Text

Insp Rept 50-302/86-14 on 860412-0606.Violation Noted:Lack of Corrective Action Procedure for safety-related motor- Operated Valve & Failure to Have Adequate Maint Procedure
	ML20204J574
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/23/1986
From:	Elrod S, Stetka T, Tedrow J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20204J558	List: ML20204J554; ML20204J564; ML20204J574;
References
	50-302-86-14, NUDOCS 8608110144
	Download: ML20204J574 (14)
	v • d • e

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SMEfog UNITED STATEL '

No NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

[" n REGION 11

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j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 50-302/86-14

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No.: 50-302 L1 cense No.: DPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Inspection Conducted: A ril ::2 - June 6,1986

Inspec r: lMk

e T. F. Stetka, Seniorr Resident Inspector

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Date signed

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{c/" J. E. Tedrow Resident Inspector Dat'e Signed

Approved by: 1 *lh0

S.'A. Elrod, Section Chief, One S'igned

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the

arees of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event

Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, biofouling

of cooling water heat exchangers,. and licensee action on previous inspection

items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and operations observed. Some of

these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results: Two violations were identified: ' failure to take adequate corrective

action, paragraph 3, and failure to have an adequate maintenance procedure,

paragraph 5.b.9.b.

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8608110144 860725

PDR ADOCK 05000302

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

M. Aarestad, Instrumentation & Controls (I&C) Engineer

J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Site Support

G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

L. Braglin, Nuclear Apprentice Mechanic

P.' Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor

M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

P. Ezzell, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

A. Friend, Nuclear Staff Engineer

J. Hammond, Nuclear Mechanical / Building Services Supervisor

V. Hernandez, Senior Nuclear Quality Assurance Specialist

B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

M. Jacobs, Area Public Information Coordinator

B. Komara, Senior Quality Auditor (Training)

K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance (QA)

J. Lander, Director of Nuclear Projects & Outages

C. Long, Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Control

M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

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P. McKee, Nuclear Plant Manager

4 *P. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent

G. Oberndcrfer, Manager, Procurement & Material QA

V. Roppel, Nuclear Plant Engineering & Technical Services Manager

W. Rossfe10, Nuclear Compliance Manager

M. Sanders, Quality Control Inspector

P. Skramstad, Nuclear Chemistry / Radiation Protection Superintendent

J. Tunstill, Se.'ior Nuclear Licensing Engineer

E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services

G. Westafer, Director, Quality Programs

K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing

R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering,

maintenance, chem / rad, quality programs, and corporate personnel.

Attended exit interview

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2. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at

the conclusion of the inspection on June 6,1986. During this meeting, the

inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are

detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Violations,

Unresolved Item (UNR) and Inspector Followup Items (IFIs).

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The inspectors also discussed the impending plant startup anc the pressures

associated with getting the plant back on line. A recent plant report had

indicated that a maintenance test on a pump was missed. This may have been

caused by such pressures, and the inspectors advised the licensee to be more

diligent and proceed with the startup in a careful and controlled manner.

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors Curing this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items

(0 pen) IFI 302/86-09-02: Review licensee's activities to place an oil plug

in the EFP bearing - The licensee documented the installation of the oil

plug in the turbine bearing of Emergency Feedwater Pump-2 (EFP-2) by issuing

a modification (MAR 86-04-15-01). The licensee has also completed the pipe

stress analysis for operation of the pump in the recirculation mode and

reset the overspeed trip setpoint to its previous value. The inspector

reviewed these items and has no further questions. The inspector also

reviewed the overspeed trip test procedure to verify that the overspeed trip

setpoint had been reestablished to its previous value. To ensure future

turbine bearings are modified prior to installation, the licensee plans to

include modification instructions in the pump disassembly and reassembly

procedure MP-162. This item will remain open pending revision of MP-162.

(Closed) IFI 302/85-42-02: Review the effect of out-of-tolerance voltages

on the amplifier function of the acoustic monitors - The licensee has

completed their evaluation of the amplifier filter function voltage drif t

problem. The licensee contacted the equipment manufacturer to determine the

effect this voltage drift has on the acoustic monitor indication. The

maximum error created by the voltage drift only slightly limited the

analysis range of the instrument. The resulting analysis range was still

well within the vendor's recommended range and, therefore, had a negligible

effect on the function of the instrument.

