ML20095D221

Forwards Gibbs & Hill,Inc Evaluation of Paint & Insulation Debris Effects on Containment Emergency Sump Performance. Related Correspondence

ML20095D221
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	07/05/1984
From:	Reynolds N BISHOP, COOK, PURCELL & REYNOLDS, TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	Bloch P, Jordan W, Mccollom K Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
OL-2, NUDOCS 8408230257
Download: ML20095D221 (150)

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LAW OFFICES OF BISHOP, LIBERMAN, COOK. PURCELL & REYNOLDS 1200 SEVENTEENTH STR E ET, N. W. IN NEW YORK WAS HINGTON, D. C. 2OO 3e D0-;8'Roa aERNAN a COOK (202) 857-9800 U$Nfg as enOAoWAY N EW YO R M N EW YO R K lQ004 TELEX 440s74 lNTLAw us (aia) a4e-eooo M AGO 20 J\h':)[**'

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00CXEi m & SFF m SRANCH July 5, 1984 Peter B. Bloch, Esq. Dr. Walter H. Jordan Atomic Safety and Licensing 881 West Outer Drive Board Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Division of Engineering, Architecture & Technology Oklahoma. State University Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078 Subj: Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al.

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Cb Units 1 and 2); Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 i

l Gentlemen:

l' Enclosed is Applicants' report regarding the safety significance of protective coatings inside containment at Comanche Peak. This report was transmitted to the NRC Staff last week. We are providing it to the Board mindful of our obligation-to keep the Board apprised of developments bearing on matters within its jurisdiction.

A copy of the report is being transmitted simultaneously herewith to Mrs. Ellis, Copies of the report will be sent shortly to the remainder of the servic ist under separate cover.

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PDR ADOCK 05000445 lj g PDR Nichola . eynolds Counse fo Applicants cc: Mrs. Ellis (w/ enc.) (,)

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i-Report Evaluation of Paint and insulation Debris Effects on Containment Emergency Sump Performance 7

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. section 8 is contributed by Ebasco Services Inc.

2. Appendix 1 is centributed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

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L TABLE OF CONTENTS EVALUATION OF PAINT AND INSULATION DEBRIS EFFECTS ON CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PERFORMANCE 1.0 PURPOSE 2.0

SUMMARY

3.0 SAFETY IMPACT OF POSTULATED PAINT FAILURE 3.1 Paint Characteristics 3.2 Potential Effects of Paint on Engineered Safeguard Performance 4.0 SUMP PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 4.1 Sump Performance 5.0 WATER VELOCITIES 5.1 Sources of Water 5.2 Water Levels at Sump Elevation 5.3 Velocities at Upper Elevation 5.4 Water Velocity at the Sump Elevation 6.0 PAINT DEBRIS GENERATION AND TRANSPORT 6.1 Paint Debris Generation 6.2 Pa' int Transport 7.0 INSULATION DEBRIS GENERATION 7.1 Typeb,'f Insulation ,

7.2 Insulation Debhis Generation 7.3 Insulation Transport (ii)

8.0 NEAR SUMP EFFECTS 8.1 Motion of Paint Fragments Through the Pool of Water .

8.2 Analysis of Potential for Su=p Clogging 9.0 DEBRIS EFFECTS ON EMERGENCY SUIGS REFERENCES APPENDIX-1 (iii)

LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title 3.1-1 Coating Systems at CPSES 3.1-2 Characteristics of Coatings 4.1-1 Sump Design Parameters 4.1-2 Pump NPSH 4.1-3 , Summary of Test Data for Sump Performance 5.1-1 Water Inventory and Levels 5.3-1 Containment Spray Distribution 5.3-2 Calculation of Velocities (Two Spray Trains) 5.3-3 Calculation of Velocities (One Spray Train) 5.4-1 , Containment Spray and RER/SI Flows 5.4-2 Spray Flow Contribution (One Train)

Low Water Level (El. 814.8 Ft.)

5.4-3 ,RER/SI Flow Contribution"(One Train)

Low Water Level (El. 814.8 Et.)

5.4-4 Spray Flow Contribution (Two Trains)

Low Water Level (El. 814.8 Ft.)

5.4-5 RER/SI Flow Contribution (Tw6 Trains)

Low Water Level (El. 814.8 Ft.)

5.4-6 Spray Flow Contribution (One Train)

High Water Level (El. 817.5 Ft.)

5.4-7 RER/SI Flow Contribution (One Train)

High Water Level (El. 817.5 Ft.)

5.4-8 Spray Flow Contribution (Two Trains)

High Water Level (El. 817.5 Ft.)

5.4-9 RHR/SI Flow Contribution (Two Trains)

High Water Level (El. 817.5 Ft.)

(iv)

K Table No. Title 5.4-10 Total Velocity - one Train, Low Level 5.4-11 Total Velocity - Two Trains, Low Level 5.4-12 Total Velocity - One Train, Eigh Level 5.4-13 Total Velocity - Two Trains, High Level 5.4-14 Sensitivity Analysis - Two Trains vs.

Water Level 6.1-1 Quantities of Paint in Containment 6.2-1 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 10 mils 6.2-2 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 5 mils 6.2-3 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 3 mils ..

6.2-4 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 10 mils 6.2-5 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 5 mils 6.2-6 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 3 mils s 6.2-7 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 10 mils 6.2-8 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 5 mils 6.2-9 Transport Velocity Summary Paint Thickness = 3 mils 6.2-10 Transport Velocity Summary Drag Coefficient = 1.5 6.2-11 Transport Velocity Summary Drag Coefficient = 1.2 6.2-12 Transport Velocity Summary Drag Coefficient = 0.9 (v)

Table No. Title 6.2-13 Transport Velocity Summary Drag Coefficient = 0.7 6.2-14 Transport Velocity Summary Friction Coefficient Dynamic = 0.1 6.2-15 Transport Velocity Summary Friction Coefficient Dynamic = 0.2 6.2.-16 Transport Velocity Summary Friction Coefficient Dynamic = 0.3 6.2-17 Transport Velocity Summary Friction Coefficient Dynamic = 0.5 6.2-18 Transport Velocity Summary Friction Coefficient Dynamic = 0.6 6.2-19 Transport Velocity Summary Concrete Coatings Paint Thickness = 20 mils 6.2-20 Transporg Velocity Summary

- Concrete Coatings Paint Thickness = 30 mils 6.2-21 Transport Velocity Summary Sand Particles 6.2-22 Transport Velocity Summary Zine Dust Particles 6.2-23 Summary of Critical Transport Velocities for Paint Particles 6.2-24 Perimeters of Openings on Upper Elevations 6.2-25 Coatings Contribution from Upper .

Elevations 7.1-1 Insulation Panel Dimensions 7.2-1 Fibrous Insulation Take off Drawing No. 2323-M1-0507 7.2-2 Fibrous Insulation Take off Drawing No. 2323-M1-0511 (vi)

Table No. Title 7.2-3 Fibrous Insulation Take Off Drawing No. 2323-M1-0511-01 7.2-4 Fibrous Insulation Take off Drawing No. 2323-M1-0513 7.2-5 Fibrous insulation Take off Drawing No. 2323-M1-0513-01 7.2-6 Metallic Insulation Damage from R.C. Loop Pipe Break Steam Generator Compt. No. 4 7.2-7 Metallic Insulation Damage from 10" R.C. Pipe Break Steam Gen. Compt. No. 4 7.2-8 Reflective Metallic Insulation Located Within 7 Pipe Dia.

of Jet from Pipe Breack 756 LWR 7.3-1 Water Velocities in Channels Approaching the Sumps 7.3-2 Transport and Blockage Test Results 9-1 Spray and RER Pump NPSH (vii)

i LIST OF FIGURES Eieure No. Title 3.2-1 Recirculation Flow Path 3.2-2 Schamatic of Sump Containment Spray and RFR/SI Connections 5.3-1 Containment Spray Zones 5.3-2 Free Fall Spillway 5.4-1 Containment Channel Locations 5.4.2 RER/SI Elow Path 5.4.3 Spray Flow Path 5.4-4 Flow Resistance Map Sub-Channel -

Locations 5.4-5 Cross Section Locations 5.4-6 Containment Building Steam Generator Compartment No. 4 Cross Section SA 5.4-7 Containment Building Steam Generator Compartment No. 4 Cross Section SC 5.4-8 Containment Building Corridor Cross ~

Section 4B 5.4.9 Network Diagram RER/SI System 5.4.10 Network Diagram - Spray _

6.2-1 Tumble Transport Model 6.2-2 Slide Transport Model _

6.2-3 Areas That Exceed Critical Velocity at El. 808' - 0" Low Water Level _

Two Trains Operating .

6.2-4 Areas That Exceed Critical Velocity at El. 808'- 0" High Water Level -

Two Trains Operating _

7.1-1 Reflective Metallic Insulation Assembly

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(viii)

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Ficure No. Title 7.1-2 Cross-Section of Insulation Assembly 7.1-3 Metallic Insulation Panel 7.2.1 Reactor Coolant Loop No. 4 Break Points and Restraint Location 7.2.2 Safety Injection System Break Point and Restraint Location 7.2-3 Schematic Drawing of Reflective Metallic Insulation Unit for 10-Inch Pipe 8.1-1 Chip Motion With Constant Angle 8.1-2 Constant Angle Analysis Results 8.1-3 oscillatory Motion of Paint Fragment 8.2-1 Sump Geometry 9-1 Paint Area vs. Percent Blocked Screen (ix) i

1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to determine if the debris resulting from the postulated failure of paint and insulation inside the CPSES Unit 1 containment due to a LOCA will adversely affect performance of the containment emergency sumps and those engineered safeguards systems drawing suction therefrom.

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2.0

SUMMARY

The detailed analysis of potential effects of coatings failure on [

the performance of all relevant plant safety systems indicated -

that the single most significant aspect of postulated coating failure will be the potential for blockage of the emergency sump  :

screens by paint and insulation debris. The mechanism for and .

offect of such blockage on emergency sump, performance are ovaluated in detail in this report. The general methodology and .

logic used for determining the potential sump blockage are based on NUREG/CR-2791, NUREG/CR-3616 and NUREG-0897, Revision 1 (Draft).

The following step-by-step approach was used to evaluate the sump screen blockage effects. First, the water velocities inside the a containment in each zone of the containment were determined.

