure shall be assumed to vary from zero to 3 psi at the rate of 2 psi per second, remain at 3 psi for 2 seconds and then return to zero psi at 2 psi/second.
c ~ W = Tornado generated missile load m
For design parameters for tornado generated missiles including missiles to be considered, see Section 3.1.4.1.
"d. Total tornado load:
~
Total tornado load shall be calculated using following combinations:
I.W=W t w IV. W = W w
+ 0.5W p
II. W = W V.W=W+W t p t w m III. W = W VI. W = W + 0.5W + W t m t w p'
Gibbs Ec Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 8 Missile Protection I.oads The individual postulated missile shall be evaluated and adequate missile protection shall be provided to prevent perforation and spalling of the inside face of the missile barrier walls. The methodology used in designing missile barriers shall be in agreement with the procedures outlined in the Standard Review Plan Section 3.5.3, "Barrier Design Procedures", Rev. 1.
Following two categories of missile loads shall be considered:
W = Tornado Generated Missile load m
Following tornado generated missile parameters shall be used in calculating missile loads:
Impact Weight Velocity Missile ~lb ~fs A) Wood plank, 4 in. x 12 in.
x 12 ft., traveling end-'on 108 B) Steel pipe, 3 in. dia.,
Schedule 40, 10 long, traveling end-on 72 147 Steel pipe, 6 in. dia.,
Schedule 40, 15 ft. long 285 170 D) Steel pipe, 12 in. dia.,
Schedule 40, 15 ft. long 750 155 E) Steel rod 1-inch dia.
x 3 ft. long 317 F) Automobile flying through the air at not more than 25 ft. above the ground and having contact area of 20 sq. ft. 4000 195 G) Utility pole 13.5 in. dia,
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
. Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 9 Impact Velocity Missile Weight
~lh ~fs 35 ft. long 1490 Note:
The vertical velocities will be considered equal to 80 percent of the horizontal velocities mentioned above.
3.1.4.2' = Site Proximity Missile Loads ms Following parameters shall be used in calculating site proximity missile loads:
SITE PROXIMITY MISSILE PARAMETERS Missile ~Wel ht Im act Velocit A) Rifle bullet fired by vandals 2 oz ~ 2667 fps B) Fragment from a truck explosion 6 oz. fragment 15 fps 3.3..5 Seismic Loads The following two magnitudes of earthquake shall be considered.
3.1.5.1 E = Loads generated by operating basis earthquake (OBE) 3.1.5.2 E' Loads generated by safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)
'.2 Ioading Combinations-Reinforced Concrete Structures:
The following combinations of service and factored loadings shall -be considered in the design of reinforced concrete seismic Category I structures. U is the requried ultimate load capacity of the structure as defined in American Concrete Institute (ACI)
In determining the most critical Standard 349-76.
loading condition to be used for design, the absence of a load or loads shall be considered as appropriate.
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 10 3 F 1 Service Load Combinations:
a. U = 1.4D + 1;7L
b. U = 1.4D + 1.7L + 1.9E
c. U = 1.4D + 1.7L + 1.7W
d. U = 1.2D + 1.9E
e. U = 1.2D + 1.7W Where soil or hydrostatic pressures are present and have been included in L and D, in addition to all the preceding combinations, the requirements of Sections 9.2.4 and 9.2.5 of ACI. 318.77 shall be satisfied.
3.2.2 -
Factored Load Combinations
a. U = 1.0D + 1.0L +
1.0E'.
U = 1.0D + 1.0L + 1.0W
c. U = 1.0D + 1.0L + 1.0W ms 3.2.3 Regarding precedir"- loads which are variable, the full range of variation shall be considered in order to determine the most critical combination of loading.
3.3 Loading Combinations-Structural The following combinations const.dered in the design of Category I structures. S
'f Steel structural is the loadings steel recgxired shall be seismic section
,strength based on the elastic design methods and the allowable stresses defined in Part I of American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, November, 1978, except that the 33-percent increase in allowable stresses for seismic or wind loadings will no" be permitted. In determining the most crtical loading condition to be used in design,
Gibbs S Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 11 the absence of a load or loads shall be considered as appropriate.
3.3.1 Service Load Combinations
a. S=D+L b.S=D+I +E c.S+D+L+W 3.3.2 Factored Load Combinations
a. 1.6S = D+L+E'.
1. 6S = D+I +W
c. 1.6S = D+L+W ms 3.4 Factor of Safety For all structures, minimum factor of safety against overturning, sliding and flotation shall be maintained as follows:
Load Minimum Factor of Safet Combination Overturning Sliding Flotation
a. D+H+W 1.5 1.5
b. D+H+W or D+H+W t ms
c. D+H+E 1.5 1.5
d. D+H+E'.
D+F H = Iateral earth pressure I
F = Buoyant Force due to ground water pressure
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 12 3.5 Methods of Analysis and Design Static analysis and design of structures shall be consistent with generally accepted engineering practice and shall be by methods suitable for hand analysis. The seismic analysis of new'EDG Building shall be performed by using computer programs. For description of seismic analysis procedure, see document No. 3544-SDC-002.
3.5.2 All steel structures shalL be designed by working stress methods in accordance with Part I of American Institute of Steel Construction' specification for Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings.
3.5.3 Reinforced Concrete Structures shall be designed by Ultimate Strength Design method in accordance with American Concrete Institute's "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures" (ACI 349-~ .
$0 3.6 Materials 3.6.1 Concreted Minimum compressive strength of concrete at 28 days for various structures and its applications shall be as follows:
Item Design Strength f'c (psi)
Structural Concrete Mat foundation, walls, slabs, etc. '4000 Mass Concrete fill, mud mat and duct banks 2000 3.6.2 Reinforcing Steel shall be deformed billet steel of Grade 60 conforming to ASTM A615.
3.6.3 Structural Steel shall conform to ASTM-A36 or other ASTM desginations listed in Section 1.4.1.1 of AISC Specifications for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, where considered necessary.
Gibbs 6 Hill, Inc.
Document 3544-SDC-001 Issue No. 0 January 1984 Page 13 3.6.4 'Anchor bolts shall be unfinished bolts conforming to requirements of ASTM A307 or threaded rods conforming to ASTM A36. Bolt material conformf ing to other ASTM standards will be used as required.
3.6.5 Welding electrodes shall be E70XX and all welding shall be in accordance with AWS Dl. 1.
4.0 APPLICABLE CODES, STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS 4.1 Code Requirements. fog> Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures (ACI 349-W f shall be used for design. of reinforced concrete structures.
4.2 Building Code Requirements for Reinf orced Concrete ACI 318-77 shall be used as supplement to ACI349-~ for items not covered in AC1 349-~gQ 4.3 AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, Eighth Edition, shall be used for the design of steel structures.
4.4 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 4.5 Form 408 specifications - Department of Transportation-Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
4.6 American Welding Society (AWS) -"Structural Welding Code" AWS D1.1-81.
4.7 US -NRC Regulatory Guide 1.142, Revision 1 Safety-Related Concrete Structures for Nuclear Power Plants (other than Reactor Vessels and Containments).
5.0 QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES The design shall comply with the Gibbs 6 Hill Quality Assurance Manual and the exceptions to Project Guide.
it stated in the
NUREG-0800 rmerly NUREG-76/087>
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O~
o C 8'Il'ANDARD RIEVIEN PLAN
3. 3. 1 MINO LOADINGS'EVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Structtrral; Engineering Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None; I. AREAS OF REVIEW, The following areas .relating to the design of structures that have to withstand the effects of the, design wind" specified for the plant are reviewed to assure conform-ance with the requirements of General Oesign Criterion 2 (Ref. 1).
The design wind velocity and its recurrence interval, the velocity variation wMh- heigh/, and the applicable gust factors are reviewed from the stapdpo&t of use in defining the input parameters for the structural design criteria appropriate to account for wind loadings. The bases for the selection and the values of these parameters are within the review responsibility of the Meteorology Section of the Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) as stated in SRP Sections 2. 3.1 and 2. 3. 2.
The procedures that are utilired to transform the design wind velocity into an effective pressure applied to structures are reviewed taking into considera-tion the geometrical configuration and physical characteristics of the structures an/ the distribution of wind pressure on the structures.
II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SEB accepts the design of structures that must withstand the effects of the design wind load if the relevant requiremeiits of General Design Criterion 2 concerning natural phenomena are complied with. The criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of GgC 2 are as follows:
"RRilo:.y p i d "f i1 f i "i SRP S i 2.3.
Rev. 2 - July 1981 U SNRC STANDARD REV)EW PLAN Standard review plans are,grpPsred for the guidance of the Office of Nucjear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct-and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public ss port ot tho Commission's policy to',irrforrn tte nuclear industry snd the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans sre not substitutes. for.,regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations snd compliance with them ls not required. The standard review plan sect(OPi are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not sll sections of the Standard Fo'rmst have s corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans* will be revised periodically, ss appropriate. to accommodate comments and to reflect now Informa-tion snd experience.
comments and suggestions'for Improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.s. Nuclear Regulatory commission, office of Nuclear Reactor,,Regulation. washington, o.c. 2065L
Wind velocities of 80 MPH, (0;50 Ft.) and 95 MPH (50-150,Ft ), were used in the design of the Diesel Generator (OG) "E" building. These-are-the same wind velocities, used in.,the'esign of all existing CategorpekustYuCtures. Refer to Susg. SES's FSAR Section'.3. 1. 1. A gust factor ofq~j.:.@VS'sed for ASCE paper No. 3269 entitled "Wind Forces on Structures"..;6~'<o't .
fggi ')sb These wind velocities were transformed into equivalent pressures using the expression provided in this SRP section. ~on&~qe -'
eN ff 986d 'Ff~
O'PJ '(c bog 1.f,~ 2Q >1
~ f(c.bo f-'&
. ff.9't Uf",f'~f r
rasp 6 ~,f' fA E& ~,
/
~
tE ~ ~, /IJ Q f J eO1 f'4. <
The various pressure loads applied are presented in Ref. 3>> Pape 6. These are the same pressure loads used in the design of all existfhg~Category I StruEcturps. f'f lbv,+~
hnb
. inp;tq feb ben i'3
~
~
t I IL
,f .<>, gntoneof U ac',&" ~
'A Ic,NA
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, -gran bn!
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.w ( ~q O' -Oi qP a3Zg win$ ~sed;~g the design shall be the most s'evere wind 'that 'h'as been I('he historiq@lily2,reported for the site and surrounding'area with sufficient margin for the.,limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which historical data has been accumulated.
.<zagqq 0 r
2. The ac'ceptance criteria for the design wind velocity and its recurrence interval, the velocity variation with height, the applicable gust factors, and the bases for determining these site-related parameters, are estab-lished by the Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) and are contained in SRP Sections 2.3. 1 and 2.3.2. The approved values of these parameters should serve as basic input to the review and evaluation of the structural design procedures.
3. The procedures utilized to transform the wind velocity into an effective pressure to be applied to structures and parts and portions of structures, as delineated in ANSI A58. 1, "Building Code Requirements for Minimum Design Loads in Buildings and Other Structures" (Ref. 2), are acceptable.
In particular, the procedures utilized are acceptable if found in accord-ance with the following; For=a design wind velocity of V30 mph specified at a height of feet above the ground, the velocity pressure, q,30'0 is given by:
2 q30 0 00256 V 0
psf
~6q,C Thezyffpetive pressure for structures, qF, and for portions thereof, q , at various heights above the ground should be in accordance with Table 5 and Table 6 of ANSI A58. 1, respectively. Since most nuclear power plants are located in relatively open country, Exposure C, as defined in ANSI A58. 1, should be selected for both tables.
Depending upon the structure geometry and physical configuration, pressure coefficients may be selected in accordance with Section 6.4 of ANSI A58. 1. Geometrical shapes that are not covered in this document are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. ASCE Paper No. 3269, "Wind Forces on Structures" (Ref. 3), may be used to obtain the effective wind pressures for cases which ANSI A58. 1 does not cover.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from the review procedures described below as may be appropriate for a particular case.
1. The site-related parameters described in subsection'. 1 are reviewed by the Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) under SRP Sections 2. 3. 1 and 2. 3. 2.
The struc'tural reviewer examines the approved values of these parameters to assure that they are consistent with those contained in SRP Sections 2.3. 1 and 2 '.2.
3. 3. 1-2 Rev. 2 - July 1981
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,iS SEC>,
~o i STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFlCE'OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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'3. 3. 2 TORNADO LOADINGS REVIEW RESPONSIBILTIES Primary - Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW The following areas relating to the design of structures that have to withstand the effects of the design basis tornado specified for the plant are reviewed to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 2 (Ref. 1).
1. The design parameters applicable to the tornado, including the tornado wind trarislational and tangential velocities, the tornado-generated pressure dif=
fer'ential and its associated time interval, and the spectrum of tornado-generated missiles including their characteristics, are reviewed'from the
'tandpoint of use in defining the input parameters for the structural design criteria. appropriate to account for tornado loadings. The bases for the selection and the values of these parameters are within the review responsi-bility of the Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) as stated in SRP Sections 2.3. 1, 2.3.2, and 3.5.1.4. (
2. The procedures that are utilized to transform the tornado parameters into effective loads on structures are reviewed, including the following:
a. The transformation of the tornado wind into an effective pressure applied to structure's, taking into consideration the geometrical configuration and physical characteristics of the structures and the distribution of wind pressure on the structures.
b. If venting of a structure is used, the procedures for transforming the tornado-generated differential pressure into an effective reduced pres-sure are reviewed by the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) upon SEB request.
Rev. 2 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REYIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prep'ared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to Inform the nuclear Industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plane will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new Informs.
tion and experience.
Comments and suggestiqps for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, O.C. 20555.
'.,i er~
(P'jDP...
f f f t9ri "69 'r" obsn't <
IIm2) The tornado design for DG "E" building is per Reg,,',5u$ de 1.76 for Region I. "f) '- I+3+
Maximum Wind Speed 360 MPH" Rotational Speed 290 MPH
q 'pg Max. Translational Speed 70 MPH-'"b Min. Translational Speed 5 MPH.,~;~n b,P Radius of Maximum Rotational Speed 150 Ft.;, ='"~~i Pressure Drop 3.0 PSI,'; (, jjg; Rate of Pressure Drop 2.0 PSI/Sjc;, ',,
3.3 3.3-4 and Ref. 3, v'6'ns (See Ref. I, Page Pages,' and 7.)
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3. i) The tornado wind velocity was transformed into ap,;yqgivalent pressure using the expression provided in this SRP section;.t ,'. z ~
asm ii) The tornado wind velocity was taken to be constant with height.
iii) Applied tornado wind pressures are calculated usipg~- the; maximum tornado wind velocity.
srlT ('
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c. The transformation of tornado""generated missile loadings, which are impactive dynam'ic loads, into effective loads.
d. The combination of the above individual loadings in a manner that will produce the most adverse total tornado effect on structures.
3. The information provided to demonstrate that fai lure of any structure or component not designed for tornado loads will not affect the capability of other structures or components to perform necessary safety functions.
I I. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SEB accepts the design of structures that must withstand the effects of the design tornado wind load and the associated'missiles if the relevant require-
'ments of General Design Criterion 2 concerning natural phenomena are complied with. The criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2 are as follows:
The tornado wind and associated missiles generated by the tornadic winds used in.tge design shall be the most severe wind that has been historically reports"t'oi'he site and surrounding area with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy; quantity, and period of time in which historical data has been accumulated.
2. The acceptance criteria for the tornado wind velocity, the differential pressure and its associated time interval, the spectrum of tornado" generated missiles and their characteristics, and the bases for deter-mining these'arameters, are established by the Acciderit Evaluation Branch (AEB) as described in SRP Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 3.5. 1.4. The approved va'tues of these paramenters should serve as basic input to the review.and evaluation of the structural design procedures.
inF 8
3. The acceptance'riteria for the procedures used to transform the tornado parameters int'o effective loadings on structures are as follows:
a~ For transforming the tornado wind velocity into an effective pres-sure applied to structures, the criteria delineated in either the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Paper No. 3269, "Mind Forces on Structures" (Ref. 2), or in ANSI A58. 1, "Building Code Requirements for Minimum Pesign Loads in Buildings and Other Sti%5tur'4's" (Ref. 3), are, in general, acceptable. In particular, the following shall apply:
,(i) The maximum velocity pressure, p, should be based upon the maximum tornado velocity, V, using the followina formula:
p
= 0.00256 V psf, in which V is in mph.,
(ii=)"- 7tH'elocity pressure should be assumed constant with height.
(iii) The maximum velocity pressure, p, applies at the radius of the tornado funnel at which the maximum velocity occurs. The tan-gential velocity varies with the radial distance from the center of the tornado core. The variation may be considered in accord-ance with that described in the paper, "Tornado Resistant Oesign of Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 4).
3.3.2 2 Rev 2 -4uly 1981
(v Shape and pressure coefficients are taken from ASCE Paper No. 3269.
x',.lw A gust factor of unity is used.
Venting of the DG "E" building is not used to reducesthe tornado-generated differential pressure. The full 3 PSI'differential pressure is applied as a static load. "E..) F> n ngil6 sc'~'~f-Sd >
Equivalent static loads were determined using Re'f." 7-'df SRP 3.5.3.
Allowable ductility ratios were taken from AC1-349'b %he modified NDRC formula was used to calculate the depth of miss'ile penetration.
The thicknesses of the DG "E" building's walls and",'r'deaf. exceed those values listed in Table 1 of SRP 3.5.3. >'fvf5<
e(3 n9n The three individual tornado-generated loads (w'ind:,~ViVferential pressure and missile) are combined per the method"presented in this SRP section. (See Ref. 3, Page 7.)
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There are no structures adjacent to the DG "E" bu'i'M'i'hus, no structures are postulated to collapse or fail on Cfire 'DG "E" building.
'.$ $ 20Q tornado-generated missiles used in the design A%9fe OG "E" 9'he building are the more severe missiles of those 1 AChcPR"n the FSAR Table 3.5-4 and the Spectrum II missiles for Region>4P"(See Ref. 1, Table 3.5-4a.) The vertical velocities were considered to be equal to 80 percent of the horizontal velocities.
(iv) For calculating velocity pressures on external surfaces of struc-
=.9 ~Yures, on external portions thereof, and on internal surfaces, where there are openings in the structure, appropriate shape co'efficients shall be used in accordance with ASCE Paper Ho. 3269 (Ref. 2). Gust factors may be taken as unity.
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If venting of a structure is adopted as a design measure to permit ti ansforming the tornado-generated differential pressure into an effective reduced pressure, the acceptance criteria are established on a case-by-case basis, upon request, by the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB).
The acceptance criteria for. transforming the tornado-generated mis-sile impact into an effective or equivalent static load on structures age delineated in subsection II of SRP Section 3.5.3.
PP flf do gyring, established the effective loads for each of the above three individual tornado-generated effects, the combination thereof should then be determined in a conservative manner for each particular
-structure, as applicable. An acceptable method of combining these e.fsgcts, is as follows:
Wt=W (ii) Wtt = W p
(iii) Wt' W
( ) W t =W+.5W w
(v) =
Wt W + W (vi) Wt
= W w
+ '.5 W + W m
where: Wt ..... total tornado load, Ww ..... tornado wind'oad, W
P
..... tornado dif'Perential pressure load 1 and W ..... tornado missile load.
For each particular structure or portion thereof, the most adverse of the above combinations should be used, as appropriate.
These combined effects constitute the total tornado load which should then be combined with other loads as specified in SRP Sections 3.8. 1, 3.8.4, and 3.8.5.
The information provided to demonstrate that failure of any structure or component not designed for tornado loads will not affect the capability of othe@,nsQuctures or components to perform necessary safety functions, is acceg++ if found in accordance with either of the following:
a. The postulated collapse or structural failure of structures and com-poqept~ got designed for tornado loads, including missiles, can be sfowggot'. to result in any structural or other damage to safety-re1atyd:structures or components.
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b Safety-related structures are designed to resist the effects of the postulated structural failure, collapse, or gener atl.on of missiles from structures and components not designed for tornado loads.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from the review procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.
1. The site-related parameters described in subsection I. l. are reviewed by the Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB) in accordance with SRP S t' 3 1 2.3.2 an d 3. 5.. 1.4. The structural reviewer examines the approved values of these p'arameters to assure that they are consistent with those contained in the SRP sections stated above.
2. After. the acceptability of the site"related parameters is established, the SEB reviewer proceeds with his review of the structural aspects of tornado design in the following manner
a. The. procedures used by the applicant to transform tornado wind veloc" ities into effective pressures are reviewed and compared with those procedures delineated in either ASCE Paper No. 3269 or in ANSI A58. 1, whichever is selected, and, in particular, with the acceptance criteria delineated in subsection II.3.a.
b. Where venting is used, procedures for transforming the tornado-generat'ed differential pressure into an effective reduced pressure are reviewed, upon request, by the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) upon SEB request.
C. The treatment of tornado-generated missiles is covered in SRP Section 3.5. 1.4 and the review procedures for design of missile barriers are described in SRP Section 3.5.3.
d. After procedures for determining the individual tornado effects are reviewed, the manner in which these effects are -then'ombined to arrive at the most adverse total tornado effect is reviewed and compared with the acceptance criteria delineated in subsection II.3.d.
Other proposed methods which may depend upon the geometry and confi-guration of a particular structure are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
3, The information provided to demonstrate that failure of any structure or component not designed for tornado loads will not affect the capability of other structures or components to perform necessary safety functions is reviewed to assure that one of the acceptance criteria of subsection II.4 is satisfied.
IY. EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer vef ifies that sufficient information has been provided to satisfy the requirements of this SRP section, and concludes that his evaluation is sufficiently complete and adequate go support the following type of statement to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report.
3. 3. 2-4 Rev 2 - July 1981
3v The tornado-generated missiles used in the design of the DG "E", .facility are the more'severe missiles of those listed in fSAR Table 3.5-4'~'and the Spectrum II missiles for Region I. (See Ref. 1, Table 3.5-4a.) The vertical velocities were considered to be equal to 80 percent of the horizontal velocities.
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+'.~ o" STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION pete
3. 5. 1.4 MISSILES GENERATEO BY NATURAL PHENOMENA REYIEM RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB)
Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REYIBI The applicant's assessment of possible hazards due to missiles generated by the design basis tornado, flood, and any other natural phenomena identified in Sec-tion 3.5 of the safety analysis report (SAR) is reviewed and evaluated by the ASB to assure that appropriate design basis missiles have been chosen and pr'operly characterized, and to assure that the effects caused by these missiles are accept-able. Currently, only missiles from the design basis tornado are consistently consiaered in the plant design bases. Missiles from other phenomena are con" sidered on a case-by-case basis when they are identified.
The ASB also reviews the identification of those structures, systems and compo-nents that should be protected against missile impact under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.5.2.
The Structural Engineering Branch (SEB) determines the acceptability of the design analysis, procedures and criteria used to establish the ability of seismic Cate-gory I structures and/or missile bar riers to withstand the effects of tornado missiles as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3. 5. 3. The acceptance criteria and their methods of application are combined in that SRP section.
I I. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA nM The acceptabi),ity of the assessment as described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR) i,s.,based on compliance with: General Design Criteria 2 and 4 as it relates to the lcapability of structures, systems, and components important to safety to withstand the effects of tornadoes and other natural phenomena. Accept-ance is based on meeting the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.76 and 1.117. The
,Rev 2 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate. to accommodate comments and to reflect new informa.
tion and experience.
Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Vtashington, O.C. 20555.
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methodology of identification of appropr iate design basis'issiles generated by natural phenomena shall be consistent with the acceptance criteria defined for the evaluation of potential accidents from external sources in SRP Section 2.2.3.
III. REYIEM PROCEOURES procedures below are used during the construction permit (CP) review o determ'he ine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary d s t forth in the p re liminary safety analys)s report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II. For review of operating license (OL) applications, the procedures are utilized to verify that the initial d haave been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report.
Upon request from the primary reviewer, SEB will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I. The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this revie~'rocedure is complete.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material from this SRP section, as may be appropriate for a particular case.
The judgment on areas to be given attention and emphasis in the review is to be based on an inspection of the material presented to see whether it is similar to that recently reviewed on other plants and whether items of s ecial safet significance are involved.
. 1 The SAR is reviewed for the identifi,cation of the design basis natural phenomena which could possibly generate missiles. Postulated missiles are reviewed for proper characterization.
2. The probability per year of damage to the total of all important struc-tures, systems, and components (as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.117) due to a specific design basis natural phenomena capable of generatin ing missiles is estimated.
3. If this probability is greater than the acceptable probability stated in Regulatory Guide 1. 117, then specific design provisions must be provided to reduce the estimate of damage probability to an allowable level.
4. Al 1 plants are required to be designed to protect safety-related equipment against damage from missiles which might be generated by the design basis tornado for that plant. The reviewer verifies that the applicant has postu- I lated missiles that include at least three objects: a massive high kinetic energy missile which deforms on impact, a rigid missile to test penetr ion t'a resi'stance, and a small rig>d missile of a size sufficient to just p ass throu gh any openings in protective barriers. Until more definitive guide-lines are established, these missiles may be assumed to be an 1800 Kg automobile, a 125 Kg 8" armor piercing artillery shell and a 1" so 1'd 1 stee 1 sphere, all impacting at 35K. of the maximum horizontal windspeed of the design basis tornado. The first two missiles are assumed to impact at normal incidence, the last to impinge upon barrier openings in the most damaging directions. These missiles are identified as Spectrum I.
Alternately, the missiles selected by the National Bureau of Standards as representative of construction site debris in report NBSIR 76-1050 may be
3. 5. 1. 4-2 Rev. 2 - July 1981
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STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE QF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
3. 5. 1. 5 SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES (EXCEPT AIRCRAFT)
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Siting Analysis Branch (SAB)
Secondary - NONE I. AREAS OF REVIEW The staff reviews the nature and extent of offsite activities identified in SRP Section 2.2. 1-2.2.2 to determine whether any missiles resulting from such activities, other than aircraft (aircraft hazards are reviewed separately -in SRP Section 3.5. 1.6),
have the potential for adversely affecting structures, systems, and components (SSC) essential to safety. In the event. that an offsite activity has the potential for missile- production (e.g., explosion) and is found to be-a design basis event accm d-ing to SRP Section 2.2.3, the staff reviews the plant design to determine whether the plant is adequately protected against the effects of the postulated missiles.
The SSC that should be protected against missiles are identified in accordance with SRP Section 3. 5. 2 as part of the primary review responsibility of the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB). The Siting Analysis Branch (SAB) identifies and characterizes any offsite missiles that are required to be accommodated within the plant design basis in order to protect adequately the safety-related SSC. The Structural Engi-neering Branch (SEB) on request by SAB reviews the missile impact effects on the safety-related SSC. The acceptance criteria necessary for the review and the methods of applica'tion for the above reviews are contained in the referenced SRP section.
II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAB acceptance criteria are based on 'meeting the relevant requirements of one of the following regulations:
10 CFR Part 100, 5100.10 indicates that the site location, in, conjunction with other considerations (such as plant design, construction, and operation), should insure a low risk of public exposure. This requirement is met if the probability of site proximity missiles impacting the plant and causing radiological Rev. 1 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of reguiatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.
Pubgshed standard review plans will be revised periodically. as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new informs.
tion and experience.
Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Washington, O.C. 20555.
<r Cr~
The following site proximity missiles were considered in the 'design of the 06 "E" facility:
Missile ~llei ht ~Velocit Riffle bullet 2 Oz. 2667 fps Fragment from a truck explosion 6 Oz. 15 fps Oxygen bottle 143 lb. 262 fps Acetylene bottle 198 lb. 179 fps 2ero gas bottle 70 lb. 342 fps (See Ref. 2, Page 4-1 and Ref. 3, Page 9.)
consequences greater than 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines is less than about',10- per year (see SRP Section 2.2.3). If the results of the do not indicate that the above criterion is met, then the acceptance criterion described in 2 below applies.
2. General Design Criterion (GDC) 4 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, requires that structures, systems, and components (SSC) important to safety be appro-priately protected against the effects of missiles that may result from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit. The plant complies with GDC 4 and is considered adequately protected against site proximity missiles if the following criterion is met: The SSC important to safety are capable of withstanding the effects of the postulated missiles without loss of safe shutdown capability and without causing a release of radio-activity which would exceed 10 CFR Part 100 dose criteria.
I II. REVIE
W. PROCEDURE
S The reviewer selects. and emphasizes aspects of the areas covered by this SRP section as may be appropriate for a particular case. The judgment on areas to be given attention and emphasis in the review is based on an inspection of the material presented to see whether it is similar to that recently reviewed on other plants and whether items of special safety significance are involved.
1. The-identification and description of accidents which could possib'ly generate missiles is obtained from the review performed in accordance with SRP Section 2.2. 1-2.2.2 and SRP Section 2.2.3.
2. The SSC identified by 'ASB in reference to SRP Section 3.5,2 are reviewed with respect to missile vulnerability. Using conservative assumptions, and experience gained from past reviews on similar SSC missile interac-tions, a determination is made of those portions of the plant which clearly have the potential for unacceptable missile damage. If all SSC appear to be adequately protected against the effects of the postulated missiles, then the review is terminated and evaluation findings are written in terms of design basis considerations (See subsection II.2 of this SRP section).
3. The total pi obabi lity of the missiles striking a vulnerable critical area of the plant is estimated. The total probability per year (PT) may be estimated by using the following expression:
= x P>R x x x N PT PE PSC PP where:
PE
= probability per year of design basis event obtained from the review performed under SRP Section 2.2.3, P>R
= probability of missiles reaching the plant, PSC
= probability of missiles striking a vulnerable critical area of the plant, Pp
= probability of missiles exceeding the energies required to penetrate
, to vital areas (e. g., based on wall thickness provided for tornado
3. 5.1. 5-2 Rev. 1 - Ju1y 1981
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~~A Rrcrir wp STANDARD oFFIcE oF NucLEAR REVIEW PLAN REAcTGR REGULATION
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3. 7.1 SEISMIC DESIGN PARAMETERS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Structural Engineer ing Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW The following areas relating to seismic design parameters are reviewed.
1. Desi n Ground Motion For the seismic design of nuclear power plants it is customary to specify the earthquake ground motion which is exerted on the structure or on the soil" structure interaction system. The design ground motion, sometimes known as the seismic input, is based on the seismicity and geologic conditions at the site and expressed in such a manner that it can be applied to the dynamic analysis of structures. The design ground motions for the operating basis earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) are reviewed. They should be consistent with the information on seismic environment at the site provided in SRP Section 2.5.2, which includes the variation in and distribution of peak ground acceleration in the free field at different depths across the soil profile, sources and directions of motion, propagation and transmission of seismic waves, and other response characteristics..
Desi n Res onse S ectra A response spectrum is a plot of the maximum response of a family of single-degree-of-freedom damped oscillators with different frequency
. characteristics wh'en the base of the oscillator'is subjected to vibratory motion indicated by an appropl'iate time motion record. The response spectra are usually displayed on tripartite log-log graph paper. When obtained from a recorded earthquake, the response spectrum tends to be irregular, with a number of peaks and valleys. A design response spec-trum is a relatively smooth plot, obtained from a number of individual Rev. 1 - July 1981 4
USNRC STANDARD REV I EW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be reviseo periodically, av appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new informa.
tlon and experience.
Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Washington. O.C. 20566.
a&b) The maximum ground acceleration values are based on the most severe earthquakes that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The values used in the design of the DG "E" facility are the same as those values utilized in the design of existing Susquehanna SES seismic Category I structures. The NRC has previously reviewed and accepted these maximum ground acceleration values.
For the DG "E" building and pedestal, which are founded on sound bedrock, the maximum ground accelerations were taken to be 0.10g for SSE and 0.05g for OBE. for the DG "E" facility's fuel tank, which is founded on soil, the values are 0.15g for SSE and 0.08g for OBE.
(See Re f. 1, Page 3. 7b-1. )
In practical seismic analysis, which usually employs linear methods of analysis, damping is also used to account for many nonlinear effects such as changes in. boundary conditions, joint slippage, plastic hinges, concrete cracking, gaps, and other effects which tend to alter response amplitude.
In real structures, it is often impossible to separate "true" material damping from system damping, which is the measure of the energy dissipation,-
from the nonlinear effects. Overall structural damping used in design is normally determined by observing experimentally the total response of the structure.
Only the overall damping used for Category I structures, systems, and components are reviewed. When applicable, the basis for any damping values that differ from those given in Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Ref. 4) is reviewed.
Su ortin Media for Cate or I Structures The description of the supporting media for each Category I structure is reviewed, including foundation embedment depth, depth of soil over bedrock, soil layering characteristics, width of the structural foundation, total structural height, and soil properties to permit evaluation of the applica-bility of finite element.,or lumped spring approaches for soil-structure interaction analysis.
4. SEB coordinates other branches'valuations that interface with structur@
engineering aspects of the review as follows:
I Review of geological and seismological information to establish the free field ground motion is performed by the Geosciences Branch as described in SRP Section 2.5. Hydrologic and Geotechnical Engineering Branch reviews the geotechnical parameters and methods employed in the analysis of free field soil media and soil properties as described in SRP Section 2. 5.
Structural Engineering Branch accepts the results of the reviews performed by these branches including the maximum seismic ground acceleratioqs for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE),
site dependent free field ground motion records, soil properties, etc.,
as an integral part of the seismic analysis review of Category I structures.
For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in
.the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SEB accepts the design of structures that are important to safety and must with-stand the effects of the earthquakes if the relevant requirements of General Design Criterion 2 (Ref. 1) and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 (Ref. 2) concerning material phenomena are complied with. The relevant requirements of GDC 2 and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 are:
a~ For Design Criterion 2 - The earthquakes used in the design should be the most severe ones that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity and period of time in which historical data has been accumulated.
3. 7. 1-3 Rev. 1 - July 1981
The design response spectra for the DG "E" facility is constructed by linearly scaling down the amplification factors presented in Tables I and II of Reg.
Guide 1.60. The scaling factor used is the ratio of the Susquehanna SES maximum ground acceleration to the 1.0g acceleration value associated with the above tables (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-1.).
'For the DG "E" facility, the maximum vertical ground acceleration was taken to be the same as the maximum horizontal ground acceleration (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-2.)
For the DG "E" Facility, two synthetic time histories (one vertical and one
,horizontal) were developed to carry out time history analyses (See. Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-2).
/
b. For Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 - Two earthquake levels, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and the operating basis earthquake (OBE), shall be considered in the design of the safety-related structures,. components and systems.
Specific criteria necessary to meet the relevant requiremen'ts of GQC 2 and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 are described below.
The acceptance criteria for the areas of review described in subsection I above are as follows:
1. Desi n Ground Motion
a. Desi n Res onse S ectra Design response spectra for the OBE and SSE are considered to be acceptable if the associated amplification factors are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Design Response Spectra for Nuclear Power Plants," for all damping values.
As noted in Regulatory Guide 1. 60, there are site circumstances where the design response spectra are more appropriately developed to suit the particQlar site characteristics. Design response spectra based upon site-dependent analysis must be derived considering in situ
-variable soil properties, a representative number of site earthquake.
records, vertical amplification, possible slanted soil layers, and the influence of any predominant soil layers., Variable soil properties and nonlinear stress-strain relations in the soil media should be considered.
If site-dependent design response spectra are used, the data and bases from which the spectra are derived should be consistent with those provided in Section 2. 5. 2 of the SAR.
To be acceptable the design response spectra should be specified'for three mutually orthogonal directions; two horizontal and one vertical.
Current practice is to assume that the maximum ground accelerations in the two horizontal directions are equal, while the maximum vertical ground acceleration is 2/3 of the maximum horizontal acceleration.
For the western United States (West of Rockies), the response spectrum for vertical motion can be taken as 2/3 the response spectrum for horizontal motion over the entire range of frequencies.
~ll i ~illi The design time history to be used at various depths in the free-field of the soil media shall be consistent wi th that developed or specified in Section 2.5.2.
When no specific time history is provided in Section 2.5.2 of the SAR, an artificial time history may be generated for use in the seismic analysis. The artificial time history is acceptable if the response spectra in the free field at the specified level of the site
3. 7. 1"4 Rev. l - July 1981
Time history response spectra have been shown to envelope the design response spectra (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-2.)
The design ground motion is applied to the OG "E" Bldg. at the basemat level.
Time history response spectra have met this criteria. (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-2 and the provided figures.)
Response spectra have been computed at these suggested frequencies.
~
~ (See Ref.~
1, Page 3.7b-2.)
Damping values utilized for the DG "E" Facility are those presented in Reg.
Guide 1.61. (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-3.) Most conduit and box supports utilize damping values associated with the existing plant criteria. This was done to take advantage. of the numerous typical conduit/box supports that are available for the existing criteria.
obtained from such time history envelop the design response spectra at the same location for all damping values actually used in the analysis. Appendix A to 10 CFR 100 specifies that for soil structure interaction analysis or for seismic design of structures, the design round motion (sometimes called the control motion or reference motion) s applied at the foundation level of Category I structures in the free field.
When spectral va'lues are ca1culated from the design time history the frequency intervals are to be small enough such that any reduction in these intervals does not result in more than 10X change in the computed spectra. Table 3.7. 1-1 provides an acceptable set of fre-quencies at which the response spectra may be calculated. Another acceptable method is to choose a set of frequencies such that each frequency is within 10X of the previous one.
The acceptance criterion for meeting the spectra-enveloping requirement is that no more than five points of the spectra obtained from the time history should fall below, and no more than 10K below, the design response spectra.
Table 3.7.1-1 Suggested Frequency Intervals for Calculation of Response Spectra Frequency Increment Range (hertz) hertz 0.2 - 3.0 .10 3.0 - 3.6 .15 3.6 - 5.0 .20 5.0 - 8.0 .25 8.0 - 15.0 .50 15.0 - 18.0 1.0 18.0 - 22.0 "2.0 22.0 - 34.0 3.0
2. Critical Oam in Values The specific percentage of critical damping values used in the analyses of Category I structures, systems, and components are considered to be acceptable if they are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.61, "Oamping VaIues for Seismic Oesign of Nuclear Power Plants." Higher damping values may be used in a dynamic seismic analysis if documented test data are pro-vided to support them. These values would be reviewed and accepted by the staff on a case-by-case basis. The damping value for soil must be based upon actual measured values or other pertinent laboratory data considering'variation in soil properties and strains within the soil.
3.7. 1-5 Rev. 1 - July 1981
A general description of the supporting media is provided in Ref. 2, page 3-6.
~
Seven borings were taken to determine the soil and rock conditions in the area of the DG "E" facility. A plan showing the location of the borings, the seven boring logs and soil/rock profiles are provided in Section 2.5 of Ref. 1.
The excavation for the DG "E" building was carried to unweathered bedrock by using soldier beams and laggings. The excavation for DG "E" facility's fuel tank was carried out in open cut (See Ref. 1, Page 2.5-98.). About 8 feet (north end) and 20 feet (south end) of sand, gravel and boulders are below the foundation grade of the fuel tank. Four standard penetration tests performed on the soil beneath the fuel tank were noted to have values exceeding 40 blows/foot. (See Ref. 1, Page 2.5-91 through 2.5-94.)
The foundation mat for the DG "E" fuel tank is 17 feet wide, 57 feet long and 5 feet thick. The bearing pressure and settlement of the soil beneath the fuel tank were determined to be less than the allowable values (See Ref. 1, Page 2.5-108.)
For the DG "E" building, lean concrete was used as fill for the volume between the sound bedrock and the bottom elevation of the building basement floor mat.
