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| issue date = 07/29/1987
| issue date = 07/29/1987
| title = LER 87-021-00:on 870701,auto Safety Injection Initiated from Spurious Containment High Pressure Signal.Nitrogen Supply Valve Manipulated to Verify Closed Causing Pressure Spike Thus Actuating Train A.Test Switch replaced.W/870729 Ltr
| title = LER 87-021-00:on 870701,auto Safety Injection Initiated from Spurious Containment High Pressure Signal.Nitrogen Supply Valve Manipulated to Verify Closed Causing Pressure Spike Thus Actuating Train A.Test Switch replaced.W/870729 Ltr
| author name = WAGER V, WOODY C O
| author name = Wager V, Woody C
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY AFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SY~EM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 8707310295 DOC.DATE: 87/07/29 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY   AFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SY ~EM       (RIDS)
NO DOCKET 0 FACIL: 50-250 Turkeg Point Planti Unit 3>Florida Poujer and Light C 05000250 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WAGER'.Florida Power&Light Co.WOODYi C.O..Florida Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
ACCESSION NBR: 8707310295       DOC. DATE: 87/07/29   NOTARIZED: NO           DOCKET 0 FACIL: 50-250 Turkeg     Point Planti Unit   3> Florida Poujer and Light   C 05000250 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION WAGER'.             Florida Power & Light Co.
WOODYi C. O..
RECIP. NAME Florida Power & Light Co.
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 87-021-00:
LER 87-021-00: on 870701i auto safety inJection initiated fr om spurious containment high pressure signal. Nitrogen supply valve manipulated to verify closed causing pressure spike thus actuating Train A. Test seitch replaced. W/87072'9 ltr.
on 870701i auto safety inJection initiated fr om spurious containment high pressure signal.Nitrogen supply valve manipulated to verify closed causing pressure spike thus actuating Train A.Test seitch replaced.W/87072'9 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR i ENCL i SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpti etc.NOTES: REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 LA McDONALDI D INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DO*AEOD/DSP/ROAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB NRR/PMAS/ILRB QEG=Pg~02 RES 4lELFORDi J RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROHz M LPDR NSIC HARRIS'COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 1'1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD ACRS MOELLER*EOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEBT/CEB NRR/DEST/I CSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/PTSB RES DEPY GI RES/DE/EIB H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYST G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 43 NRC Forn~355 (983 I LtCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAII REGULATOR Y COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.31500105 EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (II Turke Point Unit 3 DOCKET NUMBER (2)0 5 0 0 0 PA 1 OF TI'TLE MI Train A Safeguards Actuation due to Containment High Pressure Signal EVENT DATE (SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER (SI 55QVCNTIAL NVMSER R5VrsrQN NVMSER MONTH DAY YEAR'EPORT DATE (7)N/A FAC/LITY NAMES OOCKFT NUMBER(SI o s 0 o o OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI 07 018 8 7 0 2 1 0 0 07 29 8 7 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO MODE (4)POWER LEY EL 0 0'a+jet: 4~')'/o',",'0.402(5) 20AOS(~Ill~)IB 20l05(aHI IIE)20A05(s)(1)((5)20.405(s)l1)0 I 20.405(a)l1)(r)20.405(c)SOM(c)(I)50M(c)(21 50,73(a I (2)Ill 50.73(sl(2)(ii)50.73(sl(2)
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR i ENCL i               SIZE:
(5/I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.734)(2)(hl 50.734)(2)(rl 50.734)(2)(rBI 50.73(a I (2)l r(II)(A)50.73(sl(2)(r(dl(B)50.73(~)l2)(x)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR gt/Crrocn ons or mao of tns fo//ort/nt/
TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpti etc.
l11 73.7((5)73.71(c)Q7HEII fspsc/fy in Aortrsct/rs/ow and/n Tsxt HRC Form 388lf NAME Virgil Wager TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 5 246-6 76 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TVRER EPDATASL~'~$$+$5 CAUSE YkÃ4)r(Fo'I SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS)~4)'~i%(ÃR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Iol FXPECTED SU 5 M I SS IO N DATE II SI MONTH OAY YEAR YES fif ym, COmp/ttt EXPECTED Si/Ett/$$/OH DATE/NO ABSTRACT fLim/t to to00 tpocst,/o., approx/moto/y fi/toon t/no/oopsco typorrritton
NOTES:
//nN/(14)On July 1, 1987, at 0148, while Unit 3 was at cold shutdown (Mode 5)an auto safety injection was initiated from a spurious Containment High Pressure signal.The electrical department required a hose to test the penetration canisters on Unit 4 which was in hot standby (Mode 3).They borrowed a pressure rig on Unit 3 that was to be utilized for initiating a Containment High Pressure signal for Safeguards testing.The nitrogen supply valve to the pressure rig was opened in the process of verifying it was closed, thereby causing a Containment High Pressure signal.This resulted in an actuation of the ESFs All equipment lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally.Train B did not receive an actuation signal.Safety injection is not required to be operable in Mode 5.The normal'eat sink (RHR)was not lost during the event since there was no loss of offsite power.Also, there was no safety injection flow to the reactor since MOV 3-843 A and B, and MOV 3-869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance.The unit was returned to the normal configuration for Mode 5 at 0155.8707310295 870729 PDR ADOCK 05000250 S PDR NRC Form 345 (943)
REC IP IENT       COPIES            RECIPIENT          COPIES ID CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME       LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA               1    1      PD2-2 PD                1 McDONALDI D           1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON           1    1      ACRS MOELLER            2    2 AEOD/DO*               1            *EOD/DSP/NAS            1    1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB         2    2      AEOD/DSP/TPAB          1    1 DEDRO                  1    1      NRR/DEST/ADE            1    0 NRR/DEST/ADS          1    0      NRR/DEBT/CEB            1    1 NRR/DEST/ELB          1    1      NRR/DEST/ I CSB        1    1 NRR/DEST/MEB          1    1      NRR/DEST/MTB            1    1 NRR/DEST/PSB          1     1     NRR/DEST/RSB            1     1 NRR/DEST/SGB          1     1     NRR/DLPG/HFB            1     1 NRR/DLPG/GAB                1     NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RAB          1     1     NRR/DREP/RPB            2    2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB          1     1     NRR/PMAS/PTSB          1     1 QEG=Pg~        02          1     RES DEPY GI            1 RES 4lELFORDi J        1     1     RES/DE/EIB              1     1 RGN2    FILE    01          1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROHz    M          5     5     H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR                  1     1     NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS'          '1     1     NSIC MAYST G TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:      LTTR    45  ENCL    43
I!RC Form rr38A (9831 LICENSEE EVENT EPORT{LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OM8 NO.3150M104 EXPIRES'/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11 Turkey Point Unit 3 OOCKET NUMBER (2(LER NUMBER (8(YEAR'4M SEQUENTIAL-i%%!REVISION igS NUMSER 9"N NUMEER PAGE (3)Tm(T/O'RNoo<<Moo is/o9uoed, INo aAtdonal HRC Furr/I 3////A'4/(17(0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0 87-0 21 0 0 0 2 or-0 3 EVENT On July 1, 1987, at 0148 , while Unit 3 was in cold shutdown (Mode 5)and Unit 4 was in hot shutdown (Mode 3), a spurious Containment High Pressure signal actuated Safety Injection and Phase A Containment Isolation on Unit 3.The safety injection components and Phase A containment isolation valves that were lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally.The A Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because it was out of service for governor maintenance.
 
