TXX-8966, Forwards Advance FSAR Submittal Re Cable Splices in Raceways,Clarifying That Splices Having 40-yr Qualified Life Located in Raceways.Ser & Sser Sections Re Power Lockout to motor-operated Valves & Ac Power Sys Also Encl

Forwards Advance FSAR Submittal Re Cable Splices in Raceways,Clarifying That Splices Having 40-yr Qualified Life Located in Raceways.Ser & Sser Sections Re Power Lockout to motor-operated Valves & Ac Power Sys Also Encl

ML20247M132
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	08/31/1989
From:	William Cahill TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TXX-89665, NUDOCS 8909250136
Download: ML20247M132 (9)

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L MM Log # TXX-89665.

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File # 908.3 y .

::: Ref. # 10CFR50.34(b) nlELECTRIC August 31, 1989 WilNam J. Cahut.Jr.

EAecutive Vke President U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington,'D. C. 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC' STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND-50-446 ADVANCE FSAR SUBMITTAL CABLE SPLICES IN RACEWAYS Gentlemen:

This. letter provides an advance copy of. changes to be included in a future FSAR amendment dealing with cable splices in raceways. FSAR Amendment 76 stated .in Appendix BA that the description for the analysis of cable splices in raceways applies to other Class IE splices performed.at CPSES. This FSAR change' clarifies that the splices discussed as having a 40. year qualified life were located in raceways. . Selected" Class IE splices not in raceways, for high. voltage applications outside of containment, may have a shorter qualified life and will be-replaced prior _ to expiration of their qualified life.

In order to facilitate NRC staff review of these changes, the enclosure is-organi~ zed'as follows:

1. Draft revised FSAR pages, with changed portions indicated by'a~bar in the margin, as they are to appear in a future amendment (additional pages immediately preceding and/or following the revised pages are provided if needed to understand the change).

2. Line-by-line description / justification of each item revised.

3. A copy of related SER/SSER sections.

4. An-index page containing the title of " bullets" which consolidate and categorize similar individual changes by subject and related SER section.

5. The bold / overstrike vert.lon of the revised FSAR pages referenced by the description / justification for each item identified above. The bold / overstrike version f acilitates review of the revision by highlighting each addition of new text in bold type font'and-overstriking with a slash (/) the portion of the text that is deleted.

I8909250136 890831 y PDR

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PDC 400 North Olive Street LB 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 g

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TXX-89665 August 31, 1989 Page 2 of 2 If you have any questions regarding this submittal please contact Joe Harnden at (214) 812-8226.

Sincerely,

$ 11 - ) '

William J. ahill, Jr.

By: M d' n_ /

Rog'erld. Walker Manager, Nuclear Licensing WJH/vid Enclosure c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) i i

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Enclosure to TXX-89665 August 31, 1989 Advance FSAR Change Regarding Cable Splices In Raceways Item l' Draft Revised FSAR Pages pg. 2 Item 2 Description / Justification pg. 3 Item 3 Related SER/SSER Pages pg. 4 thru 5 Item 4 Index Page Containing the Title pg. 6 of " Bullets" Item 5 Bold /0verstrike Version of Revised pg. 7 FSAR Pages Pg. 1 of 7 L - - - - _ _ _ _ _

Enclosure to'TXX-89665

Page-2 of 7 CPSES/FSAR I The manufacturers have qualified the splice configurations (recommended in their procedures) per requirements of IEEE

-Sta9dards 323 and 383. The splices were thermally aged to simulate a 40 year installed life using Arrhenius methodology.

The DBE testings included vibration and LOCA exposure. The DRAFf-qualification tests have demonstrate.d that all splices in raceways are capable of performing their required functions throughout their 40 year qualified life and during Design Basis Events of seismic, radiation exposure. LOCA and post-LOCA conditions, as applicable (PIES are used only in mild environment areas). Therefore, aging of the splices will not create a weak link in the cable run.

Selected Class IE splices not in raceways, for high voltage DRAFT applications outside containment, may have a shorter qualified life and will be replaced prior to expiration of their qualified life.

e. Attribute: Mechanical integrity.