The excavated area for the DG "E" fuel tank was backfi lied with sand-cement-flyash to two (2) feet below finished grade.
3. Su ortin Media for Cate or I Structures To be acceptable, the description of supporting media for each Category I structure must include foundation embedment depth, depth of soil over bed-rock, width of the structural foundation, total structural height, and soil properties such as shear wave velocity, shea~ modulus, and density as a function of depth.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES For each area of review, the following review procedure is followed. The reviewer wi 11 select-and emphasize material from the procedures given below as may be appropriate for a particular case. The scope and depth of review procedures must be such that the acceptable criteria described above are met.
1. Desi n Ground Motion
a. Desi n Res onse S ectra Design response spectra for the OBE and SSE for all damping values are checked to assure that the spectra are in accordance with the acceptance criteria as given in subsection II. Any differences
'between the regulatory guide spectra and the proposed response spectra which have not been adequately justified are identified and the applicant is informed of the need for additional technical justification.
b. Desi n Time Histor Methods of defining the design time history are reviewed to ascertain that the acceptance criteria of subsection II.2 of this SRP section are met.
2. Critical Dam in Values The specific percentage of critical damping values for the OBE and SSE used in the analyses of Category I structures, systems, and components are checked to assure that the'damping values are in accordance with the acceptance criteria as given in subsection II.2 of this SRP section. Any differences in damping values which have not been adequately justified are identified and the applicant is informed of the need for additional technical justification.
3. Su or tin Media for Cate or I Structures The description of the supporting media is reviewed to verify that sufficient information, as specified in the acceptance criteria of subsection II.3 of this SRP section is included. Any deficiency in the required information 15 identified and a request for additional information is transmitted to the applicant.
IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and that e his evaluation supports conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:
3. 7. 1" 6 Rev. 1 - July 1981
NUREG-0800 (Formerly NUREG-75/087) sos stop U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
"::i STANDARD REVIEW. PLAN
+ --4 o'" OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
3. 7. 2 SEISMIC SYSTEM ANALYSIS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None I: AREAS OF REVIEW The following areas related to the seismic system analysis described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR) are reviewed.
1. Seismic Anal sis Methods For all Category I structures, systems, and components, the applicable seisaKc analysis methods (response spectra, time history, equivalent static load) are reviewed. The manner in which the dynamic system analysis method is performed, including the modeling of foundation torsion, rocking and translation, is reviewed. The method chosen for selection of significant modes and an adequate number of masses or degrees of freedom is reviewed. The manner in which consideration is given in the seismic dynamic analysis to maximum r elative displacements between supports is reviewed. In addition, other significant effects that are accounted for in the dynamic seismic analysis such as hydro-dynamic effects and nonlinear response are reviewed. If tests or empirical methods are used in lieu of analysis for any Category I structure, the testing procedure, load levels, and acceptance basis are also reviewed.
2. Natural Fre uencies and Res onses l
For the operating license review, significant natural frequencies and responses for major Category I structures are reviewed. In addition, the response spectra at major Category I equipment elevations and points of support are I reviewed.
Rev. 1 - Jul 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents sre made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have s corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments snd to reflect new informa-tion snd experience.
Comments and suggestions for Improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, O.C. 20555.
Cvs ~ sac ~L I
13. Anal sis Procedure for Dam in The analysis procedure to account for the damping in different elements of the model of a coupled system is reviewed.
14. Determination of Cate or I Structure Overturnin Moments The description of the method and procedure used to determine design overturning moments for Category I structures is reviewed.
15. SEB coordinates other branches'valuations that interface with structural engineering aspects of the review as follows:
Review of geological and seismological information to establish the free field ground motion is performed by the Geosciences Branch as described in SRP Section 2.5. Hydrologic and Geotechnical Engineering Branch reviews the geotechnical parameters and methods employed in the analysis of free field soil media, and soil proper ties as described in SRP Section 2. 5. Struc-tural Engineering Branch accepts the results of the reviews performed by these branches including the maximum seismic ground accelerations for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE),
site-dependent free field ground motion records, soil properties, etc.,
as an integral part of the seismic analysis review of Category I structures.
For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch, II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The acceptance criteria for the areas of review described in subsection I of this SRP section are given below. Other approaches which can be justified to be equivalent to or. more conservative than the stated acceptance criteria may be used. SEB accepts the design of structures, systems, and components that are important to safety and must withstand the effects of earthquakes if the relevant'requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 (Ref. 1) and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 (Ref 2) concerning natural phenomena are complied with. The relevant requirements of GDC 2 and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 are:
A. General Design Criterion 2 as it relates to the earthquakes used in the design should be the most severe ones that have been historically reported
,for the site and surrounding area with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which historical data has been accumulated.
B. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 as it relates to the requirement that two earthquake levels, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and the operating basis earthquake (OBE), be considered in the design of safety-related structures, components, and systems. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 further states that the design used to ensure that the required safety functions are maintained during and after the vibratory ground motion associated with the safe shutdown earthquake shall involve the use of either a 3.7.2"4 Rev. 1 - July 1981
1. The DG "E" building and pedestal were analyzed by the response spectrum method to obtain the structural responses (accelerations and relative displacements). See Ref. 2, Page C-7.
The DG "E" building and pe'destal were analyzed by the time history method to develop floor response spectra. See Ref. 2, Page C-7 & C-8.
2. The DG "E" building and pedestal are founded on sound bedrock. As a result, the soil-structure interaction effect is insignificant.
3. The DG "E" building's horizontal dynamic model reflects the eccentricity effect of the asymmetrical building configuration. Thus, it is capable of producing torsional response due to a horizontal earthquake. (See Ref. 2, Page C-5 and Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-ll.)
4. For the DG "E" building and pedestal dynamic models, the number of degrees of freedom exceed twice the number of modes with frequencies less than 33 Hz.
5. For the DG "E" building and its pedestal all modes were considered.
(See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-5.)
6. A modal response spectrum analysis was performed using the DG "E" building and pedestal models to determine the relative displacements.
(See Ref. 2, Page C-7.)
7. Piping inside the D.G. "E" building is analyzed independently using the floor response spectra. (See Ref. 2, Page C-8.) No externally applied structural restraints are considered for the DG "E" building analysis.
Hydrodynamic loads (SRV & LOCA) need not be considered due to the physical location of the DG "E" building. Stress levels are kept below allowable levels, thus, nonlinear responses, are not considered.
suitable dynamic analysis or a suitable qualification test to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components can withstand the seismic and other concurrent loads, except where it can be demonstrated that the use of an equivalent static load method provides adequate conservatism.
. Specific criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2 and Appendix A to Part 100 are as follows:
1. Seismic Anal sis Methods The seismic analysis of all Category I structures, systems, and components should utilize ei,ther a suitable dynamic analysis method or an equivalent static load method, if justified.
a. 0 namic Anal sis Method A dynamic analysis (e.g., response spectrum method, time history method, etc.) should be used when the use of the equivalent static load method cannot be justified., To be acceptable such analyses should consider the following items:
(1) Use of either the time history method or the response spectrum method.
(2) Use of appropriate methods of analysis to account, for effects soil-structure interaction.
'f (3) Consideration of the torsional, rocking, and translational responses of the structures and their foundations.
(4) Use of an adequate number of masses or degrees of freedom in dynamic modeling to determine the response'f all Category I and applicable non-Category I structures and plant equipment.
The number is considered adequate when additional degrees of
~ ~%
freedom do not result in more than a 10K increase in responses.
Alternately, the number of degrees of freedom may be taken equal to twice the number of modes with frequencies less than 33 cps.
(5) Investigation of a sufficient number of modes to assure partici-pation of all significant modes. The criterion for sufficiency is that the inclusion of additional modes does not result in more than a 10K increase in responses.
(6) Consideration of maximum relative displacements among supports of Category I structures, systems, and components.
(7) Inclusion of significant effects such as piping interactions, externally applied structural restraints, hydrodynamic (both mass and stiffness effects) loads, and nonlinear responses.
b. E uivalent Static Load Method An equivalent static load method is acceptable if:
3. 7. 2-5 Rev. 1 - July 1981
The equivalent static load method as described here is used some safety related systems and equipment found within the DG for the design of "E" facility. ~
For the DG "E" building and pedestal, modal frequencies and participation factors are presented in Ref. 1, Table 3.7b-8. Mode shapes have been calculated and are presented in the computer output.
Floor response spectra have been calculated and available upon request.
All subsystems'equipment, piping, HVAC ducts, cable trays, etc.) have been decoupled from the DG "E" building models based on the small ratio of individual subsystem mass to building mass. However, the diesel generator has not been decoupled from the diesel generator pedestal. An approximate model of the diesel generator is included in the pedestal model.
(1) Justification is provided that the system can be realistically represented by a simple model and the method produces conserva-tive results in terms of responses. Typical examples or published results for similar structures may be submitted in support of the use of the simplified method.
(2) The design and associated simplified analysis account for the relative motion between all points of support, (3) To obtain an equivalent static load of a structure, equipment, or component which can be represented by a simple model, a factor of 1.5 is applied to the peak acceleration of the appli-cable floor response spectrum. A factor of less than 1.5 may be used if adequate justification is provided.
2. Natural Fre uencies and Res onse Loads To be acceptable for the operating license review, the following information should be provided.
A summary of natural frequencies, mode shapes, modal and total responses, for a representative number of major Category I structures, including the containment building, or a summary of the total
. responses if the method of dir ect interaction is used.
b. A time history of acceleration (or other parameters of motion) or response spectrum at the major plant equipment elevations and points of support.
Procedures 0sed for Anal tical Modelin A nuclear power plant facility consists of very complex structural systems.
To be acceptable, the stiffness, mass, and damping characteristics of the structural systems should be adequately incorporated into the analytical models. Specifically, the following items should be considered in analytical modeling:
a. Oesi nation of S stems Yersus Subs stems Major Category I structures that are considered in conjunction with foundation and its supporting media are defined as "seismic systems."
Other Category I structures, systems, and components that are not designated as "seismic systems" should be considered as "seismic subsystems. "
b. Oecou lin Criteria for Subs stems It can be shown, in 'general, that frequencies of systems and sub-systems have negligible effect on the error due to decoupling. It can be shown that the mass ratio, R , and the frequency ratio, Rf, govern the results where R and Rf Pre defined as:
Total mass of the su orted subs stem m otal mass of the support>ng system Fundamental fre uenc of the su or ted subs stem f om>nant frequency o t e support mot>on
3. 7. 2-6 Rev. 1 - July 1981
c) A description of the methodology used to compute the lumped masses for the DG "E" building and its pedestal is presented in Ref. 2, Pages C-4 through C-6.
d) Two lumped mass stick models (1-horizontal and 1 vertical) for the DG "E" building and 1 model for the pedestal were developed. A description of these models along with the way they were used is provided in Ref. 2, Page C-3.
4) The DG "E" building and pedestal ar'e founded on sound bedrock. As a result, the soil-structure interaction effect is insignificant.
The following criteria are acceptable:
A
'I (1) If R <0.01, decoupling can be done for any Rf.
(2) 'If 0.01 < R m-<O.l, decoupling can be done if 0.8 > Rf >
i 25 (3) If R >0. 1, an approximate model of the subsystem should be included in the primary system model.
If the subsystem is comparatively rigid in relation to the supporting system, and also is rigidly connected to the supporting system, it is sufficient to include only the mass of the subsystem at the support point in the primary system model, On the other hand, in case of a subsystem supported by very flexible connections, e.g.,
pipe supported by hangers, the subsystem need not be included in the primary model. In most cases the equipment and components, 'which come under the definition of subsystems, are analyzed (or tested)'s a decouple'd system from the primary structure and the seismic input for the former is obtained by the analysis of the latter. One important exception to this procedure is the reactor coolant system, which is considered a subsystem but is usually analyzed using a coupled model of the reactor coolant system and primary structure.
C. Lum ed Mass Considerations The acceptance criteria given under subsection II. l.a(4) of this SRP section are applicable.
d. Modelin for Three Com onent In ut Motion In general, three-dimensional models should be used for seismic analyses. However, simpler models can be used if justification can be provided that the coupling effects of those degrees of freedom that are omitted from the three-dimensional models are not significant.
4. Soil-Structure Interaction An analytical model of a soil-structure interaction system is acceptable if both the structure model and the supporting soil model a'e properly coupled and the design motion is properly addressed. The coupled model is subjected to the design ground motion as specified in SRP Section 3.7. 1 or to the regenerated excitation system describe'd in Section II.4 (iii) below. A suitable dynamic analysis using the time history method is performed for the entire soil-structure system and the dynamic responses at various locations of the system are calculated. All assumptions to simplify the analysis should be justified and the resulting errors be studied. Any dy'namic decoupling or condensation procedure should be substantiated by theoretical verification and mathematical proofs.
At present most commonly used methods are the half-space and the finite boundaries modeling methods and there is no indication as to which one is more reliable, especially when too many assumptions are involved. There-fore, modeling methods for implementing the soil-structure interaction analysis should include both the half-space and finite boundaries approaches.
Category I structures, systems, and components should be designed to accommodate responses obtained by one of the following:
3.7.2-7 Rev. 1 - July 1981
ii) The DG."E" Huilding and pedestal dynamic models assume a fixed base since they represent structures which are supported on rock. Additional borings taken in the area of the DG "E" facility indicate that the bedrock is of the same type as that found under the existing Seismic Category I structures located nearby. Previous testing determined the Reactor Area's bedrock compression wave velocity to be approximately 15,000 fps and the shear wave velocity to be approximately 7,000 fps.
(Refer to FSAR Table 2.5-7.)
This methodology was used in the development of floor response spectra for the OG "E" facility. See Ref. 2, Page C-8.
a. Envelope of results of the two methods,
b. Results of one method with conservative design. considerations of effects from use of the other method,
c. Combination of a. and b. with provision of adequate conservatism in design.
The acceptance criteria for the constituent parts of the entire soil-structure interaction system are as follows:
i. Modeling of Structure The acceptance criteria given under subsection II.3 of this SRP section are applicable.
ii. Modeling of Supporting Soil The effect 'of embedment of structure and the layering effect of soil should be accounted for. For the half-space modeling of the soil media, the lumped parameter (soil spring) method and the compliance function methods are acceptable. For the method of modeling soil media with finite boundaries, all boundaries should be properly
. simulated and the use of 'types of boun'daries should be justified and.
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Finite element and finite differ-ence methods are acceptable methods for discretization of a continuum.
The properties used i.n the soil-structure interaction analysis should be those corresponding to the low strains which are consistent with the realistic soil strain developed during the design earthquake.
Use of high strain parameters needs to be adequately justified on a case-by-case basis.
For structures supported on rock, a fixed base assumption is acceptable.
iii. Generation of Excitation System Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 states that the vibratory ground motion produced by the safe shutdown earthquake shall be defined by response spectra corresponding to the maximum vibratory acceleration at the elevations of the foundations of the nuclear power plant structure. A regenerated excitation system is acceptable if, when applied to the soil model, it produces at the structural foundation level in the free field a response motion whose response spectra envelop the design response spectra of earthquake motion.
5. Develo ment of Floor Res onse S ectra To be acceptable, the floor response spectra should be developed taking into consideration the three components of the earthquake motion. The individual floor response spectral values for each frequency are obtained for one vertical and two mutually perpendicular horizontal earthquake motions and are combined according to the "square root of the sum of the squares" method to predict the total fl'oor response spectrum for that particular frequency (Ref. 3).
3. 7. 2-8 Rev. 1 - July 1981
A time history approach was used in the development of floor response spectra, See Ref. 2, Page C-8.
For the DG "E" facility the responses due to three simultaneous orthogonal components of an earthquake are combined by the square root of the sum of the squares method per Reg. Guide 1.92, Rev. 1. (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-8.)
For the OG "E" facility, the total response is obtained by combining the absolute values of all closely spaced modal responses with the square root sum of the squares'f the remaining modal responses. Two consecutive modes are defined as .closely spaced when their frequencies differ from each other by 10 percent or less'. Reg. Guide 1.92 is followed for the combination of modal responses. (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-8.)
In general, development of the floor response spectra is acceptable if a time history approach is used. If a modal response spectra method of analysis is used to develop the floor response spectra, the justification for its conservatism and equivalency to that of a time history method must be demonstrated by representative examples.
6. Three Com onents of Earth uake Motion Oepending upon what basic methods are used in the seismic analysis, i.e.,
response spectra or time history method, the following two approaches are considered acceptable for the combination of three-dimensional earthquake effects. (Ref. 4)
a. Res onse S ectra Method When the response spectra method is adopted for seismic analysis, the maximum structural responses due to each of the three components of earthquake motion should be combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum codirectional responses caused by each of the three components of earthquake motion at a particular point of the structur e or of the mathematical model.
b. Time Histor Anal sis Method When the time history analysis method is employed for seismic analy-sis, two types of analysis are generally performed depending on the complexity of the problem. (1) To obtain maximum responses due to each of the three components of the earthquake motion: in this case the method for combining the three-dimensional effects is identical to that described in item 6.a except that the maximum responses are calculated using the time history method instead of the spectrum method.
(2) To obtain time history responses from each of the three components of the earthquake motion and combine them at each 'time step alge-braically: the maximum response in this case can be obtained from the combined time solution. When this method is used, to be accept-able, the earthquake motions specified in t'e three different direc-tions should be statistically independent,
'7. Combination of Modal Res onses When the response spectrum method of analysis is used to determine the dynamic response of damped linear systems, the most probable response is obtained as the square root of the sum of the squares of the responses from individual modes. Thus, the most probable system response, R, is given by N
R (Z R2)1/2 where R is the response for the k th mode and N is the number of significant modes cLnsidered in the modal response combination.
When modes with closely spaced modal frequencies exist, the methods delineated in Ref. 4 are acceptable. Two modes having frequencies within 10K of each other are considered as modes with closely spaced frequencies.
3.7.2-9 Rev. 1 - July 1981
The collapse of any non-category I structure will not strike the DG "E" building.
Response spectral peaks were smoothed and broadened by 15% on each side. (See Ref. 2, Page C-8.)
Constant vertical static factors were not used in the seismic design of the OG "E" building. Constant vertical static factors were used in the seismic design of seismic Cat'egory I subsystems where shown to be appropriate.
The method used 3.7b-11.
to account for torsional, effects is presented in Ref. 1, Page
~
which give an equivalent degree of'onservatism to the e,
Other approaches above methods, and which are adequately justified are also acceptable.
Interaction of Non-Cate or I Structures with Cate or' Structures To be acceptable, the interfaces between Category I and non-Category I
.structures and plant equipment must be designed for the dynamic loads and displacements produced by both the Category I and non-Category I structures and plant equipment. In addition, a statement indicating the fact that all non-Category I structures meet any one of the following requirements should be provided.
I
a. The collapse of any non-Category I structure wi 11 not cause the non-Category I structure to strike a seismic Category I structure or component.
b. The collapse of any non-Category I structure will not impair the integrity of seismic Category I structures or components.
c. The non-Category I structures wi 11 be analyzed and designed to prevent their failure under SSE conditions in a manner such that the margin of safety of these structures is equivalent to that of Category I structures.
9. Effects of Parameter Variations on Floor Res onse S ectra Consideration should be given in the analysis to the effects on floor response spectra (e.g., peak width and period coordinates} of expected variations of structural properties, dampings, soil properties, and soil-structure interactions. Any reasonable method for determining the amount of peak widening associated with the structural frequency can be used, but in no case should the amount of peak widening be less than
+ lOX. If no special study is performed for this purpose, the peak width should be increased by a minimum of k 15K to be acceptable. (Ref.
3)'Use
10. of E uivalent Static Factors The use of equivalent static load factors as vertical response loads for the seismic design of all Category I structures, systems, and components in lieu of the use of a vertical seismic system dynamic analysis is acceptable only if it can be justified that the structure is rigid in the vertical direction. The criterion for rigidity is that the lowest frequency in the vertical direction is more than 33 cps.
Methods Used to Account for Torsional Effects An acceptable method of treating the torsional effects in the seismic analysis of Category I structures is to.carry out a dynamic analysis which incorporates the torsional degrees of freedom. An acceptable alternative,.if properly justified, is the use of'static factors to account for torsional accelerations in the seismic design of Category I structures in lieu of the use of a combined vertical, horizontal and torsional system dynamic analysis. To account for accidental torsion, an additional'eismicity of + 5X of the maximum building dimension at the level under conside~ation shall be assumed.
3. 7. 2-10 Rev, 1 - July 1981
12. For the DG "E" building, comparison of the response spectra of the time history and the design response spectra are shown in Figures 3.7b-109 through 3.7b-'18 of Ref. 1. The structural accelerations of the DG "E" building obtained from the modal response spectrum analysis compared closely with those obtained from the time history analysis.
13.. For the DG "E" facility, the'damping'values are taken from Reg. Guide 1.61. For a structural system consisting of various components having different materials, composite modal damping is computed using equation (4) presented herein. (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-l2.)
12. Com arison of Res onses The responses obtained from both modal analysis response spectrum and time history methods at selected points in typical Category I structures should be compared to demonstrate approximate equivalency between the two methods.
13. Anal sis Procedure for Dam in Either the composite modal damping approach or the modal synthesis technique can be used to account for element-associated damping.
For the composite modal damping approach, two techniques of determining an equivalent modal damping matrix or composite damping matrix are commonly used. They are based on the use of the mass or stiffness as a weighting function in generating the composite modal damping. The formulations lead to:
= ke3 [M3 f+k (3)
Ãj T
4 K j K (4) where
[K] = assembled stiffness matrix,
p. = equivalent modal damping ratio of the j mode,
[K], [M] = the modified stiffness or mass matrix constructed from element matrices formed by the product of the damping ratio for the element and its stiffness or mass matrix, and f/) = jth normalized modal vector.
For models that take the soil-structure interaction into account by the
~
lumped soi I spring approach, the method defined by equation (4) is accept-able. For fixed base models, either equation (3) or (4) may be used.
Other techniques based on modal synthesis have been developed and are particularly useful when more detailed data on the damping characteristics of structural subsystems are available. The modal synthesis analysis procedure consists of (1) extraction of sufficient modes from the structure model, (2) extraction of sufficient modes from the finite element soil model, and (3) performance of a coupled analysis using the, modal synthesis technique, which uses the data obtained in steps (1) and (2) with appro-priate damp'ing ratios for structure and soi I subsystems. This method is based upon satisfaction of displacement compatibility and force equi librium at the system interfaces and utilizes subsystem eigenvectors as internal generalized coordinates. This method results in a nonproportional damping matrix for the composite structure and equations of motion have to be solved by direct integration or by uncoupling them by use of complex eigenvectors.
3. 7. 2" 11 Rev. 1 - July 1981
The method used to determine overturning moments is presented in Ref. 1, page 3.7b-12.
Other techniques which are a1so considered acceptable for estimating equivalent modal damping of a soil-structure interaction model are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
14. Determination of Cate or I Structure Overturnin Moments To be acceptable, the determination of .the design moment for overturning should incorporate the following items:
a. Three components of input motion.
b. Conservative consideration of vertical and lateral seismic forces.
REVIEW PROCEDURES For each area of review, the following procedure is implemented. The reviewer will select and emphasize material from the procedures given below, as'ay be appropriate for a particular case. The scope and depth of review procedures must be such that the acceptance criteria described above are met.
Seismic Anal sis Methods For all Category I structures, systems, and components, the applicable methods of seismic analysis (response spectra, time history, equivalent static 1oad) are reviewed to ascertain that the techniques employed are in accordance wi,th the acceptance criteria as given in subsection II. 1 of this SRP section. If empirical methods or tests are used in lieu of analysis for any Category I structure, these are evaluated to determine whether or not the assumptions are conservative, and whether the test procedure adequately models the seismic response.
2. Natural Fre uencies and Res onse Loads For the operating license review, the summary of natural frequencies and response loads is reviewed for compliance with the acceptance criteria in subsection II.2 of this SRP section.
3. Procedures Used for Anal tical Modelin The procedures used for modeling for seismic system analyses are reviewed to determine whether the three-dimensional characteristics of structures are properly modeled in accordance with the acceptance criteria of subsec-tion II.3 of this SRP section, and all significant degrees of freedom have been incorporated in the models. The criteria for decoupling of a structure, equipment, or component and analyzing it separately as a subsystem are reviewed for conformance with the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.3 of this SRP section.
Soil-Struct'ure Interaction The methods of soil-structure interaction analysis used are examined to determine that the techniques employed are in accordance with the accept-ance criteria as given in subsection II.4 of this SRP section. Typical mathematical models for soil-structure interaction analysis are reviewed
3. 7. 2-12 Rev. 1 - July 1981
S, NUREG-0800 (Formerly NUREG-76I087) steer Wp, o
i Vl 0
r~r A
Q>> o%
Cy C
STANDARD REVIEW'PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
+e~~a SECTION 3.7.3 SEISMIC SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Struct'ural Engineering Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW The following areas related to the seismic subsystem analysis are reviewed:
1. Seismic Anal sis Methods The..information reviewed is similar to that described in subsection I. 1 of Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.7.2, but as applied to seismic Category I subsystems.
2. Determination of Number of Earth uake C cles Criteria or procedures used to establish the number of earthquake cycles during one seismic event and the maximum number of cycles for which applicable Cate-gory I subsystems and components are designed are reviewed.
3. Procedures Used for Anal tical Modelin The criteria and procedures used for modeling the seismic 'subsystem are reviewed.
4. Basis for Selection of Fre uencies As applicable, criteria or procedures used to separate fundamental frequencies of components and equipment from the forcing frequencies of the support struc-ture are reviewed.
5. Anal sis Procedure for Dam in The information reviewed is similar to that described in subsection I.13 of SRP Section 3.7.2, but as applied to Category I subsystems.
Rev. 1 - Jul 1981 USNRC STANDARO REViEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have.a corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be revised periodically. as appropriate. to accommodate comments and to reflect new informs.
tion and experience.
Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington. D.C. 20666.
0
6. Three Com onents of Earth uake Motion The information reviewed is similar to that described in 'subsection of SRP Section 3.7.2, but as applied to Category I subsystems.
7. Combination of Model Res onses The information reviewed is similar to that described in subsection I.7 of SRP Section 3.7.2, but as applied to Category I subsystems.
8. Interaction of Other S stems With Cate or I S stems The seismic analysis procedures to account for the seismic motion of non-Category I systems in the seismic design of Category I systems are reviewed.
9. Multi 1 -Su orted E ui ment and Com onents with Distinct In uts The criteria and procedures for seismic analysis of equip'ment and compo-nents supported at different elevations within a building and between buildings with distinct inputs are reviewed.
10. Use of E uivalent Static Factors The information reviewed is similar to that described in subsection I. 10 of'SRP Section 3.7.2, but as applied to Category I subsystems.
Torsional Effects of Eccentric Masses The criteria and procedures that are used to consider the torsional effects of eccentric masses in seismic subsystem analyses are reviewed.
12. Cate or I Buried Pi in Conduits and Tunnels For Category I buried piping, conduits, tunnels, and auxiliary systems, the seismic criteria and methods which consider the compliance characteristics of soil media, dynamic pressures, settlement due to earthquake, and differ-ential movements at support points, penetrations, and entry points into structures provided with anchors are reviewed.
13. Methods for Seismic Anal sis of Cate or I Dams The analytical methods and procedures that will be used for seismic analysis of Category I dams are reviewed. The assumptions made,,the boundary conditions used, the hydrodynamic effects considered, and the procedures by which strain-dependent materials properties are incorpo-rated in the analysis are reviewed.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The acceptance criteria for the areas of review described in subsection I of this SRP section ar'e given below. Other criteria which can be justified to be equival'ent to or more conservative than the stated acceptance criteria may be used. SEB accepts the design of subsystems that are important to safety and must withstand the effects of earthquakes if the relevant requirements of
~ General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 (Ref. 1) and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100
3. 7. 3-2 Rev. 1 - July 1981
a) Equipment has been qualified by analysis and/or testing. Both dynamic analysis method and equivalent static load method have been used. (See Ref. 1, Section 3. 10.) Supports for HVAC ducts and electrical raceway have used the equivalent static load method. For piping, this acceptance criteria is met by following Ref. 3.7b-14 (Ref. 1) which complies with the SRP.
b) One SSE and 5 OBE's are considered in the design of Category 1 subsystems. The synthetic time history has a duration of 25 seconds.
For piping, this requirement is satisfied as described on Page 3.7b-19 of Ref. 1.
c) The coupling criteria given in SRP 3.7.2,Section II.3, as well as the other guidelines are followed in analytical modeling. (See also the response to SRP 3.7.2,Section II.3.)
The DG "E" facility's piping is modeled based on Ref. 3.7b-14 (Ref. 1) which complies with the SRP. Main line and branch runs were analyzed together. No decoupling criteria had to be considered. The number of masses satisfy the criteria of number of DDOF equal to two times the number of modes with frequency less than 33 Hz. A three dimensional model was used.
d) Components and equipment are designed/qualified for the loads developed from the application of the appropriate DG "E" facility's floor response spectra.
e) Damping values utilized for the DG "E" facility are those presented in Reg. Guide 1.61 (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-3). Most conduit and box supports utilize damping values associated with the existing plant criteria. This was done,to take advantage of the numerous typical conduit/box supports that are available for the existing criteria.
(Ref. 2) concerning material phenomena are complied with. The relevant requirements of GDC 2 and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 are:
1. General Design Criterion 2, as it relates to the earthquakes used in the design should be the most severe ones reported to have affected the site and surrounding area with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which historical data have been accumulated.
2. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 as it relates to the requirement that two earthquake levels, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and the operating basis earthquake (OBE), be considered in the design of safety-related structures, components, and systems. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 further states that the design used to ensure that the required safety functions are maintained during and after the vibratory ground motion associated with the safe shutdown earthquake shall involve the use of either a suitable dynamic analysis or a suitable qualification test to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components can withstand the seismic and other concurrent loads, except where it can be demonstrated that the use of an equivalent static load method provides adequate conservatism.
Specific criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2 and Appendix A to Part 100 are as follows:
Seismic Anal sis Methods The acceptance criteria provided in SRP Section 3.7.2, subsection II. 1, are applicable.
b. Determination of Number of Earth uake C cles During the plant life at least one safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and five operating basis earthquakes (OBE) should be assumed. The number of cycles per earthquake should be obtained from the synthetic time history (with a minimum duration of 10 seconds) used for .the system analysis, or a minimum of 10 maximum stress cycles per earth-quake may be assumed.
C. Procedures Used for Anal tical Modelin The acceptance criteria provided in SRP Section 3.7.2, subsection II.3, are applicable.
d., Basis for Selection of Fre uencies To avoid resonance, the fundamental frequencies of components and equipment should preferably be selected to be less than 1/2 or more than twice the dominant frequencies of the support structure; Use of equipment frequencies within this range is acceptable if the equipment is. adequately designed for the applicable loads.
e. Anal .sis Procedure for Dam in The acceptance criteria provided in SRP Section 3. 7. 2, subsection II. 13, are applicable.
3. 7. 3-3 Rev. 1 - Duly 1981
For seismic Category I subsystems located within the DG "E" facility the response due to three orthogonal components of an earthquake are combined by. the square root of the sum of the squares method per Reg.
Guide 1.92, Rev. 1 (See Ref. I, Page 3.7b-8)*.
g) For seismic Category I subsystems located within the DG "E" facility and analyzed by the response spectrum method, the total response was obtained by using the criteria presented in Reg. Guide 1.92 for the combination of modal responses. (See Ref. 1, Page 3.7b-8.}
h) Non-Category I subsystems have either been located, physically isolated,
, or designed such that they will not interfere with the function of Category I subsystems during a seismic event.
The attached Non-Category I piping was analyzed as a Category I pipe in order not to cause failure of Category I systems. (See Ref. 3.7b-l4 of Ref. 1.)
i} An upper bound envelope of excitations at multi-support points of equipment is used in the'seismic analysis of equipment.
The piping supported at different elevations was analyzed using an upper bound envelope of the individual response spectra. In addition, the relative displacement of the support points due to equipment movement was considered in the most conservative way; the absolute sum of the absolute maximum relative displacements (See Ref. 3.7b-14 of Ref. 1).
For the majority of the Class 1E conduit routings, the existing plant criteria was applied to take advantage of the numerous typical conduit/box supports that. are available for the existing criteria. These supports have been designed by combining the more severe response from one of the horizontal earthquakes with the response from the vertical earthquake by the absolute sum method. To compensate for this variation from the methodology presented in Reg, Guide 1.92, the permissible attachment loads for these supports are reduced by 25K. An evaluation determined that typical existing supports meet the Reg. Guide 1.92 requirements (i.e. combination of the responses from the three orthogonal earthquakes by the square root sum of the squares method) if the permissible attachment loads are reduced by 25%.
Three Com onents of Earth uake Motion The acceptance criteria provided in SRP Section 3. 7. 2, subsection II. 6, are applicable.
Combination of Modal Res onses The acceptance criteria provided in SRP Section 3. 7. 2, subsection II. 7, are applicable.
Interaction of Other S stems With Cate or I S stems To be acceptable, each non-Category I system should be designed to be isolated from any Category I system by either a constraint or barrier, or should be remotely located with regard to the seismic Category I system. If it is not feasible or practical to isolate the Category I system, adjacent non-Category I systems should be analyzed according to the same seismic criteria as applicable to the Category I system. For non-Category I systems attached to Cate-gory I systems, the dynamic effects of the non-Category I systems should be simulated in the modeling of the Category I system. The attached non-Category I systems, up to 'the first anchor beyond the interface, should also be designed in such a manner that during an earthquake of SSE intensity it will not cause a failure of the Cate=
gory I system.
Multi 1 -Su orted E ui ment and Com onents With Distinct In uts Equipment and components in some cases are supported at several points by either a single structure or two separate structures. The motions of the primary structure or structures at each of the support points may be quite different.
A conservative and acceptable approach for equipment items supported at two or more locations is to use an upper bound envelope of all the individual response spectra for these locations to calculate maximum inertial responses of multiply-supported items. In addi-tion, the relative displacements at the support points should be considered. Conventional static analysis procedures are acceptable for this purpose. The maximum relative support displacements can be obtained from the struct'ural response calculations or, as a conser-vative approximation, by using the floor response spectra. For the latter option the maximum displacement of each support is predicted by Sd' S g/e , where S is the spectral acceleration in "g's" at the high frequency end of the spectrum curve (which, in turn, is equal to the maximum floor acceleration), g is the gravity constant, and e is the fundamental frequency of the primary support structure in radians per second. The support displacements can then be imposed on the supported item in the most unfavorable combination. The responses due to the inertia effect and relative displacements should be combined by the absolute sum method.
In the case of multiple supports located in a single structure, an alternate acceptable method using the floor response spectra involves determination of dynamic responses due to the worst single floor res-ponse spectrum selected from a set of floor response spectra obtained
3. 7. 3-4 Rev. 1 - July 1981
j) Constant vertical static factors were used in the seismic design of Seismic Category I subsystems where shown to be appropriate.
Constant vertical static factors are not used in the seismic analysis of Category 1 piping.
k) Modeling of seismic Category I subsystems'ctual mass and locations are considered, thereby, accounting for any eccentricity.
t The location of mass points in the piping model reflects the torsional effects of eccentric masses such as valves and valve operators (See Page 3.7b-22 and Ref. 3-7b-14 of Ref. 1).
1) The DG "E" buried Category I pipes were analyzed in accordance with Ref.
3.7b-13 of Ref. 1. During a SSE event, the differential displacement between the DG "E" building and the surrounding soil which supports the pipes was included in the computation of piping stress.
m) No Category I dams have been added as a result of the DG "E" facility.
at various floors and applied identically to all the floors, provided there is no significant shift in frequencies of the spectra peaks.
In addition, the support displacements should be imposed on the supported item in the most unfavorable combination using static analysis procedures.
In lieu of the response spectrum approach, time histories of support motions may be used as excitations to the subsystems. Because of the increased analytical effort compared to the response spectrum techniques, usually only a major equipment system would warrant a time history approach. The time history approach does, however, provide more realistic results in some cases as compared to the res-ponse spectrum envelope method for multiply"supported systems.
j ~ Use of E uivalent Static Factors The acceptance criteria provided in SRP Section 3.7.2, subsec-tion II. 10, are applicable.
k. Torsional Effects of Eccentric Masses For seismic Category I subsystems, when the torsional effect of an eccentric mass is judged to be significant, the eccentric mass and
'.its eccentricity should be included in the mathematical model. The criteria for judging the'significance will be reviewed on a case-b~
case basis.
1. Cate or I Buried Pi in Conduits and Tunnels For Category I buried piping, conduits, tunnels, and auxiliary systems, the following items should be considered in the analysis:
(1} The inertial effects due to an earthquake upon buried systems and tunnels should be adequately accounted for in the analysis.
In case of buried systems sufficiently flexible relative to the surrounding or underlying soil, it is acceptable to assume that the systems will follow essentially the displacements and .
deformations that the soil would have if the systems were absent.
Procedures which take into account the phenomena of wave travel and wave reflection in compacting soil displacements from the ground displacements are acceptable.
(2) The effects of static resistance of the surrounding soil on piping deformations or displacements, differential movements of piping anchors, bent geometry and curvature changes, etc.,
'should be adequately considered. Procedures utilizing the principles of the theory of structures on elastic foundations are acceptable.
(3). Mhen applicable, the effects due to local soil settlements, soil
'. arching, etc., should also be considered in the analysis.
m. Methods for Seismic Anal sis of Cate or I Oams For the analysis of all Category I dams an appropriate approach which takes into consideration the .dynamic nature of forces (due
3. 7. 3-.5 Rev. l - July 1981
e to both horizontal and vertical earthquake loadings), the behavior of the dam material under earthquake loadings, soil structure inter-action effects, and nonlinear stress-strain relations for the soi 1, should be used. Analysis of earth-filled dams .should include an evaluation of deformations. For rock-filled dams, the analytical procedure used will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES For each area of review, the following review procedure is followed. The reviewer will select and emphasize material from the procedures given below, as may be appropriate for a particular case. The review procedures are such as to satisfy the requirements of acceptance criteria stated in subsection II.
1. Seismic Anal sis Methods The seismic analysis methods are reviewed to determine that these are in accordance with the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 3.7.2, subsection II. l.
2. Determination of Number of Earth uake C cles Criteria or procedures used to establish the number of earthquake cycles are reviewed to determine that they are in accordance with the acceptance criteria as given in subsection II.2 of this SRP section. Justification for- aeviating from the acceptance criteria is requested from the applicant,-
as necessary.
3. Procedures Used for Anal tical Modelin The criteria and procedures used for modeling for the seismic subsystem analysis are reviewed to determine that these are in accordance with the acceptance criteria of .SRP Section 3.7.2, subsection II.3.
4. Sasis for Selection of Fre uencies As applicable, criteria or procedures used to separate fundamental fre-quencies of components and equipment from the forcing frequencies of the support structure are reviewed to determine compliance with the accept-ance criteria of subsection II.4 of this SRP section.
5. Anal sis Procedure for Dam in The analysis procedure to account for damping in different elements of the model of a coupled system is reviewed to determine that it is in accordance with the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 3. 7. 2, subsection II. 13.
6. Three Com onents of Earth uake Motion The procedures by which the three components of earthquake motion are con-sidered in determining the seismic response of subsystems are reviewed to determine compliance with the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 3. 7. 2, subsecti on I I. 6.
