ML18033B310

Responds to NRC 900417 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-05,50-260/90-05 & 50-296/90-05.Corrective Action: Senior Reactor Operator Assigned to Fire Protection Staff for day-to-day Supervision of Fire Protection Program

ML18033B310
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/18/1990
From:	MEDFORD M O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9005240023
Download: ML18033B310 (13)

See also: IR 05000259/1990005

Text

..ACCELERATED

DISTRIBUTION

DEMONSTPWTION

SYSTEM REGULATORY

INFORMATION

DISTRXBUTION

SYSTEM (RIDS)SSION NBR:9005240023

DOC.DATE: 90/05/18 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-259

Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

MEDFORD,M.O.

Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)DOCKET ir 05000259 05000260 05000296 D/05000259 A 05000260 D 05000296 D R~~s~1~py~ach to~8 BMck~B~~ubch&iel<, B.D.bi~~ierson~B~W~sou

1 Copy each to: S.Black,D.M.Crutchfield,B.D.Liaw, R.Pierson,B.Wilson

SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 900417 ltr re violations

noted in Insp Repts 50 259/90 05i50 260/90 05 6 50 296/90 05'ISTRIBUTION

CODE: D030D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR

ENCL SXZE: TITLE: TVA Facilities

-Routine Correspondence

01 NOTES'ECIPIENT

ID CODE/NAME LA ROSS,T.~~NAL: ACRS 0~EM..EG FILE EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

OGC/HDS2 NRC PDR COPXES LTTR ENCL1 1 1 0 1 1 D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

A D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION

LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!TAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 16 ENCL 14

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA.

TENNESSEE 37401 6N 38A Lookout Place IiiAY 18 ISO U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos.50-259 50-260 50-296 BRONNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)-UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 NRC INSPECTION

REPORT NOs.50-259/90-05, 50-260/90-05, AND 50-296/90-05

-RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS

This letter provides TVA's response to the letter from B.A.Nilson to 0.D.Kingsley, Jr., dated April 17, 1990, which transmitted

the subject report.The report cited TVA with two violations.

The first violation involved failure to follow procedures

during the performance

of 480V/240V AC electrical

system operating instructions.

The second violation concerned a failure to maintain operable fire hose stations.TVA.',s-response.to these two.violations

is provided in the enclosure.

TVA recognizes

that several violations

and licensee reportable

events have occurred during the past two years in the fire protection

arear'owever, TVA considers that management

control is now in place to ensure proper implementation

of the fire protection

program.Additionally, BFN's Operations

staff has been counseled to be more knowledgeable

of the fire protection

compensatory

measures that are in place at all times.Please refer any questions concerning

this submittal to Patrick P.Carier, BFN, Site Licensing, (205)729-3570.Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Mark 0.Medford, Vice Pres i dent Nuclear Technology

and Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 9005240023

900 ia PDR ADOCK 050002<+9 An Equal Opportunity

Employer ago ((I

H

U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

MAY 18$90 cc (Enclosure):

Ms.S.C.Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division-U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000

Mr.B.A.Wilson, Assistant.

Director for Inspection

Programs TVA Projects Division U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

ENCLOSURE RESPONSE-BRONNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)NRC INSPECTION

REPORT NOS.50-259/90-05, 50-260/90-05, AND 50-296/90-05

Letter From B.A.Nilson to O.D.Kingsley, Jr.Dated April 17, 1990 During the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC)inspection

conducted on February 16-March 16, 1990, two violations

of NRC requirements

were identified.

Violation A involved failure to follow procedures, and Violation B concerned failure to establish compensatory

fire protection

measures.Violation A Technical Specification (TS)Section 6.8.1.'la requires that written procedures

be established, implemented

and maintained

covering applicable

procedures

recommended

in Appendix A of Regulatory

Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.Appendix A of Regulatory

Guide 1.33 includes operating procedures

for onsite AC power sources and the reactor protection

system as recommended

procedures.

Site Directors Standard Practice 2.1, Site Procedures

and Instructions, requires that the site be operated and maintained

in accordance

with written, approved procedures

and instructions

which have been formally issued and distributed

for use.Contrary to the above, on March 1, 1990 during the performance

of Procedure O-OI-578, 480V/240V AC Electrical

System Operating Instructions, procedures

were not properly implemented

in that the operator failed to check the normal feeder breaker AC vol.ts greater than 450 volts as required by 0-OI-57B step 8.6.3 prior to transferring

480 volt power sources.This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement

1)applicable

to all three units.~ll l.Admission or Denial of the Alle ed Violation TVA admits the violation.