The Train B safety injection components and containment isolation valves did not operate and the B Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because Train B did not receive an actuation signal.The normal heat sink (RHR)was not lost during the event as there was no loss of offsite power.There was no safety injection flow to the reactor as MOV 3-843 A&B and MOV 3-869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance.
NRC Forn~ 355                                                                                                                                                U.S. NUCLEAII REGULATOR Y COMMISSION (983 I APPROVED OMB NO. 31500105 LtCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                                        EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (II                                                                                                                                  DOCKET NUMBER (2)                            PA Turke          Point Unit            3                                                                                                            0    5  0      0    0                1  OF TI'TLE MI Train        A  Safeguards            Actuation              due    to Containment High Pressure Signal EVENT DATE (SI                    LER NUMBER (SI                                        DATE (7)                              OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH      OAY    YEAR      YEAR          55QVCNTIAL          R5VrsrQN MONTH            DAY YEAR'EPORT FAC/LITY NAMES                            OOCKFT NUMBER(SI NVMSER            NVMSER Ill                                                                          N/A                                              o    s    0    o  o 07 018                      8 7            0      2 1            0 0      07 29                8            7    N/A                                              0    5    0    0  0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR gt /Crrocn ons or mao of tns fo//ort/nt/ l11 OPERATINO MODE (4) 20.405(c)                                      50.734) (2) (hl                                  73.7((5)
At 0155, the operators entered the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures; 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination, and returned the unit to normal configuration for Mode 5.CAUSE OF EVENT The Electrical Department needed to connect a hose to the plant nitrogen system and the penetration cannisters on Unit 4 for a pressure test.They borrowed an I&C pressure rig from Unit 3 that was going to be utilized for initiating a Containment High Pressure signal for the Integrated Safeguards Test.There were no tags of any kind on the nitrogen supply valve or hose that would have prohibited removal of the rig.Before disconnecting the hose, the nitrogen supply valve was manipulated to verify it was closed thereby causing a pressure spike greater than 4 psig on Channels I and III which actuated Train A of the ESF.Test switch S-23 (PC-456D)which simulates a Pressurizer Safety Injection signal was mechanically faulty and had been disconnected in conformance with an I&C Plant Work Order.The negative terminal (J-2)of the switch had two leads one of which completed the negative side of the DC circuit for the safety injection signal to Train B.A replacement switch which had to be ordered, had not been installed at the time of the event.The open DC circuit precluded the actuation of Train B Safety Injection.
POWER                          20AOS( ~    )IB                            SOM(c) (I)                                    50.734) (2) (rl                                  73.71(c)
NRC FORM 3ESA (94(31 o U.S.GPO:(988.0 824 538/455 N':IC Form SSSA (94)3)LICENSEE EVENT R PORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S, NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY, NAME l1)OOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (8)SEOVSNTIAL NVMSSR REVISION NVMSSR PACE (3)Turkey Point Unit 3 TS/T//PM/o FPSrrF/4'/rrSod, INo rrSWcnal HRC For/II 3854'4/l (T)o s o o o 2 5 0 8 7 0 2 1 00 03 DF0 3 ANALYSIS OF EVENT At the time of the event Unit 3 was in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5).Safety Infection and Containment Isolation are not required to be operable in Mode 5.However, the requirements for ESF equipment response to a safety injection signal depends on the status of the equipment.
LEY EL      ~')'/o',",'0.402(5) 0 0           20l05(aHI IIE)                            50M(c) (21                                    50.734)(2)(rBI                                    Q7HEII fspsc/fy in Aortrsct
Certain valves and equipment were out of service under the cold shutdown clearance and various maintenance clearances.
                                                                                                                                                                                /rs/ow and/n Tsxt HRC Form
But all equipment that was lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally upon receipt of the SI signal.Based on the above the health and safety of the public were not affected.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1)The replacement for test switch (S-23)has been received and the I&C Department installed it on 7-2-87.2)The operators returned Unit 3 to the normal configuration for Mode 5 utilizing EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.
'a+jet:    4                      20A05(s) (1)((5)                          50,73(a I (2) Ill                            50.73(a I  (2) l r(II)(A)                         388lf 20.405(s) l1) 0 I                         50.73(sl(2) (ii)                              50.73(sl(2) (r(dl(B) 20.405(a)l1) (r)                           50.73(sl(2) (5/I                               50.73( ~ ) l2)(x)
3)The Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test procedure will be changed to provide for additional protection to avoid inadvertent initiation of the ESF components.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
Section 7.1.11 of the procedure will have a step added to require the placement of caution tags on the source connection that provides the test signal to the pressure switches.ADDITIONAL DETAILS The original test switch (S-23)was supplied by the'EES company.However, the specific model had been discontinued and a different model manufactured by REES, had to be ordered and approved for replacement.
NAME                                                                                                                                                                    TELEPHONE NUMBER Virgil Wager                                                                                                                                          AREA CODE COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 3          5    246 -6                      76 CAUSE    SYSTEM    COMPONENT            MANUFAC.
Similar Occurrences:
TVRER EPDATASL ~  '~$
none NRC FORM SSSA (94)3)o U S GPO'1986 0.824 538/455 P.O.BOX 1 JUNO BEACH, FL 33408.0420 JULy'Ivy~L-87-3 I 7 IO CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gen t I emen: Re: Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No.,50-250 Reportable Event: 87-2 I Date of Event: July I, l987 Train A Safeguards Actuation, Due To Containment Hi h Pressure Si nal The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of IO CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, C.0.ody Group Vice President Nuc I ear Energy COW/SDF/pm At tachment cc: Dr.J.Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant, SDF I/0O5/I an FPL Group company}}
                                                                                  $+$ 5                      CAUSE    SYSTEM  COMPONENT                MANUFAC.
TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS Yk&#xc3;4)r(Fo'I                                                                                                    )~4)'~i%(&#xc3;R SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED                (Iol                                                                                    MONTH    OAY    YEAR FXPECTED SU 5 M I SS IO N DATE II SI YES  fifym, COmp/ttt EXPECTED Si/Ett/$ $ /OH DATE/                                     NO ABSTRACT fLim/t to to00 tpocst, /o., approx/moto/y fi/toon t/no/oopsco typorrritton //nN/ (14)
On  July 1, 1987, at 0148, while Unit 3 was at cold shutdown safety injection was initiated from a spurious                                                                                            (Mode 5) an auto The electrical department required a hose Containment                High        Pressure signal.
to test the penetration canisters on Unit 4 which was in hot standby (Mode 3 a pressure rig on Unit 3 that was to be                                                                                  ). They borrowed a Containment High Pressure signal for utilized    for      initiating supply valve to the pressure rig was opened in the testing.
Safeguards                                    The nitrogen closed, thereby causing a Containment High Pressure                                                              process              of verifying it was actuation of the ESFs All equipment lined up for operation                                                        signal.              This      resulted in an normally. Train B did not receive an actuation signal.                                                                                  on  Train          A functioned is not required to be operable in Mode 5. The normal'eat sink                                                                Safety        injection not lost during the event since there was no loss                                                                                              (RHR) was Also, there was no safety injection flow to the reactor since                                                  of    offsite              power.
MOV 3-843 A and      B, and        MOV        3-  869 were tagged closed on the                                       cold shutdown clearance . The unit                      was     returned to the normal configuration for at 0155.                                                                                                                                             Mode 5 8707310295 870729 PDR          ADOCK 05000250 S                                      PDR NRC Form 345 (943)
 