3.7. 3-6 Rev. 1 - July 1981
0 NUREG-0800 (Formerly NUREG-76/087) tgs stcu r
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l J+ 0 Cy STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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SECTION 3.8.4 OTHER SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW The following areas relating to all seismic Category I structures and other safety-related structures that may not be classified as seismic Category I, other than the containment and its interior structures, are reviewed:
Descri tion of the Structures The descriptive information including plans and sections of each structure, is reviewed to establish that sufficient information is provided to define the primary structural aspects and elements relied upon for the structure to perform the safety-related function. Also reviewed is the relationship between adjacent structures including the separation provided ot structural ties, if any. Among the major plant structures that are reviewed, together with the descriptive information reviewed for each, are the following:
Containment Enclosure Building The containment enclosure building, which may surround all or part of the primary concrete or steel containment structure, is primarily intended to reduce leakage during and after a loss-of-coolant (LOCA) from within the containment. Concrete enclosure buildings also protect the primary containment, which may be of steel or concrete, from outside hazards.
The enclosure building is usually either a concrete structure or a structural steel and metal siding building.
Where it is a concrete structure, it usually has the geometry of the containment and, as applicable, the descriptive information reviewed is Rev. 1 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power planta. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry end the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with tham is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not all sections of the Standard Format have e corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new informs.
tion and experience.
Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, O.C. 20666.
Special construction techniques, if proposed, are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine their effects on the structural integrity of the completed structure.
In addition, the information contained in items a, b, and c of subsection I.6 of Standard Review Plan Section 3.8.3 is also reviewed.
7. Testin and Inservice Surveillance Pro rams If applicable, any post-construction testing and inservice surveillance programs are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
8. Masonr Walls Areas of review pertaining to masonry walls should include, as a minimum, those items identified in Appendix A to this SRP section.
SEB coordinates other branches evaluations that interface with structural engineering aspects of the review as follows: determination of structures which are subject to quality assurance programs in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 is performed by the Mechanical Engineering Branch (MEB) as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 3. 2. 1 and 3. 2. 2. 'EB will perform its review of safety-related structures on that basis. De'termination of pressure loads from high energy lines located in safety related structures other than con-tainment is performed by the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) as described as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.6. 1. SEB-accepts the loads thus generated as approved by the ASB to be included in the load combination equations of this SRP section. Determination of loads generated due to pressure under accident conditions is performed by the Containment Systems Branch (CSB) as part of its primary review respon" sibi lity for SRP Section 6. 2. 1. SEB accepts the loads thus generated, as approved by the CSB to be included in the load combinations in this SRP section. The review for quality assurance is coordinated and performed by the guality Assurance Branch as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 17.0.
For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the rev'iew and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP. section of the corresponding primary branch.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SEB acceptance criteria for the design of structures other than containment are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following regulations:
A. 10 CFR Part 50, f50.55a and General Design Criterion 1 as they relate to safety related structures being designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality:standards commensurate with the importance of the safety function to be performed.
B. General Design Criterion 2 as it relates to the design of the safety-related structures being capable to withstand the most severe natural phenomena such as wind, tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes and the appropriate combination of all loads.
3.8. 4"5 Rev. 1 - July 1981
/
A description of the OG "E" facility is provided in Ref. 1.
ACI349-1980 and AISC-1978 were followed in the design of the OG "E" facility.
The AISC 33K increase in allowable stresses for seismic or wind loading is not used. (See Ref. 3, Page 10.)
Reg. Guides 1. 10, 1. 15 and 1.55 were withdrawn (see US HRC distribution list, Division 1, July 8, 1981).
C. General Design Criterion 4 as it relates to safety-related structure being capable of withstanding the dynamic effects of equipment failures including missiles and blowdown loads associated with the loss of coolant accidents.
D. General Design Criterion 5 as it relates to sharing of structures important to safety unless it canto be shown that such sharing will not significantly their safety functions.
impair their validity perform E. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 as it relates to the quality assurance criteria for nuclear power plants.
The Regulatory Guides and industry standards identified in item 2 of this subsection provides information, recommendations and guidance and in general describes a basis acceptable to the staff that may be used to implement the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 950. 55a and GDC 1, 2, 4, 5 and Appendix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50. Also, specific acceptance criteria necessary to meet the relevant requirements of these regulations for the areas of review, described in subsection I of this SRP section are as follows:
1. Descri tion of the Structures The descriptive information in the SAR is considered acceptable if it meets the minimum requirements set forth in Section 3.8. 4. 1 of the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 4).
Deficient areas of descriptive information are identified by the reviewer and a request for additional information is initiated at the application acceptance review. New or unique design features that are not specifi-
'cally covered in the "Standard Format..." may require a more detailed review. The reviewer determines the additional information that may be required to accomplish a meaningful review of the structural aspects of such new or unique features.
2. A licable Codes Standards and S ecifications The design, materials, fabrication, erection, inspection, testing, and surveillance, if any, of Category I structures are covered by codes, standards, and guides that are either applicable in their entirety or in portions thereof. A list of such documents is as follows:
Title ACI 349 "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures" AISC "Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings" Re ulator G'uides
1. 10 Mechanical (Caldweld) Splices in Reinforcing Bars of Category I Concrete Structures 3.8. 4-6 Rev. 1 - July 1981
Reg. Guide 1.69 is not applicable to the D.G. "E" facility.
The same truck explosion fragment as that considered in the design of the existing Category I structures, was considered in the design of the DG "E" building (Refer to PP&L's response to SRP 3.5. 1.5).
The design of the DG "E" building complies with Reg. Guide 1.94.
Reg. Guide 1. 115 is not applicable to the DG "E" facility.
The design of the DG "E" building complies with the applicable provisions of Reg. Guide I.I42.
Reg. Guide 1. 143 is not applicable to the DG "E" facility.
1. 15 Testing of Reinforcing Bars. for Category I Concrete Structures
l. 55 Concrete Placement in Category I Structures
l. 69 Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power Plants
1. 91 Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants
1. 94 equality Assurance Requirements for Insta1lation, Inspection, and Testing of Structural Concrete
l. 115 Protection Against Low Trajectory Turbine Hissi les
1. 142 Safety-Related Concete Structures for Nuclear Power Plants (Other Than Reactor Vessels and Containments}
l. 143 Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste Management Systems, Structures,. and Components Installed in LWR Plants
3. Loads and Load Combinations The specified loads and load combinations are acceptable if found to be in accordance with the following:
a ~ Loads Definitions and Nomenclature All the major 1oads to be encountered or to be postul a t e d are 1'>ste below. Al 1 the loads lssted, however are not necessarily app ap 1'-
1c abl e to all the structues and their elements. Loads and ' the applicable load combinations for which each structure has to b d 'll de p end on t he cond>talons to which that particular structure re may b e subjected.
Normal loads, which are those loads to be encountered during normal plant operation and shutdown, include:
Dead loads or their related internal moments and forces, inluding any permanent equipment loads.
Live loads or their related internal moments and forces, including any movable equipment loads and other loads which vary with intensity and occurrence, such as soil pressure.
To Therma 1 ef fects and 1 oads duri ng norma 1 operati ng or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition.
3.8.4 7 Rev. 1 - July 1981
No high-energy piping exists in the DG "E" facility.
Pipe reactions during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady
..state condition.
Severe environmental loads include:
E - Loads generated by the operating basis earthquake.
W - Loads generated by the design wind specified for the pl ant.
Extreme environmental loads include:
El Loads generated by the safe shutdown earthquake.
Wt
- Loads generated by the design tornado specified for the plant. Tornado loads include loads due to the tornado wind pressure, the tornado-created differential pressure, and to tornado-generated missiles.
Abnormal loads, which are those loads generated by a postulated high-energy pipe break accident, include:
P - Pressure equivalent static load within or across a compartment generated by the postulated break, and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load.
Thermal loads under thermal conditions generated by the postulated break and including T . 0 R Pipe reactions under thermal conditions generated by the postulated break and including R 0 .
Yr Equivalent static load on the structure generated by the reaction on the broken high-energy pipe during the postu-lated break, and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load.
Y ~ Jet impingement equivalent static load on a structure J
by the postulated break, and including an 'enerated appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load.
Y - Missile impact equivalent static load on a structure generated by or during the postulated break, as from pipe whipping, and including an appropriate dynamic load factor to account for the dynamic nature of the load.
In determining an appropriate equivalent static load for Y rs Y and jl V, elasto-plastic behavior may be assumed with appropriate duct-ility ratios, provided excessive deflections will not result in loss of function of any safety-related system.
3.8. 4-8. Rev. 1 - July 1981
The working stress design method was not used in the design of the DG "E" faci 1 i ty.
The ultimate strength design method and these load combinations were used in the design of the DG "E" facility. (See Ref. 3, Page 10.)
b. Load Combinations for Concrete Structures For concrete structures, the load combinations are acceptable if found in accordance with the following:
(i) For service load conditions, either the wor king stress design (WSD) method as outlined in ACI 318 Code or the strength design method may be used.
(a) If the WSD method is used, the following load combinations should be considered:
(1) 0+ L (2) 0+ L+ E (3) 0+ L+ W If thermal stresses due to T and R are present, the following combinations should be alamo considered:
(4) D + L + T + R
,0 0 (5) 0+ L+ T 0
+ R 0
+ E (6) 0 + L + T + R + W 0 0 Both cases of L having its full value or being completely absent should be checked.
(b) If the strength design method is used, the following load combinations should be considered:
(1) 1.4 0 + 1.7 L (2) 1.4 D+ 1.7 L+ 1.9 E (3) 1.4 0 + 1.7 L + 1.7 W If thermal stresses due to T0 and R 0 are present t the following combinations should also be considered:
(4) (0.75) (1.4D + 1.7L + 1.7T 0 + 1.7R 0 )
(5) (0.75) (1.40 + 1.7L + 1.9E + 1.7T 0 + 1.7R 0 }
(6) (0.75) (1.40 + 1.7L + 1.7W + 1.7T 0 + 1.7R )
0 In addition, the following combinations should be considered:
/
(7) 1.2 0 + 1.9 E (8} 1.2 0 + 1.7 W (ii) For factored load conditions which represent extreme environmental, abnormal, abnormal/severe environmental, and
3. 8. 4" 9 Rev. 1 - July 1981
Factored load combinations (a) 8 (b) were considered. Since no high energy piping exists, factored load combinations (c), (d) 5 (e) were not considered.
In addition the following load combination was considered.
D + L + Mms where Mms = Site Proximity Hissi le Loads (See Ref. 3, Page 10.)
For loads which are variable, the full range of variation was considered in order to determine the most critical combination of loading.
The elastic working stress design method and these load combinations were used in the design of steel for the DG "E" facility. (See Ref. 3, Page 11.)
abnormal/extreme environmental conditions, the strength des;gn method should be used and the following load combinations should be considered:
(a) 0 + L + T + R + E' 0
(b) 0+L+T0 +R 0 +Wt (c} 0+L+Ta +R a +15P' (d) 0 + L + T + R + 1.25 P + 1.0 (Y + Y. + y ) + 1.25 E<
(e) 0 + L + T + + 1.0
' + 1.0 (Yr + Y. + Y ) + 1 0 f' R
a P
j m In combinations (c), (d), and (e), the maximum values of P ,
T , R , Y ., Y , and Y , including an appropriate dynamic load factor, should be used unless a time-history analysis is per-formed to justify otherwise. Combinations (b) and (d) and (e) and the corresponding structural acceptance criteria of sub-section II.5 of this SRP section should be satisfied first without the tornado missile load in (b) and without Yr1 Y .
and Y in (d) and (e}. When considering these concentrated loads, local section strength capacities may be exceeded provided there will be no loss of function of any safety-related system.
Where any load reduces the effects of other loads, the corresponding coefficient for that load should be taken as 0.9 if it can be demonstrated that the load is always present or occurs simultaneously with other loads. Otherwise the coefficient for that load should be taken as zero.
Where the structural effects of differential settlement, creep,.or shrinkage may be significant, they should be included with the dead load, 0, as applicable.
Load Combinations for Steel Structures For steel interior structu'res, the load combinations are acceptable if found in accordance with the following:
(i) For service load conditions, either the elastic working stress design methods of Part 1 of the AISC specifications, or the plastic design methods of Part 2 of the AISC specifications, may be used.
(a) If the elastic working stress design methods are used, the following load combinations should be considered:
, (1) 0+L (2) 0 + L + E (3) 0+ L+ W
3. 8. 4-10 Rev. 1 - July 1981
Thermal loads are not present in the OG "E" facility.
The plastic design method was not used in the design of the OG "E" facility.
Factored load combinations (1) 5 (2) were considered. Since no high energy piping exists, factored load combinations (3), (4) 8 (5) were not considered.
In addition the following load combination was considered:
0 + L + lhos (See Ref. 3, Page 11.)
If thermal stresses due to T and R are present, be allo considered:
the following combinations should (4) 0+L+T0 +R 0 (5) 0 + L + T + R + E 0 0 (6) D + L + T + R + W 0 0 (b) If plastic design methods are used, the following load combinations should be considered:
(1) 1;7 0+ 1.7 L (2) 1.7 0 + 1.7 L + 1.7 E (3) 1.7 D+ 1.7 L+ 1.7 W If thermal stresses due to T and R are present, the following combinations should also 3e considered:
(4) 1.3 (D+ L+T0 +R 0)
(5) 1 3 (0 + L + + T +
0)
E R 0
(6) 1.3 (D + L + + T +
0)
W R 0
(ii} For factored load conditions the following load combinations should be considered:
(a) If elastic working stress design methods are used:
(1) 0+ L+T +R 0 +E' (2) 0+ L+To + R o +W.t=
(3) 0 + L + T + R + P a a a (4) 0 + L + T + 'R +
a a P
a
+ l.' 0 (Y + Y. + Y j, m
) + E (5) 0 + L + T + + + 1.0
' (Y + Y +
. Y ) + E' R
a P
a j m (b) If plastic design methods are used:
(1) 0+ L+ T,+ 0' R + E' (2) 0+L+T0 +R 0 W (3) D+L+Ta +R +1.5 a
P a
(4} D+ L+T +R a + 1.25 + -1.0 (Y + Y. + ) + 1.25 a
P a r j Y m
E
) + E' (5) D + L + T a
+ R a
+ 1.0 P + 1.0
' (Y + Y j+ Y m
3.8.4" ll Rev. 1 - July 1981
In determining the most critical loading condition to be used in design, the absence of a load or loads was considered as appropriate.
The DG "E" facility's design and analysis procedures comply with ACI-349.
b. The DG "E" facility's design and analysis procedures comply with AISC Spec., except the 33% increase in allowable stresses for seismic or wind loading is not followed.
C. The computer programs (NSC/NASTRAN and RESPECT) used for the DG "E" building seismic analyses meet the requirements of subsection II.4.e of SRP Section 3.8.1.
d. A design description report along with various drawings for the DG "E" facility have been submitted to the NRC. Additional information is available upon request.
Not applicable to the DG "E" facility.
In the above factored 1oad combinations, thermal loads can be neglected when it can be shown that they are secondary and self-limiting in nature and where the material is ductile.
In combinations (3), (4), and (5), the maximum values of P ,
R, Y., Y, and Y, inc1uding an appropriate dynamic load a',
a''actor, should be used unless a time-history analysis is per-formed to justify otherwise. Combinations (2), (4) and (5) and the corresponding structural acceptance criteria of subsec-r
tion II.5 of this SRP section should first be satisfied without the tornado missile load in (2) and without Y , Y ., and Y in (4) and (5). When considering these concentrated loads, local section strength may be exceeded provided there wi 11 be no loss of function of any safety-related system.
Mhere any load reduces the effects of other loads, the corresponding coefficient for that load should be taken as 0.9, if it can be demonstrated that the load is always present or occurs simultaneously with other loads. Otherwise, the coefficient for that load should be taken as zero.
Mhere the structural effect of differential settlement may be significant it should be included with the dead load, 0.
4. Desi n and Anal sis Procedures l
The design and analysis procedures utilized for Category I structures including assumptions on boundary conditions and expected behavior under loads, are acceptable if found in accordance with the following;
a. For concrete structures, the procedures are in accordance with ACI-349, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Structures" (Ref. 1).
b. For steel structures, the procedures are in accordance with the AISC "Specification..." (Ref. 3).
c. Computer programs are acceptable if the validation provided is found in accordance with procedures delineated in subsection II.4.e of SRP Section 3.8. 1.
d. Design report is considered acceptable if it contains the information specified in Appendix C to this SRP section.
e. Structural audit is conducted in accordance with the provisions of Appendix B to this SRP section.
f. Design of spent fuel pool and rods is considered acceptable when the requirements of Appendix D to this SRP section are met.
5. Structural Acce tance Criteria For each of the loading combinations delineated in subsection II.3 of this SRP section, the following defines the allowable limits which constitute the structural acceptance criteria:
3. 8. 4-12 Rev. 1 - July 1981
The limits provided herein were used in the load combinations for concrete structures. (See Ref. 3, Page 10.)
The limits provided herein were used in the load combinations for steel structures. (See Ref. 3, Page 11.)
In Combinations for Concrete Ll llllt
'aragraphs 3.b.(i)(a)(l), (2), and (3) s(s)
Paragraphs 3.b.(i)(a)(4), (5), and (6) 1.3 S Paragraphs 3.b.(i)(b)(l), (2), and (3) U(2)
Paragraphs 3. b.(i)(b)(4), (5), and (6) U Paragraphs 3.b.(i)(6), (7), and (8). ~ ~ U Paragraphs 3.b.(ii)(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) U
b. In Combinations for Steel Limit Paragraphs 3.c. (i)(a)(1), (2), and (3).... S Paragraphs 3.c.(i)(a)(4), (5), and (6) . 1.5 S Paragraphs 3. c.(i)(b)(1), (2), and (3) . y(3)
Paragraphs 3.c.(i}(b}(4), (5}, and (6) . . . . Y Paragraphs 3.c.(ii)(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) 1.6 S Paragraphs 2.(c)(ii)(a)(4), and (5)( } . . . . 1.7 S Paragraphs 3.c.(ii)(b)(l), (2), (3), (4), and (5) Y Notes (1) S - For concrete structures, S is the required section strength based on the working stress design method and the allowable stresses defined in ACI 318 Code.
For structural steel, S is the required section strength on elastic design methods and the allowable stresses 'ased defined in Part 1 of the AISC "Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings" (Ref. 3)
The one-third increase in allowable stresses for concrete and steel due to seismic or wind loadings is not permitted.
(2) U - For concrete structures, U is the section strength required to resist design loads based on the strength design methods described in ACI 349 Code (Ref. 1).
(3) Y For structural steel, Y is the section strength required to resist design loads and based on plastic design methods described in Part 2 of the AISC "Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings" (Ref. 3).
(4) For these two combinations, in computing the required section strength, S, the plastic section modulus of steel shapes, except for those which do not meet the AISC criteria for compact sections, may be used.
3.8. 4" 13 Rev. 1 - July 1981
6. No special construction techniques were used for the DG "6" facility, Welding of rebar was not permitted. The applicable codes referred to here are complied with.
~
7. No special testing or in-service surveillance requirements for the DG "E" structure were required.
8. No masonry walls are used in the DG "E" facility.
6. Materials ualit Control and S ecial Constr uction Techni ues For Category I structures outside the containment, the acceptance criteria for materials, quality control, and any special construction techniques are in accordanc'e with the codes and standards indicated in subsection I.6 of SRP Section 3.8.3, as applicable.
7. Testin and Inservice Surveillance Re uirements At present there are no special testing or inservice surveillance require-ments for Category I structures outside the containment. However, where some requirements become necessary for special structures, such requirements are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
e. Masonr Halls Acceptance criteria for masonry walls are contained in Appendix A to this SRP section.
REVIEM PROCEDURES The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from the review procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.
Descri tion of the Structures After,the type of structure and its functional characteristics are identi" fied, information on similar, and previously licensed plants is obtained for reference. Such information, which is available in safety analysis reports and amendments of previous license applications, enables identi-fication of differences for the case under review. These differences require additional scrutiny and evaluation. New and unique features that have not been used in the past are of particular interest and are thus examined in greater detail. The information furnished in the SAR is reviewed for completeness in accordance with the "Standard Format..."
(Ref. 4). A decision is then made with regard to the sufficiency of the descriptive information provided. Any additional required information not provided is requested from the applicant at an early stage of the review process.
2. A licable Codes Standards and S ecifications The list of codes, standards, guides, and specifications is compared with the list in subsection II.2 of this SRP section. The reviewer assures himself that the appropriate code or guide is utilized and that the applicable edition and stated effective addenda are acceptable.
3. Loads and Loadin Combinations The reviewer verifies that the loads and load combinations are as conserva-tive as those specified in subsection II.3 of this SRP section. Any deviations from the acceptance criteria for loads and 'load combinations that have not been adequately justified are identified as unacceptable and transmitted to the applicant.
3.8. 4-14 Rev. 1 <<July 1981
.0 NU R EG4800
[Formerly NUREG-76/OB7)
<is "<<ur Wp e 0 e >~i no 0
)
0 STANDARD REVIEW PLAN 4***4
3. 8. 5 FOUNDATIONS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)
Secondary - None I
I. AREAS OF REVIEW The following areas related to the foundations of all seismic Category I structures are reviewed.
1. Descri tion of the Foundations Thee descriptive information, including plans and sections of each'oundation, is reviewed to establish that sufficient information is provided to define the primary structural aspects and e'lements relied upon to perform the foundation function. Also reviewed is the relationship between adjacent foundations, including the methods of separation provided where such separation is used to minimize seismic interaction between the buildings.
In particular, the type of foundation is identified and its structural characteristics are examined. Among the various types of foundations reviewed are mat-foundations and footings, including individual column footings, combined footings supporting more than one column, and wall footings supporting bearing walls.
Other types of foundations that may also be used are pile foundations, drilled caissons, caissons for water front structures, such as a pumphouse, and rock anchor systems. These types of foundation are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
The major plant Category I foundations that are reviewed, together with the descriptive information, are listed below:
Rev. 1 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and pollclee. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them ls not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants.
Not sll sections of tha Standard Format have s corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, ss appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new informs.
tlon end experience.
Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cominleelon, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, O.C. 20655.
A description of the DG "E" facility's foundation is provided in Ref. 1, Section 3.8.5. 1. Additional information is provided in Ref. 2, Page 3-6.
Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), site dependent free field ground motion records, soil properties, etc., as an integral part of the .seismic analysis review of Category I structures. The review for guality Assurance is coordinated and performed by the guality Assurance Branch as part of its primary review responsiblity for SRP Section 17.0.
For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch.
I I. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SEB acceptance criteria for the design of seismic Category I foundations are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following regulations:
A. lO CFR Part 50, K50.55a and General. Design Criterion 1 as they relate to safety-related structures being designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety function to be performed.
8. General Design Criterion 2 (Ref. 3) as it relates to appropriate considerations being given to the most severe of the natural phenomena
.that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, andperiod of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, and to the combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena.
C. General Design Criterion 4 (Ref. 4) as it relates to structures, systems, and components important to safety being appr'opriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit.
D. General Design Criterion 5 (Ref. 5) as it relates to structures, systems, and components important to safety not being shared among nuclear power
', units. unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions.
The Regulatory Guides and industry standards identified in item 2 of this subsection provides information, recommendations and guidance and in general describes a basis acceptable to the staff that may be used to implement the requirement- of 10 CFR Part 50, K50.55a, and GDC 1, 2, 4, and 5. Also, specific acceptance'riteria necessary to meet these relevant requirements of these regulations for the areas of review, described in subsection I of this SRP Section are as follows:
1. Descri tion of the Foundation The descriptive information in the SAR is considered acceptable if it meets the minimum requirements set forth in Section 3.8.5. 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
3.8. 5-5 Rev. 1 - July 1981
A DG E list of the facility's codes standards and regulations considered in the design of the foundation is provided in Ref. 2.
~
The loads and load combinations used in the design of the DG "E" foundation comply with those listed in Subsection II.
The listed load combinations were used to check against sliding and overturning due to earthquakes, winds and tornados and, against floatation due to floods. (See Ref. 3, Page 11.)
e a The design of the DG "E" facility's foundation does not consider soil-structure interaction since it is founded on sound bedrock.
0 Hydrodynamic loads need not.be considered since the DG "E" facility is located far enough away from the containment structures.
Dynamic soil pressure has been considered in the design of the DG "E" fac i 1 i ty.
b. The design and analysis procedures for the DG "E" facility's foundation comply with AC I -349.
Ce The AISC specification is not applicable for the design and analysis procedures used in the design of the DG "E" facility's foundation since it is constructed out of reinforced concrete.
Oeficient areas of descriptive information are identified by the reviewer and a request for additional information is initiated. New or unique desigr features that'are not specifically covered in the '"Standard Format...",
require a more detailed review. The reviewer determines the additional information required for a,meaningful review of such new or unique design features.
2. A licable Codes Standards and S ecifications The design, materials, fabrication, erection, inspection, testing, and surveillance, if any, of seismic Category I foundations are covered by codes, standards, and guides that are either applicable in their entirety or in portions thereof. A list of such documents is contained in subsec-tion I.2 of the SRP Section 3.8.3. In addition the documents listed in subsection II. 2 of SRP Section 3. 8. are acceptable for the containment 1
foundation.
3. Loads and Load Combinations The specified loads and load combinations used in the design of seismic Category I foundations are acceptable if found to be in accordance with those combinations referenced in subsection II.3 of SRP Section 3.8. 1 for the containment foundation, and with those combinations listed in subsection II.3 of SRP Section 3.8.4 for all other seismic Category I foundations.
In addition to the load combinations referenced above, the combinations used to check against sliding and overturning due to earthquakes, winds, and tornados, and against floatation due to floods. are found acceptable if in accordance with the following:
a0 0 + H + E
b. 0 + H + M C. 0+ H+ E'+
d. H+M
e. 0+
f's 0, E, M, E', M are as defined in SRP Section 3.8. 4, H is the lateral F'here earth pressure, and the bouyant force of the design basis flood.
Justification should be provided for including live loads or portions thereof in these combinations.
4. Oesi n and Anal sis Procedures The design and analysis procedures used for seismic Category I foundations are acceptable if found in accordance with the followina:
a~ The design should consider the soil-structure inter action, hydrodynamic effect, and dynamic soil pressure.
b. For seismic Category I concrete foundations other than the containment foundations, the procedures are in accordance with the ACI-349 Code, as augmented by Regulatory Guide l. 142.
C. For Category I steel foundations, the procedures are in accordance with the AISC "Specifications...".
3.8. 5" 6 Rev. 1 - July 1981
d. Not applicable to the DG "E" facility.
e. A design description report along with various drawings for the DG "E" facility have been submitted to the NRC. Additional information is available upon request.
5. The allowable limits listed in Subsection II.5 of SRP Section 3.8.4 were used in the design of the DG "E" foundation.
The listed factors of safety against overturning, sliding and floatation are used in the design of the DG "E" facility. (See Ref. 3, Page 11.)
6. The criteria pertaining to containment foundations is not applicable for the DG "E" facility. No special construction techniques were used for the DG "E" facility's foundation. Welding of rebar was not permitted.
The applicable codes referred to here are complied with.
7. No special testing or in-service surveillance requirements for the DG "E" foundation were required.
jv/e059c:mg
d. For the containment foundation, the design and analysis procedures referenced in subsection II.4 of SRP Section 3.8. 1 are acceptable.,
e. The design report is found acceptable if it satisfies the guidelines contained in Appendix C to SRP Section 3.8.4.
f. The structural audit is conducted as described in Appendix B to SRP Section 3.8.4.
For determining the overturning moment due to an earthquake, the three components of the earthquake should be combined in accordance with methods described in SRP Section 3. 7: 2. Computer programs are acceptable if the validation provided is found in accordance with procedures deline-ated in subsection II.4.e of SRP Section 3.8. 1.
5. Structural Acce tance Criteria For each of the loading combinations referenced in subsection II.3 of this SRP Section, the allowable limits which constitute the acceptance criteria are referenced in subsection II. 5 of SRP Section 3. 8. 1 for the containment foundation, and are listed in subsection II.5 of SRP Section 3.8.4 for all other foundations. In addition, for the five additional load combina-tions delineated in subsection II.3 of this SRP section, the factors of
~
safety against overturning, sliding and floatation are acceptable if fouef in accordance with the following:
Minimum Factors of Safet For Combination Over turnin ~Slid>n Floatation a~ 1.5 1.5
b. 1.5 1.5 C. 1.1 1.1
d. 1.1 1.1 e.
6. Materials ual it Control and S ecial Construction Techni ues For the containment foundation, the acceptance criteria for materials, quality control, and any special construction techniques are referenced in subsection II.6 of SRP Section 3,8. 1. For all other. seismic Category I foundations, the acceptance criteria are similar to those referenced in subsection II.6 of SRP Section 3.8.4.
7. Testin 'and Inservice Surveillance Re uirements At present there are no special testing or in-service surveillance for seismic Category I foundations other than those required for require-'ents the containment foundation, which are covered in subsection II.7 of SRP Section 3.8. 1. However, should some requirements become necessary for special foundations, they will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
III. REVIEW PROCEOURES The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from the review procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.
3. 8. 5" 7 Rev. 1 - July 1981
The Standby ac Pover Supply System consists of four diesol-qenerator sets. The diesel-generators are sized ao that three diesels can supply all the necessary Porer requirexents for one unit in the desiqn basis accident conditionr Plus the necessarY required loads to effect the safe shutdovn of the second unit-The diesel qenerato.s are sPecified to start up and attain rat d roltaq4 and frequency rithin 10 seconds. Four independent 4 kV enqineered safety feature svitchqear assexblies are provided for each reactor'nit- Each diesel-generator feeds an independent 4 ky bus for each reactor unit.
Each diesel-qenerator starts automatically upon lo f Pover or detection of a nuc7ear accid~nt engineered safety feature system loads are apPlied in time sequence. Each generator .operates independent7y and Parallelinq during a loss of off-site pover or LOCA sign 3~2~2~9~32 DdQ 22"CX XQMXX Tach reactor unit is prorided vith four independent 125 V and tvn independent 250 V dc systems. Each dc system is supplied from a separate batt'ery bank and battery charger. The 125 V dc systems are provided to suPPly station dc control pover and dc pover 'to four diesel qenerators and their associated svitchgears. The 250 V dc systems are provided to supply pover required for the la ar ger
~
7 oads such as dc moto'r driven .Puxps .and valves.
12' Se suezymQ rg czoviueo 4 JM44rfd gg jg/f' ez Frig PZdN 4eaRfoc.
The 125/250-V dc System is desiqned to supply p'over adequate to
.satisfy the engineered safety feature load reguirexenti of t'e unit vith the Postulated loss of off-site pover and any concurrent single 'failure in the dc systex.
2~2~4~19 gq~i,C~qg Beni Zemmxl 2~rrim ate~'~~qtem h Residual Heat Removal Service Rater. System is provided to remove the heat re)ected by the Residual Heat Removal System during shutdovn operation and accident conditions.
1 )~)~4 19 gmyggegcy Qy~rfgg Qygyg System The Emerqency Service Rater System supplies vater to coo1 the standby diesel-uenerators and the FCCS and Engineered Safety Features equipment rooms, and other essential heat 1cads.
sk
'E C yC.,
%y J f
Pow~r frox the generators ~s scepnea up sroa c~ a v io c.'$M g.v of Unit Ho. 1 and frox 20 ky to 500 kV on Unit Ho. 2 by the unit xain fransgorxers and supplied by. overhead lines to the 230 kV and 500 kV switchyards, resPectivelY.
>.g g y g ZZeaizig Zmer Riuirihuffun XxMmn The electric power distribution systex includes Class IE and non-Class IE ac and dc Power sYstexs. The class IF, power systex supplies a11 safety related eguiPxent'and soxe non-class IE goads while the non-Class IE systex supplies the balance of plant eau ipxent.
Tho Class IE ac systex for each unit consists of four independent Load grouns Two independent off-site power systexs provide the norxal electrJ.c Power to these groups. Each load group includes 0.16 kv switchgear, 080 V load centers, xotor control centers and 120 v control and instruxent power panel. 'he vital ac ins fzuxentation and control power supply systexs include battery systexs static inverters Voltages listed are noxinal values, and all electrical ecruigxent essential to safety is designed to accept a range of +10 percent in voltage.
pour independent diesel generators are shared between the two units. Each exorgnncy Power diesel for generator is provided as one i standby source of of the four Class IE ac load groups iw each uni+. issuxing the total loss of off-site power and failure of one diesel generator, the rexaining diesel generators have sufficient caPacity to operate all the-'equipxent necessary to Prevent undue risk to public health and safety in the event of a design basis accident on one unit and a forced shutdown of the second unit.
pg~non-Class zHJ'Cc7 4 k'EM-$EE gl7jgcN'Fb)
The IE ac systex includes 13 ~ 8 kV switchgear, 0.16 kV switchqear, 080 V load centers and xotor control centers.
pour independent Class IE 125 Vdc batteries and .two independent Class IE 250 Vdc batteries and associated battery chargers Provide direct current power for the Class IE dc loads of each unit. Power for non-Class IE dc loads is supplied fr'ox the Class IE 125 and 250 V batteries through an additional circuit breake"
'for redundant fault Protection.
gyp real~~'g 'k'NMlAfJdc JfD) hese svstexs are discussed in Chapter 8.
1~ 2-26
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SSES-FSAR tho north and west branches of the Susquehanna River. Post-Olean advances did not reach the site vicinity (Ref. 2.5-5 and 2.'5-6) .
Peltier <Ref ~ 2.5-5) mapped discontinuous kame terraces along the Susquehanna River in the site vicinity. The highest such terrace formed by ice marginal streams occurs at about 650 feet level at the. site." Ref.er to Subsections 2.5. 1.2.2 and above sea 2.5. 1.2.3. 3 for. further discussion of Pleistocene erosion and deposition at the site.
,Since the retreat of the Risconsinan ice sheets from the region, broad regional uplift appears to have occurred, probably at least in part as a result of crustal rebound subsequent to the removal of ice load. Erosion has continued and soil profiles have formed.
5 f~g 5 Eggj,peep',gg Geology g~luytgon Site subsurface exploration is described and discussed in Subsection 2.5.4.3. Laboratory tests of foundation materials, and in situ qeophysical tests of .the foundation materials are .
discussed in Subsections 2.5.4.2 and 2.5.5. Geologic mapping of the final foundations is described in Subsections 2.5.1.2.2 ~
2.5.1.2.3 and 2.5.4.1.3. It'as concluded from these studies and evaluations that the site geologic and foundation conditions are entirelv suitable for the construction and operation of the nl ant.
i.2.5.1.).5 1 Ggo~ogic Conditions Under Cate o 1 Structur All Seismic Cateqory 1 plant facilities, except the spray pond and the Enqineered Safequard Service Rater (ESSW) pumphouse and pipeline are founded, on bedrock. The ESSM pipeline trench is excava ed nartly in soil and partly in rock. The location of
'.hese faci lities is shown on Fiqure 2. 5-24.
Yhe foundation rock is a hard, indurated siltstone, a member of the Devonian Nahantanqo Formation. In the foundations area quite massive and litholoqically homogeneous, with beddin g it is aenerally not well defined, and lackinq the bedding plane fissility usually associated with less well indurated shaly silts+ones and silty shales. Xn places the rock exhibits a slaty cleavaqe, further evidence of its indurated nature. All Category 1 rock foundations were excava ted to unweathered bedrock.
Geologic maps and sections of the Cateqory 1 excavations in rock are shown in F>> qures 2. 5-1 and . -19. Nore detailed discussion of +he foundation qeo oqi conditions is contained in Subsections gQ v '5'4 p ovl c(4$ Y4 cc'k, PAApp lip P ~
+ ~c(~gg 4: Qs'0g QA.gyp g+ 8 Pev. 35, 07/84 PROF T<c(
Pe TE. bugs;np ~~~ (uy'""j """
(SIC f5~~ c~
z.5;Lil)
c ee r*' f
SSES-PSAR 2.5.1.2.2 and 2.5.1.2.3. Fngineerinq properties of the a/
foundation rock are described in Subsection 2.5.4.
The spray pond is situated over a glacial or preglacial, east-west trendinq bedrock valley as outlined by contours on top of bedrock (Fiqure 2.5-17) . The valley is filled with dense gravelly and sandy qlacial outwash and a maximum, thickness 'of about 110 feet adjacent till deposits which attain to the spray pond a ea. They were deposited no later than the Olean substage (early Wisconsinan) of the Qisconsinan glaciation which occurred over 50,000 years ago. In general, the deposits are permeable and consist of a sequence of sand, gravel, and boulders overlain bv sand and qravel, overlain in'urn by silty sand. The entire sequence is highly variable in qrain size distribution and sortinq, and contains discontinuous pockets of similar materials.
As a rule, qrain size decreases and sortinq increases toward the top of the sequence.
The southwestern +ip of the spray pond i's cut into bedrock while the remainder was excavated in these permeable glacial materials.
The thickness of the clacial deposits beneath the bottoa of the spray pond ranges from zero at the rock contact to 93 feet at the eastern end of the pond. The spray pond is lined to minimize seepaqe losses to the underlying permeable glacial deposits. The foundation of the pumphouse structure located'at the southeastern corner nf the pond is underlain by 35 to 60 feet of qlacial material. The FSSW circulation pipelines between the pumphouse and +he plant intersect bedrock at an elevation of 668 feet, anproximately 260 feet southeast of the pumphouse (refer to Figure 2.5-17A) . A qeoloqic map of the spray pond area is oresented on Figure 2.5-15. Further discussion of conditions at the ESSQ pumphouse and spray pond are contained in Subsections 2.5.1.2.2, 2.5.3 and 2.5. 5.
77lR. cP QV kilt/EJ)l"@~A( 7V/a 2,5.$ ,2,5,2 JagQs jde-le+
Pgte))gimel p (at2<MIE IR" p J;vQS't( yaaaI el
$ p;jJ~~ ~,)fQ g6 gka gtnv~ fo vavp 'd'eave yAci:P Natural slopes adjacent or. close to the principal plant structures are relatively flat. Most of these slopes are composed .of soil; few rock slopes occur (Fiqure 2. 5-17 shows areas of rock outcrops).
North of the spray pond the Trimmers Rock Formation forms a relatively steep ridqe risinq approximately 380 ft. above the pond. The south-facing slope of this ridqe is essentially a rock slope underlain by flaqqy, resistant sandstone thinly mantled with soil and rock fraqments. The closest approach of this slope to the sn'ray pond is along the northern perimeter of the pond; the +oe of the slope, at elevation 710-720 feet, is 250 feet or mn e from +he edqe of the pond (at elevation 679 feet) - The maximum slope alonq the ridge is about 2 horizontal to 1 2.5-57
0 SSES-FSAR 1,000 ft. This rock contains na unstable minerals and provides hiqhly stable foundation conditi.ons.
soils at the site are glacial in arigin ~ depositeR mostly by flovinq @lucia) meltwater, xuch unRer torrential conditions.
The ~oil is nnncalrareous. Host of. the rock fragments consist of indurated sandstones. The oriqin and mineralogy of these such that they present no hazardous conditions (refer to soils's Sub sect i on 2. 5. 1. 2. 5. 7) .
