IR 05000483/1988014

Insp Rept 50-483/88-14 on 880703-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Surveillance, Emergency Preparedness,Security & Technical Support

ML20151U973
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	08/11/1988
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151U972	List: IR 05000483/1988014 ML20151U969
References
50-483-88-14, IEIN-88-001, IEIN-88-009, IEIN-88-1, IEIN-88-9, NUDOCS 8808220005
Download: ML20151U973 (12)

Text

n "

[

'

.

,

.

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/88014(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - M&il Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, Missouri Inspection Conducted: July 3-30, 1988 Inspectors: ' H. Little .

C. H. Brown N f

/O a

Approved By: R.\.DeFayette Chief Reactor Projects Section 3A Date

,

Inspection Summary

-

Inspection from July 3-30, 1988 (Report No. 50-483/88014(DRP))

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection of l'icensee event reports, plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance / surveillance, i emergency preparedness, security, engineering and technical support, safety assessment / quality verification, and regional requests was performe Results: The utility personnel's performance in the areas of plant operations (Paragraph 3), raoiological controls (Paragraph 4), and maintenance / surveillance (Paragraph 5), reflect favorably on supervision, training and qualification A good working relationship exists between engineering and other onsite work groups. Engineering and technical support is viewed as effective and responsive (Paragraph 8). Performance improvements resulted from utility self-improvement programs (Paragraph 10). No violations or deviations were identifie .

8808220005 880011 PDR ADOCK 05000403 O PNV

__

n .

-

.

.

.

k

.

.

DETAILS Persons Contacted -

D. F. Schnell, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

• L. Randolph, General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• J. D. Blosser, Manager, Callaway Plant C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support

• A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services

• W. R. Campbell, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

• M. E. Taylor, Superintendent, Operations D. E. Young, Superintendent, Maintenance

• W. R. Robinson, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance R. R. Roselius, Superintendent Health Physics T. P. Sharkey, Supervising Engineer, Site Licensing G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning and Scheduling W. H. Sheppard, Superintendent, Outages G. R. Pendegraff, Superintendent, Security L. H. Kanuckel, Superv.isor, Quality Assurance Program

• J. V. Laux, Superintendent, Technical Support, Quality Assurance G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineer Group J. C. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support, Quality Assurance

• J. J. Cassmeyar, Quality Assurance Engineer

• T. H. McFarland, Superintendent, Project Engineering

,

• Denotes those present at one cr more exit interview In addition, a number of equipment operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and other members of the quality control, operations,

-

maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs were contacted.

4 Inspection of Licensee Event Reports (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of records, the following licensee event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence was accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (T/Ss). The LERs listed below are considered close LER 84-033-02: Technical Specifications Violatio The initial LER described the licensee's failure to perform a retest of the cor.tainment isolation valves following valve packing adjustments within the time constraints of the Technical Specification Inspection and closeout of this event is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 483/84048(ORP). Revision 2 was submitted to amend the corrective actions inoicated in the initial LER Revision 1.

l The inspector's review or 'he revision determined tha. the changes l were minor.

I LER 84-033-02 is considered closed.

2

_

.

.

.

. LER 88-006-00: Manual Reactor Trip Due to Failure of the 'C'

Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV).

On April 21, 1988, at 2:17 a.m., CDT while operating in Mode 1 at 94 percent reactor power, a manual reactor trip was initiated immediately following the failure of the 'C' FRV (AE-FCV-530).

The manual reactor trip and engineered safety features performed per desig The licensee's evaluation determined that the 'C' main FRV failed due to material fatigue of the roll pin which secures the valve plug to the valve stem. The plug unthreaded and dropped from the stem blocking feedwater flow through the valv The 'C' FRV was disassembled and the roll pin was replaced with a solid pin of greater strengt Since the design of the remaining three FRVs and the four feedwater (FW) bypass valves contained the roll pin configuration, these valves were also modified to include the solid pin The licensee's event review team (ERT) identified additional equipment problems following the trip, e.g.: Following the expected feedwater isolation, feedwater isolation Valve AE-FE-39 could not be re-opened from the control roo This was determined normal, resulting from failure to manually reset the circuit as designed following automatic isolatio * The 'B' main feed pump (MFP) failed to trip on the actuation of a main turbine and reactor tri In addition, all efforts to trip the MFP remotely from the control room failed. An equipment operator tripped the MFP turbine locally by operating

-

the manual turbine trip. The licensee's investigation found the electric coil of Solenoid Valve SV-12 grounded to the case and indications of excessive overheating of the scienoid and contact Relays 63XAE2 and 63XAE4 (components in the feedpump trip circuit). The Solenoid Valve SV-12 and the surge capaci;or were replace Relays 63XAE2 and 63XAE4 in Cabinet RP142 were also replace Extensive testing was performed in accordance with appropriate sectiuns of OTS-FC-00001 to ensure the proper function of trip Solenoid SV-1 The inspectors responded by coming to the site upon receiving phone notification of the event from the licensee. The inspectors interviewed crew members involved in the event and attended portions of the event critique conducted by the ERT. The inspectors also observed the licensee's problem identification, resolution and corrective action The inspectors determined that the operating crew was provided onsite engineering support before the event, had correctly diagnosed the FRV problem, and the decision was made to commence plant shutdown at 10 percent per hour prior to the valve failure.

