ML20149D394

Insp Rept 50-458/87-30 on 871207-10 & 20-23.Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Notifications,Communications & Emergency Preparedness Training Program

ML20149D394
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	02/03/1988
From:	Fisher W, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149D284	List: ML20149D281 ML20149D345 ML20149D394
References
50-458-87-30, NUDOCS 8802090476
Download: ML20149D394 (7)

See also: IR 05000458/1987030

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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-30 Operating License: NPF-47

Docket: 50-458

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities (GSU)

P.O. Box 220

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: December 7-10 and 20-23, 1987  !

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Inspector: - -

N. M. Terc, Emergency Preparedness Speciayist Date

Nuclear Material and Emergency Preparedneys

Branch

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Accompanying

Personnel: J. E. Whittemore, Reactor Examiner, Operator Licensing Section

D. H. Schultz, Comex Corporation

Approved:

W. L. Fishsr Chief, Nuclear Material and

d2/7/cff

Date

Emergency Preparedness Branch

Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted December 7-10 and December 20-23, 1987

(Report 50-458/87-30)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's

notifications, communications, and emergency preparedness training program.

Results: Within the area inspected, one violation was identified

(paragraph 4).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted.

Licensee

• J. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear' Group

• J. Cadwallader, Supervisor, Emergency Planning

• T. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• E. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing

• K. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management

• 0. Williamson, Operations Supervisor

• P. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager

• D. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Training

• J. Booker, Manager, River Bend Oversight

• G. Kimmell, Director, Quality Services

• C. Fantacci, Radiological Engineering Supervisor

• J. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering

• V. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services '

• W. Odell, Manager, Administration

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• D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector

• W. Jones, Resident Inspector

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• Denotes those present during the exit interview.

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2. Follow-up on Previaus Inspection Findings (92701, 92702) *

(Closed) Deficiency (458/8580-03; 45E/8635-01): Protective Action Flow

Chart - The NRC inspector determined that a new flow chart used for making  ;

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protective action recommendations was incorporated in Procedure EIP-2-007,

"Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines," Revision 6, and that it

appeared adequate.

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(Closed) Deficiency (458/8706-02): Radiological Controls Lacking in the  :

Control Room - The NRC inspector noted that. Procedure EIP-2-017,  !

"Operations Support Center - Support Functions," Revision 4, assigned

specific responsibilities for radiation protection to the Operations  !

Support Center (OSC) coordinator. (See NRC Inspection

Report 50-458/87-06.)

(Closed) Deficiency (458/8706-03): Inadequate Concept of Operations for

OSC - The NRC inspector noted that EIP-2-017 was modified to designate the

Radiation Protection Foreman to be in charge of the OSC activities while j

the OSC coordinator is conferring at the. Technical Support Center (TSC) or

at any other time during his' absence.

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(0 pen) Deficiency (458/8706-04): Notification was Delayed - The NRC

inspector noted that the licensee had developed and implemented a new

system based on personal computers, which facilitates prompt and

simultaneous transmittal of information contained in. notification message

forms. This item will be closed when training of communicators is

completed. The licensee expects to complete training by February 1988.

(Closed) Violation (458/8G25-01): Inadequate Review and Update of

Emergency Telephone Listings - The NRC inspector noted that

Procedure EIP-2-104, "Maintenance of Emergency Telephone Numbers," was

revised in August 1987 to change the frequency of review to a more

realistic frequency. In addition, the procedure incorporated new

instructions to prevent omission of updating offsite agencies' backup .

telephone numbers. I

3. Notifications and Communications (82203)  :

The NRC inspector witnessed a weekly communication test from the Emergency

Operations Facility (E0F). The test consisted of sequential phone calls

to all offsite agencies (e.g., state and parishes) and also included a

simultaneous phone test. In addition, all offsite agencies were contacted

by radio communications.

