ML20206S752

Forwards Safety Insp Repts 50-315/86-16 & 50-316/86-16 on 860609-11.Exercise Weaknesses Included Failure to Notify Control Room,Technical Director or Site Emergency Coordinator of Completion of Plant Personnel Accountability

ML20206S752
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	06/26/1986
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Dolan J AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
Shared Package
ML20206S757	List: IR 05000315/1986016 ML20206S752
References
NUDOCS 8607070421
Download: ML20206S752 (4)

See also: IR 05000315/1986016

Text

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JUN 2 6 i986

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Docket No. 50-315

Docket No. 50-316

American Electric Power Service

Corporation

Indiana and Michigan Electric Company

ATTN: Mr. John E. Dolan

Vice Chairman

Engineering and Construction

1 Riverside Plaza

Columbus, OH 43216

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. J. Foster and

others of this office on June 9-11, 1986 of activities at the Donald C. Cook

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 authorized by NRC Operating Licenses No. DPR-58

and No. DPR-74 and to the discussion of our findings with Messrs. M. P. Alexich,

W. G. Smith and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during

the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and

interviews with personnel.

No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this

inspection. However, weaknesses were identified which will'need corrective

action by your staff. These weaknesses are summarized in the attached

Appendix to this letter. As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F,

any weaknesses that are identified must be corrected. Accordingly, please

advise us within 45 days of the date of this letter of the corrective action

you have taken or plan to take, showing the estimated date of completion with

regard to these exercise weaknesses.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed

in the NRC Public Document Room.

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American Electric Power Service 2

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Corporation JUN 2 61986

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

.

W. D. Shafer, Chief

Emergency Preparedness and

Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosures:

1. Exercise Weaknesses

2. Inspection Reports

No. 50-315/86016(DRSS);

No. 50-316/86016(DRSS)

cc w/ enclosures:

W. G. Smith, Jr. , Plant Manager

,

DCS/RSB (RIDS)

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Licensing Fee Management Branch

Resident Inspector, RIII

Ronald Callen, Michigan

Public Service Commission .

EIS Coordinator, USEPA

Region 5 Office

Nuclear Facilities and

Environmental Monitoring

Section

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EXERCISE WEAKNESSES

1. Notification of the completion of plant personnel accountability was not

reported to the Site Emergency Coordinator, the Technical Director, nor

to the Control Room. It was noted, however, that the Site Emergency

Coordinator asked for and received accountability information about 45

minutes after the Site Emergency was declared. (50-315/86016-01;

50-316/86016-01) (Paragraph 5.b.1).

2. The team sent to check operability of the PASS system was unable to get

the power supply distribution system working without assistance from the

exercise controller. The PASS sample results were not available within

the three-hour goal. (50-315/86016-02; 50-316/86016-02) (Paragraph 5.e.1).

3. Communications with the State of Michigan were inadequate. Examples of

breakdowns in communication are as follow:

a. For several hours, the EOF was under the impression that the State

had implemented sheltering out to ten miles in all directions. In

fact, this was not the case.

b. The only time the senior licensee officials contacted their counter-

part at the State level was when the licensee decided to downgrade

from the General Emergency.

d. PARS for the General Emergency declaration were slow to be provided

to the State.

e. The layout of the notification form for the State has the PARS

listed as the twelfth out of fourteen items to be transmitted.

This delayed PAR communication.

(50-315/86016-03; 50-316/86016-03) (Paragraph.5.f.1).

4. Command and control was not transferred to the E0F until two hours after

the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. The E0F must be operational

within one hour of the Site Area Emergency declaration, and this includes l

assuming overall command and control of the response to the accident.

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(50-315/86016-04; 50-316/86016-04) (Paragraph 5.f.2).

5. A number of problems were observed in the area of dose assessment and

PARS, as follow:

a. Dose assessments were conducted using the unit vent effluent

monitor, even though there was no flow through this vent. .

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b. Actual field data was not used to perform dose assessment until I

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over one hour after it was available.

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Exercise Weaknesses 2

c. The dose assessment performed at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, was used in the PAR

flowchart to recommend evacuation out to two miles in all sectors.

This conclusion was incorrect.

d. All upgrades in the PARS to include additional sectors were based on

actual wind direction changes. A meterological forecast was never

obtained to project where the plume would be, to enable PARS to be

implemented prior to the plume arrival.

(50-315/86016-05; 50-316/86016-04) (Paragraph 5.f.3).

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