|
---|
Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217L0421999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-20 on 990815-0925 & Notice of Violation.Two Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20217N2111999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 on 990913-17 & 1004-08.No Violations Noted.Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Effective,Utilized Systems Approach to Training & Showed Continued Improvements Over Previous Insp Findings ML20217L0101999-10-18018 October 1999 Provides Update of Waterford 3 Effort for Review of Ufsar. Info Listed Includes Background Mgt Expectations,Review Status & Results,Clarifications Re Review & Conclusions ML20217L0141999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Update to NRC Staff Re Circumstances & Plans for Submitting Certification Rept on Waterford 3 Plant Specific Simulator ML20217G7051999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Comments on Four of NRC RO Examination Questions for Exam Administered During Week of 991004 05000382/LER-1999-014, Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20217D5151999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Application for Renewal of SRO License for C Fugate License SOP-43039-3,IAW 10CFR55.57.Without Encls ML20217C6251999-10-0505 October 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Util Ltr & Encl Exercise Scenario Package for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Based on Review,Nrc Determined That Exercise Appropriate to Meet Objectives ML20212J6921999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-18 on 990830-0902.One Noncited Violation Identified Re Failure to Follow Procedural Instructions to Ensure That Members on Fire Brigade Shift Were Qualified ML20216G2441999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-19 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted 05000382/LER-1999-013, Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form IR 05000382/19993011999-09-21021 September 1999 Informs That NRC License Exam Previously Associated with NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-301 Will Be Incorporated Into NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 ML20212D8761999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of Waterford 3.During Assessment Period,Number of Personnel Errors Occurred,Which Demonstrated Lack of Attention to Detail by Plant Personnel.Historical Listing of Issues,Encl ML20212C2471999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Five Final Applications for RO Licenses for G Esquival,Jm Hearn,Md Lawson,Re Simpson & PI Wood.Written Exam & Operating Test to Be Administered,Is Requested. Encls Withheld ML20212C2391999-09-16016 September 1999 Requests Cancellation of SRO Licenses for Bn Coble,License SOP-43835,due to Job Assignment Location & CA Rodgers, License SOP-43537-1,due to Resignation from Company, Effective 990901 ML20212C5881999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-15 on 990719-23 with Continuing in Ofc Insp Until 0819.No Violations Noted ML20211Q4421999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-07 on 990601-11.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211M8391999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 25 to EP-001-020,rev 24 to EP-001-030,rev 25 to EP-001-040,rev 30 to EP-002-100,rev 22 to EP-001-010,rev 27 to EP-002-010,rev 26 to EP-002-102 & Rev 16 to EP-002-190.Listed Proprietary Revs to Epips,Encl ML20211L3681999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Five Preliminary Applications for Reactor Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed,Iaw 10CFR55.31.Encls Withheld ML20211K9741999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-16 on 990704-0814.Two Severity Level IV Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 05000382/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211M3641999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Written Examination,Operating Tests & Supporting Ref Matl Identified in Attachment 2 of ES-210,in Response to NRC .Encl Withheld ML20211G5751999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards RAI Re IPEEE Submittal.Please Provide RAI within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr,Per Util Response to GL 88-20,suppl 4 ML20211E3281999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Period of 990101-0630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Ltr Does Not Contain Commitments 05000382/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately 05000382/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211F5421999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Proposed marked-up TS Page Xviii, Index Administrative Controls, Correcting Page Number Re TS Change Request NPF-38-220.Editorial Changes for TS Change NPF-38-221 Discussed ML20211F3561999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards CTS Pages & TS Proposed marked-up Pages for Insertion Into TS Change Request NPF-38-207 Re Efas, Originally Submitted on 980702.Original NSHC Determination Continues to Be Applicable