ML19210C286

Comments on Revision of 10CFR2.764,providing Issuance of CP on Basis of Aslb Initial Decision.Discusses Licensing Process,Nonconformance to Nepa & Abolishment of Nuclear Power

ML19210C286
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/19/1979
From:	Berryhill F COALITION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT POSTPONEMENT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML19210C282	List: ML19210C281 ML19210C286
References
NUDOCS 7911140034
Download: ML19210C286 (9)

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2610 Grendon Dr., Wilmington, DE 19808 Telephone (302) 994-1342

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June 19, 1979 gm 9

. g. o$ b U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary of the Commission

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Washington, D. C. 20555 4 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch 4 g. .

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Request for Public Comment ~ ~ -~

Study of Nuclear Power Plant Construction During Adjudication The revision of 10 CFR 2.764, the "immediate effective-ness rule," which provides that construction permit can be issued on the basis of an initial decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board even though that decision is subject to further review of the Commission,is long overdue.

You state, "If each viewpoint on the rule is presented fully by these comments, the committee will be able to formulate

, its recommendation to the Commission with confidence that it has taken into account a fair balance of all viewpoints." My ability to share this confidence will depend on the selection of the panel by the study group. I hereby request that the name of Dr. Chauncey Kepford (433 Orlando Avenue, State College, Pa. 16807, telephone number 814-237-3900) be placed in nomination. His qualifications are public knowledge.

Let me state at the onset that I find it astounding that questions 1 through 8 are applicable to citizens anywhere in the country, considering that this government has consistently refused funding for intervenors. Equally astounding is the tenacity of intervenors to want to participate in a game in which the cards are stacked and the victor is declared be. fore the game is played to its conclusion. .

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Case in point:

Three Mile Island II was licensed in violation of NEPA.

.c a) The Commission has conceded that Table S-3

" Summary of the Environmental Considerations for the Uranium Fuel Cycle 10 CFR 51.2" is grossly in error.

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" b) Revision of Table S-3 leaves the cost benefit analysis demanded by NEPA Section 102(2c) open.

c) Further hearings on a valid safety issue were raised by the intervenors,and hearings were set for April 4, 1979 (which were cancelled since TMI already experienced the Accident), after operating license was granted and the plant was already in commercial operation.

In the TMI case, the predestined victor had already left the game before it was played to its conclusion. What possible purpose could the hearings on April 4 have achieved but to'give the illusion of participation by the public? Running out of funds and left hanging before the U. S. Court of Appeals, the predestined loser in this game, Dr. Chauncey Kepford, gave vent to his frustrations in testimony before the House Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on June 5, 1979, as follows:

"We must now ask what justification there can be, under either NEPA or the Atomic Energy Act, for

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this administrative approval procedure which allows a major federal action--the license to operate--

prior to completion of review of issues which, in one environmental instance, may decisively tip the

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cost-benefit analysis against the reactor and, in the other, may equally decisively determine that the safety-related risk is too great to permit operation."

The Commission's disregard of the necessity for revision of Table S-3 and its ability to break the law (NEPA) by continuing to grant licenses without impunity has a long history:

a) Prof. Robert O. Pohl was the first scientist to' address the question of long-term emissions from uranium mill tailings in 1976. This was brought to light during GESMO and Table S-3 '

hearings on behalf of the Sierra Club. .

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3-b) Af ter the circulation .cdf a preprint of Prof.

Pohl's paper in 1975, the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution petitioned the Commission for a revision of Table S-3. The Commission

^ has still not acted on the NECNP petition. When the D. C. Court of Appeals directed the Commission to review Table S-3 regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the Commission called for rule-making proceedings, it specifically

stated that mill tailings not be considered.

c) During the hearings on TMI, Dr. Kepford conserva-tively calculated the health effects from Radon 222 to be 1.2 million future deaths from cancer for each reactor year that TMI II (and any other reactor) operates. This was acknowlddged as correct by NRC's Dr. Gotchy in sworn testimony. Consequently, in the now-famous memo from Walter H. Jordan of the ASLBP to Dr. James R. Yore, Chairman of the

- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, we find the admission that the health effects from Radon 222 have been underestimated by a factor of 100,000.