,

.

. -

.

,

-

.

,

. .

.

Plant management and support groups including the ERT responded promptly to the sit The event was categorized as a Condition I event requiring problem resolution / correction and Onsite Review Committee (ORC) review prior to plant restart. In addition to the required "corrective" maintenance on the failed FRV, plant startup was delayed to complete preventive maintenance on the remaining FRVs and FRV Bypass Valve LER 88006-00 is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Operations (71707, 71710) Operational Safety Verification Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspections focused on the implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensee's control of operating activ.ities, and on the performance of licensed and non-licensed operators and shift technical advisor The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions of operation (LCO), and reviews of facility procedures, records, and reports. The following items were considered during these inspections:

• Adequacy of plant staffing and supervisio * Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence, operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and l off-normal condition l

• Operability of selected safety-related systems, including l attendant alarms, instrumentation, and control l

,

• Maintenance of quality records and report l The inspectors observed that control room supervisors, shift technical )

advisors, and operators were attentive to plant conditions, performed I frequent panel walkdowns and were responsive to off-normal alarms and i condition l l

The operating crew was cognizant of ongoing work activities, i Surveillances and testing activities were appropriately authorized ,

and logged. Licensed operators and shift technical advisors were !

cognizant of entry into and compliance with LCO action requirements.

i

4

- -

, .

-

.

. .

l

,

'

I Off; shift Inspection of Control Rooms The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the rours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shift The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were attentive to their duties, and that the administrative controls relating to the conduct of operation were being adhered t :

The inspectors observed that personnel assigned to training watches in the control room were apprcprictely involved in control room activities and were under close supervisio The control room and other on-shift personnel were found to be .

alert and attentive to their dutie No pre-communication of the inspector being onsite was noted, ESF System Walkdown The operability of selected engineered safety features was confirmed by the inspectors during walkdowns of the accessible portions of several systems. The following items were included: verification that procedures match the plant drawings, that equipment, instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker line-up status is in agreement with procedure checklists, and verification that locks, tags, jumpers, etc., are properly attached and identifiabl The following systems were walked down during this inspection period:

- * 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator

,

o Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

• Component Cooling Water System i * Essential Service Water System

• Auxiliary Feedwater System Plant Material Conditions / Housekeeping The inspectnrs performed routine plant tours to assess material conditions within the plant, ongoing quality activities and plant-wide housekeeping. The inspectors also accompanied the licensee's management on monthly plant tour Improved housekeeping conditions and practices were observe Recent painting of the concrete walls and floors of the emergency

, diesel generator rooms has resulted in a significant improvement in visibility and appearanc Plant deficiencies were appropriately tagged for deficiency correctio No violations or dtviations were identifie .

r

_

--

.,

-

.

,

.

. Radiological Controls (71709)

The licensee's radiological controls and practices were routinely observed by the inspectors during plant tours and during the inspection of selected work activities. The inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and monitoring, mainte1ance of radiological control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls. The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's radiological and water chemistry control records and report Health physics controls and practices were satisfactory. The housekeeping in the radiological controlled areas was noted to have been maintained at a high level. The knowledge and training of the personnel were satisfactor Extensive radiological work controls were established prior to commencing work in the refueling transfer cana No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance / Surveillance (62703, 61726)

Selected portions of th'e plant surveillance, test and maintenance activities on safety related systems and components were observed or reviewed to ascertain that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional te: ting and/or calibration was performed prior to returning the components er systems

-

to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; and appropriate firo prevention, radiological, and housekeeping conditions were maintaine Maintenance The review 1d maintenance activities included:

Work Request N Activity W114537 Grouting breaker trolley channels in residual heat removal Pu.np ' A' and pressurizer back-up heater breaker cubicle Fire hose visual inspection (per MSM-KC-FWOO4).

W112593 Installation of correct weatherstripping o6 north non-vital AC switchgear room fire doo A109423B Replace rod drive motor generator set bearin .

-

.

.

.

Work Request N Activity W117352 Replace card in Loop 4 delta temperature circui W438914 Equotip hardness test - component cooling

-

water system (CCWS) flange (FE-80).

W439024 Equotip hardness-test - CCWS flange (FE-79).

W439026 Equotip hardness test - essential service w&L9r (ESW) flange (S-5008). , Surveillance The reviewed surveillances included:

Procedure N Activity ISL-88-0T441 .

I&C loop calibrationf'unctional test surveillance (Loop 1 delta temperature /

temperature average).

OSP-EG-P01BD 'B' and 'O' component cooling w3ter pump run (ASME Section XI test).

ITL-EA-OR04 A Loop - nuclear, service water radiation detecto ISF-AB-0P544 Functional - Pressure Steam Generator 'D'.

.

ETP-ZZ-01324 Engineering hardness test on flanges per NRC Bulletin 880 MSE-KC-FWOO1 Fire detection functional and supervisory operability tes ISF-BB-OF414 Functional - flow, reactor coolant Loop 1 flo OSP-ZZ-00001 Control room shift daily log readings and channel check Personnel performing maintenance or surveillances were noted to have, and use, the correct procedures and proper work control document .

Work authorization had been obtained for the job being performed.

"

Prerequisites for perfonning the job, such as worker protection and tagging haa been performe Maintenance and surveillance continue to be areas where only an occasional minor problem arises. The licensee continues to maintain a low threshold for incident reportin Incidents

,

are appropriately evaluated for root caus No violations or deviations were identified.

"

_-. . - -. .

- --

,

-

.

. .

.

6. Emergency Preparedness (82301)

An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the licensee's implementation of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection included monthly observation of emergency facilities and equipment, interviews with licensee staff, and a review of selected emergency implementing procedure The equipment and facilities were noted to be satisfactory. The licensee performed routine emergency equipment functional verification The emergency procedures reviewed were of current revisio No violations or deviations were identifie . Security (71831)

The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals ,

and departures. Observations included the security personnel's performance associated with access control, security checkt, and surveillance activitiet, and focused on the adequacy of security staffing, the security response (compensatory measures), and the security staff's attentiveness and thoroughnes The security personnel were observed to be alert at their post Appropriate compensatory measures were established in a timely manner. Vehicles entering the protected area were thoroughly searche No violations or deviations were identifie . Engineering and Technical Support (37701)

An inspection of engineering and technical support activities was performed to assess the adequacy of support functions associated with operations, maintenance / modifications, surveillance and testing activities. The inspection focused on routine engineering involvement in plant operations and response to plant problem The inspecticn included direct observation of engineering support activities and discussions with engineering, operations, quality control and maintenance personne Engineering has established a number of routines to enhance engineering support effectiveness. These include:

• Weekly assignment of an engineering duty superviso * Assignment of engineers to back-shif * Engineering participation in operation's morning briefing * System engineering department supervisors attend all

"Plan of the Day" meeting * Routine system walkdowns by system engineer * Operation's participation in design changes and attendance at conception design meeting , .

.

-

.

,

.

~

~

In addition, the Superintendent of Systems Engineering is undergoing Senior Reactor Operator Hot Licensee Trainin c The inspectors have observed a contir.uing increase in engineering preser.ce in the plant, noticeably relating to maintenance work and in response to plant problems. Engineering efforts to reduce the backlog of temporary modifications (TMs) have been effective. TMs are relatively current and in the past year have been reduced from approximately 35 to 17. It

-

appears that a good working relationship exists between engineering and the other work groups on site. Engineering support is viewed as being timely and professiona No violations or deviations were identifie . Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (35701)

An inspection of the licensee's quality programs was performed to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management control, verificatior.. and oversight activities. The inspectors considered areas indicative of overall management involvement in quality matters, sel,f-improvement programs, response to regulatory and industry initiatives, the frequency of management plant tours and control room observations, and management personnel's attendance at technical' and planning /schedu?ing meetings. The inspectors attended Onsite Review Committee meetings and incident / event critiques and reviewed related documents, focusing on the licensee's root cause determinations and corrective actions. The inspection also included a review of quality records and selected quality assurance audit and surveillance activitie Performance in this area included the following major items: Quality Verification Activitie,s

.

The inspectors observed portions of the licensee's field verification of ASME Section XI testing of pumps and valve The field verification was part of a scheduled Quality Assurance (QA) audit. During the audit, QA witnessed the testing of six safety-related pumps and 12 safety-related valves. The field verification was accomplished by stationing 0,A engineers at the components being tested and at the control statio Inspection in this area included in plant observations during the performance of three tests, interviews with QA audit team members, and the review of the QA audit plan (No. AP88-015). The insptetors determined that the QA audit provided a comprehensive verification of inservice testing of pumps and valves. The audit focused on the following:

• Technical adequacy of test procedures and administrative control * Supervision and control of testing activities including the release of components, pre-test briefing >, prerequisites and restoration of components to servic , - - i .

