ML20248A013

Forwards FEMA Final Rept on Plant 881018 Emergency Response Exercise.No Deficiencies Identified.Eight Areas Requiring Corrective Actions & Several Areas Recommended for Improvement

ML20248A013
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	07/28/1989
From:	Dan Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Eury L CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8908080183
Download: ML20248A013 (1)

Text

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_ 1 Carolina Power and Light Company 1 ATTN: Mr. Lynn.W. Eury Executive Vice President Power Supply P..O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC. 27602 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE BRUNSWICK EXERCISE OF 0CTOBER 18, 1988 Enclosed is a ~ copy of the report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on. the -Brunswick Plant emergency response exercise conducted on '

October 18, 1988. As indicated in the report. FEMA' identified no deficiencies.

However, 8 areas requiring corrective action were identified by FEMA during the exercise, as well as an additional 21 areas recommended for improvement.-

We . encourage you to assist the . appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of'these items should.be completed.

prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the. l development of. a scenario for the next full-scale exercise. that will effectively test the areas in which the referenced items were identified..

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sin ~cerely, OPJGINAL SIGNED BY DOUGLAS M. COLUNs Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w/ encl:

R. B. Starkey, Jr. , Manager Brunswick Nuclear Project J. L. Harness, Plant General Manager  ;

State of North Carolina bec w/ encl:  !

NRC Resident. Inspector  ;

Document Control Desk .!

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pg, g b { Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 Mr. Frank J. Congel JM 22 g Director Division of Radiation Protection and Errergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the October 18, 1988, full-participation Joint exerci se of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans site-specific to the Brunswi ck Nuclear Power Plant.

The Brunswick Plant is located near the City of Southport in Brunswick County, approximately 16 miles south of the City of Wilmington, North Carolina. The State of North Carolina and Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone, fully participated in the exercise.

The exercise report was prepared by Region IV staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). There were no deficiencies idertified during this exercise. There were, however, eight areas requiring corrective actions and and several areas recommended for improvement.

Based on the results of this exercise, the State of North Carolina and Brunswick and New Hanover Counties demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on March 17, 1982, will remain in effect.

FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this final exercise report to the State of Nortn Carolina. They will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.

Sincerely, WM j ~ .

6 Dennis H. Kw'atkowski Assistant A sociate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure

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Utility: Carolina Power and Light company Plant Location: Near Southport, North Carolina Participating State and Local Governments:

State of. North Carolina Brunswick County New Hanover County L

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a-TABLE OF CONTENTS I

Page l I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

1 II. DETAILED DISCUSSION 2 State of North Carolina 2 l I

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 2 I Dose Assessment 3 Area "C" Office 4 Joint Information Center (JIC) 5 Emergency Operaticns Facility (EOF) 6 Mobile Radiological Laboratory 6 Radiological Field Team No. 1 7 Radiological Field Team No. 2 8 Radiological Field Team S-RAD 3 9 j Medical Services Drill- 12 Brunswick County, 13 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 13 Decontamination 15  !

School Evacuation 16 New Hanover County 17 i

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 17 Decontamination 19 Brunswick and New Hanover Counties 21 Traffic Control Points 21 i

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,1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) l I

Pacre III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 22

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IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED 23 FOR IMPROVEMENT V. APPENDICES 27 A. Evaluator List and Assignments  ;

B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario i

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I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

This full participation joint exercise of the off-site plans and I preparedness for the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant was conducted i on October 18, 1988. The exercise was evaluated by a team of twenty-one Federal evaluators representing six Federal agencies.

The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1,

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants". l l

The State of North Carolina activated both its State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Raleigh and its Area "C" Office in Wallace. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) remained at '

the SEOC.

The exercise included the following major participants:

4 North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management North Carolina Department of Human Resources, >

Radiation Protection Section~(RPS) .

Brunswick County New Hanover County .

Carolina Power and Light Company '

All objectives of the exercise were accomplished, and no deficiencies were identified. There were, however, eight " Areas Requiring Corrective Actions" and several " Areas Recommended for Improvement" identified.

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II. DETAILED DISCUSSION State of North Carolina I

State Emercency Operations Center (SEOC)

The State EOC is located in the basement of a state office building in Raleigh. The EOC has sufficient space and amenities _

to support extended emergency operations. While some maps were l posted and each staff member had the map in the Emergency Public  ;

Information Brochure, a large operational map would have been '

helpful to clearly depict the affected sectors and plume path for the EOC staff,

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The communications capability consisted of a dedicated ring-down telephone, commercial telephone, RACES operators, a new radio system, and facsimile machines. The addition of facsimile l

machines in the radiological health section and the public information section implemented the " Areas Recommended for Improvement" identified during the 1986 exercise.

In accordance with the plan, the North Carolina Division of  !

Emergency Management called appropriate state agencies when the Alert was declared. Twenty state agencies were represented at the EOC. A public information officer and a liaison were  !

dispatched to the media center and the emergency operations facility, respectively.

The SZRT Team Leader effectively managed the emergency and involved appropriate staff in decision making. The SERT staff a were knowledgeable of their duties and executed them promptly.

The EOC was effectively managed by the Operations Officer. He conducted numerous briefings and had state agency participants briefly describe their activities.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None I Areas Recommended _for Improvement:

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1. Provide a large-scale operations map which clearly delineates operational data for EOC staff.

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l Dose Assessment The Radiation Protection Section (RPS) demonstrated the ability 1 to perform dose projections and recommend protective actions for  :

the airborne plume pathway. {

Upon notification that a Site Area-Emergency had been declared, RPS used data _ supplied by the utility and field monitoring teams to project off-site consequences. Computer programs were l employed throughout the exercise to model the atmospheric j dispersion and project off-site radiological dose rates.  !

Recommended protective actions (sheltering and evacuation) were 1 based on current PAG recommendations for the expected duration of l release. j The considerations in making protective action decisions wero )

whole body and-thyroid projected doses, duration and pluma j arrival times,-rstimated delay and implementation time for  !

protective action, available sheltering, and mode of evacuation.

This was tha ff'rst exercise with~RPS' dose essessment performed at i SERT headquarters in Raleigh,-North Carolina. 'All objectives associated with dose assessment and protective action i recommendations were accomplished.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None ,

Areas Recommended f,or Improvement:  ;

1. Provide improved communications system (within SERT) {

for RPS Dose Assessment Team:

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a. The speaker phone was plugged into the wrong location; it should have been in the dose assessment room.

b. The scanner system to the mobile lab was inoperative.

c. Pre-arranged facilities (at SERT) for RPS dose assessment (i.e. tables and phone lines) are needed.

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Area "C" Office The Area "C" Office is located on U.S. 117 in Wallace, North j Carolina. The building contains several rooms and bathroom facilities. The space is adequate but could be enhanced if the rooms were rearranged.

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The Area coordinator exhibited excellent command and control. l j

Ho, along with his staff, appeared to be well trained and enthusiastic about their duties.

Communications capability was adequate. Back-up radio communications were provided by the Amateur Radio Emergency l Services Operators. The Emergency Information System (computer) was used throughout the exercise and was inpressive, especially the graphics capability.

Staffing of the area office was excellent and included representatives of seven state agencies and the American Red Cross. A shift-change roster was available.

The staff was aware of inadequate ventilation in the operations room and the need for a back-up power source (H.3.) and intends to eliminate thess inadequacies as soon as possible.

Superior Items:

1. Active participation of Area "C" staff, state agencies, .

and the Amateur Radio Emergency Services Personnel.

2. Emergency Information System (EIS) capability.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

i 1. H.3. - Back-up emergency power has been planned but has not been installed. Installation should be accomplished soon.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Ventilation in the Operations Room.

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Joint Information Center (JIC)

The Joint Information Center was officially activated at 10:22 a.m., October 18, 1988. This facility is located on State Highway 87, adjacent to the' visitors center just south of the i plant entrance. (The utility, State, and FEMA nave discussed the l relocation of the JIC outside the 10-mile EPZ. FEMA Region IV has received a letter from CP&L documenting and outlining the utility's plans for this relocation. This was an area recommended for improvement in the last exercise report.)

The leadership, organization, and direction and control demonstrated by the State and Utility lead PIO's were excellent.  :

Staff support during the exercise was also excellent. The '

facilities, displays, and equipment were a marked improvement over the 1986 exercise.

The co-location of the Utility, State, and County PIO's in the  !

JIC greatly improved the coordination of press releases, press '

briefings, and the interaction among all parties. This was an area recommended for improvement in the last exercise report.

Press releases by the Utility, State, and counties, as well as joint releases, were well-coordinated, promptly prepared, and were in sufficient quantities for media personnel during the briefings.

Three media briefings were conducted involving the Utility, NRC, State of North Carolina, and Brunswick and New Hanover Counties.

Actual and mock media representatives participated in these ,

j briefings. State and utility technical representatives were '

available to assist state and local PIO's. Displays were available and used in all but the first briefing. Media questions were handled well by State, local, and utility representatives. Communications between the SERT and the JIC  ;

were adequate. The use of computers to generate press releases  ;

for rapid coordination was excellent. A HAM radio operator was present during the exercise and actually transmitted at least one message via radio.

Seven Rumor Control personnel effectively handled over 75 simulated inquiries from the public. Eight media PIO's responded to approximately fifty media inquiries.

Overall, the JIC operations were excellent.

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Superior I.tems: I

1. Leadership and staff cooperation and coordination.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement: None ]

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Emercency Orerations Facility (EOF 1 l

Emergency classification levels were effectively exercised at the l EOF, and State and local emergency officials were notified in a timely manner. Direction and control of the EOF and communications and coordination with county and State officials (SERT) located in the EOF were exemplary. Staff changes were handled efficiently and SERT (Raleigh) was notified immediately when the plant status changed and when emergency classification  ;

levels changed. Excellent communications were demonstrated '

throughout the exercise.

Facilities, status boards, maps, and other displays of emergency information were exceptional. However, the noise level was high at times. Coordination between the licensee and Stato SERT team I members in the EOF regarding off-site dose Essessment and field monitoring was excellent, and recommendations of protective i actions were timely and effective.

Superior Items:

1. Direction and control.

2. Coordination and communications.

Deficiencies: None Aret e Recuirina Corrective Actions: None, Areas 9ecommended for Improvement: None 1

Mobile Radiological Laboratory One area recommended for improvement in the last Brunswick exercise involved communication links between SERT and the mobile 6

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laboratory. These communications were adequate during this exercise. Communications were observed on Monday, during deployment to Brunswick, and on Tuesday, during the exercise.

The fax was used during the exercise to send logs to SERT. This  !

proved helpful in avoiding communication problems on radio. No communications problems were observed.

Mobilization on Monday from Raleigh was adequate. The field car was delayed because of a flat tire, but otherwise the team was deployed to Brunswick without problems.

As stated above, faxing proved very helpful. Also, the logs were well kept, clear, and legible. More emphasis should be placed on informing field teams of meteorological data and ECLs.

l The team leader in the mobile lab left for approximately 30 j minutes during a period of inactivity to assist field vehicles I coming in for decontamination.

The Mobile lab proved adequate in all areas.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement: None Endiolocical Field Team No. 1 Team No. 1 arrived at the Bolivia control station on October 17, 1988, pre-positioned for the field monitoring activities. This did not detract from their capability to effectively mobilize for a "real" situation. The team had a Radiation Manual with six sections which included equipment checklists, all required forms for field monitoring, procedures for obtaining all types of samples, and operational procedures for field radiation monitoring equipment. All equipment was checked against the inventory and for operability before departure. All required personnel dosimetry was available or issued prior to departure.

Radio operation was checked prior to departure. The team had very effective maps showing pre-designated sampling locations and directional information sheets. The team members were familiar with the area and were able to find all required locations.