In a rare moment of honesty and humanness, Dr.

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Jordan states, "It is very difficult to argue that ~

deaths to future generations are unimportant."

Howev'er, all this honesty is to no avail while the Commission proceeds with " business as usual."

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Case in point:

To extricate itself, the Commission now produced NUREG-0511, Volumes I and II, Generic Environmental Impact State-ment on Uranium Milling, April 1979, while it continues to make a mockery of NEPA.

s Case in point:

Public Electric & Gas Co. et. al., Hope Creek Generating Station Docket 50-354, 50-355, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board " Licensees' answer to motion to consolidate proceedings to receive new evidence "

with regard to Radon releases and associated health effects." ... It must be considered that at least for Hope Creek and Peach Bottom proceedings the Appeal Boards have already considered whether the cost benefit balance for the facility or unit in question tios or might tip in favor of abandonment of the facility, in light of the interim fuel cycle rule. Parties were invited to comment on that question. There were no substantive comments received.in the Peach Bottom proceedings,and the only comment reci 'ved in the

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Hope Creek proceedings was rejected by the Appeal Board as well bevond the question at issue." Again the rules of the game pre-vailed, and construction of Hope Creek, now 12 percent completed, -

continues at a vigorous pace. Indeed " Construction during Adjudication" while intervenors wait on the sideline until the millions invested weigh heavily against them. Even at this moment the Commission is considering to grant an operating license for Salem II (on the same site) without revision of Table S-3 and therefore in violation of NEPA.

To further complicate matters, the Commission is now in litigation concerning the expansion of the spent fuel facility for Salem I. Reasonable men would assume that the licensing for Salem I[and construction of Hope Creek should be halted until the waste problem is solved at least for these sites--and for all sites until NUREG-0511 is brought to its ultimate conclusion.

. Anything short of that enables the Commission to operate as a " fourth branch of the Government" unhindered by laws and governed only by rules of its own making. This is brought about by the fact that courts labor under the delusion that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is still alive. In case after case, the courts find themselves bewildered as to their jurisdiction (constitutionality of Price-Anderson, Honicker vs. Hendrie, and others) and dump the matter back to the Legislative Branch.

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Overworked and understaffed legislators have not the foggiest notion of what is contained in NUREG-0511, for example, and it has been my experience that any attempt to get a legislator to come to grips with the enormous problems facing the nuclear industry and the American people in connection with that industry is met with total incredulity.

The Executive Branch (until the creation of the IRC 8 by President Carter) stood--and still stands--aloof in the hope that the band-aLis applied will hold back the hemorrhage and keep it from bursting forth until after the next election.

The Executive Branch, the Legislature, and the Judiciary concocted the mixture which fertilized the ground upon which the NRC can operate by its own rules.

In the past seven years I have spent thousands of dollars from my meager personal funds, traveled thousands of miles, filed interventions (Hope Creek and Salem), and prepared numerous pieces of testimonty. Time and time again I have attended and participated in hearings which I witnessed the heavy-handed rules of the NRC in action. It is for this reason that I see a new game, with a

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5-new branch of government--the FIRST branch--namely the people.

The American people are beginning to take their rightful place endowed them by the framer of the Constitution. Deceived by the Executive, let down by the Judiciary, and ignored by the Legislature, they will take to the streets and nuclear power will become our domestic Vietnam. They will not stop until this government of the people, for the people, and by the people will respond to their demand for no more nukes.

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Sincerely,

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Frieda Berryhill x Chairman .

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Chairman Hendrie Commissioners:

Bradford Kennedy ,

Ahearne Gilisky Senator William V. Roth ' ' 9 104 Senator Joseph R..Biden Rep. Thomas Evans

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fv.ning Jovmol, Wilmington, Del., Friday. [vly 6,1979

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( gUUM'gNJJCf EfUS do around other nuclear in-

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thenations, sta they'll simply deny it..

