IR 05000483/1985023

Safety Insp Rept 50-483/85-23 on 851022-1216.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Surveillance of Operational Safety Maint Cold Weather Preparations & Security Info Meeting W/Local Officials

ML20137L053
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	01/17/1986
From:	Hehl C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137L037	List: IR 05000483/1985023 ML20137L032
References
50-483-85-23, NUDOCS 8601240340
Download: ML20137L053 (9)

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r U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/85023(ORP)

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, M0 63166 facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 l

Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, M0 Inspection Conducted: October 22 through December 16, 1985 j Inspectors: B. H. Little Brown 4L>

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4 Approved by: C. W. Hehl,' Chief /-/ /- 5 0 Reactor Projects Section 2A Date Inspection Sumary Inspection on October 22 through December 16, 1985 (Report No. 50-483/8 M2?(LPP))

Areas Inspected:_ Routine unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of 1fcensee event reports, surveillance operational safety maintenance cold weather preparations, radiological emergency drill, security information meeting with local officials and a site visit. The inspection involved a total of 269 inspecto hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 57 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results

No violations, deviations or safety concerns were identified in the areas reviewe .

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DETAILS 1 Persons Contacted

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• S. E. Miltenberger, Manager, Callaway Plant D. F. Schnell, Vice President, Nuclear

• D. C. Poole, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager - Quality Assurance M. E. Taylor, Operations Superintendent

• J. E. Davis, Compliance Superintendent J. C. Gearhart, Supervisory Engineer, QA 1 *P. T. Appleby, Assistant Manager, Support Services J. T. Patterson, Assistant Superintendent, Operations

• C. D. Naslund, Superintendent, Instrumentation and Control

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J. V. Laux, Supervisor, QA W. A. horton, Engineer, QA A. P. Neuhalfen, Assistant Manager, Administrative W. P. Robinson, Compliance Supervisor D. E. Heinlein, Assistant Superintendent, Operations K. R. Evans, Instrument and Control Supervisor

• H. Sheppard, Superintendent Outage

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• Denotes those present at one or more exit interview In addition, a number of equipment operators, Reactor Operators, Senior Reactor Operators, and other members of the Quality Control (QC),

Operations and Maintenance staffs were contacte . Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and the review of records, the following LERs were reviewed to determine that the events were documented and evaluated, reportability requirements were fulfilled and appropriate corrective measures had been implemente (Closed) LER 85-013-00: Technical Specification Violation. On February 26, 1985, the licensee performed a mini-purge (containment purge valve open)

during the time the containment atmosphere monitors GT-RE-31 and GT-RE-32 were in bypass. Technical Specification 3/4.3.3 Table 3.3-6, Action 26 permits continued operation with the above monitors in bypass provided the containment purge valves are maintained closed. The purging operation continued for approximately three hours and was terminated when a reactor operator noticed the monitors were in bypass and closed the purge valve The inspector determined that, once identified by the licensee, action was promptly taken to correct the condition and report the violatio The licensee evaluation of this event attributed the cause to an

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4 inadequate procedure. OTN-GT-00001 (Containment Purge System Normal Operation Procedure) has been revised to provide instructions to ensure l the atmosphere monitors are not in bypass prior to operating the mini i

purge dampers. The inspector determined that the event was of lesser

, severity as both primary monitors GT-RE-22 and GT-RE-33 were operable and designed to initiate a containment purge isolation prior to exceeding i radiation level limit , No citation was issued since under the Enforcement Policy this was i considered a Technical Specification violation of lesser severity which

'j was identified and satisfactorily corrected by the licensee, and no

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further violations of a similar nature have occurred. This item is

considered closed.

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(0 pen) LER 85-017-00: Overcurrent Protection of Containment Penetrations.

, On March 22, 1985, Bechtel Power Corporation notified the licensee of

discrepancies in plant design regarding backup overcurrent protection of i containment penetrations. The corrective actions included installing i appropriate fuses in 120 volt circuits and developing design changes to j match wire size to the overcurrent protection rating on the motor operator

circuits. The design changes are to be performed during the Cycle 1 l outag ,

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, (Closed) LER 85-022-00: Manual Reactor Trip. On April 10, 1985, the

, plant was in Mode 3 with the shutdown rod bank withdrawn and rod drive l power being supplied by motor generator (MG) set #2. The design capacity of these MG sets is sufficient so that rod drive system could be operated

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on one MG set if required. The MG set output breaker tripped letting the 4 rods drop. The reactor operator manually tripped the reactor which also isolated the main feedwater, i

l The licensee's investigation indicated that tN n ?rcurrent setpoint (not Technical Specification controlled) was set 19 .ose to the operating

! current for the MG exciter when a single MG s u is used to supply power to

! the rod drive system. The MG set exciter overcurrent setpoints were j increased approximately 10% to limit recurrence.

! (Closed) LER 85-024-00: Inadvertent Engineered Safety Features Actuation.