-

.

,

.

.

• Attentiveness and performance disciplin * Performance of post-test engineering evaluation Test procedures were generally considered to be of high quality ;

(as the result of a previous joint procedure enhancement effort by engineering and operations' personnel). Effective supervision and control of testing activities was demonstrated. Operations'

personnel maintained an attentive and professional atmosphere during the performance of pump and valve testin b. Self-Improvement Programs An inspection in this area was performed to assess the effectivene of licensee initiated programs designed to improve plant or personnel performance. The inspection of specific improvement programs are documented in previous NRC inspection report Areas these programs addressed uclude:

• Reactor trips and event * Surveillances,and test * Health physics ALARA Programs / Hot Particle Prevention, Detection, and Contro * Planning and schedulin Management's involvement in improvement programs has been continually evident. A review of program effectiveness indicates overall performance improvements have been achieved. Examples of areas showing significant improvement are the reduction of reportable events and the lack of missed surveillances resulting from planning /

scheduling or personnel error .

The licensee's quality improvement process (QIP) is an ongoing self-improvement program. The initial phase of the program involved ,

management commitment, orientation and training. A quality -

improvement division was established to develop and implement the QIP program in November 1986. The program is designed to provide an environment that encourages involvement of employees at all l levels in the identification and resolution of problems or j improvement opportunitie The QIP involves team participation in the collection, selection, and analysis of a problem and providing a recommended sclution to the ;nanagement. Currently, 17 QIP teams have been formed involving approximately 15 percent of the licensee's employee Inspection in this area included the review of QIP program material, and informal discussions with quality improvement division personnel and QIP team member Upper + management involvement and support in the program is evident. Team members expressed a positive attitude j toward personal involvement in the program. The process has resulted '

in various improvement actions including the revision of departmental l procedures and the design and constructien of a reactor head stud l cleaning devic !

10 j

, .

.

.

,

. .

.

Missed quality control (QC) hold points in mechanical work packages was selected by a QIP team for problem resolution. Subsequently, improved performance in this area indicates ti'st action resulting from tiie QIP process was effective, e.g. , utility data indicates five occurrences of missed QC hold points in mechanical work packages in 1987. There has been no recurrence of this problem in the past nine month No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Regional Requests (92701)

The following NRC Information Notices (ins) were selected for resident inspector followup as identified in a regional request dated May 2, 198 A ssmple review of information notices is performed to assure that the licensee reviews ins and, if applicable, takes appropriate actio NRC Information Notice (IN) No. 88-09, notified licensees of continuing problems with Woodward PG-PL type governors used on steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbines (AFWPT).

The problems relat,ed to overspeed tripping during initial (cold) startup testin The inspector determined that the licensee had performed an evaluation in response to IN No. 88-09 (engineering letter No. UOTE 88-139). The licensee concluded that the AFWPT did not have a governor reliability problem based on the following:

• The Terry Woodward Governor Type PG-PL addressed in the notice is a mechanical governor. The governor on the AFWPT is Type EGR-EGM, an electronic hydraulic governo .

• The AFWPT is maintained continuously in a pre-warmed condition by the use of bypass Valves AB-HV-048 and AB-HV-049. These valves are maintained in the open position and are procedurally controlled by the locked-valve program. Condensate in the steam lines is constantly drained via steam traps and a level control valve. Control room alarm annunciation is provided for high drip leg condensate level * There has been no instability problems experienced during monthly surveillance tests of the AFWP * The governor is torn down for a complete inspection during each refueling period. In addition to the governor, the governor linkage and overspeed mechanism are inspected for degradation, alignment and lubricatio The inspector determined that problems identified in IN No. 88-09 were appropriately evaluated for applicability by the license IN No. 88-09 is considered close I

._

.

-

(

-

.

,

. .

. NRC Information Notice No. 88-01, notified licensees of a potentially generic problem concerning the reliability of piping in safety-related systems due to valve leakage which results from thermal cycling of the piping. Subsequently the NRC issued Bulletin No. 88-08 and Supplement I thereto, providing additional information and requested licensee action in this matte The inspector determined that the licensee had received IN No. 88-01 and had commenced an engineering review for applicabilit The licensee's review of this matter is continuing and included an action plan to implement the requirements of NRC Bulletin No. 88-0 Tracking and inspection followup will be under NRC Bulletin No. 88-0 NRC Information Notice No. 88-01 is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Meeting (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scupe an'd findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar .

12