On June 20, the radiation re- Concerned about the recent Sundo# N* J""" Wi'* '"9a D*l Jufv 8.1979 Jeases of the Peach Bottom Nu- leaks, people have called me to clear Power Plant were 6 percent ' ask what can be done about this.

above " permissible limits" which 3fy answer is absolutely nothing.

reached 16 percent on June 21. Citizens have the fabulous privi- yeffdown e3pecfeg This has been going on for a long lege of " intervening" in licensmg Since the accident at Three time. Ever since the plant started hearings. Out of non-existent citi. 5 tile Island. the press has been operating it has contaminated the ' zens funds they can hire a lawyer accused of hysteria. However, the milk and cheese in the area, while the tax funded NRC brings 800-page transcript of the meeting Extensive hearings were held by , out armies of lawyers who are at of the Nucle &r Regulatory Commis-the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- their beck and call. Intervenors in sion on Starch 30 reveals that the sion. I have obtained a good por- the Operating License Hearings situation during the T5!! emer-tion of the transcript of these hear-- for Three 3 file Island were sched- gency was w;rse than the public ings, which I submitted to the uled to be heard on April 4,1979, was led to believe.

' after the plant was three months

'Finally, News-Journal the time. ! in operation. These hearings were ingYet papers at report the NRC inspection despite its belated awaken-to the issues of nuclear power.

of April 78 (Docket 50 277) states canceled because the plant had al- the pr,ess missed or ignored one of as follows: " Plant radiation levels ready undergone the accident. the biggest items , coming out of

-have been increasing with time. What possible purpose could the the wholeT5fl affair.

Design and staffing of plant ap- hearings in A..ril have served The mdustry trade paper called ear to have not been c&pable of i other than to give the appearance ..Inside . D.O. E. (Department of andling this change. 5f anage- that the public has a say in the Energy) of af ay 18 raports on me'nt has been s!ow to take large matter? There is not a shred of testimony by DOE Deputy Secre-step changes to correct prob- evidence that citizens' interven- tary John O' Leary before DOE s lems." tions have evei accomplished any- envir nmental advisory commit-Hundreds of such burps, spills, thin .

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leaks and unexpected migration of Al else failing, citizens can go to ',as foHows:

Deputy Secretary John radioactive poisons take place the courts, which are then assured O,feary admitted last week that across the country every. year. i by the same government lawyers he and other federal officials had Always they are accompanied ' that this is a matter for thelegisla- assumed since 1973 that a core with the same statement: "The tive and not the judiciary branch meltdown m a nuclear power

( amount released poses no danger of government. plant would occur within ten to public health." Trust us, they . Frederick Douglass, one of the years and that he found the be-say. But don't forget that these are most distinguished leaders of his the same people who planted 50,- i time said: " Find out just what nign nature of -the Three, 5 file Island accident surprising.

000 coconut trees on Bikini Island. ~ people will submit to, and you have 3!r. O' Leary, a former director returned the natives with great found out the exact amount of of licensing for the Atomic Ener-fanfare only to find that Bikini i injustice and wrong which will be gy Commission. told the commit-

"was unfit for human habitation i imposed uponthem.

and may remain so for decades." Frieda Berghill, tee that he and other AEC offi.

l cials had been taught that a "No problem," they say. After f Chairman, Coalition forNuclear meltdown would take place once

! all, by the time the cancers start Power Plant Postponement

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. showing up 10 years from now, as ' Heritage Park

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. the coolmg system m a nuclear reactor malfunctioned to the ex-tent that the one at T511 did.

Considering that a core

• meltdown, according to govern-ment reports (iiot , anti nuclear rantings) could kill thousands of people instantly, injure hundreds of thousands and render unin-habitable an area the size of Pennsylvania, it seems incredible that the government is ready to play this kind of Russian roulette with its citizens without their knowledge and consent.

FRIEDA BERRYHILL Chairman, Coalition for Nuclear Power Plant Postpone-ment Heritage Park

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5-N9 events which, taaen as part of a pattern, are trying wite nato tu tell us something about sees pitfalls of-regulatory

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M The backdrop for my thesis, stated generally, as that all regulatory agencies waiver between their civics testboom mission to protect some form of the public interest and a THE NUCLfAR CPTION: DID 17 JWMP CR hAS IT PW51lED7 far more umfortunate function of forming a gauty 111uston of protection across conduct the public would not tolerate if it did not think that it was Denng protected Dy the regulators.

