ML20138R124

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Spds.Requested Info Includes Parameter Selection & Scope of SPDS

ML20138R124
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/31/1985
From:	Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8511180451
Download: ML20138R124 (5)

Text

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o October 31, 1985 4 ,

1  !

I Docket No. 50-414 DI TION I

Ecket File

NRC PDR I PRC System  !

Mr. H. 8. Tucker, Vice President NSIC  !

Nuclear Production Department LB #4 r/f  !

Duke Power Company MDuncan j i 422 South Church Street KJabbour >

j. Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 OELD, Attorney I ACRS (16) EJordan

Dear Mr. Tucker:

i JPartlow WRegan BGrimes Glapinsky i

Subject:

Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 - Request for Additional Information  !

Concerning the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) j;  !

j On May 14 and 15, 1985, the NRC staff and its consultants conducted an audit

of the Catawba Unit 2 SPDS. By letter dated September 10, 1985, we transmitted i;

to you the report containing the SPDS audit results, and informed you that our review is continuing in the areas of Procedures and Systems Review and the Instrumentation and Control Systems. Presently, we have completed our review ft of those areas, and find that additional information, as identified in the enclosure, is requested by the staff to complete its review.  ;

1 Please provide the additional information requested in the enclosure as soon as  !

j possible. Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the [

Project Manager, Kahtan Jabbour, at 301-492-9789.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under l

P.L.96-511.

t

Sincerely, ).

a f(ElinorcvG. Adensam, I & Chief Mc lQ {

I I greensing Branch No. 4 l  ; Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated I cc: See next page  ;

8511180451 851031

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Mr. H. B. Tucker Duke Power Company Catawba Nuclear Station CC*

William L. Porter, Esq. North Carolina Electric Membership Duke Power Company Corp.

P.O. Box 33189 3333 North Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 P.O. Box 27306 Raleigh, Ncrth Carolina 27611 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Bishop Liberman, Cook, Purcell Saluda River Electric Cooperative, and Reynolds Inc.

1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. P.O. Box 929 Washington, D. C. 20036 Laurens, South Carolina 29360 North Carolina MPA-1 Senior Resident Inspector Suite 600 Route 2, Box 179N 3100 Smoketree Ct. York, South Carolina 29745 P.O. Box 29513 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0513 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission, Mr. C. D. Markham 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Power Systems Division Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Westinghouse Electric Corp.

P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Robert Guild, Esq.

P.O. Box 12097 NUS Corporation Charleston, South Carolina 29412 2536 Countryside Boulevard Clearwater, Florida 33515 Palmetto Alliance 2135 i Devine Street Mr. Jesse L. Riley, President Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Karen E. Long Charlotte, North Carolina 28208 Assistant Attorney General N.C. Department of Justice Richard P. Wilson, Esq. P.O. Box 629 .

Assistant Attorney General Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 S.C. Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 11549 Spence Perry, Esquire Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency Piedmont Municipal Power Agency Room 840 100 Memorial Drive 500 C Street Greer, South Carolina 29651 Washington, D. C. 20472 Mark S. Calvert, Esq. Mr. Michael Hirsch Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Federal Emergency Management Agency Purcell & Reynolds Office of the General Counsel 1200 17th Street, N.W. Room 840 Washington, D. C. 20036 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D. C. 20472 Brian P. Cassidy, Regional Ccunsel Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I J. W. McCormach POCH Boston, Massachusetts 02109

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CATAWBA UNIT 2 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) s PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS REVIEW BRANCH Parameter Selection As a result of its review, the staff noted that the following variables are not proposed for the Catawba SPDS

1. Hot Leg Temperature

2. RHR Flow Rate

3. Stack Monitor

4. Steam Generator (cr steamline) Radiation

5. Containment Isolation Hot leg temperature is a key indicator used in the ERGS (Revision 1, "ES-0.1. Attachment A," " Generic Instrumentation," page 3) to determine the viability of natural circulation as a mode of heat removal.