Discussion: Splicing wire connectors (in-line butt type or parallel connectors) or wire connectors (bolted back to back solid tongue (with hole (s)) type lugs) are used for making splice connections. The connectors are crimped on the cable conductors by using manufacturer's certified compression toolt. Bolted joints are torqued to the values specified in the installation procedures. The splicing wire connections are capable of withstanding the UL 486C pull-out test requirements and the wire connections (bolted tongue connections) are capable of withstanding the UL 486A pull-out test regt.iremel.ts. The AMP 76 PIDG and PIES connectors meet MIL-T-7928 pull out test requirements which are more severe than UL 436A and UL 486C.

Additionally, splices at terminations can only be made af ter the cables are pulled. Thus, pulling stresses which have potential to degradc~the splices are eliminated. Hence, mechanical integrity of CPSES splices will not be degraded during or after installation.

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" Enclosube to TXX-89665 CPSES FSAR AMENDMENT .

.,faga.,3;of 7 DETA~ILED DESCRIPTION -l IFSARPage (n._ amended) .GrouD Description l

8A 3 Environmental qualification of high'. voltage Class -lE cable splices not in raceways.

Clarification:

FSAR Amendment.76 stated in Appendix 8A that the description for the analysis of cable splices in-

' raceways applies to other Class IE splices. performed at CPSES. ;This FSAR change clarifies that the splices discussed as having a 40 year. qualified life _ were located in racewa Selected Class IE splices not in raceways, ys.for high voltage applications outside of containment, may have a shorter qualified life and will be replsced prior'to expiration of their qualified FSAR Change Reques. t Number: life.89-635 Related SER Section: 8.4'.4 SER/SSER Impact: Yes This impacts information under review by NRC.

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l result'in' needless hindrance to successful completion of safety functions.

-Rigulatory. Guide l.106 recommends (in Position C.1) bypassing thermal overload devices during accident conditions or (in Position C.2) selecting the setpoints fcr the thermal overloads in a manner that precludes spurious trips. In the Comanche Peak design, Class IE MOV motor starters'are provided with thermal cverloads, connected to alarm only. Thermal magnetic breakers are used to trip the starter for sustained locked-rotor conditions. This design is in

-conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 and is acceptable.

' 8.4.3 Power Lockout to Motor-Operated Valves The applicant has provided a list of valves that require power lockout in order to meet-the single-failure criterion in the fluid systems. Branch Tcchnical Position ICSB 18 (PSB) requires that all such valves and their r; quired position be listed in the Technical Specifications and that the position indications for these valves meet the single-failure criterion. The

~tpplicant has not submitted the Technical Specifications for review, but a start toward compliance with BTP-ICSB 18 (PSB) is accomplished by providing position indication and out-of position alarms at the control board and a centrol power cutoff switch for each valve.

The applicant states that spurious movement of an MOV as a result of an

- electrical- fault in the motor actuation circuitry, coincident with a LOCA, has-b:en analyzed and found to be a very low probability event. However, to comply with the present NRC position on this issue, the applicant has made the commitment to comply with BTP-ICSB-18. Compliance is accomplished by providing a control board control power cutoff switch for each valve.

In order to meet the staff requirement ,that redundant valve status indication

'be provided to the control room opernor, the applicant has provided redundant End separate valve position switches. One position switch is gear-driven and m unted on the valve operator. The second position switch is mounted on the

' valve stem. In the event that one position switch is inoperable, the second will'be available to provide position indication. Each position switch actuates a separate indicating light-in the main control room. These indicating lights are powered frora separate power supplies. -

-The applicant has not yet submitted the draft Technical Specifications. The staff will ensure that the valves and their required positions are included in the Technical Specifications when performing this aspect of our review.

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8.4.4 PhysicalIdenti7icationandIndependenceofRedundantSafety-Related Electrical Systems The applicant has provided the criteria for physical identification and separa-tion of electrical equipment to preserve the independence of redundant equipment.

Physical identification of safety-related electrical systems is accomplished as follows. Each cable and raceway is given a unique alphanumeric identifica-tion and is color coded to indicate its separation group. This identification provides a means of distinguishing a cable or raceway associated with a particular separation group.

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EnclosurG.to TXX-89665

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'6 Exposed raceways containing Class IE cables are marked by color codes in a

' distinct permanent manner at intervals not to exceed 15 ft and at points of entry to and exit from enclosed areas. In general, all Class 1E cables and  !

associated cables are jacket color-coded throughout their entire length.

