ML20246H469

Forwards Testimony Demonstrating That Plant Built Using Conterfeit,Defective Components & Enumerating Other Safety Violations.W/Certificate of Svc.Served on 890510

ML20246H469
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/08/1989
From:	Comley S WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (WE THE PEOPLE
To:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
CON-#289-8587 OL-1, NUDOCS 8905160105
Download: ML20246H469 (11)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:IS#7 We The People TlE!"$fohp of the United States,Inc. Stop ChernobylHere w. .,

                                                                                                                             ,,g ,j
                                                                                                              '89 W 10 P3 y May 8, 1989                             ~

t Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 White Flint North 16th Floor gggEE04g Jgj 0 g 1155 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

Dear Mr. Chilk,

Enclosed is testimony for inclusion in the records of the licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant in New Hampshire (docket #50-443/444). The enclosed (NRC) documents, demonstrates that Seabrook Station has been built using counterfeit defective components. The NRC has not required Seabrook Station's owners to find and replace the counterfeit components; instead the agency has lowered the engineering safety standards. The enclosed report also enumerates other safety violations in the plants construction which in combination with the defective materials will create a serious danger to public health and safety if Seabrook Station is allowed to operate. We The People opposes HRC decision #89-7 as of May 3, 1989, to grant Seabrook Station an operating license. Such a decision compromises public safety, violating the FRC Congressional mandate to protect the public. Furthermore, confidence inathe decision agency to itself. allow operation undermines public Licensing Seabrook Station is thepart. most recent incident of ill-advised decisions on the

  'h meo NRC's For example, last January the agency allowed the 88"-          Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in Plymouth, Massachusetts, to restart, g@            despite extreme opposition by the public and by the state.

mo Pilgrim has not yet been able to reach full power. In fact, og it has had to shut down seven times since January due to one emergency or another.

   ,8                                                    Some of the accidents in the last six om           months have also resulted in worker contamination.

I M The NRC's reputation now may be damaged beyond repair in the

  $a-          Public's eyes.

A majority now agree with Massachusetts-

  &ck          Attorney General Shannon's opinion that "the NRC should change its name to the Nuclear Advocacy Conunission."

Box 277 Rowley, MA 01969,(508)948-7959 A non pront, tax exempt orpnasuon 50 Court St., Plymouth, M A 02361, (508) 746 9300 f' National Press Bldg., Suite 994,14 & F. Sts.. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20045. (202) 628-661I Omces 5 & 6,3 Pleasant St., Concord. NH 03301, (603) 228-9484 (((M

4 1 The agency is trampling the rights of the American people and in the process is cracking the democratic foundation on which the United States is built. The enclosed information proves that Seabrook Station will endanger the public if the NRC insists on allowing it to operate. If you ignore this information and persist in licensing the pl ant, you will prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the NRC is a disgrace to this country. Sincerely, 1 s_ ,, s. [ . s, u .- i, .- 3

                                                                                                                                                                  . n .f -

Stephen B. Cauley l Executive Director ' J

      - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - _ . _ - - - - - . - - - - . . .                                                                              l

. We The Pespie of the United States,Inc. - - Stop Chernobyl Here A catastrophic nuclear power plant accident in the U.S., worse than Three Mile Island or even Chernobyl, is imminent. Such an accident will most likely be caused by mechanical failure due to the tens of thousands of substandard parts and materials, falsely certified as safe, recently discovered to be installed in a majority of U.S. nuclear plants (1). Materials have been counterfeited in two ways cheap imports were falsely marked or certified to say they were made in the U.S. and meet required safety standards, and used parts were refurbished to appear new then falsely labelled and certified as having passed safety tests. These substandard materials currently fall into three broad categories: piping materials, fasteners, and electrical components. However, the possibility that other categories of materials are involved cannot be dismissed. The counterfeit parts frequently do not meet the standards engineers require to ensure nuclear plant safety. Seabrook Station has received materials in all three categories. In 1985 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) testimony put the likelihood of a devastating nuclear plant accident at 45 percent every 20 years, a probability in itself unacceptable. The probability has now multiplied substantially. It was not until 1988 that extensive installation of counterfeit materials in nuclear plants was uncovered. The NRC is well aware of the serious danger to public safety posed by these substandard materials. But the agency has caved in under nuclear industry pressure. Instead of requiring detection and replacement of substandard counterfeit parts, the NRC has lowered nuclear plants safety standards, so the counterfeit parts now meet the revised standards. To protect public safety, it is of particular importance to prevent operation of Seabrook Station in New Hampshire. Substeadard parts built into that plant, in combination with faults in the plant's construction, create a high probability of a serious accident if it is activated. During an NRC-ordered inspection, Seabrook Station's o.wner , reported that at least 369 suspect piping fixtures had been found at the plant as of August 25, 1988 (2), but said the fixtures met required safety standards. However, a chemical analysis of Seabrook Station fixtures in October, 1980, by an independent Box 277. Rowley. M A 01969,(508) 948-7959 A no tro6. tan enernpi orsanusuon 30 Coun St., Plymouth, M A 02361,(508) 746 9300 National Press Bldg., Suite 994,14 & F. Sts., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20045.(202) 628-6611 Offices S A 6,3 Pkesant St., Concord, NH 03.101 (603) 228-9484

