IR 05000315/1986016
| ML20206S784 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1986 |
| From: | Foster J, Kers L, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206S757 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-86-16, 50-316-86-16, NUDOCS 8607070428 | |
| Download: ML20206S784 (20) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/86016(DRSS); 50-316/86016(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Licensee: American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Electric Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Donald C. Cook Site, Bridgeman, MI Inspection Conducted: June 9-11, 1986 h
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Inspectors:
Foster G/ 1 (/
eam Leader Dpte
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Ld M W. Snell 6/24/sG Date
[p/$$$$p Ke s Dgte /
w R. 00 Approved By:
W. Snell, Cliief CAI4/st.
Emergency Preparedness Section Date~
Inspection Summary Inspection on June 9-11, 1986 (Reports No. 50-315/86016(DRSS);
50-316/86016(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the ann'ual D. C. Cook emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by five NRC representa-tives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection was conducted by three NRC inspectors and two consultants.
Results: Although no items of noncompliance, deficiencies or deviations were identified, five exercise weaknesses were identified and are summarized in the Attachment to the report's transmittal letter.
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3607070428 860626
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DR ADOCK 05000315 PDR
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed
- J. Foster, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Staging Area (0SA), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
- W. Snell, E0F
- L. Kers, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
Medical Drill, Fire Drill
- F. Victor, Control Room, TSC American Electric Power Service Corporation, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company
- M. Alexich, Nuclear Safety & Licensing
- W. Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
- A. Blind, Assistant Plant Manager
- D. Loope, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- K. Baker, Operations Superintendent
- T. Harshbarger, Emergency Planning, AEPSC
- E. Smarella, Public affairs
- R. Stephans, Operations
- D. Bruck, Operations
- P. Jacques, QC
- J. Allard, Maintenance
- J. Rutkowski, Staff Assistant
- S. Brewer, Rad Support Manager
- J. Rischling, QC/ Administration Compliance Coordinator
- J. Dickson, Administration / Training
- A. Barker, QA
- K. Scherer, Administration / Training
- S.
Cherba, STA/MGR
- R. Sims, Mgr/STA
- P. Leonard, Administration / Training
- M. Barfelz, Mgr/STA
- R.
Heydenburg, AEPSC QA
- L. Gibson, Tech. Engineering Support
- P. Barrett, Nuclear _ Safety & Licensing
- R. Barnes, Security-Supervisor
- B. Svensson, Assistant Plant Manager-Operations
- J. Paris, Tech. Engineering J. Shields, Chem Tech.
R. Burgett, Chem Tech.
S. Sterk, Chem Tech.
B. Zordell, Chem Tech.
S. Simko, Rad Protection L. Zucharelli, Controller M. Glissman, Controller
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G. Cook,' Control'1er T. Serratore, Controller D. Hubble, QA Observer W. Hasty, JPIC Controller t
- Denotes personnel listed above who attended the exit interview on June 11,
1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Items
(Closed) Open Item No. 315/85008-01; 316/85008-01:
Revision needed to l
Exhibit B of PMP-2080 EPP.012 to provide a space to log callbacks. The form had been revised to provide the space for callback logging. This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item No. 315/85008-02; 316/85008-02:
NRC to be notified of
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declaration of emergency class following notifications of State and local
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agencies.
The sequence of NRC notification, as observed in this exercise, j
was as required.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item No. 315/85008-03; 316/85008-03:
Provide easily
readable titles of key emergency positions in the TSC.
Key emergency positions in the TSC were identified by easily readable position title
placards, suspended from the ceiling above each position. This item is
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j closed.
j (Closed) Open Item No. 315/8500804; 316/85008-04:
Emphasis needed on j
control of contamination during training and drills.
Contamination
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control, as observed during this exercise, was adequate.
This item is
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closed.
i (Closed) Open Item No. 315/85008-05; 316/85008-05: Utilization of
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realistic release durations and lack of specification of release duration j.
utilized.
During this exercise, realistic release durations were utilized as adequate data became available.
The dose assessment computer
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printout specified the release duration utilized in dose projection i
calculations. This item is closed.
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3.
General
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An exercise of the D. C. Cook Power Plant Eme'rgency Plan was conducted.
at the D. C. Cook plant on June 10, 1986.
The exercise. tested the
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licensee's and offsite emergency support organizations' capabilities to l
respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of j
radioactive effluent.
Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives.of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise
scenario.