Remarts By I want to be clear at this point that I am not Commissioner Peter A. Bradford talking only about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ahaat health and safety regulation. I was for six years a Before The member of a State Public Utilities Commission, and many of NARWC Annual Regulatory Studies Program tne it M &_o l$he NRC are pitfalls to the state agencies _ ~~

test Lanaing, michigan *st wel If economic regulatory fal kres were' conducive to

- single large accidents or the Three mile Island sort, they August 2, 1979 would long ago have produced their share of evacuations and deaths.

I want to set the tone for this talk with reference to The essential element, it seems to me, in any regulatory an advertisement that ta entraordinary on several levels. system that reassures here than it regulates is that it' have It ran two full pages in last Tuesday's wall Street Journal an immense capacity for self-delusion. Let me describe some and featured nuclear physicist Edward Tel.or prociatmang of the elements of that capacity and leave it to you to himself *the only casualty of Three mt;e Island." His claim decide whether they 1004 familiar.

was that his recent heart attact was brought on by woraing 20-nour days to refute the post-Three mile Island anti-nuclear First, the agency's role must be hee.aly reactive and arguments of Jane Fonda and Ralph Nader. Dr. Teller's defined largely in terms of cases brought to it by those appearance was sponsored my Dresset Industries. His words whom it regulates. It is helpful in this contest if the in the ad state that the abiding lesson of Three mile Island relevant legislature and press have a strong tendency to was that nuclear power plants were even safer than the evaluate the agency largely in terms of permits issued and esports believed and would be safer still in the future. rate Cases processed.

The ad concludes by inviting readers who want to anow more about Dresser Industries to write and ask. Had Doctor Second, the agency's budget must be a tiny fraction Teller asked beforehknd, he would have Isarned, and could (less than one percent) of the gross revenues of those whom have informed his r3aders (as the ad did not), that Dresser it regulates. As a general rule, the total salaries of the Industries had manufactured tne relief valve that maltunctioned Commissioners should not equal much more than half of the and stuck open during the accident sequence at three mile salary of the chief esecutive of the largest requieted Island. entity.

It would be interesting to trace this tendency to Third, regulation should be on an ' audit' beats, give testimony sougnt by his sponsors bact through Teller's esamining only a small fraction of the total nuncer of career to the oppenheimer case, where his troubled and accounts or plant designs or operating practices of the equivocal cordemnattore was a me*-c - -e f evidence on the regulated entities, --

side of those who were to ter- 'oenheimer's ~.

security clearance as a sea 's a # Fourth, the system should deal with its critics more er Government advisor on nuels . y *r, such less the way the tar baby dealt with D'rer Rabbit. I*

a tracing is beyond the see 's .

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t should have an almost infinite capacity for repressive tonight's purposes, the e/ as 3

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I talerance, the extending of enquisite procedural courtesy to estraordinary monusent te nuc~ participants who are never, in fact, allowed to get their asi hands on anything vital. This can be espected to frustrate most vehement supporter sense en the object .t ade moi. prasse an and r '

k ) critics to a point at which they become obsessed or shrill potentially embarre*st- sets c e e .y. i or demagogic or a little crasy. Then, et course, their arguments are more easily dismissed as obsessed, shrill, The ad also 11. . ers' 94 . -gar' demagogic, or crasy, espeelally if others who had these the Three male tal ad il characteristics all along have at some point been attracted '

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nuclear power, att - 'll s qs . i t. 6 same. As far .a t*,e p. < a s tt. s  % -N --

l general public are aa- e air Fifth, almost a caro 11ary of the preceding point, assessment. As a ym.sta - 4 w intervenor funding of any substantial sort is to be avoided l ,p either had no stre 'wer at teadne like the plaque. Discovery and cross-esamination must, of "

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to support it art e tna nge of course, be allowed on some occasions, but *.he occasions can criticisam and a * - .t a e* orts and

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be limited and the examining boards must be constantly a at ioustry. Tne reminded of the need to keep the issues narrowly defined and [

claims of the va i .

balance point of e se de .t seinly shift:d in the proceedings moving along. Furthermore, troublesome q

.e to f .il ar ps..r, participants can sometimes be excluded entire 1h in the

'pe. tally when J e direction less aver the issue is phrased 1 ter- Lether ;itt ans . are manrer of the restrictions placed on the General Services prepared to ' . a nw ' ear a t in tnstr town. The Adstnistration a few years ago wnen its interventions in i i Department e.