Noxt, the quantities of paint and insulation debris in each zone "

of the containment were calculated. The calculations determined -

that there is no potential for insulation debris to reach the gumps. Finally, the transport velocities for paint particles in ecch zone were calculated, and the quantity of paint transported to the sump screen was calculated.

Based on the conservatively assumed quantity of paint debris that could reach the sump screen, the screen blockage and pressure drops were evaluated. The analysis determined that about 90,000 sq ft (about 300 cu ft) of paint could reach the vicinity of the sump screan through mechanisms derived from the above NUREGs, and cause partial blockage. The extent of screen blockage by paint debris was calculated to be 35 to 50 percent of tho screen area, well within the design basis for sump parformance. The conclusion of the analysis is that this amount of screen blockage cannot cause any impact on plant safety.

To supplement the above methodology, other possible near sump effects were analyzed, assuming the various mechanisms for sump acreen blockage. All these mechanisms evaluate paint particles impinging on the screen befcre settling to the floor of the containment. The analysis determined that paint debris within approximately ten feet of ten feet of the screen has the potential to impinge on the screen and be retained on the screen by flow forces, thereby blocking the screen. Using highly conservative assumptions, it was determined that up to 94 percent of the screen could be blocked. The sump blockage discussed in the previous paragraph and blockage due to the near sump effects discussed here are not additive. However, even in this worst possible case, the required level of sump performance would be unimpaired.

In addition to sump screen bicekage, secondary effects of paint failure were analyzed. Most of such effects are only. likely if there are very fine particles of paint debris which pass thrcugh the screen. The analysis of such effects leads to the conclusion that blockage of narrow passages in containment spray and RER/SI

will not occur because these systems are , designed to handle particles less than 1/8 inch in size. Further, impacts of very fine particles in the reactor systems are acceptable in that no significant buildup of fines in the core will occur.

The ECCS and its critical operating components were analyzed for potential erosion or corrosion degradation due to the postulated ingestion of sinc into the ECCS. The conclusion resulting from this evaluation and the related containment paint chemical analysis was that no significant erosion or corrosion damage to the ECCS or to its critical components would occur. No deleterious effects are postulated in the reactor core for the material concentrations assumed in this evaluation. .

In addition, the analysis led to the conclusion that the design basis containment hydrogen generation will not increase because the original estimates of hydrogen generation in the ESAR conservitively assume that all zine in the coatings react to produce hydrogen.

Finally, the analysis led to the conclusion that any failed paint would not tend to become airborne. In any event, the analysis reflected that any paint that did become airborne would have no adverse effects on plant filter systems.

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3.0 SAFETY IMPACT OF POSTULATED PAINT FAILURE

-3.1 Paint Characteristics Tha major coating systems (paint) used inside the containment and thsir average DFT (dry film thicknesses) are presented in Table 3.1-1.

Tha steel coatings are manufactured by Carboline Co.; the concrete coatings are manufactured by Imperial Professional Coating Corporation, Inc.

Approximately 285,000 sq.ft. of concrete an'd 333,000 sq.ft. of steel are coated. The Carbo:ine 11 is a self-curing zine-filled inorganic coating, containing about 80% wt. solids, with a cpecific gravity of 4.0. The Phenoline 305 is a modified phenolic coating, containing about 81% wt. solids, with a cpecific gravity of 1.5. The Nutec 11 is a water-based epoxy coating, containing about 78% vol. solids, with a specific gravity of 1.8. Nutec 115 is the same as Nutec 11 except that it contains 51% wt.30-140 mesh sand, and has a specific gravity of 1.8. Reactic 1201 is a polyamide epoxy coating, containing about 73% wt. solids, with a specific gravity of 1.5.

The Nutec 11S is used as a surfacer for concrete. Nutec 11 and Rsactic 1201 are used as top coats.

All of these _ coatings have successfully passed the DBA test conforming to ANSI N101.2-1972, " Protective Coatings (Paints) for Light Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities." Thus, these coatings can withstand the environmental conditions, such as, temperatures, pressures, chemical and radiation levels during a LOCA.

3-1

Paint impurities for the steel coatings are presented in _

Table 3.1-2.

Decomposition temperatures for all the containment coatings are 2 350 F. They are thermally stable for continuous exposure at 200 F. Carbozinc is thermally stable for continuous exposure at 750 F. The characteristics of all coating systems used at CPSES are summarized in Table 3.1-2.

Paint Failure Modes Paint can fail by two general modes: chalking and flaking / peeling. Chalking is loss of the paint film by powdering to small (micrometer-size) particles. Flaking / peeling is loss of the paint film by flakes of small (usually <one inch) particles.

Field and laboratory observations of the containment coatings used at Comanche Peak confirm that the failure modes are by flaking of small (1/8 - 1 inch) particles, mode except by for the chalking Carbozine 11. The Carbozine 11 failure is (powdering).

Other terminologies to explain coating failure used in the industry, such as blistering, intercoat delamination, cracking, undercutting (lifting of the paint film by substrate corrosion),

checking, mud-cracking, alligatoring, erosion, wrinkling, pinpoint rusting and pitting, lead to either chalking or flaking / peeling.

Blistering, checking or mud-cracking can lead to failure by flaking / peeling of small si=e (< 1/2 inch) particles (" Good Painting Practice, Vol. 1, Steel Structures Painting Manual,"

SSPC 1982, Chapter 23; ASTM D772-47, " Standard Method of -

Evaluating Degree of Flaking (Scaling) of Exterior Paints," ASTM Vol. 06.01, 1984; ASTM E714-56, " Standard Method of Evaluating w Degree of Blistering of Paints," ASTM Vol. 06.01, 1984; ASTM D660-44, " Standard Method of Evaluating Degree of Checking of Exterior Paints," ASTM Vol 06.01, 1984).

3-2

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3.2 Potential Effects of Paint en Encineered Safecuards Performance The potential effects of coatings failure on performance of plant engineered safeguards systems are evaluated in this report. Some of the areas of likely concern are:

. Blockage of containment emergency sumps

. Blockage of containment spray and RER/SI system flow passages

. Containment hydrogen generation

. Blockage of filters in containment air handling systems.

. Fouling of heat transfer surfaces This report addresses each of these concerns and evaluates the impact on the plant safety systems.

Following a LCCA, the safety injection and RER systems provide cooling water to the reactor core. The water supplied to the core spills on the containment floor. The containment spray system sprays water into the containment through noz;1es in the dome of the containment and underneath the slabs of the major floors to remove heat and iodine from the containment atmosphere.

Initially, both of these systems take water from the refueling water storage tank. When the refueling water storage tank contents are depleted, these systems are switched to recirculate water which has accumulated on the lowest level of the containment. Figure 3.2-1 shows, in simplified form, the flow path for these systems during recirculation.

The recirculation inlets to the RER/SI and containment spray systems are protected by sump screens in the containment as shown in Figure 3.2-2. These screens comprise trash racks, coarse ccreens and fine screens.

The containment spray no::les contain orifices 3/8" in diameter.

The recirculation screens are sized to exclude particles larger than 1/8" diameter to avoid plugging of the spray no::les. The rcmainder of the containment spray system is designed to cccommodate 1/8" particles. For example, the containment spray pumps can pass such particles without clogging. The safety injection and RER systems can also pass 1/8" particles, without clogging.

It is apparent that the screens might be blocked by large debris particles. Failed paint must be counted as a potehtial type of dabris which could affect the screens.

3-3

Particles smaller than 1/8" can enter the systems and can cause other effects, such as erosion and accumulation in low velocity regions. These effects must~therefore be investigated.

Ono possible influence of coatings on engineered safeguards syctem is hydrogen generation. The prime coat on steel surfaces is a cine paint which, on exposure to hot water, can oxidize to cinc oxide, thereby releasing hydrogen gas from the water. It could be postulated that failure of the topcoat could expose the prime coat and therefore facilitate such hydrogen formation.

However, the design basis hydrogen generation for the plant was calcu.'.ated based on assuming that all the sine in the coatings reacts to form hydrogen. Therefore, failure of the topcoat does not influence containment hydrogen generation estimates.

3.2.1 Airborne Paint Particles It is concluded that airborne paint (failed paint that becomes cirborne) is not a problem because of the following:

- All containment, HVAC equipment shut down on accident initiation

- The containment Hydrogen Recombiners are not fed by fans and have no filters; they are fed by natural convection and do not have any catalyst. They are the thermal type which oxidize hydrogen (Hz) by electrically heated tubes.

There is a backup H Purge System which is manually initiated and located outside the containment. This system would be operated in the event the containment Hz exceeds a. predetermined concentration. This system has fans and filters (1007. redundant filter banks). However, these filters can be manually changed on high pressure drop. Therefore, airborne failed paint, even if it reached these filters, would not affect their operation since the filters can be changed if they clog.

During a LOCA failed paint would not tend to be airborne due to the scrubbing effect by the containment spray system, and the high density of the failed paint relative to containment atmosphere density.

3.2.2 Impact on NSSS Safety Systems The effects of paint failure, specifically intrusion of paint fine particles into the NSSS safety systems was studied by Wastinghouse. This report is presented in the Appendix-1 and cummarized below.

3-4

The evaluation of the ECCS.and its critical operating components revealed no potential erosion or corrosion degradation with respect to the postulated ingestion of sinc into the ECCS. The conclusions resulting from this evaluation and the related containment paint chemical analysis are as follows:

• No significant erosion or corrosion damage will occur to the ECCS or to its critical components.

• Leachable chloride concentration levels (for all containment panels) which could enter the ECCS are significantly below the chloride concentration levels which could cause cracking in sensitized austenitic stainless steel.

• No fluoride cracking of sensitized stainless steel will occur since any fluoride ions, if present, would form fluoroborates which have no affect on stainless steel.

• No deleterious effect are postulated in the reactor core for the material concentration assumed in this evaluation.

3-5

SPRAY HEADERS .