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The team performed all the required field monitoring activities in the field. Team members kept their instruments "on" throughout the exercise to monitor ambient levels; bagged the equipment to prevent contamination; operated the low-volume air sampler to collect particulate and iodino air samples; logged all samples taken on appropriate forms; calculated the iodine concentration; communicated all information promptly.and effectively to the radiation control station, and took soil and vegetation samples as well. The team demonstrated exceptional health physics practices throughout the exercise. This included proper dosimetry; knowledge of the operation of all equipment (survey meters and radios); exposure rate monitoring with bagged meters; collection of air samples; bagging of samples to prevent contamination; labeling of all samples with required information; and transmission of data. The team members were well motivated throughout the exercise. They were never given meteorological data, plant status, or informed of iodine levels in order to i determine whether KI should be taken.

SuDerior Itema:

1. Team No. I was very knowledgeable about radiological field monitoring and demonstrated excellent health l physics practices throughout the exercise.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None i

Areas Recommended fcn Improvement:

1. Manufacture and/or purchase a " plastic doughnut" to hold the silver zeolite cartridge for better reproducible gasometry without having to remove the sample tray holder.

Radiological Field Team No. 2 The State (Radiation Protection Section, Division Facility Services at North Carolina State) field monitoring teams were pre-positioned at Bolivia. The teams were briefed and deployed to the field from the Mobile Radiological Laboratory (stationed at Bolivia) at 9:30 a.m. The two-member team was well organized, trained, and knowledgeable in their specific assignments. Proper procedures for checking supplies, equipment, and communication

. systems were followed before deployment into the field.

) Checklists in a " Survey Team Procedures Handbook" were utilized 8

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e to insure:that proper equipment-was aboard the vehicle. Radio communication procadures between the field teams and the EOF were excellent. Reception was adequatc at all monitoring locations and interference was minimal.

Dosimetry was adequate, including procedures, and each team member had a permanent-record dosimeter. The team utilized a printed form (pocket-size card) to record personal exposure. The monitoring equipment was exceptional and included a-ratemeter with a pancake probe for counting all samples, a ratemster with a thin window GM probe, and an ion chamber.for higher-level measurements. Iodine sampling included a vehicle battery operated air sampling pump, silver zeolite cartridges'and {

particulate filters. All of the equipment hhd been recently R

calibrated and labeled appropriately.

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overall,. team members were knowledgeable in essentially all aspects of sampling and measurements and completed their assigned {

tasks in a most professional sanner. -

gunerior Items:

1. Taan members were well trained. The equipment f checkliet of operation procedures was well documerited in the " Survey Team Procedure Handbook".

Deficienci,1: None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement: None  !

Radiological Field Team S-RAD 3 Field monitoring team S-RAD 3 demonstrated the ability to adequately perform the required environmental monitoring functions. The team executed their responsibilities in a professional and well-organized manner. . Sufficient equipment and supplies were available, and the team easily c. accomplished all applicable exercise objectives. The recently installed state-wide radio system performed admircbly and was'a great asset to the emergency response effort.

Though all applicable exercise objectives were met, there were i some items which could be improved upon: when counting air i samples, the detector was placed in a positicn which was only 5-8 inches away from the instrument check sources. Even though the  :

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background count rate probably was not greatly affected in this l particular situation, the sources should have been removed from the immediate area of the detector.

The a_r sampler was not leaded with sampling media until tne team was at the assigned monitoring locations. If the sampler had been loaded prior to entering the plume, personnel exposure could have been reduced.

The procedure for obtaining environmental air samples instructs l the technician to obtain the sample, reinove and package the i sample media, and then refer to another procedure for sample analysis. Not until the other procedure is consulted is the technician reminded to relocate to a low-background area before  ;

analyzing the sample. '

The equipment available to the environmental monitoring teams for analyzing silver zeolite air sample cartridges is not adequate '

for ensuring a reproducible sample-counting geometry.

The potassium iodide tablets in the environmental monitoring kits had an August 1988 expiration date.

l Current guidance on storing silver zeolite air sampling media I states that as long as the original, airtight package remains j intact, silver zeolite cartridges have an indefinite shelf-life. i When the airtight package is broken, however, each cartridge i should be marked with an expiration date of one year from the j date the package was opersed. The silver zeolite cartridges in '

the environmental monitoring kits had been removed from the original package and were not marked with an expiration date.

Environmental monitoring team coordinators (S-RAD Control) decided not to relay meteorological data and plant conditions to the field teams. Once, when team S-RAD 3 requested wind direction and speed prior to performing their next assignment, S-RAD Control declined the rr. quest.

On one occasion, S-RAD Control sent team S-RAD 2 to the locatien of team S-RAD 3 to pick up samples to return to the mobile lab. '

To accomplish this, team S-RAD 2 had to traverse the plume twice because team S-RAD 3 was cut off by the plume on the Sunny Point access road. A few minutes later, team S-RAD 3 was dispatched to another loce. tion, which also required them to go through the plume. Later, in a discussion with control personnel, they indicated that the dose rates in the plume were not really that high, and the additional exposure received by field personnel would not have been a significant amount.

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.4 Superior Items:

1. Radio communications.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Personnel training should be strengthened on the l procedure for counting air samples.

2. Personnel training should be strengthened on the procedure for loading air samplers with sampling media.

3. The air sampling procedure should be revised to. I instruct the technician to exit the plume immediately I after drawing the sample and then remove and package the sample media.

4. Equipment for analyzing silver zeolite air sample cartridges should be obtained.

5. Potassium iodide tablets should be replaced as soon as possible. j l

6. The silver zeolite cartridges currently in the j environmental monitoring kits should be replaced, and State personnel should ensure that the new cartridges are maintained in a manner consistent with current guidance.

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7. State management personnel should reconsider their I position on information dissemination. Environmental monitoring teams need wind direction and.. speed information to determine such things as plume arrival time and best routes to sample locations and low-background areas.  !

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8. The concepts of operation utilized by control personnel {

for field team deployment and coordination should be l revised to follow more closely the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) concept of exposure control. ]

Medical Services Drill This drill began with an aircraft accident. The small aircraft was carrying nuclear medicine material (exercise boxes). The Myrtle Grove Volunteer Fire Department was the first responder. l A fire on the aircraft was simulated with smoke flares. The response of the fire department was excellent. The fire was addressed while a other responders attended the victim. The  !

victim was moved to a safe area as other members of the squad secured the area and established an access control point. A contral-line tape was extended around the site as two monitoring teams made initial surveys.

The New Hanover County EMS team arrived about three minutes after the fire department. One member of the team, dressed in protective clothing, attended the victim with assistance from the fire department personnel. The other EMS team member prepared the vehicle for a " contaminated victim" and supplied the control point with treatment material to be passed into the controlled area. The victim was monitored, disrobed, and wrapped.  ;

The victim was then passed through the control point and loaded ,

into the EMS vehicle. Team work between the fire department and i New Hanover County EMS personnel was excellent.

The victim was transported to the New Hanover Memorial Hospital I and transferred to the emergency team staff. Communication between the EMS team and the hospital staff was excellent and included presentation to the hospital of the shipping papers '

(properly bagged) for source identification. .

1 The hospital team functioned extremely well. The Health l Physicist (H.P.) was a volunteer from the local Westinghouse Plant. The hospital supports, and has an agreement to receive, H.P. support through the North Carolina Health physicists Society. The encrgency team worked in a well-coordinated fashion. Monitoring was accomplished and wounds decontaminated.

Areas were remonitored and again decontaminated. The proper samples were taken, marked, and sent to the hospital laboratory for confirmation. Contamination control was exercised and waste  ;

products were isolated.

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The outside monitor was inexperienced. Monitoring of the EMS personnel went slowly. The outside monitor is taking a course being given by the Westinghouse facility to train personnel in monitoring activities.

Undressing procedures were posted by the egress point and were closely followed.

The demonstration at the hospital was outstanding.

Superior Items:

1. Fire department, EMS, and hospital training.

2. Attitude.

Deficiencies: None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Training of additional staff monitors at the hospital was discussed. This is being addressed by the recent initiation of a training program.

Brunswick County Emercency Operations Center (EOC)

The Brunswick County EMA Director promptly and efficiently activated the EOC and directed an excellent response to the simulated release. This was accomplished despite considerable handicaps resulting from inadequate EOC space and equipment.

(H.3.) Principal among these inadequacies were:

Shortfall in ccmmercial telephone circuite.

The actual operations space within which county government response operations were directed.

No consolidated display of operational information.

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1 Although county governmental units participated in the exercise, they were not continuously involved and were not consulted relative to major decisions. This situation was a direct result l of space inadequacies. County elected officials did not I participate. l A more demanding scenario or an actual event could easily overwhelm the relatively fragile facilities arrangement. The County Director indicated that past hurricane evacuation I operations had come close to going awry because of facilities problems.

No rumo; control function was activated. (G.4.c.)

Periodic rebroadcast or update of emergency public information was not demonstrated. E

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Suoerior Items:

l 1. The professional ability of the county Director transcended problems and enabled the county to mount an effective and relatively well-coordinated response.

Deficiencies: None

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Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1. H.3. - The entire matter of space, furnishings, and equipment is in urgent need of attention. l

2. G.4.c. - Demonstrate rumor control.

3. E.5. - Rebroadcast emergency public information periodically. l Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Prescripted messages for " Alert" and " Site Area Emergency" were identical. A clearer differentiation should be made.

2. The County Director was concerned that weather information being received was not accurate. Assurance of accuracy should be provided. j 1

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3. The EBS station staff should be briefed in depth to ensure existence of emergency procedures knowledge.

Decontamination The decontamination site was established at a "T" intersection on a main road providing access and egress to the 10-mile EPZ. A pumper truck provided washing capability, and the site had adequate room for vehicular movoment and storage space.

Additional storage space for vehicles was available across the road.

Personnel on site had proper dosimetry and records. Instruments were pre-checked as was equipment on the pumper truck. A faulty auxillary pump on the pumper truck was identified during the check; however, the chief did not inform his team of this in order for him to observe the corrective actions they might take when it was discovered. The team promptly moved to using a main line at reduced pressure during the exercise.

Team training was adequate. Personnel were aware of their responsibilities and performed them adequately during the monitoring and decontamination of a vehicle.

The following items were discussed with the team:

The decontamination rite had been moved from the 10-mile EPZ. Consequently, traffic control personnel were not available. The State Patrol arrived during the middle portion of the exercise because they first had gone to the original site as indicated in the plan. (P.4.)

Guidance on monitoring emergency workers at the decontamination site should be reassessed. Presently, people are not monitored at the site. If the vehicle is contaminated, it is decontaminated, then the vehicle and personnel are sent to a personnel decontamination site. This process appears to be inefficient. Appropriate monitoring of emergency personnel, e.g., when within a contaminated vehicle, would determine whether an individual should go to a decontamination center.

Guidance on the " level of contamination" used for vehicle storage '

versus decontamination was vague.

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Areas Recuirine corrective Actions:  !

1. P.4. - Update plans when the location of a decontamination site is changed. 1 Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Examine guidance on personnel monitoring at the  ;

decontamination site for emergency workers, i 1

2. Examine and quantify guidance on contamination level )

used to determine vehicle storage versus i decontamination.

I School Evacuation A meeting took place between Federal and State evaluators and j Brunswick County School System personnel to discuss the Standard operating Procedure for school evacuation. Notification and evacuation procedures were discussed as plan documents were reviewed. Present at the meeting with the evaluators were the School Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, bus personnel, 4

and the principals of the schools located in the 10-mile EPZ. {

Representatives of the Superintendent's office have met with principals and transportation personnel regarding the Brunswick County SOP, but little information has been provided to the faculty and other school personnel. The schools have given ovacuation information, bus, and information-flow procedures to the teachers.

The principals seemed prepared, but faculty and other staff were not well informed. The ability to evacuate in a timely manner was demonstrated in a previous exercise. This is the first year ,

adult drivers have been used, and driver notification has yet to be tested. (E.2.) l l

Superior Items:

1. Updated plan and phone list. I Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

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1. E.2. - Test and review ability to contact drivers at '

their workplace.