I!RC Form rr38A                                                                                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9831 LICENSEE EVENT                    EPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                        APPROVEO OM8 NO. 3150M104 EXPIRES'/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11                                                              OOCKET NUMBER (2(              LER NUMBER (8(                    PAGE (3)
YEAR '4M SEQUENTIAL -i%%! REVISION Turkey Point Unit                  3                                                                    igS NUMSER 9"N NUMEER 0  5   0  0    0 2 5 0 87 0 21                  0 0      0 2      or-  0 3 Tm(T /O'RNoo <<Moo is /o9uoed, INo aAtdonal HRC Furr/I 3////A'4/ (17(
EVENT On    July      1, 1987,        at 0148              , while Unit 3 was in cold shutdown (Mode 5) and Unit 4 was in hot shutdown (Mode 3), a spurious Containment High Pressure signal actuated Safety Injection and Phase A Containment Isolation on Unit 3. The safety injection components and Phase A containment isolation valves that were lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally. The A Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because it was out of service for governor maintenance. The Train B safety injection components and containment isolation valves did not operate and the B Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because Train B did not receive an actuation signal. The normal heat sink (RHR) was not lost during the event as there was no loss of offsite power. There was no safety injection flow to the reactor as MOV 3-843 A&B and MOV 3-869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance. At 0155, the operators entered the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures; 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination, and returned the unit to normal configuration for Mode 5.
CAUSE OF EVENT The     Electrical            Department needed                to connect a hose to the plant nitrogen system and the penetration cannisters on Unit 4 for a pressure test.
They borrowed an I&C pressure rig from Unit 3 that was going to be utilized for initiating a Containment High Pressure signal for the Integrated Safeguards Test. There were no tags of any kind on the nitrogen supply valve or hose that would have prohibited removal of the rig. Before disconnecting the hose, the nitrogen supply valve was manipulated to verify                            it  was closed thereby causing a pressure spike greater than 4 psig on Channels I and III which actuated Train A of the ESF.
Test switch S-23 (PC-456D) which simulates a Pressurizer Safety Injection signal was mechanically faulty and had been disconnected in conformance with an I&C Plant Work Order. The negative terminal (J-2) of the switch had two leads one of which completed the negative side of the DC circuit for the safety injection signal to Train B. A replacement switch which had to be ordered, had not been installed at the time of the event. The open DC circuit precluded the actuation of Train B Safety Injection.
NRC FORM 3ESA                                                                                                                      o U.S.GPO:(988.0 824 538/455 (94(31
 