The State of Michigan and Berrien County participated in this
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exercise to a limited extent, as described in Attachment 1.
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General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the D. C. Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and generally timely.
If the exercise events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been marginally sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
Actions taken to mitigate onsite events were appropriate and timely.
c.
Observers The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with five NRC observers and a number of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers.
FEMA observations on the response of State and local governments will be provided in a separate report.
d.
Exercise Critiques A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on June 10, 1986, the day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.
Attending personnel are listed in Section 1.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room The initiating conditions for the seismic event were quickly and accurately classified as an Alert by the Shift Supervisor.
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Proper classifications of emergency conditions were made, based on the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL) for the event.
Operators quickly and efficiently reviewed their EALS, which minimized the time necessary to make classifications.
Notifications were accurate and timely.
Operators showed coordination and perseverance in their efforts to mitigate the effects of the simulated accident. Operators appeared to be well trained, were knowledgeable of their procedures and generally used them properly, and responded appropriately to operational and safety systems failures.
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The transfer of Site Emergency Coordinator responsibilities from the Shift Supervisor to the Plant Manager were conducted in a formal and effective manner.
Following the transfer, the Shift Supervisor then announced to the Control Room personnel that the Plant Manager had relieved him as Site Emergency Coordinator.
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Good communications and information flow were maintained with other Emergency Response Facilities throughout the exercise.
There was a
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good chain-of-command evident.
The Shift Supervisor properly guided i
the Contrcl Room Team and kept them informed.of plant and overall
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conditions.
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Decisions were well thought out and appropriate to the situation.
Actions in this area were generally appropriate, with the following
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i exception: While initial notifications were conducted in a timely manner,.the requirements of Procedure PMP 2080 EPP.012, which governs
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notifications, were not fully complied with.
The procedure requires
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the use of two forms, Exhibits A and B.
Only Exhibit B was filled
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out, and only one Exhibit B form was used for both notification of l
the Alert and the Site Area Emergency.
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l Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered
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for improvement:
During training, emphasize the procedural requirements of
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Procedure PMP 2080 EPP.012 regarding utilization of the
forms in Exhibits A and B.
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
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I The TSC activation was timely, and procedures, logs, and checklists were well utilized.
Noise levels were acceptable, and the plant parameters status boards were updated regularly during the entire j
exercise.
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The physical arrangement of personnel, communication equipment, l
computer terminals and status boards enhanced the efficient j
functioning of TSC operations.
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TSC personnel made timely recommendations and continuously explored different approaches on how to deal with the problem at hand.
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Communications and cooperation between TSC, Control Room and OSA l
were very good.
The Status Board writers were well qualified and
did an excellent job of keeping a chronological. summary of events.
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Contingency planning was done, taking into account the possibility for degrading. conditions.
Notifications were made as required, and
within the required timeframes.
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Activities in this area were. acceptable, with the following j
exceptions:
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(1) Notification of the completion of plant' personnel accountability I
was not reported to the Site Emergency _ Coordinator, the Technical
Director, nor to the Control Room.
It was noted, however, that
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the Site Emergency Coordinator asked for and received accountability information about 45 minutes after the Site Emergency was declared.
l This is an Open Item (315/86016-01; 316/86016-01).
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i (2) Periodic in-depth briefings to keep TSC personnel appraised of current conditions in the plant (other than initial conditions of the exercise) and the status of progress in handling the
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emergency were not conducted.
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(3) The public address (PA) system could have been utilized to
provide in plant personnel with significant changes in plant t
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conditions and updated status information, yet very few PA
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announcements were made.
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I (4) ~ An unapproved draft procedure, PMP 2081 EPP.001, Attachment 3
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(xerox copy in longhand), was in use, providing guidance in l
copying, and routing of messages and TSC scribe notes. The j
procedure appeared to be needed and worthwhile, and should be
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j approved and formalized.
I Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered j
for improvement:
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Unapproved draft procedure PMP 2081 EPP.001, Attachment 3
should be reviewed, approved, and incorporated into the training process.
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Operations Staging Area (0SA)
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The OSA was activated at 0821 hours0.0095 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.123905e-4 months <br /> and was fully operational at
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0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> when first observed.
At this time all major OSA
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functions were filled.
In general, the OSA appeared to be capable j
of providing operational support to the emergency response effort.