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1. Provide instructions to parents living outside the 10-mile EPZ, that do not receive utility information, on the location of shelters-for their children ,

j attending schools within the 10-mile EPZ.

2. Provide faculty instruction concerning P sics of nuclear pouer plant, potential problems, and evacuation SOP.

3. Develop a method of accountability for students who drive private cars.

New'Hanover County Emercency Operations Center (EOC)

At approximately 8:15 a.m., the 911 Operations Center began notifying EOC staff to report to the EOC. A call list was used to make notification. At 9:00 a.m., the EOC coordinator deemed the EOC operational with the majority of the key organizations in place. The EOC, located in the training room at the Law  !

Enforcement Center, is a spacious, well-furnished facility, and j because of its close proximity to the jailhouse, other facilities j such as a kitchen and showers are available if needed for  ;

extended operations. Maps and status boards were displayed but could have been utilized more. For example, ECLs were ,

prominently dicplayed but other types of information were not always updated on the board. At the end of the exercise the i

" shelter", " roadblock", " decontamination" and " notification" boards were blank, even though the information was discussed i during regular briefings.

The New Hanovar Emergency Services Coordinator was effectively in ]

charge of the operation. At least one County Commissioner was 1

present in the EOC during the exercise. They were knowledgeable )

about emergcncy management and contributed to the decision }

making. Frequent and timely briefings were held by the coordinator, and agency activities reports we*te given at the {

briefings. This procedure enabled all staff to be fully informed.

i 17 4

Communications capabilities consisted of 20 telephone lines. "

emergency uanagerent radio, two fire scanners, RACES / ARES radio operators, two fax machines (incoming / outgoing), and portable cellular telephones. In addition, a personal computer (PC) was used to log messages and a staff person kept hand-recorded  ;

messages. The PC was also capable of displaying maps and retrieving hazardous materials information via the CAMEO System.

This was the first exercise in which the ceinty utilized the PC.

It was found to be a valuable addition. New Hanover County could l communicate with 3tunswick County, the JIC, SERT, Area C, and j 911, as well as other agency personnel. Communications equipment '

functioned properly with no undue delafs or breakdowns.

The county PIO very ably and professionally held several media briefings via telephone and professionni contact in coordination with Brunswick County and the JIC. Two etaff members were located at the EOC and coordinated efforts with the county liaison at the JIC. Generally, briefings coincided with the i isruance of an EBS message, JIC news releases, or upon request of l the media. Actual briefings were held outside the EOC.

The county PIO coordinated information to be disseminated to the public in a very professional manner. Pre-ccripted messages were used and modified to fit the situation. Concurrence with ,

Brunswick County and the JIC was reached before a message was  ;

released. For the most part, the messages were handled in a timely manner. Verbally, the information was prompt; however, on '

occasion, there uas a 5 to 30-minute delay in receiving a hard '

copy cf the message, The Radiological Health Officer recommended to the County Health Departrent at 12:50 p.m. that XI should be "provided" to  !

emergency workers based on projected doses. There was I considerable confusion as to the meaning of "provido" because the j KI had already been delivered to the staging area. Once it was determined that Rad Health intended for the KI to be ingestede the County Health Representath 0 contacted the County Health j Director and Registered State Tharmacist. At 2:05 p m., the j County Health Director, via the County Health EOC representative, j instructed emergency workers to ingest KI. At 2:10 p.m., after  ;

receiving field monitoring data, a Rad Hea3th representative i advised County Health to discontinue taking KI. At 2:13 p.m.

l County Health advised the staging area (Base 4) to discontinue ,

{

, taking KI. Once County Health reached the decision to administer  ;

I KI, the instructions were provided to emergency workers promptly (2:00-2:05 p.m.). The considerable delay (12:50-2:00 p.m.) from 1B l

l l

4 l

I i

the time Rad Health recommended ingesting KI until the j instructions were issued, however, indicated there was confusion i which needs to be resolved. (J.10.e.) I 1

Rumor Control was effectively managed by the 1033d Army Reserve I Training Unit (IMAs) who have a staff of fifteen available.

Deficiencies: None 1

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions- i

1. J.10.e. - Provide training to clarify KI procedures.

Areas Recommended for Imorevement:

1. Utilize the status board and maps to a greater extent (e.g., indicate wind direction and sheltered areas.)

1

2. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) should be reviewed and, if necessary, rewritten to. include procedures requiring use of measage forms for important l updates. This would ensure proper message flow and updating of status boards.

Decontamination At 10:50 a.m., the Department of Public Service, located at the New Hanover County EOC, dispatched the Myrtle Grove Volunteer Fire Department to set up and operate a vehicle decontamination facility. The decontamination team, consisting of six fire personnel, arrived at the pre-determined site at 11:00 a.m.

While enroute (approximately 10:57 a.m.) the Incident Commander j (IC) requested a load of sand be delivered to the decontamination  !

area to be used for diking. Upon arrival, the IC set up traffic I cones to direct traffic flow, ensured adequate consideration was given to controlling run-off, and established " clean / dirty" parking areas.

, The Safety Officar issued two self-reading dosimeters and record I forms to each emergency worker who was part of the  ;

decontamination team. Dosimeter chargers were available. TLD's were not issued. (K.3.a.) Personnel dressed in turn-out gear and taped their pants and coat cuffs with duct tape to preclude contamination. A " hot zone" we.s established to separate surve'y personnel who had the potential for contamination from other i personnel. Security was enforced by the Safety Officer.

l i 19

._. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ ~

Once the decontamination facility was set up, thc'IC briefed the ,

Highway Patrol on traffic flow. When a vehicle t.pproached the '

decontamination area, a team member (recorder) recorded pertinent vehicle information on the prescribed form and i:1structed the l

occur 7.s of the vehicle to remain in the vehicle, keep windows l up un as otherwise instructed, pull hood release, and turn off the ignition. At that point, two monitors with CDV-700 survey meters began surveying.the vehicle, paying particular attention to the grill front, radiator, air filter, wheel wells, and front j and rear bumpers. The monitors adequately demonstrated appropriate survey procedures. The vehicle driver was directed to the " clean" area. For purposes of the exercise, contamination on the right rear wheel well was simulated. After receiving this information, the driver was instructed to drive to an area roped off for decontamination. A low-volume /high-pressure water washdown was performed by the two monitors, and the car was re-surveyed and found to be clean.

The New Hanover County decontamination facility successfully demonstrated the ability to equip and operate a vehicle decontamination facility in accordance with plan procedures. .The decontamination team did an excellent job of setting up the site as well as monitoring and decontaminating a vehicle. All team members der.07strated a working knowledge of the plan and procedures.

Superior Items:

1. Overall demonstration.

Deficiencies: None Areas Regpirina Correctj're Actions:

1.

K.3.a. - Provide TLD's ta decontamination team in accordance with the plan.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Provide additional training on proper dosimetry procedures for State Highway Patrol Officers assigned to the decontamination facility.

l 20

Brunswick and New Hanover Counties Traffic Control Points Seven Traffic Control Points in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties were evaluated. All were adequately manned and in operation by 8:30 a.m. St, aft personnel at all locations demonstrated professionalism iM all areas. Personnel were aware of their responsibilities and, when questioned, stated that they had received training in their assigned functions.

The method of recording instrument calibrations was not uniform.

Soine instrument boxes had calibration dates, and most instruments had the calibration dates noted either on the top or side of the instrument. Personnel explained that the instruments are separated from the boxes at times; therefore, if all recordings were posted on the instruments only, the problem would be solved.

The State Troopers, County Deputies, and the amateur radio support organization were very proud of their role in this exercise.

sumerior Items:

1.

Knowledge of traffic control procedures q Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Record manner. instrument calibration dates in a uniform 1

)

I 21  !

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III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Scheduled Facility or NUREG Corrective Date of Activity Item Acticn Completion Deficiencies None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions Area "C" H.3. Back-up emergency power has office been planned but has not been installed. Installation should be accomplished soon.

Brunswick H.3. The entire matter of space, County furnishings, and equipment is in urgent need of attention.

G.4.c. Demonstrate rumor control.

E.5. Rebroadcast emergency public information periodically.

P.4. Update plans when the location of a decontamination site is changed.

E.2. Test and review ability to contact drivers at their workplace.

New Hanover J.10.e. Provide training to clarify County KI procedures. l K.3.a. Provide TLD's to decontamina-tion team in accordance with the plan.

22

IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement SEOC 1. Provide a large-scale operations map which clearly delineates operational data for EOC staff.

Dose Assessment 1. Provide improved communications system (within SERT) for RPS Dose Assessment Team:

s

a. The speaker phone was plugged into the wrong location; it should have been in the dose assessment room.

b. The scanner system to the uobile lab was inoperative,

c. Pre-arranged facilities (at SERT) for RPS dose assessment (i.e.

tables and phone lines) are needed.

Area "C" Office 1. Ventilation in the Operations Room.

Radiological 1. - Manufacture and/or purchase a " plastic Field Team No. 1 doughnut" to hold the silver zeolite cartridge.for better reproducible geometry without having to remove the sample tray holder.

Radiological 1. Personnel training should be Field Team S-RAD 3 strengthened on the procedure for counting air samples.

2. Personnel training should be strengthened on the procedure for loading air samplers with sampling media.

23

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Facility or Activity l Areas Recommended for Improvement i l,

Radiological 3. The air sampling procedure should be' Field Team S-RAD 3 revised to instruct the technician to j (Continued) exit the plume immediately after drawing  ;

the sample and then remove and package  !

the sample media. l 1

4. Equipment for analyzing silver zeolite I air sample cartridges should be i obtained.

5. Potassium iodide tablets should be replaced as soon as possible.

6. The silver zeolite cartridges currently 1 in the environmental monitoring kits should be replaced, and State personnel should ensure that the new cartridges are maintained in a manner consistent with current guidance.

7. State management personnel should reconsider their position on information i dissemination. Environmental monitoring teams need wind direction and speed information to determine such things as plume arrival time and best routes to sample locations and low-background 3 areas.

8. The concepts of operation utilized by control personnel for field team deployment and coordination should be revised to follow more closely the As i Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) '

concept of exposure control.

Medical Services 1. Training of additional staff monitors at Drill the hospital was discussed. This is l l being addressed by the recent initiation i of a training program.

d

( 24

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ - - - - - - - - _ _ - - -- - - - - - - - -- - L

l si 6

l; Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for ImDrgyement Brunswick County 1. Prescripted' messages for " Alert" and

" Site Area Emergency" were identical. A l clearer differentiation should be made. '

2. The County Director was concerned that j weather information being receivec:. was  !

not accurate. Assurance of accuracy'

~

should be provided.

3. The ZBS station staff should be briefed in depth to ensure existence of emergency procedures knowledge.

1

4. Examine guidance on personnel monitoring '

at the decontamination site for 1 emergency. workers. I

5. Examine and quantify guidance on ,

contamination level used to determine vehicle storage versus decontamination. 3

'j

6. Provide instructions to parents living outside the 10-mile EPZ, that do not receive utility information, on the location of shelters for their children attending schools within the 10-mile

,EPZ.

7. Provide faculty _ instruction concerning basics of nuclear power plant, potential problems, and evacuation SOP.

8. Develop a method of accountability for students who drive private cars.

25 4

4 V. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario i

l 27

i l

Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement New Hanover 1. Utilize the status board and maps to a County greater extent (e.g., indicate wind direction and sheltered areas).

2. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) l should be reviewed and, if necessary, )

i rewritten to include procedures requiring use of message forms.for important updates. This would ensure proper message flow and updating of status boards.

3. Provide additional training cn proper dosimetry procedures for State Highway i Patrol Officers assigned to the decontamination facility. ] '

l

4. Record instrument calibration dates in a '

uniform manner.