N':IC Form SSSA U.S, NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)
LICENSEE EVENT R PORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                       APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY,NAME l1)                                                           OOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (8)                     PACE (3)
YEAR  SEOVSNTIAL      REVISION Turkey Point Unit                   3 NVMSSR        NVMSSR TS/T //PM/o FPSrrF /4 '/rrSod, INo rrSWcnal HRC For/II 3854'4/ l (T) o   s   o o   o 2   5 0 8 7     0 2     1       00 03             DF0       3 ANALYSIS OF EVENT At the time of the event Unit 3 was in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). Safety Infection and Containment Isolation are not required to be operable in Mode 5. However, the requirements for ESF equipment response to a safety injection signal depends on the status of the equipment. Certain valves and equipment were out of service under the cold shutdown clearance and various maintenance clearances. But all equipment that was lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally upon receipt of the SI signal.
Based on the above the health and safety of the public were not affected.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
: 1)       The replacement                   for test switch (S-23)           has been received and the I&C Department           installed it on 7-2-87.
: 2)         The     operators returned Unit                 3 to the normal configuration for Mode                 5 utilizing           EOP-E-O, Reactor             Trip or Safety Injection and EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.
: 3)         The Engineered                 Safeguards Integrated Test procedure will be changed to provide for additional protection to avoid inadvertent initiation of the ESF components.                     Section 7.1.11 of the procedure will have a step added to require the placement of caution tags on the source connection that provides the test signal to the pressure switches.
ADDITIONAL DETAILS The     original test switch (S-23)                       was   supplied by the'EES company.
However, the specific model had                           been discontinued and a different model manufactured by                 REES,         had to be ordered and approved for replacement.
Similar Occurrences:                           none NRC FORM SSSA o U S GPO'1986 0.824 538/455 (94)3)
 