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Health Physics coverage was observed by OSA and in plant teams at
all times. Good Health Physics and contamination control practices l
were followed.- Briefings given to teams dispatched included j
adequate instruction, turnback dose rates and individual dose limits. Access control to the OSA was established, and included i
frisking stations with ster off pads.
No equipment failures were i
observed, and all instruments were within calibration dates, t
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Status boards were kept current, and communications appeared to be j
adequate.
Periodic status updates by the OSA Manager and the i
Emergency Director were very useful.
The facility had a pool of support personnel and was able to field 17 teams during the
exercise.
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Teams were observed to be well equipped and thoroughly briefed prior i
to plant entries.
Entry teams were well controlled by the OSA'with respect to instruction and safety.
Health Physics initiated adequate habitability monitoring when radioactive releases began.in i
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i-In general, actions in the OSA were adequate, with the following exceptions:
(1) ~ Communication between the OSA and teams were mostly adequate, however, some problems exist in understanding radio and telephone communications, particularly when teams were wearing self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
.(2) The extensive use'of SCBA depleted the' supply of air bottles, demonstrating the need for a larger supply.
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Based on the above findings, the following item should be considered for
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Improvement:
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Provide for a larger supply of air bottles, or the capability
to refill expended air bottles from an acceptable air source.
d.
Medical Drill and Fire Drill The licensee demonstrated a competent medical response to a
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contaminated injured man.
Personnel trained in first aid and health physics promptly responded to a report of an injured man.
i The. injured, contaminated individual was handled effectively.
From the time the individual was discovered to tne time the ambulance
left the plant, only one hour elapsed.
The medical care was very
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good, as personnel concentrated on the wound and did not over-react to the potential for minor radiological contamination.
First aid j
treatment was excellent and contamination control techniques were observed.
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The licensee also demonstrated a commendable fire brigade response.
The personnel responding to a simulated fire were well equipped and
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appeared to be well trained. -The fire was declared out 20 minutes
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i after the fire was first observed. During the drill, a fire hose was
completely uncoiled from its stored position and then dragged around a corner, creating the possibility of tangling the hose.
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e.
Post Accident Sample (PASS)
Two teams were utilized in the PASS drill, one team to survey the
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PASS panel and vicinity and energize the PASS ~ systems, and one team to actually obtain the PASS sample and convey the sample to the
chemical lab.
In general, actions in this area were acceptable, with good health physics surveys and dose monitoring, adherence to procedures and
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i observance of contamination control practices.
The team sent to check operability of the PASS system was unable to get the power supply distribution system working without assistance from the exercise controller, as they were unfamiliar with the t
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location of one of the two switches necessary to activate the system.
The PASS sample results were not available within the three-hour goal.
Procedures, instruction, and training should be improved.
This is an Open Item (50-315/86016-02; 50-316/86016-02)
f.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
E0F activation was accomplished in a professional manner, within 60 minutes of the decision to activate.
On activation, personnel were briefed on recent events and their assignments.
EOF staff briefings were made periodically, and the Emergency Coordinator held conferences with his principal advisors.
Status boards were well maintained and updated periodically.
Briefings and conferences aided understanding of plant conditions.
Information Liaison was
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also commendable.
The Emergency Coordinator approved all press releases prior to release.
Public Address System announcements to the staff in the E0F were thorough, timely, and helpful.
The licensee conducted several discussions concerning the need for giving Potassium Iodide (KI) to personnel.
The discussions were
well thought out and appropriate.
Control and direction of the field monitoring teams from the E0F was excellent.
The teams were utilized to provide timely and useful field monitoring data.
The Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs) were well controlled from the EOF, and they were kept informed of meteorological conditions.
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The command and control demonstrated by AEP personnel after arrival
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at the E0F was excellent. The turnover of tasks and responsibilities from plant to AEP personnel was smooth, well coordinated, and timely.
Recovery planning was accomplished.
Recovery / reentry was covered in discussions.
In General, actions in this area were adequate, with the following exceptions:
(1) Communications with the State of Michigan were inadequate.
Examples of breakdowns in communication with the State are as follow:
(a) For several hours, the EOF-was under the impression (as reflected by the Status Board) that the State had implemented sheltering out to 10 miles in all directions.
In fact, this was not the case.
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(b) The only time the senior-licensee officials contacted
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licensee decided to-downgrade from.the General Emergency.
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This contact was made at the recommendation of a controller.