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EL. 802'-0" 24" GUARD PIPE 2*-6" TYP CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP FIGURE 3. 2- 2 SCHEMATIC OF SUMP CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND RHR/S1 COMMECT10MS l

TABLE 3.1-1 COATING SYSTEMS AT CPSES Average Service Tvee DFT Mils'1'

1. Steeltat:

Primer carbo ine 11 3 Topcoat Phenoline 305 5

2. Concrete'88:

Surfacer Nutec 11 S 20 Topcoat Nutec 11 12 Reactic 1201 10 Notes:

'1' Dry film thickness in mils (1 mil equals .001 inch) 828 Manufactured by Carboline Co.

ca> Manufactured by Imperial Professional Coating Corporation.

i

TABLE 3.1-2 CHARACTERISTICS OF COATINGS Coating Tvoe Carbo:ine Phenoline Nutec Reactic Characteristic 11 305 11S & 11 1201

1. Chemical:

Solids (wt %) 80-85 81 78 73 Chlorides (ppm) 70-80 170-180 NA NA Halogens (ppm) 70-80 850-900 NA NA Lead (ppm) 1000 (max) NA NA NA

2. Physical:

Specific Gravity 4.0 1.5 1.6-2.0 1.5 Thermal Stability (*F) 750 >200 >200 >200 Decomposition ('F) >750 >350 >350 >350 NA - not available 4

4.0 SUMP PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 4.1 Sump Performance Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2 show the schematic of the Containment Emergency Sump and the Containment Spray and RER/SI system connections to the sump. There are two sumps in each containment at Comanche Peak - one for train A and one for train B. Sefety requirements can be met with one train operating. However, in normal post-LOCA conditions, both sumps will operate, and all pumps on each sump will operate. Design parameters for the sumps cre shown in Table 4.1-1.

In this discussion, all elevations are referred to the containment basement level, 808 ft in the plant elevation reference. After a LOCA, water level in the containment will be a minimum of 6 ft 10 inches above this datum.

The containment spray pumps and the RER pumps were tested at the manufacturers' shops. Shown in Table 4.1-2 are the minimum water lovels in the containment required to accommodate the required

!!PSH, excluding the head losses across the screen. Head losses ccross the screen is considered later in this report.

Similar sumps were tested at the Western Canada Hydraulic

• Laboratories (WCHL) using a full scale model as reported in Reference 8. Most tests at WCHL were run with a water level of 2 ft 10 inches above datum. This level was selected to maximize the possibility of vortexing and to maximize head loss in the cumps.

Two series of WCHL tests should be noted in this analysis.

First, there was a series of tests with "50 percent blockage."

This was based on blockage of 50 percent of the screen below the 2 ft 10 inch level. Since the screen extends 5 ft 9 inches above datum, about 94 square feet of screen were available. Several "50 percent blockage" tests were run with different blockage configurations. Included among these blockage configurations was one where all screen area below 1 ft 5 inches was blocked.

Some tests were also run with approximately "90 percent blockage." These tests were run with 9 out of the 10 screens blocked off. This test established that sump performance was entisfactory even with only 19 square feet of screen available for flow.

Table 4.1-3 summarises the WCHL test data for different sump blockages, flow velocities and corresponding screen pressure drops.

4-1

TABLE 4.1-1 SUMP DESIGN PARAMETERS DESIGN FLOW, gpm 12,500 COARSE SCREEN Dimensions, ft.-in. Length 30'8" Long radius 26'7" Short radius Width 7'10" Height 5'9" Opening size, in. 0.420 Open area, % 70 FINE SCREEN Dimensions, ft.-in. Length 30'3" Long radius 27'O.5" Short radius Width 6'10" Height 5'9" opening si=e, in. 0.115 Open area, % 64.6 e

TABLE 4.1-2 PUMP NPSH Pump CSS RER Flow at runout, gpm/ pump 3900 5300 Pump centerline elevation 775'7" 776'6" t$oter level required to 0.62' 2.2' provide minimum NPSH ft.i28 above above contairment contairment floor floor

'18 Does not include head loss in screens

TABLE 4.1-3

SUMMARY

OF TEST DATA FOR SUMP PERFORMANCE (Ref. Western Canada Hydraulic Laboratories) f Screen i

Sump Screen Flow Area Pressure Drop

! Blockage,  %'1' (com) (sc. ft.) (ft. of water) 0 12,200 188 0.005 94 50 16,600 - 17,600 0.020 - 0.035 50 9,500 - 10,500 94 0.005 - 0.01 88.3 16,000 - 19,000 22 0.271 - 0.454 89.8 18,500 - 19,500 21 0.314 - 0.34 91.5 18,500 - 19,500 16 0.4 - 0.44

'1* Below 2'10" Level

- - - - . - _ _ _ . ~ _ . - _ _ . _ . . . _ _

5.0 WATER VELCCITIES Following the post-LOCA safety injection phase, when the contents of the RWST are exhausted, valving is aligned to provide for a recirculating flow of water from the containment emergency sumps.

The water flowing through various zones provides the motive force for the transport of debris to the containment emergency sumps.

The available water velocity in a given area of the containment determines the transport potential for the debris.

The object of the water velocity analysis is to establish migration patterns for debris within the containment. The flow pattern within the containment is complex due to the presence of equipment supports, shield walls, openings in The compartments, floor methodology used openings and related hydraulic resistances.

to estimate recirculation flow velocities within various regions of the containment is similar to that discussed in NUREG/CR-2791.

5.1 Sources of Water

'The sources of water inside the containment following a LOCA determines the water level. The water level in turn determines the flow area for calculation of water velocities in various zones of the containment. The sources of water considered in This table gives the this evaluation are given in Table 5.1-1.

maximum available unter sources, the minimum and =aximum amounts of water expected to be in the containment following a LOCA. The difference between the maximum and minimum water source is in the rofueling water volume. The maximum water is based on the tank useable volume, i.e., 2 percent above high water level set point to the pump suction no::le. The minimum water volume is based on the refueling water tank capacity from 2 percent below the high water level set point to 2 percent above the empty level set point (the empty level set point is 6 ft. 4 inches above the pumps suction nos:le.)

5.2 Water Levels at Sump Elevation (808 ft. EL)

The high and low water levels were calculated using the maximum These and minimum water inventories given in Table 5.1-1.

calculations were based on the actual net volume available at 808 ft. EL. in the containment. The net volume was calculated by determining the gross volume and deducting the actual volumes of equipment, foundations and other components. The calculated high and low water levels are also presented in Table 5.1-1.

5-1

5.3 Velocities at Upcer Elevation Figure 5.3-1 shows a schematic of the containment spray system arrangement. The sprays are arranged in four zones. Each spray area covers the space above the floor in the zone. The water spray flow rates given in Table 5.3-1 were used to determine the velocities on each of the containment floors. Each floor in the containment is provided with 4-inch-high curbs all around. The pathways for spray cooler is only through openings in the floor for staircases, equipment hatches and grated openings.

The general methodology used for velocity determination is as follows:

a. The amount of spray flow collected on each floor was calculated using the spray flows and floor areas. The sprays which fall in open areas are attributed to the next lower floor.

The total spray flow for each floor consists of net spray on the floor and the flow intercepted from floor above for both open areas and spill openings.

b. The flow discharge from each floor will be through the spill opening available. Average discharge in gallons per linear foot of spillway width was calculated for each floor.

c. The minimum water depth for each floor was calculated based on the critical depth. For flow discharging from a rectangular channel ending in free fall at a spill, critical depth occurs near the outlet, as shown in Figure 5.3-2 (Ref. 9 and 10).

D8 = eQ2 where D = critical depth (ft) gw2 Q = discharge (cfs) g = accel, of gravity w = width (ft) e = energy coefficient The energy coefficient (e) is applied to account for the energy non-uniform distribution of velocities. The coefficient varies from 1.03 to 2.0. An average coefficient of 1.5 was assumed. The assumption is reasonable and conservative because o the wide variation of flow conditions and obstructions which results in wide velocity fluctuations.

5-2

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gi >

d. Flow < depths and'yelocities for locations otiner than near the spill bri.sk ,are approximated by deriving flow profiles using " backwater" procedures based on Manning's formula for open channel flow and Bernoulli's Theorem (Ref. 9 and 11).

Friction ailevance is based on a conservative roughness coefficient; / ey 0.011 (Ref. 9) for smooth concrete, trowel finish.,, ,

, oc- -

Ucing the above methodclogy, flow velocities ori each of the upper ficor elevations are calculated and tha results are presented in Tables 5.3-2" and 'd.3-3. Table 5.3-.2 gives flow velocities with twa containment spray trains operating and Tabl.a 5.3-3 gives flow v01ocities for one train operation. (

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, 5.4 Water Velocity at the Sump Elevation 5.4.1 -

Water Flow Paths Tha flow of fluids entering and exiting the containment during i tho recirculation phase of a LOCA were examined.

Tho RER/SI' (ECCS) and containment spray systems were each 1 . oriented as two completely redundant trains. Each train draws l water from one of the containment emergency sumps. The

ccntainment spray and RHR flow rates are as shown on Table 5.4-1.

Tho flow rates corresponding to both one and two trains were 4 . considered in the water velocity determination. The spray flows et each elevation of the containment were evaluated in 1~

Section 5.3. All the spray flows from upper flows terminate on tho 808'-O" elevation at various locations. Based on the diccussions in Section 5.3, it was determined that the bulk of tho spray flow terminates at azimuth 225*. For the purposes of

. this evaluation, it was conservatively assumed that the source of all the spray flow wil be at azimuth 225' and as shown on Figure 5.4-1. The flow from the RER/SI system occurs through the poctulated break in the coolant system. This break location was e 4 datermined to be in Steam Generator Compartments No. 4. The

! Iccation of this source of water is also shown on Figure 5.4-1.

Figures 5.4-2 and 5.4-3 show the flow paths to the sumps for the RER/SI flow and the spray flow, respectively.

5.4.2 Water Velocity Analysis i The spray and RER/SI flows were considered separately and then cuperimposed to yield the total velocity. The containment water inventory- determines the height of water inside the containment i which in turn determines the cross-sectional area available for i flow.. The available areas for flow were chosen by examining the j- ctntainment and choosing cross-sections that presented maximum rostriction to flow. These restriction were projected along the l ,

flow path until a more limiting restriction or a significant zone of larger flow area was encountered. Typical cross-sections  ;

cxamined for this evaluation are shown on Figures 5.4-4 and l

5.4-5. Figure 5.4-4 and 5.4-5 represents the location of

{ cross-sections within the containment and the steam generator j ecmpartments, respectively. Figures 5.4.-6 and 5.4-7 represent two typical cross-section within the steam generator compartment No. 4. Figures 5.4-8 represents a typical cross-section along

' the most restrictive channel tc> the sumps in the corridor outside the steam generator compartments. [

i 5-4 I i

I

s Flow within the containment was assumed to be represented by a number of parallel open channel flows. Accordingly, pressure drop from the break regio.n and spray source to the sump is constant for each flow path, and the summation of mass flows through the various paths equals the total flow. The magnitude of the flow rat's through each channel is dependent upon the hydraulic resistance presented by the path.

