IR 05000483/1985014
| ML20209E973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1985 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Wohld P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209E948 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-85-14, NUDOCS 8507120365 | |
| Download: ML20209E973 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-483/85014(DRS)
Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: The Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 St. Louis, M0 63166 Facility Name: Callaway, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Callaway County, M0 Inspection Conducted: May 28-31 and June 14, 1985 Inspectors:
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Date Approved By:
Guide 7-/-#f
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Operational Programs Section Date Inspection Sunrt.ary Inspection on May 28-31 and June 14, 1985 (Report No. 50-483/85014(DRS))
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of licensee action on previously identified inspection findings; pump and valve inservice test program implementation; and residual heat removal pump testing. The inspection involved a total of 20 inspector-hours onsite (including 2 inspector-hours onsite during off-chifts) and 12 inspector-hours offsite.
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'Results:
In the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
. identified in two areas; one violation was identified in the remaining area (failure to meet Technical Specification 3.5.2 for ECCS systems -
Paragraph 4).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. C. Poole, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- G. L. Randolph, Assistant Manager, Technical Services
- R. D. Affolter, Supervisor, Engineering
- K. R. Bryant, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
- W. R. Campbell, Superintendent, Engineering J. M. Gloe, Mechanical Engineer
- P. W. Godt, QA Engineer
- D. E. Heinlein, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- G. A. Hughes, Supervising Engineer
- K. Mayo, Licensing Engineer
- W. A. Norton, QA Engineer
- J. R. Veatch, Supervising Engineer
- R. C. Wink, Compliance Engineer
- W. A. Witt, Assistant Engineer
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on May 31, 1985.
- Denotes those participating in a telephone conference on June 14, 1985.
Additional plant technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspector during the course of the inspection.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(483/84034-04(DRS)): Vibration point locations. The licensee has implemented a program to monitor both horizontal and vertical bearing vibrations to the extent practical.
The Section XI vibration criteria will be applied to the vibration direction having the highest baseline vibration measurement. This is in compliance with the Code; hence, the inspector considers this item closed.
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(0 pen) Open Item (483/85007-02(DRS))h Refueling cavity water seals. Parts a. and b. of this item remain open pending completion of activities ~ indicated below; parts c. through h. are considered closed based on licensee evaluations, plant procedure changes, and commitments made. Each item is discussed further as follows:
Parts a. and b.
These items remain open pending completion of (1) a Bechtel evaluation of the adequacy of the inflatable seals, and (2)
field confirmation of the horizontal dimension and side to side vertical offset of the seal gaps. Field confirmation is to assure that dimensions assumed in the evaluation of seal adequacy envelope actual conditions. This is to be completed prior to the first refueling outage, i
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Part c.
Calculations were done by the licensee which indicate that the probability of a fuel assembly being dropped and impinging on either of the two reactor cavity seals would be about four in one hundred thousand refuelings.
In addition to the low probability, seal failure is not expected to result from an impingement.
Also, refueling cavity and spent fuel pit geometry are such that a water drain down.to the vessel flange level by any means could only expose one fuel assembly to an air environment in each area. Each of these would be in the raised position by a fuel handling crane and could be readily lowered to a safe position within minutes. Because of the remote possibility of occurrence and limited consequences, the inspector has no further questions on this item.
Part d.
This item is closed based on the licensee's commitment to limit seal bladder pressure by installing a safety valve in the air or nitrogen line to the seal bladder (with a setpoint of approximately 35 psig).
Part e.
This item is closed based on the licensee's commitment to replace the Presray seals after use in two refuelings. The seals to be used in the first refueling have not been used before. They arrived on site February 21, 1984, and should be well within the manufacturer recommended five year shelf life when used.
Parts f., g. and h.
The licensee's staff indicated that other existing reactor cavity drain paths have been evaluated end are under adequate administrative controls to prevent a loss of cavity level. New potential paths that may occur, such as during steam generator maintenance, will be evaluated by the licensee for the need to restrict fuel movements when such activitics are planned.