4 l

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1 26 l

t

b FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS BRUNSWICK NUCLiAR FOWER PLANT ~ EXERCISE October 18, 1988 CHIEF EVALUATOR AND'RAC IV CHAIRMAN John Heard (FEMA)

iERT HEADQUARTERS (RALEIGH)

Larry Robertson (FEMAl-Chuck Wakamo (EPA)

Dot Nevitt.(USDA)

AREA "C" OFFICE (WALLACE)

Al Hall-(FEMA)

MEDIA CENTER Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Bill McSwain (FEMA)

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Ray Boyett (FEMA)

MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY Jon Richards (EPA)

RADIOLOGICAL FIELD TEAMS David Richards (DOE)

~Neil Gaeta (FEMAI Walt Kisieleski (FEMA)

MFDICAL ACTIVITIES Brad Eichorst-(DHMS/FDA)

Robert Perdue (FEMA)

BRUNSWICK COUNTY Don Hammonds (FEMA)

Tim Dowd.(FEMA)

Rachael Rowland (FEMA)

NEW HANOVER COUNTY Josh Moore (FEMA)

Linda Zander (FEMA) 1 MOBILE EVALUATORS-I Walt Lucas (DOT)

Lamar Arrendale (DOT)

I

l. _ - _ _ _ - ____-______-_-___J

Y rn

. .:~%

v North Carolina De.partment of Crime Control and Public Safety James G. Martin, Governor Division of Emergency Management Joseph W. Dean, Secretary 116 W. Jones St., Raleigh, N. C. 27603-1335 (919) 733-3867 August 11, 1988 l

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency  ;

Region IV i 1371 Peachtree Street, N l

Atlanta, Ge rgia 3 '

Dear Mr. W odard:

A full participation 10-mile plume exposure exercise will be conducted with Brunswick and New Hanover Counties for

]

Carolina Power and Light Company's Brunswick Steam Electric j Plant on October 18, 1988. l I

The exercise will consist of a simulated accident at the {

Brunswick Plant which will escalate to a . General Emergency j and involve planned response actions. l 1

North Carolina State Participation will consist of activation of the State Emergency, Operations Center, and operation of the Area "C" Office for coordination of State support to the participating counties.

In accordance with FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 and NUREG-0654 the objectives for North Carolina during this exercise (*) are:

• l. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

"2. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties) l 3 T 'N.

. . . .1 . . 3 .F.,

q

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Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Page 2 August 11, 1988 i

i

• 3. Demonstrate the ability to_ direct,- coordinate and'  !

control emergency activities. (State, Brunswick and New-Hanover Counties)

• 4. Demonstrate the ability. to communicate with all Appropriate.. locations, -organizations and field personnel. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 5. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support.- emergency j operations. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties) '

• 6. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. . (State, Brunswick' and New Hanover Counties)

• 7. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for l determining field radiction measurements. (State) I i

• 8. Demonstrate the appropriate. equipment and procedures for the low as measurement of airborne as 10- microcuria radiciodine concentrations

• per cc - in the presence of l

l noble gases. (State) .j

• 9. Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume . and promptly ' perform  ;

laboratory analyses. (State) i l

• 10. Demonstrate the ability, ,within. the. plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the publici via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. (State)

• 11. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation .

time estimates and other relevant factors. (State, ,i Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)-

• 12. Demonstrate . the ability to initially alert the public 2 within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an.  !

instructional message within.15 minutes of a decision by ,

appropriate State and/or local. official (s). (State, i Brunswick and New Hanover Counties) I

i 1:

1 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Page 3  ;

August 11, . 1988 i

.1 1

• 13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and-j instructions to the public.in a timely fashion after the'  ;

initial alert and notification has occurred. -(State, .i Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 14. Demons trate the ability to brief the media in' an accorate, coordinated and . timely marmer. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties) ,

j

• 15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. (State, Brunswick'and New Hanover Counties)

• 16. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, based on predetermined 1 criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it l once the decision .is made, .if necessitated by radio- ]

iodine releases. (State, Brunswick .and 'New Hanover. O 1 Counties)

17. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, if the 3 State plan so specifies, to recommend the use of KI for  !

the general public, based on predetermined criteria, as 1 well as to distribute and administer. it.'once 'the-decision. is made, if . necessitated. by radioiodine releases. (Not applicable - State' Plan does not specify  ;

the use of KI for the general public). )

18. Demonstrate the ability -and resources necessary' to  ;

implement appropriate protective. actions for. the

~

impacted permanent and transient pluma EPZ population-(including transit-dependent persons,- special needs j po.mlations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons). (Accomplished July 10, 1985)

• 19. Demonstrate the ability and' -resources necessary 'to implement appropriate protective actions for. school 4 l

children within the plume EPZ. (Brunswick County) l

• 20. Demonstrate the organizational. ability and resources necessary to control evacuation and traffic flow and to l

control- access to evacuated and sheltered areas. l (Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)  !

l

~

4 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Page 4 August 11, 1988

21. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and e'acuees. decontamination of (accomplished July 10, 1985) j 22.

semonstrete personnel the adequacy for congregate of facilities, equipment and required care of evacuees. (not by secnario, accomplished i 1986). December 10-11,

{

• 23. Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, =

procedures and personnel injured or exposed for transporting contaminated, individuals. (New Hanover County)

• 24. Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facilities equipment, procedures and personnel for handling {

contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.

Hanover County) (New .!

l

25. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986)

• 26. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies' assistance. (State)

27. Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment- and procedures for collection and transport of samples of vegetation, food crops,. milk, meat, poultry, water _and animal feedo (indigenous to the- area and stored).

(accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

28. Demonstrate the appropriate lab operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water and animal feeds (indigenous to the area and stored).

(accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

29. Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective measures based on field data, FDA PAG's and other relevant factors. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

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Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Page 5 August 11,.1988 j I

30. Demonstrate the ability to implement both preventive and emergency protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (accomplished December 10-11,-1986 exercise)

31. Demonstrate the ability tr estimate total population-exposure. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

32. Demonstrate the. ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery based =on estimated total population exposure, available EPA PAG's and other relevant. factors. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

33. Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery.

(accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

34. Demonstrate the ability to maintain. staffing. on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change. .

(accomplished July 10-11, 1985)

35. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the evacuation of on-site personnel. (not applicable)

36. Demonstrate the ability to carry ou't emergency response functions (i.e., activate EOC's, mobilize staff that )

report to the EOC's, establish communications linkages and complete telephone call down) during an unannounced off-hcurs drill or exercise. (New Objective) (must be completed by 1994)

Sincerely, Joseph F. Myers Director

/fsl cc: CP&L NC/EM (Area C) ~

i l

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/$

N.x,.M North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety James G. Martin, Governor Division of Ernergency Management Joseph W. Dean, Secretary 116 W. Jones St., Raleigh, N. C. 27603 1335 (919) 733-3867 September 15, 1988 Mr. John Heard Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30309 RE: Brun wick Nuc e Power Plant Exercise

Dear Mr.,

Heard 4, The purpos of this letter is to amend the objectives j that the State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties will accomplish during the October 18 exercise at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.

In our original letter (dated August 11, 1988), we had )

omitted objectives 18 and 34; however, following i conversations between Charles Cochran and Tom Hawkins, the s two objectives will be accomplished with the following stipulations. 4 Cbjective 18 will be accomplished by Brunswick and New Hanover Counties by showing a list of individuals who will l require transportation out of the threatened area, in the event of an actual release from the Brunswick Plant. Since the scenario does not support evacuation, we will show the organization that will be responsible for transporting persons requiring this assistance.

Objective 34 will be accomplished by State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties through showing a double staffing roster in the EOC. No actual shift change will be conducted, but we will show the responsible official for each position

. who would be called in for replacement in the event of a l needed shift change.

l 512 N. Salisbury Streer

• P. O. Box 27687 e Raleigh, N. C. 2 76Il-7687 An Equai Opportunity Affirrnanvc Acnon Ernplover

~ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _

i 8

J Mr. John Heard Page 2 September 15, 1988 ]

i

.If any of these stipulat1ons.do not agree with what han been agreed to verbally, please notify Bob Buchanan of this j so that we may take other actions to satisfy the objectives 1 of this exercise.

Should you have any questions concerning this, please-  !

contact Bob Buchanan of my staff.

Sincerely, Joseph F. Myers Director

/fs1 I J

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• ~ +

s &I V s,-

North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety James G. Martin, Governor Division of Emergency Management  !

Joseph W. Dean, Secretary 116 W. Jones St., Raleigh, N. C. 27601- 1335 (919) 733-3867 August 19, 1988 1

1 l

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Geo gia 303 9

Dear Mr. W dard:

Attached you will find the " Events Sequence" outlining North Carolina participation in the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant full participation exercise to be conducted october 18, 1988.

Please contact Gary L. Jones, at (919) 733-3867, if you have any questions concerning this portion of our planned activities.

Sincerely, Joseph F. Myers, Director JFM/GLJ/jgm cc: Carolina Power and Light Company (Emergency Preparedness)

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (Emergency Preparedness)

NC/EM (Area C) l

u. , m, - .- u. ,, ,,,m. w .ams. ~,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - _ _ _ . - . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - -- -- -- - -- -- A J

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BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT j EXERCISE EVENTS SEQUENCE q FOR NORTH CAROLINA PARTICIPANTS TIME EVENT 0600 Unit #1 is in " cold shutdown" for a short duration outage. Unit #2 is being operated at'100% power.

0630 A workman at the Radwaste Low-Level Warehouse is injured while working in a contaminated area.

" UNUSUAL EVENT" should be declared; and county, )

State and US Coast Guard Warning Points contacted.  !

0700 A flange leak has developed in Unit #1, with '

reactor vessel temperature at 170 F and vessel

" heat up" rate at 35 F/hr. Repairs are estimated to not be able to be completed before vessel temperature exceeds 212 F. Technical  ;

specifications requirements have not been met to '

allow operation in Mode III. Enter Mode III in approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

0800 Unit #1 enters Mode III. . )

i

" ALERT" should be declared. i Initial notification of off-site authorities by j plant. Alert and notification of responders 1 implemented. Minimum staffing of state and county EOCs begins.

0900 Gasket is replaced on Unit #1, but not before exceeding 212 F.

0930 Unit #2 Reactor Building ventilation isolates.  ;

0935 " ALERT" is over. Temperature in Unit #1 is below 212 F.

0943 " Scram", Unit #2.

0950 Unit #2 Standby Liquid Control System fails.

" SITE AREA EMERGENCY" should be declared.

Notification of off-site authorities. State and county EOCs are fully staffed. State Emergency l Response Team (SERT) is established and has W ______ _______________- -__--- __ -- _ = _ _ _

operational control of state agency support. l Coordination of public notification via sirens, public address systems, Emergency Broadcast System  ;

(EBS), and National Weather Service 3roadcast j System. '

i 1001 High Pressure Coolant Injection fails, and. vessel

. level drops below the top of the fuel for approximately 10 minutes.

i 1215 Conventional and nuclear service. water system  !

header low pressure alarms are received. Standby pumps start automatically, but within minutes the .

low pressure annunciator is again received. Water l Service water pumps indicate that strainer differential pressures are increasing; strainer motors are not running.

1230

~

Loss of service water. Venting' starts for three hours duration.

"GENEPAL EMERGENCY" should be declared.

Recommendation to off-site authorities for "in-place" sheltering. l 1330 off-site medical emeriency; a transportation accident in New Hanover. County involving a vehicle carrying a radiation hazard.'

1515 Plant conditions stabilize, with power restored and

" cool down" continuing.

1600 Recovery phase begins.

Exercise terminates. Time may be advanced, if all objectives have been met and utility / state / federal-controllers concur.

s a

JUL 2 81989 PM  !