Ao described in NUREG CR-2791, a flow resistance map of the containment floor was developed as shown on Figure 5.4-4. The mp identifies channels (parallel resistance paths) and cub-channels (series resistances within a charnel). A point source of flow was. selected and the potential paths of flow to the sumps were determined. The source of RER and SI water was poctulated to be from a reactor coolant pipe break in steam g:nerator compartment No. 4, which is closest to the sumps.

Th3 resistances were determined as' the length divided by the area of each sub-channel in the flow path. The area will vary d:pending on the water level chosen. The pathways are developed in the form of " circuit" diagrama -or networks for the RHR/SI ficws and spray flows as shown on Figures 5.4-9'and 5.4-10 rocpectively. The fraction of flow in each branch was determined by combining the resistances as in an electrical cicuit diagram and proportioning the flows by resolving the parallel and serial

• rocistances. The resistances utilized are hydraulic and thorefore the resistances relate to pressure drop in proportion to the. square of the mass flow. By determining the total cquivalent resistance, the total flow was apporsioned to each channel. Velocity was then determined for each subchannel by dividing the channel flow rate by the subchannel area.

The velocity summary is presented on Tables 5.4-2 through 5.4-13.

Tchles 5.4-2 through 5.4-9 show the flows and sub-channel rosistance determinations. Tables 5.4-10 through 5.4-13 show the ccmbined velocity summary for RER/SI and spray systems operation.

The influence of various factors on the velocity was examined.

It was determined that the effect of the cross-sectional area area, wasin the most significant factor. The cross-sectional cetuality, is subject to change as the water level in the centainment varies. The total velocity was determined as the water level was varied between 814 feet and 817.5 feat. The rcsults of this analysis are presented in Table 5.4-14.

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Allcws for Drepfall Eetwen Flecrs.

2. Ut=ber of Nczzles shown fcr each Flocr is for One Train cnly.

FIGURE 5.3-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY ZONES

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1 FRICTIOM LOSS  !

o VELOclTY HEAD ZZ CRITICAL DEPTH --'

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FIGURE 5. 3 - 2 FREE FALL SPILLWAY

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I FIGURE 5.4-1 CONTAINMENT CHANNEL LOCATIONS

@= SOURCE OF WATER

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SG -3 SG -2 P _ N' A +

d FIGU RE 5.4-2 RHR/SI FLOW PATH (x= ISREAx tocATtow)

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FlQURE 5.4- 4 FLOW REsl5T ANC.E MAP SUS CHAN N! ._L LOCATIOMS 1

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STEAM GiEN. COMPARTMEMT No. A CROSS SECTION Sc l

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9 FIGURE 5.4-9 NETWORK DIAGRAM RHR/ SI SYSTEM O

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CHANuEL CHANNEL 2 5 TOTAL NETWORK CHAWWEL EQUIVALENT RESISTAk!CE g FOR. PARTIAL METWOi2.KS.

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TABLE 5.1-1 WATER INVENTORY AfD LEVELS .

Available Maximum Minimum capacity, Quantity, Quantity, Source cu.ft. cu.ft. cu.ft.

R3 actor Coolant 12,740 12,740 12,740 Rofueling Water Storage Tank 70,400 67,990 53,570 Accumulators 3,810 3,810 3,810 Miscellaneous 920 920 470 Total 87,370 85,460 70,590 Water Level (ft)(13 817.5 814.8 Note:

(1) Based on calculation of actual net volumes available excluding equipment volumes, foundations, and other components. .

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TABLE 5.3-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY DISTRIBUTION

. Floor Flow gpm

! Zone (1) Elevation One Train Two Trains A 905 4165 8330

'B 860 1018 2036 i C 832 213 426 I

l D 808 410 820 Nate:

1. See Figure 5.3-1 for Zone locations.

9

TABLE 5.3-2 CALCULATION OF VELOCITIES (Two Spray Trains)

Floor Elevatien L wels 905'-9" 860'-O" 832'6" Open Area sq.ft. 6,836 6,372 6,100 NI:n-Open Area sq.ft. 7,478 7,942 8,214 Clear Floor Areas for Flow sq.ft. 6,400 6,750 6,900 Flow on Floor Area gpm 4,352 1,723 5,752 Spill Opening Perimeter ft 62 74 110 Unit Discharge at Spill Openings (Average) cfs/ft 0.156 0.0519 0.116 Wcter Depth inches 1.2 1.5 1.08

^ Volocity at Spill Brink fps 1.5 1.0 1.4 Volocity @

5 ft. from Spill Brink fps 0.6 0.5 1.1 Volocity @

10 ft. from Spill Brink fps O.4 0.4 1.0 l-

{

TABLE 5.3-3 CALCULATION OF VELOCITIES ,

(One Spray Train)

Floor Elevation L'.vels 905'-9" 860'-O" ,

832'6" Open Area sq.ft. 6,836 6,372 6,100 Non-open Area sq.ft. 7,478 7,942 8,214 Clear Floor Areas for Flow sq.ft. 6,400 6,750 6,900 Flow on Floor Area gpm 2,176 861 2,875 Spill Opening Perimeter ft 62 74 110 Unit Discharge at Spill Openings (Average) cfs/ft 0.078 0.0259 0.058 Water Depth inches 0.79 0.38 0.55 Volocity at Spill Brink fps 1.2 0.6 1.1 Velocity @

5 ft. from Spill Brink fps 0.5 0.4 0.7 Velocity @

10 ft. from Spill Brink fps 0.3 0.3 0.7

TABLE 5.4-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND RHR/SI FLOWS Containment Spray GPM CFS One Train 5,800 12.94 4

Two Trains 11,600 ,

25.87 RHR/SI-One Train 2,570 5.73 Two Trains 5,140 11.45 it h

5-6

TABLE 5.4-2 SFRAY FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( ONE TRAIN )

LOW WATER LEVEL ( EL. 814.8 FT. )

SPRAY FLOW (CFS): 12.94 CHANNEL BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SO.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FFS 7 DOOR 3 17.00 9.11 1.87 2.07 0.23 7 A3 3.00 15.35 0.20 0.13 7 B3 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.07 7 C3 5.00 39.17 0.13 0.05 7 D3 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.04 7 E3 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.04 7 F3 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.11 7 A2 3.00 15.35 0.20 0.13 7 'B2 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.07 7 C2 5.00 39.17 0.13 0.05 7' D2 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.04 7 E2 16.00 56.96 O.28 0.04 7 F2' 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.11 7

DOOR 2 14.00 9.11 1.54 0.23 -

TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 5.02 8 A 30.00 35.72 0.84 5.40 0.15 8 B 14.00 81.60 0.17 0.07 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.01 1 A 55.00 81.60 0.67 3.33 0.04 1 B 29.00 27.20 1.07 0.12 1 C 23.00 115.60 0.20 0.03 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.94 2 A 60.00 115.60 0.52 7.54 0.07 2 B 16.00 74.80 0.21 0.10 2 C 38.00 102.00 0.37 0.07 TOTAL CHANNEL REFISTANCE 1.11 3 A 24.00 143.96 0.17 7.54 0.05 3 B 10.00 85.47 0.12 0.09 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.28 4 A 22.00 128.43 0.17 5.40 0.04 4 B 28.00 38.51 0.73 0.14 4 C 7.00 101.07 0.07 0.05 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.97 h

TABLE 5.4-3 RHR/SI FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( ONE TRAIN )

LOW WATER LEVEL ( EL. 814.8 FT. )

RHR/SI FLOW (CFS): 5.73 CHANNEL BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SO.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS 5 DOOR 4 17.00 9.11 1.87 2.63 0.29 5 A4 3.00 15.35 0.20 0.17 5 B4 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.09 5 C4 5.00

• 39.17 0.13 -

0.07 5 D4 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.05 5 E4 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.05 5 F4 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.14 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 2.68 6 A1 3.00 15.35 0.20 3.10 0.20 6 B1 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.10 6 C1 .5.00 39.17 0.13 0.08 6 D1 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.06 6 E1' 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.05 6' F1 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.17 6 DOOR 1 14.00 9.11 1.54 0.34 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 2.35 3 A 24.00 143.96 0.17 3.10 0.02 3 D 10.00 85.47 0.12 0.04 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.28 4 A 22.00 128.43 0.17 2.63 0.02 4 B 28.00 38.51 0.73 0.07 4 C 7.00 101.07 0.07 0.03 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.97

TABLE 5.4-4 SPRAY FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( TWO TRAINS )

LOW WATER LEVEL ( EL. 814.8 FT. )

SPRAY FLOW (CFS): 25.87 CHANNEL -BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SQ.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS 7 DOOR 3 17.00 9.11 1.87 4.13 0.45 7 A3 3.00 15.35 0.20 0.27 7 B3 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.14 7 C3 5.00 39.17 0.13 0.11 7 D3 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.07 7 E3 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.07 7 F3 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.22

7. A2 3.00 15.35 0.20 0.27 7 B2 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.14 7 C2 5.00 39.17 0.13 0.11 7 D2 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.C7 7 E2 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.07 7 F2 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.22 7 DOOR 2 14.00 9.11 1.54 0.45 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 5.02 8 A 30.00 35.72 0.84 10.79 0.30 8 B 14.00 81.60 0.17 0.13 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.01 1 A 55.00 81.60 0.67 6.65 0.08 1 B 29.00 27.20 1.07 0.24 1 C 23.00 115.60 0.20 0.06 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.94 2 A 60.00 115.60 0.52 15.08 0.13 2 B 16.00 74.80 0.21 0.20 2 C 38.00 102.00 0.37 0.15 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.11 3 A 24.00 143.96 0.17 15.08 0.10 3 B 10.00 85.47 0.12 0.18 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.28 4 A 22.00 128.43 0.17 10.79 0.08 4 B 28.00 38.51 0.73 0.28 4 C 7.00 101.07 .O.07 0.11 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.97 9