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The NRC inspector reviewed records for the last 12 months (1987) and

verified that coma nication tests had been conducted as follows:

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Weekly Test - A weekly test was conducted consisting of simultaneous

and sequential contact with all offsite agencies (except NRC, which 1

is tested separately) using primary (state and local hotline) and

secondary means (radio notification system).

Monthly Test - A notification message form (NMF) from EIP-2-006,  !

"Notifications," was completed and transmitted to all offsite i

agencies (except NRC). An annual communication drill conducted in

conjunction with the annual exercise consisted of the transmission of

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NMF information generated during the exercise. These messages were i

transmitted via state and local hotlines. After the exercise, these

NMFs received by the offsite agencies were collected and compared ]

with the originals generated onsite to look for discrepancies and  ;

their cause. During the February 1987 exercise, the licensee  !

identified three discrepancies (loss of information) which were

inadvertently caused by poor clarity of handwriting of individuals

initiating the message. These individuals were retrained and all  ;

communicators were told to ensure that messages were clearly j

handwritten. 1

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Offsite Team Communications Test - A new procedure, EPP-2-501,

"Emergency Facility and Equipment Readiness," was implemented since

October 1987. This procedure requires a monthly check of the two

primary and the two backup field monitoring vehicles and an

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operational test of the field monitoring radios. Radio-transmissions

were made from the TSC and E0F radio consoles to the individual

vehicle radios.

Prompt Notification System - The licensee followed written

instructions, namely a document titled "RBS System Maintenance

Procedures; Weekly Siren Silent Test and Associated Memo." (The

licensee is revising their procedure and assigning a number,

EPP-2-503, "Siren Maintenance," to perform the daily, weekly, and-

monthly testing of the prompt notification system sirens.) When any

problems are identified in daily, weekly, or monthly tests, a Siren

Repair Work Ticket is initiated by the communications staff (for

testing and repairing) and actions are taken to perform the repair.

The extent of repairs is documented in the same form. The NRC

inspector noted that 411 repair tickets were documented since

March 1985. In addition to the tests, the NRC inspector noted that

each siren was inspected quarterly. Numerous external and internal

parameters are verified during these individual tests.

4. Knowledge and Performance of Duties (82206)

The NRC inspector reviewed appropriate sections of the emergency plan,

Procedure EIP-2-102, "Training, Drills, and Exercises," and representative

records c.f selected key emergency response personnel listed in the "River

Bend Station Emergency Response Organization. Personnel List," Revision 6,

dated November 11, 1987, to ensure that the training program was in place.

The review of records revealed that the training program for emergency

response personnel was established and that training was given.

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The NRC inspector attempted to determine if the licensee was in compliance

with 10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires that a licensee shall maintain in

effect emergency plans which meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47 and the

requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, to provide. reasonable assurance

that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a

radiological emergency. Specifically, the adcquacy of the licensee's

training and retraining methods as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) were

reviewed.

In addition, the NRC inspector addressed the requirements of

Section 13.3.7.1.1.2 of the RBS Final Safety Analysis Report'(FSAR),

"Specialized Training," which requires that shift supervisors and other

senior reactor operators receive specialized training in the use and

meaning of emergency action levels and evaluation of plant safety

degradation with offsite potential. In addition, the RBS FSAR states that

these members of the staff will receive training in plant safety system

analysis, offsite dose projections based upon effluent releases and

ambient meteorology, and protective action guides.

The NRC inspector attended several classes'and noted that retraining

sessions given to shift supervisors and control operations foremen did not

appear to be commensurate with the scope and depth of training required by

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senior control room personnel,.who would be responsible for direction and

coordination of emergency response during accidents. At the beginning of

retraining sessions, the instructor stated that'if the students did not

want a formal review of the subject. matter, a written test would be given

immediately. The students waived any additional instruction. The test

given consisted of filling blanks and matching specific conditions to

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) using the classification or Protective

Action Guideline procedures which were made available to each student.

Later, the NRC inspector interviewed available senior members of the

operations staff from three different shifts. The interviews consisted of

a series of questions involving basic technical and administrative

concepts needed for coordinating and directing emergency actions.