A few of the safety-related principal plant structures are foundeR an soil. These structures consist of the Engineered Safequard service Water (ESSM) pumphouse, the spray pond, and portions of the Seismic Category I aipeline linking the reactor building to <<he spray pand Host other plant structures are oun ed an roc . e ocation of these structures is shovn on Fiqure 2. 5-24: soil and rock foundations are identified on Figure
2. 5-17A
<he static and dynamic enqineerinq properties of the site bedrock and overhurden soils vere determined by field investigation and laboratory te tinq. The results of laboratory testing of the materials sampled from the prospect site are covered in tvo reparts (Bof. 2.5-97 and 2.5-98).
A detailed study of the soil properties at the site af the spray ponR and ESSW pumphouse i.s qiven in Subsection 2.5.5.
7 5~4 2 1 ProueXti.a af Zmndnfiaa Back The Cateqnry I reactor buildinqs and diesel generator building, as well as the non-cateqory I turbine and radwaste buildinqs (see Pi.qure 2.5-24) are founded on unweathered siltstone bedrack. The
's siltston~, a member of the Nahantanqo Formation hard anR indurated, and in the foundations area is litholoqically hoxoqeneous vith bedding generally no<<veil of Devonian age+
Ref in~d, and lackinq the bedding plane fissility usually associated vith less veil indurated shaly siltstanes and silty
.-.ha 1 ~s. In places <<he rock exhibits cleavage, further evidence of i<ho aro.a of <<he princi.pal plant structures, bedrock beddi.nq where observeR aenerally dips gently (less than 104) south; locally, such as north of the circulatinq water puxphouse, building beds R ip slightly north ~ At the north end of the radvaste anR the narth side of the vnit 1 coolinq tower, bedding dips xore p~y. 35, 07j84 2.5-89
~~SSES-PS AR~~
~~'.ha~ ~re sliqhtly lover, by a factor of aho>>t 15 percent ~~~
~~is, > V va)u> of about 14,000 fns anr) V of about 6,200 Fps.~~
1'he.,r in sit> results are in qood aqreement vith the laboratory i)etermina tions. Additional cross-hole and>>p-hole in situ Peismic velocit.y measurements vere made in the spra y pond area (Ref. 2.S-99) . Results of the cross-hole explorations at the sitr are f>>rther discusserl in Subsections 2.5.4.2. 2 and 2.5. 4. 4.
~~Plate load tests vere carried out on sound rock near the center of the Units and 2 reactor b>>ilding excavation in the vicinity of'or inn 105 (refer to Piqure 2 5-18) . Plates 24, 13.5, and 1~~
~~R in. in diameto.r vere suhjected, to successively increasing total loarlinqs of 7, 22, and 60 tons per square foot (tsf),~~
rr.so~rtively. A total deflection of .062 in. occurred vhen the 24 in. o]ate vas loar)erl to a maximum of. 7 tsf. An additional deflection of 0.036 in. vas recorded on subsequent loadinq to
~~'?2 tsf, and'another A.O'36 in. of def lee+ion on application of the~~
~~<0 ~sf maximum load, producinq a total settlement of 0. 134 in, for the three-stage loadinq to 60 tsf. Recovery of the rock by~~
.las..ic rebound upon release of these loads vas substantial: 68, 75, .and 80 percent repeatable elastic recovery cf the total Reflections vere recorderl after release of the 7, 22, and 60 tsf 1 carl inqs, respr ctivel v. Additional deflections d ue to cycl ic loarlinq vera small. Application of 14 cycles of load at 7, 15, and 3p t..f resulted in arlditional settlements of only 0.012, 0.00'1, and 0.002 in.. respectively, over the correspondinq sinqle loadinqs. These results are consistent vith the high modulus valu~s ard seismic velocities of the foundation rock, and indicate structurally strong, competent material for foundations in>> nveat hered rock.
i. conc ludor) from t he en gin eer inq proper ties of the unvoa<hererl abler herl rock of the Nahantanqo Formation that the rock provides 1rl~auat~ support for the ma]or plant s t ructures under both saba'ic and dynamic cnndi tions. Set+ lement of structures
~
>nd>> sta~ ic lour) inq is insiqni fic..ant. It. cons ists of pseudo-
~~. lastic cnmn ~..sion of the underlying rocks and occurs~~
~ssential ly>>pnn load application. moreover, t he bedrock
>>rderqo ro l oss of strenqth anr) vill experience neq 1 iaihle v'l ar)hit iona 1 sett lement unrler earthq>>ak~ loadinq.
summary of th~ properties of the foundation rock is compiled in 2.
2, .4.2~2 proportios of Foundation Soils
~~h~ r~s>>its of detai]ed exploration of the soils in the spray pond a ~a are qi vc n in Subsection 2.5. 5. only information on t.h~~~
proper+ i ...- nf the p>>mpho>>sc fo>>ndat ion soils is qi ven in this s>>h."-er.~ ion.
~)i>( q;as>>g
~ ~>>
p'he
~
~>>g Six>>lc p~>- .
natural soils at the oumphou e site are normally consolidaterl and consist predominantl y of sand, aravel, cobbles, and boulders.
-he soils are pnor] v strati f ied, startinq as sand or sanrly
<<ravel at the surfare and qradinq to mostly cobbles and boulders near herlrork. The rlepth of the soil deposit below foundation arable rona~.. from ahout 35 ft a t the south enrl cf the pumphous~
"o at o!it F A ft a'. th~ north end. ~Asubsur e oss-sect>on hrouah h 'um phou se sit is shown on Figure 2. 5-30 cross-s~rt ion D- D. The soi ls helov t e o a . n e are nr~rlominar t l v sanrly aravels with large amounts of cobbles and hr>>lders. Th~ properties of these sandy and gravelly soils are follovs:
( rain Size Distribution Grain size distribution tests were made on most of the snl it: spoon samples for classif ication purposes.'ieve anrl hydrometer analyses vere performed according tn ASTN
~tS Procerlure P-422. The range of grain size curves is
"-~own nn Fia>>re 2. S-31. The mean qrain size (D50) of ol
+he qravell y soils, which are the predominant material h~l ov the pumnhouse vas founrl to be in +he. range of 4..S tn 2S.0 mm. Mhcrever he sand is nresent belov the pumphouse, the DSO siz is in the range of 0.14 to QC~ 1.0 mm.
Qelatiye Density F~]ative rlr;nsity rlata vere derived from standard nen>>ratinn tr.st. results usinq the 6ibbs and Holtz procedure (pef. 2. 5-100) ~ This procedure is valid for normally consol irlated sands.
Va 1>>es of relativo densi ty ohtainerl in this way are
..>>mmarizc rl on Fiaure 2.5-32. A direct comparison of ro1ati v~ l~nsi ~ y from 'tl'alues qiven in Figure 2. 5-32 a-.rl from undisturherl samples and/or in site density rannnt ha mad~ hecause no relative densit y tests v~re maR~. The soil deposi+s are glacial in nature.
Th~ deposits are quite variable in particle size anrl
.,or+ina and conta'n discontinuous sand pockets and aravel norkots. Grain size in general increases vith d-'p'h. A! 'he foundat ion level of the p!!'mphouse maximum sizes of tho part icles are in the range of 3 to inch!! s. undis+ urbed uhe samples co>>ld not he obtained in the aravelly soils. The gravel also vill inf]uenco +he rosults of in site density tests so that
< hr y may. not represent th in sit e r.ondit ion as a v hole.
<he St andarcl nenet ration resistance vorsus elevation is ai Ven On Figure 2. S-33. The 'N values vill be
~
pe v . 15, 07/R4 2. 5-q2
SSES-PSAR influenced hy gravel. Secause of this the higher hlovcounts vere not considered representative of site conditions. h value of = 40 vas selected for desiqn.
W
,Of the ()9 standard .penetration tests made b neath the fodndltz6n level at the ESSQ Pumphouse 43 .xcee ed 40 blows per foot. Of the 6 value" that were less than 40
+>>
blows per foot only one va less than 30 blovs per foo?.
5Q X
~. ra~ ~
5X ~
~
g;~~
\
~ g~ g+~$ ~1~ ~
g ~~pi~+- "~',q~.g J ~
4 tJndisturhed sampling of qravelly soils vas not possible.
Therefore, shear strenqth testinq vas conducted only on the sands. The shea strenqth of the qravelly soils vas t.hen conservatively assumed to he equal to that of the sands.
Tho. details of the testinq procedures and selection of Resign strengths are given in Subsection 2.5.5. The effective anqle of internal friction was selected from' be +est data to he 35~ (Piqure 2.5-34) . The cyclic shear stress ratios at the tvo ef fective consolidation pressures 1'.0 ksf and 6.0 ksf vere determined to be
0. 320 and 0. 260, resoectively, for 5 loadinq cycles (Figure 2. 5-35, Subsection 2.5.'5) . A linear rolationship was assumed in computing cyclic shear stress ratios at other ef fee+ ive consolidation Dressures ~
d) Shear Rave Volocitg and Shear tloduli Cross-hol~ shear vave velocity measurements vere performed hy teston ('eophysical Engineers, Inc. (ref.
2.5-99) . Compressional and shear wave velocities obtained from the measurements are qiven on Pigure 2.5-36.
Shear modu! i vere computed from the values of shear va v~
voloci t y:
2 G = V g S who.re:
shea r modulus, ps f unit veiqht, pcf qravitational acceleration, ft/sec~
nc v. 35, 07/84 2. 5-93
l l SSFS-FSAR q+~@(~@ v = shear vav~ velocity, f ps A disc>>ssi or. on how the shear modulus is influenced by ronfinina pre,sure, the s+rain amplitude, and th~
"ela+i v~ d ansi+ v is aiven in ~uhsection 2.5.5. 2.
~he location of al1 field explorations is shovn nn the plot plan, F'quro 2. 5-72.
A total nf approximately 250 exploratory borings was made in soil
~nd rock a- t he siie. Oorinqs were logged in detail; horin'g logs
~re contained in Ref.s. 2.5-97, 2.5-98 and 2.5-99 and Appendix 2.5C. -he soils were classified in accordance with the Unified "oil Classi fication Svsiem. Rock loqs include RQD (rock quality dosiqnation) values. Coring in rock was performed usinq NX n do>>".le-tahe'or ina eauipment.
4. Drillina was conducted in late 1970 (100 and 200 series borinqs) to estahl ish q~reral qeoloqic relationships over the site area and to detormine general soil and rock conditions at the site. A mor~ inten .ive D oqram (300. series borinqs) was conducted in the
<nr nq of 1971 to dc fine foundation conditions in the principal olart st"ucturo.s ar~a. Four 45-degree angle holes were drilled in "h~ reactor a ea. Addit ional exploraiion drilling was r.ocessary .o locatecitronthe si+e for the Susquehanna River intake and lischaran structure~ (700-B00 series borinqs), to define soil and ock condi+ions at the, spray pond and ESSQ pumphouse site (1100
..eries and some 400 series borings), and to investigate foundation conditions for the cooling towers (borings B1 to 810) hand the ra ilroad spur and bridge over State Highway 11 (borings 417 to 455 and 92a tp q40) . BeCauSe Of the Safety-rela+ed f(a+aaory T) ur of the spray pond>mad= PSSM pumphouse the
'xDloration proaram for t hese facilities was comprehensive ard
'ncluded snl ii spoon and undisturbed samples, lahoratory testing, hvdroloaic survevs, nermeabilit.y tests, and seismic cross-hole
~nd up-holo surveys.
iaiic water lc vels were measured inionsomeof of Af+er comple+ qeoloqic borinqs,
~
the borings dr'ied on ~he si te. Pc rforated plastic pipes were installed in a rumbler of tho hnrinas 'o al low collection of future water level data.
geese hnriras are 6 no>ed on the plot plan, Figure 2.5-22.
Portly-sever. t~st pit~ vere excavated by backhoe at selected 1ccaiions to ohserve soi.l and rock conditions. Two north-south trar ches totall ina over 700 ft in lenqth were excavated to obtain infcrmat'on on phvsical prop~rties, structure, and variability of
>h~ near-surfac~ materials at the. site. Loas of the test pits arh trent hes are compiled in Appendix 2. 5C.
~ev. 35, 07/A4 2.5-94 IIAAR):
K~)p
SSES-FShR gf 5 4 )~)~1 ggcgygt jons ln Rock A]1 Snismic Ca'.~gory I rock foundations were carried to or well holov unweathered hedrock. Rock foundations for the turhine and radwaste t uildinqs, although they are not Seismic Category I struc+uro., were prepared according to the same qeneral orncedures and cri+eria used in preparinq the Seismic Category T rock foundations.
Fxcava+.ion of rock proceeded hy initial ripping of any weathered surficial rock material folloved vhere necessary by line blasting and pro.split tinq in hnles drilled to provide slopes of 1 horizontal to 4 ver+ical. Fssentially vertical slopes in unweathered rock proved stable throughout the duration of construction and nn special protective measures vere required.
'eath~red rock was cu~ on'slopes of 1 horizontal to 2 vertical.
~n a f~v places, vie'~ mesh vas used for protection of higher voa~hered rock slopes +hat vere exposed for extended periods.
he surface nf the excavated foundation rock vas scaled to remove 1nose debris and Jetted vith vater or air to remove loose
~rauments and to prepare the surface for concrete. Before olacemert nf st uctural concrete or concrete backfill to design el ovation, all Seismic Cateqory I foundations vere inspected hy an enqin~erinq geologist to verify the suitability of the rock and i.s nroper surface preparation to receive concrete.
foundation rock hea. inq a Seismic Category E structure was Ill rvool oqica] ly mapoed (see Figure 2. 5-183 .
Foundations for each of the coolinq towers (nonsAismic-Category E s+ruct.ures) consist of 40 individual pedestals supportinq the column ard ex+ended to bedrock. Excavation proceeded by cuttinq ring trench and r renarina for each pedestal a suitable sur face in unvca'hired or partly weathered bedrock by rippinq or blastin4 nares.".ary, followed hv scalinq and setting..
During cons. ruction of orircipal plant structures founded on rock, exca vations extended below the vater table and some.
~
l~waterinq vas roquired. Due to" the lov permeability of the rock, groundwater inflov vas small. Devaterinq was accomplish'ed hy surface drains and sumos.
Th~ excavat icn fnr ~he spra y pond>sask ESSQ Pumphouse as orodominan+1v in soils. Fxcavation proceeded initially hy usinq
~ g l~gpa.( w < ~
gn v, 15, (}7/R4 2. 5- 97 4t4h~ pg,pQ~~ E
SS~S-PSALM larqe ear>>h moving oquipment, then finished by using more refined p ocedur~s.. On completion of excava<<ion, the surface layer of he na<<ural soil formation was recompactcd as follows:
pnr soils having not more than 12 percent passinq the Nn. 200 ..ieva size, 80 nercent relative density as Rc ter mined by ASTI 02009 h) F'r all o<<her soils, 95 percent of maximum dry density as determined by ASTI 015~7
>ps>> Resul>>s ar~ included in Appendix 2. 5C. The location of test specimens with respect tn the spray pond is shown on )'iqure 2. 5-
~9. A statistical analysis of the test results was made and is summarized on Figure 2.5-60. The required compaction was m~t or exceeded.
A Drotecti ve concrete ma+ was immediately placed over the compacted soil unde the ESSE Pumphouse and a minimum of 5 in.
thick reinforced concrete liner placed over the entire spray pond area.
A11 temporarv slopes in soil were formed at a maximum slope of 1 1/2 hori zontal to 1 vertical. Thetemporary slopes in the v'ci nity of the '?SSW pumphous>> vere protected wi>>h a 3 in. layer of concret~ to maintain <<he natura} soil formation intact. All pormanen>> slopes in soil were former) at a slopo, of 3 horizontal
.o 1 vert ica l..
.h ~ ~xcava<<ion for <<ho. Seismic Category 1 pioelines in soil was carr.'c d out similarly. All slopes were cut at' maximum of 1 1/2
.",or 'zontal to 1 vertical. The minimum clearances were 1 ft ben~a<<h he pipe and 2 ft <<o the siRes.
p9JISQY~
?.'>.0.5. 3 pack f.ill and Compaction
<;~neral] v, the, excavated area, for a minimum distance of 10
~
~~-.urrounRina <<he ma d'or structures, was hack filled with a non-ft corrosive 1ean mix concrete known as sand-cement-flyash backfill.~~
minima3 amount of backfilling has taken place using qranular backfill, wi<<h <<ho exception of <<he sprav pond and vicinity addrc sed 1'at~r in th s section.
h~ Sie'smic Category T pipelines were qeneral ly backfil led with
<<)>,~ sand-cern< nt -f] yach; othcrwis~ qranular material was used.
Puris d S~i.,mic Category I electrical ductbanks are composed of oir fore~.d concr~>>a encasements around plastic cr metal duct ing;
>> he conc".c t~ ~ncas<<m~nt brine cast direc+ ly aqa inst he exca va ted
~~2. 5-98~~
J3H SoI4 IL M ocLInLPIAo pv- I(:egwg poeycL II PP f u ceo(g;
<<g upcLo o-o-r> P +
~ Iocc ocoq7Viar+ kwc(p-oo/c.
ALII Jc( er IfooLo d MAP'P 'tP/ /f+ Q~ ]ac +oecP, Py~
c op Pr~lQ ~ 4 gp-~~a~a7:ou. k~ y~~daru ro ooss Q R Pole('J goccUN g aocc Qapp 'Icpw Pgaoa.. Ttl~ /Id'r(Q ~'(
'1'z. s'oc( j
~goat~
~
op ~ ceclAdIP
.y.voatsg -
+ga.2 ysuM/'gacLcp: II 5 eve Ice -d/e H s oop<<(oo7~
p o.ct".
Jy grocIXui~ edera eon'p" og h~ ~~a.v. (o+eoo ctraf~
vao'IL(Ji gS/o> ~~7'luu)o~
x2 cML( cartc+eoe7P o plAn
~g;~Tii gQ M ~r~
/a dT oLPe c.ceA.ct + o 5'ce ceto o'Ig ~ pl Sd (s' ca lpog'dpc Pp c( -cere( gaef pace.k gv- o(dodec g:u~ unco c rcLp cL(ro oPPILu u ode. ocg'g
/ P ev7'Q .
SSHS-PS AR larqe earth movinq equipment, then finished by usinq more refined procedures. On completion of excavation, the surface layer of ihe natural soil formation was recompacted as follovs:
a) Por soils havinq not more than 12 percent. passing the No. 200 sieve size, 80 percent relative density as determined by AST!l D2049 h) For all other soils, 95 percent of maximum dry density as determined by ASTI D1557 Tes+ Results are included in Appendix 2.5C. The location of test sp~cimens with respect to t he spray pond is shovn on Piqure 2. 5-
~~59. A statistical analysis of the test results vas made and is ummarized on Figure 2.5-60. The required compaction vas met or exceeded.~~
A protective conrrete ma+ vas immediately placed over the compacted soil under the ESSM Pumphouse and a minimum of 5 in.
thick reinforced concrete liner placed over the entire spray pond area.
All temporarv slopes in soil vere formed at a maximum slope of.
1 1/2 horizontal to 1 vertical. The temporary slopes in the vicinity of the ~SSW pumphouse vere protected vi+h a 3 in. layer of, concrete to maintain the natural soil formation intact. All pormanen+ slopes in soil vere formed at a slope of 3 horizontal
+o 1 vertical, Tbe excavation for +he Seismic Category 1 pipelines in soil vas carried out similarly. All slopes vere cut at a maximum of 1 1/2 horizontal to vertical. The minimum clearances vere 1 1 ft beneath the pipe and 2 ft to the sides.
~~2. ".>. 4. 5~ )Back f ill g nd Comport ion~~
'Generall v, the excavated area, for a minimum distance of 10 ft surrounding the maior structures, vas backfilled with a non-corrosive lean mix concrete knovn as sand-cement-flyash backfill.
A minima) amount of bark fill inq has taken place using granular backfill, vith the exreption of the spray pond and vicinity addressed later in th's section.
p <gs+vg
-he Seismic Category T pipelines vere generally backfilled vith the sand-cement-flyash; otherwise qranular material was used.
Buried Seismic Category I electrical ductbanks are composed of reinforced concre+e encasements around plastic cr metal ducting;
'he concrete encasement being cast direc+ly aqainst 'he excavated Re v. 35, 07 j84 2. 5-98
3 pzu+
Q a. ~ n.v~tQ p~~ ~~ELM ~ 4@i(: II) atra- 3Ajc-p;(/Q w+L. s~$ -'c.~~ J
$ al~~ p-,~:~l g(p,l, +, ~ (~)
~>t r'rial, '".>>.", m~r i nq ."pacification int~n<<. ~)o s>>hqraqe also insn"r!r for unsui tahl<<'ateria
) 1 such as vnter fr ozen,
~manic or r)'r 1-"t~rir>>.- ma eria l. s>>ch ma<<aria), when found rnmovpg, The s~nh-r~mr r<<-flva.,h heddinq material vas either mixed at the t a<<c)plant or nh>ainr d from an approved of fsita source. T).p sa n )-r.~m~ n
~~.nCh i.- i.~~
- f1yash vas then placerl ir
) a i>>'ht lifts not exceerlinq 30 nOr U fee< p~r hnur. FOr pipeS the pour WaS
).ro>>qh<<<<o the p'n~ sprinq line an0 vas alloved <<o set. Fo. duct t ink.", >h~ ) er)dinq was no'. placed until the duct bank concretP .
r achier) r 'hc rooui".~4 strenqt h. Sand-cement-flyash was then nour" rl <<o <<h< tr p of tho. d>>ct hank and alloved to set.
Analysis of .he rr levant field tests for beR6inq material is nc)udo) in <<he ~umvary qiven in Table 2.5-61.
g, 5. U,6 ( go>>ndva<<~r Conrli'+ ions
."n~c'a l roa~ur~s for cont ol of qroundvater levels beneath s:~ismic Ca<<~ao".y I nlant st.ructures founrled on rock are not
-.rq>>'red. How~ v~r, control of qroundva<<er levels and seepaqe s r~~0~i) a<<<<h~ snrav oonrl; discussion of desiqn criteria for a hi li<<v of <<ho sprav pond is presr n'ted in Suhsection 2.5. 5.
d
>>."i otic vat=r level readinqs verr obtained in the vicinity of p".in'nal nl ant (power block) structures between December
~n7P and huaus'672. Groundwater fluctuations ranqed from 1.5 i,". 4r ) ) ).olds 209, 311, to 6.2 f in drill hole 213.
maxim>>m qrounrlva ter level measured in the plant structures
~~)uri na th's preconstruction perior) ranqerl from approximately~~
~~f. a. <<h~ v~st ~dqe of the site of the <<urhine huildinq, to~~
,>)~n>>'6'e a! t ho eas<<edqe of t he site of the reactor
.">>i).);na". (re.e". <<.o.Fiqure 2. 5-55) . Thesr levels vo re 'ohviously nf l>>~nc>r) hv hr <<onoqraphic hiqh of 7U9 ft just vest of 'the nf <<h pnv. r h)nck structures.
~ However, subset quent
~xr~vat ov and nrar) inn in theso. aroas preclude water levels from
".isir q n his h~i>>ht in the futu e.
P>>ri '.>> cnr.",tr>>c rior,, >hr area just vest. of .he pover hlock
-true ur=.. va~ arxr)~) to el evat ion 710 f t or lr ss. Excavations fnr th~ fn>>rrla~inns of the principal plant structures ex<<ender)
) air v <<h~ va<<or <<ab]e and some minor rlevato.r inq* vas required.
>u ~ <<n t )-r lr:v nnrm~ahi 1 it y of the rock, qro>>ndvater in flow was
=mall an) .va.. cnnfined tn seopaqe from fractures. Devaterinq vas accomnl i..hr,) ) v rumninq from lov areas and sumps. Mh~re seeps v.'r~ no'~r) issu) nq from f ractures in the rock, holes vere rl illcA ir, n >h~ f ractur~s and pip s caulked in the holes to control vhi lr the mudmat was placed. In the foundation for the
~~2. 5-102~~
sS FS-PSAR reactor huildina (elevation 619 ft) and i n the turbine condensate pump pi t (at elevati on 635 ft), hydrost ntic oressure caused liftina of small areastheof impervious the 3 inch thick concrete mudmat that membrane. Approximately 20 had heen placed ove relief ve] ls dri lied throuqh the mudmat released t he pressure ard allows d the mat: +o set;tie back to its oriqinal position. The weiaht of the structural concrete slab subsequent:ly placed on his mudma t was mor> than suf f icient to'esist any upli ft nre s sures.
The hiqhost see ps no+ed in the foundat ion rock dur inq construct ion were at elevation 642 ft ir. the radvaste buildi nq
~xcavation and at about the same elevat inn in the pipe t"ench in
.he sout hem part: 'of. the Unit 2 turbine huildinq. Some seeps were also noted in the. foundation rock for the reactor buildings eleva+ion 619 ft. and in sumps below this. To the west of the urbine huildinq in .he circulatinq vater pumphouse excavation, vatnr was noted to en+er the excavation to an elevation of anprnximat.~ly 660 .f t. Hvdrostatic lift inq (described above) of imperv'ous momhrane did not occur at fourdation elevetions ahove 640 f t.
g'ona hi}d jf5'av+
)
C.
informat ion with reqard to groundvater monitor inq and vato,. tzbl~ fluctuat.i.ons in the principal plart structures area proyidF in Subsect:ion 2.4. 13 and Tables 2. 4-31 and 2.4-32.
s1
+h t sorwv pond, w~ter level ir formatior. 'aken betveen July 29, 1974 and huaust 4, 1975, ard from January <hrouqh March 1977, indiCate a minimum Va~er leVel fluCtuatiCn Cf 4.0 f t reCOrded a+
nt s~rva'r. wells 1111 and 1113, and a maximum f luctuat ion o f 7.0
<<t in 11~5. Additional discussion of qrcundvater fluctuatiors ir ho Fnrav pond area can he found in Suhsect'on 2.5.5. Because
<<" oun! wa .e". levels s-. the pord will be higher t. han the maximum n"o jec ed flood el~vation (refer to Piaure 2.5-38 and Subsectior.
7.4. t, resp~r+ively), floodinq conditions fairer v'll not siqnificantly
> << f r <- who around va ter levels.
mil~s of the plan'eto v~re inventoried 4
'.~ca 1 v ~! l .. wi~hir. +vo and +he inf orma ior. is qivon ir. Table 2. 4-22.
':rour<'.wa+ . flovs avav from the principal p!ant structures area h~ nor+h, east, hard south. Hovevor, the predominant ion of flow i.- to the east and southeast a'radients of 0.05 ~nd 0.0~, r.snect;ively. The flov rate in bedrock is i mater'. >O h~ '..e.-.;-" thar. 1 ft per day aS diSCuSSed in SubSeCt iOn
~~2. 4. 1l. Groundva".er contours a t the site are shcwn on Figure~~
>. )-'10.
n:~rm'ahil i ty nf tho intact bedrock at the si'e is less than 1 f/vi ir. h~ av1raa~ pormc ahilitv of the qlacial materials at snrav nonl is 7,000 ft/year; hovever, this value has heen
~Onrilerabl V eXC-~dr ] in Same teStS. FOr a complete descrip+ ion 7.. 6-103
Qzwav f
+~~>40~ ~ 4'Qs'~p g<lta waM
~X 4lt 04%( I W/e AJ 7Vt g Cu~~ ~(~
+ 8cu'@:gg
b: Mv o(<~~er:ep >g vs~; p-Q 73' ~~un.f~~
ale W
+La. mm~~~'h~
~~~ ~~ ur~
a-~p yo:>>f Mrs'"a.~du'~f ky pulAa/pl pp
SS PS- P SAR 2, 5. 4. 1 0 S t a t ic ..". a h i itv 1
~~2. 5. 4. 10. 1 S<a t ic St a hi 1 it y o t Sa f et y - P~ 1 a'<) St t uct(ir es Su ppnr+. ed on go ck~~
~he reactor hu'dinqs, control structure, and th< diesel e'en< rotor huildinq, all of which ar<'eismic Ca teqory
-~r>>c+ur~s, ar< foundod on sound,'nweathered siltstone bedrock.
~he Soismic (.a+eqnry I pipel ines linkina the reactor buildings with the sprav pond are trenched partly in soil and partly in bo.d rock.
>h~ strenq+h of the unweathered bedrock amply accommodates the load. nf <.he plant prnvidinq hiqhly stable foundation cnnditions.
m< as>>red in the Seismic Cateqory I reactor area, compressional v~ 1ncitins are in the ranqe of 14,000 to 16,000 fps; shear wave velocity ranqes hetween 6,200 and 7,600 fps. Static deFcrmational mnd>>l's measured on rock cores vary hetween 3.1 n q.4x10~ psi (refer ~o Tahl~ 2.5-3) . measurements of
>> neon f ined corn pressive strength of un wea t he'red f cun()ation rock from he vicini".v nf the principal plant st"oct ures were between 3,650 and 16,000 psi (Table 2. 5-3) . Static properties of 'the fnun.lat ion nck ar~ summari zed in >able 2.5-5. Loads induced by thn nlant structures are less than the allowable bearinq pressure nf +);e rnck and far below the ultimate hearinq capacity. The st rue+ural loads will produce no siqnificant total or d' f< r ~n+ ial settlement of the foundations.
Safety-r~lat<<d structures founded on rock were desiqned for a hvdrosta+it around'water loadirq caused hy a maximum qroundwater
,1<~v~1 of. 665 f+. This is higher than the expectod maximum, water lev~l, a<<) i scussed in Suhsection 2. 4. 13.
?.'5.4. 10." S'.at ic ~'ahilit y of Safet v-R~la~od St, uctures Sunonr< < d on Soil
~he ma~ fon.inq of the FSSW pumphouso is 112 ft, 1onq, 64 ft wide, and 3.ft thick.. The total dead and live loads are 20,000 kips and 2,100 k ps, resnectively. The corresponding>>nit pressures ar 2. PA k.".f and A. 30 ksf, respectively. The ho tora of t;he mat
~~~, at, e'ovation 6'>7 f+.~~
.h> ultimat< bearing capacitv of tho ((at can be estimated by the fnl )owinq ~q<>ation (Ref. 2. 5->>5):
1/? 0 N + D (N " 1) f c) w hi+ rP ~
~~2. 5-106~~
SS FS-FS An ultimate hearing capacjt y 8 = width of the mat = 64 Y = unit weiqht of the soil = 130 pcf D
f = dapth of, surcharge, conservatively assumed to be zero Y q hearinq capacity factors 38, and 33, respectively (Fef. 2. 5-115}
correspondinq to g = 35~ (Subsect ion 2. 5. 4. 2.?)
Tho. ul+ ima+a haarinq canaci ty of the mat foundation vas found t o be 158 kips/sa ft. The factor of safety was computed to he 51, vhich indicates ro danqar in overstrassinq the supportinq granular soil. Therefore, the allowable hearinq pressure and sattlament of the mat footing were evaluated by the method of limi+inq settlaments suggested by Peck, Hanson, and Thornhurn
{3~f. 2.5-116) . Th~ allovable hearinq pressure for a maximum so,.+tlament not to qxcaad 2 in. was computed by the formula:
0.22 Cn Cw H vher~:
allowable hearinq pressures, tsf number of blovs par foot in the standard penat. ation test n 'Cw correction factors for "N", for the effects of overburden pressure and location of groundwater surfac~
co;.. erva ive N value of 4A vas selected to represent tha soils l.elow +ha ma'oundation (El~vation 657 ft, Fiqure 2.5-38) . The Stardard Pc n<. tration Tests helov t he founda'.ion level vere made an avaraqe overburden pressure of about 6,000 psf (Figure 2.5-39); the corraspondinq correction factor Cvas obtaired from Figure 19.6 of Baf. 2.5-115 to be 0.63. Assuminq that the groundwater surface is at 7 ft belov the mat and no surcharqe, the correction factor C vas computed to be 0.55 hy equatio 19 4 of Fc~f. 2. 5-115.
~ha nllnva ble baarinq pressure vas computed to he 6.0 kips/sq f t hasad nn t ho va lues of, N, C, and Cw qivan above. At this hoarinq pressure, the settlement of ~the mat f oundation should he loess ',han 2 in. anR the different ial settlement should be less her 1/4 .in. Therefore, hv proport ion, for a desiqn total nrossura of 3.1 kips/sq ft, the corresponding maximum and Pav. )5, 07/84 2.5-107
SSFS-FShR
~
I j~ fn ent respect
v ill ~
settlements lv. Settlement would be less than 1 in. and 1/2 in.,
in sand ard qravel depnsits occurs almost simultaneously vith ~he application of lead. Since more hen 00 nercon> nf the total load is dc ad load, 'hen less than 0.2 in. nf settlom~nt js expected after the completion of the cng.-. runt
~
inn.'a gert "he 'tructural stability of the ESSv pumphouse is discussed in Suhection 3.8.4 and 3.8.5.
~he sustair ed load from the spray pond is less than the veiqht of overburden removed; therefore, there is an adequate factor of safoty aaainst overstressinq the underlying soil. Soil rebound durina excavation ir. granular soils of the type found at the snrzv pond is insiqnificant.
h~ maximum predicted elevation of the water table is belov the hase of th~ sprav pond and ESSM pumphouse; therefore, hydrostatic water loadinqs were not considered in the design of these s+ru'ctures. A full discussion of the water table in this vicinity is in Subsection, 2.5.5.
. he la'nral narth pressure acting on suhterranear. valls of smic Ca+eqorv I structures vas comput.od assuming qranular hack f
~ he ill ha vina co~fficiont the of propert earth ies pressure stated in "at-rest" Subsection vas used.
2.5.4.5. 3.
idditinnallv, the walls vere desiqned for surcharge loadinqs and dynamic soil pressu es as appropriate. The typical pressure diaqrams and comhinatiors are shovn on Fiqure 2.5-39.
>'ater levels in 'he spray pond area are discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.1.2. Contours of 'he qroundvater table in the spray pond area are sho~n on Figure 2. 5-38.. Profiles of measu ed and prospected prnfiles of the qroundwater table heneath th spray oond are shovn nn Figure 2.5-40.
2,.'>.4.11 Design Criteria 2.5.4.11.1 Pesiqn Criteria of Safety-Related Structures nn Rock
-h~ plant ';=+ructures founded on rock are designed for a maximum acceleration nf 0.10q from an occurrence of the SSF. event. From c.onside ation of its enqireerinq properties, it is evident that th~ founda t ion roc:k vill not be measurably af fected hy seismic lozdinas, and nealiqible additional foundation settlement vill aI-.compa ny,theso maximum potential dynamic loads. ~he maximum cnn'emplat~d to>al static and dynamic loads of 40 tsf are only a
~~2. 5-108~~
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~
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SSES-PSAR 2 ~ 5 1 15 peck p, B f{anson, R ~ P . and Thron'burn, T H ~, 1974,
~
~
Foundation Fnaineerina, 2nd Hd., John Riley 6 Sons, Inc.
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9o v . 35, 07/R4 2. 5-151
tr/ / (
S EXPLANATION
<<ggg>> Coraour on toa ot ueorocsl coraour intenKI IO rect.
f/, ///////; ~
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~ Sersn'.K cctecor7 I Q true-.Utes orner roon I:
M~ ~~~
se sn K categor7
.) t, g QC MA~J'r/ ( SasrnK Carertory I pipeones.
>Jl/I
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DIESEL I
GENERAT BLDG. m%J Shaarng rtenores structures fr/~g~~
e I I ~' founcle4 cn hearock, "iE I I n I I rrrya r'oo I I I
I II I I
=R~ l
(:- )~ I eco 'oo eco SCALE IN FEET TIO~~-
r :
J.'/j~
Rev. 35. OT 94
~ SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTAIC STATION
/ J UNITS 1 ANO 2 FINAL SAF ETY ANALYSIS 8 EFOIIT ee c eel s
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. 1. CEOLOCIC SECTIONS ARE SNOMN IN ee I FICURES 2. 19, 2.5-21A. 2.5-219,
'el / s
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~~2. CEUPNTS ICAL EIPLORAT ION ANO OR ILL I~~
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44 547 BORING LOCATION'OREMAN
- DRILLER J R TxLlde PROJECT NAME aci ities
~
INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE ELEV.
CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING WATER LEVEL START DRILLS~
FINISH DATE HOURS TYPE SIZE I.D.
HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs.
~E" 140 lbs. BIT TIME CASING DEPTH 18" 30" DATE HAMMER FALL X O SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN.
< <no EA 0 X x 3..u. ON SAMPLER o< SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS I
(FORCE ON TUBE) vi>
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60 NOTES: USED IN. CASING TO FT., THEN IN. CASING TO 'FT.
CODING: U.S.C.S.* IINIFIED SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM H.S.A. HOLLOW STEM AUGER A- AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD = UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T s THINWALL V = VANE SHEAR
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Gibbs 8 Hill. /nc. BORING No.~
CLIENT IFEGIFGIIRS. OISIGFII RS, COFISTRUCIORS SHEET~OF~:
CONTRACTOR . 'OJECT No. BORING LOCATION:
FOREMAN-DRILLER J.R- Trude PROJECT NAME a ities
~
INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE KLEV.
CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING DRILLING WATER LEVEL DATE HOURS CASING DEPTH TYPE SITE LD.
HAMMER W.T.
HAMMER FALL 300 18" lbs.
~3CG 140 lbs.
30" BIT NE TIME DATE START FINISH I
O SAMPI.E BLOWS PER 6 IN. plO I
Z < EFIO ON SAMPLER OP I Z yIE. W SOIL DESCRIPTION ANO REMARKS W W O IS No 0 S
BOT.
(FORCE ON TUBE) 0 6 6-I2 I2-18 3 0 79 7 SS 24'.0 18 21 30 39 Reddish brown and gray SAND, trace silt, trace fine to coarse clay.
Grading with small boulders.
83 5
272 36.0'0 36.0 -38. C. 100%
QD. 80% Dark gray SZLTSTONE-46 QD. 97.5 of hole 0'ottom 6
46.0'0 l
60 I~ NOTES: USED CODING:
IN. CASING TO FT., THEN U.S.C,S. UNIFIEO SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN. CASING TO 'T.
H.S.A. = HOLLOW STEM AUGER A= AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD = UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THIN WALL V = VANE SHEAR
v s~sae 0
'.-. p..:=".;
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.:sieii2 -'."
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n Power a Cl IENT Li ht Co. Gibbs j4MI'RO 8 Hill, Inc.
OKSSGFYCISS CO'VSlESUMTORS BORING N SHEET 1
.~
OF' CONTRACTOR g ROJECT No. BORING LOCATION:
44 547 N. 341 341.00 FOREMAN-DRILLER J.R. Trude PROJECT NAME ac'ties 0.00 INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE ELEV.
669.51'RILLING CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING WATER LEVEI. 27 Os DATE HOURS CASING DEPTH
~11 9/83 TYPE SiZE I.O.
HAMMER W,T.
HAMMER FALL 300 18" lbs. 140 30" lbs. BIT TIME DATE
~ START ll/7/83 A m FINISH,
~2:00
'l/9/83
.m.
z I SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN. Qlo x I- <(no O
ON SAMPLER p
Kyu TH C9 P SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS Id le 4$
CFE CE g EC. (FORCE ON TUBE) Ka Cl IL O 40 CL BOT. 0-6 6-I2 12-IB W PaLL (Dark gray fine to coarse SAND 37 with crushed stone) .
4N 25 27 57 (Hit concrete between 3 0'nd 4 0')
10 24'.0'5 30 5.0'ellowish brown silty fine SAND.
2 SS .0'7 15 10 13.
29 10 57 9.7'5 179 Sandy GRAVEL with cobbles and boulders -.
2.0 -15. C.