ML20211F4611999-08-24024 August 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Ltr & Encl Objectives for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet Emergency Plan Requirements ML20211G1731999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That Info Submitted in ,B&W Rept 51-1234900-00,will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20210T9791999-08-18018 August 1999 Discusses Which Responded to Reconsideration of Violation Denial (EA 98-022) Enforcement Action Detailed in .Concludes That Violation Occurred as Stated ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210S0561999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for NRC Fys 2000 & 2001 for Waterford 3 ML20210Q6161999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Corrected Copy of Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.Original Rept,Submitted with ,Contained Typos ML20217F2661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Copy of 1999 Waterford 3 Biennial Exercise Package to Be Performed Using Waterford 3 CR Simulator ML20210R9231999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-10 on 990719-23.Violations Noted.Nrc Has Determined That One Severity Level IV Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 05000382/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20210H4291999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Rai,Associated with TS Change Request NPF-38-208,proposing to Replace Ref to Supplement 1 with Ref to Supplement 2 of Calculative Methods for CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model, in ACs Section of TSs ML20210F9451999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Version of Rev 29 to EPIP EP-002-100, Technical Support Ctr Activation,Operation & Deactivation. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210D3171999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Proposal for Final Resolution of Reracking Spent Fuel Pool at Plant,Per License Amend 144,issued by NRC in .No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr 05000382/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached ML20210D8701999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requests for Relief ISI-018 Through ISI-020 for Entergy Operations,Inc,Unit 3 ML20210B1521999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-13 on 990523-0703.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20209G9771999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Objectives & Guidelines for Waterford 3 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991013.List of Objectives cross-referenced Where Applicable to Relevant Sections of NUREG-0654 IR 05000382/19990081999-07-12012 July 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 Issued on 990503 ML20209E5231999-07-0909 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL-92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes Staff Efforts Re TAC MA0583 ML20209D4051999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages to Replace Attachment C,Entirely in Original TS Change Request NPF-38-207,per 990519 Discussion with C Patel of Nrc.Changes to Action 20 Delete Word Requirement & Revise Word Modes to Mode 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217L0101999-10-18018 October 1999 Provides Update of Waterford 3 Effort for Review of Ufsar. Info Listed Includes Background Mgt Expectations,Review Status & Results,Clarifications Re Review & Conclusions ML20217L0141999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Update to NRC Staff Re Circumstances & Plans for Submitting Certification Rept on Waterford 3 Plant Specific Simulator ML20217G7051999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Comments on Four of NRC RO Examination Questions for Exam Administered During Week of 991004 05000382/LER-1999-014, Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20217D5151999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Application for Renewal of SRO License for C Fugate License SOP-43039-3,IAW 10CFR55.57.Without Encls 05000382/LER-1999-013, Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20212C2391999-09-16016 September 1999 Requests Cancellation of SRO Licenses for Bn Coble,License SOP-43835,due to Job Assignment Location & CA Rodgers, License SOP-43537-1,due to Resignation from Company, Effective 990901 ML20212C2471999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Five Final Applications for RO Licenses for G Esquival,Jm Hearn,Md Lawson,Re Simpson & PI Wood.Written Exam & Operating Test to Be Administered,Is Requested. Encls Withheld ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211M8391999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 25 to EP-001-020,rev 24 to EP-001-030,rev 25 to EP-001-040,rev 30 to EP-002-100,rev 22 to EP-001-010,rev 27 to EP-002-010,rev 26 to EP-002-102 & Rev 16 to EP-002-190.Listed Proprietary Revs to Epips,Encl ML20211L3681999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Five Preliminary Applications for Reactor Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed,Iaw 10CFR55.31.Encls Withheld 