• egy ha o. e p..d to revive interrat in state fmberrassing questions from other forums can sonettees p be avoides by preemptive legislation such as that wnten r

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its legisla; s. to enredite rs .ar power plant sicing and licensing. s %ar-sect e ca rw v'_=  %?s stated seweral *h dentes tne states any role in setting tne standards for the if F that no resp'I C ~"I ~ T~ nn . ear radioactive exposures that their citisens will face. S, t

_agwer plant tov =y, *4 * ' so?

7 /T.o g'4"TTIT ing self-tu ,p.,element, Proceedings themselves can often be selectively embarked - , ,

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accuraTT T*T Ga'It .e4 an industry that upon under regulatory f rameworks that allow citizen petitions j rememeets a t:ne in :en t. e Atomic bas to languish for years while imposing firm deadlines on rate g b Commission wa- pre 1ic. enu nuclear wer gano ay _ cases and licensing actions. rj ,

the end of the centur .idF". .e teestng t5at i

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somFioemitien ~ n ue ns aecessary to ensure our Stath, the enforcement system must be a elatively benign one with only the most distant possibility of a truly Q{ ;,

i energy futu a na . t r t. ..a smitted nuclear power Infractions or testimony that tend to w plant; from 3( -

• v features of his proposed severe penalty.

Energy mobilias ur a

mislead the regulatory agency in ways short of outrignt y

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perjury are Jealt with, if at all, under a tenient potat q l my owe pe ,pti of i e ne wee:aa of the Three mile system or with fines that bear only a trivial comparnson to Island . cad.. . A n . ep.nq as racy I have seen. we annual revenues unless the violator is unlueuy enougn to be 7'.g. .

have mara at at <vnews amend sf us before ! will be quite small. Jail sentences should be avaslacle almost e satasit a tr t . a t are .s to anow aoout the exclustvely to those who disclose proprietary or classified 2 eause. d .se ar : . s of rne 2eeldent. nevertheless, or otherwise restricted information. a the F e den. 2 pt ,7Gund tonight is that the I ace!

It nc- r- que or we ershed or cataclysmie seventh, though it is not essential, it is very helpful even 11. **rma tri ess.eer nistory that it may nave Deen in to have tne systen re-enforced by courts wnich defercopiouslyf tares oe 4.oiie m eeption. *he last four years have eeen a to agency espertise in tne face of ena11enges from ettsrens  ; ,

coata m m 21. r watersted of wnien Three atie island is groups, out wnten bow wien e+.a t f ervor to *aa**eaent -

oalv he mus' visible maniftstat1on. The acendeat is of a dnscretion of prerogatives in the face of Challenges to the f p ty e with several others f= UP of these last four years, agency from the regulated entitles. Should a Commissioner 4f4 j~

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be overty recounctious in Puelicly questioning t r. e syetem **

• to a plutontun-cased fuel cycle, which was ein it worss an particular (natances, he can (as Chat tnen based at one t1*e or anotner on some self-delusions acout Pertsches of tee Pederal Trade Joemission recently was) Le k the relationship net.een reprocessin.3 and waste mana,ement, ordered to disqualify himself from further proceeutngs, though ! thina one wou1J._ sea longace 1.s find a ca" { ,-

a the econcetes of reprocessing, the usefulness of reactur grade plutonium in a weapons program, and t3e measures in watch a' Commissioner hat e(C.D aeen ?Ts oasified for y speeeh ~ W, essen61a1 to an effective system of international safeguarJa TK"g l ow i ng p r a i s i~oTT'TTTTTwi r?'a ch no Da y . came to a nalt 19 this country anJ are under intense scrutiny elsewnere in the world. The consequence at all tignth, researen programs that would actually test the this--asi'* from ene isle facilaties at west valley ag .

validtty of the underpinnings and nypotneses of the regulatory _Sar9we11Ms Ee tas*;nat Internat toTWriWeyele evaluation systee are rarely, if ever, undertanen. This is ostena Dir which will conclude ear., nest year an investigation of ways because they would to too costly. Policy evaluation offices to be more certain that nuclear power can indeed be divorced are avoided, or hamstrung, or told enat not to evaluate. from nuclear weaponry.

