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Insp Repts 50-413/86-03 & 50-414/86-03 on 860106-10. Violations Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures in Restoring to Svc Failed Supports/Restraints & Inadequate Engineering Evaluation of Event That Damaged Supports
	ML20154C616
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/10/1986
From:	Blake J, Vias S; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20154C588	List: ML20154C583; ML20154C597; ML20154C616;
References
	50-413-86-03, 50-413-86-3, 50-414-86-03, 50-414-86-3, NUDOCS 8603050271
	Download: ML20154C616 (5)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

[" $ REGION ll

$ j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

's ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-413/86-03 and 50-414/86-03

Licensee:. Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and CPPR-117

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: January 6-10, 1986 -

Inspector: - M 2)7 b

S. J fM Date Signed

Approved by:

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d. 'J./BTalie, Section Chief Date'51gned

E gipeering Branch

ivision of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection entailed 47 inspector-hours on site

and at the licensee's design engineering office in Charlotte, North Carolina, in

the areas of pipe support baseplate designs using concrete expansion anchors (IEB 79-02) and seismic analysis for as built safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14) - Unit 2. Also, inspected and evaluated the information related to the

failed supports / restraints in the Auxiliary Steam (SA) System - Unit 1.

Results: Two violations were identified - Failure to follow proceduret in

restoring to service failed support / restraints, paragraph Sa, and inadequate

engineering evaluation of an event that damaged support / restraints, paragraph Sb.

8603050271 060220

PDR ADOCK 050g3

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

E. M. Couch, Project Manager, Construction and Maintenance

t *T. B. Bright, Engineering Manager, Construction and Maintenance

i *C. L. Ray, Jr., Principal Engineer, Design Engineering

H. B. Barron, Superintendent of Operations

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B. F. Caldwell, Superintendent of Station Services

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J. W. Cox, Superintendent Technical Services

L. N. Adams, Quality Assurance (QA), Operations

C. L. Hartzell, Compliance

P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

F. P. Schiffley II, Licensing Engineer

i Other licensee employees contacted included construction cra f tsmen ,

technicians, operators, QA/QC inspectors, design engineers, and office

personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

P. Skinner, SRO

P. J. VanDoorn, SRC

Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 10, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed

.) below. No dissenting coments were received from the licensee.

Violation 50-413/86-03-01, Failure to follow procedures in restoring to

service failed support / restraints - paragraph Sa.

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Violation 50-413/86-03-02, Inadequate engineering evaluation 'of an

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event that damaged support / restraints - paragraph Sb.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection. -

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4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Auxiliary Steam System (SA) Damaged Supports (Unit 1) (92700)

The inspecter cnnducted an independent inspection of the Auxiliary Steam

(SA) System support / restraint damages that was discovered on January 3,

1986, to determine the systems integrity / operability. The inspector held

discussions with selected licensee personnel in the areas involved in the

I restoration of the support / restraints and the engineering evaluation of the

event, including design engineers, mechanical maintenance, and quality

assurance / control (QA/QC) inspectors.

l On the morning of January 3,1986, the licensee's field personnel reported

to design engineering that the "SA" line had damage to four pipe supports

(1-R-SA-1505, 1-R-SA-1507, 1-R-SA-1508, and 1-R-SA-1510). Design

i Engineering personnel began evaluating the damage based on the data from the

field personnel. Engineering concluded that all four supports were required

! for the system to be declared operational, and instructed the craft to

I restore the four hangers including minor modifications to the anchor bolts.

i On the morning of January 6, 1986, the field personnel reported to

engineering that they were not going to be able to install one of the four

supports (1-R-SA-1510) by the deadline, as required by the Technical

Specifications, Section 3.7.8. At this time, Engineering concluded that

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they were not going to be able to complete an analysis of the system without

, the fourth support, so the licensee declared the SA system inoperable.