05000382/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211M3641999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Written Examination,Operating Tests & Supporting Ref Matl Identified in Attachment 2 of ES-210,in Response to NRC .Encl Withheld ML20211E3281999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Period of 990101-0630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Ltr Does Not Contain Commitments 05000382/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form 05000382/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately ML20211F3561999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards CTS Pages & TS Proposed marked-up Pages for Insertion Into TS Change Request NPF-38-207 Re Efas, Originally Submitted on 980702.Original NSHC Determination Continues to Be Applicable ML20211F5421999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Proposed marked-up TS Page Xviii, Index Administrative Controls, Correcting Page Number Re TS Change Request NPF-38-220.Editorial Changes for TS Change NPF-38-221 Discussed ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20210Q6161999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Corrected Copy of Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.Original Rept,Submitted with ,Contained Typos ML20210S0561999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for NRC Fys 2000 & 2001 for Waterford 3 ML20217F2661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Copy of 1999 Waterford 3 Biennial Exercise Package to Be Performed Using Waterford 3 CR Simulator 05000382/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20210H4291999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Rai,Associated with TS Change Request NPF-38-208,proposing to Replace Ref to Supplement 1 with Ref to Supplement 2 of Calculative Methods for CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model, in ACs Section of TSs ML20210F9451999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Version of Rev 29 to EPIP EP-002-100, Technical Support Ctr Activation,Operation & Deactivation. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210D3171999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Proposal for Final Resolution of Reracking Spent Fuel Pool at Plant,Per License Amend 144,issued by NRC in .No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr 05000382/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached ML20209G9771999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Objectives & Guidelines for Waterford 3 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991013.List of Objectives cross-referenced Where Applicable to Relevant Sections of NUREG-0654 ML20209D4051999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages to Replace Attachment C,Entirely in Original TS Change Request NPF-38-207,per 990519 Discussion with C Patel of Nrc.Changes to Action 20 Delete Word Requirement & Revise Word Modes to Mode ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl 05000382/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,providing Details of Discovery of Untested Electrical Contacts in safety-related Logic Circuits1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,providing Details of Discovery of Untested Electrical Contacts in safety-related Logic Circuits ML20196G5731999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Operator Licensing Exam Outlines Associated with Exam Scheduled for Wk of 991004.Exam Development Is Being Performed in Accordance with NUREG-1021,Rev 8 ML20212J4121999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Reconsideration of EA 98-022. Details Provided on Actions Util Has Taken or Plans to Take to Address NRC Concerns with Ability to Demonstrate Adequate Flow Availability to Meet Design Requirements ML20196E9371999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Revs Made to EP Training Procedures.Procedures NTC-217 & NTC-217 Have Been Deleted.Procedure NTP-203 Was Revised to Combine Requirement Previously Included in Procedures NRC-216 & NTC-217 ML20196A1021999-06-17017 June 1999 Provides Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Per 990513 Request of NRC Project Manager ML20195F3671999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to EP-001-010, Unusual Event. Rev Reviewed in Accordance with 10CFR50.54(q) Requirements & Determined Not to Decrease Effectiveness of Emergency Plan ML20195C7801999-06-0303 June 1999 Submits Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-08.Corrective Actions:All Licensee Access Authorization Personnel Were Retrained Prior to Completion of Insp ML20195C2951999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Annual Evaluation of Changes & Errors Identified in Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models Used for LOCA Analyses.Results of Annual Evaluation for CY98 Detailed in Attached Rept,Based Upon Suppl 10 to Abb CE Rept ML20195C0241999-05-28028 May 1999 Notifies NRC of Operator Medical Condition for Waterford 3 Opertaor Sp Wolfe,License SOP-43723.Attached NRC Form & Memo Contain Info Concerning Condition.Without Encls