Ninth, it Can also be eKpected that the re991ated Second, for a time in the 1950's it was claimed that industries will utter frequent empressions of angutan at tne

• nuclear power would be too cneap to meter.* Even after toughness of the regulatory regime under ut.acn tney labor. this delusion failed, tne industry and tne Atomic Energy In this, they do run the tissa of the boy wne cried wolf in Cocmission continued to base their assesaments of the the event that they are ever face-to* face w.th a requiatory procaole costs of the very large units now under construction inlustice so great that it outweighs tne otnerwise oevious on the marginally relevant esperience derived from building advantages of the systee 1 an describing. In fairness, one auch smaller units in more favorable times, ft was on this must acunowledge that this sometimes happens for regulation basis, coupled with a dramatie misforecasting of demand -

rarely encourages innovation, and an imaginative company that the As. ... .s.e to say watn a .trea, ... ..a t a will sometimes get stifled. thousand reactors would be Peeded by the end of the century.

There is no central proceeding now underway to reevaluate Tenth, the semantics that surround such a process are nuclear economics, but the reevaluation continues nonetheless obviously critical to maintaining the illusions. Accidents before many state commissions in rany different gunses.

Secome incidents e j. gens become otest groupst'arDageous Total electric demand in the Year 2C00 is now seen to be

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TTG3 tTons " less than the AEC was forecasting for nuclear power alone, TITT1"T M1 ang company'ttocshoITera ~

seek close ident a ficatTo~n _ - and the boom and bust cycle this has created is especially difficult for an industry requiring large amounts of capital j with the widows and orphans who own stock in_ raising the bills of N or1 W d:dd Z6t ~ Transfer payments from and long lead times. *

"Tonsumers or f rom sunsidiaries to parents are labeled r.

• tases' for ratesetting purposes even when none of it h Third, it was said, as recently as four or five years actually gces to tne covernment. The e*firienetes of the Iago, that " waste is the greatest non-proclem in history."

ant!4anvoued ae s p a tejaL However, f3110 wing the atorting of the AEC's nonsolution to Jtee enterprise y te g e prese,ce or U. . < .CaQe competttaon--compaT! tion fof . this nonproblem at Lyons, Kansas and following the decision Mapit ai--raced oy cosoant es"wTTch7 Weal Trtr7F fiee ,_'\ in California, aisconsin, and elsewhere to avoid further

m. ytt.se and'compitew'TYMtnet supplieht same commitments to nuclear power untti this non-probles as

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W oct f or' customers as wel1~as financing. solvel, the Federal Government had just spent two years

" ~ ~ ~ ~ ' reviewing and revamping the fundamental basis for its approach to the waste question in the form of President r F

Carter's Interagency Review Group on waste management.

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• l Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Appeals has recently con-f cluded that it would like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission h to conduct a proceeding into some aspects of its confidence that wastes can be safely handled at and away from reactor Aa ! have said, the fundamental characteristic of this sitps at the point in time in which the reactor themselves system is f_*= _cacity f or self-delusionm for without an began to be decommissioned.

