ML20132D646

Forwards Matl Re Alleged Violations of Nrc,Asme & ANSI Code Procedures Concerning Welds,Mismatches of Round Pipe, Grinding Down of Pipes,Failure to Check Nozzles in Steam Generators & Concrete Lining Cracks

ML20132D646
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/24/1984
From:	Day D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Asselstine J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20132D624	List: ML20132D621 ML20132D630 ML20132D641 ML20132D646 ML20132D667 ML20132D676 ML20132D688
References
FOIA-85-560 NUDOCS 8509300248
Download: ML20132D646 (7)

Text

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July .4,1984 F.r-. Jazer Asselstin) V,$.NRC Chairman Nuclear Begulatory Commission Bh AE 33 AN I' 38 1717 E Street, N.W. .

Washington, D.C. 20555 U,Iy,y[thgrI Dear Kr. Asselstine I a= sending you this material at the sugghstion of Ross Gelbspan of the Boston Globe, to whom I first brought it.

While identity I am satremely concerned about protecting my I would be willing to speak on the telpphone to your or your investigators, should you decide to act on this material.

Sincerely, David Day (Not my real name)

Og9302OG50906 GROSSBE05-560 PDR Exhibit 1

~_ -

Mr. James Asseletine t Chairman

- Nuclear ReFulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

As a result of my working on the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station I ob;erved a number of violations of NBC, ASME and ANSI code procedures which I would like to bring to your attention.

- Faulty welds and mismatches of round pipe with out-of

-round pipe in the auxiliary reactor coolins system.

In addition to the potential for a loss-of-coolant accident such mismatches could -- if the emergency cooling system was activated -- create turbulence in the water which could lead to the formation of air pockets.

- The grinding down of pipes to thicknesses significantly

- below those mandated by NRC codes. Bombardment from radioactiven particles could cause the overly-thin pipe sections to become brittle before engineering projections would anticipate their embrittlement. Such grinding down of pipes to rake them fit ~

properly was one thing everyone at the plant knew we were doing.

It was as illegal as hell, but everyone did it. See, for '

example, line E2936-283 CBS-1211 -- the Containcent Building Spray line from the main steam feed which runs through the Pump Auxiliary Building through the Radioe.ctive tunnel through the Equipment Vault.

I worked on the CBS system connecting the main steam feed pipes to valve set into the contrete containment hull.

Throughout the plant, welding crews frequently found that the pipes didn't match in size or shape the valve or pump they feed. The company appeared to be using cheaper pipe as roney got tighter at the plant. Often the piple wouldbe significantly out-of-round. We would have a 1/4" concentrie in a large spipe. Under codes of both the NRC and American Societ.v of Mechanical Engineers, only 1/16th" concentric (or 1/32nd" eccentric) is permitted. When a concentric mismatch greater than 1/16th" was found, a welder was sent squirming (sometimes, myself) indide the pipe to grind out the inside base metal diameter. That would, however, reduce the thickness of the pipe from 1/2" to 1/4" con-centrically. I am concerned this could affect the metal's ability to withstand radiation. The error is not detectable by X-rays. I understand that ultrasonic tests cuct be conducted to determine pipe thickness. I know of no ultrasonic tests I

done on this specific line, except for one weld repair at a different location.

Exhibit 1

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. On the Ret .cr Ccolant Line, it tas <-so o normal prooties to grini down Czoossivo riscotch, center line

. shrinkage, suck back and taconsured ring. Look ot the f BC line from the main steam feed.

- The failure to check neeribs on three of the plant's four steam generators. In one case, workers found a seperation of cladding -- that is, the stainless steel nozzle kept separ-sting from the carbon steel ofthe steam generator. After such grinding and rowelding, it was discovered that the nozzle was contaminated by 1erge amounts of slag. Representa~tives of General Electrio, which manufactured the nozzles, apparently repaired that particular nozzle. But to my knowledge, none of the other nozzles. on the plant's other three Atent generators were checked for similar problems.