Carolina Power and Light Company ,

ATTN: Mr. Lynn W. Eury i Executive Vice President Power Supply ,

P. O. Box 1551 l Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE BRUNSWICK EXERCISE OF OCTOBER 18, 1988 I

Enclosed is a copy of the report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the Brunswick Plant emergency response exercise conducted _on October 18, 1988. As indicated in the report, FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, 8 are.as requiring corrective action were identified by FEMA during the exercise, as well as an additional 21 areas recommended for improvement.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the i weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed i prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise, j We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the referenced items were identified.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, j OTJGINAL SIGNED BY DOUGLAS iA COLLINS I Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards l

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w/ enc 1:

R. B. Starkey, Jr. , Manager Brunswick Nuclear Project J. L. Harness, Plant General Manager .

State of North Carolina i bec w/ encl:

! NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk R.I:DRSS RIV SS RII:DRP h

sreh

/

dr-Rnkin bb HDance  !

7 4 89 7/.17/89 7/g)/89 non A>^~ f h V v DD W*b #l2 '

JUL 2 81989 [N Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. Lynn W. Eury Executive Vice President Power Supply P. O. Box 1551 i

Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen: <

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE BRUNSWICK EXERCISE OF OCTOBER 18, 1988 Enclosed is a copy of the report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the Brunswick Plant emergency response exercise conducted on October 18, 1988. As indicated in the report, FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, 8 areas requiring corrective action were 'dentified by FEMA during the exercise, as well as an additional 21 areas recommended for improvement.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the referenced items were identified. (

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely.

OPJGINAL SIGNED BY  :

DOUGLAS & COLLINS Douglas M. Collir.s. Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

4 FEMA Final Report cc w/ encl:

R. B. Starkey, Jr., Manager Brunswick Nuclesr Project J. L. Harness. Plant General Manager  !

Statt of North Carolina bec w/ encl:

NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk R.II:DRSS RI l- SS RII:DRP

/D W reh Mr <nkin Qs.b HDance 7489 7/.17/89 7/g)/89

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D l v O VD U PU J

UNITED S1 ATES (

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[ o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 74 -

REGION N j ! ' #i. 101 MARIETTA STRE ET,N.W.

ATL ANTA, GEOPGl A 30323 4& g N +4 -.../ JUL 2 8 m Carolina Power and Light Company  ;

ATTN: Mr. Lynn W. Eury i

Executive Vice President i Power Supply i P. O. Box 1551 l Raleigh, NC 27602  !

i Gentlemen: )

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE PRUNSWICK EXERCISE OF OCTOBER 18, 1988 Enclosed is a copy of the report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the Brunswick Plant emergency response exercise conducted on  !

October 18, 1988. As indicated in the rescrt, FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, 8 areas requiring corrective action were identified by FEMA during the exercise, as well as an additional 21 areas recommended for improvement.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the referenced items were identified.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, 5

• Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and i Radiological Protection Branch j Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

i FEMA Final Report  !

cc w/ enc 1: l l R. B. Starkey, Jr. , Manager i

Brunswick Nuclear Project

! J. L. Harness, Plant General Manager l State of North Carolina j r es a r/ w R I T L L (

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. s

- *T 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency ft .I Washington D.C. 20472 Mr. Frank J. Congel M 22 m Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the October 18, 1988, full-participation Joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency  ;

preparedness plans si te-speci fic to the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant. l The Brunswick Plant is located near the City of Southport in Brunswick County, approximately 16 miles south of the City of Wilmington, North Carolina. The State of North Carolina and Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone, fully participated in the exercise. ,

i The exercise report was prepared by Region IV staff of the Federal Emergency l Management Agency (FEMA). There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. There were however, eight areas requiring corrective actions and and several areas rec,mmended o for improvement. l I

Based on the results of this exercise, the State of North Carolina and i Brunswick and New Hanover Counties demonstrated the capability to protect I the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency l at the site. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on March 17, 1982, ,

will remain in effect, i FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this final exercise report i to the State of Nortn Carolina. They will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions. l i

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.

Sincerely, y , _~ f/ h e C ,.

[6DennisH.Kw'atkowski Assistant A sociate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure

-896 720005 Jr -

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l BRUNSWICK NUCI. EAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE ]

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV 196 7L6969 2 'l9pp .

g Federal Emergency Management Agency 5( ji' Region IV 1371 Peachtice Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 l

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BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT j

/

EXERCISE '

l Conducted on October 18, 1988 Exercise Report January 15, 1989 1

Utility: Carolina Power and Light Company l Plant Location: Near Southport, North Carolina Participating State and Local Governments:

State of North Carolina Brunswick County New Hanover County 1

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TABII OF CONTENTS I

EDS_t I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

l II. DETAILED DISCUSSION 2 State of North Carolina 2 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 2 Dose Ascessment 3 i Area "C" Office 4 Joint Information Center (JIC) 5 Emergency operations Facility (EOF) 6 Mobile Radiological Laboratory 6 Radiological Field Team No. 1 7

{

i Radiological Field Team No. 2 8 l

Radiological Field Team 3-RAD 3 9 Medical Services Drill 12 l 1

Brunswick County. '

13 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 13 Decontamination 15  ;

School Evacuation 16

[few Manover County 17 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 17 Decontamination 19 Brunswick end.Ngg_Manover Counties 21 Traffic Control Points 21

')

~

.y 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS  !

(Continued) {

i I

Pace III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 22 l

IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED 23 l FOR IMPROVEMENT V. APPENDICES 27 A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario 1

J i

1 l

l l

l l

d l

i I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

This full participation joint exercise of the off-site plans and preparedness _for the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant was conducted on October 18, 1988. The exercise was evaluated by a team of '

twenty-one Federal evaluators representing six Federal agencies.

The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1,

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

1 Tne State of North Carolina activated both its State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Raleigh'and its Area."C" Office in Wallace. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) - remained at the SEOC.

l The exercise included the following major participants: )

l l

North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Radiation Protection Section (RPS)

Brunswick County New Hanover County .

Carolina Power and Light Company All objectives of the exercice were accomplished, and no deficiencies were identified. There were, however, eight " Areas Requiring Corrective Actions" and several " Areas Recommended for.

Improvement" identified. j l

i l

i 1

II. DETAILED DISCUSSION State of North Carol (ng State Emercency Operations Center (SEOC)

The State EOC is located in the basement of a state office building in Raleigh. The EOC has sufficient space and amenities to support extended emergency operations. While some maps were posted and each staff member had the map in the Emergancy Public Information Brochure, a large operational map would have been helpful to clearly depict the affected sectors and plume path for the EOC staff. j The communications capability consisted of a dedicated ring-down l telephone, commercial telephone, RACES operators, a new radio system, and facsimile machines. ~The addition of facsimile 1 machines in the radiological health section and the public information section implemented the " Areas Recommended for Improvement" identified during the 1986 exercise. i In accordance with the plan, the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management called appropriate state agencies when the Alert was declared. Twenty state agencies were represented at the EOC. A public information officer and a liaison vare j dispatched to the media center and the emergency operations '

facility, respectively.

The SERT Team Leader effectively managed the emergency and involved appropriate staff in decision making. The SERT staff were knowledgeable of their duties and executed them promptly.

The EOC was effectively managed by the Operations Officer. He conducted numerous briefings and had state agency participants briefly describa their activities.

Deficiencies: None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None .

1 Areas Recommended for Increvement:

1

1. Provide a large-scale operations map which clearly delineates operational data for EOC staff.

2 t

Dose Assessment I The Radiation Protection Section (RPS) demonstrated the ability to perform dose projections and recommend protective actions for the airborne plume pathway.

Upon notification that a site Area Emergency had been declared, RPS used data supplied by the utility and field monitoring teams to project off-site consequences. Computer programs were employed throughout the exercise to model the atmospheric dispersion and project off-site radiological dose rates.

Recommended protective actions (sheltering and evacuation) were based release.

on current PAG recommendations for the expected duration of The considerations in making protective action decisions were whole body and thyroid projected doses, duration and plume arrival times, estimated delay and implementation time for protective action, available sheltering, and mode of evacuation.

This was the first exercise with RPS dose assessment performed at SERT headquarters in Raleigh, North Carolina. All objectives associated with dose assessment and protective action revnnmendations were accomplished.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Imorevement:

1.

Provide improved communications system (within SERT) for RPS Dose Assessment Team:

a. The speaker phone was plugged into the wrong location; it should have been in the dose assersament room.

b. The socaner system to the mobile lab was inoperative.

c. Pre-arranged facilities (at SERT) for RPS dose assessment (i.e. tables and phone lines) are needed.

3

Area "C" Office The Area "C" Office is located on U.S. 117 in Wallace, North Carolina. The building contains several rooms and bathroom facilities. The space is adequate but could be enhanced if the rooms were rearranged.

The Area Coordinator exhibited excellent command and control.

He, along with his staff, appeared to be well trained and enthusiastic about their duties.

Communication capability was adequate. Back-up rad'o communications vere provided by the Amateur Radio Emergency I

Services Operators. The Emergency Information System (computer) was used throughout the exercise and was impressive, especially the graphics capability.

Staffing of the area office was excellent and included representatives of seven state agencies and the American Red Cross. A shift-change roster was available.

The staff was aware of inadequate ventilation in the cperations room and the need for a back-up power source and intends to eliminate these inadequacies as soon as pos(H.3.)sible.

Suoerior Itgag:

1. Active participation of Area "C" staff, state agencies, and the Amateur Radio Emergency Services Personnel.

2.

Emergency Information System (EIS) capability.

Deficiencies: None Areas Keeuirina Corrective Actions:

1. H.3. - Back-up emergency power has been planned but has not been installed. Installation should be accomplished soon.

Areap Recommended for Improvement:

l 1. Ventilation in the Oparations Room.

4

l l

i Joint Information Center (JIC)

The Joint Information Center was officially activated at 10:22 I a.m., October 18, 1988. This facility is located on State Highway 87, adjacent to the visitors center just south of the plant entrance. (The utility, State, and FEMA have discussed the !

relocation of the JIC outside the 10-mile EPZ. FEMA Region IV I has received a letter from CP&L documenting and outlining the utility's plans for this relocation. This was an area l

recommended for improvement in the last exercise report.) j The leadership, organization, and direction and control demonstrated by the State and Utility lead PIO's were excellent.

Staff support during the exercise was also excellent. The facilities, displays, and equipment were a marked improvement l over the 1986 exercise.

The co-location of the Utility, State, and County PIO's in the {

JIC greatly improved the coordination of press releases, press j briefings, and the interaction among all parties. This was  !

an area recommended for improvement in the last exercise report.

Press releases by the Utility, State, and counties, as well as  !

joint releases, were well coordinated, promptly prepared, and were in sufficient quantities for media personnel during the briefings.

Three media briefings were conducted involving the Utility, NRC,

~, State of North Carolina, and Brunswick and New Hanover Counties.

Actual and nocx media representatives participated in these briefings. State and utility technical representatives were available to assist state and local PIO's. Displays were '

availabic and used in all but the first briefing. Media questions. ware handled well by State, local, and utility representatives. l were adequate.

Connunications between the SERT and the JIC The use of computers to generate press releases for rapid coordination was excellent. A HAM radio operator was present during the exercise and actually transmitted at-least one message via radio.

Seven Rumor Control personnel effectively handled over 75 simulated inquiries from the public. Eight media PIO's responded to approximately fifty media inquiries.

overall, the JIC operations were excellent.

5

Egggrior Items:

1. Leadership and staff cooperation and coordination.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement: None Emercency Oeerations Facility (EOF)

Emergency classification levels were effectively exercised at the l EOF, and State and local emergency officiale were notified in a timely manner. Direction and control of the EOF and communications and coordination with county and State officials (SERT) located in the EOF were exemplary. Staff changes were handled efficiently and SERT (Raleigh) was notified immediately when the plant status changed and when emergency classification levels changed. Excellent communications were demonstrated throughout the exercise.

1 Facilities, status boards, maps, and other displays of emergency information were exceptional. However, the noise level was high at times. Coordination between the licensou and State SERT team members in the EOF regarding off-site dose assessment and field monitoring was excellent, and recommendations of protective actions were timely and effective.