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i l

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TABLE 5.4-5 I

RHR/SI FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( TWO TRAINS ) '

LOW WATER LEVEL ( EL. 814.8 FT. ) i RHR/SI FLOW (CFS): 11.45 CHANNEL -BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SQ.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS 5 DOOR 4 17.00 9.11 1.87 5.26 0.58 5 A4 3.00 15.35 0.20 0.34 5 B4 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.17 5 C4 5.00 39.17 0.13 0.13 5 D4 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.09 5 E4 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.09 5 F4 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.29 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE- 2.68 6 At 3.00 15.35 0.20 6.19 0.40 6 B1 3.00 30.57 0.10 0.20 6 C1 5.00 39.17 0.13 0.16 6 D1 3.00 56.23 0.05 0.11 6 El 16.00 56.96 0.28 0.11 6 F1 1.00 18.39 0.05 0.34 6 DOOR 1 14.00 9.11 1.54 0.68 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 2.35 3 A- 24.00 143.96 0.17 6.19 0.04 5 B 10.00 85.47 0.12 0.07 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.28 4 A 22.00 128.43 0.17 5.26 0.04 4 B 23.00 38.51 0.73 0.14 4 C 7.00 101.07 0.07 0.05 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.97

- TABLE 5.4-6 SPRAY FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( ONE TRAIN )

HIGH WATER LEVEL ( EL. 817.5 FT. )

SPRAY FLOW (CFS): 12.94 CHANNEL BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SQ.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS 7 DOOR-3 17.00 17.90 0.95 2.31 0.13 7 A3 3.00 30.15 0.10 0.08 7 B3 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.04 7 C3 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.03 7 D3 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.02 7 E3 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.02 7 F3 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.06 7 A2 3.00 30.15 0.10 0.08 7 B2 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.04 7 C2 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.03 7 D2 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.02 7 E2 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.02 7 F2 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.06 7 DOOR 2 14.00 17.90 0.78 -

O.13 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 2.56 8 A 30.00 49.90 0.60 5.45 0.11 8 B 14.00 114.00 0.12 0.05 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.72 1 A 5s.00 114.00 0.48 3.14 0.03 i B 29.00 38.00 0.76 0.00 1 C 23.00 161.50 0.14 0.02 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.39 2 A 60.00 161.50 0.37 7.49 0.05 2 B 16.00 104.50 0.15 0.07 2 C 38.00 142.50 0.27 0.05 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.79 3 A 24.00 201.12 0.12 7.49 0.04 3 B 10.00 119.41 0.08 0.06 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.20 4 A 22.00 179.43 0.12 5.45 0.03 4 B 28.00 53.00 0.52 0.10 4 C 7.00 141.20 0.05 0.04 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.69 t

i

TABLE 5.4-7 .

RHR/SI FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( ONE TRAIN )

HIGH WATER LEVEL ( EL. 817.5 FT. )

RHR/SI FLOW (CFS): 5.73 CHANNEL BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SQ.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS

________ ________ - = _ ______ ________

5 DOOR 4 17.00 17.90 0.95 2.59 0.14 5 A4 3.00 30.15 0.10 0.09 5 B4 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.04 5 C4 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.03 5 D4 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.02 5 E4 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.02 5 F4 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.07 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.36 6 A1 3.00 30.15 0.10 3.14 0.10 6 B1 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.05 6 C1 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.04 6 D1 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.03 6 El 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.03 6 Fi 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.09 6 DOOR 1 14.00 17.90 0.78 0.18 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.19 3 A 24.00 201.12 0.12 3.14 0.02 3 9 10.00 119.41 0.08 0.03 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.20 4 A 22.00 179.43 0.12 2.59 0.01 4 B 28.00 53.80 0.52 0.05 4 C 7.00 141.20 0.05 0.02 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.69 O

e

~ - , ,,r v - + - - -

re

TABLE 5.4-8 SPRAY FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( TWO TRAINS )

HIGH WATER LEVEL ( EL. 817.5 FT. )

SPRAY FLOW (CFS): 25.87 CHANNEL' BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SO.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS 7 DOOR 3 17.00 17.90 0.95 4.62 0.26 7 A3 3.00 30.15 0.10 0.15 7 B3 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.08 7 C3 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.06 7 D3 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.04 7 E3 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.04 7 F3 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.13 7 A2 3.00 30.15 0.10 0.15 i -7 B2 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.08

! 7 C2 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.06 7 D2 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.04 7 E2 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.04 7 F2 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.13

. 7 DOOR 2 14.00 17.90 0.78 0.26 l

TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 2.56 8 A 30.00 49.90 0.60 10.90 0.22 8 B 14.00 114.00 0.12 0.10 g _ TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.72

-1 A 55.00 114.00 0.48 6.27 0.06 i B 29.00 38.00 0.76 0.17 1 C 23.00 161.50 0.14 0.04 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.39 l 2 A 60.00 161.50 0.37 14.97 0.09 2 B 16.00 104.50 0.15 0.14 2 C 38.00 142.50 0.27 0.11 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.79 3 A 24.00 201.12 0.12 14.97 0.07 3 B 10.00 119.41 0.09 0.13 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.20 4 A 22.00 179.43 0.12 10.90 0.06 4 B 29.00 53.80 0.52 0.20 4 C 7.00 141.20 0.05 0.08 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.69

TABLE 5.4-9 RHR/SI FLOW CONTRIBUTION ( TWO TRAINS )

HIGH WATER LEVEL ( EL. 817.5 FT. )

RHR/SI FLOW (CFS): 11.45 CHANNEL BRANCH LENGTH AREA RESIST. FLOW VELOCITY NO. NO. FT. SQ.FT. L/A,1/FT CFS FPS 5 DOOR 4 17.00 17.90 0.95 5.18 0.29 5 A4 3.00 30.15 0.10 0.17 5 B4 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.09 5 C4 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.07 5 D4 3.00 110.46 0.03 0.05 5 E4 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.05 5 F4 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.14 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.36 6 A1 3.00 30.15 0.10 6.27 0.21 6 B1 3.00 60.05 0.05 0.10 6 C1 5.00 76.95 0.06 0.08 6 D1 3.00 110.46 0.03 . 0.06 6 El 16.00 111.88 0.14 0.06 6 F1 1.00 36.13 0.03 0.17 6 DOOR 1 14.00 17.90 0.78 0.35 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1.19 3 A 24.00 201.12 0.12 6.27 0.03 3 B 10.00 119.41 0.08 0.05 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.20 4 A 22.00 179.43 0.12 5.18 0.03 4 B 28.00 53.80 0.52 0.10 4 C 7.00 141.20 0.05 0.04 TOTAL CHANNEL RESISTANCE O.69

TABLE 5.4-10 TOTAL VELOCITY-ONE TRAIN, LOW LEVEL WATER HT= 814.80 FLOWS,CFS SPRAY = 12.94 ,RHR/SI= 5.73 SPRAY RHR/SI TOTAL CHANNEL BRANCH FLOW VELOCITY FLOW VELOCITY VELOCITY FPS FPS NO. NO. CFS FPS CFS 5 DOOR 4 0.00 0.00 2.63 0.29 0.29 5 A4 0.00 0.17 0.17 5i B4 0.00 0.09 0.09 5 C4 O.00 O.07 0.07 5 D4 0.00 0.05 0.05 5 E4 0.00 0.05 0.05 5 F4 0.00 0.14 0.14 6 A1 0.00 0.00 3.10 0.20 0.20 -

6 B1 0.00 0.10 0.10 6 C1 0.00 0.08 0.08 4 D1 . 0.00 0.06 0.06 6 El O.00 -O.05 O.05 6 F1 0.00 0.17 0.17 6 DOOR 1 0.00 O.34 O.34 7 DOOR 3 2.07 O.23 0.00 O.00 O.23 7 A3 0.13 0.00 0.13 7 B3 0.07 0.00 0.07 7 C3 0.05 0.00 0.05 7 D3 0.04 0.00' O.04 7 E3 0.04 ' O.OO' O.04 7 F3 0.11 O.00 .O.11 7 A2 0.13 0.00 0.13 7 B2 .

0.07 0.00 0.07 7 C2 0.05 x O.OO O.05

'7 D2 O.04 0.00 O.04 7 E2 0.04 0.00 0.04 7 F2 0.11 0.00 0.11 7 DOOR 2 m O.23 O.00 O.23 t

8 A 5.39 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.15 8 B O.07 O.00 O.07 i A 3.33 0. O'4 0.00 0.00 0.04

• 1 B O.12 0.00 0.42 1 C O.03 0.00 0.03 2 _A 7.54 0.07 ,

0.00 0.00 0.07 2 B O.10 . 0.00 0.10 2 C O.07 0.00 0.07 t 3 A 7.54 O.05 3.10 0.02 0.07 3 B O.09 0.04 0.12 N \ ,

4 ,A 5.39 0.04 2.43 0.02 0.06 4 B O.14 0.07 i O.21 4 C O.05 s 0.03 0.08 l %l <

TABLE 5.4-11 TOTAL VELOCITY-TWO TRAINS, LOW LEVEL WATER HT= 814.80 FLOWS,CFS: SPRAY = 25.87 ,RHR/SI= 11.45 SPRAY RHR/SI TOTAL CHANNEL BRANCH FLOW VELOCITY FLOW VELOCITY VELOCITY NO. NO. CFS FPS CFS FPS FPS 5 DOOR 4 0.00 0.00 5.26 0.58 0.58 5 A4 0.00 0.34 0.04 5 B4 0.00 0.17 0.17 5 C4 0.00 0.13 0.13 5 D4 0.00 0.09 0.09 5 E4 0.00 0.09 0.09 5 F4 0.00 0.29 0.29 6 A1 0.00 0.00 6.19 0.40 0.40 6 B1 0.00 0.20 0.20 6 C1 0.00 0.16 0.16 6 D1 0.00 0.11 0.11 6 El O.00 0.11 0.11 6 F1 0.00 0.34 0.34 6 DOOR 1 0.00 0.68 0.68 7 DOOR 3 4.13 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.45 7 A3 0.07 0.00 0.27 7 B3 0.14 0.00 0.14 7 C3 0.11 0.00 0.11 7 D3 0.07 0.00 0.07 7 E3 0.07 0.00 0.07 7 F3 0.22 0.00 0.22 7 A2 0.27 0.00 0.27 7 B2 0.14 0.00 0.14 7 C2 0.11 0.00 0.11 7 D2 0.07 0.00 0.07 7 E2 0.07 0.00 0.07 7 F2 0.22 0.00 0.22 7 DOOR 2 0.45 0.00 0.45 8 A 10.79 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.30 8 B O.13 0.00 0.13 1 A 6.65 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 1 B O.24 0.00 0.24 1 C O.06 0.00 0.06 2 A 15.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 2 B O.20 0.00 0.20 2 C O.15 0.00 0.15 3 A 15.08 0.10 6.19 0.04 0.15 4