WorkinE in thepipe tunnel I saw frequent instances of lack of proper documentation of faulty welds in pipes. F.any welds were perforced with the use of 2 Diametrics (automatic welding) machines. ( Af ter six writz Diacetrics welds were time cut out and discovered to suffer from lack of fusion and

" suck back", the company (Pullman HigCins) quality assurance inspector was oniered not to inspect other welds performed with the nachine. I The Diametrica machine was used to weld beveled pipe ends'with a consumable ring. But the ring, which is about 1/16th" thick and the same diameter as the pipes, would shrink by as much as 1/8th". As a result , the inner circle of the ring would shear off or " fingernail."

The crew was ordered to out out shs 6 such welds. All were  ;

found to have up to 75 percent of their root below accepted standard s. All these welds resulted in e cessive suck back and lack of fusion, center line shrinkage and unconsumed ring.

G fter the 6 welds were cut out and repaired, the cocpany  :

ordered the quality assurance inspector to stop e mmining other Diametries welds. The supervisor said, "hy God,  !

we've got over 100 suspect welds." To my knowledge, they l were never checked or repaired 3 ear the end of the job, l the company switched to e diff6ent type of consurnable welding ring which seemed to perform properly. (See notes below)

- In the Waste Processing Building, skura cracks have appeared in the two-foot . thick concrete walls because of impro=

per concrete pouring. In one instance, a 30-foot-long crack was chiseled out and filled with ordinary grouting material to a depth of two inches and a width of sim inches.

The Ferini Corp. apparently circumvented standards applying to concrete pours. Those standards litit each pour to a depth of 10 feet liquid. At the plant, they rede 30-foot pours. This was done with the use of a v3 brator which

! causes the crushed rock in the concrete te settle to the botton. I believe this is why cracks and groundunter lecks have developed (see p)otocraphs).

- Concrete linings of several sections of ferrScement pipe which brings service water into the plant have cracked. f Exhibit 1 '

. _ - __ _ _- -_- - - -_-.- =

I When the pipes fa cd to cest roperly, o 1, ton Pertopower Rydrcu11e Jack tas maca to ooo o spri g

' the pipe -- that I.

1s to try to bend the Pipe. to make it Tit. When the pipes were sold sprung, E could hear conerate oracking some distance behind the joint in the pipe slot. I as afraid some worker sould get hurt if he loose,ns the phlanges.

In F.ay,1983, the company issued a memo forbidding any more " cold springing

• of pipes and indicating that anyone found, to be engaging in the practice would be disciplined and perhaps terzinated. However, following the memo, at least one area supervisor instructed workers to "oold spring" a pi)e from the Tank Fars near the Pump Au:siliary Building to a valve. -

- While working in Turbine Building No.1, the crew received many prefabricated sections of welded pipe made by Dravo. Many times the joints did not meet ASKE codes.

On May 11, 1982, I was assistig another welder on line E X -4125-01-REV/1, field weld no.108, & 10" weld outlet (WOL) off a 24" carbon steel line, when I noticed a Dravo shop weld defect. I informed the Quality Assurance inspector about a one-inch root pass.

lack of fusion zone on the interior of the However I was told, "A Dravo shop weld is not our concern." This was the accepted philosophy about all fabricated pipe on the job, no. matter how severe the defect.

I was told on several occasions by supervisors and foremen not to worry because "it's not our problem."

Two days later I was assigned to work on line No.

4417-01-R/1 F0101, NCE no. 2166 to grind and remove block (

weld stainless metal from weld area. This field weld had i sugar deposits (o*1dation caused by atmospheric contkrination '

when welding stainless steel) from 10:00 to 2:00 on the interior of the root pass. I pointed this out the welding foreman, but the field weld was completed regardless of this defect. I believe it involved the diesel generator.

- In the Waste Processing Building. I observed several instances of improperly welded pipes to valves. Because the valves are made with teflon seating material, a manufacturer's tag warns never to hbst them beyond 250 degrees. A photo of one such valve shows discoloration and rust, an apparent j

result of ezposures far in eAcess of 250. The welding was spparently so hot it baked the chrocium out of the alloy. The j

j valves have been installed but, to my knowledge, they have

' never been checked for dataEe to the seating. A company inspector wrote up NOBS on this and several hundred other joints. But the cocpany decided to " Accept As Is" the work in quertion.