laboratory, revealed that some materials tests had failed to meet safety requirement. Several flanges in the service water system require replacement (3). Dravo, a piping supplier, and Pullman-Higgins, the plant's contractor which installed the piping (until the company was fired in 1984), were both listed as recipients of counterfeit piping in NRC documents (4). Seabrook Station was plagued with piping safety problems long before the revelations of counterfeit piping became a concern in 1988. In 1982 end 1983, a piping weld inspector falsified 2400 inspections. After he was arrested some of the welds were re-inspected, but nearly half of them were never physically re-examined; many were inaccessible by then (5). A Level III weld inspector who was hired after the inspection scandal to examina records and weld x-rays, found that fully 20 percent of the welde he inspected had failed (6). He was fired, he believes, because be found so many faulty welds. In 1984, a Seabrook Station welder informed the NRC that welds in Dravo piping were flawed, but the NRC concluded they were not a safety concern (7). In 1985, an inspector trainee failed the test to qualify as an Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) but performed inspections for Seabrook's insurance company. The ANI is a role critical to Seabrook Station's legally insured status. The insurance company dropped an investigation undertaken of this violation, and the NRC accepts Seabrook Station's contention there was no wrongdoing (8). The NRC consistently exhibits a lax attitude toward safety by allowing th?se and other safety violations to stand, with only a token glance at evidence provided by the utility, on the assumption that backup systems act other inspections would cover for any breakdowns. These past problems are significant because the NRC decided I

                   .that installed count.erfeit materials which had passed weld inspections should be left in place, hoping that weld inspection programs would have uncovered any substandard counterfeit piping installed (9). But those programs were riddled with problems, and throughout construction, inspectors were unaware or the counterfeit materials.

l

Seabrook Station received safety-related electrical components supplied by an Illinois firm engaged in counterfeiting according to l an April, 1988, NRC notice (10). Two months later, during a raid of California electrical supply companies engaged in counterfeiting, one of the companies owners told a U.S. Marshal that substandard circuit breakers had been sold to nuclear plante

                                                     'throughout the U.S. (11) for the last ten years (12). General Electric and Westinghouse labels were among the false labels affixed to these electrical components (13), a type used in nuclear plant safety systems (14). When the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant checked circuit breakers bought from the California companies,               ;

every circuit breaker tested by the plant failed (15). ' According to Thomas Murley, NRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the agency knew of substandard fasteners sold to nuclear plants for two years before the NRC ordered any action taken (16). A Maryland nuclear plant had used commercial grade fasteners in safety systems; when the fasteners were tested, 339 of 1539 failed (17). The NRC ordered a very limited testing programs plants had to test 10 safety and 10 non-safety fasteners in their I warehouses (18). Seabrook Station construction was completed two years ago, and the problem has been public knowledge for a least that long, so it is unlikely flawed fasteners would be found in.the warehouse; more likely they have already been built into the plant. Assumptions of nuclear plant safety are based on several factors redundancy, meaning backup systems will compensate for failures in main systems; and estensive inspection program that guarantee quality construction. Yet Seabrook Station's flawed r inspection program, the substandard counterfeit materials built into the plant, and a series of NRC documents and statements belie the conclusion the nuclear plant is safe. A failure of a non-safety system could " challenge safety systems," meaning it could trigger a safety system failure, the NRC i noted in an August, 1988, memo (19). The process for upgrading non-safety components for use in safety systems, a common practice, is flawed, according to another NRC document (20). Materials inspections by the NRC itself do not work, admitted the NRC's own Thomas Murley (21). He also said that once a percentage of components with a specific model number had been tested, there was no requirement for testing further orders of that model number i