3 B 0.18 0.07 0.25 4 A 10.79 0.08 5.26 0.04 0.12 4 B O.28 0.14 0.42 4 C O.11 0.05 0.16

4 4 - -

-TABLE 5.4-12 TOTAL VELOCITY-ONE TRAIN, HIGH LEVEL

-WATER HT= 817.50 FLOWS,CFS: SPRAY = 12.94 ,RHR/SI= 5.75 SPRAY ,

RHR/SI TOTAL CHANNEL BR'ANCH FLOW VELOCITY FLOW VELOCITY VELOCITY NO. NO. CFS FPS. CFS FPS FPS 5 DOOR 4- 0.00 0.00 2.59 0.14 0.14 5 A4- 0.00 x 0.09 0.09 5' B4 0.00 0.04 0.04 5 C4 0.00 0.03 0.03 5 D4 U.OO O.02 \ 0.02 15 E4' O.OO  ; O.02 0.02 5 F4, 0.00 0.07 0.07 6 , Al O.00 0.00 3.14 0.10 0.10 6 B1 0.00 0.05 4 0.05 C11 O.OO O.04 0.04 6 ,,

6- D1 0.00 0.03 0.03 6 El O.00 0.03 0.'03 6 F1 0.00 0.09 0.09 6 DOOR 1 0.00 0.18 0.18 7 DOOR 3 2.31 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 7 A3 0.08 0.00 0.08 7 B3 0.04 0.00% 0.04 7 C3 0.03 0.00 0.03 7 D3 0.02 0.00 0.02 l-7 E3 0.02 0.00 0.02 7 F3 0.06 s 0.00 0.06

, 7 A2 C.08 0.00 0.08

( 7 B2 0.04 +

.O.00 0.04 73 C2 0.03 0.00 0.03 J7 D2 0.02 0.00 0.02 7 E2 f ' s 0.02 0.00 0.02 7 F2 0.06 0.00 0.06

,7 DOOR 2 0.13 0.00 0.13 3

8 An 5.45 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.11 8- Bfc O.'05 O.00 0.'05 1 A 3.14 ,0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 3 1 1 B' 'O.08 0.00 0.08-1 C O.02 0.00 0.02 2 A s7.49 0.05 0.00 0.00. 0.05 i 2 B O.07 0.00 0.07 2 C . 0.05 0.00 0.05 3 A 7.49 0.04 3.14 0.02 'O.05 s e 0.06 0.03 0.09 l s

' 0.01 0.04 4 A- 5.45 0.03 2.59 4 N'i O.10 O.05 O.15

_4 C O.04 0.02- 0.06 4%

I- __ .- e r

TABLE 5.4-13 TOTAL VELOCITY-TWO TRAINS, HIGH LEVEL WATER HT= S17.50 FLOWS,CFS: SPRAY = 25.87 ,RHR/SI= 11.45 SPRAY RHR/SI TOTAL CHANNEL BRANCH FLOW VELOCITY FLOW VELOCITY VELOCITY

-NO. NO. CFS FPS CFS FPS FPS 5 DODR 4 0.00 0.00 5.18 0.29 0.29 5 A4 0.00 O.17 0.17 5 B4 0.00 0.09 0.09 5 C4 0.00 0.07 0.07 5 D4 O.00 O.05 0.~05 5 E4 0.00 O.05 O.05 5 F4 0.00 0.14 0.14 6 A1 0.00 0.00 6.27 0.21 0.21 6 B1 0.00 0.10 0.10 6 C1 0.00 0.08 0.08 6 D1 0.00 0.06 0.06 6 El O.00 0.06 0.06 6 F1 O.00 O.17 O.17 6 DOOR 1 0.00 0.35 0.35 7 DOOR 3 4.62 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.26 7 A3 0.15 O.00 O.15 7 B3 0.08 0.00 0.08 7 C3 0.06 0.00 0.06 7 D3 0.04 0.00 0.04 7 E3 0.04 0.00 0.04 7 F3 O.13 O.00 O.13 7 A2 0.15 0.00 0.15 7 B2 0.08 0.00 0.08 7 C2 O.06 0.00 0.06 7 D2 0.04 0.00 0.04 7 E2 O.04 O.00 O.04 7 F2 0.13 0.00 0.13 7 DOOR 2 0.26 0.00 0.26 8 A 10.90 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.22 8 B O.10 0.00 0.10 1 A 6.27 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 1 B O.17 O.00 O.17 1 C O.04 0.00 0.04 2 A 14.97 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 2 -B O.14 0.00 O.14 2 C O.11 0.00 0.11 3 A 14.97 0.07 6.27 0.03 0.11 3 B O.13 0.05 O.18 4 A 10.90 0.06 5.18 0.03 0.09 4 B O.20 0.10 0.30 4 C O.08 0.04 0.11 l

-. . ~-

TABLE 5.4-14 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS TWO TRAINS VS. WATER LEVEL .

VELOCITIES (FPS) VERSUS WATER ELEVATIONS (FT)

---

-= ---== -- ------

EHANNEL BRANCH O. NO. 814.00 814.80 815.00 815.50 816.50 817.50 5 DOOR 4 0.81 0.58 0.54 0.46 0.35 0.29 5 A4 0.48 0.34 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.17 5 B4 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.09 5 C4 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07 5 D4 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 5' E4 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 5 F4 0.40 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.14 6 Al O.56 0.40 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.21 6 B1 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.10 6 C1 0.22 0.16 O.15 O.13 O.10 0.08 6 D1 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 6 El O.15 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 6- F1 0.47 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.17 6 DOOR 1 0.94 0.68 0.63 0.55 0.43 0.35 7 DOOR 3

• O.59 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.31 0.26 7 A3 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.15 7 B3 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 7 C3 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 7 D3 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 7 E3 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 7 F3 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.13 7 A2 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.15 7 B2 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 7 C2 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 7 D2 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 7 E2 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 7 F2 0 29 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.13 7 DOOR 2 0.59 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.31 0.26 0 A O.34 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 O S 0.15 O.13 O.13 O.12 0.11 0.10 1 A O.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 1 B O.29 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 1 C- 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 2 A O.15 O.13 0.13 O.12 0,10 O.09 2 B O.23 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 O.17 C.15 O.14 0.13 O.12 O.11 2 C A O.17 O.15 O.14 0.13 O.12 O.11

'3 B O.28 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.18 3

4 A O.14 O.12 O.12 O.11 0.10 0.09 O.47 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.33 0.30 4 B O.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 4 C I

~

6.0 PAINT DE3RIS GENERATION AND TRANSPORT 6.1 Paint Debris Generation Most of the coating systems in the containment at C?SES are LOCA qualified and are expected to withstand the service conditions during normal plant operation and post-LOCA operations. However, for the purpose of this evaluation it is postulated that all the coating systems in the containment fail.

An-extremely conservative worst case scenario was postulated whsre all the coatings (100 percent) inside the containment fail and form debris. This assumption, although unrealistic, provides for an analytical approach to evaluate the effects of the coating failures on plant safety systems.

In addition to the as'sumption that all the paint fails, another extremely conservative and equally unrealistic worst case assumption was made for the particle size distribution of the failed paint. For the paint debris transport analysis, it was assumed that all the paint fails as 1/8-inch particles. This is the smallest particle size which cannot pass through the sump ecreens and-is the most transportable. Thus, this assu=ption is extremely conservative for sump blockage analysis purposes.

Table 6.1-1 summarizes the estimated quantitles of paint used in C?SES Unit 1 containment in various locations. The quantity of paint debris at each elevation of the containment was apportioned The based on the available. paint directly above the floor area.

paint _ .from the vertical surfaces was assumed to fall vertically to the floor surface below. In all cases very conservative assumptions were used to maximize the paint debris transport to

'the sumps. For example, all the paint on vertical surfaces of the containment liner-(up to-the spring line) was assumed to be deposited on the lowest floor (El. 808'-0").

W

} 6-1

, , _.,.-c. . , , , - , , . ,,- ,,_.. , ,. - .-. -... . ,. ,-~,_ - , _ . . . . , , , _ - -

i 1

1 Paint Transport i 6.2 The NUREG/CR-2791 methodology addresses short term and long term transport of insulation debris inside the containment. _The short .

tarm transport is associated with the initiating event such as pipe whip, pipe impact and jet impingement. Eor the purposes of the evaluation of paint debris transport, the short term transport was not considered because it was conservatively aosumed that all the paint fails.

The long term transport begins at the initiation of the recirculation phase of the post-LOCA operation. Dislodged paint is subjected to a circulating water flow during the operation of 1 the containment recirculation pumps. Iluid velocity, debris l dtnsity, and debris size were analyzed to determine if long term transport occurs.

This section establishes the transport velocity required to move the paint particles.

6.2.1 Paint Transport Velocity Using the basic concepts of NUREG/CR-2791 for insulation debris, N the transport velocity for paint particles was derived. Eirst, tumbling motion was considered. A model of the forces on a cylindrical paint particle with its surface area perpendicular to the water flow was developed (see Figure 6.2-1). EA is the force available to tumble or flip the pe. int particle To so that its curface area will be parallel to the water flow.

tumble, the available force (FA) must exceed the friction between the particle and the floor (ps Fg ), whereNs is the static friction coefficient and F is the force exerted by the paint particle normal to the floor, its weight. To find the minimum velocity to tumble the paint particle, FA was set equal toff s FN.

6-2

F4 = Co Ap Pw 9 2 F t = lift force 2ge .