Sucerior Itans:

1. Direction and control.  !

l

2. Coordination and communications.

Deficiencies: None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Incrovement: None Mobile Radiological Lahoratorv One area recommended for improvement in the last Brunswick i i

exercise involved communication links between SERT and the mobile 6

I 1

laboratory. These communications were adequate during this exercise. Communications were cbserved on Monday, during deployment to Brunswick, and ca Tuesday, during the exercise.

l The fax was used during the exercise to send logs to SERT. This proved helpful in avoiding communication problems on radio. No

! communications problems were observed.

Mobilization on Monday from Raleigh was adequate. The field car was delayed because of a flat tire, but otherwise the team was deployed to Brunswick without problems.

As stated above, faxing proved very helpful. Also, the logs were well kept, clear, and legible. More emphasis should be placed on informing field teams of meteorological data and ECLs.

The team leader in the mobile lab left for approximately 30 minutes during a period of inactivity to assist field vehicles coming in for decontamination.

The Mobile lab proved adequate in all areas.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Argps Recommended for Improvement: None Radiological Field Team No. 1 Team No. 1 arrived at the Bolivia control station on October 17, 1988, pre-positioned for- the field monitoring activities. This did not detract from their capability to effectively mobi.'ize for a "real" situation. The team had a Radiation Manual with six sections which included equipment checklists, all required forms for field monitoring, precedures for obtaining all types of samples, and operational procedures for field radiation monitoring equipment. All equipment was checked against the inventory and for operability before departure. All required personnel doeinstry was available or issued prior to departure.

Radio operation was checked prior to departure. The team had very effective maps showing pre-designated sampling locations and directional information sheets. The team members were familiar with the area and were able to find all required locations.

7

1 The team performed all the required field monitoring activities in the field. Team members kept their instruments "on" throughout the exercise to monitor ambient levels; bagged the equipment to prevent contamination; operated the low-volume air sampler to collect particulate and iodine air samples; logged all samples taken on appropriate forms; calculated the iodine concentration; communicated all information promptly and effectively to the radiation control station, and took soil and vegetation samples as well. The team demonstrated exceptional I

health physics practices throughout the exercise. This included  !

proper dosimetry; knowledge of the operation of all equipment l (survey meters and radios); exposure rate monitoring with bagged meters; collection of air samples; bagging of samples to prevent contamination; labeling of all samples with required information; and transmission of data. The team members were well motivated throughout the exercise. They were never given meteorological

}

data, plant status, or informed of iodine levels in order to l determine whether KI should be taken.

Sumerior Items: 4

1. Team No. I was very knowledgeable about radiological field monitoring and demonstrated excellent health ,

1 physics practices throughout the exercise.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions: None Argos Recommended for Improvement:

1. Manufacture and/or purchase a " plastic doughnut" to hold the silver zeolite cartridge for better reproducible geometry without having to remove the sample tray holder.

Radiolecical Field Team No. 2 The State (Radiation Protection Sectit,n, Division Facility Services at North Carolina State) field monitoring teams were pre-positioned at Bolivia. The teams were briefed and deployed to the field from the Mobile Radiological Laboratory (stationed at Bolivia) at 9:30 a.m. The two-member team was well organized, trained, and knowledgeable in their specific assignments. Proper procedures for checking supplies, equipment, and communication systems were followed before deployment into the field.

Checklists in a " Survey Team Procedures Handbook" were utilized 8

I

l to insure that proper equipment was aboard the vehicle. Radio communication procedures between the field teams and the EOF were ,

excellent. Reception was adequate at all monitoring locations I and interference was minimal.

Dosimetry was adequate, including procedures, and each team member had a permanent-record dosimeter. The team utilized a i printed form (pocket-size card) to record personal exposure. The l monitoring equipment was exceptional and included a ratemeter with a pancake probe for counting all samples, a ratemeter with a thin window GM probe, and an ion chamber for higher-level measurements. Iodine sampling included a vehicle battery  ;

operated air sampling pump, silver zeolite cartridges and l particulate filters. All of the eIuipment hhd been recently '

calibrated and labeled appropriately.

Overall, team members waro knowledgeable in essentially all <

aspects of sampling and measurements and completed their assigned tasks in a most professional manner.

sumerior Ita==:.

1. Team members were well trained. The equipment checklist of operation procedures was well documented in the " Survey Team Procedure Handbook".

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement: None Radiological Field Team S-RAD 3 Field monitoring team S-RAD 3 demonstrated the ability to adequately perform the required environmental monitoring functions. The team executed their responsibilities in a professional and well-organized manner. Sufficient equipment and supplies were available, and the team easily accomplished all applicable exercise objectives. The recently installed state-wide radio system performed admirably and was a great asset to the emergency response effort.

Though all applicable exercise objectives were met, there were some items which could be improved upon: when counting air samples, the dctactor was placed in a position which was only 6-8 inches away from the instrument check sources. Even though the 9

background count rate probably was not greatly affected in this j particular situation, the sources should have been removed from the immediate area of the detector. 1 The a_r sampler was not loaded with sampling media until the team was at the assigned monitoring locations. If the sampler had been loaded prior to entering the plume, personnel expecure could have been reduced.

The procedure for obtaining environmental air samples instructs the technician to obtain the sample, remove and package the sample media, and then refer to another procedure for sample analysis. Not until the other procedure is consulted is the technician reminded to relocate to a low-background area before analyzing the sample.

The equipmcnt available to the environmental monitoring teams for analyzing silver zeolite air sample cartridges is not adequate for ensuring a reproducible sample-counting geometry.

The potassium iodide tablets in the environmental monitoring kits had an August 1988' expiration date.

Current guidance on storing silver zeolite air sampling media states that as long as the original, airtight package remains intact, silver zeolite cartridges have an indefinite shelf-life.

When the airtight package is broken, however, each cartridge should be marked with an expiration date of one year from the date the rackage was opened. The silver zeolite cartridges in the environmental monitoring kits had been removed from the original package and were not marked with an expiration date.

Environmental monitoring team coordinators (S-RAD Control) decided not to relay meteorological data and plant conditions to the field teams. Once, when team S-RAD 3 requested wind direction and speed prior to performing their next assignment, S-RAD Control declined the request.

On one occasion, S-RAD Control sent team S-RAD 2 to the location of team S-RAD 3 to pick up camples to return to the mobils lab.

To accomplish this, team S-RAD 2 had to traverse the plume twice because team S-RAD 3 was cut off by the plume on the Sunny Point access road. A few minutes later, team S-RAD 3 was dispatched to another location, which also required them to go through the plume.

Later, in a discussion with control personnel, they indicated that the dose rates in the plume were not really that high, and the additional exposure receivsd by field personnel would not have been a significant amount.

10

t Suoerior Items:

1

1. Radio communications.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Improvement: i

1. Personnel training should be strengthened on the _j procedure for counting air samples, j

2. Personnel training should be strengthened on ne-procedure for loading air samplers with samp 1 media.

I

3. The air sampling procedure should be revised to l instruct the technician to exit the plume immediately after drawing the sample and then remove *and peakata the sample media.

4. Equipment for analyzing silver zeolite air sample cartridges should be obtained.

5. Potassium iodide tablets should be replaced as soon as possible. j

6. The silver zeolite cartridges currently in the environmental monitoring kits should'be replaced, and State personnel should ensure that the new cartridges are maintained in a manner consistent with current guidance.

7. State management personnel should reconsider their position on information dissemination. Environmental monitoring teams need wind direction and speed information to determine such things as plume arrival time and best routes to sample locations and low-background areas.

1 11

)

8. The concepts of operation utilized by control personnel for field team deployment and coordination should be revised to follow more closely the As Low As Reasonably Achievable.(ALARA) concept of exposure control.

Medical Services Drill This drill began with an aircraft accident. The small aircraft J was carrying nuclear medicine material (exercise boxes). The Myrtle Grove Volunteer Fire Department was the first responder.

A fire on the aircraft was simulated with smoke flares. The response of the fire department was excellent. The fire was addressed while a other responders attended the victim. The ]

victim was moved to a safe area as other members of the squad :j j

secured the area and established an access control point. A control-line tape was extended around the site as two monitoring teams made initial surveys. j i

The New Hanover County EMS team arrived about three minutes after the fire department. One member of the team, dressed in protective clothing, attended the victim t'ith aseistance from the fire department personnel. The other EMS team member prepared i the vehicle for a " cont:ainated victim" and supplied the control peint area.

with treatment material to ba passed into the controlled The victim was monitored, disrobed, and' wrapped.

The victim was then passed through the control point and loaded into the EMS vehicle. Team work between the fire department and New Hanover County EMS personnel vse excellent.

The victim was transported to the New Hanover Memorial Hospitel and transferred to the emergency team staff. Communication between the EMS team and the hospital staff was excellent and included presentation to the hospital of the shipping papers (properly bagged) for source identification.

The hospital team functioned extremely well. The Health Physicist Plant.

(M.P.) was a volunteer from the local Westinghouse The hospital supports, and has an'4greement to receive, H.P. support through the North Carolina Health Physicists Society. The amargency team worked in a well-coordinated fashion. Monitoring was accomplished and wounds' decontaminated.

Areas were remonitored and again decontaminated. The proper samples were taken, narked, and sent to the hospital laboratory for confirmation.

products . Contamination control was exercised and waste were isolated.

12 1

i The outside metator was inexperienced. Monitoring of the EMS personnel went elowly. The outside monitor is taking a course being given by t%s Westinghouse facility to train personnel in  !

monitoring activities.

Undressing procedures were posted by the egress point and were closcly follcwed.

The demonstration at the hospital was outstanding.

Sumerior Items:

1. Fire department, EMS, and hospital training.

2. Attitude.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None Areas Recommended for Incrovement:

1. Training of additional stas- monitors at the hospital was discussed. This is being addressed by the recent initiat_sn of a training program.

Brunswick County Emercancy Oeerations Center (TOC)

The Brunswick County EMA Director promptly and efficiently activated the EOC and directed an excellent response to the simulated release. This was accomplished despite considerable handicaps resulting from inadequate EOC space and equipment.

(H.3.) Principal among these inadequacies were:

Snortfall in commercial telephone circuits.

The actual operations space within which county government response operations were directed.

No consolidated display of operational information.

13

Although county governmental units participated in the exercise, they were not continuously involved and were not consulted relative to major decisions. This situation was a direct result of space inadequacies. County elected officials did not participate.

A more demanding scenario or an actual event could easily overwhelm the relatively fragile facilities arrangement. The County Director indicated that past-hurricane evacuation operations had come close to going awry because of facilities problems.

No rumor control function was activated. (G.4.c.)

Periodic rebroadcast or update of emergency public information was not demonstrated. (E.5.)

Sueerior Items:

1. The professional ability of the County Director transcended problems and enabled the county to mount an effective and relatively well-coordinated response.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1. H.3. - The entire matter of space, furnishings, and equipment is in urgent need of attention.

2. G.4.c. - Demonstrate rumor control.

3. E.5. - Rebroadcast emergency public information periodically.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Prescripted messages for " Alert" and " Site Area Emergency" were identical. A clearer differentiation should be made.

2. The County Director was concerned that weather information being received was not accurate. Assurance of accuracy should be provided.

14

1

)

3. The EBS station staff should be briefed in depth to ensure existence of energency procedures knowledge.

l Decontamination The decontamination site was established at a "T" intersection on a main road providing access and egress to the 10-mile EPZ. A pumper truck provided washing capability; and the site had adequate room for vehicular u.ovempnt and storage space.

Additional storage space for vehicles was available across the road.

Personnel en site had proper dosimetry and records. ' Instruments were pre-checked as was equipment on the pumper truck. A faulty '

auxillary pump on the pumper truck was identified during the check; nowever, the chief did not inform his team of this in order for him to observe the corrective actions they might take j when it was discovered. The team promptly moved to using a main  !

line at reduced pressure during the exercise. j Team training was adequate. Personnel were aware of their responsibilities and performed them adequately during the monitoring and decontamination of a vehicle.