312 0 0
~ 212 5.0 -20. C. 22 i 115 i 25 137 20.0 - 2 PS C. 58 100 110 131 r 30 25.0 -30. C. ~ 20
'T.
Ig NOTEK USED COOING:
IN. CASING TO FT., TNEN U.SCS.= UNIFIED SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN. CASING TO H.S.A. HOLLOW STEM AUGER A AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD = UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THINWALL V = VANE SHEAR
~ A" %14a&gt+llM
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it h. 4 t' Ps'I 44Vg
nn Power & Li ht Co. Gibbs 8 Hill,lric. GORING No.~
CLIENT E'EGItsEEEIS OES'G'oE+S. COPISTEEUCTOIIS SHEET~OF 2 CONTRACTOR ROJECT NEE, 44 547 BORING LOCATION:
FOREMAN-DRILLER J.R. Trude PRO~ECT NAME ac ties
~ ~
INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE EI.EV.
CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. ORII.LING WATER LEVEL
'RILLING'TART TYPE FINISH DATE HOURS SIZE I.O:
HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs.
~UJ!
140 lbs. BIT TIME CASING DEPTH DATE HAMM X I O
SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN. MIO X e ETIO ON SAMPLER I
~O C/I O SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS O CO I
0 AC Cll 3,LS OQ ISI (FORCE ON TUBE) Ka X 5)
EO O IS 0 C) 0 I BOT. 0-6 6-IR Ia-IB IAI S2T 30 170 SS 3" 31. 25 36 50/1 Sandy GRAVEL with Cobbles and boulders.
160 179 32 0'EC ~ 62 SS 0" 6 0'/0' 167 4
170 170 176 1.0 -46. REC.
6.0 - 4 .5'EC 47.5'ark gray SILTSTONE.
47.5 - 5 .0'EC. ~10%
RQD. ~ 8 57.
53.0 -57. 10 QD ~ 93 of hole 5'ottom 60 857.5'OTES:
USED IN. CASING TO FT., THEN IN. CASING TD 'T.
CODING: U.S.C,S.= UNIFIED SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM H.S.A. - HOLLOW STEM AUGER A AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD = UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THINWALL V = VANE SHEAR
~~P C~~
V
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Penn. Power 6 Light Co. Gibbe 8 Hill,inc. SDRING No.~
CLIENT E'S~."GERS OESIGA EISS. COFEST4V BOORS SHEET~OF~
CONTRACTOR OJECT No. 44 547 BORING LOCATION:
FOREMAN" DRILLER J. R Trude PROJECT NAME ace 44 92 INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berw<<ks>>- SURFACE KLKV. 674 '9s CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING DRILLING WATER LEVEL START FINISH 18.5'4.6'ATE TYPE
~11 17 ~11 21 SITE I.D.
HOURS HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs. 140 lbs. BIT CASING DEPTH HAMMER FALL 18" 30" DATE 11/17/83 I SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN. gg 0I
+no KyV ON SAMPLER CS EA, SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS EC (FORCE ON TUBE)
EST Qg V CD 4 BOT. 0-6 6-I2 I2-IB fine to coarse 20 24'0'9 62 58 70 PILL (Dark gray crushed stone).
SAND and 40 46 50 59 2 SS 24'0'0 37 I 35 41 7.
gray fine to coarse 0'eddish SAND, grading 22 with small boulders.
10 30 24 2.0 6 7 6 9 40 61 71 20 i 67 27 5 SS 24 22.0 13 13 14 19 i 25 i 81 6 SS 24 27.0 12 13 12 17 27.0'OULDERS.
12 00 30
'T.
I~ NOTES: USED IN. CASING TO FT., THEN IN CASING .TO 30.0'OOING:
U.S.C.S.* UNIFIED SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM I ~ ~
H.S.A. = HOLLOW STEM AUGER A= AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER VD
~~UNDISTURBED SAMPLE~~
= THINWALL V = VANE SHEAR I
0 OK!J Jl&.
H8tHi
~ 90~~<<
I E
I 4
) P.
I 1I I
1 J C
t Ilk HWAPAIWMPW~A
Gibbs 8 Hill, inc; GORING No.~
CLIENT C'GQ INCC TCS OSSIQ'SI AS, COFGSZAUCTOAS SHEET 2 OF 2 CONTRACTOR ROJECT No. 44 547 BORING LOCATION:
FOREMAN- DRILLER J.R. Triode PROJECT NAME acilities INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE ELEV.
CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING .DRILLING WATER LEVEL START FINISH TYPE DATE SI2E I.D.
TIME HOURS HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs. 140 lbs. BIT CASING DEPTH 1B" 30" DATE HAMMER FALL l SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN. pl l O X < cnoO ON SAMPLER O O CO 0 I Z 3:CA. W (FORCE ON TUBE) X CA, O Ccl SOlL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS CF) O C5 No o. cri~
W W o 4. v co4 BOT. 0-6 6-12 I2-IB %co 30 Reddish brown fine to coarse SAND, trace 117 41 36 silt, trace gravel.
130 35 127 161 24 ll 37. 26 30 39 56 37.3'0 Dark gray SILTSTONE 7.3'47. REC ~ ~ 97 47.3'ottom of hole ls 47.3'0 60 NOTES: USED IN. CASING TO FT., THEN IN. CASING TO 'T.
CODING: U.S.C.S. ~ UNIFIEO SOIL 'CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM H.S.A. HOLLOW STEM AUGER A= AUGER S S R SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD 4 UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THINWALL V = VANE SHEAR
E
- c~M! J.ll~ ~
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,CB'i&i%
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'I
nn Power 6 Li ht Co. Gibbs 8 Hill. Inc. GORING No.~
CLIENT I VviFAEERS, DfSIGFEI<$ . COFSST<VCTORS SHEET 2 OF 2 ox s an ROJECT No.
CONTRACTOR 44 547 BORING LOCATION:
J.R. Trude 341 360.75 FOREMAN- DRILLER I'ROJECT NAME aci ities 2 402.84 INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE ELEV.
'~16 '5.
671.00'ATER CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING DRILLING LEVEL 17. 0 9 START FINISH TYPE 83 'ATE SIZE I.D.
~C1NG AFTER'OURS TIME HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs. 140 lbs. BIT CASING DEPTH RVC HAMMER FALL 18" 30" DATE 11/16/83 I
I- SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN.
2 ecnO C2 ON SAMPLER EYE 0 l- ZgbO' (FORCE ON TUBE)
SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS
~~o. EYE Q 2W No vi+~~
CE U cJ cl o BOT. 0 6 6-I2 12-IB 0 FILL '(Yellowish brown fine SAND, trace silt) .
50 1 SS 3.0'7 31 36 40 3.0'eddish and grayish brown fine to 31 coarse SAND and GRAVEL, with small 56 boulders.
70 79 10 110 3 SS 4ls 12. '0 27 27 39
'99 125 4 SS 24 ss 7.0'6 29 31 46 161 20 120 5 SS 20'.7'5 37 46 130 0/2'00 6 SS 24'.0 19 26 31 30 119 30 30 USED IN. CASING TO FT., THEN IN. CASING TO 0'OTES:
'T.
CODING: U.SCS. ~ UNIFIED SOIL CI.ASSIFICATION SYSTEM H.S.A. ~ HOLLOW STEM AUGER A AUGER S S = SPI.IT SPOON SAMPLER UD > UNDISTURBED SAMPLE
' = VANE SHEAR T = THINWALL
C l
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1 S
J' 4
4%
4
Gibbs 8 Hill, Inc. GORING No.~
CLIENT KAY",iEERS (5'QF ESSS, COFG5ZRUCiORS SHEET 2 OF 2 CONTRACTOR 'OJECT No. 4 547 BORING LOCATION:
FOREMAN" ORILI.ER J.R. Trude PROaECT NAMF ac tie INSPECTOR T-C. Shieh LOCATION Berwxck, Pa. SURFACE ELEV.
CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR DRILLING DRILLING WATER LEVEL START FINISH TYPE OATE SIZE LD.
HOURS HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs. 140 lbs. BIT CASING OEPTH HAMMER FALL 18" 30" DATE Z I o cnoo SAMPLE'LOWS PER 6 IN. II Po O X KglL ON SAMPLER P Eh (FORCE ON TUBE)
E5 o cl SOIL OESCRIPTION ANO REMARKS W
UJ UJ QH5 IC vi> )
O 0 EL CO BOT. 0-6 6-l2 I2-IB W ~
30 49 48 Reddish brown fine to coarse SAND and 101 GRAVEL, with small boulders.
120 35 117 8 SS 24'.0 30 29 36 41 137 40 9 SS 24'.0 29 28 40 47 161 10 SS 0" 45.0 50 0 45.0'6.0'"
- BOULDERS 55 46.0 -56.
56.0'ottom of hole 6 56.0'y NOTES: USED IN. CASING TO FT~ THEN IN. CASING TO 'FT, CODING: U.S.C.S. UNIFIED SOIL CL'ASSIFICATION SYSTEM H.S.A.
~~HOLLOW STEM AUGER A AUGER S S > SPI.IT SPOON SAMPLER UO > UNOISTURBEO SAMPLE T = THINWALL Y = VAHE SHEAR~~
1 RiA.
f i 4
0
Penn. Power & Light Co.'LIENT Gibbe 8 Hill.Inc. BORING No. 6 E4uIFTIIRS DISCGFSf CCS, COSCSTCCVCZOCCS SHEET 1 OF Z CONTRACTOR . ROJECT Ncs, 44 547 BORING LOCATION:
N 41 451.00 FOREMAN - DRILLER J.R. Trude I ROJECT NAME ac'lities E 2 442 450.00 INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Berwick, Pa. SURFACE ELEY.
673-31'ATER CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING DRILLING LEVEL 23 ~ 5 START FINISH TYPE 11~23 83 'ATE SIZE LD.
0 TIME HOURS HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs. 140 lbs. BIT CASING DEPTH HAMMER FALI 18" 30" 11/22/83 11/23/83 CLC I SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN.
Cl I O T <
K coO ON SAMPLER C0 cs cfJ O SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS I I y cc, (FORCE ON TUBE) K ~ C)
CO CF No Q cri> t o I) gcc.
w )
BOT. 0-6 ccc cc cc. 6-l2 I2-IB ccc ~
39 41 0 2M FILI (Dark gray fine to coarse SAND, some crushed stone)'.
50 61 2 SS 24 ss .0'0 51 70 7.0'rownish gray fine to coarse SAND 71 40 with gravel, grading with cobbles and boulders.
46 10 50 110 160 15 80 97 24T 7.0'9 38 47 61 212 177 2
117 135 160 4
179 116 121 130 25.0 PG REC.
30.0'OTES:
USED IN. CASING TO FT., THEN IN. CASING TO 'T.
CODING: U.S.C.E, 'UNIFIEO SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM H.S.A.
~~HOLLOW STEM AUGER A= AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD = UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THINWALL Y = YANK SHEAR~~
~ ~ ~ II ~ ~
~
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ERSRRRWW~
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'aarrraeraaa SHR%88PII~R%RSR5555~
ALLLLMMMMMM AIQI IAAAAAR
. A1%88AAAAAA aarLLMMMMMM AISIEAAAAAA ARRILAAAAAA aararAAAAAA AararAAAAAA MEE&HLHK~SQRKIEKKR QLQQIRRAHKRES WQQQR&&MMMM
&RRS IA&AAAA ARRLIAAAAAA ALOLLWRAAAA ALRLLMAAAMR AISiRIAAAAAW AIXIIAAAAAA
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Penn. Power G Light Co. Gibbs 8 Hill,inc; SORIIIG No.~
CLIENT f4GINEE RS. OC 5IGFGC RS, CODES'CRIICTORS SHEET 1 OF 2 s an ROJECT Nos BORING LOCATION:
CONTRACTOR 44 547 FOREMAN- DRILI ER J.R. Trude PROJECT NAME ac itic 442 450.00 INSPECTOR T.C. Shieh LOCATION Bezwick, Pa. SURFACE ELEV.
672.55'RILLING CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING WATER LEVEL 28 START FINISH TYPE 1~122/83 6'AT E SIZE I.D.
0 TIME HOURS 300 lbs. 140 lbs.
CASING DEPTH HAMMER W.T.
HAMMER FAI I 18n 30n BIT DATE 11/21/83 'l/22/83 X I O
SAMPLE BLOWS PER 6 IN. MI0 I CO O
>cnO ON SAMPLER & IS SOIL DESCRIPTION AND REMARKS I K QIZ IAI O CI)
IFI O (FORCE ON TUBE)
IAI III II.
g CJ IEI CL I BOT. 0-6 6-I2 l2-IB CO
)
37 SS 8" PILL (Reddish brown a Dark gray medium 60 1.5'.0'7 to coarse SAND and CINDERS trace crushed stone.
00 21 On 0/0'0 Grading with boulders.
S 27 90 12 9.0'ellowish brown silty fine SAND with 10 some crushed stone.
2 Grading with small boulders between SS 4n 2.0' 5 23.0'.
19.5'nd 29 S 24 7.0' 3 25
~ 31'0
'70 SS 2n 0.2'0/2
~
115 23.0'eddish brown medium to coarse SAND 69 with some gravel, trace fine sand.
27.0 21 30 29 46 101
~
30 lo NOTES: USED COOING:
IN. CASING TO FT., THEN U.SC.S.= UNIFIED SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN. CASING TO 'T.
H.S.A. = HOLLOW STEM AUGER A= AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD = UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THINWALL V = VANE SHEAR
lS Gibbs 8 Hill,Inc. BORING No.
CLIENT I FSGIFGIETES, OjSIGFEE45, COFSST<UCTORS SHEET~OF~
'OJECT CONTRACTOR FOREMAN- DRILLER INSPECTOR J-R- Trude T.C. Shieh PROJECT NAME LOCATION No. 544 547 Berwick, Pa.
a 'ti s BORING LOCATION:
SURFACE EI.EV.
I CASING SAMPLER CORE BAR. DRILLING DRILLING WATER LEVEL START FINISH TYPE DATE SIEE 1.0.
HOURS HAMMER W.T. 300 lbs. 140 lbs. BIT CASING DEPTH 30" DATE HAMMER FALL 18ss X I O
SAMPLE SLOWS PER 6 IN.
l ego Z ala ON SAMPLER SOlL DESCRIPTION AHD REMARKS ut w LL No. S BOT.
(FORCE ON TUBE}
0-6 6-I2 12-18 30 Reddish brown medium to coarse SAND 7 SS 4 Ts 2 0'0 29 37 with some gravel, trace fine sand.
39 33.4s 10 4'6 121 130 141 40 40.0'ark gray SZLTSTONE.
45 0.0' 5 0~ REC. ~ 96 RQD ~ 81 50 50.0'ottom of hole 8 50.0' lo NOTES: USED CODING:
IN. CASING TO FT., THEN U.S.C.S.* UNIFIED SOIL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN. CASING TO 'T.
H.S.A = HOLLOW STEM AUGER A= AUGER S S = SPLIT SPOON SAMPLER UD "- UNDISTURBED SAMPLE T = THINWALL V "-VANE SHEAR
'5 ~
pl.CI
SSFS-PSAR poggoI}gy coJ;vj,go NCgCZ NIQCQR-~~~-"~~
FsgS is designed to a} Supply coolinq water to the RHR puaps and their associated rooa coolers during the several non-emergency andes of RHR puep o'peration such as fuel pool cooljnq, normal shutdovn, and hot standby b) Supply coo)ing vater to the various diesel qenerator heat exchanqors, RHR puaps, rooa coolers RBCCQ and TBCCtr boat exchanqers during eaerqency shutdovn.
condit ions such as a LOCh.
The ESvs pumps are 1ocated in the ESSES purghouse vith the RHPSN pumps ThP RSvS puwphouse is designed as Seisaic Category I and
!he psvs consists of +vn redundant loops. (denoted A and B) each capable of providirq 100 percent of the cooling, va ter required by all t.ho, FSF equipaen! of both Units 1 and 2 siaultaneously. The system is desiqned so that no single active or passive coaponent fai)ure oh)ective.
vill p eron! i! froa achiering its safety related 1'he systes star+s autoaatica)ly on a diesel start signal.
For additional discussion ~ see Subsection 9 2 5
~ l diesel Qeaer~kazs g The four diesel generators are housed in a Seisaic Category I structure. They are separated from each other by concrete valls vhich prov ide o i ssi)e protection. Loss of one diesel genera tor vil) not iwpair the capabilxty to safely shutdovn both units, since .this can be done vi!h three diesel generators. Pgr pddi+iona) djsyusyion> ye~ QbsejtiynJ~3~~14+/> +1~>+~+~j ++++ J>
or lesErkptxons of'he f)diesel Generator Puel Oil'Systea, Ccrolinq Qatar Syst'ea, hir Startinq System Lube Oil'ystem, and the.-
En!ake and Kxha ust Systeas see Subsections 9~5 4, 9.5.5, 9 5;6, 9.5.7, and 9.5. 8 respect ively..
Por aissi)o protection see Subsection 3 5 Separation is discussed in Sections 3 12 and 8 3 'I
~ > "~
Q~ggmia Hgf s$ ng $ $2Kyx Pgx}gl, The spray pond provides the vater for both the ESlfS systea and the RHRSI sy tees. Xt is the ultimate heat sink for both Units 1 and 2. The. return lines froa the ESSES and the BHRSV are cosbined and the total quantity of vater froa both these systees is discharq~d throuah spray netvorks, vhich dissipate the heat hack
~~'85HVjtt 3~ 1-7 1~~
I
f SSES- FS hP f ol ] ovj nq a ) o..s-o f -cool ant accident to assure t ha t core coc ling, y, ma i ntai n~d. Provisions shal] be'ncluded to minimize the probability of losinq electric pover from any of the remaining supplies as a result of., nr coincidont vith, the loss cf povex'generated by th loss of pover from the transmission net vork, oz the loss of pover f rom the onsite electric pover su p plies. A) g)C P Tvo offsite pover transmission systems and four onsite standby diesel qonerato."s vith their associated battery systems are provided. Either of the tvo offsite transmissicn pover syste)Is or any three of the four onsite standby diesel generator systems have sufficient capability" to operate safety related equipment for coolinq .he reactox'ore and maintaininq primary containment
~~~(Agy inteqritv and other accident in one un' vith a safe shutdovn of the other unit.~~
~~ru~az "/c'" mme- m CZa~~> 7 The tvo independent offsite pover systems supply~~
~~')~~~
vital functions in the event of a postulated electric pover to the onsite pover distribution system via the 230 kV transmission arid. Each of t'e offsite pover sources is supplied from a transmission line vhich texminates 'in svitchyards (or Sabstations) not common to the other transmission line. The tvo
'ransmission lines are on separate rights-of-vay. These tvo transmission circuits are physically independent and are designed to miniaiz) the possibility of their simultaneous failure under operatinq and nostulated accident and environment conditions.
Fach ~ffsite pover source can supply all Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses throuqh the associated transformers. Pover is available to the FSF buses from their preferred offsite pover source daring normal operation and from the alternate offsite .
+~p~pover source if the preferred paver is unavailable. '~g Each diesel (Ai+) qenexator supplies standhy pover to one of the four ESP buses in each unit. Loss of both offsite pover sources to an ESF bas results in automatic startinq and connection of the associated yP,P ) i C4 sequentially added to avoid qenexator instabili ties.
~~There are four independent ac load groups provided to assure independence and redundancy of equipment function. These meet the safety r~quirements assuainq a sinqle failure since any three~~
~~-of the four load qroups have sufficient capacity to supply the.~~
minimum loads required to safely shut dovn the unit. Independent nu~inq of the prefer. ed and alternate offsite pover source circuit.. to he FSF buses are provided to meet the single f ailure safety requirements. Rev. 3 1-18
\
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/
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nt her l Y NA NONE NA< N I.uln oi) .cifculatiii I p<tnp+ p /.-. r 5 n nther Nl IfA N nil sc 1 st.l I I I 10 .Il f tlvstcin
~~~ /~~
nlplnn ant valve- fcon dovnn\rca ~ nf ti!i ln'ovlnn ma pfcssor dis- r<.,~5 C ZZZ 3 cha r un t n en llnq v! I ic plpinq/ ~ e rr..r" r>. ~ n , other b31, 1 NA N Cool Inn Itcknt vat<.f hna'ti!r NA other NL Nl Cni!I I!ot Iacket vat<;c hcatcc. put<n e- r< /< C D nt her Nl Nl N N Air 1nt.itn 4 rthao::I piplnq P ) ZZZ-3 1 Y Iovrctit nuf f lees .!nd nvpao!<I tn gni ot ) Dirt V lul.<! oil dr. n t<tnk r~~S '\ NA ntbcr N0Nv NA Ubdllns<.Z< bt I gg)jl jnnjid jl utbbynb
<i dn5 1j,t <I r< nl r01 ..". NCINCN 1~1~ I-rnnt <il coon C Cnnputor Roon IIVAC . /Wntnr.".
J e "cb NA 3 - =NANNA NGI ZCKF.-) t!1/ 323 Ncv. ~ D-~ ~ Refer to th< nun<cat Notes at:the end of this tabLR.
~~"0 ~~ ~ ~~~
~~Prdnc) n 11 1'u! l i! y Cosntruc-CESAR Sour cc. of inca-~~
~~< ~~~
~~1 ilu fi rl.l>>oi.- S<afnty tdon Co<)os and Setsslc Qua) lt I Lsouranc<!~~
~~"bhdi<) a 11 1 j90 f jrv) l l ~b flLf)r Skah<)LI JN fa 1.<<<)Egg Rs~gfgbbbbl ~ !il1'<.1!:~~
!rincina) c.ls poni!ntn ila ~ ) (I) 4 . 12) ~ i3) s (4) 4 . (S) 4 is<) ~ l7) 4 pusn ant nrs, funl nil systes p/Isl/ig O, G,$ 5 NA IREE-32 ')/ 314 Diesel i!cni!r4 turn
~ lrctric1l sndulns v)th <safety P/Pg ri~d~5 N l IREE-387 function>> P/iC G,65 Nl IEER-279/
~~323 Cat le, vlth saf< ty funct lons G~Q5 Nl IREE-279/ p/CA'/C~~
~~') --- 323/3 b3 nicse l fui! l storaqi! tanks I<)c "cl lui<. ol f~yntes plplnq sf n~' IXE-3--.-~~
~~4 nil va 1 vcs P //L. G,~v5 C 531 1 +Heal ear mt seLit vater~~
~~'n) lut<<!~~
hanqc nil 1 wp./<L G,r5' III-7/ TEEL C yll1'ec' ousinns G4rc5 C ) VIII/O l Lu t <! n i 1 hiia 1 r< p/.- r,,c,g NA <!ther NONE NAr huhn oi)-.i-.icculatin<> pusp~ p/ ~ r..-, 5 n nther NL )fi N N ni< sul ss'ls tinq .!i r !systems g nip) ni! .1<i) va) v<inn 1<ii val v< i', nth<!rs 0,45 3'3)~
~
~~p n Other 1,0 Nl Air c i "ivc rr. N~~
~<
P Gr <gS C l 111- 3 1 r rnsnre: Silrn p /!"4 G,4$ n nt)cer NL Nl N 41C)u'1 nill ng V!'1 <r p p i nq r 1 ~ 1 P .other b31 ~ 1 NA N Cool)nil 1.!Ctnl vat 1'ua'tw!r <~ r-r'5 . Nl 4 other NL Nl N Co<!i ini! 1.!eke t va I< r heater, pusn P '. rii cC D nt her NL ill N iu Air f nt.<i<! E shan>>t p) p)nq
>)
Dirty lul,c. oi) 4r 'n tant ries/ !ll other NON+ UCL))0<) ~ .)< 0) ll~ ba Lad dit-- rnid+)jn<<) p~j S u)EIN r<< )) f0) .- NG)<)CR 9~4~ 1 r nn/t<<) pons C Cnsputor Roon IIVAC,.' untorn P 'CS NElll NG1 1 IREE-344/
/g.. 323 no v ~ n 7!<ut ~ Refer to ths <'<n<'ral Noses at the en4 nf this table.
Y t~ik SSVS-FSAR TABI,E 3.2-! !Continued) Pa e 22 Pr inc I) a 1 equality Construc-Sour" >> Group tion Quali'ty
'assi- '5) '6) !'SAR of Lc ca- Sa fete Codes and Seismic Assurance fication Sec lo l ~i tion '3) Class Standards Ca tecLo~r uvres'ent Comments -'lle ~Su Price:"a! Cc mporen .- I3'~) I2) ~ Il) '
ot ist err u..c nta'tlon Associated v ti Piteous Iles::ireir ior~sfi. '.6 Spent fuel pcolang coolsng s:.stem R :In IEEE-274 I Fuel handling area ventilation isolatxon system P R NA IEEE 279 I Y Control room panels P CS NA IEEE-279 I Y ccal instrument racks assoc atcd vith safety reaaced ecuipment ALL Nn IEEE-279 I Instrumentation Associated with
'stems ot Re uvre or Sa et ~ ~ 7 Seismtc instrumentation P ALI NA Other Nh I brea radiation monitorirg P ALL Nh other Nh Nh
.Leak Detection Znstrumentatior. Temperature elemen s GE C,R,T Nh 2 IEEE-323 I Y 39 Differential temperature switch GE C,A Nh ~ 2 IREE-323, I Y 39 Differertial flo~ indicator GE CS NA' IEEE-323 I Y 39 Pressure switch CE C,R HA 2 IEEE-323 I Y, 39 Differential pressure indicator smitch GE CS NA IEEE-323 Y 39 Di f ferential f lo~ sunimer GE CS Nh IEEE-323 Y 39 Process Radiation Nonitors Electrical modules, main steam line and reactbr building ventilation'monitor GE A Nh IEEE-323 I= Cable. mqln stcam line and reactor bui lding vent I la I ron moni tors P R IEEE-279/ Hh 15m 323/383 P
~
~~Electric S stems Kn ineered Safet Features AC~~
~~~ill IIIIIlit 8.3 + e~~
~~4. 16 kv switchgear P/$ /I QO!45 HA IEEE-308/ I 323/344~~
~~/BID Rev. ~+RH- Aefer to the Ceneral Notes at the end of this table,~~
SSES-FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued) Pa e 23 Principal Quality Construc-Source Group tion Quality Principal V Components load centers (34 ~ ) FSAR Section
~~- of ~no P ~t P~~
~~Loca-tion Classics fication 12)'3)'4)'5)~~
~
~~7" 4 HA Safety Class Codes and Standards~~
~~'6)~~
~~IREE-308/ Seismic~~
~~~Ceto I~~
~~or a Assurance~~
~~~ne otrsnent (7)~~
Y
'80 Coementn 323/344 480 V motor control centers 4,g,Kv'- <a~'! )/,w)ssojfv/.'-/z. - ":: ): /PS/'njS! SA //jj) 2 IEEE/308/
~~323/344 I Y~~
.2 En ineered Safet Features DC ~Eaux ment 8.3 125 V and 250 V station batteries and rocks, battery chargers P CS/$ 5 NA IEEE-308/ I 323/344 125 V s)"itchgear and distribution panels ~a a~ P/4aI CS )l5 HA 2 IEEE-308/- I ]j)5 V Mayajf. Cou7gnL CC /P-/A-D/S E 2 323/344 120 V Vital AC S stem E ui ment 8.3 Static inver ters CS NA I EEE" 308/ NA 323/344 120 V distribution panels CS,R NA IEEE-308/ I 323/344 Electric Cables for ESF E ui men.3 5 kV poR)er cables P/ 4H ALL NA 2. IEEE-323/ NA 15 383 600 V power cables ALL HA IEEE-323/ NA 15 383 Control and instrumentation cables ~
P )S// ALL HA IEEE-323/ Nh 15 383 Ni,scellaneous Electrical P rimary containment building electrical penetration assemblies P C NA IEEE-317/ I 344/383 Conduit supports, safety related P) $ // ALL Nh 2 IREE-344 I Y 15 ~gg Emergency Tray supports> safety related P) /m)H ALL HA 2 IEEE-344 - I Y 15 lighting systems P))5// ALL Nh 2 IEEE-344 I Y Emergency communications systems P))5// ALL' Nh Other NONE Nh H I
=
Diesel generator PL G)45 Hh 2 IEEE"387 77~/5f EP Pr)/-'l-L5 DP 05 Nh ? mrs/." Jzf/344/X Y
~~~}~ /qg r~~
~~A jojJ Cj!/u~g upE'~+w~~
~~'p'ev. 'efer <s 4/A 2 +ECd 823/Jff X to the Geperal Notes at the end of this table~~
~~SSES-FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued) Pa e,26 Principal Quality Construc-~~
'eismicor'uality Source Group tion -FSAR of Loca- Classi- Safety Codes and Assurance Section ~Su ~1 tion fication Class Standards C~ar.e ~ne nirement Comments Principal. Components (34') (1)" (2) * (3)" (4) * (5) (6) (7)
Water Hakeu S stem 9.2.9 'emineralized Tanks CW D Other VIII-1 NA Pumps CW D 0 her 831.1.0/ NA 24 Nyd.I Motors CW Other NEMA MG1 Piping and valves ALL Other 831.1.0 ~Bnildin Reactor Building ACI/AISC Pressure resistant doors ASTH/AWS AISC Watertight door R 8 ASTH/AWS NA Y R. B. Equipment door R 8 ASTH/AWS NA Y Primary Containment C 8 ACI/AISC/ III I Y 27,30 Access hatchesjlocks/doors P C 8 2 III-HC I Y Liner plate P C 8, 2 III-MC I Y Penetration assemblies P C 8 2 III-HC I Y 29 Vacuum relief valves P C 8 2 III-2 I Y Downcomers Bracing P C 8 2 III-2 I Y 44 Downcomer Diesel generator building P C 8 2 AISC I Y Control structure P G NA 2 ACI/AISC I Y Radwaste and offgas building P CS NA 2 ACI/AISC I Y P RW, NA Other ACI/AISC NA N 22 Turbine building P T NA Other ACI/AISC NA N 21 Administration building P 0 NA Other ACI/AISC NA N Circulating water pump house P 0 NA Other ACI/AISC NA N ESSW Low pumphouse Level Radwaste Molding Facility P 0 NA 3 ACI/AISC I Y~ P 0 NA Other ACI/AISC/ NA N D IE.S 6L Cj 6t46RAToR 'E. ~l<&44 ~RH NA UBC Structures Dc'e,',CS,G At:yqrcd. Roof Scuppers and Parapet Openings NA 2 ACI/AISC NA Y Spray pond a Emergency Spillway Condensate storage tank 0 NA 3 AC I I Y 0 D Other D100 NA N Spent fuel pool R NA 2 ACI/AISC I Y Spent fuel pool liner R NA 2 ACI/AISC I Y Refueling water storage tank 0 D Other D100 NA N Pipe Whip Restraints R,C NA 3 AISC I Y Rev. 35, 07/84
~~Refer to the General Notes at the end of this table.~~
SSES-PSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued) Pa e 27 Principal Quality Construc-Source Group tion Qual,ity PS: .. of . Loca- Classi- Safety Codes and Seismic Assurance tion fication Class Principal Components (34"> Section ~Su (1) '2) '3) i~i
* (4)
Standard (5)

C~ate or (6)

r
~~~ae (7) nirement Comments Hissile Barriers for safety related equipment C,R, NA 0 her ACI/AISC I CS,SH, G~~
Biological shielding within Primary containment, reactor Building and control bui.lding C,R, NA Other ACI/AISC CS Safety related masonry walls R,G, NA Other ACI/UBC CS Rev. 35, 07/84 Refer to the General Notes at, the end of this table.
~ ~ SSES-FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 SSES DESIGN CRITERIA
~~SUMMARY~~
~~(Continued) Pa e 29 General Notes and Comments~~
1) GE ~ General Electric PL ~ Pennsylvania Power a Light p ~ Bechtel as agents for Pennsylvania Power a Light NA ~ Not Applicable gy =yegg(euyncs A ws~rs rc see comments P~syc.~~a P~~aa g u+gp

2) Location C Part of or within primary containment R Reactor Building T Turbine Building CS Control Structure Radwaste and Offgas Building g)g G gQ Diesel Generators)Building Intake Structure.
Administration Building CW Circulating Water Pumphouse . SW Engineering Safeguards Service Water (ESSW) Pumphouse CA Chlorine and Acid Storage Building 0 Outdoors. Onsite, pied/l. 4hdDCA A,B,C,D - Quality group classification as defined in 7'3) Regulatory Guide 1.26. The equipment shall be constructed in accordance with codes listed in Tables 3.2-2, 3.2-3, and 3.2-4. NA - Not applicable to quality group classification
~~4) l,2,3,4, other = safety classes defined in ANSI-N212 and Section 3.2.3.~~
NA - Not applicable to safety classification
SSES-FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 SSES DESIGN CRITERIA
~~SUMMARY~~
~~(Continued) Pa e 29 General Notes and Comments~~
1) GE = General Electric PL = Pennsylvania Power & Light, P = Bechtel as agents for Pennsylvania Power & Light QINtH = Gi&SSA HiLL, Mc. Ii >r u rr NA = Not Applicable, see comments

2) Location C Part of or within primary containment R Reactor Building T Turbine Building CS Control Structure RW Radwaste and Offgas Building G Diesel Generator Building Dq'a , Dias~~ 4 ~weRAvoR '6,'
Intake Structure A Administration Building CW Circulating Water Pumphouse SW Engineering Safeguards Service Water (ESSW) Pumphouse CA Chlorine and Acid Storage Building 0 Outdoors, Onsite
3) A,B,C,D - Quality group classification as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.26. The equipment shall be constructed in accordance with codes listed in Tables 3.2-2, 3.2-3, and 3.2-4, NA - Not applicable to quality group classification

4) 1,2,3,4, other = safety classes defined in ANSI-N212 and Section 3.2.3.
NA - Not applicable to safety classification Rev. 35, 07/84
'I 0 4
SS>S-FSAP 3 ~ 3 QT "ID AFD TORNADO LOAO~RGS 3 3 " VT ND OA T89 DX~1GS All exposeR structures are designed for mind loading. 3.').1 1 Des'~KG ad Valor +v f The design vind velocity for all structures is 80 mph at 30 ft above qroard for a 100-year recurrence inte"val. The Resign vin9 velocity 's baseR on Figure 5 of Reference 3.3-1. (Refe ences are 1'sted in Subsection 3. 3. 3) . The vertical velocity distribution is baseR on Table 1(a) of Reference'.3-2. The veloci y distribat'on is tabalated in Table 3 ~ 3-1 A qust factor of as given in Peference 3.3-2, is u. oR. ~he procedu"e used to transform the wind velocity into an effective pressure apolied to exposeR surfaces of structures is as Rescribed in Peference 3.3-2 and 's summarizeR as follovs: The dynamic pressu e is given by: cr = 0.002558 V~ vhere, a = Dynamic p essa" e in psf V = Rind velocity in mph (desiqn wind velocity x gust Lac' ~ The local pressure at any point on the sar face of a building is .qual to: g x Cp where Cn = pressure coefficient Re v. 35 ~ 07/80 3 ~ 3
SS ZS-FSaR
~~. he .otal pressure on a building is equal +o:~~
q xCD whe e, CD - ~ Shape coef ficient. The Susquehanna SES structures have sloping roofs with a pitch less than 20 degrees. The followinq are values for Cp and C (See Reference 3. 3-2 ~ p. 1151 and Piqure 7) Cp for windward wall ~ 0.8 (pressure) Cp for leeward wall ~ -0. 5 (suction) Cp for windward slope = 0 ' Cp for Leeward slope ~ -0.6 (suction) C D
~~~ 1.3 (pressure) .~~
~~wind loads on structures are tabulated in'able 3.3-1 Exposed tanks are designed to resist a minimum wind Load of 30 psf on the vertical pro1ection based on Reference 3 3-3. For~~
~
cvlindricaL tariks, wind is considered acting on six-tenths of the v rtical nro1ection. Vo increases in allovanle vorking stresses are permitted for these structures for Loading conditions involvinq wind. 3~/~/ TOQNQDO LOAQENGQ Table 3.3-2 lists the sYstems that are protected against tornadoes and the enclosures which provide this protection. table is based on NRC RegulatorY Guide 1.11'7 (Reference 3-3-4)This 3 3*3~ . hPPliQRbke QeMKRQ Rather+> Xs The following design parameters are used for the design of tornado-resistant structures and are based on Reference 3.3-5: a) ~~ic Fjord Qgg5i)Lg (FoR S 7'R,ucyv Res GEHERR7oR ~f o7'HeR, 1'HAH 8 tlirt g) IM g ) bIeseL Tangential speed: 300 mph Translational speed: '0 mph Rev ~ 35, 07/84 3~ 3 2
SSZS-PSAR b) Pressare Differential Between the Znside and Ogtsgde of g Buigggng Q FoR >l'RocTOR6S OTHBg THAW 5g<sRA A pressure drop, of 3 psi. at the rate of 1 psi p r second. Msgr c) oggaQo-Qggega ting Qgg.ig'~eg These are discussed in Subsection 3.5.1.4. I a7'<> g.Q.g~p Qeteggi))gtggg~f Zogr2s og Stgucfureg The follovinq procedures are used to transform the tornado loadinqs into effective loads on structures: a) Dgngmgc wound J,o~dggg A procedure the same as the one utilized to transform the wind velocity into an effective pressure, as described in Subsection 3.3. 1.2, is used vith .he f ollowinq exceptions:
1) Velocity and velocity pressure are assumed not to vary vith height.

2) -
The gast factor is taken as unity. As shovn in Figure 5 of Reference 3.3-5, and as explained therein, the equivalent anif orm tornado wind velocity on the building due to a tangential component of 300 mph and a translational component. of 60 mph is 220 mph. On Susquehanna SES the pr ssu e loads are calculated on the basis of a uniform 300 mph wind velocity and are as followss pyg Sygdc peg,Eg o7HER, ESEL +EN ER AToN'O'QILDINq. 7ahH') Mindwa d p'ressure on walls: 185 sf I Ei 8 Leeward suction on valls: 115 psf l66 pc/ Total design pressure: 300 psf gyp @ST Suction (uplift) on roof: 140 psf. I90 ~~/
~~<The turbine building is designed to resist the tornado loadinq assaminq 2/3 of the metal siding and the roof deck being blown away. However, all the frames are designed for the full tornado loadinq.~~
The metal siding and'he roof deck of all s.ructares are not designed to resist full tornado loading.< Rev. 35, 07/84 3 3-3
b) Dgff~geggj al >ges~ug~ pressure loading
~~~odin'ifferential is calculated using the folloving pressure-time function:~~
The differential pressure is assumed to vary from zero to 3 psi at the rate of 1 psi/sec, remain at 3 psi for 2 seconds and then return to zero at 1 psi/sec. r lN~< <T +
~~~ / Blowout panels are used as necessary on safety related structures to minimize differential pressure.~~
c) ~o MQQ-game ~~ 54ggQSs Tornado-generated missiles are classified as iven in Table&3 5-4AHpThe barrier design procedures are described'n Subsection 3.5. Z'. Load'ngs a), b), and c) are combined in the following manner to obtain the total tornado loading: Cii) Q~ ~ Vp (iii) V~ = ffm (iv) Wv+0. 5Rp (v) W~ = Qv+Qm (vi) R~ ~ Rv+0.5Qp+Wm where, Total tornado load Ww ~ Tornado vind load Rp = Tornado differential pressure load, and Mm ~ Tornado missile load 3.3.2 3 Effect of Failure of Structures or Components Not De2493ei foX <<RMQo <MCR Structures not designed for tornado loads 'a"e checked to ensure that during a tornado they vill not generate missiles that have more severe effects than those listed in Table 3.5-4. Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 3-4
SS ES-FS AR E The modes of failure of these structures are analyzeR to verify that they vill not collapse on safety related structures. 3 3 ~Q R g~B~C~S 3 3-1. H.C.S. Thos, >>Nev Distributions of Extreme Rinds in the United States", gouryag of the S~tuctugal giyision, ASCE, (July 1968} ~ pp 1787 ~
~~3. 3-2 >>Rind Forces on Structures", 3269, Transactions, Volume 126, Part II Paper ASCZ No.~~
(196 1), p 1124. 3~3 3 ~ "Steel Tanks, Standpipes, Reservoir, and Elevated Tanks for Rater Storage>>, AWRA Standard, 0100-73. 3.3-4 ~ "Tornado Design Classification>>, US NRC Regulatory Guide
~~, 1. 117, (June 1976) .~~
~~3. 3-5. J.A. Dunlap and Karl Riedner, "Nuclear Pover Plant Tornado Design Considerations",Journal of the Pover Division, ASCE, (Aarch 1971) .~~
Rev. 35, 07/84 3~ 3-5
I!I I l H 1'
d) Dynamic eland loading (for Diesel Generator 'E'uilding) .