After initial emergency actions (classification, notifica-j tions) all major decisions (e.g. emergency classification i
declarations, Protective Action Recommendations) should be i
made-in discussion with the State (and NRC). This will
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ensure the State is knowledgeable of events, promotes good
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communication, and gets PARS done in conjunction with a single declaration and all parties in agreement. -Part of
i the problem in communications may have resulted from the j
communicators passing information too fast through the EOF i
via the EOF Scriber.
The EOF communicator who interfaces i
with the State picks data off the status board and relays
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this information to the State immediately as the Scriber
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This may have caused the State to be informed
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of the General Emergency prior to it being formally
declared.
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(c) Meterological data was slow to be provired to the State.
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In one case it took approximately 40 min.tes to send a meterological forecast to the State after the request was made.
(d) The Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for the General l
Emergency declaration was slow to be provided to the State.
j It took more than 15 minutes to provide the PAR to the
i State after they were informed of the General Emergency.
j During this time the State was trying to resolve
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j conflicting information from the licensee as to whether
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releases were 100 R at the site boundary or 250 mR.
i Differences in values of this magnitude, coupled with a j
General Emergency notification, and no PAR could lead the State to take improper protective actions.
In this case,
the State went ahead and implemented a protective action
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without waiting any longer for the licensee to give them a i
PAR.
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(e) The layout of the notification form for the State has the PARS listed as the twelfth out of fourteen items to be -
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hours notification form to the State, he went through each
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. item in sequence (which included 16 calculated dose values in item ten). This took considerable time and was i
i inappropriate from the standpoint.that the last item was
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the PAR awaited for by the State; This is an Open Item (50-315/86016-03; 50-316/86016-03).
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i (2) Command and control was not transferred to the EOF'until two hours after the declaration of Site Area Emergency.
The EOF must be operational within one hour of the Site Area Emergency
declaration, and.this includes assuming overall command and i
control of the response to the accident. This-is an Open Item j
(50-315/86016-04; 50-316/86016-04).
(3) Prior to 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> when corporate personnel arrived to lend
j support in the EOF, a number of problems were observed in the j
area of dose assessment and PARS, as follow:
(a) Dose assessments were conducted using t'2 unit vent i
effluent monitor, even though there was.no flow through-i this vent. The actual release was via an unmonitored
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pathway, so initial dose assessments were inaccurate.
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(b) Actual field data was not used to perform dose assessment until over one hour after it was available. When field data was actually utilized, it was recognized that j
calculated doses were much lower than those being observed,
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but an unmonitored release pathway was not immediately considered.
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j (c) The dose assessmen't performed at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, giving a child j
thyroid dose of 277 mR at 2 miles was used in the PAR
flowchart to recommend evacuation out to 2 miles in all
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This conclusion was incorrect, as proper use of j
the flowchart for this value results in no evacuation necessary.
(d) All upgrades in the PARS to include additional sectors were
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based on actual wind direction changes.
A meterological
forecast was never obtained to project where the plume
would be, to enable PARS to be implemented in sectors to be j
affected prior to the plume arrival.
j This is an Open Item (50-315/86016-05; 50-316/86016-04).
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i (4) The dose assessment field data board. lacked a section for
. recording the times of field data collection.
It was difficult
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to determine if listed readings were current.
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j (5) There is a potential problem in information exchanged with
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State and local authorities, in that licensee Protective Action.
Recommendations are made by sectors, while State and local j
authorities respond by townships or areas (political or j
geographical boundaries).
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
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- The dose assessment field data board should have an area where the time of field data acquisition can be noted.
Discussions should be held to assure that licensee, State and
local officials clearly understand the areas deliniated by any Protective Action Recommendation, and the licensee clearly i
understands the areas affected by State and local response.
g.
Offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams Offsite radiological monitoring teams were not observed during this exercise.
h.
Emergency News Center (ENC) and Joint Public Information Center
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(JPIC)
The ENC was observed from the Alert declaration until the decision was made to activate the JPIC, at which time the observer accompanied the ENC Manager and his communicator to the JPIC.
Due to the short period of time between the Alert and Site Area Emergency declarations, ENC activation did not proceed beyond initial media notification, nor was the Energy Information Center reconfigured as the ENC.
The ENC Manager's copy of the Indiana & Michigan Electric Company Emergency Response Manual, IERP No. 9.0, " Emergency Notification Phone Numbers," Revision 0, dated 2/15/86, was reviewed and was found to be current and to contain provisions for semi-annual updating of the information.