Both normal and off-normal operating procedures (OTG-ZZ-C0007, R2,
" Refueling Preparation, Performance, and Recovery", and 0TO-KE-00001, R0, "Fucl Handling Accident") were reviewed for loss of water level concerns. The cff-normal procedure appeared adequate in that it addressed essential actions including closure of the fuel transfer tube isolation valve on loss of pool level, area evacuation, and isolation of the containment and fuel buildings. A statement was added to the normal procedure, OTG-ZZ-0007, R2, stating, "During suspension of fuel handling operations, all irradiated fuel assemblies shall be either in the reactor core or in the spent fuel pool." This will prevent exposing fuel during a small leak when fuel handling personnel are not readily available.
Based on the above and discussions with the licensee in the area of administrative and procedural controls, parts f., g. and h. are considered closed, (Closed) Open Item (483/85007-03(DRS)): Questions on the inservice c.
test program implementing procedure. Revision 4 to EDP-ZZ-01001,
"Section XI Pump and Valve Program," was issued on May 28, 1985, which satisfactorily addressed all questions raised by the inspector.
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The licensee also agreed to add a cross reference between valve test requirements and implementing procedure numbers for administrative control purposes. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed)UnresolvedItem(483/85007-04(DRS)): Pump vibration data collection. Since this item was opened the licensee has marked the pumps to identify correct data collection points and has initiated-training to assure the proper use of the vibration test equipment.
Residual heat removal pump testing observed by the inspector indicates that the licensee's corrective action has been effective;
-hence, this item is considered closed.
e.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(483/85007-05(DRS)): Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) protection.-Thelicenseehasaddedsurveillanceprocedure steps to help identify unacceptable flow conditions that result in pump damage. The time delay in making the flow determination after pump start, however, is long enough that pump damage may still occur.
The inspector noted that at least one other licensee has added flow detection for immediate determination of satisfactory pump miniflow conditions. This was done after three pump damaging incidents occurred due to inadequate pump flow protection.
Because the licensee has initiated measures to identify inadequate flow conditions during testing, degraded conditions will be identified and corrected prior to continued operation; hence, the inspector considers this item closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Pump and Valve Inservice Test Implementution This inspection completed the inspect *on of pump and valve inservice test program implementation, the first part of which was reported in Paragraph 4 of Inspecticn Report 50-483/85007(DRS). The three items opened in that paragraph are all closed in Paragraph 2 of this report. The initial positive impressions stated in the previous report remained cachanged during completion of the inspection.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Audits in the inservice test program area.
The inspector stated to the licensee that the quality and depth of the audits were comendable and contributed to quality evident in the test program.
It was also noted, however, that field testing was not available to be observed during the audits. This, in the inspector's opinion, is an area which needs attention based on testing observations made during the inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Testing The inspector reviewed Operations Surveillance Procedure, OSP-EJ-P001A,
'Section XI RHR Train A Operability", and observed field testing according to the procedure. After reviewing the procedure, the inspector
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questioned the acceptability of. isolating the residual heat removal crossover line valve EJ-HV-8716B for test purposes. Closing this valve would allow the pump that is not in a test configuration to feed only two cold leg injection lines instead of the four available if the valve was left open. As the proper piping system lineup requirements are not clearly identified in either in the FSAR or Technical Specifications, the licensee requested Westinghouse technical assistance. Westinghouse indicated to Union Electric that the minimum ECCS analyses assume a four cold leg injection line lineup; hence, isolation of the crossover line and putting the Train "A" pump in a test configuration unacceptably degrades the RHR system for minimum ECCS requirements. This procedural inadequacy is contrary to 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion V and is considered to be a violation (483/85014-01(DRS)). The licensee's staff understands the problem and had already corrected the RHR pump test procedures prior to running the test. A review of past test histories by the licensee indicated that the abnonnal lineup never existed for more than an hour while running the test. Consequently, the operability requirements of Technical Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.0.3 were not exceeded.
Actual testing of the pump was technically adequate but appeared poorly administered in terms of getting the proper equipment set up and accomplishing the activity in a timely manner. This is a potential concern under ALARA requirements and was discussed with the staff.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on May 31, 1985, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector wiui respect to items discussed in the report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
The inspector also discussed the item identified in Paragraph 2.b. via telecon on June 14, 1985.
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