(Closed) IFI 302/85-42-01: Review the adequacy of the poison material

in the spent fuel storage racks - The licensee has evaluated the percent

weight loss of the carbon tetraborate poison material used in the high

density spent fuel storage racks. From this evaluation, the licensee

determined that the approximate two percent weight loss experienced in the

sampled poison material is still far below the allowable thirty percent

weight loss required to prevent criticality in the spent fuel pool. The

licensee will continue to trend the poison material percent weight loss in

subsequent surveillances to detect accelerat id weight losses and potential

problems. The licensee has revised the test procedure's acceptance criteria

to more accurately reflect the allowable poison percent weight loss. This

should prevent confusion over this matter in the future.

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(Closed) IFI 302/85-37-05: Review the licensee's activities to correct

spare cell voltages - The licensee has revised preventive maintenance

procedure PM-110 to require verification that the spare cell battery charger

is energized and that the output voltage is at the proper setting.

(Closed) IFI -302/85-29-08: Review the licensee's action to prevent steam

generator overpressurization - The licensee has attributed the cause of the

steam generator overpressurization to the failure of personnel to ensure

that a feedwater regulating valve was fully closed. The licensee has

counseled operations personnel on proper valve position verification

techniques and has revised procedure CP-115, In Plant Equipment Clearance

and Switching Orders, to clarify methods to be used to verify valve

positions. The inspector considers this action sufficient to prevent

recurrence of this event.

(0 pen) IFI 302/86-12-01: Review the licensee's investigation of the SWP-1B

failure - Further investigation into the pumping failure on Nuclear Services

Closed Cycle Cooling (SW) pump 1B indicates that the pump was becoming gas

bound. Venting operations on all the SW pumps indicated the presence of

nitrogen that was entrained in the SW system water. It is believed that the

nitrogen is coming from the SW system surge tank, which has a nitrogen

blanket on it. It is not understood at. this time why this has not been a

problem in the past. Tests, to date, indicate that if the pumps are vented

at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , gas binding will not occur. As a result, the

licensee has added vent valves to the top of each pump and revised their

shift and daily check procedures (SP-300 and SP-301) so that the pumps are

vented at least every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The license's investigation into the cause

of this phenomenon is continuing.

(0 pen) UNR 302/85-44-05: Justify that QC inspector and supervisor qualifi-

cations are adequate - The licensee completed an investigation of this item

and provided information to the inspector which indicated that all the QC

inspectors were qualified to perform the inspection activities to which they

were assigned. This information also indicated that the identified problems

resulted from inadequate contract QC inspector indoctrination and the use of

inadequate procedures.

To verify the licensee's findings and the general status of QC department

personnel qualifications, the inspector conducted a review to determine

whether:

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QC inspectors (bott past and present) and QC supervisors were certi-

fled, in writing, as qualified in accordance with the requirements of

ANSI N45.2.6 (1978); and

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the licensee had developed and implemented a comprehensive indoctri-

nation, training, and certification program for QC inspectors to

correct and prevent recurrence of the deficiencies identified in their

investigation.

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As a result of these reviews the following was identified;

a. All present and past QC inspectors meet (or met) the qualification

requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 and were certified, in writing, as being

at least Level II qualified.

b. The licensee has developed and implemented an indoctrination program

for contract QC inspectors and a training and certification program for

all QC inspectors. As the result of reviewing this program, the

inspector determined that all but three contractor inspectors of the

present cn-site inspection force have passed the licensee's

indoctrination, training, and certification program. Of these three

individuals, two have not yet completed the program and one must be

retested.

c. The qualifications of the present QC supervisor were also examined.

This individual was assigned to the supervisor's position on a

temporary basis in March 1985. Prior to December 1985, this individual

had not been certified, in writing, as Level I, II, or III qualified,

apparently because information about his past work experience was not

available. This fact was identified by a licensee Quality Programs

audit (QP-273) conducted in July 1985 and responded to in October 1985.

In December 1985, the licensee reviewed past work experience records

and determined that the individual had previous Level II background.

But since he had not completed the training and qualification program,

remedial training was necessary and he was therefore considered to be

Level II (restricted) pending satisfactory completion of this training.

This UNR remains open pending NRC review of the completion of the inspector

qualification program by the contracted inspectors and the supervisor.

(Closed) IFI 302/86-07-03: Review the licensee's inspection and repair of

valve DHV-39 - On May 29, 1986, the inspector' reviewed the work performed

on this valve by the electric shop and compared it to the work described in

Licensee Event Report (LER) number 86-03-01, dated May 15, 1986. Although

the LER reported that the operator torque switch for the valve had been

adjusted to its proper value, the shop records could not confirm this. The

inspector questioned licensee personnel about this apparent discrepancy and

discovered that the torque switch setting had not been adjusted to its

proper value. On June 5, 1986, the licensee reset the operator torque

, switch for valve DHV-39 to its proper value.