(22). Vendors of supplies and equipment to nuclear plants do not always carry out required inspections correctly, the NRC warned in June, 1988 (23). Guarantees that the nuclear plants are built safely are based on vendor certifications. The NRC refuses to take a position protecting public. health and safety. initial effortThe NRC's attitude was demonstrated by the agency's to pass on responsibility for dealing with the counterfeit electrical components to the industry (24) and manufacturers (25). Additionally, after several months of fumbling for a solution to the counterfeit piping problem, the NRC, under  ! industry pressure, cancelled its order that the counterfeit, substandard materials be found and replaced (26). The NRC also delayed for long periods of time before notifying nuclear plants of the various types of counterfeit materials distributed to them. In the case of the festeners, the agency delayed for several years (27). The NRC knew about the California counterfeit circuit breakers for three months before the agency notified possible recipients of the probism (28), and waited a--full eight months before requiring any inspections for flawed circuit breakers (29). In the case of the counterfeit piping materials, the NRC was aware of the of the problem as early as January, 1988

      '(30). But the agency actually knew about it earlier and did nor notify nuclear plants until May 6 (31). By the fall, the NRC had dropped any requirement for further investigation by nuclear plants of piping problems     (32).

In all cases, the actions the NRC required are inadequate. The agency lowered safety standards for nuclear plants (33) to accommodate the unsafe conditions. Corrupt NRC policies have set the stage for a major disaster. Since the agency will not avert this disaster, it is up to the people of this country and the elected officials who represent them to intervene, both to prevent activation of Seabrook Station, and to fully investigate the NRC. c l 4 REFERENCES

1. Inside NRC, Vol. 10, No. 13, McGraw Hill, June 20, 1988.

2. Thomas Murley, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Letter to Stephen B. Conley, Executive Director We The People, October 4, 1988.

3. Boston Herald, December 10, 1988.

4. USNRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Bulletin No.

88-05, May 6, 1988; Supplement 1, June 15, 1988; Supplement 2, August 3, 1988.

5. United States of America vs. James V. Padavano, No.

85-16-01-L, U. S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

6. United States Department of Labor, Case No. 84-ERA-13, March 19, 1984.

7. USNRC, Region I, Inspection Report No. 50-443/84-12, August, 1984.

8. Donald R. Havercamp, USNRC Region I, Division of Reactor Prsjects,_ Letter to Stephen B. Conley, We The People, November 16, 1988.

9. Bechtel National, NUMARC Generic Testing Program Response to NRC Bulletin No. 88-05, for Electric Power, Palo Alto, CA, July 29, 1988. I

10. USNRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information l Notice No. 88-19, April 19, 1988.

11. Inside NRC, Vol. 10, No. 15, McGraw Hill, July 18, 1988.

12. USNRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information Notice No. 88-46, July 8, 1988.

13. USNRC Information Notice 88-46, Attachment 2, July 8, 1988.

14. Inside NRC, July 18, 1988.

15. USNRC Information Notice 88-46, July 8, 1988.

16. Inside NRC, Vol. 10, No. 16, McGraw Hill, August 1, 1988.

17. USNRC Compliance Bulletin, No. 87-02, November 6, 1987.

18. Ibid.

19. USNRC Region II Division of Reactor Projects, Memorandum to Gus Lainas, Assistant Director, from James Stone, Project 9 Manager, regarding NUMARC meeting, Enclosure 3, Draft Bulletin, August 9, 1980.

20. USNRC meno to Gus Lainas.

21. Inside NRC, August 1, 1988.

22. Ibid.

23. USNRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information Notice No. 88-35, June 3, 1988.

24. Inside NRC, August 1, 1988.

25. Inside NRC, July 18, 1988.

26. Thomas Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Requistion Letter to Stephen Conley, We The People, August 15, 1988.

27. Inside NRC, August 1, 1988.

28. Ibid.

29. USNRC Bulletin No. 88-10, November 22, 1988.

30. Thomas Murley Letter to Stephen Conley, August 15, 1988.

31. USNRC Bulletin No. 88-05.

32. USNRC Bulletin No. 88-05, Supplement 2.

33. William H. Rasin, Director Technical Division, Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC). Letter to Thomas T.

Martin,.USNRC Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, July 29, 1988.