The ENC Manager was notified of the emergency shortly after the initial classifications were made.
The ENC Manager set up his conference call with his Corporate counterparts quickly and i
efficiently, allowing for concurrent drafting, coordinating and
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approval of the initial media notification.
The technical expertise of the ENC Manager and the early provision of a dedicated communicator and link to the TSC and E0F allowed him access to an exceptional amount of plant technical information.
This link was re-established after the ENC Manager arrived at the JPIC.
The decision to activate the JPIC was well coordinated and timely.
The activation timeframe for the JPIC was not demonstrated as all JPIC personnel, except the ENC Manager and his communicator, were pre positioned for this exercise.
The JPIC was activated within 45 minutes of the Site Area Emergency declaration.
Both print and television journalists participated in the JPIC.
The facilities
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provided for the JPIC appear to be more than adequate, with
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sufficient communications for initial media representatives.
However, there were no telephones provided for use by NRC responders in either the JPIC Command Center or the NRC room.
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Informational packets were available to the press, and all press briefings were videotaped to allow media representatives to view previous briefings upon arrival.
Both voice and hardcopy communication were maintained between the JPIC and the TSC, E0F, JPIC and the State Emergency Operations Center.
A joint facility logbook was maintained, containing a record of information received in the JPIC by telephone from all sources, using a communicator / scribe and multicopy forms.
This logbook would be of considerable assistance during event reconstruction.
Press releases were coordinated with State and County representatives at the JPIC and approved by licensee management prior to issuance to the media.
Berrien County's provision of only one representative to the JPIC slowed the coordination process and decreased the number of press briefings and releases given.
Confusion over protective actions implemented by the State (using natural or township boundaries, versus the use of sectors by the EOF when making protective action recommendations), delayed the release of this information to the media.
Offsite radiological monitoring information was generally not provided to the JPIC. When a reading was received and released during a press briefing, no one was able to explain the numbers and units to the media.
As part of the scenario, pre-scripted questions were called in to Rumor Control.
For the most part Rumor Control provided acceptable answers to the questions asked, however, they did not aggressively seek answers to all questions and on several occasions waited until the next joint coordinating meeting, held prior to press briefings, to request additional information.
Based on the above findings, the following item sho'uld be considered for improvement:
Either provide an individual with health physics expertise, or
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prepare informational packets containing sufficient information for media representatives to interpret radiological monitoring information and Protective Action Guidelines and Recommendations.
6.
Exercise Scenario and Control
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I The exercise scenario was considered very challenging and difficult (both fast-moving and complex), including an unmonitored release pathway, wind direction shifts, fire drill, medical drill, PASS sample, and assembly /
accountability. A heavy rainstorm (actual) further complicated field monitoring team actions.
This scenario exercised all aspects of the Emergency Plan.
Evaluation of the exercise took into consideration the degree of challenge to the licensee's organization.
Exercise control was considered adequate in all areas.
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7.
Exercise Critiques
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NRC representatives observed the licensee self-critiques which took place immediately following the exercise in each of the following areas: Control Room, OSA, and E0F.
NRC personnel also attended the management exercise critique held on June 11, 1986.
Individual critiques were considered very good to excellent, and the overall critique was excellent.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on June 11, 1986, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team
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Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
i Attachments:
Attachment 1:
D. C. Cook 1986 Exercise Scope and Objectives Attachment 2:
D. C. Cook 1986 Exercise Scenario Outline
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Attachment 1
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DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT EMIRGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE
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II.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES As the result of coordination between AEPSC, IMECo, the State of Michigan, Berrien County, Michigan, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and following the guidance of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the following objectives have been developed for the 1986 D. C. Cook i
exercise: (State and County objectives are addressed in Section V.)
A.
Overall Licensee Objectives i
1.
Demonstrate an understanding of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency conditions.
i 2.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize corpurate level support.
in response to the incident.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate administrative and logistical support for non-I&MECo/AEP emergency support personnel.
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4.
Demonstrate at all Donald C. Cook emergency facilities the ability to establish and maintain solid accident management command and control authority and maintain continuity of authority throughout the exercise.
5.
Demonstrate the DCCNP emergency organization's ability to make proper decisions related to emergency radiation exposure guidelines, and the capability to implement these decisions.
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6.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and make protective action recommendations to protect station personnel and the general public based on Plant parameters and/or field monitoring information.