Cables that require field color coding will be so worked at intervals not to exceed 5 ft. -Non-Class IE equipment, raceways, and cables in raceways are not .

marked by color code and have a black outer jacket.  !

t In plant areas which are free from potential hazards such as missiles, external fires, and pipe whip, the minimum separation between redundant cable trays is ,

3 ft between trays separated horizontally and 5 ft between trays separated vertically.

In the cable spreading areas and the control room, the minimum separation between redundant cable trays is 1 ft between trays separated horizontally and 3 ft between trays separated vertically. Where plant arrangements preclude maintaining the minimum separation distance, the redundant circuits are run in solidly enclosed raceways or other barriers provided between redundant circuits in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

In addition, each reactor protection system or ESF system at the channel level has its own distinct w1or. Protection of equipment against simultaneous failures is achieved by physical arrangement and separation between redundant Class 1E systems.

r Each diesel generator, including its associated auxiliaries, is located in a separate room.

The electrical switchgear of train A is separated from that of

} train B by locating them on different elevations.

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I Each Class IE 125-V de battery is located in a separate and independently ventilated room. Battery chargers, distribution panels, and SUPS of one train I

! are separated from those of other trains by locating them in separate rooms.

I The Class 1E MCCs and distribution panels of ore train are separated from I those of the other train by a distance of at least 20 ft. Where it is not possible to maintain a 20-ft distance, barriers are provided to maintain proper separation.

The control room and cable spreading area do not contain l

high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformers, rotating equipment, high energy piping, or other potential sources of missiles.

Based on its review of the applicant's design criteria regarding physical identification, separation, and independence of redundant safety-related electrical systems, the staff finds these criteria to be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 and, therefore, acceptable. However, the staff will .

verify the implementation of applicant's design criteria for these areas during a site vis 4 8.4.5 Nonsafety Loads on Emergency Sources f

Present regulatory practice for Operating License applications allows the connection of nonsafety loads--in addition to the required safety loads--to Class 1E (emergency) power sources if it can be shown that the connection of ,

i nonsafety loads will not result in degradation of the Class 1E system. The I Comanche Peak design provides for the connection of both safety and selected nonsafety loads to the Class 1E emergency buses of the ac and de onsite emergency power systems.

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Enclosure to TXX-89665

.Page.6'of 7 8.3.1 AC Power Systems CPPD 33. The FSAR has been amended to clarify the (77) environmental qualification for high voltage Class IE splices not in raceways.

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EnclesurG to TXX-89665

. PagG-7' of - 7 'CPSES/FSAR-

.The manufacturers'have' qualified the splice configurations (recommended in their procedures) per requirements of IEEE

. Standards 323 and 383. The splices were thermally aged to simulate a 40 year installed life using.Arrhenius methodology.

The DBE testings. included vibration and LOCA; exposure. The 76 qualification tests have demonstrated that all' splices in-raceways are capable of performing their' required functions-throughout their 40 year qualified life and during Design Basis 1 Events of seismic, radiation exposure. LOCA and post-LOCA conditions. as applicable (PIES are.used only in mild environment areas). Therefore, aging of the splices will.not create a weak link in the cable run.

Selected Class IE splices not in raceways, for high voltage applications outside containment, may have a shorter qualified

. life and will be replaced prior to expiration of their qualified life,

e. Attribute: Mechanical integrity.

Discussion: Splicing wire connectors (in-line butt type or parallel connectors) or wire connectors (bolted back to back solid tongue (with hole (s)) type lugs) are used for making splice connections. The connectors are crimped on the cable conductors by using. manufacturer's certified compression' tools. Bolted joints are torqued to the values specified in the installation procedures. The splicing wire connections are capable of withstanding the UL 486C pull-out test requirements and the wire connections (bolted tongue connections) are capable of withstanding the UL 486A pull-out test requirements. The AMP 76 PIDG and PIES connectors meet MIL-T-7928 pull out test requirements which are more severe than UL 486A and UL 486C.

Additionally splices at terminations can only be made after the cables are pulled. Thus, pulling stresses which have potential to degradF the splices are eliminated. Hence, mechanical integrity of CPSES splices will not be degraded during or after installation.

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