The licensee initially identified the improperly set torque switch in an

interoffice memorandum (speed letter), dated May 2, 1986, which responded to

Nonconforming Operations Report (NCOR) number 86-22. This NCOR documented a

failure of valve DHV-39 to open properly. Corrective action, assigned per

this speed letter, consisted of revising procedure MP-402, Maintenance of

Limitorque Valve Controls, to reflect the correct torque switch setting for

the valve and to reset the valve's torque switch setting to the correct

value. Although the procedure was revised, the valve's torque switch

setting was not adjusted.

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The licensee tracks corrective action for identified deficiencies in

accordance with procedure CP-125, Corrective Action Procedure. This

procedure requires that a Corrective Action Assignment Form be completed to

document and track corrective actions. This form was not used in resetting

the torque switch because personnel believed this action had already been

completed. Failure to complete this form and assess the necessary cor-

rective action resulted in the valve's torque switch not being reset to its

proper value. The failure to establish the correct torque switch setting

for DHV-39 compri ad an inadequate corrective action for an identified

deficiency. The failure to adhere to the requirements of CP-125 is consi-

dered to be a violation against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

Violation (302/86-14-01): Failure to adhere to the requirements of the

corrective action Procedure CP-125, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V.

For record purposes, IFI 302/86-07-03 is considered closed and all further

action concerning this issue will be tracked by the violation.

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(Closed) IFI 302/86-07-02: Review the licensee's repair of loose Rosemount

transmitters - The licensee performed modification MAR 86-03-17-01 to

tighten the loose electrical connections to Rosemount transmitters in the

reactor building. As part of this modification, the electrical connections

were tightened to 24 foot pounds to establish a tight seal. On April 29,

1986, the inspector observed this modification being performed on four

transmitters. After each transmitter's electrical connection was tightened,

the inspector verified that the connection was finger tight. The inspector

did this in the presence of the technician and QC inspector performing the

work. The inspector thn checked other nearby Rosemount transmitters and

noticed that trant .s,er RC-164A '_T-1 was loose to the touch. When the

inspector informed cae technician and QC inspector of this observation they

agreed that the connection was loose and proceeded to tighten it. They

informed the inspector that that transmitter had already been modified and

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was supposed to have been tightened to 24 foot pounds.

On June 3,1986, the inspector toured the reactor building and checked some

of the transmitters to determine if the electrical connections were still

finger tight. The inspector found six connections which were loose to the

touch, including RC-164A-LT-1, which the inspector had previously witnessed

being tightened. The inspector informed licensee management of this finding

and questioned the adequacy of the modification being performed. The

licensee is evaluating the possible effects that the loose electrical

connections may have on the environmental qualification of these trans-

mitters and the possible cause for this condition. This matter will be

considered unresolved pending completion of the inspector's review of the

evaluation.

Unresolved Item (302/86-14-02): Review the licensee's evaluation of the

possible effects that loose electrical connections may have on the

environmental qualification of the Rosemount transmitters and possible

causes for this condition.

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For record purposes, IFI 302/86-07-02 is considered closed and all further

action concerning this issue will be tracked by the unresolved item.

(0 pen) IFI 302/86-12-03: Review the addition of the 00 system to CP-115 -

During the safety systems walkdown conducted during this inspection period,

the inspector identified additional systems that should be added to the

independent verification of system lineup section of CP-115. See paragraph

5.b.(2) of this report for further details.

4. Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or-

deviations. A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 3 of this

report.

5. Review of Plant Opertions

The plant remained in the cold shutdown condition (Mode 5) for the duration

of this inspection period.

a. Shift Logs and Facility Records

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to veri fy compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TSs) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log;

Equipment Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist;

Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log;

Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Start Up Manager's

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Log; Outage S.hift Manager's Log; Short Term

Instructions (STIs); and selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified clearance order tagouts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during

backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, the inspector

attended licensee meetings to observe planning and management

activities.

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The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator

room; auxiliary building; reactor building; intermediate building;

battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

(:) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation was

observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance

with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation

monitors; electrical system lineup; and auxiliary equipment

operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of

the Emergency Feedwater (EF) System to verify that the lineup was

in accordance with license requirements for system operability and

that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as built"

plant conditions.

During a review of the procedures and drawings the inspector noted

that the Main Steam (MS), Feedwater (FW) and Auxiliary Steam (AS)

systems were not listed in procedure CP-125, In-Plant Equipment

Clearance and Switching Orders, as being systems that require

independent verifications of system lineup when returned to

service from a maintenance condition. Parts of these systems are

utilized by the EF system to accomplish its design function.

Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that these

systems were not included in the procedure since the majority of

each system is used for nonsafety-related applications. However,

the licensee is considering adding the applicable portions of

these systems to procedure CP-115. This item will be tracked in

conjunction with a similar, previously identified, IFI (302/

86-12-03).

(3)^ Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift

staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control

room operations were being conducted in an orderly and

professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems and other pertinent plant information

during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components

and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the

facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire

hazards existed. -

No violations or deviations were identified.

(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to

verify proper identification and implementation. These

observations included selected licensee conducted surveys, review

of step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and

area posting. Area postings were independently verified for

accuracy through the use of the inspector's own radiation

monitoring instrument. The inspector also reviewed selected

radiation work permits and observed the use of protective

clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring devices to assure

that the licensee's radiation monitoring policies were being

followed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(6) Security Control - Security controls were obserted to verify that

security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and

access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in accordance

with the facility security plan. Personnel within the PA were

observed to verify proper display of badges and that personnel

requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel within vital

areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(7) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and

equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was

appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,

actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment,

and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that

approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were

conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment

operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS require-

ments were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

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SP-110, Reactor Protection System Functional Testing;

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SP-112, Calibration of the Reactor Protection System;

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SP-161A, Reactor Coolant T Hot & T Cold Calibration;

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SP-187, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System

Testing;

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SP-210, ASME Class 3 Hydrostatic Testing;

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SP-350, Turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump 3B

Overspeed Trip Test;

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SP-416, Emergency Feedwater Automatic Actuation;

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SP-455, Functional Test of Vital Bus Redundant

Transformers & Static Transfer Switches;

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SP-523, Station Batteries Service Test;

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SP-701, Radiation Monitoring System Surveillance Program; and

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SP-906, Calibration of the Reactor Coolant Pump Power

Monitor Watt Transducers.

While reviewing the data for SP-523, completed on March 7,1986,

the inspector noticed that workmen had logged the finished battery

bank voltage for battery bank 3Al in the margin of the procedure's

data sheet but had not logged the voltage for banks 3A2, 381 and

382. The inspector noted that although this measurement is used

as an acceptance criterion for the test, there is no place to log

this value on the data sheets. The inspector verified that the

battery banks met the acceptance criteria by adding each cell's

voltage thereby deriving the net bank voltage. The inspector

discussed the possibility of adding a place to record the finished

battery bank voltage in the procedure with licensee representatives.

They agreed that this addition would help clarify that the

acceptance criteria of the procedure had been met. The licensee

plans to revise procedure SP-523 to include a place to record the

finished battery bank voltages.

Inspector Followup Item (302/86-14-03): Review the licensee's

revision of SP-523 to include a place to record battery bank

voltages.

(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance

activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in

effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as

required, were issued and being followed; quality control

personnel were available for inspection activities as required;

and TS requirements were being followed.

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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the

following maintenance activities:

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reassembly of a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal in accordance

with procedure MP-166;

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troubleshooting and repair of valve DHV-39 in accordance with

procedures MP-531 and MP-402;

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reinstallation of RCP seals in RCP-1A and RCP-1D in

accordance with MP-165;

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troubleshooting of valve EFV-57 in accordance with procedures

MP-531 and SP-416;

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replacement of oil in the steam-driven Emergency Feedwater

Pump (EFP-2) in accordance with PM-133;

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post-maintenance testing of EFP-2 in accordance with test

procedure PT-207;

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replacement of the turbine shaft for EFP-2 in accordance with

MP-124;

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resetting of relief valve DHV-17 in accordance with

procedures SP-119 and SP-602;

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replacement of reactor coolant system hot leg temperature

(T ) thermocouples and thermowells in accordance with

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procedure MP-101;

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torquing and retorquing of the flanges between the Power

Operated Relief Valve (PORV), RCV-10, and the PORV block

valve, RCV-11, in accordance with procedures MP-155 and

MP-122; and

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troubleshooting and replacement of the detector cable for the

Source Range Nuclear Instrument (NI-1) in accordance with

procedures MP-531, MP-405, and MP-201.

As a result of these reviews the following items were identified:

(a) While observing the changing of lubricating oil in the steam-

driven EFP on May 28, 1986 the inspector noted that procedure

PM-133 listed Mobil 1 as the required lubricant for the

pump's Woodward governor but listed a different oil (Gulf

Dieselmative 471) for the Emergency Diesel Generators' (EDG)

Woodward governor. The inspector reviewed the licensee's

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documentation which allowed the use of Mobil 1 for the EFP

but was unable to-find similar documentation for oil in the

EDGs. The inspector discussed the difference in oil usage

with licensee personnel, but they were unable to explain the

reason for the difference and referred the issue to the

engineering staff for research.

Inspector Followup Item (302/86-14-04): Review the

licensees's documentation for the use of Gulf Dieselmotive

471 in the Woodward governor for the Emergency Diesel

.. Generators.

(b) 01 June 3, 1986, while reviewing the work package for

installation of the cable for NI-1, the inspector noted that

the cable was installed and the insulation resistance tested

in accordance with procedure MP-405, Installing, Repairing

and Terminating Control, Power and Instrumentation Cables.

Review of MP-405 indicated that this procedure required a

test of the insulation resistance of control and instrument

cable using a 1000 volt direct current (VDC) insulation

tester. Review of voltage operating curves for this

instrument indicated that this cable normally operates at a

potential of approximately 2000 VDC.

This finding was discussed with licensee maintenance

personnel and it was determined that procedure MP-405 was

inadequate because it did not address proper insulation

testing of this cable.

Failure to have an adequate maintenance procedure for the

performance of post-maintenance testing is considered to be

contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.A and is considered

to be a violation.

Violation (302/86-14-05): Failure to have an adequate

, procedure for the performance of post-maintenance testing.

(c) On June 3, the inspector was informed that a loose flange

bolt was found on the connection between the pressurizer PORV

(RCV-10) and the block valve (RCV-11). A QC inspector found

the bolt loose to the touch while performing an inspection in

the vicinity of these valves. This connection was previously

torqued to approximately 335 foot pounds on April 25.

Discussions with licensee representatives, including inter-

views with the personnel involved with the original torquing

prccess, and a review of associated work packages did not

disclose any reason why this flange bolt had become loose nor

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any evidence that demonstrated improper torquing. The flange

was subsequently retorqued on May 29. The licensee is

continuing an investigation in an attempt to find a reason

for the loose bolt.

Inspector Followup Item (302/86-14-06): Review the

licensee's investigation into " 9 loose bolt on the flange

between valves RCV-10 and RCE

(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected

liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that approved

procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were

obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and

seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were

observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage

was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that

anchoring points were not binding. .

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions

appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were

reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TSs were satisfied.

LERs 86-04 and 86-05 were reviewed in accordance with current NRC

policy and are closed. The licensee has completed outstanding

corrective action for the LERs listed below. These LERs are also

considered closed for the following reasons:

(1) LER 85-14: The licensee has counselled the personnel involved

regarding the maintenance of steam generator levels and has

provided all operators a discussion of this event via the

Operators' Study Book.

(2) LER 85-23: The licensee has completed the design changes to the

static transfer switches to increase the sensed voltage setpoint

at which these devices will operate. The change should increase

the reliability of this power supply.

(3) LER 85-27: The licensee has revised procedure OP-209 to require

entry into the Technical Specification Action Statement.

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(4) LER 85-30: The licensee has completed ~ the change to procedure

OP-302 to ensure that the RCPPMs are bypassed prior to

transferring pumps.

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to

verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as

identified in the . reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as required by the TS.

NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement

Policy.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Design Changes and Modifications

New or modified system installations were reviewed to verify that the

changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the

changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved

procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria

or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate

drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review

included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.

The following Modification Approval Records (MARS) were reviewed and/or

associated testing observed:

-

replacement of Rosemount transmitter elbow connections in accordance

with MAR 86-03-17-01;

-

refit of the turbine governor end bearing for the steam-driven EFP in

accordance with MAR 86-04-15-01; and

-

fuse upgrade for improving vital plant security in accordance with

MAR 86-04-10-01.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Biofouling of Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

An inspection of the licensee's program for detecting and correcting

biofouling of cooling water heat exchangers was conducted as required by

IE Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515//7, " Survey of Licensee's Response to

Selected Safety Issues". This inspection included a review of the instru-

mentation available to detect degradation of heat exchanger performance and

operator action once degradation is identified. The licensee's responses to

IE Bulletin 81-03 and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 84-01 were also reviewed. No

adverse findings were identified.

_ _ - . . _.

ML20204J574

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