almost oblessive need not to anow wnat as really going on in "

the dollar flows or piping systems or atoms and so;ecules Fourth, for many years it was believed that esposure to that are being regulated, it would be almost untninnatie for radioactivity below a certain level need not be carefully the people who come and go every two or three or five years guarded against and some nuclear safety regulation rested on at tae top of regulatory agencies not to start mening some that assumption. While the proposition is still being troublesome and disruptive decisions. Ag long as those at debated as to very low levels of radiation, it has been the top can be made to focus largely on timetables, they discarded now as a responsible basis for the protection of will impose the same duty on the people who staff the the public. The grim consequences of its application to agency, 41.t,a the reiult Ian researen or iny stus Qon_that_ ._ wespons testing near certain towns in Utah are still becoming M 1tL discover real !TTws as subtly discouraged unless a ~ - public, and it is argued though not proven that it has led threat of cIoa M oli455tFg'or Jan'q Meblic esposure to increased cancer fatalities among certain classes of can be established. nuclear workers as well. The entire subject of low-level radiation has also been under estenstve review within the Aa e few of you may remember, I began this talt on Carter Administration and various proposals for interagency the subject of Three Mile Islard and why I did not thins it coordination and decisionmasing on this subject had been about to come from Secretary Califano a couple of weems ago.

was so unique an event from the standpoint of nuclear regulation, nor even regulation in general as it seems right I as not sure where they are now.

now. Among other things, it illustrates that regulation is fallible and needs all the help it can get. Regulators Fifth, on the subject of reactor safety itself, the should never convince themselves or anyone else differently. classic self-delusion is probably in ths !secutive Sammary of the Rasmussen Report, wherein it is stated that a citizen Aa 1 have suggested, 1 thina that economic regulation is as likely to te tilled by a meteorite as by an accident has nose f orgiving consequences of self-delusion than at a nuclear power plant. Three year. later, the Nuclear scientific or technical requietton. It is less timely that aegulatory Commission withdrew any endorsement from the rases that are eithe. too high or too low will have clear faecutive Summary and noted that the report itself had conseguences allocable to the agency or the individuals that significantly understated the uncertainties involved in its made a particular decision. The same is not true of an conclusions. In fact, whether or not a member of the public agency that meses a safety decision that goes awry. It can is ever directly and provably tilled by an accident involving espect to be subjected to numerous evaluations and inquiries radioactivity at a nuclear power plant, the Nuclear kegulatory when the chtetens come home to roost, thougn the Three Male Commission's own studies assume that some deatna will result Island case reveals a paradosteal s!)e effect in that as f rom the radiation involved in the nuclear f uel cycle.

long as the agency succeeds in remaining essential to These studies tend also to indicate that there are more the solution to the problem whose creation it has presided deaths involved with an equivalent amount of coal-fired over, it may esperience substantaal increases in the budget generation than with nuclear power, but tats is ratner a and the stature of some of the divistens most closely different elaim than saying that meteorites are as dangerous.

Thus, the subject of reactor safety was thrown open to related to the accident. reassessment even before Three 911e Island, though it is the basic reason that Three mile Island does not seem clear that the reassessment will cow be far more urgently to me to be unique in nuclear history is that the last fin undertamen than would otherwise have been the case.

years have seen several major re-evaluations of propositions In short, and to oversimplify samewhat, the crumbling that once seemed to be the underpinnings of nuclear development of these delusions has precipitated at least two different and that are now y wn to contaia clear, elements of self- eTises for nuclear energy. I flave already alluded to the

__ de _t u s n on . Three Male M d as tar E d away'the most highly first--that is that an industry wnich by its nature requires pwodcited of these, but it is of the same sort. Let me [ a good deal of long-run stability and predictability has

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give you some others: First, for years the Atows for peace \ instead undergone a history of very raptd growth in size and Program aumbered among its basic assumptions the propos&tions that there would be no overlap between peaceful and enlitary espectations, followed by a dramatic and precipitous slowdown nuclear applications. However, in 1974 India detonated an f ^ accompanied by an espenstve need to bactfit safety require-ments. If the industry could have casen the orders that atomic weapon using plutonium from a Canadian researen reactor moderated at least in part by U.S. heavy water, will actually have cccurred between 1960 and 1985 in sitihtly supFlied ulder the Atoms for Peace program. were recentif, '.ncreasing increments wit suitable variations as to site Patistan has been the suolect of much speculation to the and reactor type and with complete and early attention of the sort that the National Environmental Policy Act now effect that it is developing a bomb based on uranium entscheent plans temen by a Pakistant from a European Sandates to the proclems of the fuel cycle, low-level facility. in the aftermath, many concluded tnat the barriers radiation, and proliferation, perhaps tne industry (and between a nuclear weapons program and peaceful nuclear use. certainly our electrical supply situation) would be in were nowhere near as high or as thict as had been thought. better snape today.