~~'Tangential Speed: 360 mph Translationa L Speed: 70 mph ') >'"<ssul. ~ 1 ~ ~ ~~~
~~g .,I'" ~~~
". 'v'ni '.,i ~ ',";l,':.*;'n 1;ho insit!c And outside 0,'. dies +1 genera tor ' 'uilding. 3 A pressure drop of 3 psi at the rate of 2 psi per second.
~~INSERT ' differential pressure is assumed~~
'he to vary from zero to 3 psi at the rate of 2 psi/sec, remain at 3 psi for 2 seconds and then return to zero at 2 psi/second. (p~ p~sssL, gagaRhTog 'c'ulL.Dlgg)
~, SSES'"FSAR TABLE 3.3-2 TORNADO WIND PROTECTED SYSTEMS AND TORNADO RESISTANT ENCLOSURES (Pg. l of 2) Protected S stem Tornado Resistant Enclosure Reactor coolant pressure Reactor Building boundary Reactor core and reactor Reactor Building vessel internals I
3. Systems or portions of systems required for a) Reactor shutdown Reactor Building b) Residual Heat Reactor Building Removal c) Cooling the spent Reactor Building fuel storage pool d) Makeup water for Reactor Building primary system e) Systems necessary to ESSW Pumphouse and Reactor support service Building water, cooling water source, and component cooling

4. Reactivity control Reactor Building and Control systems Building

5. Control room Control Building

6. Monitoiing, actuating, Reactor Building and and operating systems Control Building important to safety

7. Electric and mechanical Reactor Building, Diesel devices and circuitry Generator Building, and ESSW between the process Pumphouse sensors and the input Cg terminals of the g galEAA7~
actuator systems involved in generating signals SIP(LD l~8t that initiate protective action Rev. 35, 07/84
~, SSES-FSAR TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued) (Pg. 2 of 2) Protected S stem Tornado Resistant Enclosure
8. Long-term emergency Reactor Building, Diesel core cooling system Generator Building, and ESSW Pumphouse pjgZEL g~4f+~7o8 6 uIc. A(44 Class 1E electric All Seismic Category I systems structures
.Rev. 35, 07/84
SSP.S-FSAR 3~4 MATjQ LgVQL ggLOODQ DESIGN As discus,ed in Section 2. 4, all Seismic Category I structures sncuro against floodinq due >o probable maximum flood (PNF) of the Susauc hanna River or probable maximum precipitation (PNP) on the area surroundinq the plant. Therefore, special flood protec+ion measures are unnecessary. The Seismic Cateqory I structures have, how~ver, been desiqned for hydrostatic loads resulting f=om groundwater, as discussed in Section 3.8. The groundwater table is at elevation 665 NSL in the main plant area. A oostulated break in the cooling tower basins cr of the water delivery pinos +o the basin could result in a build-up of water against the walls of either o" both of the ESSM pumphouse and the
+urbine building. In the event of such water build-up breaching the turbine buildinq wall, water that would not be intercepted hy the floor drains or qrilles and thus would flow through +he turbine bui'.ding to +he reactor building would be prevented from endangering eguipmen+ in the latter by means of watertiqht doors.
Flood water h>>ildinq up against the ESSM pumphouse would also be prevented from entering the huildinq by means of watertight doors. Impact forces and water pressure due to flood water will not endanger the integrity of the ESSM pumphouse. All safe~y-related systems are located in the Reactoz Building Diesel Generator Building, Control Structure and the Engineered Safequard S~rvice Mater (ESSM) Pumphouse p~gggg, gggggpfyg BASIL& Sufficient physical separation between these buildinqs is provided to preven+ internal spreadinq of any floods from one building to another. Redundant Engineered Safety Features, pumps and drives, heat e xchangers and associated pipes, valves and instrumentation in the react or bui'ding subject to potential flccding, are housed in separate watertiqht rooms, with the excep+ion of HPCI and RCIC rooms in (tnit 2. Seismic Cateqory I level detectors trip alarms in, the -. in conir.=l room when "'.!:e water level in any room exceeds the set point. Isolation of the floor drainage lines f rom these rooms is provided by outsid'e manual valves. All other rooms in +he reactor building and control struc+ure containinq safety related equipment which are subject to potential floodinq by process fluid leakage or fire protection water are provided with at least one open floor drain. Floods in excess of the approximately RO qpm fleer drain capacity increase t h~ water level in the affected area and are released through th~ door-to-floor clearance of these rocms.
~~3. 4-1~~
SSES-PSAR Refer to Subsection 9.3.3 for a detailed description of the reactor building. and control structure drainaqe system. The four diesel generator sets are housed in individual vater tiqht compartments within the diesel generator building. Ploor drain line hranches from each of these compartments are equipped with check valves to prevent backfloodinq from the common sump. The ESS'R pumphouse is divided into tvo redundant compartments, Ploodinq from internal leakaqe would, therefore, only affect one of t.he redundant pump sets. The control and electrical panels are mounted nn minimum 4 inch high concrete pads or structural supports. nperatinq floor openings allov drainaqe of any leakaqe to the ESSV pump suction space belov or to a reserve sump space that could be emptied vit.h a portahle pump. The HPCT and RCXC rooms in Unit 2 are interconnected through a vent plenum vhich leads to the common blowout panel. Ploodinq in either room could potentially spill over to the other via the vent path. The ven. path is 10'-8" above the floor. A'oderate enerqy pipe break in each room has been postulated and analyzed in consi. tonce with BTP APCSB3-1. It is conservat ively estimated, without taking credit for floor drain capacity, that it vill take approximately 13'ours for the maximum moderate energy. pipe crack leakage in the RCZC room to overflov into the HPCI room, and 5 hours from HPCI room to RCIC room. The maximum moderate, o.nerqy pipe crack leakage that cannot be isolated from outside these. pump rooms vill take approximately 23 hours to overflow from RCIC room to the HPCI room and 6 hours to overflow from HPCX room to RCZC room. There is sufficient time 'to identify the pipe failure and take appropriate action to mitigate the consequence of pipe failure prior to overflew occurred hetveen these tvo interconnected rooms.
/N 7//S 9SZ nF b/SS~/. Cr~rR A 7o 4 E F u//-4/ /4 fCOOL +0 4/45 . 4 y'L ~ Cgg - g 4g f Eg 4l/pPZD HIT// CACO@ VAL 7o pR ~ ~sup Sic/ AoobA/g FRohf T~f ~o//b/44'~MP. Age FZoo4t oF 7p f 4/CSEE 6EH<Rh 7OQ E 5U/Cp///$ WA'/C'ff A8F +~@<+ 7 ~o Po7<N7/aL Face J /4P SP'/Rf PA7sc7/ok At~7~<
QI7// +Cook +RA IAIS, Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 4-2
SSES-FShR cgg@eXggal hiXgLgft, Tn V-232 18 ~ 000 movements x 0 12 x 10-< ~/mi~ x ~ 04 mi~
~~.Oq x 10-6 per year.~~
~~Tn V-106 . 3,000 movements x 1.9 x 10-<</mim x .04 mi~~~
~~.23 x 10-8 oer year.~~
The sum of these event probabilities at the Susquehanna SES site is about 9. 3 x 10-6. 5~31 Qisggle ggotegtjon Qesggn gQgggsoghg Systems that are reviewed-for missile protection are listed in Subsection I.12.2. For into.ma lly qenerated missiles, protection is provided through basic station component arranqement so that, occurs, +he missile does not cause the failure of a Seismic if equipment failure Cateqory I structure or any safety related system. Where it is impossible to provide .protection through station layout, suitable physical ba rrie s are provided whose function is either to isolate the missile or to shield the critical system or Zn addition, redundant Seismic Category I component 'omponent.
~
are suitably protected so that a single missile cannot 'simultaneo>>sly damage a critical component and its backup system. 3~5.2~) S'guet>>~es Degiggegd to Miggstagd /lissy le Effects Seismic Ca oqo. y I structures are desiqned to withstand postulated external or internal missiles which may imoac+ tho.m. Tahle -'-2 is a iist of the structures designed to withstand external tornado generated missiles, and the safety related equipment which they protect. The missiles are listed in TableS 3-5-4aNp 8.5'-4o, P SIv~~ o~ g~~~
~~,.3 t. 5 3 &Not 0 hc D t cscA.~~
~~OARPIE> DESIGNL 2PROCPDURES the~ 3)jag g~~ftrv' ~((. y (gq v~ 'E.'et4ldQ~~
~~.he structures and barriers are designed in accordance with the procedures deta'ed in Reference 3.5-5. The procedures include:~~
Rev. 35, 07/84 3 '-33
SSES-FS AR a) Prediction of local damaqe (penetration, perforation, and spallinq) in the impact area including estimation of the depth of penetration
~~) ) Fstimation of barrier thickness required to prevent - perforation c) Prediction of the overall structural response of thi barrier and portions thereof to missile impact.~~
Tho use of a duct'lity ratio hiqher than 10 but less than the allowables qiven in Reference 3.5.5 will be qoverned by the fol3 cwinq conditions: (1) Reinforced concrete barriers The allowable displacement of reinforced concre"e flexure members can be based on an upper limit for plastic hinqe rotation r6as follows: d r& = 0.0065 < 0.07 where d = distance from compression face to centroid of tensile steel reinforcement (inch) c = distance from compression face to the neutral axis at strenqth (inch) ~'ltimate This condition is qiven in section C .5 of Appendix C and comm ntary to Appendix C of ACI 349 g> (2) St~el bar"iers Tc ins>>re the a bi 1ity of a steel beam to sustain f ul).y plastic behavior and thus to possess the assumed d>>ctility at nlastic hinqe formation, it is necessary that the elements of the beam section meet minimum
~~>hickn=ss renuirements sufficient to prevent local hucklinq failure.~~
The conditions to preclude local buckling as given in AI~C manual are satisfied. Rev. 35, 07/84 3 5-34
SSES-FSAR 3~~/ ~EfgRQPCgg
3. 5-1. GF Nemo Report "Hypothetical Turbine Nissile Data-38, inch Last Stage Bucket Units<<(Narch f6, f 973) .

3. 5-2. GE Nemo Report "Hypothetical Turbine Nissiles - General Discussion>> (Narch 13, 1973) .

3. 5-3. GE Nemo Report "Hypothetical Turbine Nissiles Probability of Occurrence" (Narch 14, 1973).
~~3 5-4 D.C. Gonyea, "An Analysis of the Energy of Hypothetical wheel Nissiles Escapinq from Turbine Casinqs", GE Technical Information Series No. DP73SL12 (February 1973).~~
~~3. 5-5. <<Desiqn of Structures for Missile Impact<<, BC-TOP-9A, Rev. 2, Bechtel Pover Corporation, San Francisco, California (September 1974) .~~
3~ 5" 6. U.S. Army, "Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions>, Dept. of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, (1969) . 3 ~ 5-7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, <<Standard Reviev Plan Section 3.5.1.6<<, NUREG-751087, (24 Nov. 1975) . 3 5-8 Solomon, K.A., "Hazards Associated vith Aircraft and Nissiles>>, presented at American and Canadian Nuclear Society Neetinq, Toronto, Canada, (June, 1976) .
~~3. 5-9 Solomon, K. A., "Estimate of probability that an Aircraft vill impact the PVNGS", NUS-1416, NUS Corp.,~~
~~(June 1975) .~~
3. 5-10 National Air Transportation Safety Board, >>Annual Peviev vf: Aircraf t Accident Data", Published 1972 and annually thereafter.

3. 5-11 Chelapati, C. V., Kennedy, R ~ P., and Sall, I. B.
~~bilistic~~
~
~~Proba Assessment of Aircra f t Hazard f or Nuclear Pover Plants, Nuc. Eng. Design 19,336 (1972) .~~
3. 5-12 Barber, R. B., Steep goggCgngggfe Sggb Impact Teyt ggggeggme n+gg Sggg],afford), Bec hte1 Co r p., (Oc to ber, 1973)

3. 5-13 Vasallo, F. A., fissile Intact gestjng of gej,ngorced
~~.Concge+e panels, Prepared for Bechtel Corp., Calspan Corp., (January, 1975)-~~
Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 5-35
SSES-FSAB 3~ 5-14 National Defense Beseatch Coaait tee, gffecgN of~ffact add ggglosion, Suleary .echnical Report of Division 1, Washington, DC, 1946 2,'olume
~~3. 5-15 Gvalt net', R. C. ~ Qisggle Gegez;agio'ad ggcgyction ig~~
~~. LgQhg-Wates;-Cog],ed Pgvgg~eyggogg, ORNL NSIC-22, Oak R idge Hat ional Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for t he rr.s. A. z.c., (sept caber, 1968) .~~
~~05. hlOCL 8 A R. BEAU LA ToR'tf CoW<<SS>d<~~
~~~7AHQAkg Review Pt.AH 3-5 I '+ ~<v ~ ~ ~~~
~~NDNECa,- oSoo ( JuaY lDBl) 3 5'-l7 V.g.,NuC ~eAR Roc UL,AToay go Hhh I SS(od V~~
~~~TMDARD 8KV) <N PLAQ 3.F. Rev. I gV ff Ct - OSOo ( tv hM ip8i)~~
Bev. 35, 07/84 3 '-36
TABLE 3. 5-4a Tornado-Generated Missile Parameters for Diesel Generator 'E'uilding. T!tl j > s I s ~ t
~~!>4~ s 1/'1 t 1 1 ~ 1 11issi ie (lb}~~
A) Wood plank, 4 in. v 12 in. x 12 ft., traveling end-on 108 440 B) Steel pipe, 3 in. dia., Schedule 40, 10 ft. long, traveling end-on 72 147 C} Steel pipe, 6 in. dia., Schedule 40, 15 ft. long 285 170 in. dia., D) E) Steel pipe,
~~~H C Oua.a 4o, 12 Steel rod l-a.nch dia.~~
x 3 ft. long 750 8'55 317 F) Automobile flying through the air at not more than 25 ft. above the ground and having contact area of 20 sq. .'t. 4000 195 G) Utility pole 13.5 in. dia, 35 ft. long 1490 211 Note: Tho vcr".ical:~toes ties i~s l.l '.~1~ const."'.ered oa::al to 80:~~~! cen" the ho 1 zon tag i~ 1 oci ties me'o'L Oned above .
SSES-PS AR P7 XENIX 3~5=4
~~.TORNADO-GENERATED EMISSILE P AR AN ET ERS /gag GYROS ft3g GS 0 TH 6 R THhH Dies EL geweRAT og. P QuJgy~~q)~~
~~Alber. Hi~sile Meiqht Ve loc it y~~
~~/mphil Mood plank, 4 in. r 12 in. r 12 ft, traveling end-on 108 300 Steel pipe, 3 in. dia.,~~
Schedule 40, 10 ft long, travelinq end-on 100 Automobile flyinq through the air at not sore than 25 ft above the qround and having contact area of 20 sq ft. 4000 Steel rod 1-inch diameter x 3 feet long 216 Dtility pole 13-1/2 inch diameter, 35 feet long actinq not more than 30 feet above the qround 1490 144'OTE The vertical velocities will be considered equal to 80% of the horizontal velocities mentioned above. Bev. 35, 07/84
0 0
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~~'I/ 1 2~~
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~
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I W tfl>>fe ON ~ If M>>4 e>>f I Rev. 35, 07/84 SUSCUEHANNA STEAN ELECTAIC STATION UNITS I ANP 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS AE. ORT G 'KRAL ARRANCESan A'VD PATROL ROAD tee FICUAE 3. 5-8
'i e
SSES-FSAR
~~$ ~7b SEISMIC QESZGQ ~~~
This section descri.bes the seismic design requi.rements and methods used for Susquehanna SES and the seismic design and analysis of non-hSSS equipment Seismic desiqn of NSSS equipment is described in Section 3.7a. XL ~ ~M-'y,~ II e
=~ ~ ~ ' 7b. SEI S.'fIC INPUT p 1 We 3 7h.1. 4 Desian Rosaonse 'Spectra fcccc o i Xi(ccc Pcc .)r ";, ~ gpf~i c
~~n > ~ ~qb-N5i~~
~~. ~~~
j. pc The site design response spectra for rock founded structuresAare illustrated on Fiqures 3.7b-1. and 3.7b-2 for the horizontal components of the Operatinq Basis Earthquake (OBZ) and Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) respectively. e esxgn earthquake is a sumed to be the. free field .motion at the base mat of the structure without the effect of the structure. For all seismic Category I structure founded on rock the horizontal ground ..
~~acceleration values are 5 and 10 percent of gravity for OBE and SSE respectively (refer to Subsections 2.5.2.6 and 2.5.2.7) .~~
~~However, Seismic Category I structures founded on soil, and the spray pond have been desiqned for ground accelerations of 8 percent (OBE) .;and 15 percent (SSE) of qravity. The maximum~~
~~'qround displacement is taken proportional to. the maximum ground . acceleration 1.0.qravitv.~~
~~and. I is '~~
~~~3/ i'(4 set. a't 40 in~ for a ground acceleration of Dg a /~le)~~
The base diaqra'm of all desiqn spectra consists of three parts: '. the maximum qround acceleration line on the left part, the maximum q ound displacement line on the right part, and the middle part depends on the maximum pseudo-velocity.
~~'j For various damping values, the numerical 'values of design displacements and accelerations for the horizontal component .~~
~~desiqn response spectra are obtained by multiplying the values of etc the maximum qround displacement and acceleration by thy,~~
~~~'+ v~ ~~~
~~correspondi >g factors given in Table. 3.7b-1. Mc ja~~
~~~~ ~~<y>~ >4 < P"~~'~~
P~lM e The acceleration lin~s of the esign response spectra are drawn q parallel to the maximum qround acceleration line between the frequency lines of 6.67 cps (control point B of Figures 3.7b-1 and 3.7b-2) and 2 cps (control point C) . The acceleration lines converqe at .the )unction of the maximum qrcund acceleration line and the 33 cps frequency line (control point h) . For frequencies higher than 33 cps, the maximum qround acceleration line represents tbe desiqn response spectra. The displacement lines '*:- Rev. 35, 07/84 g& f~lP ~cc ~ ~~
~~~ ~~~
~~3. 7b-1 C.ccat~c.~ c' r pCr~~~~
r'
l are drawn maximum SS ES-PS AR parallel to the maximum qround displacement line. pseudo-velocity is assumed to be constant drawn parallel to the constant velocity lines connecting the Lines were acceleration lines. at control point t' and the displacement lines.
~~ pe ~ ~Q @g,~ g~ //.CO~ g/bM/ m /It/2~, ~pesiqn response spectra va'lues for the vertical component of o~PCart hqua he,ar e taken as 2g3 of th. correspondinq values of the horizontal:,component of 'the 'earthquake. ~~gg '~'~yg .~+e site desiqn spectra devrate from those sugqested in equlatorv Guide 1.60. piqures 3.7b-102 through 3.7b-105 provide qo,.>'0/;-'ttcomparison of the tao, The dampinq values for the 'RRG spectra .(~r y/'re those speci fied hy Regulatory Guide 1.61 for reinforced CP': . concre'ti. structures. /rvL. ~ /Pcv~" ~/G ~~ f 'da /db 8 ./ ~
~~da /.6/~ Av. o 3.7Q.1.g Degjgg Tgge Hisgogy A synthetic time history motion>~~
~~~is mff Scud~/c.~~
~~D6 & I=~(i'Qz ~ 2: >~/~ 4Aceft tke. generated by modifying the actual records of the 1952 Taft earthquake according to the techniques proposed in Reference 3.7b-1. Figure 3.7b-3 shows the a~~
~~normalized synthetic time history motion.'he duration of the time history is 20 sec. The. time interval of the time history is 0.005 sec.~~
Fiqures 3.7b-0:,and 3.7b-5 show a comparison of the time history response spectra and the desiqn response spectra for 2, 3, 5, and 7 percent dampinq values. The spectra are computed at the followinq f requency values (in cps): I k 0;2 to 1.0 (increment of 0.05) a 1.0 to 10.0 (increment of 0.1)
~~'10. 0 +o 30. 0 (increment of 1. 0)~~
Figure 3.7b-6 hows a comparison of the time history response spectra and the design response spectra for 2 and 5'ercent dampinq values for a frequency range between 0.2 and 1.0 intervals of 0.0125 cps. All the above figures show that cps,'ith the time history response spectra envelop the design response spectra. y/'/G e W~ li Q, W~PM~ a~A'M~P
~~~ ~cfog w ~ +6 ~ TM~ ~~ XXI~~~~~,o/~~
~~376 /oy 3.7 Jf 0 /oI P'~~+A m rpp7 ~/ee ~~,Q ~ 9~~ pi, i,~.~~
~~-'~m~ ~~,v~~ ~ ~~pM~ 'f~'~Jm~4Jg ~/o ~-pr-~~~
c m ~s-.mcp Sa S~~ g~~)l~
SSZS-PSAP. 3~7h.1.3 Cggtgcal Damogng Values /Non-HSSSl Table 3.7b-2 summarizes the damping values used on Susquehanna They are expressed as a percentage of crit'cal dampinq and SES are baseR on R ference 3.7b-2. P 3 ~ 76 7a
~~~$ '6 E P ~Jr M gap'y~~~~
The ESsw pumphouse, piping to the reactor oui.lding ac@3 the spray pon are the onlY Seismic Category I structures and systems ounded nn scil. The equivalent spring constants and the soil Rampirq coeffici nts used in the analysis of the ESSQ pumphouse are shown in Table 3.7b-3. These values are based on formulae
~~.containW in Table 3-2 of Reference 3.7b-3. A lumped representation of soil structure interaction was used.~~
g.g. <l. Soil structure irite action is also considered in'he generation of 'the response spectra for the containment.. As in the ESSV pumphouse, a. lumped representation of tho soil structure interaction is'onsidered. Table 3.7b-3 shows the equivalent sprinq ar R dampinq coef ficients used in the conta'ment model.
$ ~7b~1~4 $ uggogtina Nedia for Seismic Category I Structures All .Soismic Category I structures, '.with the exception of ZSSM pumphouse and the spray pond, and-its pipe supports are founded cn rock. For the structural analysis of the rock based structures, soil structure interaction is considered to be negligible due to the high stiffness of the rock which has a modulus of elasticity of approximately 3.0x10~ psi. However, the response spectra of the containmert are derived from a model that considers the flexibility of the rock.
The proper ties,.of the rock and soil supporting the ESSM pumphouse are showr. in Table 3.7b-4. Discussion of the embedment of structures in soil w'll be limited to the ES5H pumphouse, since all the other structures are founded on rock. The ESSP pumphouse i 59 ft high and concreto mat, f oundation. rests on a 64 f t 'x 112 depth'f ft reinforced The embedment the
~~- foundation i."'q'to ft. The depth of soil below the mat foundation varies from 35 60 ft. The soil is predcminantly sand, gravel.~~
cobbles, and boulders. Near .he surface, the soil is primarily sand and sandy qravel. With increasing depth, the soil chanqe's to more cobbles and boulders. Hear bedrock, the soil is mostly cobbles. and boulders. The site geology is discussed in detail in Section 2-5 ~ yi ~ z/ I I ' Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 7b-3 ~ ~ I L
SSES-PSAR 3,7b.2 S-ISilIC SYSTEM ANALYSIS Section 3.2 identifies Seismic Cateqory I structures, systems, and components. Seismic Category I structures are considered seismic systems an 1 are discussed here. Seismic Category I systems and components a e considered seismic subsystems and are discu sod in Subsection 3.7b.3. Seismic systems are analyzed for both the OBE and SSR. The response spectrum method, as described iii'ection 4.2.1 of Reference 3.7b-3, is used for seismic analysis of Seismic Category I structures. Separate lateral and vertical analyses of .structures are performed. The responses are then combined to predict the total response of the structure., A time history analysis of the Seismic Category I structures is done to generate the re ponse:spectra at the various .mass points of the. model. The mathematical models used for these analyses are lumped mass, stick models. The same models were used for both the response spectrum and time history analyses with the exception of containment.. In 'this case,'he time. history analysis used the flexible base'models shovn in Figures 3.7b-7 and 3.7b-8 whereas ~ the structural analysis used a fixed hase model. The fixed hase model differs from the flexible base only in that the soil "sp'rinqs and dampers are assumed to be infinitely riqid, vhich results in a fixed base. The equivalency of the tvo models determined by comparinq their dynamic characteristics is discussed in ansver to NRC Question 130.20 in Volume 16 of PSAR. The mathematicaL models of the reactor and control building are shown on Figures 3.7b-9 through 3.7b-11. " For all models, the masses are located at elevations of mass concentrations, such as floors and roofs. Hovever, in the case of the containment. which is a structure of continuous mass distribution, masses are. lumped at approximately 15 ft intervals alonq the cont.ainment shell and reactor pedestal. These methods of ma s distribution are in accordance with the procedures of Section 3.2 of Reference 3.7h-3 to provide an adequate number of . masses. E ~ The reactor and control buildinqs act as a single structure due to the monolj.thic construction. The entire reactor and control Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 7b-4
'I I L 5
SSES-FSAR building structure is shown as a single unit in piguze 3.7b-12. Both the control'uildinq and the line 29 wall of the reactor buildinq are connected to the P-line vali, vhich is common to both the reactor'nd control buildings. In the east-west direction, the control building and the line 29 wall are considered to respond as a single unit. The horizontal mathematical models are shown on Piguzes 3.7b-9 and 3.7h-l0. The sticks represent shear walls located at the base mat eleva .ion in the reactor buildinq in the direction of the earthquake m'otion. In the east-vest model (Figure 3.7b-.9) the control buildinq is lumped entirely on the line 29 'stick. The entre control buildin'q is considered to contribute to the stiffness of'he line 29 stick. In the north-, south direction, the control huildinq has its ovn stick ccnnected to the P-line wall by springs. r J floor slab connectinq each stick. Since theseflexibility The sprinqs between'he sticks represent the 'of .the sprinqs act'n the direction of the earthquake motion, the model allovs relative displacemor t betveen sticks. Fiqure 3.7b-11 shovs the vertical earthquake model of the reactor ard control buildings. The left stick represents the steel columns. The right stick represents the shear valls of both the reactor and control buildin'gs. The floors are represented by lumped masses and beam elements vith the appropriate stiffness to capture the out of plane flexural vibration.
~
~~translatioral couplinq sprinqs aze provided to Vertical represent the couplinq stiffness of the floor slab betveen the vali and column sticks. Mass numbers 8, 55 and 57 represent the. fuel pool~~
~
qirder masses. Mass numbers 34; 35, 41, 43, 44, 46, 53 and.54 represent the floors betveen. the fuel pool girders and columns/walls. Figure 3.7h-13 shows the correlation betveen the model mass'oints and the actual structure. To more accurately determine the dyramic characteristics of the mathematical models the modulus of elasticity for concrete used ir the analysis, is determined based on test. results of concrete samples obtained from the plant. site. The modulus value used is m5~ 720,000 ksf. The seismic analysis of the Seismic Category I structures considers all modes whose frequencies are less than-33 cps. However, if- a tructure has only one or two modes vith a natural frequency below 33 cps, then the three lowest modes are used. structure has three or less deqrees of freedom, then all modes If ' considered in the analysis. 're
~~~ c ~~~
~~Dq.e"~~
~~~ 'r BM~ ~~M, .~~A e Rev. 35 '7/S4 3.7b-5 I ~~~
~~q l~~
~~~ l ~~~
~~Ie pz 0 7A DAN Mcz 4 a 3 7 4 !Iffy~ '3-7 L ll95) ~ ~~.~ 7W Z ~+M g m,~.. ~ ~~~~~ ~.~.~~.a I I A~ MR D 4 II 'l~~~
~~.>ac ~ ' ~~ g ~~.....,.. g<< )'k<<A* ~~~
~~I'*I I[~~
~~~ ~ ~ A~ ~ ~~~
~~I ~ ~ 4 ~~~
~ ( ~~K.7L II D@ a' P~~ Q ~ Sl ~a I tZO) ~ .)~~ ~,~ 3 ~~p ~ ~ ~
~~I II~~
~~~ 3',gggo I+'~~~
V ~ ~
SSES-FSAR The Seismic Category I structures are supported by continuous base mats; therefore, relative displacement of supports consideration. Nonlinear responses are not conside ed since the Seismic Category I structures are desiqned to remain elastic.
$ ~7b~2,$ Natura/ ggeguggcies ag~Resnogse Loads The nest;>>ra1 frequencies...of the containment and the reactor and control-building below 33 cps are shovn in Tables 3.7b-5 and 3 7b-6 respectively. The first seven frequencies of the reactor
'nd~ control building in the east-vest direction are dePendent upon the location of the reactor building cranes. The significant mode shapes of the containment and the reactor and control building are shown on Figures 3.7b-14 throuqh 3.7b-
43. The mode shapes for containment are fc" the horizontal and vertical directions. The reactor and control building mode shapes are for each o'. the three principal directions: east-west, no th-south, and vertical. As with the frequenci'es, the firsteast-.west'.rection seven mode shapes of the reactor and control building in the depend on the location of the cranes.
Figures 3.7b-20 throuqh 3.7b-26-shov that it is the superstructure of the reactor building that is excited at these lov freguoncies. The location of the cranes is noted on the figures ~ Fiqures 3.7b-44 through 3.7h-57 shov the response (i.e., displacements, accelerations, shear forces, bending moments, and axial forces) of the containment for both OBE and SSE. The response of the reactor and control building is shown on Figures
~~3. 7b-58 through 3. 7b-79.~~
Response spectra at critical locations are shovn on Figures 3.7b-80 through 3.7b-101. The curves are shovn for each of the three principal 'directions at the damping values used for each desiqn earthquake (see Subsection 3.7h.2.15 for further discussion of dampinq values}. A brief description of the location of each series of curves is provided belov vith the correspondinq figure numbers. Fiqures 3. 7h-80 throuqh '3.7b-83 RPV Pedestal Figures 3.7h-04 throuqh 3.7h-89 R efuelinq brea A-D Figures 3. 7h-90 throuqh 3.7h-95 Diesel G e nera tor> Pedesta ls, Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 7b-6
Cl SSES PSAR Piqures 3.7h-96 through 3.7b-10'l Operating Floor of ESSW pumphouse Seismic. systems and subsystems ve e defined in Subsection 3.7b. 2. E All equipment, components, and piping systems aze lumped into t he supportirq structure mass except for the reactor vessel, vhich is analyzed usinq 'a coupled model of the containment structure and the reactor vessel (refer to Figures 3.7b-7 and 3.7h-8) . See Sanction 3. 2 of reference 3.7b-3 for the criteria of lumping the equipment, components and pipinq systems into the supporting mass.. 'tructure Adequacy of the number of masses and degrees of freedom is discussed in Sub ection 3.7b.2. 1. Each Seismic Category I structure is considered to be independent because of a qap betveen adjacent structures. For example, there is a 2 in. horizontal qap betveen the reactor and control building and the containmen above the foundation mat. To form these qaps rodofoam material (Ref. 3.7b-12) vas used. ~ Rodofoam vas left in place in the folloving areas: (1) Joints vheze the provided actual qap is 0-5 inch greater than that originally specified on the civil dzavings. (2) Joints vhere the interaction forces betveen structures due to presence of rodofoam cause insignificant effect on shear and moment. I'll Seismic Cateqory I structures, except the ESSN pumphouse and spray pond, are founded on rock. The seismic analysis of these structures is done assuminq a fixed base. As stated in Subsection 3.7b.2.1, the containment response spectrum curves are generated from a flexible hase model. The rock is assumed to be a homoqeneous material comprisinq an entire elastic half-space. The soil springs and dampers used to represent the effect of the soil are discussed in Subsection 3. 7b. 1. 3. Rev. 35, 07/84 3 7b-7
na.WM P% <
~~~cu B~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~~~
~~p~~M ~~~ ~)M~~~
~~~ 7~~~ Z.7LP Z '7k-9' r- ~~& Ig to%/, p~.~~
~~l~~ I . v SS~.~ ~ +j g~ 2-~ 3~ + .~ S .~~~ ,B OE~. r~~
~~~ ~ ~~~
~~0 L~~
'/
~~t I~~
~~I I~~
~~I P I~~
~~>>)~~
40 SSES FSAR The ESSM pumphnuse is supported by natural soil formation; consequently, soil structure interaction has been considered in the analysis of th,. pumphouse. Information regarding soil characteristics, foundation embedment, etc., is contained in Subsection 3.7b.1.4. The oil structure interaction analysis is performed usinq the lumped spring approach. The soil is considered a homoqeneous material. The equivalent spring constants and the soil damping coefficients are discussed in Subsection 3.7b.1.3. The seismic analysis of the spray pond is discussed i'n Subsection
2. 5. 5.

g. 7h.7,,5'evelopment of floor response Spectra time hi..tory analvsis is used to develop th'e floor response A
spectra. 'he mathematical models used for this analysis are discuss~cd in Subsections 3.7b.2.1, 3.7b.2.3, and 3.7b.2.0. The floor response spectra are calculated at the. frequencies listed in Table 5-1 of Reference 3.7b-3. Structural freguencies
~~'up to '33 cps are used." ~( eZZI /~,~~
~~17<'R I-~li'r'p e $ ,7ba2,6 Independent Th ea Comuonenhs analyses oE garthguake are, done for the Sation vertical~~
~
~~and two pj. I hcrizcntal~~
,~
~~feast-vest 'and north-south) directions. For design purposes, the response value used is the maximum'value obtained by adding the~~
'response due to vertical earthquake with'he larger value of the response 'du'. to one of the horizontal earthquakes by the absolute Sum methcd a fa the PS e Esca'/ltE,ZE ~~r ~No Z~,~~A ~et of-~~.
3.71 ~2~2 7 nat Combination of NNodal Hosoonseg The modal responses, i.e., shears, moments, deflections, acceleration, and inertia forces, are combined by either the sum of the absolute values method or by the square root of the sum of the squares methods Mhen the latter method is used, the absolute values of closely spaced modes for each group are added first and then combined with the other modes or groups of closely spaced modes hy the square root of the sum of the squares method. Two consecutive modes are defined as closely spaced when their
~
frequences differ from each other by 0.5,cps or less. ms~ I Rev ~ 35, 07/BQ I yE 3.7b-8 a 8:
c/ Q~ l k~e ="- << -/
~~,.....- o-~~A I " " C I C ~' ~ ~ ~ 1 I~~
~~7 ~ .~~
~~'I I' ~~~
I I' I <4 *,P
SSES-PSAR 37b28 Interaction of Non-Category I Structures with Seismic Cateaorv I Structures tfon-Category I structures that are close to Seismic Category structures,'iz., the turbine and radwaste buildings, have been designed to withstand an SSE. Dynamic analyses of theso '.structures were done by the response spectrum method. I The remaining non-Category I structures vere designed for seismic loads according to the UBC (Ref. 3.7b-4) . The collapse of any of these remaining non-Category I structures will not cause the failure-of a Seismic Categ'ory I structure.