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7.
Test the adequacy, effectiveness and proper utilization of DCCNP ERFs and their emergency response equipment.
8.
Demonstrate efficient and reliable communications and flow of information from the DCCNP ERFs to participating off-site agencies.
9.
Demonstrate an effective exercise critique program.
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Attachment 1
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II.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (Continued)
10.
Demonstrate the ability to fully staff the emergency organization and maintain staffing around the clock in the TSC, EOF and OSA. The demonstration of the ability to
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maintain staffing around the clock will be limited to the designation of a subsequent shift.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to implement a site evacuation, assemble predesignated personnel and complete accountability.
B.
Operations Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the control room's ability to recognize operations symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading Plant conditions.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to properly escalate through the emergency classifications.
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3.
Demonstrate efficient and effective notification / alerting
procedures and methods.
Demonstrate effective communications and information flow from the control room to supporting locations.
5.
Demonstrate the capability to shift authorities and responsibilities from the on-shift emergency organization to the DCCNP emergency organization upon their activation.
C.
Radiological Control Objectives 1.'
Demonstrate the radiological controls necessary to remove contaminated injured individuals from the accident scene and to assist the medical team in minimizing the consequences of a contaminated individual.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate radiation protection through the utilization of appropriate procedures in support of the Plant's response.
I 3.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessments, and to formulate inplant and onsite radiological dose projections.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision whether to issue KI to inplant emergency workers based on predetermined criteria.
De'onstrate the ability to supply and administer KI to S.
m inplant emergency workers, if the decision has been made to do so.
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Attachment 1
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II.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (Continued)
D.
Environmental and Radiological Safety Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to perform offsite radiological monitoring. Include response to and analysis of simulated airborne samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.
2.
Demonstrate timely and effective offsite dose projections concerning radiological releases.
l 3.
Demonstrate the ability to assist the Site Emergency
Coordinator and the Recovery and Control Manager with protective action recommendations for site employees, the public and other resources.
E.
Chemistry Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Chemistry Section to obtain samples in support of accident assessment activities.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability to assess data obtained as a result of the sampling activities, and the ability to factor results into the overall assessment process.
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F.
Public Information Objectives
1.
Demonstrate prompt activation and operation of the Emergency News Center and/or Joint Public Information Center, as appropriate.
2.
Demonstrate the timely release and distribution of news announcements.
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3.
Demonstrate coordination of news announcements with State and County emergency response agencies.
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4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct timely and informativc media briefings at the Emergency News Center and/or Joint'
Public Information Center, as appropriate.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and. operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
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Attachment 2
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DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE VI.
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY Real Scenario Time Time Event 0800 00:00 Establish initial conditions as follows:
' Unit 1 is in mode one at 90% power, 565'F Tave, 935 MWe.
Control rod bank D at 215 Steps. RCS boron = 1460 ppa at 0217 chis morning.
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' Unit 2 completed a shutdown from 90% power (178 EFPD) at 1105 on June 9,1986 in preparation for a refueling outage. Degas operations were completed at 0635 on June 10, 1986.
' Unit 1 failed fuel detector is out of service.
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- 1-East RHR pump is.out of service due to excessive bearing temperatures identified late
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yesterday. No actions have been taken to identify the cause or rectify this problem.
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' Unit 1 pressurizer PORV block valves (1-NMO-151/1-NMO-153) are closed due to leakage from the associated PORV.
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- 2CD diesel is tagged out for a surveillance test.
'#14 Circulating Water Pump is out of service for motor replacement.
'#12 RCP lower oil pot low level indication,is in.
l 0815 00:15 Earthquake occurs registering 6.3.
The quake is felt onsite and results in a 1000 gpm leak in the RWST.
(Alert, ECC-3)
0820 00:20 Alarms are received in the Control Room indicating a fire.
Fire is adjacent to Waste Gas Decay Tanks (WGDT)
0821 00:21
"RWST. Level at 350,000 gallons" alarm received
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in the Control Room.
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Attichment 2
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i VI.
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (Continued)
Real Scenario Time Time Event 0825 00:25 The WGDT that received gas products from previous Unit 2 degas and Unit I dilutions explodes due to heat and high hydrogen concentrations. This explosion causes three studs on the adjacent WGDT manway to shear resulting in a gradual radioactive release. The explosion also results in a contaminated injured man.