1 On May 6, 1985, the "B" main feedwater pump tripped due to a failure of a

{ component in the control circuitry. This resulted in a reactor trip / turbine

trip because of a 10-10 level in one steam generator. This resulted'in i the actuation of the engineered safety features. The failure was considered ;

j to be random and the card was replaced.

i (Closed) LER 85-027-01: Technical Specification Violation. On May 30, 1985, while the licensee was preparing to perform surveillance procedure

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OSP-EJ-P001A (Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A Operability Test), a NRC inspector determined that the valve line up, as specified in the procedure,

closed the cross-tie valves which isolate two of the four reactor coolant j system (RCS) cold leg injection pathways. RHR system operability assumes i that each RHR train be capable of injecting in four RCS cold legs. The '

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d above operability test is routinely performed every three months. The closing of the cross-tie valves during the performance of the test (closed for a period of less than one hour) rendered both RHR trains inoperable and resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3. This matter is documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-483/85014(0RS)

which includes the Notice of Violation for this event, licensee corrective action, and NRC closecut of this ite The licensee has revised surveillance procedures OSP-EJ-P001A and B which eliminated closing of the cross-tie valves and specifies testing using the RHR mini-flow line. The

licensee has taken appropriate corrective action to prevent recurrenc The inspector has no further questions in this matte (Closed) LER 85-030-00

Technical Specification Violation. At 1300 CDT on July 17, 1985, while in Mode 1 at 100% power, the licensee discovered that the Pressurizer Vapor Sample Outer Containment Isolation Valve

! SJ-HV-0013 had not been tested within the allowable time interval j specified in Technical Specification 4.0.2. The licensee performed the

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required surveillance procedure and found the valve to be operable. This isolation valve had been de-energized to maintain isolation per Technical Specification 3.6.3 Action Statement while maintenance was being performed

, on its companion isolation valve SJ-HV-001 The surveillance was not performed on SJ-HV-0013 when SJ-HV-0012 was I returned to service as it had not been specified in the tracking

! documentation due to personnel error. The licensee's corrective action

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included notifying the operations personnel that individual components

, declared inoperable are to be entered and tracked separately in the 1 Equipment-Out of-Service Log.

1 No citation was issued since under the Enforcement Policy this was

considered a Technical Specification violation of lesser severity which j and no was identified further and violations of satisfactorily a similar nature corrected by the licensee, have occurre This item is

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considered closed.

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(Closed)LER 85-040-00: Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirements. On September 10, 1985, at a) proximately 0930 CDT an hourly firewatch patrol was initiated covering tie North and South Cable Penetration Areas in i the Containment Building. The firewatch patrol was established per TechnicalSpecification(T/S)3.7.10.2.bduetomaintenancebeing performed on a fire protection loop containment isolation valve. T/S 3.7.10.2.b, Action a. specifies that hourly firewatch patrols be

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established when the fire protection loop is inoperable. The required-firewatch patrol for the period 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight on September 10, i 1985 1985., was not commenced until approximately 12:15 a.m. on September

)i time intervals is a violation of T/S 3.7.10. l The licensee's evaluation determined that a contributing factor to this i incident was the fact that back-to-back firewatch patrols were being 4 )atrol by going performed into the area (i.e.,forethehourandcomingoutafterthelour).

be Duecovering to the two hou inoperability of the Personnel Access Hatch, back-to-back firewatch patrols l

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had been initiated to limit the use of the Personnel Access Hatc Firewatch personnel were arriving at HP Access later than normal because of the back-to-back firewatches. Another contributing factor was the lack of priority placed on getting the firewatch personnel into containment ahead of other personne The shift Supervisor, upon notification of the late firewatch patrol, immediately initiated separate hourly firewatch patrols. To prevent recurrence of this situation, the firewatch patrol post instructions have been revised to emphasize the importance of starting the hourly firewatch patrols at the beginning of the hour such that sufficient time is available for completion. The revision also prohibits back-to-back firewatch patrol No citation was issued since under the Enforcement Policy this was considered a Technical Specification violation of lesser severity which was identified and satisfactorily corrected by the licensee, and no further violations of a similar nature have occurred. This item is considered close (Closed) LER 85-046-00: Missed Technical Specifications Surveillanc On October 10, 1985, during a licensee monthly review / update of the manual surveillance tracking log, the licensee determined that the Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) surveillances on containment " personnel" and " emergency" access air locks had not been completed within the specified time interval of the Technical Specification (T/S) Surveillance 4.6.1.3. Surveillance due dates were September 28 and October 5, 1985 respectivel The licensee declared the air locks inoperable and performed the specified surveillance Both air locks were tested, found satisfactory, and returned to operable status on October 11, 198 The event was the result of the licensee's scheduling of these surveillances which incorrectly applied a 25% allowable extension of the "due date" as provided in T/S 4.0.2. However, T/S 4.6.1.3 specifically excludes the

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extension provision of T/S 4.0.2 and the licensee's failure to perform the air lock surveillances on or before the due date was a violation of T/S 4.6. NRC inspection in this matter determined that the above violation was promptly identified, corrected, and reported by the licensee. The licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence included a 100% review of all Surveillance Task Sheets (no other deficiencies were identified).