~~~ ~~~
structural separations have been provided to ensure that interaction between Category I and non-Category I structures does not occur. The minimum separation at any point is maintained at one and a half times the absolute sum of the predicted maximum displacemerts of the two structures. The rodofoam mater'al which was used to form the separation gaps was lef in place in some areas as mentioned in Section 3.7b.2.3. 3.7b.2.9 Fffects of Parameter Variations on Floor Response Spectra To account for variations in the structural frequencies owinq to 'uncertaint'es in the material pxopertios of the structure and to approximat'ons in tho modelinq techniaues used in the seismic analysis, the computed floor response spectra are smoothed and peaks associated with each of the structural frequencies are . broadened. The parameters, which are considered variable, are tho masses, the modulus of elasticity of the material, and the cross-soct ional properties of the members. Xn. addition, . in the structural.frequency is also taken into account
~~'ariation because the base of the structures may not be fully fixed as assumed in the analysis.~~
Rev. 35, 07/84 3 'h-9
SSES-PS AP. get nf = Natural frequency of the building at a peak value of the floor response spectra hnf Total variation in nf hn fm Variation in'f due to variation in the mass 5n fe Variation in nf due to variation in the modulus of elasticity of the material Vari. ation in nf due to variation in the cross-sectional properties of the members factor of 0.05 is used to account for the decrease in nf due'o the possibility that the base of the st'ructures may not be fully fixed. Sine'.e it is hiqhly improbable that the maximum variations in the
~
~~individual parameters mould occur simultaneously, bnf is determined bv the. square root of the sum of the squar'es of the individual variations as follows: maximum increase in nf i.s given by: V'he
~~+conf = (~)~~
~~m 2~~
+ (~)e + (~)s -hnf = (~ + (~ + (~ + (0.05) ~~ ) ) )
~~5+~~~ 'V'g Q -md/ 5c >~i~ I-the follovinq values of i 5nf are used: I'ES,~~
+ deaf = 0 12nf Lhf = -0.14 nf 3~7b.2~10 Use of Constant Vertgcal Static Factors Constant vertical static factors're not used in the seismic design of Seismic Cateqory I structures. The methodology used for the vertical seismic analysis is similar to the horizontal
~~~~ analysis. pc~ e Pz~'$~ ~ erma>~~~
'ix. ~ ~M B P ~dp(+
~~0 /+ ~~M. ~~~
~~. aev.,~ 35, 07l84 ~ ~~~
~~3. 7b-10~~
SSES-PSAR 3~7b./~11 methods Used To Account for Torsional Effects Torsional effects for the diesel qenerator building and ESSQ pumphouse are accounted as follovs: A static analysis vas done to account for torsion on these tvo structures. For the ESSM pumphouse the eccentricity vas determined by the di tance between the center of mass and the center of rigidity of the structure. The inertia force from the response spectrum analysis vas applied at the center of mass. The resultinq torsional moment is equal to the inertial force times Me eccentricity. The shear forces due tc the torsional
~
moment vere then distributed to the walls. -The .,torsional shear forces are distributed accordinq to.the method described in Section 3..4 of Refe ence 3.7b-5. ln the diesel qenerator buildinq, torsion is considered due to the eccentricity caused by the difference in rigidities of, the east and vest shear,valls.'he torsional .shear forces are assumed to be taken entirely by east and vest walls only. Torsional effects are neqliqible for the .containment because of A the symmetry of the structure. Th'e reactor/control building is modeled for horizontal dynamic analysis as multiple sticks coupled by sprirqs representing the . shear stiffness of the floor slab . Each stick represents a
~~~ .ma]or structural shear vali. The mass and stiffness distribution . of the structural valls is such that torsional effects are properly represented in the dynamic analysis'.~~
~~Torsional effect fo the diesel generator building, ESSM pumphouse, and reactor/control building are also discussed in response to HBC questions 130.21 and 130.22. ~~Q6~~
3. 7h. 2~12 Coragagi son of geryon ses Figures 3.7b-4 through 3.7b-6 shov that the respcnse spectra of the time history envelop/ the design response spectra at all frequencies. The time history has been used to qenerate response spectra, in the structures but has not been used to calculate force in the structures. Response in containment; a typical Category I Structure, obtained from the response spectrum analysis compare closely vith those obtained frcm time history analysis based on studies comparing displacements and
~~, pn W~~~
Mph 3 8 7~"I/d. R'~, ~ p+~~Ccn p~~ ~~~ accelerations obtained by the tvo methods. Rev. 35, 07/04 3. 7b-11
~ ~ I 'W
II ~l p~ pi~ DR a B~>~, ~ A~ ~<< ~~ ~ ~L ~ ~y~ ~* 5~~ 's.7$ a
~
P ~ SSFS -FSAR a-~~ 3,7b. 2~13 methods for Seismic Analysis of Dams Dam..'re not provided on Susquehanna SES. 3.7b. 2.1Q Determination of Seismic Cateqcry I Structure overt. ugnj,ng Nomegts The overturninq moments for Seismic Categcry I structuresgis the of .the moments at the base of e'ach stick of the mathematical sum model. 'or each @tick, th'e moment at the base is determined by combininq the modpl ovezturninq mo'ments. The. moments are combined hy the methods described in Subsection 3.7b 2.7. The components of the earthquake motior. used are the same as those discussed in Subsection 3.7b. 2. 6. Subsectic.. 3.8. 5 discusses the factor of safety against overturninq for several loadinqs which include seismic loads. The structures consist of reinforced concrete and welded/bolted st" uctural steel. Dampinq values for these materials are shcwn in Table 3~7b-2.~Ho ever,. jn the seismic analysis of the structures<,'ampfnq vafu~es 4f 2 and 5 percent are used for (.BE and SSF. respectiv'ely for reinforced concrete, as well a welded/bolted structural steel. -Therefore,. analysis of composite model dampinq is not necessar y. All Seismic Cato.qory I structures except the ESSM pumph ouse and spray pond and its pipe supports are founded on rock. Consequently, soil dampinq values are. calculated for the ESSM pumphouse as described in Appendix D of Reference 3.7b-3. The interaction dampinq values for the time history analysis of the containment are also calculated by the method described in Appendix D of preference 3.7b-3. P.ev. 35, 07/80 3.7b-12
SSES-PSAR For riqid equipment having a fundamental frequency greater than 33 Hz, the dynamic load consists of a static load obtained as the equipmen~ ~ weiqht times the acceleration corresponding to 33Hz. For structurally complex equipment:, which carnot be.classif'ed as structurally simnl or riqid, the equipment is idealized by a mathematical model and dynamic analysi is performed usinq standard analytical procedures. An alternative method used for verifvinq structural integrity of members physically similar to beams and columns is the static coefficient method..?n this method no determination of natural frequency is made. Dynamic forces are calc~ilated a" product of the weight and peak acceleration of response spectra multiplied by a static coefficient of 1.5. 'san nine valups used a "e uiven in Table 3.7b-2/en',/$ Dynamic testinq is perfo med when analysis is insufficient to determine either the structural or functional adequacy of the equinment or both. Typical test methods used are as follows: a) frequency sine beat test Sinqle frequency b) Sinqle frequency dwell test
~~'I c) t".ultif test AL1 seismic qualification tests sub ject the equipment to excitation for at least 30 seconds.~~
Q~7Q~Q Q, 1 g Combj,ra+jog o f Qnalysjs and gyngmgc Jesting h Certain equinment is aualified by a. combination of analysis and dynamic testinme 3,7h~g~1.2 pipinq System ms RP-TOP-l, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3.7b-6) describes the methods used for seismic analysis of pipinq systems. Reference 3.7b-6 is followed on Susquehanna SES with the followinq exceptions:
~~3. 7b-14~~
SSES-FSAR Por rigid equipment having a fundamental frequency greater 33 Hz the dynamic load consists of a static load obtained as th> equipment s weight times the acceleration corresponding to 33Hz.
~
For structurally complex equipment, which cannot be classified as structurally simple or rigid the equipment is idealized by a mathematical model and dynamic analysis is performed usinq standard analytical procedures. An alternative method used for verifying structural integrity of members physically similar to beams and columns is the static coefficient method.. In this method no determination of natural frequency is made. Dynamic forces are calculated as product of the weight and peak acceleration of response spectra. multiplied by a static of 1.5. 'oefficient 'Dampinq values used are given in Table 3.7b-2 ~ 3 7h 2~1 2~2 QYnnia ~afiaa Dynamic beesting is pe'rformed when analysis is insufficient to determine either the structural or functional adequacy of the equipment or both. Typical test methods used are as follovs: a) Single frequency sine beat test b) Single frequency dwell test c) pultifrequenry test All seismic qualification tests subject the equipment to excitation for at least 30 seconds. 2 2h 2 1..l 2 Gamhirntion uX k,naXZair. ~Un SYaaUmc ~e Certain equipment is qualified by a combination of analysis and dynamic testina.
~~.3a7b~3ilaZ PiRRM SYsXQH ~~~
~~fi8 ~ an+Pdd)~o 2;<((ck ( '(( "~~)~~
~
~~RP-TOP'-l, Rev. 3 (Ref. 3.7b-6)hdescribes the methods used for seismic analysis of piping systems Reference 3.7b-6 is folloved on Su quehanna SES with ( ~g ~~ vinq exceptions:~~
~ ~ Q,I g W~~~ E 'L 'I ~Ay Rev. 35, 07/84 3 'b-10
~~SSES-PSAR Tn seismic analysis the modal responses are combined by SRSS and low~r damoinq values than specified in Reference 3.7b-6 are used. See Subsection 3. 71. 3. 7.~~
~~$ .7).. 3.1. 3 Class IP. Cable Trays The cable trays are seismically qualified by the capacity evaluation mothod which consists of the following:~~
~~a) ~~~
-Calculation of the fundamental frequency of the cable tray'ased on the tray properties obtained from static tests Seismic load computation based upon the tray frequency, .the possible support frequencies and the design spectra c) Calculation of the tray allowable capacity d) Evaluation of the tray capacity by interaction formulae I C" S 3.7 .3.1.4 'u ort~ fgg S gg'sm'c g Cat glory l HVAC Ducts c5 The supports of HVAC ducts are analyzed by the response spectrum method.
3,7h~ 3~1,5 Cogcgeg~ Block Nasongy Structures QBlockwalgsg . I The dynamic analysis of safety related concrete masonry CLa, blockvalls 'n Class. I structures. is performed by the response pectrum method. Response spectrum for the lower floor has been . used for vertical motion and for walls, cantilevered from the floor. For horizontal motion, the acceleration of the lo~er floor or average of the 'lover and upper floor, whichever is qreater, is used in determining inertia loads. Prequency LJ calculations for blockwalls supporting class I attachments or located in areas of class I equipment are based on e'ther crackedI section, partially cracked section, or uncracked section Cl properties; whichever represents the condition based upon the calculated loads. Partially cracked section analysis is based on the followinq AC1 I 318 (Ref. 10A of Table 3. 8-1) formula
~~3. 7b-15~~
~~SSES-CESAR te = (i'r /Na' l> T < (l - (t'5 cr a~~
)~) cr where, = effective moment of inertia of cracked Section Icr = moment of inertia of cracked Section = bendinq moment applied to the blockwall g = Gross ection moment of inertia (uncracked) crackinq bendinq moment =
~~yt fr = mo<)ulus of rupture for masonry = 50 psi modulus nf rupture for concrete = 6 f' psi Yt = distance from centroid aris of qross section to the~~
~
extreme fiber in tension. For assessinq the effects of frequency variations on the, responses, t,he variable items such as boundary conditions, mass, modulu'f <<lasticity, crackinq moment are considered. Damping values used are ir. accordance with Table 3.7b-2. The response of attachments to blockwalls is determired as described .in Subsection 3.7b.3.1.l.l. The three components of earthquake motion are combined in accordance with Subsection 3.7b.2.6.
~~3. 7b. 3.1. 6 Supports of Seismic Cat eqory I Electrical Raceway~~
~~~~Xw~M~~
-.<<is sectior. defines +he procedures u ed fcr the des'qn of the =-'>>oports of elect. ical raceway systems; i. e., cable tray, con<)uit, and wire~ay aut ter systems, sub ject to the seismic and other applicable loads. The raceway support system usually consists of raceways, horizontal ard vertical support members and lateral and lonqitudinal bracinq members. gev. 3 )~ 07/R4 3. 7h-16
SSFS-PSAR s~wXvtao,~d xc D~ Q G~.~ E
~~'5e adequacy of raceway systems to withstand seismic and other applicable static loads is determined accordinq to the loading combinations and allowable responses qiren below:~~
Eauation Condj,trop Load Combination hlgowgble gespon e Normal D 4 L F - See note 4 Normal/Severe D + L + E See Notes 2 6 4 (Eauation 2 applies only to connections for fatique considerations.) A bnormal/Extreme D+ Ei See Notes 2, 3, 6 4 Notes: 1.. For notations, see Table 3.8-2.
~~2. The followinq equation is applicable for bending in overhead connections:~~
~~5'BE l.o SSE where:~~
~~"EQ Total number of load/stress cycles per earthquake.~~
OBE Allowab3e number of load/stress cycles per OBF. event. SSE Allowable numler of load/stress cycles per SSE event. 3.- The followinq criteria are used for checkinq the members. In no cas~ shall the allowable stress exceed 0.90F in bendinq, 0.85F in axial tension or compression, and 0.50F in shear. Where the desiqn is qoverned by requirements of stability
~~'local or lateral bucklinq), the actual stress shall not exceed 1.5F .~~
Allowable shear and normal loads in connections are do.~ermined from the manufacturers'ata or from code al lovable stresses whichever is applicable. Bev. >5, 07/H4 3. 7b-17
SSRS-FSAq he allowable values are increased 50% for load
~~~ cnmb i.na ~ ion equation 3.~~
~~AS SR7 7b 2 1 6 2 AM1YtiQRL XRGhGiK>>QR~~
~~~~ I ~f VX'~~~~
Fith~r of two methods of analysis is used. method 1 is a simplifi~d method of analysis vhich determines the fundamental frequency of braced supports using tvo dimensional analysis. Frequencies are determined in each of three principal directions. Then loads are determined by takinq the spectral accelerations times the weight; and stresses are determined from static analysis. All members and connections are checked using stress criteria. method 2 used a three dimensional computer analysis and includes springs to represent joint stiffnesses. Response spectrum analyses are done to determine stresses and deformations. The number of stress cycles is determined by multiplying the time of maximum earthquake motion hy the natural freguency of the system. The allovable number of cycles is taken from Reference 3.7b-8 for , the joint rotations calculated. Only overhead connections are checked for fatique since the test results {ref. 3.7b-8, pg. 7-
~~19) demonstrate that failures occur only in overhead connections.~~
The basis for the desiqn criteria and analysis method 2 is the "Cable Tray and Conduit Racevay Test Program" (references 3.7b-7 throuqh 3. 7-10) . t l~seaT e 7Q g 1,6 g t)amping of racevay systems. 7% Dqmplng
~~~ s~~, ~~ c4 O~eP g~~~~~
~~I of the critical is used for the'esign of akk-The test program demonstrates that for cable tray systems dampinq is, in general, much hiqher than 7'%.~~
'~" ~ I Ref~ rene~ 3.7h-7 recommends usinq 20% but values up to 50% are reported. The recommended dampinq values, developed from the ~st proaram and based on lover bound values, are sho~n in Figure ).7b-106. Damaging is amplitude dependent, i.e.,
vith inc 'casing amplitude of 'nput motion. For conduit systems it increases the dampinq increases vith increasinq amplitude, but is much lower than for cable tray systems. This 7'Jt is a realistic value for input motion exceeding O. lq for conduit systems. Mirevay gutters were not tested; hovever, the manner in vhich they are constructed - with more bo] ted connections and more cables than conduit 'provides more dampinq mechanisms that are present in conduit systems so that 7% is a conser vatively lov dampinq value. 4la JEC Pog O8E A'N >R87a4 CoH Dly'IqQ 4 8<3 8tll<DAI f FOR A
$4F DWMPratg VW<~E F Co+DITiyg Ia usFD 3.7b-18 yg4)I Sy PP'ORTS . /W ~ 4E oi a+D~<7 S"P'P4~7$ k% h4A Prefab IS u SCD ~OR OBZ AH birioa P D/o ahQPIA4 P'og StE Ce/DIJ'/oQ. 6/ +/+FR To g++g+E fff+7 7+E pg s]gy (g coNSERvh 7 I vE
DIESEL 'E<Eg, 4 fo+ E SOIL/) r'~Cy.
IPSE A7 pg AE4EC. gd AZg A 7oC E GcJ/C.Nr&y,
~~~/pc'c t ~cd a ~p ~ ~l.~~
~~(4 d~~ a/ C LE tii~a ~p>~g .~~
~~/m A. C C c 4 +celiaciv cs. <c a C ac 4p 4 r..~)~~~~
~~lief>'n 8 76 b /, g. J~~
~
~~7g'~+~ Cop'C c t. /g~~
~~~ pe ~J/ cf) <.<4 >~~
~~ikpp, ~ ~,~ e*. o(~~
~~'mg~~~
SSES- FS AR Vb S,g 6 < gger~Xjng lna<a llnzihamh~ AMJ1. (s<<~>< ~'< ~ ~<~@) The OBE is considered in the load combinations only for the overhead connections which are checked for fatigue. The OBE stresses are not checked during design for two reasons: first, raceway systems do not. fail in a brittle or catastrophic mode as demonstrated by the test proqram in which such failures did not occur and the electrical systems were able to continue to function in all cases. Thus, there is no need to limit the OBE stresses to the low levels usually used to preclude such, failures. Second, the OBE stresses will always be less than the SSE stresses as demonstrated below. In all cases the ZPA values are hiqh enough to use 7$ dampinq
'all based on Fiqure 3.78-106 since they exceed O.lq. A comparison of response spectra for correspondinq dampinq values demonstrates that for all response spectra the OBE acceleration values are less than the correspondinq SSE acceleration values.
(See References 3.7b-8 and 3.7b-10) Thus, the OBE acceleration response and stresses are below the SSE acceleration response and stresses. 3.74*3~3 .De+eZmiQagion of Ngmher of gagtQguake cycles .In aeneral, the desiqn of the equipment is not fatique controlled because the equipment is elastic and the number of cycles in an earthauake is low. Equipment that is qualified by analysis is designed to remain elastic during the earthquake. Any fatique effects in tested equipment are accounted for by performinq extended duration test on selected specimen . Consequently, the number of cycles of the mart hauake has heen accounted for. Tn c der t o ron<luct a fatiaue evaluation for nuclear Class I pipina, >h< number of cycles for a qiven load set is obtained. This is <!or~ hy con~iderina <<en maximum stress cycles per earthquake and five OBE's and one SSE to occur within the life of the plant. 3 7b. 3 P., 3 Procedure Used for Nodel ina
~~< he models'ro. developed to represent the eauipment. Two or~~
<<hree dime~sinnal models are used dependinq on the complexity of the eauipm~:r t. The boundary conditions are modeled to ref lee+ Rev. 35, 07/B4 3. 7b-19
SSFS-FSAR the in-plant mountinq conditions. The equipment is represented by lumped mass models. massless elastic members are used to co'nnect the masses. Suooorts for HVAC ducts are modeled as tvo dimensional, lumped mass, plane frame models. The masses are lumped at the center of the ducts. The cabl~ tray support analytical techniques are discussed in Subsection 3.7b.3.1.6.2. The cable tray properties are determined from the load deflection tests (see Reference 3.7b-ll) . Sections 2.0 and 3.0 of Reference 3.7b-6 discuss the techniques and orocedures used to model piping other than the buried type. 3~7h,3~4 Basgs for Selecfgo)l gfggeguenc~es The natural frequencies of components are calculated. nat.ural frequency of the component falls within the broadened If the peak of the response spectrum curve, then Mithstand tl e ooak acceleration. it is designed to The equivalent static load method of analysis is used when the natural frequency of the equipment is not determined. If the equipment can be adequately represented by a single degree of freedom system, then the applied inertia load- is equal to the weight of the equipment -times the peak value of the response spectrum curve. If the equipment requires more than one degree of freedom for an adequate representation, then a factor of l. 5 is aoolii d to t.he peak of the response spectrum curve-Section 7. l.2 and Ano~ndix D of. Reference 3.7h-6 discuss the use of eguival~n. static load method of analysis as applicable to oipina. For eciuioment, cable trays, and supports for cable trays and HVAC ducts, the three soatial comoonen+s of the earthquake are considered in the same manner as for structures (described in Subsection 3.7h. 7.6) . Fev. 35, 07/04 '). 7h-20
SSFS-CESAR The criteria usehd for comhininq the results of horizontal and vertical seismic responses for pipinq systems are described in Section 5 1 af Reference 3.7b-6 ~
~~'~25~ ~f ~t P ~ ~ b~ G~~F. f~~~
aaahiaaCiaa SaCaL Xemuaaaa The modal resnanses (~~<4 of equipaenthare coibined by the square root w. of the sum of the squares method The absolute values of t<<o-closely paced modes are added first before combininq <<ith the other mohas bv the square root af the sum of the squares method. Twa consecutive modes are defined as closely spaced <<hen their fre~cencies TAe Of~fr Sif Ae f~efron~ech I;f2 i "g" tea, ~~ >~ other by 10 nercint or less. Procedures qiven in Requlatary Guide 1.92 for combining modal responses, <<hen closoly-spaced modes are present, are not chNf. gem~ ~~ Cri e~ 4r complied <<ith in the seismic response spectra analysis f or p p nq> h ll modal responses are combined by square root of'um of squares (SRSS) in. the response spectra method of modal nn "e- ka ig. analysis f or seismic loadinq (OBE and SSE) . Seismic response soectra used in the pipinq analysis corresponds to conservative
~~~ values ampinq "E." of 1/2% fpr OBE and J.% for SSE ~~~
ee:ibg a. C'Ct'-Vpf'nd ta ~5~- ~<SknM is B+uhC @~ Guide /nb/, 6arnni'no vcducf. mW The procedures u ed in evaluatinq the pipinq system for hydrodynamic loads (SFV and LOCA) by response spectra method is in compliance <<i+h Requlatory GaMe 1 ~ 92. The modal responses in
+his case are combined in accordance <<ith section 5 ~ 2 of BP-TOP-1, Pev. 3, <<hich has been accepted by the IRC staff, per the letter dated September 29, 1976 ~ fram Karl Kniel, Chief Light Rater Reactors Branch No. 2, Division of Progect Hanaqeaent to Burtan L. Lex, Dechtel Po<<er Corporation.
~~The rrite ia used for pipinq systems are described in Sections~~
5. 1 and 5. 2 of Reference 3. 7b-6 3~75 3 B hnakx ian3, 2Xucehuz~a Xur Rimmed The Resiqn criteria and the analytical procedures applicable to pipinq systems are as described in Sectian 2.0 of Reference 3.7b-

6. The methods used to consider differential pipinq support movements at different support points are as described in Section 4.0 of Reference 3.7b-6 ~
~~'ev.~~
35, 07/84 3 7b-2f
I 0
SSES FSAR 3.7b.3.9 Nultiply Supported Eguipment and Components vit4 9'a.'isn't Xaam For cab!.e trays and ducts vhose supports have tvo distinct innu~s, a response spectrum curve is used that envelopes the curve: at tl e tvo locations. Section 4.0 of Reference 3.7b-6
~
discusses ~he method's used for, the analysis of multiple supported nipino svstems. g~1y~g~>n- o;.~ g~ gggggygg yQxgigy~~g~kg goal Constant v~."tical static factors are not used in the seisaic design of subsystems. 3<71. 3~1>:-aa'aiaaaL Zffaala uX XaaaufZia 3~N~ The torsional effects of valves and other eccentric masses are considered in the seismic analysis of piping by the techniques discussed in Section 3.2 of Reference 3.7b-6.
~~$ L7b~)~1? Pqs;j, 0 ~4sg~g C'atggQgg T 7i~~~g >Z~g~ms ~lie Z~ull~g~~~
~~Puried Seism'c Cateaory I pining has been analyzed and desigred for seismic effects in accordance vith Section 6.0 of Reference 3 7h" lq <<n6~~
~ RAc'~oce <.7b- I8 k~.- ice. ~ "E." Fc.iilig, ~he ma1ori+v nf th~ anticinated settlement due tn static loading of the E."SM Pumpho>>sa vill have occurred prior to connecting the piping to th huilding. During a SSE event, the differential settlement hdtv"r r. th~: pumphouse and ~he surrounding soil vhich supports >he vining, vill he less than one inch (see Subsection 2.5.0.7 for further discussion of settlement ). his movement vill he accommodated by the piping vithout exceeding ~
~~code all cvab'le s.ress~s.~~
~~~unnels on the Susen~hanna SES are non-Seismic Category Z.~~
~ Rev. 35, 07/<<5 3. 7b-22
SSRS-FS il P. 3.7b-12 I c<fofoxm II marufac" ureQ b7 W. 8 ~ Grace C t:o. or eauivalcn~ equal. sess' 8 7bIs -H. 8 XgInsl n-n' a ~g, ~ PIen~& n1 ynje
~~~ sf'~+ /~~
~~Z ne/ ' IVneJnn p/~ f. ~y g, c)f. at ~Q / ~ stan~~~
~
~~Voce~~ f>5 J g ,s~,< -pp nsyss er- pipit, 5psr6nep i>> A/usleciw~~
~
Qyssn~ / M~TS 3++ sS OR )P~ & g~~ p~g PlM> Zn s Ae 'ick. isu form: (~one IqgI) Bev. 35, 07/RO 3.7b" 28
D~pt~g IIALu&s fbE N<< -+sss QAT~iALs pL Dg & p~<<>7p' (Percent of Critical Damping) Operating Basis Safe Shutdown Structure az Component Earthquake (OBE)< Earthquake (SSE) Equipment and lazge-diameter piping systemsa, pipe diametez greats than 12 Small-diametez piping systems, diameter equal to or less than 12 in ~ ~, ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S We1.ded steel structures 2 Bolted steel structures Reinforced conc ete structures
'I
~In the dynamic analysis of active components as defined in U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.48, these values should be used for the SSE. ~Include both material and structural damping. If the structural little piping system consists of only one or two spans with damping, use values for small-diameter piping. sIf the maximum combined stresses due to static, seismic, and other dynamic loading are significantly lower than the yield 'stress and 1/2 yield stress for SSE and OBE, respectively, in any structure or component, damping values lower than those specified abov'e should be used for that structure or component, to avoid underestimating the amplituide of variations or dynamic stresses.
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~~g f We~dq Melding and nondestructive examination is performed in accordance with A WS D1. 1.~~
).Q~3~6~$ ,'3 Pgectjog Togepqgces Erection tolerances for the drywall platforms are in accordance with AISC Specification (Ref. 2H of Table 3.8-1) 3 8 3 6 6 gugggtX cogggol puality control requirements for construction are discussed in Appendix D and amendmen+s to the PSAR. ~ 4 8 4 3.7.1 ~ ! e Preooerational ~ Testina pQ~
The drywel1 floor is tested to 1.15 times the design downward dif ferentia1 prossure. See Subsection 3. 8. 1. 7. 1.1 for a 'description of the structural acceptance tests. V Deflection.. and strains of the drywell floor measured during the ttnit tes+ were less than the predicted values. Thus, the 1 desiqn of +he drywell floor provides an adequate safety margin aqainst internal pressure. Piqure 3.8-79 shows a comparison hotween measured and predicfed deflections for the drywell floor at p'" ~ differen-:.ial pressure. 3.8.3~7~1~$ g~ak Byte <eggj,gg Preoperational leak rate 'testinq is discussed in Subsection 6.2. 6. Rev. 35, 07/84 3 ~ 8-.5 1
SSP S-.~S AR 3 8 3 7 2 .In-service Leak Rate Testinc In-service leak rate testinq is discussed in subsection 6.2.6. This section qi ves 'nformation on all Seismic Category I tructures except the primary containment and its internals. It also describes safety related non-Seismic Category I structures. The structures included in this section are as follows: Reactor Buildina Control Buildinq Diesel Generator Buildinq Engineered Safeguards Service 'Rater Pumphouse Spray Pond. y)g.sG. L Qgt46 kAToR 6. SulL5 >86 pop-Seismic Category I~ Sgfegx Regated Stguctgros Turbine Building Padwaste Buildinq The qene al arranqement of these structures 's shown on Figures 3.8-80 throuqh 3.8-103. Amp 8 9- tO5'Tgpooqg 3 8-lo6. Re ac',- " i Bu 1 . - ".".. Refer to Figures 3.8-80 throuqh 3.8-89. The reactor building encloses the primary containment, and provides secondary containment when the primary containment is in service durinq power op~ration. It-also serves as. containment durinq reactor refuelinq and maintenance operations, when the primary containment is open. It houses the auxiliary systems of nuclea steam supply system, new fuel storaqe vaults, the 'he refueling facility, and equipment essentia 1 to the safe shutdown of ~he reactor. Rev. 35, 07/8Q 3.8-52
SSFS-PSAR The reactor building, up to and including the operatinq floor, of reinforced concrete on a mat foundation. The bearing walls are of reinforced concrete and are designed as shear valls to resist lateral loads. The floors are of reinforced concrete sunported by a steel beam and column fraainq system and are desiqned as diaphraqms to resist lateral load. The framing runs in both east-vest and north-south directions, vith the exterior ends of the beams supported by either the bearing valls or steel columns. The steel columns are supported by base plates on the mat foundation. The reinforced concrete valls and floors aeet structural as well 'as radiation shielding requirements. Rhere structurally pe missible, concrete block masonry walls are used at certain locations to provide better access for erection and installation of equipmen+. The block walls also meet the radiation shieldinq requirements. The reactor building superstructure above the operatinq floor is steel st ucture. .he structural steel framing supports the roof, metal sidinq, and overhea d cranes. The framinq consists of a series of. riqid frames connected by roof and vali bracing systems. ~he roof. consists of built-up roofing on metal deck. The refuelinq facility is located above the containment struc+ure. It cons'ts of 'spent fuel pool, fuel shipping cask storaqe pool, s+eam dryer and separator storage pool, reactor cavity, skimmer surqe tank vault, and load center room. The facility is supported by two reinforced concrete girders running north-south, spanning over the containment. The girders are supported at the ends by concrete valls and at intermediate points by steel box columns. A qap is provided between the bottom of the girders and the top of the containment to ensure that loads from +he refuelinq facility are not transferred to the containment. The walls and slabs of the spent fuel pool, the fuel shippinq cask storage pool the reactcr cavity, and the
~
steam dryer and separator storage pool are lined on the inside vi+h a stainless steel liner plate. The facility meets the radia+ion shieldinq requirements. The reactor buildinq is separated from the primary containment by qap, oxcopt a+ the foundation level, vhere a cold joint is. pro~ided betveen the tvo aa's. A qap is also provided at the int .face of the reactor buildinq vith the diesel generator and +urbine buildinqs. con tqo], Bu if'g g Refer to Piqures 3.8-80 throuqh 3.8-88. The control builhinq houses the control room, the cable spreading rooms, computer and relay ronm ~ the battery room, HGV equipment room, off-qas treatment room, and the visitors'allery for the control room. Fev. 35, 07/84 3.8-53
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control building is structurally inteqrated with the reactor The buildinq. It is a reinforced concrete structure on a mat foundation. The bearing walls are of reinforced concrete and are
~~~ .~~
desiqned as shear walls to resist lateral loads. The floors and roof are of reinforced concrete supported by steel beams, and are desiqned as diaphragms to r~sist lateral loads. The beams span in the east-west Air ction and are supported by the bearing walls at the ends. The einfo'reed concrete walls and floors meet structural as veil as radiation shielding requirements. Where structurally permissible, concrete block masonry valls are used at certain locations to provide better access for erection and installation of equipment. The block walls also meet the adiation shieldinq requirements. The control buildinq is separated from the turbine building by a qap, except at the foundation level, vhere a cold )oint is orovided betveen the tvo mats. Qge59$ Geoggagog Builgjgg Pefer to Piqures. 3.8-92 and 3.8-93. The diesel generator bui1dinq houses the diesel generators o.ssentia1 for safe shutdown of the plant,. The diesel generators are separated from each o her by concrete valls. A concrete overhanq on the east side of the building serves as an air intake plenum. A concrete plenum for diesel exhaust is located on the roof. I. is a reinforced concrete structure on a mat foundation. The hearing valls are of reinforced concrete and are designed as shear walls to resist lateral loads. The floors and roof are of reinforced concrete supported by steel beams, and are designed as diaph"aqms to resist lateral loads. The sou..h side of the buildinq in>erfaces vith the reactor building; there, a reinforced concrete vali is provided from foundation up to the desian hiqh vater t'able level and then a steel frame is provided up to the roof. Where structurally permissible, concrete block masonry valls are used at certain 'ocations to provide better ace~ "; for erec-.ion and ins ta~lation of equipment. The diesel generators are supported by reinforced concrete pedesta1s. The nedestals are separated from the operatinq floor bv a qap to allow for their independent viht'ation. 3 '-54
SSES-FS hR gggj,peeped Safeggygdg Serg~> l(y~eggSQVJ gumppguse Refer to Figure 3.8-94. The ESSQ Pumphouse contains the emergency service vater (ESM) and residual heat removal (RHR) pumps and the weir and discharge conduit. for the spray pond. It is a tvo-story reinforced concrete structure on a mat foundation. The bearing walls are of reinforced concrete and are des jqned as shear valls to resist lateral loads. floor and roof are of reinforced concrete supportedTheby operating steel beams and are designed as diaphragms to resist lateral loads. h mezzanine floor composed of qratinq over steel beams is provided tn support the heatinq and ventilating equipment. SPXaZ pQpd Refer to F'qures 3.8-q5 throuqh 3.8-98. The spray pond is a reservoir, free form in shape, vhich holds approxima+ely 2R million gal of wa~er during normal operation. Tha vater surface area is approximately eiqh+ acres and has a depth of approximately 10 ft 6 in. It is designed so that normal operatinq vater is retained in excavation alone, ie, not by constructed embankments. Embankments are provided to ensure a minimum freeboard nf 3 ft and to direct flood water avay from safety relato.d facilities in a controlled manner. he ESSW pumphouse is located at the southeast corner of the spray pond. A reinforced concrete liner covers the entire spray pond and is integrated with the outer valls nf the ESSM Oumphouse. The 'water level .in the pond is controlled by a vei" housed in the FSSM. pumphouse. Puri nq normal oper at ion, excess va ter 's discharqed into t l e susquehanna river via a corduit from the ESsM pumphouse. emerqency spillvay is provided at the east end of the An he 'ly articioated use of this spillvay vill be either malfunction of '.he discharge conduit leadinq out of pond. during a the ESSM pumphouse or durinq certain postulated flood conditions. This is discussed in Suhsec~ion 2.4.8. 'rhe'SSW and PHP pipes enter the sout h side of the pond and traverse to the spray bank areas buried in 18 in. of corcrete, provided a s missile protection. Concrete columns support the riser pipes in the spray bank areas. Re v. 35, 0 7/84 3 8-55
SSES-PShH Turbjgg Bgj,gdgjq Refer to Piqures 3.9-80 through 3.8-84, 3.8-88 '.8-90, and 3 8-q~. The turbine building is divided into two units with an expansion joint set>aratina the two units. It houses two in-line turbine qenerato" units and auxiliary equipment including condensersg condensate pumps, moisture separators, air e jectors, feedwater heaters, reactor feed pumps, motor-generator sets for reactor recirculating pumps, recombiners, interconnecting piping and valves, and switchqears. Two 220-ton overhead cranes are provided abcve the operating floor for service of both-tu bine generator units. Two einforced concrete tunnels, one for each unit, are provided for the off-qas pioeline at the foundation level be~ween the recomhiners and the radwaste building. Reinforced concrete tunnels are also provided for the main steam lines. below the operating floor from the reactor building to the condenser areas of the turbine generators. The turbine buildinq rests on a reinforced concrete mat foundation. Th~ superstructure is framed with structural steel hard reinforced concrete. Riqid steel frames support the two 220-.on cranes. Th~y also resist all transverse (east-west) lateral loads. Stoel hracinqs resist longitudinal (north-south) .lateral loads above the operatinq floor. Below this level, reinforced concrete shear walls transfer all lateral loads to the foundations. A seismic separation gas, also serving as an expansion )oint, is orovided near the center of the buildinq between the two units.
~~~eismic separation qaps are also provided at the interface of turt inc building with the reactor, control, and radwaste buildinqs.~~
The floors of the turbine building are of reinforced concrete on structural steel beams. They are designed as diaphragms for late ~1 load transfer to the ".hear walls. The roof is built-up roof;,.q on metal deckinq. Pxterior walls are precast reinforced conc ete panels except for the upper 30 ft, which are metal siding. Interior walls required for radiation shielding or fire protection are constructed of reinforced concrete block. These walls are not used as elements of the load resistant system ~ The turbine qeno.rator units are suppor.ed on freestanding reinforced concrete pedestals. The mat foundations for the nedes+als are founded on rock at the same level as the base mat Rev 35'7/84 3.8-56
SS LS-PSAR for the turbine buildinq. Separation points are provided between the pedestals and the turbine building floors and walls to prevent transfer of vibration to the building. 'he operating -floor of the building is supported on vibration damping pads at the %op edge of the pedestal. gOQ w5sgQpu j,lgXQQ Refer.to Piqures 3.8-99 through 3.8-103. The radwaste build'nq houses systems for receiving, processing, end temporarily storinq the radioactive waste products qenerated durinq the operation of the plant. Xt is a reinforced concrete structure on a mat foundation. The bearing wa.lls are of reinforced concrete and are designed as shear walls to resist lateral loads. The floors and roof are of reinforced concrete supported by a beam and column framing system and are de.iqned as diaphraqms to resist lateral loads. The columns. are supported by base plates on the mat foundation. The reinforced concrete walls and floor meet structural as well as radiation shieldinq requirements. Mhere structurally nermissible, concrete block masonry walls are used at certain locations to provide better access for erection and installation of equipment. The block walls also meet the radiation shielding requirements. The radwaste building is separated from the turbine building by a zap. IN 5KLT The codes, standards'nd speci'fications used in the design, fabrication, and construction of the structures listed in Suhsection 3.8.4 are sho~n in Table 3.8-1 an4 include reference numbers 10A, 18, 1H, 2H, 3H, 1J, 2K, 3K, and 1L. l2A 8, '.. 3 Loads .;"d Load Comb. nat ions n .he followinq loads and load combinations are considered in the desiqn of Seismic Category I structures (other than the .ontainment) . Rev. 35 '7/84 3.8-57
SSFS-FSAR O7 3 8 4,324, 1
~~~ Descriotion of. Loads For a general description of loads, see Subsection 3.8. 1. 3. 2.~~
Table 3.8-8 describes the load rombinations applicable to the reartor huildinq. TableS 3. 8-9'ont ainp the load combinations applicable to Seismic Category I structures other than the reactor building. Table 3. 8-10 describes the load rombinations used in the desiqn of the turbine and the radvaste buildings.
.he structures described in Subsection 3.8.4.1 are designed to maintain elastic behavior under various loads and their combinations. The loads and the load combinations are fully desrribed in'Subsection 3.8.4.3. All reinforced concrete com n en+ of the structure are designed by the strength method qp.'cI ~yper ACI 318 (Reft.10A of Table 3.8-1 . All structural stee components are desiqne y . e working stress method per AISC specif ication (Ref lH of Table 3. 8-1) . cay >>A Det'ermination of. wind and tornado loads is described in Section 3.3 Seismic de ian of s+ructures is described in Section 3. 7. The buildinqs are analyzed dvramically.
Desiqn of structure for missile protection i" covered in Subsection 3.5.3. Computer programs STRESS and ICFS STRIJDL-II (Ref 1 and 2 respectively of Subsection 3. R. 4.8) are used to analyze strn:..~ural "..":-"'raminq. The refuelinq'acili'y of the reactor buildinq is desiqned based on finite element analysis by use of computer program NRI/STARDYNE 3 (Ref 3 of Subsection 3.8.4.8) . 4 7he soray pond is basically a concrete-lined soil strurture. Its desiqn is discussed in Subsection 2.5.5. Concrete masonry blockvalls in all Seismic Cateqory,T. structures have been analyzed dynamically as described in Section 3.7b.3.1.5. They are desiqned for out-of-plane and in-plane iner+ia forces generated by the mass of the blockwall and Rev. 35, 07184 3 8-58 ~-
Qa" j+ 58 g.7 C
'IESEL GENERATOR UILDING Refer to- Figures 3.8-l05 and 3.8-l06 rhe diesel genera'o!. i'. bu1ldinc houses the diesel <i,"no,-at<ir, wnicn will be used as a replacement'or any one of the .ou; uxi:;tin>>;
dz.esel generators. The main purpose of the diesel generator 'E's to allow maintenance to be performed on any one of the four existing diesel generators without the necessity for a unit outage. The diesel generator 'E'uilding is a two-story structure with a basement consisting primarily of reinforced concrete. A gap is orovided between the pedestal and the floor slab at grade level so that no vibrations from the diesel generator are transmitted to the building. The outer reinforced concrete walls and roof of the diesel generator 'E'uilding are designed to resist effects of tornado missiles. A portion o'f the outer wall is removable to facilitate diesel generator installation and/or "emergency removal and maintenance operation. This removable wall portion is also designed to resist the effects of tornado missiles.
0 SSES-PSAR attachment loads, combined with other loads as descrihed in Tables 3.8-8 and 3 8-9. Mails in the turbine and radvaste buildings have been designed for seismic loads per UBC (Ref. 1L of Table 3. 8-1) . g g 4 Q S+guctugg1 ~pep ggce ggjtegj,a Re2,gfogced Co))QXQie hup A 4%309 The reinforced concrete structural components are designed by the strength method per ACI 318~(ReQ.10A of Table 3.8-1 for loads and load combinations described in Su section 3.8.4.3. AuP l'L A St J:Zc. ural Ster,l The s+ructural steel components are designed by the vorking stress method per AISC specification (Ref 1H of Table 3.8-1) for loads.and load combinations described in Section 3.8.4 allowable st es.es for different load combinations are indicated
~~'. The t herein.~~
All masonry blockvalls are reinforced walls and do not act as shear valls. Masonry blockvalls are designed by the working stress method per UBC (Ref. 1L of Table 3.8-1) . The allovable loads per UBC Tables 24-B or 24-H (special inspection) are modified as described in Tables 3.8-8, 3.8-9 and 3 8-12, except ~ as noted below. For double vythc walls designed as composite sections and having concrete or grout infill thickness of 8 inches or more, the allowable shear or tension betveen 1.1 f ~ i.e. 43 p.s.i. However, masonry block 'and infill the actual design stress does is no+ exceed 15 p.s.i. For other double vythe walls, allowable ."-hear/tension stress is assumed to be zero at the interface. 3.8. ~.6 Haterials, Qual'ity Control, and S pecial Cogsfgugtiog Tecggj,gus s 3 8 4 6 c-1 Concrete -- and Peinforcina
~ 9 Steel The concrete and reinforcing steel materials are discussed in Appendix 3.RP. Concrete design compressive strengths are given in Table 3. 8-11. Materials for concrete block masonry walls are discussed in Appendix 3. RC.
Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 8-59
SSHS-PSAR 'The various structural steel components conform to the followinq specificat ions: Item Speci Q,gyt 2,on Reams, qirder, and plates ASTN A36 and ASTI A588 Pox columns includinq base plato.s and cap plates AST< A588 Structural tubinq ASTI A500 and ASTH A501 Hiqh strenath bolts AST".l A325 and ASTI A490 Studs ASS D1 ~ 1 d>8~4~6~ZaZ Huldina aalu 2aad sizuctiva eatinq Meldinq and nondestructive testinq is performed in accordance with either AMS D1.1 (Ref. 10 of Table 3.8-1) or Section EX of the ASIDE Cede (Ref. 1J of Table 3.8-1) . Rev. 35, 07/84 3. 8" 60
SSES-FSAR g 8 4 6 7, g fabZgglfgon Md gKQ~$ 29 The fabrication and erection of structural steel conforms to the AISC specification (Ref. 1H, 28 and 3H of Table 3.8-1) . 1 3~8~4~6~g~4 pug],gy Contgol gualitv control of structural steel for the construction phase is discussed in Appendix D of the PSAB and amendments to the PSAR. 4 $ g 'gycggl Consgpgctgon gecgpigueg Techniques involved in the construction of Seismic Category I structures are standard construction procedures. g,8~4~7 Testing ynd I))-gepyice Inypection pegui~emgnfs Testing and in-service inspection are not required for Seismic Category I structures (other than +he containment) . 3.8.4.8 Computer Programs Used in the Desiqn and Analysis o f Other Sggsmgc Cgtggo~~ Stgug~gQs STRESS, Department of Civil Engineering, massachusetts Institute of Technology
2) ICES STRUDL-II, Department of Civil Engineering, massachusetts Institute of Technology

3) NRI/STABDYNE (Version 3), Control Data Corporation.
For r ther comouter programs . ef er to Subsection 2. 5. 5 and Section 3 ' 3~ 8 5 FOUNDATIONS This subsection describes foundations for all Seismic Category I structures except tho spray pond. The spray pond is basically a soil structure end its design is discussed in Subsection 2.5.5. Descriptions of foundations for safety related non-Seismic Rev. 35, 07g84 3 8-61
Qu SS ES- PS AR cateqory I structures, such as the turbine building and the radvaste building, are also includeR in this section. 3~/~5~/ pyscgfption o f thegogndgtiggg Typical Retails of the foundations for various structures are shovn on Fiqure'.8-104. Reinforced concrete mat foundations have been provided for all structures. The mats rest on sound rock except the ESSW pumphouse mat is supported by natural soil. All bearing valls of the structures are rigidly connected to the foundation mat. Where steel columns are provided, they are attached to the mat by base plates and anchor bolts. The bearing walls and the steel columns, carry all the vertical loads. from the structure to the mat. Horizontal shears due to wind, tornado, and seismic loads are transferred to the shear valls by the roof and floor diaphragms. The shear valls transfer the horizontal shears to the foundation mat and from there to the foundation medium through friction. Also, as shown on Figure 3.8-104, the . ides of the base mats of all the structures except the ESSW pumphouse are keyed +o <<he foundation rock all around by poured concrete, vhich helps in transferrinq the horizontal shears to the foundation rock. The edqes of the ESSW pum chouse base mat are poured directly aqainst the excavated slopes of the natural soil formation. A mudmat (unreinforced concrete layer) is provided between the base of the foundation mat and the foundation medium. Except for the ESSW pumphouse, a vaterp oofing membrane is provided in the mudmat ard on the outside face of peripheral subterranean walls perforated pipes are provided around the periphery of the b'uildinqs to collect groundvater seepage and drain it to the sumps. Waterproofing membrane urder the ESSW pumphouse foundation mat is not considered necessary as the predicted groundwater, table at the pumphouse site is well belov the foui".tion mat -refer to Subsection 2.5. 5) . Peripheral subterranean valls are designed to resist lateral pressures due to backfill, qroundvater, and surcharge loads, in addition to dead loads, live loads, and seismic loads. Cd@<<gj,ggapg: The containment foundation is described in Subsection 3.8. 1. gyagtog Build/I)g and Cogtgol Quilting: The foundation mats of the reactor and control huildinqs are poured monolithically. Rev. 35, 07r84 3~ 8-62
SSES-PSAR The reactor building foundation mat is approximately 4 ft 9 in ~ thick-.and is reinforced typically with f11 bars at 12 in. centers. at top and bottom in both the north-south and east-vest directions. The mat surrounds the containment mat, with a cold joint separating the tvo. The control building foundation mat is about 2 ft 6 in. thick and is reinforced typically with 48 bars at 12 in. centers at top and bottom in the north-south direction and f11 bars at 12 in. centers at top and $ 8 bars at 12 in. centers at bottom in the east-west direction. A cold joint is provided betveen the control and the turbine building mats. Oping~], Gogegagog Bujlaqnq: The foundation mat of the .diesel aenerator building 'is approximately 2 ft 6 in. thick and is reinforced typically with 49 bars at 12 in. centers at top and bottom in both +he north-south and east-vest directions. h cold joint is provided betveen the diesel generator pedestal mat and the diesel generator building FSSQ gum@house: The foundation mat of the FSSM pumphouse is about 3 ft thick and is reinforced typically vith 09 bars at 12 in. centers at +op and bottom in both the north-sout'h and east-vest directions. guqbine Building: The turbine building mat is approximately 2 ft 6 in. thick and is reinforced typically vith 06 bars at 12 in. cent'ers at top and bottom in both the north-south and east-west directions. A cold joint is provided betveen the turbine pedestal mat and the turbine building mat. gagvasgg Bujgging: The radvaste building mat is about 3 ft thick and i.. reinforced typically vith 49 bars at 12 in. centers at top and bottom in both -the nor+,h-south and east-west directions. II4$ 6Rihe codes, standards, and specifications used in the design, fabri.".ation, and construction of foundations of structures are list.. in Table 3.8-1. The loads and load combinat ions used in the design of the containment foundation are described in Subsection 3.8. 1.3. The loads and load combinations used in the design of foundations of other Seismic Category I structures are discussed in Subsection 3.8.4.3. In addition, the following load combinations are Be v. 35, 0 7/84 3~ 8-63
SSES-FShR considered to determine the factors of safety against sliding and overturning due to winds, tornadoes, and seismic loads, and aqainst flotation due to groundwater pressure: a) D+H+W b) D+H+W'R D e~+ eS, c) D+,H+'E d) D+H+8') D+P where: D, W, W', S, and and 3.8.4.3 and E're as described in Subsections 3.8.1. 3 H and P are as follows: H = Lateral cart h pressure F = Buoyant force due to qroundwater pressure. g~g~g~4 Pepingpd ggalgsgs Pgoceduges The foundations are qenerally designed to maintain elastic behavior under different loads -and their combinations. The loads and the load combinations are described in Subsection 3.8.5.3. The design and analysis of the reinforced concrete mat foundations have been carried out in accordance with ACE 318 A<o AcZ549 (Re fs.10A ~ f Ta hie 3. 8-1) .- AwD I> A The hearing walls and the steel columns carry all the vertical , loads from the structure to the foundation mat. The -lateral loads are transferred to the shear walls by the roof and floor diaphragms, which then transmit them to the foundation mat. Dotermination of overturning moment due,to seismic loads is disc'issed in Subsection 3 7. ".. 14.
%b Fxcept for ESSW pumphouse, settlement of the foundations of Seismic Category I structures is considered negligible as the foundations are supported hy sound rock. The settlemen of the HSSW pumphouse mat is considered in the design and is discussed in Subsection 2. 5. 4.
As ~xplained in Subsection 3.8. 5.1 and shown in Figure 3.8-104, the sides of the foundation mats (except for the KSSW pumphouse) are keyed to the rock by poured concrete, which resists sliding of the mats. Stability aqainst slidinq for the ESSW pumphouse is Rev. 35, 07/84 3 8-64
XNSERT
~~'D'XESEL GENERATOR ' 'UXLDXNG foundation of the diesel generator 'E'uildin is a MAT The 3 '-10" thick and zs reinforced ty centers at top and bottom in both o~~
ll ypica y withh 59 bars a thee north-nort -south and east-west directions.
SSFS-FSAR maintained by the friction on the underside of the basemat and passive resistance of the soil against the edge of the mat. Detailed description of the foundation rock and soil is contained in Subsections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5. Por design purposes, the a'llowable bearing pressures of rock and soil are 40 and 2.5 tons/sq- ft respectively. The calculated bearing pressures for loads and load combinations described in Subsection 3.8.5.3 do not exceed these allowable values.
~~'J The design and analysis of the containment foundation mat are discussed in detail in Subsection 3.8.1.4.~~
3~ 8~ 5~) S tggcg ugy 1 Qccgpfg gee Q$ t egga The foundations of all Seismic Category I structures are designed to meet themselves. the same structural'cceptance criteria as the structures These criteria are discussed in Subsections .3.8 and 3.8 4.5. In addition, for the additional load combinations
~~'. 5 delineated in Subsection 3 8. 5. 3, the minimum allorable factors of safetv against overturning, sliding, and flotation are as follows:~~
I.ggd Comggngtj,an Oyertuggigg Sliding Floatation a) D+H+I 1.5 1 ~ 5 b) D~H~W ~ ~a D+H+ W~s 1. 1 1 ~ 1 c) D+H+8 1 ~ 5 1.5 d) D+H+P. i 1 1 1 ~ 1 e) D+P The calculated factors of safety exceed the above minimum factor of saf et v. 4ev. 35, 07/84 3~ 8-65
SSES-PSAR 3 ~ 8~ 5~6 Haterials,'uality Control, and Special construction Taahnlm~a The foundations of Seismic Category I structures are constructed of reinforced concrete. The concrete and reinforcing steel materia.ls are discussed in Appendix 3.8B. Concrete design compressive strenqths are qiven in Table 3.8-11. Techniques involved in the construction of these foundations are standard construction procedur'es. The containment foundation is load tested during the structural acceptance test as described in Subsection 3.8 1.7 An in-service surveillance program to aonitor the settlement of the ESSI pumphouse foundation has been instituted. Detailed discussion of the proqram is contained in Subsection 2.5.I. Testinq and in-service inspection is not necessary for foundations of all other Seismic Category I structures. pev, 35, 07g80 3. 8-66
SSES ~LR Xhl(5 2+9=1 LIST OP APPLICABLE CODES STANDARDS RECORRENDATIONS ~ LND SPECIFICATIONS Page 1 of 6 Reference Desiqnation Title Editloni Qg '6, ELDER. Nuahec (A) hnariaaa caaarara zaifirafB LCI 211 1 Becoaaended Practice for Selecting Proportions for 1970 19( Nocaal aad Heavyveiqht Coacrete ACI 21q Recoaaended Practice foc Evaluation of Coapression 1965 )977 Test Results of Pield Coacrete ACI 301 Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings 1972 )98l Lcy 304 Recoaaended Pcacti.ce for Beasur inqi Biringg 1973 (978 Transporting, and Placing Concrete ACI 305 Recoaaended Practice for Hot Neather Concreting 1972 (917 LCI 306 Recoaaende4 Practice for Cold Qeather Concreting 1966 (1972) )$ 78 7A ACI 307 Specif ication. for the Design an 4 Construction 1969 of Reinforced Concrete Chi.aneys ACI 308 Recoaaunded Practice for curing concrete 197'1 l98 ( ACT 309 Recoaaended Practice f or Consolidation of Concrete 1972 10A ACI 318 Buildinq Code Requireaents for Reinforced Concrete 1971 (077 ACI 3q7 Becoaaended Practice fo'r Concrete Pocavork 1968 (978 12L LCI 399 Ccitecia foc Reinforced Concrete Nuclear Paver Containaent Structures (included in ACI annual of Standar4 Practice, Pact 2, 1973) 13l ACI SP2 Ranual of Concrete Inspectioa 1975 )$ 8l (8) hn~ricdn Melding Raaintx 18 LNS Dl 1 Stcuctucal Neldinq Code 1972 (Generally all vock) 19a ~ 1975, 1980, 1981 (Soae vock after June 1975) 28 ANS D12 1 Recoaaended Practice for Ne14ing Beinforcing Steel 1961 an4 connections in Reinforced concrete construction C listed; later ppditions applied, for specific cases>cl hS p16SEC cz<ekAToR ~ iprinciplp //ditions used are may be 8uic Al4$. Rev. 35, 07/84
SSES-PSakk KALI@ 1 B-1 iConlin004). P~ae 2 of 6 Reference Desianation Title - Editioni bQ C BLDG,. Nuaber (C) q5 HRQl.Bif. BBBRlRCBfY CQRBiM1M IC BG 1 10 Bschaaical {Cadveld) Splices ia Rei.nforciag Bars of Revision \ Category I Concrete Structures Jaa 1973 2C RG 1~ 15 Testing of Reinforciag Bars foc Category I Revision 1 Coacrste Structures Dec 1972 3C BG I ~ IB Stcuctural Ac" sptaaca Test for Coacrets Revision 1 Pciaary Reactor Containaents Dec. 1972 4C RG I 19 Iloadsstructive Exaaiaatioa of Priaary Revision 1 Coataiaasat Liner Rsl4s Aug. 1972 SC BG I 54 Quality Assucaace Reguireaents for Protective June 1973 Coatings Applied to Rater-Coole4 Povsr Plants 6C RG I ~ SS Coaccsts Placeaeat ia Category l Structures June 1973 7C BG 1 ~ 57 Design Liaits and Loading Coabinations for June 1973 Betal Priaacy Reactor Coatainasat Systea Coaponeats r SC BG 1k SB Qualification of Ruclsar Povsf Plant Zaspectionr Aug. 1973 Exaainationr and Testing Psrsonael BG I ~ 69 Coacrete Radiatioa Shields for Nuclear-Pover Plants Dsc 1973 10C RG 1 ~ 94 Quality Assurance Bsquireaeats for Iastallationr Apr 1975 AP/t. I976, Inspection, and Testing of Structural Coacrete an4 C Stcuctucal Steel Duciag the Construction Phase of ~<f IASf/LP E Nuclear Pover Plaats ~lkl kk rirkk-.k kiktxoikk k kiikk kkk ckkkkiklk 10 ASTI AS)9 Seaalesa Cacbon aad Alloy Steel Nechaaical Tubiag 1971 1974, 1975 ABATOR 20 ASTB A615 Dsforsed aa4 Plain Billet steel Bars for concrete 1972r 1974r 1975 Reinforcsaent 30 ASTB C29 Unit Vsight of Aggregate 'I971 ASTB C31 llakiaq and Cuciag Coaccste Test Speciasns in the 1969 I 983 P is id C~g.kI 5
~~~principl)/ Xjditions used are listed> later jj(ditions may be applied for specific cases>SOC)) AS DI<~~
eO)l.y IQQ. Rev. 35, 07/B4
SSES-FSLR spill,g i a-1 gcookkRH94l. Page 3 of 6 Reference Designation Title Editiono DO 'C l3t. OC,. Nuabar LSTN C33 Concrata iqqragatas 1971r 1974 LSTN C39 Coapraasiva Strength of Cylindrical Concrete 1972 tgel Speciaans 7D LSTN C40 Organic tapurities in Sands for Concrete 1966'973 i979 an LSTN C87 Effect of Organic Zapurities in Fine Aggregate on 1969 Strength of Nortar qn ASTN C88 Soundness of Aqgraqates by Use of Sodiua Sulfate or 1971'973 >)76 Naqnasiua Sulf ate 10o LSTN C94 Ready-Nixad Concrete 1973 ~ 1974 19 SB 11D ASTN C109 coaprassiva stronqth of Hydraulic caaeat Nortars 1973, 1975 i98o 12D ASTN C117 Naterials Finer than Ro. 200 Sieve in Nineral 1969 l98o Aqqraqates by Mashing 13D ASTN C123 Liqhtvaiqht Pieces in Aggregate 1969 lg& 3 14n LSTN C127 specific Gravity an4 Absorption of Coarse Lgqragata 1968, 1973 <)8 I i'Oit 15O ASTN C128, Specific Gravity and lbsorption of Pine Lgqregate 1968, 1973 l919 I 16D ASTN C131 Resistance to nebraskan of Saall Size Coarse Aggregate 1969 l)S I by Usa of the Los. Angeles Nachine 17D ASTN C136 Sieve or Screen Analysis of Fiae an4 Coarse Aggregates 1971 (ps 3 180 ASTN C138 Unit Makqht ~ yields an4 lir content of Concrete 1973'974'975 itsl LSTN C142 Clay Luaps an4 Friable Particles in lgqraqatas 1971 >978 20n LSTN C143 Sluap of Portlan4 Caaant Concrete 1971, 1974 1978 lSTN C150 Portland Caaaat 1973 ~ 1974r 1976+ l980 >yP4A-1978'960 22D LSTN C215 Fundaaantal Transverse, Lonqitudinali an4 Torsional-Fraquancias of Concrete Speciaans 23D ASTN C231 Lir Content of Freshly Nixad Concrete by the 1973 ~ 1974 ~ 1975 Pressure Nathod
Principld Zjfditions used are listed; later Nditions may be applied for specific cases +> ylgS6i, l48l4SC,ATOL 6 pl S l46 Rav. 35, 07/84
SSES-PSLH ThQl,a ) 5=} }coafiaaail Page 4 of 6 Reference Nuabec Designation Editionv Dg ' SLDQ. 24D ASTH C235 Scratch Hardnsss of Coarse Lqqregate Particles 1968 25n 'ASTH C260 Air Entraining Ldaixtures foc Concrete 1973'974 260 ASTH C289 Potential Reactivity of Lqqregates 1971 19 8 I 270 LSTH C295 Petrographic Exaaination of Lqgregates for Concrete 1965 I) 7g 28D ASTH C311 Saapling and Testing Ply Lsh for Use as aa Ldaixture 1968 in Poctland Ceaent Concrete 29n ASTH C330 Liqhtveiqht Aggregates for Structural Concrete 1969m 1975 3nn LSTH C469 Statl.c Hodulus of Elasti.city and Poisson's Ratio of 1965 Concrete in Coapcession 31D LSTH C494 cheaical Adaixtures for Concrete 1971 lg 82. 32n ASTH C566 total Hoisture Content of Lggcegate by Dcyinq 1967 f978 3 '10 ASTH C618 Ply.Lsh and Rav or Calcined Hatural Poxxolans for 1973 Use in Portlan4 Cesent Concrete ASTH C637 Lqqreqates for Ra4iation Shiel4ing Concrete 1973 (E) hREKicaa haaaQiakiaa of uata lliahMRY 404 XXaaramlaliaa~Uakali LASH'TO T26 Quality of Hater to be Used in Concrete 1970 AASHTO T150 Parcentaqe of Particles of Less Than 1.95 Specific 1949 Oravity in Coarse Aggregate AASHTO T161 Resistance of Concrete Speciaens to Rapid Preexinq 1970 an4 thaving in Rater [pl Lt5 hfaY cnL'Baof Eaaiaaal'a 1P CRD C36 Tost for Tharaal Diffusivity of Concrete 1973 2P CRn c39 Test foc Coefficient of Linear Thecaal Expansion 1955 of Concrete 3P CRD C119 Test foc Plat an4 Elongated Particles in Coarse 1953 Lqqr eqat e 4F CRJ) G572 5pgcl FlCA /If'OR PolVVI<VLclLOkl>a HgTLRSgoP 197 0
~~<4~o P Cg R ~L>i<4~~
+Principlg ypditions used are listedg iaterpdditions may be, applied for spa.cific casesy50C H hS Dl6$ EL . Ca<~ Rov. 35, 07/84
0 SSES- PSAh Thh))l y s=l lcanlinna4). Page 5 of 6 Reference Huaber Desiqaation Ti t.le Edition+ QG, 'a )L<yq. (G) haaxjnaa nnziannl Qlaadax{la Iaaajhnln 10 LHSI Hu'5~2~5 Supplesentacy QL Requireaents for Installationt 1972 )$ Inspection and Testing of Structural Concrete and Structural Steel Ducing the Constcuction Phase of Hucleac Pover Plants. 7'dSfa.T F AHSI H101 6 Concrete Radiation Shields 1972 (H) daarjnaa Innljlnja af 5lnnl Qanajrncljon 1H LISC Specification for the Design, Pabricstion, and 1969 07s Erection of structural Steel for Buildings and Supplesent Hos. 1~ 2 and 3 2H A ISC Code of Staadard Practice for Steel Buildings 1970 (Soae vork before) )076 and Bridges 1972 (Generally all vock) 1976 (Soae work aftec Sept 1976) 3H AISC Specification for Structural Joints Using 1966,1972 and 197& ) f75 ASTI A325 or l490 Bolts 4H AISC Specification for the design~ 1978 (Soae vork fabrication and erection of after July 1977) Structural Steel. for buildiags (J) dan@jean 50njntX af nachanjgaj hagjaaaca ASHE ASHE Boiler and Pcessure Vessel Code, 1971 vith Addenda Sections II, III, V, VIII'nd IX thcough Susaer 1972 {K) gacb)ej pnHRI CDIaolaljnn~ dna gKangjanai CnjjfnKnja~,goajcaj ))apogean 1K BC-TOP-1 Containaent Building liner Plate Revision 1 Design Report Dec 1972 2K DC-TOP-4-l Seisaic Analyses of Structures and Equipaent Revision 3 tor Huclear Pover Plants Hov 1974 3K DC-TOP-9A Oesiqn or Structures for Hissile Ispact Revision 2 Sept 1974 (L) Intngnd jjnnai Cnnfefaaca of t)ajjgjng Of fjc ja js A 8 <eg&nhloP- c ~Principlpfgpfditions used are listed> later+ditions may be applied for specific cases> ~VC.H A> SuLDIIJ Q. Rev. 35, 07/84
SSES-PSLa.
~~~ggl,g 3 S-1 ICoatinue41.~~
Page 6 of 6 . Reference Desiqnation Title Bditione Ilnaher Unifora Quildinq Code 1973, 1976 j Principl jfj(ditions Rev. 35, 07/84 used are listeds later pgditions may be applied for specific cases SVCn 4>
~~<4al 6 RA ToR E WIt> ~<0.~~
INSERT QQktg Oooo STaADhRP RGV JGQ pC AQ FOL 1'l<a ~~~>>~ oF ~+Fa~ ~ AiALgsts Qgp>pyg FoR HvccbhR Poplck 12C 1.28 Quality Assurance Program Requirements 2/79 (Design and Construction) 1'fC 1.60 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of 12/73 Rev. 1 Nuclear Power Plants AC l. 61 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear 10/73 Rev. 0 Power Plants 15C 1.76 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power':;Plants 4/74 Rev. 0 lgC 1.92 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial 2/76 Rev. 1 Components in Seismic Response Analysis AC 1. 117 Tornado Design Classification 4/78 Rev. 1PC 1. 132 Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear 3/79 Rev. 1 Power Plants )AC l. 142 Safety-Related Concrete Structures for 10/81 Rev. 1 Nuclear Power Plants (other than Reactor Vessels and Containments)
IH5ERQ p ipse ZcF GR~WC~ao. 9a'ip H AT TITLE S b>T>Ou ANSI N45.2 Quality Assurance Program Requi rements Facilities, for Nuclear l977 Rite% ANSI N45.2.2 Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items i)78 for Nuclear Power Plants, N45.2.5 Supplementary Quality Ass Requirements for lation, Inspectio Testing of S al Concrete and tructura el During the Construction Phase ear Power Plants, 1974 ANSI N45.2.6 Qualifications of Inspection, Examination and Testing Personnel for the Construction i)78, Phase of Nuclear Power Plants, I I ANSI N45.2.9 Requirements for Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Power Plants, ANSI N45.2.10 Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions, sq ANSI N45.2.11 Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants, ANSI N45.2.12 Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance Programs for l)7I Nuclear Power Plants, I ANSI N45.2.13 Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of Procurement= of I<76 Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants, lip ANSI N45.2.23 Qualifications of Quality Assurance Program Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power l)78 Plants,
~~.'I E9'i7104 5 ARE 05t' I~~
SSES-FSAR Q6 TABLE 3- a-8 (P~ 1 <>~ 4) LOAD COHBENATZONS APPLICABLE 70 3:-AC OH BUELDINr, W ~s,= <<Ta, P~o'K I HIT/ Missla.6 I op > Notations I .v'ind load Tornado wind load fs = Calculated stress in structural s"e 1 Fs = Allovable stress for structural steel Fy = Yield strength of structu"al s eel Ho= Force on structure due to ..hermal expansion of pipes under ope"ating conditions Ha= "-orce on structure due to thermal i expansion of pipes under acciden+
,, condi.ions Ds Force on blockvall due to story drift under operating Basis Earthquake Loading D's Force on blockwall due to story drift under Safe Shutdown Earthquake Loading Allowable stress for rein orced con"rete masonry per UBC, Table 24-H (special inspec..ion) for global wall analysis; or allovable stress or unreinforced concrete ma onry per UBC Table 24-3 (special inspection) fo=
local vali analysis as a result o a. +achments. Allovable vorking stress in tens'on fo" reinforcing steel (as specified in UBC) . Yield strength of reinforcing -teel. For all other notations, see Table 3.8-2. A >ein orced Concrete Normal operating loads: U = 1.4=.--:1.7L+1.0T + 25 H 0 0 Normal opera ing loads vi.h Severe environmental loads: U = 0 ~ 75[ 1 4D+ 1 ~ 7L+1 ~ 7 (1 ~ 1) E ]+ 1 ~ OTO+ 1 ~ 25 HH U = 0 75 (1 4D+1 7L+1 7H) +1 OTO+' 25 Ho Where overturning forces cause net tens'on in the absence of live load, the folloving load combinations are considered: U = 0 ~ 9D+1 3 {1 1) E+1 ~ OTo ~ 1 ~ 25 U = '0 90+1 39+1 OTO + 1 25 Ho Rev. 35, 07/84
SSES-.".S AR TABLe 3. 8-8 ~Continue+) (p8 2 of n) Por s" uc ural shear walls carrying se'smi" orces, the following load combination is also considered: U = 1.0D+1.0I+1 SE+1 OTo + 1.25 Ho Normal operating loads with Extreme environmental loads: 7 = 1 OD+1.0L+1.0T +1.0W' 1.0 H Normal operating loads with Abnormal loads: U = 1.05D+1 05L+1 0 (T o+T ) a +1.0P+ l. 5P + 1.0 Ho Normal operating loads with Severe env'ronmental and Ahnormal loads: r U = 1 OSD+1 05L+1 ~ 0(TO+T )+1 ~ OR+1 25.+1 25E + 1 0 Ho Where overturning forces cause,net tension 'n the absence o live load, the following load, combination is considered: U = 0e95D+1 25E+1 0 (To+T ) +1 ~ OR + 1 0 Ho Normal operating loads with Extreme environmental and Abnormal loads: U = 1.0D+1 OL+1e0 (To+T )+1.0- '+1 ~ OP+1 OR + 1.0 U = 1 OD+1 OL+1 OTo+1 Sc,'+1-OR + 1.25 H a Rev. 35. 07/84
SSZS-FS AR TABLE 3.8-8 ~Continue"..) (Pg 3 of 4) B. Structural Steel Condition Load Combing ion Allowable Stress Increase Normal operating loads: D.+L + T 0
+
~~0 Normal operating loads with Severe environmental loads: D+L+ To+5 +Ho l. 25 Fs D + L + T 0~~
+ N + H 0 >.33 FA Normal operating loads with Extreme env iro nme n ta 1 loads: D + L + T 0 + -.l~. + H 0 See note belo~
~~Normal operating loads with Extreme environmental 'and Abnormal Loads: D+L+R+T + "+P+H See no.e belo~ D+L+R+(T+T)~~
~~+ P+ ~' H See note belo~~~
Note: ;he allowable stress in structural steel does not exceed, O.g Fy in bending, 0.35 Fy in axial tension or co~pression, and 0.5 Fy in shear. <<here Zs is gove ned by requirements of stability (local or lateral buckling}, fs does not exceed 1.5 Fs. Rev. 35, 07/84
S S ES- ...S AP. Qzq TILB~E3.~8-8 ContgnuEB) (u8 u uf 8) C. Conc "et e <ason~rStructures~31ockra lie L Safety "elated blockwalls in category .". st uctures othe" than "he reactor building are designed for the following load combinations and allowable stress increase. The load "ombinations apply to out-o -plane loading as sell as in-plane loading. Acceptance criteria is in accordance vith Subsection 3.8.4.5. Condition Load Combination Allovab1e Stres Increase Normal D+L+T+H o a No increase Normal/Severe D+ L+T0 + H 0
+ E+ D s No increase Normal/Extreme D+L+T+H+ o 0 See Table 3. 8 Abnormal D+L+(T+T}+q+0 'See Table 3, 8 oa"'a o a a Abnormal/Severe . D+L+ (T + T ) +3!+H +1~25E+D "s See Table 3.8 Abnor ma 1/E xtreme D+L+ (T +T a ) - "a +E'+D' +2+2 s See Table 3. 8 Rev.
SSES-FSAR TABLE 3 8 9 (pg I pf 3) LOAC COMBINATIONS APPLICABLE TO SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES OTHER THAN CONTAINMENT~M4 REACTOR BUILDING SLABS Cl" QEA GR ATOR. 6 Sett. Dtd
~
Notations: See Tables 3.8-2 and 3 8-8 A. Reinfo ced Conc ete Normal operatinq loads: U = 1 4'D+1 7L+1 ~ OTp+ 1. 25 Hp Normal operating loads with Severe environmental loads: Y U = 0 75(1>>4D+1 7L+1 7 (1 ~ 1E) )+1 OTo+ 1 25 "o U0 75(14D+17L+17W)+10Tp+1 25Hp Where overturninq forces cause net tension in the absence of live load, the following load combinations are considered: \ UO ~ 9D+1 3(,11E)+1 Of()+1 25H
~
UO ~ 9D+13W+1 ~ OTp+125H For structural elements carrying mainly seismic forces: U 1 ~ 0D+ 1 ~ OL+ 1 8E+ 1 OTp+ 1 25 H 'ormal operatinq loads with Extreme environmental loads: U = 1'DC+1 OL+1 OW'+1 ~ OTp+ 1.0 H p Normal operating load with Severe environmental and Abnormal loads: U = '. -05Dt 1. 05L+1 ~ <5E+1 ~ 0 (Tp+Ta) >1.0R + 1.0 H Where overturning forces cause net tension in the absence of live loa<i, the f o1 low i nq load combination is considered: 0 = 0>>95D+ l>>25E+1 ~ 0 (Tp+T a) + 1>>OR + 1>>0 H a Normal operating loads with Extreme environmental and'bnormal loads: U 10D 10L1 E 10To 10R 12 Ho U1 00+ 10L+1 "DE+10(To+T)+10R+ 1 0H Rev. 35, 07/84
SSES-PSAR TABLE 3. 8-9 QContinuedg < pg ~ B, Stguct ural Steel Condi tion Load Combination Allowable Stress r Normal operating loads: D+ L+To + Ps Normal operating loads with Severe environmental loads: D+L+To +E+Q 1. 25 Fs D+L+To+M+Ho 33 Ps Normal operating loads with Extreme environmental loads: D+LiTp+N'+Hg See note below Normal operating loads with Extreme environmental and Abnormal loads: D+L+R4To+F '+No See note'elow D+L+R+To+Ta4 8'+Ha See note below Note. The allowable stress in structural steel does not exceed 0.9 Fy in bending, 0.85 Fy in axial tension or compre sion, and 0.5 Py in shear. %here Ps is governed by requirements of. stability (local or lateral buckling) ~ f s does not exceed 1.5 Ps. Rev. 35, 07/84
SSES-FSAR TABLE 3.8-9 Continued (pg. 3 of 3) C. Concrete Masonr Structures Blockwalls Safety related blockwalls in the reactor building are designed for the following load combinations and allowable stress increase. The load combinations apply to out-of-plane loading as well as in-plane loading. Acceptance criteria is in accordance with Subsection 3.S.4.5. Allowable Stress Condition Load Combination Increase Normal D+L+To +Ho No increase Normal/Severe D+L+To +Ho +E+D s No increase Normal/Extreme D+ L+T +H+ 0 W'0
~~.See Table 3.8-12 Abnormal D+L+ (T +T ) +R See Table 3.8-12 + 1.25P + 8 a~~
~~Abnormal/Severe D+ + (To+ a) + See Table 3.8-12 Abnormal/Extreme~~
~~+ 1 o25P + Ha +~~
~~E'ee D+L+ (To+Ta) +R+P~~
~~+ Ha+ D's +~~
1 ~ 25E + Ds Table 3.8-12 Rev. 35, 07/&4
TAUI E 3. 8-9a Load Combinations for Diesel Generator 'E'uilding (See tables 3.8-2 and 3.8-8 for definitions of loads and other no ta tions ) The Diesel Generator 'E'uilding is designed for the following load combinations: A. Reinforced Concrete Service Load Combinations:
a. U = 1.4D + 1.7L

b. U = 1.4D + 1.7L + 1.9E

c. U = 1.4D + 1.7L + 1.7W

d. U ='.2D + 1.9E

e. U = 1;2D + 1.7W Where soil or hydrostatic pressures are present and have been included in L and D, z.n addition to all the preceding combinations, the requirements of Sections 9.2.4 and 9.2.5 of ACl 318.77 have been satisfied.
~~Factored Load Combinations:~~
~~a. U = 1.0D + 1.0L + l.OE'.~~
~~U = 1.0D + 1.0L + 1.0W~~
c. U = 1 OD + 1.0L + 1.0W ms Regarding preceding loads which are variabl~, the full range of variation have been considered in order to'etermine the most critical combination of loading.
PAgf 2. OE 2 3H B. Structural Steel The following combinations of loadings have been considered in the design of structural steel seismic Category I struc-tures. S is the required section strength based on the elas-tic design methods and the allowable stresses defined in Part I of American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specifi-cation for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, November, 1978, except that the 33-percent increase in allowable stresses for seismic or wind loadings has not been permitted. In determining the most critical loading condition to be used in design, the absence of a load or loads has been considered as appropriate. Service Load Combinations
a. S=D+L b.S=D+L+E

c. S ='+ L+ W F
~~Factored Load Combinations~~
~~a. 1.6S = D+L+E'.~~
1.6S = D+L+W t c.'.6S = D+L+W ms
SS ES-FS AR TABLE 3,8-11 CONCRETE DES1GN CONPRESSXVE STRENGTHS Concrete Design Compressive Strength, 8 tgnctu~e f 'c (osis
>urbine generator pedestal 3000 All other Seismic Category I and 4000 safety-related, non-Seismic Cateqory I structures and their associated foundation mats includinq:
a ) Co nta inme nt (inc ludinq its internal structures) b) Reactor Building r) Control Building d) Diesel Generator Building e) ESSV Pumphouse E) Spray Pond q) Turbine Building h) Ra dwaste Building A.) g($ ,564 46 ~ K NATO~ Rev. 35, 07/84
Qsc SSES-FSAR A PP END ZX 3 88 CONCRETE, CONCRETE MATERIALS'UALITY Naterials, workmanship, and quality control are based on the code, standards, recommendations and specifications listed in Table 3.8- 1. These documents are modified as required to suit the particular 'conditions associated with nuclear power plant design and construction while maintaininq structural adequacy. Extent of application and principal exceptions are -indicated herein, and as follows: ACX 221=72 a). Provisions of ACI 301-72, Chapter 12 ~ Curing and Protection, shall be modified as follows:
')
~~gagggggph 1g.2~1 shall be revised to read as follows:~~
~ "For concrete surfaces not in contact with forms, one of the following procedures shall be applied immediately after completion of placement and finishinq except that the curing process may be interrupted as necessary not to exceed 8 hours providinq requirements for weather protection are maintained. Such curing process may not be interrupted more than twice with a minimum of 8 hours elaosinq between interruptions. If the curinq i" interrupted for up to 8 hours, the curina time shall be extended to provide a total of 7 days curinq.
~~ii) gyggggggQ 1g,2~/ shall be revised to read as follows:~~
<Curing in ac"ordance with Section 12.2-.1 and 12.2.2 shall',be contained for at least 7 days in the case of all concrete except high-early- .'trenqth concrete for which the period shall, be at least 3 days. Alternatively., if tests are made of cylinders kept adjacent to the'tructure and cured by the same methods, moisture retention measures may be ter'minafed prior to 7 days when test results indicate that the average compressive strength, has reached 70 percent of the specified strength, f'c. Required period of initial curing need not be qreater than the lesser of the two periods. If one of the curing procedures of Section 12.2. 1. 1 through 12.2.1.0 is used it initially, may be replaced by one of the other Rev. 35 '7y80 3~ 88-1
~~Qp SSES-PSAR interpretation of these detail drawings in erecting the reinforcinq steel. While this is also true of Bechtel field operation we do have the additional help and~~
~
quidance of the field enqineers both during the "installation phase and finally at the inspection phase nrior to final siqn-off on the report card. The field enqineers have the added benefit of beinq able to plan and witness the actual installation and can, therefore,.better foresee any di.fficulties in meetinq the intended desiqn requirements. Their assessment of the situation is further assisted by reqular telephone communication with the desiqn enqineers who also periodically visit the Jobsite. The above procedure of delegation of the desiqn engineering office's responsibility to the field personnel and peri.odic monitorinq hy the enqineerinq office ensures correctness and conformance of the shop drawings to the design drawings and-therefore meets the-intent of Requlatory Guide 1.55 (gsEL g~hlENA bR 8 c(IL b/A Af A y e R]A l.s~ WO((l 4 H~NSHh'e8 ~ oA(.( v'y CoarwoL Q4 E'%7oR s7x~dhass, S 4u(C bldg S pE'cl+icn rrW~ 4'M us4Wc g ccoggg~cc >I 7q g~'g Raw(((.4rozy Cozogs,4uc) C DES~ AQUI
~~.boc.uHE<7$ LlsTFP << f~&.'e 3 8-/.~~
Ro.v. 35, 07r8(( 3 8B-17
sj PI I . I+I NI~.
~~-I y D+~liV ~i~~-~~
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!~I:AC7 OH CON TRQI VII-SI=I BI=%I-RAI Ofh Dl~szc <i~~e res Rmalnw~ I I= ~ l uwel!MI= Hull c)IIRG 0 0 -~)rR. aACKF>t gX =Fil~
~~i O O Mn'L L~~
~~. c~ P.~tv=.~~
~~ZI=: i. RGOVC~~
~~~~= 'o II 4 c.J. c.J.~~
I
~Jz a' ~ 0 '2 4 MrIIU~-V ='3I~ . /)~ ~ ~U~r i~W (vhlRPwFopCBD CoNC. LAYER)
~~I=OUI IC)WI le'V C)~~~
~~~ST ~ialm,~i-IDLY I=~~
~~I'll Rev. 35, 07/84 SUSOUEHANNA STEAII ELEC UNITS 1 ANO 2 FINALSAFETY ANAL' IQUIIE XO-104}}~~

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