ML20196L3281999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Entergy Is Withdrawing TS Change Request NPF-38-205 Re TS 3.3.3.7.1, Chlorine Detection Sys & TS 3.3.3.7.3, Broad Range Gas Detection Submitted on 980629 ML20206S4691999-05-17017 May 1999 Requests Waiver of Exam for SRO Licenses for an Vest & Hj Lewis,Iaw 10CFR55.47.Both Individuals Have Held Licenses at Plant within Past Two Year Period,But Licenses Expired Upon Leaving Util Employment.Encl Withheld 05000382/LER-1999-004, Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery That Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed for ESFAS Containment Cooling Function,As Required by TS SR 4.3.2.31999-05-14014 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery That Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed for ESFAS Containment Cooling Function,As Required by TS SR 4.3.2.3 ML20206N1921999-05-10010 May 1999 Provides Revised Attachment 2 for Alternative Request IWE-02,originally Submitted 990429 Re Bolt Torque or Tension Testing of Class Mc pressure-retaining Bolting as Specified in Item 8.20 of Article IWE-2500,Table IWE-2500-1 ML20206J1471999-05-0606 May 1999 Requests That Implementation Date for TS Change Request NPF-38-211 Be within 90 Days of Approval to Allow for Installation of New Monitoring Sys for Broad Range Gas Detection Sys ML20206J1721999-05-0606 May 1999 Notifies That Proposed Schedule for Plant 1999 Annual Exercise Is Wk of 991013.Exercise Objective Meeting Scheduled for 990513 at St John Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Ctr ML20206G8021999-05-0404 May 1999 Provides Revised Response to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-01.Licensee Denies Violation as Stated.Change Made Is Denoted by Rev Bar & Does Not Materially Impact Original Ltr ML20206E7811999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposes Alternatives to Requirements of ASME B&PV Code Section XI,1992 Edition,1992 Addenda,As Listed.Approval of Alternative Request on or Before 990915,requested ML20205T2531999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-S02-00,describing Occurrence of Contract Employee Inappropriately Being Granted Unescorted Access to Plant Protected Area ML20205R2611999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to Physical Security Plan,Submitted in Accordance with 10CFR50.54(p).Plan Rev Was Approved & Implemented on 990407.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20205Q3241999-04-16016 April 1999 Submits Addl Info Re TS Change Request NPF-38-215 for Administrative Controls TS Changes.Appropriate Pages from New Entergy Common QA Program Manual Provided as Attachment to Ltr 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
\
g Ent rgy
- ~ -
ggymmu=. i.x.
Operations - u me Td 504-739 6650 l
l W3F1-97-0017 4 A4.05 l PR l
I January 28,1997 ;
1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 I License No. NPF-38 l NRC Generic Letter 96-06 Assurance Of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions l 1
Gentlemen: l Pursuant to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, addressees were notified of safety significant issues that could affect containment integrity and equipment operability during certain accident conditions. The generic letter requested the following actions with respect to referenced scenarios:
(1) Determine if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either waterhammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions; (2) Determine if piping systems that penetrate the containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of fluid so that overpressurization of piping could occur.
This response provides a written summary indicating actions taken relative to the generic letter along with, in Attachment A, conclusions reached regarding the susceptibility of Waterford 3's containment fan cooler cooling water system to waterhammer and two-phase flow. This evaluation concludes that the waterhammer and two-phase flow scenarios described in the generic letter are not a concern at Waterford 3. The provisions of the Waterford 3 design ensure single-phase flow to the unit containment fan coolers prior to operation in a design basis event and hence meeting associated heat removal assumptions.
i 9701310030 970128 PCR ADOCK 05000382 P PDR
j '
i NRC Generic Letter 96-06 Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis
- Accident Conditions
- W3F1-97-0017 j Page 2 I j January 28,1997 !
I l l
\
! In Attachment B, determinations pertaining to containment penetration piping j susceptibility to overpressurization are provided. Also, incorporated within the j summary, is the basis for continued operation of affected systems and components, I
- as applicable, and corrective actions, as appropriate, which will be completed by Refuel Outage 9, currently scheduled for the Fall of 1998.
4 There were 12 penetrations reviewed for effects caused by pressure locking or thermal binding in accordance with GL 95-07. None of the valves required to open post accident are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding.