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a. During the inspection of the four supports, which had been signed off

as complete and acceptable by QC, the inspector noted that restraint

1-R-SA-1507 was not properly reinstalled per the design drawing. The

pipe clamp had rotated approximately four degrees due to the pipe

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movement and the angle between the strut and clamp axis was

approximately nine degrees. In specification CNS-1206.00-04-003,

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" Procedure Requirements for Fabrication and Erection of Hangers,

Supports and Seismic Controls", Section 7.10.B.4.a. states: "The stret

axis must remain within an eight degree cone of action from the pipe

clamp load stud...". In procedure MP/0/A/7650/59, " Controlling

Procedure for Support / Restraint Maintenance Activities", Section

11.3.7, states: "The newly installed / restored to service support /

restraint shall meet the requirements of all applicable design drawings

and documents and this procedure". Section 11.3.7.1, states: " Perform

maintenance inspection of support to verify it conforms to the

requirements of this procedure and referenced documents".

Contrary to the above, procedures for the restoring and inspection of

the pipe support were not being met. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings", and

is identified as Violation 50-413/86-03-01, Failure to Follow

j Procedures in Restoring to Service Failed Support / Restraints.

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! b. On January 7, 1986, during the inspection of the SA line and the four

! damaged supports, the inspector noted that damage to insulation due to

! the movement of the pipe indicated that there was a possibility that

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the snubber in restraint 1-R-SA-1529 could have bottomed out. The

i inspector inquired if the licensee had looked into this possibility and

i if they had ascertained that the snubber could be stroked properly, or

! if the setting was correct, the licensee stated that they had not and .

l they would issue a rework order. In the evening of January 8, 1986,

j the inspector was told that an additional support was found to be

damaged and that an additional rework order was issued to repair

1-R-SM-1534. It was after identifying a fifth damaged support, that

! the field personnel decided to walkdown the SA line to ascertain if

I there was any additional damage to any other supports, piping, and

i equipment and/or structures. It was found that four additional

supports were slightly damaged, (I-R-SA-005,1-R-SA-006,1-R-SA-009,

and 1-R-SA-027). During a telephone conversation between nuclear

production and design engineering, on the morning of January 9,1986,

. nine additional hangers were listed as having sustained some damage.

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In correspondence from the Civil Engineering / Environmental Division to

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the Nuclear Haintenance, dated January 9,1986, it was concluded that '

i based on engineering review and evaluation of all the corrective

< actions taken to date, including the last 13 hangers reporteo',the

j morning of January 9, 1986, the affected portion of the SA syster was

i operable with no further action required.

With respecton

to January

the above, the first

wasevaluation dor,a by DesignThisisaviolation\

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Engineering 3, 1986, inadequate. of

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action", and is

identified as Violation 50-413/86-03-02, Inadequate Engineering

Evaluation of an Event that Damaged Support / Restraints.

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l 6. Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Restraints System (50090) Unit 2

The inspector selected the following sample of eight hangers / supports in the

area of dynamic pipe supports and component support structures that had been

QC final inspected.

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Hanger Number System Type

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i 2-R-CA-1021 Auxiliary Feedwater #1 Strut

2-R-CA-1024 Auxiliary Feedwater #3 Snubber i

2-R-CA-1626 Auxiliary Feedwater #3 Spring <

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2-R-CA-1645 Auxiliary Feedwater #6 Spring

1 2-R-CA-1646 Auxiliary Feedwater # 1/2 Snubber

i 2-A-NI-4233 Safety Injection Double #000 Springs !

j 2-R-ND-0316 Residual Heat Removal #8 Spring

! 2-R-ND-0324 Residual Heat Removal #8 Spring

i Design Calculations for the eight supports were reviewed and evaluated for

i . thoroughness, clarity, consistency, and accuracy. They appeared to be

l adequate in terms of using design input, references, units (dimersion,

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force, and movement), equations, tables, and computer analytical models. In

general, design calculations were of good quality.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

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ML20154C616

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