The following items were discussed with the team:

The decontamination site had been moved from the 10-mile EPZ. Consequently, traffic control personnel were not available. The State Patrol arrived during the middle portion of the exercise because they first had gone to the original site as indicated in the plan. (P.4.)

Guidance on monitoring emergency workers at the decontamination site should be reassessed. Presently, people are not monitored  !

at the site. If the vehicle is contaminated, it is decontaminated, then the vehicle and personnel are sent to a i personnel decontamination site. This process appears to be inefficient. Appropriate monitoring of emergency personnel, e.g., when within a contaminated vehicle, would determine whether an individual should go to a decontamination center.

Guidance on the " level of contamination" used for vehicle storage versus decontamination was vague.

Deficiencies: None 1

)

15

__--___--___-O

Areas Re.cuirine Corrective Actions:

1. P.4. - Update plans when the location of a decontamination site is changed.

Areas Recommended for Imorevement:

1. Examine guidance on personnel monitoring at the decontamination site for emergency workers.

2. Examine and quantify guidance on contamination level used to determine vehicle storage versus decontamination.

School Evacuation A meeting took place between Federal and State evaluators and Brunswick County School System personnel to discuss the Standard Operating Procedure for school evacuation. Notification and evacuation procedures were discussed as plan documents were reviewed. Present at the meeting with the evaluators were the School Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, bus personnel, and the principals of the schools located in the 10-mile EPZ.

Representatives of the Superintendent's office have met with principals and transportation personnel regarding the Brunswick County SOP, but little information has been provided to the faculty and other school personnel. The schools have given evacuation information, bus, and information-flow procedures to the teachers.

The principals seemed prepared, but faculty and other staff were not well informed. The ability to evacuate in a timely manner was demonstrated in a previous exercise. This is the first year adult drivers have been used, and driver notification has yet to be tested. (E.2.)

Sueerior Items:

1. Updated plan and phone list.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions:

1. E.2. - Test and review ability to contact drivers at their workplace.

I 16

Areas Recommended for Improvement: 1

1. Provide instructions to parents living outside the 10-mile EPZ, that do not receive utility information, )

on the location of shelters for their children attending schools within the 10-mile EPZ.  ;

I

2. Provide faculty instruction concerning basics of nuclear power plant, potential problems, and evacuation SOP.

3. Develop a method of accountability for students who.

drive private cars.

New HEnover County Emeraency Ooerations Center (EOC) j At approximately 8:15 a.m., the 911 Operations Center began notifying EOC staff to report to the EOC. A call list was used to make notification. At 9:00 a.m., the EOC coordinator deemed the ZOC operational with the majority of the key organizations in place. The EOC, located in the training room at the Law .

Enforcement Center, is a spacious, well-furnished facility, and because of its close proximity to the jailhouse, other facilities i such as aoperations.

extended kitchen and showers are available if needed for  !

Maps and status boards were displayed but could have been utilized more. For example, ECLs were prominently displayed but other types of information were not always updated on the board. At the and of the exercise the

" shelter", " roadblock", " decontamination" and " notification" boards were blank, even though the information was discussed during regular briefings.

The New Hanover Emergency Services Coordinator was effectively in charge of the operation. At least one County Commissioner was present in the EOC during the exercise. They were knowledgeable about emergency management and contributed to the decision making. Frequent and titely briefings were held by the coordinator, briefings.

and agency activities reports were given at the informed.

This procedure enabled all staff to be fully 17

Communications capabilities consisted of 20 telephone lines, emergency management radio, two fire scanners, RACES / ARES radio operators, two fax machines (incoming / outgoing), and portable cellular telephones. In addition, a personal computer (PC) was used to log messages and a staff person kept hand-recorded  ;

messages. The PC was also capable of displaying maps and '

retrieving hazardous materials information via.the CAMEO System.

This was the first exercise in which the county utilized the PC.

It was found to be a valuable addition. New Hanover Ccunty could 4 communicate with Brunswick County, the JIC, SERT, Area C, and 911, as well as other agency personnel. Communications equipment functioned properly with no undue delays or breakdowns.

The county PIO very ably and professionally held.several media briefings via telephone and professional contact in coordination with Brunswick County and the JIC. Two staff members were-located at the EOC and coordinated efforts with the county liaison at the JIC. Gene ally, briefings coincided with the issuance of an EBS message, JIC news releases, or upon request of 1 the media. Actual briefings were held outside the EOC.  !

The county PIO coordinated information to be disseminated to the public in a very professional manner. Pre-scripted messages were used and modified to fit the situation. Concurrence with Brunswick County and the JIC was ranched before a' message was released. For the most part, the messages were handled in a timely manner. Verbally, the information was prompts however, on occasion, there was a 5 to 30-minute delay in receiving a hard '

copy of the message. 1 The Radiological Health Officer recommended to the County Health Department at 12:$0 p.m. that KI shculd be "provided" t) emergency workers based on projected doses. There was considerable confusion as to the meaning of " provide" because the KI had already been delivered to the staging area. Once it.was determined that Rad Health intended for the KI to be ingested, -

the County Health Representative contacted the County Health Director and~ Registered State Pharmacist. At 2:05 p.m., the '

County Health Director, via the County Health EOC representative, instructed emergency workers to ingest KI. At 2:10 p.m., after receiving field monitoring data, a Rad Health representative advised County Health to discontinue taking KI. At 2:13 p.m.

i

' County Health advised the staging area (Base 4) to discontinue taking KI. Once County Health reached the decision to administer KI, the instructions were provided to emergency workers promptly (2:00-2:05 p.m. ) . The considerable delay (12:50-2 s 00 p.m. ) from j l

18

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the time Rad Health recommended ingesting KI until the instructions were issued, however, indicated there was confusion which needs to be resolved. (J.10.e.)

Rumor Control was effectively managed by the 1033d Army Reserve Training Unit (IMAs) who have a staff of fifteen available.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1. J.10.e. - Provide training to clarify KI procedures.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Utilize the status board and maps to a greater extent (e.g., indicate wind direction and sheltered areas.)

2. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) should be reviewed and, if necessary, rewritten to include procedures requiring use of message forms for important updates. This would ensure proper message flow and updating of status boards.

Decontamination At 10:50 a.m., the Department of Public Service, located at the New Hanover County EOC, dispatched the Myrtle Grove Volunteer Fire Department to set up and operate a vehicle decontamination facility. The decontamination team, consisting of six fire personnel, arrived at the pre-determined site at 11:00 a.m.

While enroute (approximately 10:57 a.m.) the Incident Commander ,

(IC) requested a load of sand be delivered to the decontamination area to be used for diking. VIpon arrival, the IC set up traffic cones to direct traffic flow, ensured adequate consideration was given to controlling run-off, and established " clean / dirty" parking areas.

The Sa:'ety Officer issued two self-reading dosimeters and record forms to each emergency worker who was part of the decontamination team. Dosimeter chargers were available. TLD's were not issued. (K.3.a.) Personnel dressed in turn-odt gear and taped their pants and coat cuffs with duct tape to preclude contamination. A " hot zone" was established to separate survey personnel who had the potential for contamination from other personnel. Security was enforced by the Safety Officer. i l

1 19 1

n once the' decontamination facility was set up, the IC' briefed the Highway Patrol on traffic flow. When a vehicle approached the decontamination area, a team member (recorder) recorded partinen vehicle information on the prescribed form and instructed the occur s of the vehicle to remain in the vehicle, keep windows up un .as otherwise instructed, pull hood release, and turn off l the ignition. At.that point, two monitors with CDV-700 survey meters began surveying the vehicle, paying particular attention.

to the grill front, radiator, air filter, wheel wells, and front and rear bumpers. The monitors adequately demonstrated appropriate survey procedures. The vehicle driver was directed to the " clean" area. For purposes of the exercise, contamination on the right rear wheel well was simulated. After receiving this information, the driver was instructed to drive to an area' roped of f fe,r decontamination. A low-volume /high-pressur? Water washdcwn was performed by the two monitors, and the car was re-surveyed and found to be clean.

The New Hanover County decontamination facility successfully demonstrated the ability to equip and operate a vehicle decontamination facility in accordance with plan procedures. The decontamination team did an excellent job of setting up the site q

as well as monitoring and decontaminating a vehicle. All team j members demonstrated a working knowledge of the plan and procedures.

Sumerier Items:

1. Overall demonstration.

Deficiencies: None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actionst

1. K.3.a, - Provide TLD's to decontamination team in accordance with the plan.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1. Provide additional training on proper dosimetry procedures for State Highway Patrol Officers assigned to the decontamination facility.

20

Brunswick and New Hanover Countigg Traffic Control Points Seven Traffic Control Points in Brunswick and New Hanover counties were evaluated. All were aduquately manned and in operation by 8:30 a.m. Staff personnel at all locations demonstrated professionalism in all areas. Personnel were aware of their responsibilities and, when questioned, stated that they had received training in their assignad functions.

The method of rscording instrument calibrations was not uniform.

Some instrument boxes had calibration dat*s, and most instruments had the calibration dates noted either on the top or side of the instrument. Personnel explained that the instruments are separated from the boxes at times; therefore, if all recordings were posted on the instruments only, the problem would be solved.

The State Troopers, County Deputies, and the amateur radio support organization were very proud of their role in this exercise.

Sumerior Items:

1. Knowledge of traffic control procedures.

Deficiencies: None

&rgas Recuirine Corrective Actions: Nona

&J As Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Record manner. instrument calibration dates in a uniform 1

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1 III. SU}c".ARY LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facility or Scheduled EQEEQ Corrective Date of Activity Item Action Comeletion I

Deficiencies None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions Area "C" H.3. Back-up emergency power has office been planned but-has not been  !

installed. Installation should be accomplished soon-J Brunswick H.3. The entire matter of space, (

County furnishings, and equipment is j in urgent need of attention.

I G.4.c. Demonstrate rumor control.

1 E.5. Rebroadcast emergency public information periodically.

P.4. Update plans when the location of a decontamination l site'is changed.

I E.2. Test and review ability to i contact drivers at their workplace.

New Hanover J.10.e. Provide training to clarify County KI procedures.

K.3.a. Provide TLD's to decontamina-tion team in accordance with 1 the plan.

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IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED l FOR IMPROVEMENT l Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement l li SEOC 1. Provide a large-scale operations map which clearly delineates operational ,

, data for EOC staff. 1 Dose Assessment 1. Provide improved communications system  ;

(within SERT) for RPS Dose Assessment i Team:

a. The speaker phone was plugged into the wrong location; it should have been in the dose assessment room.

i

b. The scanner system to the mobile )

lab was inoperative. I

c. Pre-arranged facilities (at SERT) ,

for RPS dose assessment (i.e. 1 tables and phone lines) are needed.

Area "C" Office 1. Ventilation in the Operations Room.

Radiological 1. Manufacture and/or purchase a " plastic Field Team No. 1 doughnut" to hold the silver zeolite cartridge for better reproducible geometry without having to remove the l sample tray holder.

l l

Radiological 1. Personnel training should be i Field Team S-RAD 3 strengthened on the procedure for j counting air samples.

i i

2. Personnel training should be strengthened on the procedure for  ;

loading air samplers with sampling l media.

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a Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement Radiological 3. The air sampling precedure should be i rield Team S-RAD 3 revised to instruct the technician to (continued) exit the plume immediately after drawing the sample and then remove and package .

the sample media.

]

4. Equipment for analyzing silver zeolite air sample cartridges should be obtained.

5. Potassium iodide tablets should be 3 replaced as soon as possible.

]

6. The silver zeolite cartridges currently in the environmental monitoring kits should be replaced, and State personnel should ensure that the new cartridges are maintained in a manner consistent with current guidance.

7. State management personnel should  !

reconsider their position on information dissemination. Environmental monitoring teams need wind direction and speed I information to determine such things as plume arrival time and best routes to sample locations and low-background areas.