P. O. BOX 1   JUNO BEACH, FL 33408.0420
                                                                                      ' Ivy ~
JULy L-87-3 I 7 IO CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gen t I emen:
Re:     Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No.,50-250 Reportable Event: 87-2 I Date of Event: July I, l987 Train A Safeguards Actuation, Due To Containment Hi h Pressure Si nal The     attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of IO CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
Very truly yours, C. 0.       ody Group Vice President Nuc I ear Energy COW/SDF /pm Attachment cc:    Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant, an FPL Group company SDF I/0O5/I}}

Latest revision as of 10:19, 22 October 2019

LER 87-021-00:on 870701,auto Safety Injection Initiated from Spurious Containment High Pressure Signal.Nitrogen Supply Valve Manipulated to Verify Closed Causing Pressure Spike Thus Actuating Train A.Test Switch replaced.W/870729 Ltr
ML17342A816
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1987
From: Wager V, Woody C
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
L-87-317, LER-87-021, LER-87-21, NUDOCS 8707310295
Download: ML17342A816 (5)
v • d • e


Text

REGULATORY AFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SY ~EM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8707310295 DOC. DATE: 87/07/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 FACIL: 50-250 Turkeg Point Planti Unit 3> Florida Poujer and Light C 05000250 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WAGER'. Florida Power & Light Co.