                                           ~

c

L UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of 1 I PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW I Docket No.(s) 50-443/444-OL-1 HAMPSHIRE. ET AL. 1 (Seabrook Station. Units 1 and 2) i i 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that cocios of the forsootno LETTER FROM COMLEY TO CHILK  ; have been served upon the followino persons by U.S. mail, first class. except I as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712. Administrative Judae Administrative Judae Alan S. Rosenthal. Chairman Thomas S. Moore Atomic Safety and Licensino Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensino Appeal Board Board U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Washincton. DC 20555 Washinoton DC 20555 Administrative Judae Howard A. Wilber Administrative Judoe Atomic Safety and Licensino Appeal Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Board Atomic Safety and Licensino Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission Washinoton, DC 20555 Washington. DC 20555 Administrative Judae Administrative Law Judas Jerry Harbour Ivan W. Smith Atomic Safety and Licensino Board Atomic Safety and Licensino Board U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Washincton. DC 20555 Washington DC 20555 Administrative Judae Edwin J. Reis. Esc. Emmeth A. Lusbke Office of the General Counsel 5500 Friendship Boulevard, Apt. 1923N U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Chevy Chase, MD 20815 Washington. DC 20555 Diane Curran. Esc. Thomas 8. Dianan. Jr., Esc. Harmon, Curran & Tousley Ropes & Brav 2001 S Street N.W.. Suite 430 One International Place Washington, DC 20009 Boston, MA 02110 l 1 --_m.__m_. _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _

4 L* Docket No.(s)90-443/444-OL-1 LETTER FROM COMLEY T0 CHILK i I Robert A. Backus. Esc. Paul McEachern. Esc. i Backus. Meyer &' Solomon Shaines & McEachern ' 'l 116 Lowell Street 25 Maplewood Avenue. P.O. Box 360 Manchester. NH 03106 Portsmouth. NH 03801 , I l Gary W. Holmes. Esc. Charles P. Graham. Esc. { Holmes 6 Ells McKay. Murphy.and Graham l 47 Winnacunnet Road 100 Main Street ' Hancton. NH 03842 Amesbury. MA 01913 Barton Z. Cowan. Eso. Jane Doughty Eckert. Beamans. Cherin & Mellott Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 600 Grant Street. 42 Floor 5 Market Street Pittsburch. PA 15219 Portsmouth. NH 03801 i Georce W. Watson, Esc. Edward A. Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street. S.W. 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH) Washington, DC 20472 Boston. MA 02109 Georae D. Bisbee. Esq. Suzanne Breiseth Assistant Attorney General Board of Selectmen Office of the Attornov 6eneral Town of Hampton Falls 25 Capitol Street Drinkwater Road Concord. NH 03301 Hampton Falls. NH 03844 John Traficante. Esq. Matthew T. Brock. Eso. Chief. Nuclear Safety Unit Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Office of the Attornov General One Ashburton Place. 19th Floor One Ashburton Place. 19th Floor Boston. MA 02108 Boston. MA 02108 The Honorable Philip Ahrens. Esc. Edward J. Markey. Chairman Assistant Attorney General ATTN Linda Correia Office of the Attorney General Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and State House Station.'#6 Power Aucusta. ME 04333 House Committee on Energy and Conserce Washington, DC 20515 l 1 __--.m_ _ . - _.

    -                                                                                                                                                  l Docket No.(s)50-443/444-OL-1                                                                    -

LETTER FROM COMLEY TO CHILK j at l I Richard A. Hampe, Esc. J. P. Nadeau Hampe & McNicholas Board of Selectmen { 35 Pleasant Street 10 Central Street Concord..NH 03301 Rye, NH 03870

                                                                                                                                                      )
                                                                                                                                                      /

Allen Lampert William Armstrono Civil Defense Director Civil Defense Director Town of Brentwood Town of Exeter 20 Franklin Street 10 Front Street l Exeter. NH 03833 Exeter, NH 03833 Sandra Bavutis. Chairman Calvin A. Canney Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD #1 Box 1154 City Hall Kensinoton. NH- 03827 126 Daniel Street Portsmouth. NH 03801 Anne Goodman Ci; airman Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen 13-15 Newmarket Road Town Hall - Friend Street Durham NH 03B24 Amesbury, MA 01913 Peter J. Matthews Mayor of Newburyport Michael Santosuosso. Chairman City Hall Board of Selectmen Newburyport, MA 01950 South Hampton, NH 03827 R. Scott Hill-Whilton. Esquire Stanley W. Knowles. Chairman Lacoulis, Hill-Whilton & McGuire Board of Selectmen 79 State Street P.O. Box 710 Newburyport., MA 01950 North Hampton, NH 03862 The Honorable Gordon J. Humphrey ATTN Janet Colt United States Senate Washington. DC 20510 Dated at Rockville, Md. this Office of the' retary of the Conaission = _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - - - -}}