Pw = density of water Fy = (?m-Pw) Vg (g/ge)

Pm = density of material Fg = 0 for tumbling per NUREG/CR-2791 Vm = volume of material Fg=Ms (Fy -F_) = gs Fy g

Ap = area normal to flow Ap = Tf d2/4 ,

v = average water velocity Vg = (tTda/4)t C o (Trd2/4)Pw v2 =((Pm-Pw) (Tid 2/4)h 2 gc L d = diameter of particle Equation 1 t = thickness of particle Tumble Velocity = v :! N s(Pm-Pw)(t) 2qc 0 g = gravitational force a

gPw .

ge = Newton's constant Similarly, the model for slide velocity was developed as shown en Figure 6.2-2. F_or a particle to slide, FA should be greater than the force . required to move the particle. _The major differences in the derivation are that the friction coefficient uced is now the dynamic coeffioient, phe lift force (F() will be cqual to (F g) and areas normal to the flow Ap now equals (det).

_Thus, F4 = CD (det) Pw U2 2ge FN= (Pm - Pw)Vg (g/ge)

Fg=F4 Fg =f.[d (Fg - Fg )

(1 +,yd) Eg = Md Fg (1 +#d) Co (det) Pw gz = Nd (Pm-Pw) (Wd2/4*t)"

2ge Slide Velocity = v = pfd (Pm-Pw) (Yd/4) 2 q c" (1 +pd) CO

• P" J ,

6-3

Tables 6.2-1 through 6.2-9 show the expected transport velocities for several different particles si=es, paint densities, containment conditions, and three particle thicknesses. It chould be noted that while the density of each coating used is known- in the dry film, the density of failed particles is not.

The failed particles' density will include topcoat with all or come smaller portion of its primer or concrete surfacers. Thus a rcgime of failed particle density was conservatively assumed to envelope the known individual material densities. This regime ,

varies from a specific gravity of 1.5 for Reactic 1201 topcoat to 4.0 for Carbozine 11 primer. Failed point particles' thicknesses ware also conservatively assumed at 3, 5, 10, 20 and 30 mils, which envelopes the lowest acceptable thickness to an almost excessive topcoat thickness. The particle size regime considers particles from 1/16-inch to 128-inch diameter. The sump screen opening size is 1/8-inch; thus a large variety of particle sizes which are capable of blocking the openings were considered. Both the tumble and slide transport velocities were calculated and presented in Tables 6.2-1 through 6.4-9, 6.2-19 and 6.2-20.

- Tables 6.2-10 through 6.2-18 show the effect of varying the friction and drag coefficients. The following conclusions can be drawn from the-data presented in these tables:

• The thickness of the paint particle has no effect on its transport velocity.

• The smaller the paint particle si=e, the higher is the potential for its transport.

• The greater the relative density difference between the paint and the water, the lower is the potential for transport.

• The higher the drag coefficient between the paint particle and the moving water, the higher is the potential for transport.

• Variation in the friction coefficient between paint particle and concrete floor of the containment does not significantly affect the transport velocity.

6.2.2 Fine Particle Transport Considerations l

For completeness, the transport velocity for very fine (dust) particles which could be generated from the failure of the coating systems was analyzed. Specifically, the behavior of particles of concrete coating, sand (used as a filler in the concrete surfacer) and zine dust (used in the steel primer) were examined. This analysis provides a quantitative basis for evaluating the safety impact of paint failure other than sump screen blockage:

S 6-4

, , , .--w .----__--.--.--,,._,.---m., , , , . , - - , - . . - - - n,,,_.,--..._-- ..r._.m..--. -,.,--------,---.-----,_..y.,.w.----,--.v--.~--

6.2.2.1 Sand in Concrete Coatings The concrete is covered with a thick film coating system consisting of Nutec 11S, Nutec 11, and Reactic ~_201 with a total coating dry film thickness of about 30 mils. The Nutec 11S is different from Nutec 11 in that it has a sand filler material.

The sand constitutes approximately 51 weight percent of the dry film and varies in particle size from 30-140 mesh.. The transport volocity datermination of 20 and 30 mil thick particles of the previously described density and particle size regimes was parformed. This analysis is presented on Tables 6.2-19 and 6.2-20. In addition, for sand particle transport, velocities w0re evaluated by varying the sand specific gravity from 1.4 to 2.2. The transport velocities determined are shown on TCble 6.2-21.

6.2.2.2 Zinc in Inorganic Zine Primer The steel primer for CPSES is a self-curing inorganic zine type coating with about 85 percent by weight of zine in the dry film.

The zine is added as a basic component of the primer in the form of fine dust. The zine dust particle size is commonly 5-10 microns; however, a particle size distribution by sieve analysis shows that particle sizes will vary from two to 50 microns with the bulk in 5-20 micron range.

B cause failure of the steel primer could liberate zinc dust particles, a tranport velocity analysis was performed for this mnterial. The analysis envelopes the expected particle size and uses both the known density of pure zine (S.G. = 7.1) and the density of the primer dry film (S.G. = 4.0). Due to the extremely- small particle sizes, very small velocities can transport the zine dust.

Table '6.2-22 gives the transport velocities for different particle sizes up to 50 microns.

6.2.3 Paint Transport from Upper Floors The quantity of paint that can be transported to El. 8C8'-0" floor (sump flocr) and the location (azimuth) where the paint will be deposited is evaluated. This evaluation is based on the results of the calculations for: water velocities at upper olevations (Section 5.3), paint transport velocities (Section 6.2.1), and the quantity of paint available in each area (Section 6.1).

The water velocities on the upper floors range from 0.3 to the available 1.2 ft/sec (refer to Tables 5.3-2 and 5.3-3 )velocity

. If required to water velocities exceed the critical transport a paint particle, then the particle is conservatively 6-5

i casumed to be transported towards the sumps. Table 6.2-23 cummarizes the results presented in Tables 6.2-1 through 6.2-18.

The data presented in Table 6.2-23 is for very conservatively casumed contaiment water temperature of 200 F (higher tcmperatures give higher critical velocities for transport). The lowest critical velocity for transport of 0.27 ft/sec is for 1/8-inch-size particles of the Phenoline 305 and Reactic 1201 ,

coatings. The critical velocity for 1/8 inch size, carbozine 11 particles exceeds 0.57 ft/sec. Also, the critical velocity for transport increases with increase in particle size. The transport velocity for one inch size particles varies from 0.75 to 1.62.

For the purpose of this analysis, a very conservative. critical volcocity of 0.27 ft/sec was used. This is the lowest value in the table and is based on the assumption that all the paint fails et 1/8-inch particles. Based on this very conservative critical volocity value and the complexity of evaluating accurate flow velocities on the upper floors, it was assumed that all the paint particles from the upper floors are transported to the El. 808'-0" floor (sump level).

The distribution of the paint debris was evaluated based on the flow paths available for transport frem the upper floors. The flow paths correspond to the open areas in the upper floors where the curbing is not present. The quantity of paint transported through each opening will be proportional to the water flow thrcugh the opening. Table 6.2-24 and 2.2-25 give the flow cpenings, their locatient and the quantity of paint debris transported from each of the upper floors. The paint debris from the containment liner is assumed to be uniformly distributed at the 808'-O" elevation. The transport of paint debris on the 808'-0" elevation where the sumps are located is discussed in the following section.

6.2.4 Paint Transport at 808'-0" Elevation Based on the critical velocities for paint transport discussed in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 and the available water velocitiespaint at the 808'-O" elevation, the transport potential for particles was evaluated. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, a very conservative critical velocity of 0.27 ft/sec was used for this ovaluation.

Paint particles in any given zone of the containment were considered to have a potential for transport with the water flow towards the containment sumps if the available water velocity oxceeded the critical velocity for transport. Ef;ures 6.2-3 and 6.2-4 show the critical areas on the 808'-0" elevation of the containment, where the paint particles have a potential for transport. The critical areas are marked cross-hatched.

6-6

Figure 6.2-3 is based on the low water level and Figure 6.2-4 is for high water level.

For the purpose of this evaluation the following assumptions were uced to determine paint transport at the 808'-0" elevation: I

a. All the paint at 808'-O" elevation and the paint deposited from the upper levels (discussed in Section 6.2.3) is available for transport within the near. sump zone Azimuth 45-0-315*.

b. Paint particles transported from critical areas continue to move from the critical areas until either the particle reaches the sump or enters a zone where the available flow velocity is less than the critical velocity for transport.

c. The water velocities used are based on the low water level in the containment.

d. No credit is taken for possible paint debris hideout at obstructions, corners and curbs.

O e

6-7 e.. .- - , . _ , _ _ , - . - - , . , - _ _ _ , _ _ , , , , , - _ , , _ _ - .,n_, , _ _ _ _ _ _ , , , . . . . , ,_ ~,,n. _ , _ , ,,_.,-.n, , , . _ . _ ,

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s..

sv\..,c,.. ..

c. %s. ...,y. ,/.<,,c.~. ...

.p ,

['t'.*\* . ,k, ** '

\.' s .-~.'.' ,%%%:%'  :~; '. :.),s./

/.w/ 'b ~s.

q=>,* % /.-

y' .

1 9

Plan View FIGURE. G.2 2 SLIDE TPMSPORP FDEL

4

)

i a SG 3 SG -2 m__ 1 54-4 64-1 i .

Sum, -

In i

FIGURE G.2-3 AREAS TH AT EXCEED CRITICAL VELOCITY @ ELEV. 808'-O" LOW WATER LEVEL TWO TRAlblS OPERATING e

v l

ai a

• 4 l

+  !

- 4

, S G -3 SG -2 5"

m

- M usummE*-

=

SQ-4 64 1 q / ,

Sump I

FIGURE 6.2- 4 AREAS THAT EXCEED CRITICAL VELOCIT'( @ ELEV. 80 8'-O" HIGH WATER LEVEL TWO TRAINS OPERATING

TABLE 6.2-1 TRANSPORT VELCCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 10 MILS 60 Orag coef 1.1 Cent. pres PSI Cont. temp F 307 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Wntcr density Lb/cf 57.0

.Vicconity water 0.000073

' Thickness Mils 10 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Pcint den. lb/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumbio vel. fps 0.131 0.149 0.180 0.219 0.272 Dio.in .