WOODYi C. O..

RECIP. NAME Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-021-00: on 870701i auto safety inJection initiated fr om spurious containment high pressure signal. Nitrogen supply valve manipulated to verify closed causing pressure spike thus actuating Train A. Test seitch replaced. W/87072'9 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR i ENCL i SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES:

REC IP IENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 McDONALDI D 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DO* 1 *EOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEBT/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ I CSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/PTSB 1 1 QEG=Pg~ 02 1 RES DEPY GI 1 RES 4lELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROHz M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS' '1 1 NSIC MAYST G TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 43

NRC Forn~ 355 U.S. NUCLEAII REGULATOR Y COMMISSION (983 I APPROVED OMB NO. 31500105 LtCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA Turke Point Unit 3 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF TI'TLE MI Train A Safeguards Actuation due to Containment High Pressure Signal EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (SI DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR 55QVCNTIAL R5VrsrQN MONTH DAY YEAR'EPORT FAC/LITY NAMES OOCKFT NUMBER(SI NVMSER NVMSER Ill N/A o s 0 o o 07 018 8 7 0 2 1 0 0 07 29 8 7 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR gt /Crrocn ons or mao of tns fo//ort/nt/ l11 OPERATINO MODE (4) 20.405(c) 50.734) (2) (hl 73.7((5)

POWER 20AOS( ~ )IB SOM(c) (I) 50.734) (2) (rl 73.71(c)

LEY EL ~')'/o',",'0.402(5) 0 0 20l05(aHI IIE) 50M(c) (21 50.734)(2)(rBI Q7HEII fspsc/fy in Aortrsct

/rs/ow and/n Tsxt HRC Form

'a+jet: 4 20A05(s) (1)((5) 50,73(a I (2) Ill 50.73(a I (2) l r(II)(A) 388lf 20.405(s) l1) 0 I 50.73(sl(2) (ii) 50.73(sl(2) (r(dl(B) 20.405(a)l1) (r) 50.73(sl(2) (5/I 50.73( ~ ) l2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Virgil Wager AREA CODE COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) 3 5 246 -6 76 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TVRER EPDATASL ~ '~$

$+$ 5 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS YkÃ4)r(Fo'I )~4)'~i%(ÃR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Iol MONTH OAY YEAR FXPECTED SU 5 M I SS IO N DATE II SI YES fifym, COmp/ttt EXPECTED Si/Ett/$ $ /OH DATE/ NO ABSTRACT fLim/t to to00 tpocst, /o., approx/moto/y fi/toon t/no/oopsco typorrritton //nN/ (14)

On July 1, 1987, at 0148, while Unit 3 was at cold shutdown safety injection was initiated from a spurious (Mode 5) an auto The electrical department required a hose Containment High Pressure signal.

to test the penetration canisters on Unit 4 which was in hot standby (Mode 3 a pressure rig on Unit 3 that was to be ). They borrowed a Containment High Pressure signal for utilized for initiating supply valve to the pressure rig was opened in the testing.

Safeguards The nitrogen closed, thereby causing a Containment High Pressure process of verifying it was actuation of the ESFs All equipment lined up for operation signal. This resulted in an normally. Train B did not receive an actuation signal. on Train A functioned is not required to be operable in Mode 5. The normal'eat sink Safety injection not lost during the event since there was no loss (RHR) was Also, there was no safety injection flow to the reactor since of offsite power.