Reference 1 indicates "NC System temperature" as a proposed variabl'e ,

but does not specify hot leg temperature.

During RHR and ECCS modes of cooling when steam generators are not available, RHR flow is a key indicator to monitor the viability of the heat removal system. Steamline (or steam generator) radiation, in conjunction with containment radiation and reactor stack radiation, gives a rapid assessment of radiation status for the most likely radioactive release paths to accomplish the " Radioactivity Control" safety function. For a rapid assessment of Radioactivity control, the applicant has not demonstrated how radiation in the secondary system (steam generators and steamlines) is monitored by SPDS when the steam generators and/or their steamlines are isolated. The analysis should be expanded to include this discussion.

Containment isolation is an important parameter for use in making a j rapid assessment of " Containment Conditions." In particular, a detennination that known process pathways through containment have been secured provides significant additional assurance of containment integrity.

The above variables do, for given scenarios, provide unique inputs to the determinations of status for their respective CSFs, which have not been discussed by the applicant as being satisfied by other variables in the proposed Catawba SPDS list. The applicant should address these variables and their functions by: (1) adding the variables to the Catawba SPDS, (2) providing alternate added variables along with justifications that these alternates accomplish the same safety functions for all scenarios, or (3) providing justification that variables currently on the Catawba SPDS do in fact accomplish the same safety functions for all scenarios.

-2 1

Parameter Validation

! In References 1-3, the, applicant. discusses i,ts progran for validation of r the Catawba SPDS variables. In that discussion the applicant references validation programs for the Westinghouse Owners Group ERGS and Duke Power's Emergency Procedure Guidelines for Catawba. Also referenced is the task analysis performed by Duke Power's Control Room Design Review Team. Included is a description of a " control board mockup" walk-through of a scenario developed using plant emergency procedures and the Westinghouse ERGS. A detailed description of the event scenario was not provided. However, a more detailed presentation of Verification and Validation (V&V) program plans was As noted in the audit report (Reference 4) presented at an audit

, the V&V program review.

is not complete, but will be completed after the Catawba simulator is installed in 1988.

Although this program may provide a proper framework for validation of the SPDS variable set, the staff recomends that future validation exercises (particularly those using the simulator) include a spectrum of events which would challenge both the near-tenn and long-term scenario monitoring capabilities of the SPDS. Such a spectrum of events might include: Large LOCA, Loss of Main Feedwater, Core Power Excursion, Steam Generator Tube Rupture with Loss of Offsite Power, Large Steamline Break, and one or more Severe Accident cases.

The applicant should respond to the staff's recomendation by providing a list of the transients / scenarios that will be used to validate the Catawba SPDS variable set.

HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING BRANCH Scope of SPDS In its SPDS safety analysis, the applicant defines the Cataba SPDS as the six Critical Safety Function (CSF) color blocks that are driven by logic that is based on Westinghouse Owners' Group decision trees which are part of the symptom-oriented emergency procedures.

I The staff finds this position unacceptable on the basis that the six CSF color blocks alone do not give sufficient information to accurately determine plant safety status. The staff requires that the actual value of each of the SPDS parameters be readily available to the operator.

It appears that this information may already be available on the Operator Aid Computer, of which SPDS is a part.

The applicant should clarify / redefine its position regarding the scope of the SPDS.

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REFERENCE

1. Letter from H.B. Tucker (DPC) to E. Adensam (NRC) dated March 28, 1984, forwarding Revision 4 to response to supplement I to NUREG-0737.

. 2. Letter from H.B. Tucker (DPC) to H. Denton (NRC) dated October 18, 1984

3. Letter from H.B. Tucker (DPC) to H. Denton (NRC) dated January 23, 1985

4. Letter from E. Adensan (HRC) to !!. B. Tucker (urc) cateo septemoer iv,19eo

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