Waterford 3 has concluded that none of a questioned population of 12 containment penetrations exceed burst pressure. The piping may yield and deform, but the piping will not fail. Since the safety function of the penetrations is not compromised, l a basis for operability in accordance with GL 91-18 is established. The associated i nonconforming condition is documented in the Waterford 3 corrective action program. Because all the affected containment penetrations retain their ability to perform their safety function and thus ma!ntain containment integrity, this nonconforming condition is not considered reportable under the 10CFR50.72/50.73 criteria.
Please contact me at (504) 739-6666 or Phillip R. Snowden (504) 739-6348 should any questions arise.
Very truly yours, yA W T.J. Gaudet Acting Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs TJG/ PRS /ssf Attachment cc: E.W. Merschoff (NRC Region IV), C.P. Patel (NRC-NRR),
R.B. McGehee, N.S. Reynolds, NRC Resident inspectors Office
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -
! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
In the matter of )
5 )
- Entergy Operations, Incorporated ) Docket No. 50-382 j Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station )
l l AFFIDAVIT l
! Timothy Joseph Gaudet, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Manager, Licensing - Waterford 3 of Entergy Operations, Incorporated; that he is duly l authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached
- Response to NRC Generic Letter 96-06; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, l
- information and belief.
1 l l
[ A--itp ban AM j Timothy Jose $ DIaudet' j Manager, Licensing - Waterford 3 4
t i
- STATE OF LOUISIANA )
) ss PARISH OF ST. CHARLES )
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the Parish and State above named this 28" day of _ d Aw<vt T .1997.
~
bc >IL Ic.
Notary Public My Commission expires W 'm 'i re
! . Attachm::nt to W3F1-97-0017 Page 1 of 6 ATTACHMENT A Containment Fan Cooler Cooling Water System Susceptibility to Waterhammer and Two-Phase Flow Generic Letter 96-06 describes circumstances wherein, Containment fan coolers ;
may be subject to failure during a LOCA with concurrent loss of offsite power, due to boiling of the component cooling water (CCW)in the fan coolers. The CCW may boil because heat is transferred from the containment atmosphere while CCW flow is stagnant, until the CCW pumps are loaded onto the Emergency Diesel Generator j (EDG). When the CCW pump is restarted, the steam voids would collapse possibly j resulting in waterhammer loads.
Waterford 3 has evalusted these concerns and has concluded that they are not applicable to Waterford 3 for the following reasons:
- 1. The CCW pumps and containment fan coolers are simultaneously loaded on the EDG in the 7 second load block. Thus, following a LOCA with concurrent loss of offsite power, stagnant conditions would on;y exist for a maximum of 17 seconds (10 seconds for the EDG to start and begin loading plus 7 seconds for the sequencer to load the pumps and fans). j This relatively short period of time limits the amount of heat that is i transferred to the stagnant CCW in the fan coolers.
l
- 2. The Waterford 3 design incorporates a CCW surge tank located on the I roof of the Reactor Auxillary Building (RAB). This configuration provides increased pressure above atmospheric pressure. Due to this elevation ,
head, the saturation temperature of the water in the fan coolers increases. l The elevation head of 62 feet (between the bottom of the surge tank and the top of the fan cooler coils) creates an additive pressure of 26.7 psi, which increases the saturation temperature to 269'F. Since the maximum temperature calculated for a LOCA is 269'F, it is very unlikely that CCW in the fan coolers will boil within 17 seconds after a LOCA starts.
- 3. The worst case containment temperature excursion at Waterford 3 occurs during a steam line break event. During this ennt, the cooling coil tubes will have a water film on the outside (containment side) due to condensation. The temperature of this condensate film will be at the saturation temperature of the partial pressure of steam in containment.
The CCW water inside the tube will remain at a temperature lower than this temperature as long as the condensate film is on the tube. FSAR l analyses for a steam line break show that the containment temperature '
and pressure at 17 seconds after the break is about 375'F and 44 psia.
l l
3
]. .