MOV 3-843 A and B, and MOV 3- 869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance . The unit was returned to the normal configuration for at 0155. Mode 5 8707310295 870729 PDR ADOCK 05000250 S PDR NRC Form 345 (943)

I!RC Form rr38A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9831 LICENSEE EVENT EPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OM8 NO. 3150M104 EXPIRES'/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMBER (2( LER NUMBER (8( PAGE (3)

YEAR '4M SEQUENTIAL -i%%! REVISION Turkey Point Unit 3 igS NUMSER 9"N NUMEER 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0 87 0 21 0 0 0 2 or- 0 3 Tm(T /O'RNoo <<Moo is /o9uoed, INo aAtdonal HRC Furr/I 3////A'4/ (17(

EVENT On July 1, 1987, at 0148 , while Unit 3 was in cold shutdown (Mode 5) and Unit 4 was in hot shutdown (Mode 3), a spurious Containment High Pressure signal actuated Safety Injection and Phase A Containment Isolation on Unit 3. The safety injection components and Phase A containment isolation valves that were lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally. The A Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because it was out of service for governor maintenance. The Train B safety injection components and containment isolation valves did not operate and the B Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because Train B did not receive an actuation signal. The normal heat sink (RHR) was not lost during the event as there was no loss of offsite power. There was no safety injection flow to the reactor as MOV 3-843 A&B and MOV 3-869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance. At 0155, the operators entered the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures; 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination, and returned the unit to normal configuration for Mode 5.

CAUSE OF EVENT The Electrical Department needed to connect a hose to the plant nitrogen system and the penetration cannisters on Unit 4 for a pressure test.

They borrowed an I&C pressure rig from Unit 3 that was going to be utilized for initiating a Containment High Pressure signal for the Integrated Safeguards Test. There were no tags of any kind on the nitrogen supply valve or hose that would have prohibited removal of the rig. Before disconnecting the hose, the nitrogen supply valve was manipulated to verify it was closed thereby causing a pressure spike greater than 4 psig on Channels I and III which actuated Train A of the ESF.

Test switch S-23 (PC-456D) which simulates a Pressurizer Safety Injection signal was mechanically faulty and had been disconnected in conformance with an I&C Plant Work Order. The negative terminal (J-2) of the switch had two leads one of which completed the negative side of the DC circuit for the safety injection signal to Train B. A replacement switch which had to be ordered, had not been installed at the time of the event. The open DC circuit precluded the actuation of Train B Safety Injection.

NRC FORM 3ESA o U.S.GPO:(988.0 824 538/455 (94(31

N':IC Form SSSA U.S, NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)

LICENSEE EVENT R PORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY,NAME l1) OOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (8) PACE (3)

YEAR SEOVSNTIAL REVISION Turkey Point Unit 3 NVMSSR NVMSSR TS/T //PM/o FPSrrF /4 '/rrSod, INo rrSWcnal HRC For/II 3854'4/ l (T) o s o o o 2 5 0 8 7 0 2 1 00 03 DF0 3 ANALYSIS OF EVENT At the time of the event Unit 3 was in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). Safety Infection and Containment Isolation are not required to be operable in Mode 5. However, the requirements for ESF equipment response to a safety injection signal depends on the status of the equipment. Certain valves and equipment were out of service under the cold shutdown clearance and various maintenance clearances. But all equipment that was lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally upon receipt of the SI signal.

Based on the above the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) The replacement for test switch (S-23) has been received and the I&C Department installed it on 7-2-87.
2) The operators returned Unit 3 to the normal configuration for Mode 5 utilizing EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.
3) The Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test procedure will be changed to provide for additional protection to avoid inadvertent initiation of the ESF components. Section 7.1.11 of the procedure will have a step added to require the placement of caution tags on the source connection that provides the test signal to the pressure switches.

ADDITIONAL DETAILS The original test switch (S-23) was supplied by the'EES company.

However, the specific model had been discontinued and a different model manufactured by REES, had to be ordered and approved for replacement.

Similar Occurrences: none NRC FORM SSSA o U S GPO'1986 0.824 538/455 (94)3)

P. O. BOX 1 JUNO BEACH, FL 33408.0420

' Ivy ~

JULy L-87-3 I 7 IO CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gen t I emen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No.,50-250 Reportable Event: 87-2 I Date of Event: July I, l987 Train A Safeguards Actuation, Due To Containment Hi h Pressure Si nal The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of IO CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, C. 0. ody Group Vice President Nuc I ear Energy COW/SDF /pm Attachment cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant, an FPL Group company SDF I/0O5/I

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