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Exhibit 1

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- In January,1982, near th2 Waste Process Builliinc, I observed electronically activated valves stored in the rain and showing s1 Ens of rust. Such equipment, ith its e aposed wiring, is covered by Class B cleanliness requirements.

'Desipite their condition, the NBC site inspector apparently overlooked the violation and the ytymrava galves were installed.

No one ever took them apart and looked at them to be sure they weren't da=ased. I know because I helped install them.

These valves are located in the main steam feed zone and are connected to pipes emerging from the containment.

- I also observed a number of inproper welds on Dravo-made pipe with eW essive mismatches in the-Radioactive Tunnel --

up to 1/2" concentric.

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Exhibit 1

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' Photo 1: l f Wosto Processing Building Elevation: -25 0 DescriptionL South efterior wall, with crack extending approfimately 30 feet. Ground water is evidently percolating through. Crack was superfleially repaired by removing concrete the lenEth of .;

the defect to an approtimate depth of one to two inches and I a width of 6 inches, and replacing it with mortar.

Photo 2:

WPB

Description:

South emierior wall, with crack extending approyitately 4 feet. Evidence of ground water percolating through.

Photos 3&4:

WPB

Description:

Kest Exterior wall, with crack eptendin6 along embed plate. Evidence of grounda water and mineral d eposita percolating through.

Photo 5:

Weste Processing Building Elevation: 0.0 Descrpition: 3-inch Teflon valve welded to 3-inch stainless steel nipple. Valve and nipple were obviously overheated. .

An NCH on this joint and several hundred others as written up by a Pullman H1Egins inspector, but the dispositions from i the company came back " Accept as Is."

Photos.1 & 7 Area: Main Steam Feed, Penetrations Elevation: -20. O Description; Contain=ent Vessel for 16" stainless steel Motorized Gate Valve, on Containment Building Spray (CBS) l Line. Also pipe fabrication by Dravo, which estended from the vslve through the Radioactive Tunnel and connecting to the.

Equipment Vault. Upon an attempted " fit-up" of the valve l described above, an e:cessive " mismatch" exacted between it and the Containment Penetration Connection. Eith Quality w' i Assurance acquiescep eM Jw_ag ness of a ,1f4"._ mismatch Q ;$

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Tlie__Jcint was _ welded out as is. As W accepted practice by Production Kanagement N 11ty assurance and NDT, I was told by my area supervisor and foreman to grind down the mistatch so that the joint would pass K-ray criterien, thus diminishing the wall thkekness by a minimum of 1/4 inch.$

"'f' Due to the out-of-ronniness of all of the Ra Dravo fabricated pipe, from the opposite side of the valve to the Equipment l Vault tie in, the practice of grinding the root inside diameter l was necessary for it to pass NDT tests because of mismatch 4 and e zHsive suck back.-

1 l

Exhibit 1 N

Photo N3. 8

Areas Main Stcas Food Penetrations

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. Elevotions -20.0

Description:

4-inch motorized gate valve as. This valve -

and many others were left out in the open, e: posed to the ele:ents durinc the winter months of 1981, through February 1982. Note the water drops on the coiled ire in the foreground, attesting to the open roof conditions these ASEE Class III Section 1 valves were e aposed to. The NBC did cite these valves with obvious storage violations.

However, LWAs were issued, the valves installad and accepted as is. (

Photo No. 9 Area: Emin Stegm Feed , Penetrations:

Elevation: -20.0 .

Description:

Pabricated Dravo pipe used in the assembly of ASEE lines off the penetrations. Obviously they are e : posed I to the elements. Note the ice in the center of the photograph.

Phot'o No. 10:

l Area: Kain Steam Peed Penetrations :

1 Elevation: -20.0

Description:

ASME and ANSI pipes and valves being stored in conditions which are flagrant dode violations.

Photo No. 11 Area: WPB (Pipe Tunnel)

Elevation: -4.0

~

l

Description:

Shown is one of the tuo Diametrics Automatic Welding machines used in the pipe tunnel. .

Exhibit 1 l

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