. Attachment to W3F1-97-0017 Pags 2 of 6 However, the partial pressure of the steam at 17 seconds is less than 23 7 psia. Saturation temperature at this partial pressure, and thus, the temperature of the condensate film on the outside of the cooling coil, is i 235'F. Thus, the CCW temperature will remain be!ow saturation.
a Conclusion i
- This evaluation concludes that the waterhammer and two-phase flow scenarios j described in the generic letter are not a concern at Waterford 3. The provisions of J the Waterford 3 design ensure single-phase flow to the unit containment fan coolers prior to operation in a design basis event and hence meeting associated heat 4 removal assumptions.
J i-
. . Attachm::nt to VV3F1-97-0017 Pago 3 of 6 ATTACHMENT B !
1
, Evaluation for Susceptibility of Containment Penetration l Piping Overpressurization Due to Thermal Expansion of Fluid 4
1 An evaluation was performed of the Waterford 3 containment mechanical '
penetrations utilizing the following criteria developed for all Entergy sites:
Enterav Generic Letter 96-06 Penetration Evaluation Criteria l
- 1) Scope: All containment (Pressurized Water Fteactor (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)) and drywell f,WR penetrations.
- 2) A penetration piping system, including any connected heat exchangers, will be considered to be Potentially Susceptible if it meets aji of the following four criteria:
A.) The penetration must be full of liquid at the time of the accident. Pipes containing air, gas or steam will be excluded.
B.) The liquid contained in the penetration piping must be at a lower I temperature than the surrounding environment during operational or I accident situations. Piping that contains water at or near Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) or Steam Gerarator (SG) temperatures, such !
as feedwater, letdown, blowdown or Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), I wou!d actually have initial fluid temperatures higher than those !
expected during an accident.
1 C.) The penetration must be isolated during an event, i.e. plant heatup or l accident, that could cause a significant heat transfer to the fluid beiween the isolation valves. The valve arrangement used for penetration isolation must restrict flow out both directions. If the inboard isolation valve is a check valve or certain type and orientation of solenoid valve, (with a mechanism of pressure relief in the connecting piping) the penetration may possibly be excluded. This exclusion would also include piping open to the suppression pool, SG, RPV, or containment air space.
.. _ 7
. . . Attechment to W3F1-97-0017 Pago 4 of 6 l- In order to be excluded, the extended piping system available I l for fluid expansion inside containment must not constitute a i j closed system, so that the fluid volume can expand and prevent j damage to the containment isolation portion of the piping j penetration. I i
l Additionally, another closed valve further down the line inside l containment must not prevent expansion of the fluid volume in j the penetration, thereby isolating a penetration with an expected l available leak path i.e. check valve.
D.) The potentially susceptible penetration will not have any pressure relief !
valves (with sufficient capacity and setpoint) or other method of overpressure protection (such as a check valve in parallel with the main inboard valve) between the isolation valves.
A penetration will additionally be considered potentially susceptible if it meets any one of the following two criteria:
The penetration will be considered potentially susceptible if a single-failure coupled with an accident would cause isolation, heatup and ,
overpressurization, of a normally open, low temperature, fluid filled I penetration.
A penetration will be considered potentially susceptible if trapped pressure can prevent safety-related isolation valves from opening when required to mitigate an accident, i.e. pressure locking. Ref.:
Generic Letter 95-07. ;
A Potentially Susceptible penetration may be eliminated from concern if l qualified calculations or analyses demonstrate that the penetration piping 1 system, which includes the valves, remains within its Design Basis.
Penetrations that do not meet their Design Basis requirements shall be considered Susceptible, and have a basis for operability established in accordance with Generic Letter 91-18 guidance.