As a result of the interviews, the NRC inspector determined that:

Seninr control room personnel responsible for emergency direction and

coordination during accidents were unable to classify accurately and

efficiently a given accident scenario resulting in a general

emergency condition.

The six persons interviewed did not demonstrate knowledge of basic-

technical factors (e.g., range of containment radiation and main

stack effluent monitors, the physical units involved, ana conversion

factors) required to make adequate decisions regarding protective

acticqs for the general public.

The interviewees failed to recognize the difference between the

delegation of responsibilities and the delegation of work. In

addition, they were indecisive about priorities pertaining to their

duties and responsibilities.

Two senior control room operators failed to recognize the requirement

that parishes needed to be contacted within 15 minutes of a general

emergency declaration.

During the second phase of the inspection on DecenAr 20-23, 1987, a team,

consisting of two regional inspectors and a contractor, designed a plant

specific walkthrough to test the ability of control room senior operators

to detect and classify accident conditions, to notify offsite authorities,

and to formulate protective action recommendations. The NRC inspectors

preceded each walkthrough with a series of questions to test the

licensee's understanding of basic emergency response concepts. These

questions were similar to those used during the first inspection period

(December 7-10, 1987). The NRC team interviewed and held walkthroughs

with four different operating shifts consisting of Shift Supervitor,

Control Operations Foreman, Communicator, and Shift Control Room Clerk.

Each walkthrough lasted approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The main objective of

these walkthrcughs was to verify that personnel in actual operating shifts

were capable of adequately implementing their emergency plan.

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The. following findings resulted from the interviews and walkthroughs:

All teams interviewed were able to detect emergency conditions and

initiate implementation of accident mitigation activities in

accordance with procedures.

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All shifts were able to properly classify emergency conditions in a

timely manner.

All teams were able to notify offsite authorities promptly.

All teams formulated protective action recomme,1dations effectively.

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All teams demonstrated the ability to perform dose assessment

calculations with computer or manual methods. ,

However, the following weaknesses were identified during the walkthroughs:

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Two of the four teams interviewed did not know ranges and/or units

for accident monitoring instruments.  !

Two of the four teams were unable to relate radiological impact of an

accident promptly to the public for Site Area and General Emergency

classifications.

One of the four teams was unable to relate drywell/ containment

monitor dose rates to fission product activity releases.

Guidelines for evacuation of the control room under adverse

radiolo0ical habitability conditions were nonexistent or unknown to

teams. One team replied they would leave _the control room if

500 mR/hr were detected in the general area.

One of the four teams erroneously concluded that "scenario 28" (in

block 7 of notification form) would communicate to offsite

authorities plant status and accident conditions and causes.

Procedure EIP-2-006, "Notifications," is devoid of instructions for

filling out the forms - Attachment 1.

Administrative Procedure EIP-P-007, "Protective Action Guidelines,"

was difficult to read, partic;1arly data relating to

Evacuation /Shelterin" Sections.

One of the four teams incorrectly prescribed wrong section

(180 degrees opposite) for evacuation / sheltering.

One of the four teams incorrectly transcribed protective action

recommendations to the notification form.

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One of the four Shift Supervisors did not understand his nondelegable-

responsibilities and seemed reluctant-to delegate certain. tasks;to.

the communicator or C0F, thus delaying: notifications.

One o'f the four teams was unfamiliar-with'the Nomogram backup method

to perform dose calculations.

Procedure EIP-2-006, "Notifications," does not include guidance

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concerning the use of scenario numbers in the notification esssage. '

Several persons experienced difficulty in reading the ta' ales of

' Procedure EIP-2-007, "Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines,"

due to poor copy legibility.

-The above weaknesses constitute a violation (458/8730-01),

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5. Exit Interview

'he NRC inspector met with the NRC resident inspectors and licensee

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representatives identified in paragraph 1 on Decemter 10 and 23, 1987, and

summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in'this -j

report.

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