ML20206S752
| ML20206S752 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1986 |
| From: | Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Dolan J AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206S757 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8607070421 | |
| Download: ML20206S752 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1986016
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JUN 2 6 i986
Docket No. 50-315
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Docket No. 50-316
American Electric Power Service
Corporation
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
ATTN:
Mr. John E. Dolan
Vice Chairman
Engineering and Construction
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus, OH 43216
Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. J. Foster and
others of this office on June 9-11, 1986 of activities at the Donald C. Cook
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 authorized by NRC Operating Licenses No. DPR-58
and No. DPR-74 and to the discussion of our findings with Messrs. M. P. Alexich,
W. G. Smith and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during
the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective
examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and
interviews with personnel.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this
inspection.
However, weaknesses were identified which will'need corrective
action by your staff. These weaknesses are summarized in the attached
Appendix to this letter.
As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F,
any weaknesses that are identified must be corrected.
Accordingly, please
advise us within 45 days of the date of this letter of the corrective action
you have taken or plan to take, showing the estimated date of completion with
regard to these exercise weaknesses.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of
this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed
in the NRC Public Document Room.
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JUN 2 61986
Corporation
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely,
.
W. D. Shafer, Chief
Radiological Protection Branch
Enclosures:
1.
Exercise Weaknesses
2.
Inspection Reports
No. 50-315/86016(DRSS);
No. 50-316/86016(DRSS)
cc w/ enclosures:
W. G. Smith, Jr. , Plant Manager
DCS/RSB (RIDS)
,
1
Licensing Fee Management Branch
Resident Inspector, RIII
Ronald Callen, Michigan
Public Service Commission
EIS Coordinator, USEPA
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Region 5 Office
Nuclear Facilities and
Environmental Monitoring
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EXERCISE WEAKNESSES
1.
Notification of the completion of plant personnel accountability was not
reported to the Site Emergency Coordinator, the Technical Director, nor
to the Control Room.
It was noted, however, that the Site Emergency
Coordinator asked for and received accountability information about 45
minutes after the Site Emergency was declared.
(50-315/86016-01;
50-316/86016-01) (Paragraph 5.b.1).
2.
The team sent to check operability of the PASS system was unable to get
the power supply distribution system working without assistance from the
exercise controller.
The PASS sample results were not available within
the three-hour goal. (50-315/86016-02; 50-316/86016-02) (Paragraph 5.e.1).
3.
Communications with the State of Michigan were inadequate. Examples of
breakdowns in communication are as follow:
a.
For several hours, the EOF was under the impression that the State
had implemented sheltering out to ten miles in all directions.
In
fact, this was not the case.
b.
The only time the senior licensee officials contacted their counter-
part at the State level was when the licensee decided to downgrade
from the General Emergency.
d.
PARS for the General Emergency declaration were slow to be provided
to the State.
e.
The layout of the notification form for the State has the PARS
listed as the twelfth out of fourteen items to be transmitted.
This delayed PAR communication.
(50-315/86016-03; 50-316/86016-03) (Paragraph.5.f.1).
4.
Command and control was not transferred to the E0F until two hours after
the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
The E0F must be operational
within one hour of the Site Area Emergency declaration, and this includes
assuming overall command and control of the response to the accident.
(50-315/86016-04; 50-316/86016-04) (Paragraph 5.f.2).
5.
A number of problems were observed in the area of dose assessment and
PARS, as follow:
a.
Dose assessments were conducted using the unit vent effluent
monitor, even though there was no flow through this vent.
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b.
Actual field data was not used to perform dose assessment until
over one hour after it was available.
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Exercise Weaknesses
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c.
The dose assessment performed at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, was used in the PAR
flowchart to recommend evacuation out to two miles in all sectors.
This conclusion was incorrect.
d.
All upgrades in the PARS to include additional sectors were based on
actual wind direction changes.
A meterological forecast was never
obtained to project where the plume would be, to enable PARS to be
implemented prior to the plume arrival.
(50-315/86016-05; 50-316/86016-04) (Paragraph 5.f.3).
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