1
. . , Attachment to VV3F1-97-0017 Pago 5 of 6 At Waterford 3, seventy-four (74) containment penetrations were evaluated per the
, preceding criteria. Of these 74 containment penetrations, the following 12 were considered potentially susceptible:
Penetration # System Fluid Dwg 7 Primary Makeup Water G-161 Sh 2 24 CCW Retum From RCP's Water G-160 3h 4 28 RCS Sampling Water G-162 Sh 2 29 PZR Surge Line Sampling Water G-162 Sh 2
, 3^ _
PZR Steam Space Sampling Water G-162 Sh 2 4e Containment Sump Pump Discharge Water G-173 Sh 3 43 Reactor Drain Tank Outlet Water G-171 Sh 1 44 RCP Controlled Bleedoff Water G-168 Sh 2 )
51 Refueling Water Supply to Refueling Cavity Water G-163
- 59 SIT Fill / Drain From RWSP Water G-167 Sh 4 62 Refueling Cavity Drain Pump to RWSP Water G-163 l 71 Demineralized Water Water G-161 Sh 2 l Initial analysis determined that all 12 potentially susceptible penetrations exceeded their normal code allowables and would require a basis for operability established in accordance with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 91-18. In accordance with GL 91-18, a penetration is considered operable if analysis demonstrates that ;
the penetration piping system mairitains its ability to perform the safety function it l was designed to perform.
l A calculational analysis of the 12 containment penetrations has been prepared. This calculation determines the maximum internal pipe pressure due to thermal expansion of the water, and considers the expansion of piping due to pressure from the encased water and the increase in pipe temperature. The change in pipe volume will result from the elastic and plastic deformation of the pipe due mostly to the internal pressure, and partly due to the temperature rise. No consideration was given for leakage past the isolation valve seats. This assumption is conservative and results in an internal pipe pressure greater than actual values.
The resulting internal pipe pressure was then comparcd to the burst pressure of the pipe. The calculation concludes that none of the 12 penetrations exceed burst pressure.
.j._..__._.___..._-._.__._____._...___.-______._
..- . . Attachment to
{ .
W3F1-97-0017 j- Pago 6 of 6 i
j Conclusion i None of the 12 penetrations exceed burst pressure. The piping will yield and deform j to relieve the pressure, but the piping will not fail. Since the safety function of the penetrations is not compromised, a basis for operability in accordance with GL 91-18 is established. This conclusion is further supported by available Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) leakage data; valve leakage would decrease the internal pressure j and provide additional margin for operability.
i-
! These 12 penetrations were reviewed for effects caused by pressure locking or j thermal binding in accordance with GL 95-07. None of the valves required to open
- post accident are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding.
l Reportability Determination l
i j in performing the review requested by Generic Letter 96-06, Waterford 3 noted i several containment penetrations that were potentially susceptible to i overpressurization. While detailed engineering evaluations demonstrated that the
' postulated overpressurization of these penetrations would not jeopardize the ability l of the penetrations to perform their safety functions (i.e., containment isolation); it i was determined that in some instances that ASME Ill Class 2 code limits could be i exceeded. Waterford 3 considers this to be a nonconforming condition as described
) in Generic Letter 91-18 and thus addressed the issue accordingly.
I l
! In accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, the noncenforming condition was
{ documented within the corrective action program and a prompt determination of
- i. operability determined and documented for each affected penetration. Following assurance that containment integrity would be maintained (i.e., no safety concern exists), the nonconforming condition was evaluated for potential reportability requirements. In this instance the reportability determination was contingent on the interpretation of the phrase "outside the design basis". Waterford 3 believes guidance provided for making this interpretation directs one to focus on preservation j of defense in-depth particularly as it relates to protection of fission barriers. !
In this case since all affected containment penetrations retain their ability to perform their safety function and thus containment integrity is maintained, this nonconforming condition is not considered reportable under the criteria of 10CFR 50.72/50.73. As with other nonconforming conditions, appropriate corrective action to restore the condition to within the required quality requirements will be taken in accordance with the safety significance of the issue.
J
, - -, - . , . - - + . -.- -- -