No citation was issued since under the Enforcement Policy this was considered a Technical Specification violation of lesser severity which was identified and satisfactorily corrected by the licensee, and no further violations of a similar nature have occurred. This item is considered close This paragraph identified violations for which citations were not issue No other violations or deviations were identifie ,

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. Surveillance The inspector reviewed / observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing:

Surveillance Procedure Test Surveillance Task #0009636 Nuclear Instrument ISL-SE-00N36 Intermediate Range N-36 Surveillance Task #0009139 Incore-Excore Calibration ESP-ZZ-00006 Engineering Surveillance Procedure ISL-SE-0N44B I&C Loop Calibration PRN44 Axial Flux Difference Items which were considered during the inspection included: that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and, that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected safety-related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine building were conducted. During these tours, observations were made relative to plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological controls and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance, containment integrity, and availability of safety-related equipmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications,

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Number Activity WR 52844 Rework Fire Dampers GKD 0281, CMP 85-0282 WPA 85-3592 Component Cooling Water Pump "B" Biennial Preventive Maintenance, PM 28029 I

and PM 28029 WR 52389 Replace Conduit and Pull New Cable (GKRE-41 Radiation Monitor)

WR 55103 Temporary Modification T.M. 85E062 (Automatic Control Rod Syst a-Limit Rod Speed to 48 Steps Per Minute)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Cold Weather Preparations The licensee's preparations for cold weather were reviewed. The procedures for systems that are susceptible to freezing were reviewed and found to have sections and checklists for preparations necessary for operations during cold weather. The fire protection systems were spot checked and revealed that preparations for cold weather had been implemented. Selected thermostats, heat-tracing and space heaters were noted to be functiona The upcoming outage scheduled to commence in March has been factored into the necessary cold weather protectio No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Emergency Plan Drill On November 15, 1985, the licensee held an unannounced emergency dril The drill was initiated from the control room ar.d involved the onsite crew and licensee's emergency response team members. Off site agencies were natified of the drill but did not participate in i The resident inspectors observed licensee performance from the conirst room and the technical st port cente _

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The drill was well planned and coordinated. Personnel involved were responsive and business-like during the performance of the drill. The inspectors noted only minor communication problems and there was an initial delay by team members in the technical support center to obtain and post plant status. These deficiencies were noted by the licensee's

" controllers" and discussed at the drill critiqu No violations or deviations were identifie . Security Penetrations On December 4,1985, NRC Region III (DRSS) advised the resident office of the existence of unsecured protected area penetrations at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Plant and requested that the Calloway site be checked for similar deficiencies. The NRC inspector, accompanied by licensee security personnel, performed a partial protected area walk down. The penetrations inspected were found to be barriered in accordance with design. The licensee initiated an engineering evaluation of all penetrations. This evaluation identified three penetrations (one-unprotected to protected areas; two protected to vital areas which had not been adequately designed to

, prevent personnel access. The licensee took prompt compensatory measure This matter remains unresolved pending evaluation by NRC Region III (DRSS).

Unresolved Item No. 483/85023-01(DRSS).

One unresolved item, no violations and no deviations were identifie . Information Meeting With Local Officials

, On December 4, 1985, C. W. Hehl and J. F. Suermann (both from Region III)

and the resident inspectors met with local public officials in Fulton,

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Missouri. The meeting was held to introduce local officials to regional and resident staff and to discuss NRC functions and matters relating to the Callaway Nuclear Plant. The public officials were provided NRC organization charts and NRC contacts and phone numbers for sources of additional informatio The inspectors met with the following official Mr. C. Ausfahl Presiding Judge Mr. P. Willett County Judge - Western District Mr. R. Wright County Judge - Eastern District

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Mr. H. Lee Sheriff, Callaway County Those attending the meeting expressed a general interest in the plant activities and specific interest in the Radiological Emergency Response

Exercises (RERE). Also expressed was the desire for a more effective utilization of off site agencies during REREs. This matter was

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subsequently discussed with the licensee. The licensee plans'to provide better utilization of off site agencies in future REREs.

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10. Site Visit On December 4, 1985, a site visit and plant tour was performed by Messr C. W. Hehl and J. F. Suermann from NRC Region III. The meeting with the licensee staff was introductory in nature. The licensee provided organizational information and discussed programs and planned activitie The Manager, Callaway Plant, accompanied the NRC Region III personnel and resident inspectors during the plant tou Informal interviews were held with various plant and on-shift personnel. Those interviewed were knowledgeable of plant systems and status and expressed a positive attitude with regard to operations at the Callaway Plant. Overall material conditions within the plant were good. Several deficiencies were observed in the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump room. These included valve locking wires which had been removed and not properly disposed of, a missing blank flange and a steam leak. The licensee promptly corrected the first item The steam leak had been tagged for repair during the next extended outag No violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar