ML20154C616
| ML20154C616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Vias S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154C588 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-86-03, 50-413-86-3, 50-414-86-03, 50-414-86-3, NUDOCS 8603050271 | |
| Download: ML20154C616 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1986003
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-413/86-03 and 50-414/86-03
Licensee:. Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.:
NPF-35 and CPPR-117
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: January 6-10, 1986
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Inspector:
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S. J
fM
Date Signed
Approved by:
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d. 'J./BTalie, Section Chief
Date'51gned
E gipeering Branch
ivision of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection entailed 47 inspector-hours on site
and at the licensee's design engineering office in Charlotte, North Carolina, in
the areas of pipe support baseplate designs using concrete expansion anchors (IEB 79-02) and seismic analysis for as built safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14) - Unit 2.
Also, inspected and evaluated the information related to the
failed supports / restraints in the Auxiliary Steam (SA) System - Unit 1.
Results:
Two violations were identified - Failure to follow proceduret in
restoring to service failed support / restraints, paragraph Sa, and inadequate
engineering evaluation of an event that damaged support / restraints, paragraph Sb.
8603050271 060220
ADOCK 050g3
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- E. M. Couch, Project Manager, Construction and Maintenance
- T. B. Bright, Engineering Manager, Construction and Maintenance
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- C. L. Ray, Jr., Principal Engineer, Design Engineering
- H. B. Barron, Superintendent of Operations
- B. F. Caldwell, Superintendent of Station Services
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- J. W. Cox, Superintendent Technical Services
- L. N. Adams, Quality Assurance (QA), Operations
- C. L. Hartzell, Compliance
- P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
- F. P. Schiffley II, Licensing Engineer
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Other licensee employees contacted included construction cra f tsmen ,
technicians, operators, QA/QC inspectors, design engineers, and office
personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
P. Skinner, SRO
- P. J. VanDoorn, SRC
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 10, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph above.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
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below. No dissenting coments were received from the licensee.
Violation 50-413/86-03-01, Failure to follow procedures in restoring to
service failed support / restraints - paragraph Sa.
Violation 50-413/86-03-02, Inadequate engineering evaluation 'of an
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event that damaged support / restraints - paragraph Sb.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Auxiliary Steam System (SA) Damaged Supports (Unit 1) (92700)
The inspecter cnnducted an independent inspection of the Auxiliary Steam
(SA) System support / restraint damages that was discovered on January 3,
1986, to determine the systems integrity / operability.
The inspector held
discussions with selected licensee personnel in the areas involved in the
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restoration of the support / restraints and the engineering evaluation of the
event, including design engineers, mechanical maintenance, and quality
assurance / control (QA/QC) inspectors.
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On the morning of January 3,1986, the licensee's field personnel reported
to design engineering that the "SA" line had damage to four pipe supports
(1-R-SA-1505,
1-R-SA-1507, 1-R-SA-1508, and 1-R-SA-1510).
Design
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Engineering personnel began evaluating the damage based on the data from the
field personnel. Engineering concluded that all four supports were required
for the system to be declared operational, and instructed the craft to
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restore the four hangers including minor modifications to the anchor bolts.
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On the morning of January 6,
1986, the field personnel reported to
engineering that they were not going to be able to install one of the four
supports (1-R-SA-1510) by the deadline, as required by the Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.8.
At this time, Engineering concluded that
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they were not going to be able to complete an analysis of the system without
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the fourth support, so the licensee declared the SA system inoperable.
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a.
During the inspection of the four supports, which had been signed off
as complete and acceptable by QC, the inspector noted that restraint
1-R-SA-1507 was not properly reinstalled per the design drawing.
The
pipe clamp had rotated approximately four degrees due to the pipe
movement and the angle between the strut and clamp axis was
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approximately nine degrees.
In specification CNS-1206.00-04-003,
" Procedure Requirements for Fabrication and Erection of Hangers,
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Supports and Seismic Controls", Section 7.10.B.4.a. states:
"The stret
axis must remain within an eight degree cone of action from the pipe
clamp load stud...".
In procedure MP/0/A/7650/59, " Controlling
Procedure for Support / Restraint Maintenance Activities", Section
11.3.7, states:
"The newly installed / restored to service support /
restraint shall meet the requirements of all applicable design drawings
and documents and this procedure".
Section 11.3.7.1, states:
" Perform
maintenance inspection of support to verify it conforms to the
requirements of this procedure and referenced documents".
Contrary to the above, procedures for the restoring and inspection of
the pipe support were not being met. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings", and
is identified as Violation 50-413/86-03-01, Failure to Follow
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Procedures in Restoring to Service Failed Support / Restraints.
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b.
On January 7, 1986, during the inspection of the SA line and the four
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damaged supports, the inspector noted that damage to insulation due to
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the movement of the pipe indicated that there was a possibility that
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the snubber in restraint 1-R-SA-1529 could have bottomed out.
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inspector inquired if the licensee had looked into this possibility and
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if they had ascertained that the snubber could be stroked properly, or
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if the setting was correct, the licensee stated that they had not and
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they would issue a rework order.
In the evening of January 8, 1986,
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the inspector was told that an additional support was found to be
damaged and that an additional rework order was issued to repair
1-R-SM-1534.
It was after identifying a fifth damaged support, that
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the field personnel decided to walkdown the SA line to ascertain if
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there was any additional damage to any other supports, piping, and
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equipment and/or structures.
It was found that four additional
supports were slightly damaged, (I-R-SA-005,1-R-SA-006,1-R-SA-009,
and 1-R-SA-027).
During a telephone conversation between nuclear
production and design engineering, on the morning of January 9,1986,
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nine additional hangers were listed as having sustained some damage.
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In correspondence from the Civil Engineering / Environmental Division to
the Nuclear Haintenance, dated January 9,1986, it was concluded that
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based on engineering review and evaluation of all the corrective
actions taken to date, including the last 13 hangers reporteo',the
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morning of January 9, 1986, the affected portion of the SA syster was
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operable with no further action required.
With respect to the above, the first evaluation dor,a by DesignThisisaviolation\\
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Engineering on January 3, 1986, was inadequate.
of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action", and is
identified as Violation 50-413/86-03-02, Inadequate Engineering
Evaluation of an Event that Damaged Support / Restraints.
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Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Restraints System (50090) Unit 2
The inspector selected the following sample of eight hangers / supports in the
area of dynamic pipe supports and component support structures that had been
QC final inspected.
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Hanger Number
System
Type
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2-R-CA-1021
- 1 Strut
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2-R-CA-1024
- 3 Snubber
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2-R-CA-1626
- 3 Spring
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2-R-CA-1645
- 6 Spring
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2-R-CA-1646
- 1/2 Snubber
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2-A-NI-4233
Safety Injection
Double #000 Springs
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2-R-ND-0316
- 8 Spring
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2-R-ND-0324
- 8 Spring
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Design Calculations for the eight supports were reviewed and evaluated for
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thoroughness, clarity, consistency, and accuracy.
They appeared to be
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adequate in terms of using design input, references, units (dimersion,
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force, and movement), equations, tables, and computer analytical models.
In
general, design calculations were of good quality.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
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