8. The concepts of operation utilized by control personnel for field team deployment and coordination should be revised to follow more clously the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) concept of exposure control.

Medical Services 1. Training of additional staff monitors at Drill the hospital was discussed. This is being addressed by the recent initiation of a training program.

24

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Epcility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement 1 Brunswick County 1. Prescripted messages for " Alert" and

" Site Area Emergency" were identical. A clearer differentiation should be made. 1

2. The County Director was concerned that weather information being received was not accurate. Assurance of accuracy should be provided.

3. The EBS station staff should be briefed in depth to ensure existance of emergency procedures knowledge.

4. Exsmine guidance on personnel monitoring at the decontamination site for emergency workers.

5. Examine and quantify guidance on contamination level used to determina vehicle storage versus decontamination.

6. Pravide instructions to parenta living outside the 10-mile EPZ, that do j 1

not receive utility information, on the i location of shelters for their children {

attending schools within the 10-mile

,EPZ.

7. Provide faculty instruction concerning  !

basics of nuclear power plant, potential I problems, and evacuation SOP. I

8. Develop a method of accountability for students who drive private cars.

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V. APPENDICES

)

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A. Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise objectives and Scenario 1

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u_-_-----_----- -- -

Facility or Activity Aream Recommended for Improvement New Hanover 1. Utilize the status board and maps to a County greater extent (e.g., indicate wind direction and cheltered areas).

2. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) should be reviewed and, if necessary, rewritten to include procedures requiring use of message forms for important updates. This would ensure proper message flow and updating of status boards.

3. Provide additional training on proper dosimetry procedures for State highway Patrol Officers assigned to the decontamination facility.

4. Record instrument calibration dates in a uniform manner.

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FEDERAL EVALCATOR ASSIGNMENTS .)

BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR FOWER PLANT EXERCISE ,

October 18, 1988 1 CHIEF EVALUATOR AND RAC IV CHAIRMAN John deard (FEMA)-

SERT HEADQUARTERS (RALEIGH) 3' Larry Rooertson (FEMA)

Chuck Wakamo (EPA) i Dot Nevitt (USDA) 1 AREA 'C" OFFICE (WALLACE) <

Al Fall (FEMA)

MEDIA CENTER Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Bill McSwain (FEMA)

LMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY j Ray Boyett (FEMA) l MOBILE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY )

Jon Richards-(EPA j RADIOLOGICAL FIELD TEAMS David Richards (DOE) l Neil Gaeta (FEMA) 1 i

Welt Kioieleski (FEMA)

MEDICAL ACTIVITL11' j Brad Eichorst (DHHS/FDA). {

Robert Perdue (FEMA) ]

BRUNSWICK COUNTY Don Hammonds (FEMA)

Tim Dowd (FEMA)

Rachael Rowland (FEMA) l NEW HANOVER COUNTY j Josh Moore (FEMA) I Linda Zander (FEMA) l MOBILE EVALUAMS, Walt Lucas (DOT)

Lamar Arrendale (DOT) .

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North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety James G. Martin, Governor Division of Emergency Management

'oseph W. Dean, Secretary 116 W. Jones St., Raleigh, N. C. 27603-1335 (919) 733-3867 August 11, 1988 M4. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, N ,

Atlanta, Ge rgia 3G

Dear Mr. W odard:

A full participation 10-mile plume exposure exercise will be conducted with Brunswick and New Hanover Counties for Carolina Power and Light Company's Brunswick Steam Electric Plant on October 18, 1988.

The exercise will consist of a simulated accident at the Brunswick Plant which will escalate to a General Emergency and involve planned response actions.

North Carolina State Participation will consist of activation of the State Emergency, Operations Center, and operation of the Area "C" Office for coordination of State support to the participating counties.

In accordance with FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 and NUREG-0654 the objectives for North Carnlina during this exercise (*) are:

• l. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate impicmentation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 2. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties) 3 e s . 1. .

2 n..

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Page 2 August 11, 1988

• 3. Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. (State, Brunswick and Nea Hanover Counties)

• 4. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• S. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 6. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 7. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements. (State)

• 8. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the low as measurement of airborneper as 10- microcuria radiolodine concentration cc in the presence of noble gases. (State)

• 9. Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the ai:-borne plume and. promptly perform laboratory analyses. (State)

• 10. Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. (State)

• 11. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 12. Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local official (a). (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

I I

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Page 3 August 11, 1988 l

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• 13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the 1 initial alert and notification has occurred. (State, Brunswick and New Hanover Ccunties) l

• 14. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accorate, coordinated and timely manner. ,

iState,

. Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

• 15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. (State, Brunswick and New Fanover Counties)

• 16. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and j institutionalized persons, based on predetermined i criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radio-iodine releases. (State,. Brunswick and New Hanover Counties)

17. Demonstrate ths ability to make the decision, if the State plan so specifies, to recommend the use of KI for the general public, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it' once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiciodine releases. (Not applicable - State Plan does not specify the use of KI for the general public).

18. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary .to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized l persons). (Accomplished July 10, 1985)

• 19. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ. (Brunswick County)  ;

• 10. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation and traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

(Brunswick and New Hanover Counties) l

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA I Page 4 August 11, 1988 4

21. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, i equipment and personnel for the registration, l radiological monitoring and decontamination of l evacuees. (accomplished July 10, 1985)

22. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and I personnel for congregate care of evacuees. (not I required by secnario, accomplished Dc-cember 10-11, j 1986). i

• 23. Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed individuals. (New Hanover County)

• 24. Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facilities j equipment, procedures and personnel for handling  !

contaminated, . injured or exposed individuals. (New Hanover County)

)

25. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986)

• 26. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies' assistance. (State)

27. Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of vegetation, food crope, milk, meat, poultry, water and animal feede (indigenous to the ares and' stored). -

(accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)  ;

28. Demonstrate the appropriate lab operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water and animal feeds (indigenous to the area and stored).

(accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

29. Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective measures based on field data, FDA PAG's and other relevant factors. (accomplished Dacomber ' 10-11, 1986 exercise)

I i

o Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, FEMA Pago 5 August 11, 1988 I

i 30. Demonstrate the ability to implement lboth preventive and emergency protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise).

31. Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population-  :

exposure. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

32. Demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate '

measures for controlled reentry and recovery based on estimated total population exposure, available EPA PAG's and other relevant factors. (accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise)

33. Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate  ;

measures for controlled reentry and recovery.

(accomplished December 10-11, 1986 exercise) )

34. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change.

(accomplished July 10-11, 1985) l l

35. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the evacuation of on-site personnel. (not applicable)

36. Demonstrate the ability to carry ou't emergency response functions (i.e., activate EOC's, mobilize _ staff that report to the EOC's, establish communications linkages and complete telephone call down) during an unannounced-off-hours drill or exercise. (New Objective)- (must be completed by 1994)

Sincerely, l Joseph F. Myers i Director I

/fs1 cc: CP&L NC/EM (Area C) l 4

I ss i Ds.

North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety James G. Martin, Governor Division of Emergency Management Joseph W. Dean. Secretary 116 W. Jones St., Raleigh, N. C. 2 7603. I 335 -

(919) 733-3867 September 15, 1988 Mr. John Heard Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30309 RE: Brun wick Nuc Power Plant Exercise

Dear Mr.,

Heard '

/

The purpose of this letter is to a. mend the objectives that the State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties will accomplish during the October 18 exercise at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.

In our original letter (dated August 11, 1988), we had omitted objectives 18 and 34; however, following i

conversations between Charles Cochran and Tom Hawkins, these two objectives will be accomplished with. the following  :

stipulations.

- 1 Objective 18 will be accomplished by Brunswick and New Hanover Counties by showing a list of individuals who will require transportation out of the threatened - area, in the event of an actual release from the Brunswick Plant. Since the scenario does not support evacuation, we will show the .

organization that will be responsible for transporting  !

persons requiring this assistance.

Objective 34 will be accomplished by State, Brunswick and New Hanover Counties through showing a double staffing i roster in the EOC. No actual shift change will be conducted, l but we will show the responsible official for each position who would be called in for replacement in the event of a needed shift change.

512 N. Salisbury Streer

• P. O. Box 27687

• Raleigh, N. C. 27611.T687 An Equal Opportunirv Athrmarave Action Emplover

i Mr. John Heard Page 2 i September 15, 1988  ;

If any of these stipulations do not agree with what has been agreed to verbally, please notify Bob Buchanan of this so that we may take other actions to satisfy the objectives ' ,

of this exercise. '

Should you have any questions concerning this, please contact Bob Buchanan of my staff.

Sincerely, A-Joseph F. Myers  ;

Director

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Vl M) t North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety I Jarnes G. Martin, Governor Division of Ernergency Managernent Joseph W. Dean, Secretary 116 W. Jones Sr., Raleigh, N. C. 2760L1335 (919) 733 3867 August 19, 1988 l

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Geo gia 303 9

Dear Mr. W dard:

Attached you will find the " Events Sequence" outlining North Carolina participation in the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant full participation exercise to be conducted October 18, 1988.

Please contact Gary L. Jones, at (919) 733-3867, if you have any questions concerning this portion of our planned activities.

Sincerely, Joseph F. Myers, )

Director )

JFM/GLJ/jgm cc: Carolina Power and Light Company (Emergency Preparedness)

Brunswick Steen Electric Plant (Emergency Preparedness)

NC/EM (Area C)

An E. .., - - , - - -

2-~ aneAsaeFmcha

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a

7 . .

BRUNSWICK STEAM. ELECTRIC PLANT EXERCISE EVENTS SEQUENCE. 1 FOR i NORTH CAROLINA PARTICIPANTS ]

)

i TIME EVENT 0600 Unit #1 is in " cold shutdown" for a shcrt duration outage. Unit #2 is being operated.at'100%. power.

0630 A workman at the Radwaste Low-Level Warehouse is injured while working in a contaminated area.

" UNUSUAL EVENT" should be declared; and county, State and US-Coast Guard Warning Points contacted.

0700 A flange leak has developed in Unit #1, with reactor vessel temperature at 170 F and vessel

" heat up" rate at 35 F/hr.. Repairs ~are estimated to not be able to be ccmpleted before vessel temperature exceeds 212 F. Technical specifications requirements have not been met to j allow operation in Mode III. Enter Mode III in  !

approximately.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

0800 Unit #1 enters Mode III.

" ALERT" should be' declared.

Initial notification of off-site authorities by plant. Alert and notification-of responders implemented. Minimum staffing of state and county EOCs begins.

0900 Gasket is replaced on Unit #1, but not before.

exceeding 212 F.

0930 Unit #2 Reactor Building ventilation isolates.

0935 " ALERT" is over. Temperature in Unit il is below 212 F.

0943 " Scram", Unit #2.

0950 Unit #2 Standby Liquid Control System fails.

" SITE AREA EXERGENCY" should be declared.

Notification of off-site authorities. State and county EOCs are fully staffed. State Emergency Response Team (SERT) is established and has i

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6 operational control of state agency support.

Coordination of public notification via sirens, public address systems, Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), and National Weather Service Broadcast System.

1001 High Pressure Coolant Injection fails, and vessel level drops below the top of the fuel for approximately 10 minutes.

1215 Conventional and nuclear service water system header low pressure alarms are received. Standby pumps start automatically, but within minutes the low pressure annunciator is again received. Water Service water pumps indicate that strainer differential pressures are increasing; strainer motors are not running.

1230 Loss of service water. Venting starts for three hours duration.

" GEN}IRAL DIRGENCY" should be declared.

Recommendation to off-site authorities for "in-place" sheltering.

1330 off-site medical emergency; a transportation accident in New Hanover County involving a vehicle carrying a radiation hazard.'

1515 Plant conditions stabilize, with power restored and

" cool down" continuing.

1600 Recovery phase begins.

Exercise terminates. Time may be advanced, if all objectives have been met and utility / state / federal controllers concur.

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