0830 00:30 Dose projections from WGDT rupture indicate
> 50 mR/hr whole body dose at site boundary.
Security reports a large quantity of water on the ground near the three large tanks just north of the Unit I containment.
(Site Area Emergency, ECC-19)
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0835 00:35 Indication is received in the Control Room of a 35 gym LOCA. Assume reactor shutdown is started
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at a rate of 50% per hour. Due to the earthquake the fire suppression system in the West RHR' room actuated and has wet down the. west RHR pump. This pump will respond to the subsequent safety injection signal and will run for approximately 30 minutes. If RHR pump is stopped at any time, it will not restart.
0845 00:45 LOCA' leak rate has increased to 80 gpm. An unmonitored ralease is occurring via the steam enclosure vent. The earthquake caused the containment penetration seal for a main steam line to fail. Containment temperature and humidity are increasing while containment pressure remains below the isolation setpoint of
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2.9 psig.
0855 00:55 Fire is out.
0900 01:00 LOCA leak rate has increased to 1500 GPM and will remain steady, then decrease with pressure.
Safety injection is actuated. TSC, OSA, EOF and ENC /JPIC should be manned but may not be operational. Onsite assembly and accountability should,be near completion.
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'0915 01:15 Emergency response facilities should be O
operational. Portal monitors in Security Building alarm due to ongoing release. Top priority for emergency response should be the restoration of RHR (if tripped), offsite
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radiological monitoring and obtaining a post accident sample.
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Attachment 2
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VI.
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (Continued)
Real Scenario Time Time Event 0930 01':30 The leaking WGDT has emptied while the containment leakage continues. At this time, a weather change will commence due to a low pressure zone passing-through the area. The wind direction will shift from 210' - 220* at present to 290* - 310' over the next three hours. Wind speeds will generally increase and
atmospheric stability will become less stable.
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JPIC activated.
0935 01:35 RWST low level alarm. Attempts to establish pump recirculation will be unsuccessful due to the unavailability of RER pumps If the east RHR pump is started, it will seize due to bearing failure.
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0945 01:45 Doses at site boundary are in excess of 250 mR/hr whole body and 1250 mR/hr thyroid with particulates present. Dose projections indicate less than 2 mR/hr at site boundary based.on
effluent monitors.
(General Emergency, ECC-19)
s 1000 02:00 Most central core thermocouples indicate 10%
clad failure. Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 10% clad failure but readings are elevated.
1015 02:15 AE0 on earthquake inspection reports an air leak in the steam enclosure. This is actually containment atmosphere blowing out the steam line seal.
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1030 02:30 AEPSC and IMECo personnel arrive at the EOF and JPIC respectively.
1045 02:45 Turnover to AEPSC personnel in the EOF is l
ongoing. Central core thermocouples indicate a
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10% clad failure. Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors.do not support thermocouple i
j indications but readings are elevated.
1050 02:50 The AE0 that reported the air leak in the steam
enclosure informs the Control Room he is contaminated.
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Attachment 2
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VI.
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (Continued)
Real Scenario Time Time Event 1100 03:00 Damage Control Team reports that the west RER pump has been dried out and meggered. No electrical grounds are apparent and the pump j
breaker has been reset. This pump is now
available and sump recirculation can be i
established.
1110 03:10 Actions are underway in the OSA to dispatch a Reentry and Rescue Team in response to the contaminated AEO.
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1130 03:30 Sump recirculation has been established and the core is cooling. Release from containment continues.
1145 03:45 Release from containment continues. Weather
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conditions have stabilized somewhat.
Contaminated AE0 tells R&RT that it was a little steamy in the steam enclosure and thats the only place he can figure he was contaminated.
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1200 04:00 Release from containment continues. Core temperature is decreasing.
1215 04:15 Source of containment leakage has been identified and repaired. Release is terminated.
l 1230 04:30 Dose rates at site boundary are 5-10 mR/hr due
to surface contamination in area. Dose rates in 3 - 10 mile range remain evident.
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1245 04:45 EOF continues to track the plume which'is
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diminishing. The OSA should be evaluating the extent of onsite contamination.
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1300 05:00 Evaluation of onsite and offsite radiological conditions continue.
I 1315 05:15 Plus four hour time advance.
Reactor has cooled and is stable.
Post accident sample results i
indicate a 10% clad failure. Contamination levels onsite have been quantified.
Deescalation and recovery discussions underway.
1345 05:45 Drill terminated.
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