2.Reasons for the Violation The root cause of this violation was personnel error.The Assistant Shift Operations

Supervisor (ASOS)failed to adequately

follow procedures

before transferring

480 volt shutdown board 3A from its alternate electrical

source to its normal electrical

source, During his review of the operating

0 0

Page 2 of 4 instruction

on the 480V/240V AC electrical

system, the ASOS overlooked

the step which instructs the user to check that the normal feeder breaker AC voltage is greater than 450 volts before transferring

the board.Additionally, the voltage indicators

on the 480 volt shutdown board 3A indicate when the normal electrical

supply is available.

This indication

should have been examined by the ASOS before attempting

the power transfer.Contributing

to this violation, the operations

personnel on February 28, 1990 did not follow the procedure in verifying that the 4KV shutdown board 3EA had been restored to the configuration

as required in the 4KV electrical

system operating instructions

following preventive

maintenance

on the 3A diesel generator and the 4160 volt and 480 volt circuit breaker.As a result, the feeder breaker on the 4KV shutdown board 3EA which provides normal electrical

power to the 480 volt shutdown board 3A was left open.Corrective

Ste s Which have been Taken and Results Achieved The immediate corrective

action was to close the 4KV feeder breaker to the 480 volt shutdown board 3A, and reenergize

the shutdown board (the board was reenergized

on March 1, 1990 at 0016 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />).Additionally, operations

instruction

on 480V/240V AC electrical

system has been revised to make more noticeable (with a caution and by underlining)

the step which instructs the user to verify that the AC voltage across the emergency (normal)feeder breaker is greater than 450 volts.The ASOS involved in the incident received appropriate

disciplinary

action and was individually

counseled concerning

use of plant procedures

and attention to detail.Additionally, a human performance

evaluation

report has been completed, which reinforced

the original conclusion

of personnel error as the root cause for this violation.

Operations

personnel have reviewed a description

of this event, and those operations

personnel involved in restoring the 4KV shutdown board configuration

have been counseled concerning

compliance

to plant manager'instruction

on system status control.Corrective

Ste s Which will be Taken to Avoid Further Violation No further corrective

steps are required.Date When Full Com liance will be Achieved Full compliance

has been achieved.

0 S,I

Page 3 of 4 Violation 8 TS 3.11.E requires that the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.ll.c shall be operable whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be operable.Nhen a fire hose station is inoperable, a gated wye shall be connected to the nearest operable hose station.One outlet of the wye shall be connected to a length of hose sufficient

to provide coverage for the area left unprotected

by the inoperable

hose station.Contrary to the above, this requirement

was not met for the following two examples: l.On March 1, 1990, a NRC inspector identified

that inoperable

hose stations for both Units 1 and 2, on reactor building elevations

639, 621, 593, and 565, were protected by a single gated wye connection

connected to a single 50 foot roll of hose from operable hose stations at each station in Unit 3.The length of connected hose was insufficient

to provide coverage for Units 1 and 2.The combined length of the reactor buildings is 425 feet.2.After reviewing the inspector's

concerns in example one, the licensee determined

that the hold order (0-90-60)which was issued to isolate the Unit 1 and 2 fire protection

systems for a system outage had been expanded on March 1, 1990, to include Unit 3.This resulted in the removal from service of all hose stations within all three reactor buildings.

This condition remained until the Unit 3 hose stations were returned to service t on March 5, 1990.This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement

1)applicable

to all three units.TVA's Res onse 1.Admission or Denial of the Violation TVA admits this violation.

2.Reason for the Violation The root cause of this violation was personnel error.The SOS did not perform a sufficiently

in-depth review of TSs and other existing fire protection

impairments

to determine if the compensatory

measures met TS 3.11.E.

1 I

Page 4 of 4 3.Corrective

Ste s Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved As a result of the problem identified

by this violation, corrective

maintenance

was performed to the sectionalizing

valves that would allow restoration

of the Unit 3 turbine building fire protection.

Compensatory

measures were then established

utilizing the Unit 3 fire protection

hose stations.The plant manager discussed this event with Operations, Work Control, Technical Support, and Maintenance

Management

personnel.

The plant operations

manager and operations

superintendent

met with SOS, ASOS, and cognizant fire protection

personnel and discussed with them the need for TS compliance.

The personnel involved in the event received appropriate

disciplinary

action and were counseled on meeting the letter of TS as well as the intent.Operations

and Fire Protection

personnel were required to review the Final Event Report for lessons learned from the error that led to this violation.

A senior reactor operator has been assigned to the fire protection

staff for day-to-day

supervision, direction, implementation

of the fire protection

program, and coordination

with the shift SOS.The shift SOS has assumed direct supervision

of the shift fire brigade and is now involved in the fire system impairment

permit process.In so doing, the SOS has the responsibility

of ensuring all TS requirements

are met prior to implementation

of perm)ts.4.Corrective

Ste s Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

No further corrective

steps are required.5.Date When Full Com liance will be Achieved Full Compliance

has been achieved.

0