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It e sy se argded sna', a new tecnnelegy .annet te developed and commercialated in se orderly a eenner, out the potential nasarde innerent in nuclear power, if tney had seen setter stadled and disclosed years ago, *Lght asefally have tempered the enumerence with wnicn tie industry and tne Atomic Snergy Commissten made commitmente tnat the tocanology was not ready to live up to. O D D The second crists has more to do with puolle confidence.

It is clearly related to the first, eut it rests more on the way in watch a puelic already sna en in its confidence in V the relationantp between covernment and large indastries (or ~

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staply in its confidence in large "overnment agenctes) O'

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T necessactly reacts to tne crumoling of the verloas optialsas that were once arged on them Oy those to wnom it assigned 0 i f

the taan of regulating nuclear power. This crisis as clearest at Three mile Island, wnere people who do not

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ss k - J consider themselves radical in eny ense of the word are determined that two power plants wn.cn many of them ettner accepted or actively supported snou1J not be allowed to operate again. It is refle313,J also in polls that snow _ , , . _

50-60% of the Americ M 11e is ;repares 6 accept nuclea r .

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D ue W bu M o F C he fly t_,,is to t,e_ tut 4_t Is.thetr conau,naty. ,

D. ere is oeviously not a complete Identfty cetween those wEo 4 taeor nuc1str power and those wno do not want it near thee, but the percentages are so large that a siseable overlap must entst.

I know of no easy set of remedies to reform regulatory '

seencies away f rom the ways in whicn they mislead themselves 5 and the public. The industries that seen always ts h ap ~

the greatest inf1 N ME5 W f_tpe way Ene-- agencies condJct #

s "1.d aelves n ai twevitafly es more Inter' ested In 'a' f avoracle

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A reia!C in the nest rate case or licensing pr.oceeding taan in. _

_ a requistory process wnose credte111tf nay gwarantee them a 1etater long-run _stant11ty. " There are, of course, people in tne &ndustry wno understand this point, but they have never been a large group and have certainly never dominated industry policymaning whien has tended instead toward the protection of the lowest common demoninator.

The great difficulty is that strong regulation is a chain that must be strong at every line. The basic legisla-tion must confer the necessary powers. The Dudget must suffice. The 11eensing er rate case reviews must go deep enough to have a reasonaale chTET orietecting error. The

. D nspection or auditing process must do the same and must be bacmed Dy an enforcement system that deters even unintentional i deviaties from the established stardards, which must themselves a have been set rigorously. It does no good to compensate for a weam 1tna in inspection by strengthening licensing, for the proposition that no ensin is wester than its strongest lina La no truer in requistion than in engineering, though there are some who find assurances of reactor sa'ety or regulatory soundness by just such a process of pointing venemently at the strongest linas. .

Because a sound regulatory system is so like a chain, reform cannot lie solely in espedited 11 censing measures or in energy superagencies er in tignter limits on state rate case and licensing proceedings, though these are the measures meet often proposed at the Federal and state levels. ,2nless N

py arec belanced by a willimaena to set= upe ariant process that__

is _acaDie of saying "no- wnen 'ao# answer, and

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, ' het is capa=6e et g a nnq an eg reet tve voace and a sonattIve

" ear to t.no v. n .ancerns at Laose uno raase oojections'

's N et in parallel wac . si s t ua. .acensing and '

'__ r a t e cas ef oce T7tWgT Te to corerent y aware or we s u ng 3t e r m envTTXP,' rent al and ecoWale ef f ects o ' its setto s. I tnTMk that these meas Wes are a road ta stalemate, disillusionment, and probably some local violence. It doesn't have to to tnat way, of course, Dut Lt will to it we allow ourselves to be lulled into believing anything remotely lite the proposition that fdward Teller is tne only casualty of Three Mile M[

Island.

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