ML20149D345

Notice of Violation from Insp on 871207-10 & 20-23.Violation Noted:Procedures & Emergency Training Deemed Ineffective Due to Listed Weaknesses Being Exhibited During Training Class Sessions

ML20149D345
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	02/04/1988
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149D284	List: ML20149D281 ML20149D345 ML20149D394
References
50-458-87-30, NUDOCS 8802090464
Download: ML20149D345 (3)

Text

. __

APPENDIX A NOTICE OF' VIOLATION Gulf States Utilities Docketi 50-458 River Bend Station Operating License: HPF-47 During an NRC. inspection conducted on December 7-10 and 20-23, 1987, a violation of-NRC rcquirements was identified. .The violation involved inadequate training of personnel assigned to the emergency response organization. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987), the violation is listed below:

Inadequate Training of Personnel 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that a licensee shall maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47 and the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) requires that. radiological emergency response training be provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

Section 13.3.7.1.1.2 of the River 8end Station (RBS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), "Specialized Training," requires that shift supervisors and other senior reactor operators receive specialized training ir. the use and meaning of emergency action levels and evaluation of plant safety degradation with offsite potential. In addition, the RBS FSAR states that these members of the staff will receive training in plant safety system analysis, offsite dose projection based upon effluent release and ambient meteorology, and protective action guides.

Contrary to the above, certain procedures and emergency training were determined to be ineffective, in that during training class sessions and interviews performed during the period December 7-10, 1987, three teams, each consisting of Shift Supervisor and Control Operations Foreman, ,

exhibited the following weaknesses: {

All teams were unable to classify accurately and efficiently an accident scenario which resulted in a general emergency condition.

Interviewees did not demonstrate knowledge of technical information (e.g., range of containment radiation and main stack effluent monitors, the physical units involved, and conversion factors) required to make adequate decisions regarding protective actions for the general public.

• Interviewees failed to recognize the difference between what was meant by delegation of responsibilities and delegation of work. In addition, they were indecisive about priorities pertaining to their duties and responsibilities.

l 6802090464 000204 DR ADOCK0500gG

~ - . ,

2:

Two senior control room operators failed to recognize the offsite; agencies that needed to be contacted within 15 minutes of a general emergency declaration.

Further, the NRC inspector attended three requalification training sessions given to shift supervisors and. control operations foremen and determined that such training was not commensurate with the scope and. depth of ,

training' required-by persons who would be responsible for direction and coordination of emergency response during accidents.

In addition,-during the second phase of the inspection in December 20-23,

~

1987, a team of HRC inspectors interviewed a team from each of four- ,

operating shifts. Each team consisted of a Shift Supervisor, Control Operations Foreman (C0F), Communicator, and Shift Control Room Clerk. The interview consisted of a series of' questions and a formal walkthrough. The following weaknesses were identified during the interviews:

Two of the four teams interviewed did not know ranges and units of several accident monitoring instruments.

1 Two of the four teams were unable to relate radiological impact of j accident promptly to the public for Site. Area and General Emergency classifications. .

i Guidelines for evacuation of the control room under adverse radiological habitability conditions were nonexistent or unknown to 1 teams. One team replied they would leave the control room if general radiation levels of 500 mR/hr were detected. l One of the four teams was unable to relate expected drywell and l

containment monitor dose rates to fission product activity due to fuel damage.

One of the four teams erroneously concluded that certain codes (e.g., i "scenario 28" in block 7 of notification form) would communicate to 1 offsite authorities plant status and accident conditions-and causes.

One of the four teams incorrectly prescribed the wrong geographical sectors for implementation of protective actiont.

One of the four teams incorrectly transcribed protective action recommendations to the notification message form.

One of the four Shift Supervisors did not understand his nondelegable responsibilities and seemed reluctant to delegate certain tasks to the Communicator or C0F. As a consequence notifications were delayed.

One of the four teams was not able to perform dose calculations promptly using the nomogram method used when the computer was out of order.

l 3 ,

l Procedure EIP-2-006,."Notifications," does not include guidance l concerning the use of scenario numbers in the notification message. l Several persons experienced difficulty in reading the tables of Procedure EIP-2-007, "Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines,"-

due to poor copy legibility.

This is a Severity Level IV violation. (Supplement VII.D)

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Gulf States Utilities is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to this Office'within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice. This reply, should ,

include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation if_ admitted, I (2) the corrective steps that have been taken'and the results achieved, (3) the l corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, i consideration will be given to extending the response time.

1 Dated at Arlington, Texas, l this 4th day of February 1988.

i l

1 l

f 1

l 1

l i

i 1

- . .,