12S 9.17 10.46 12.67 15.39 19.08 64 6.48 7.40 8.96 10.88 13.49 32 4.58 5.23 6.33 7.6* 9.54 16 3.24 3.70 4.48 5.44 6.75

8 2.29 2.62 3.17 3.85 4.77 4 1.62 1.85 2.24 2.72 3.37 2 1.15 1.31 1.58 1.92 2.39 1 0.81 0.92 1.12 -1.36 1.69 0.5 0.57' O.65 0.79 0.96 1.19 0.25 0.41 0.46 0.56 0.68 0.84 0.125 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.60 0.0625 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.42

TABLE 6.2-2 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 5 MILS

. Cont. pres PSI 60 Drag coef 1.1 LCrnt. temp F 307 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42

,Wnttr density Lb/cf 57.0

-Viccosity water 0.000073 Thickness Mils 5 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Turb10 vel. fps 0.092 0.105 0.128 0.155 0.192 Dio.in 128 9.17 10.46 12.67 15.39 19.08 64 6.48 7.40 8.96 10.88 13.49 32 4.58 5.23 6.33 7.69 9.54 16 3.24 3.70 4.48 5.44 6.75 8 2.29 2.62 3.17 3.85, 4.77 4 1.62 1.85 2.24 2.72 3.37 2 1.15 1.31 1.58 1.92 2.39 i O.81 0.92 1.12 1.36 1.69 0.5 0.57 0.65 0.79 0.96 1.19 0.25- O.41 0.46 0.56 0.68 0.84 0.125 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.60 0.0625 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.42 e

9

TABLE 6.2-3 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 3 MILS Cont. pres PSI 60 Drag coef 1.1

' Cont. temp F 307 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic 0.42

-Wntcr density Lb/cf 57.0 Viccesity water 0.000073 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Paint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumbit vel. fps 0.072 0.082 0.099 0.120 0.149 Dio.in 123 9.17 10.46 12.67 15.39 19.08

~64 6.48 7.40 8.96 10.88 13.49 32 4.58 5.25 6.33 7.69 9.54 16 3.24 3.70 4.48 5.44 6.75 8 2.29 2.62 3.17 3.85 4.77 4 1.62 1.85 2.24 2.72 3.37 2 1.15 1.31 1.58 1.92 2.39 1 0.81 0.92 1.12 1.36 1.69 0.5 0.57 0.65 0.79 0.96 1.19 0.25 0.41 0.46 0.56 0.68 0.84 0.125 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.60 0.0625 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.42

TABLE 6.2-4 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 10 MILS Cont. pres PSI 20 Drag coef 1.1 Crnt. tamp F 250 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Wctcr density Lb/cf 58.8 Viccocity water 0.000127 Thickness Mils 10 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Paint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tuzblo vel, fps 0.125 0.144 0.175 0.214 0.266 Dio.in .

128 8.78 10.08 12.29 15.00 18.67 64 6.21 7.13 8.69 10.61 13.20 32 4.39 5.04 6.15 7.50 9.33 16 3.10 3.57 4.35 5.30 6.60 8 2.19 2.52 3.07 3.75 4.67 4 1.55 1.78 2.17 2.65 3.30 2 1.10 1.26 1.54 1.88 2.33 1 0.78 0.89 1.09 1.33 1.65 0.5 0.55 0.63 0.77 0.94 1.17 0.25 0.39 0.45 0.54 0.66 0.83 0.125 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.0625 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41

TABLE 6.2-5 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 5 MILS 20 Drag coef 1.1 Cont. pres PSI Cont. temp F 250 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Wntcr density Lb/cf 58.8 Vicencity water 0.000127 Thickness Mils 5 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Pcint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumbio vel. fps 0.088 0.102 0.124 0.151 0.183 Dio.in 128 8.78 10.08 12.29 15.00 18.67 64 6.21 7.10 8.69 10.61 13.20 32 4.39 5.04 6.15 7.50 9.33 16 3.10 3.57 4.35 5.30 6.60 8- 2.19 2.52 3.07 3.75 4.67 4 1.55 1.78 2.17 2.65 3.30 2 1.10 1.26 1.54 1.88 2.33 1 0.78 0.89 1.09 1.33 1.63 0.5 0.55 0.63 0.77 0.94 1.17 0.39 0.45 0.54 0.66 0.83 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.125 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41

-0.06:5 0

+

. e, J

TABLE 6.2-6 .

5 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 3 MILS A

Cont. pres PSI 20 Drag coef 1.1 C nt. temp F 250 Fric coef static 0.6 Fric coef dynamic 0.42 W tcr density Lb/cf 58.8

-Vicconity water 0.000127 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumblo vol. fps 0.068 0.079 0.096 0.117 0.146 Dio.in 128 8.78 10.08 12.29 15.00 18.67 64 6.21 7.13' O.69 10.61 13.20 32 4.39 5.04 6.15 7.50 9.33 16 3.10 3.57 4.35 5.30 6.60 8 2.19 2.52 3.07 3.75 4.67 4 1.55 1.78 2.17 2.65 3.30 2 '

1.10 1.26 1.54 1.88 2.33 1 0.78 0.89 1.09 1.33 1.65 0.5 0.55 0.63 0.77 0.94 1.17 0.23 0.39 0.45 0.54 0.66 0.83 .

0.125 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.0625 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41

TABLE 6.2-7 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 10 MILS Crnt. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Ccnt. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Wstcr density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccocity water 0.000194

' Thickness Mils 10 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumbio vei. fps 0.121 0.140 0.171 0.210 0.262 Dio.in .

128 8.50 9.82 12.03

• 14.75 18.38 64 6.01 6.94 8.50 10.42 13.00 32 4.25 4.91 6.01 7.37 9.19 16 0.00 3.47 4.25 5.21 6.50 8 2.12 2.45 3.01 3.68 4.59 4 1.50 1.74 2.13 2.60 3.25 2

• 1.06 1.23 1.50 1.84 2.30 1 0.75 0.87 1.06 1.30 1.62 0.5 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.92 1.15 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.65 0.81 0.125 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.0625 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41 e

TABLE 6.2-8 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 5 MILS Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef -

1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42

,Watcr ' density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccccity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 5 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Pcint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumbio vol. fps 0.086 0.099 0.121 0.148 0.185 Dio.in 128 8.50 9.82 12.03 14.73 18.38 64 6.01 6.94 8.50 10.42 13.00 32 4.25 4.91 6.01 7.37 9.19 16 3.00 3.47 4.25 5.21 6.50 8 2.12 2.45 3.01 3.68 4.59 4 1.50 1.74 2.13 2.60 3.25 2 1.06 1.23 1.50 1.84 2.30 1 0.75 0.87 1.06 1.30 1.62 0.5 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.92 1.15 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.65 0.81 0.125 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.0625 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41 e

TABLE 6.2-9 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

PAINT THICKNESS = 3 MILS Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Cont.tcmp F- 200 Fric coef static 0.6 Fric coef dynamic 0.42 Water density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccroity water 0.000194

Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumblo vol. fps 0.066 0.077 0.094 0.115 0.143 Dio.in ,------

128 8.50 9.82 12.03 14.73 18.38 64 6.01 6.94 8.50 10.42 13.00 32 4.25 4.91 6.01 7.37 9.19 -

16 3.00 3.47 4.25 5.21 6.50 8 2.12 2.45 3.01 3.68 4.59 4 1.50 1.74 2.13 2.60 3.25 2 1.06 1.23 1.50 1.84 2.30 1 0.75 0.87 1.06 1.30 1.62 0.5 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.92 1.15 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.65 0.81 0.125 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.0525 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41 f

?

l

TABLE 6.2-10 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

DRAG COEFFICIENT = 1.5 Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.5 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic 0.42 W;ter density Lb/cf 60.1 Vicccaity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200

Turbio vol. fps 0.057 0.066 0.080 0,.098 0.123 -

Dic.in 128 7.28 8.41 10.30 12.62 15.74 64 5.15 5.94 7.28 8.92 11.13 32 3.64 4.20 5.15 6.31 7.87 16 2.57 2.97 3.64 4.46 5.56 8 -

1.82 2.10 2.57 3.15 3.93 4 1.29 1.49 1.82 2.23 2.78 2 0.91 1.05 1.29 1.58 1.97 1 0.64 0.74 0.91 1.12 1.39 0.5 0.45 0.53 0.64 0.79 0.98 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.46 0.56 0.70 0.125 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.49 0.0125 C.16 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.35 I

i

~ - - - - - - _ - - - - _ - - - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ .

c .

TABLE 6.2-11 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

DRAG CCEFFICIENT = 1.2

' Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.2

. Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42

.Wntcr density Lb/cf 60.1

.Viccccity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Pcint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumbio vel. fps 0.063 0.073 0.090 0.110 0.137 Dio.in 128 8.14 9.40 11.51 14.11 17.60 64 5.75 6.65 8.14 9.97 12.44 32 4.07 4.70 5.76 7.05 8.80 16 2.88 3.32 4.07 4.99 6.22 8 2.03 2.35 2.88 3.53 4.40 4 1.44 1.66 2.04 2.49 3.11 2 1.02 1.17 1.44 1.76 2.20 1 0.72 0.83 a.02 1.25 1.56 0.5 0.51 0.59 0.72 0.88 1.10 0.25 0.36 0.42 0.51 0.62 0.78 0.125 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.55 0.0625 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.39 S B

TABLE 6.2-12 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

DRAG COEFFICIENT = 0.9 C:nt. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 0.9 Cont. temp.F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42

, Water density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccccity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps .

Paint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200

, Tumbio vel. fps 0.073 0.085 0.104 0.127 0.159 Dio.in ,-----

128 9.39 10.85 13.30 16.29 20.32 64 6.64 7.67 9.40 11.52 14.37 32 4.70 5.43 6.65 8.14 10.16 16 3.32 3.84 4.70 5.76 7.18 8- 2.35 2.71 3.32 4.07 5.08 4 1.66 1.92 2.35 2.88 3.59 2 1.17 1.36 1.66 2.04 2.54 i O.83 0.96 1.18 1.44 1.80 0.5 0.59 0.68 0.83 1.02 1.27

~ 0.25 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.72 0.90 0.125 0.29 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.60 0.0625 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.45 4

s;

\ \

(

i 44, i

1

.s

's 'N .

\ .

.,, TABLE 6.2-13 s 1 TRANSPORT VELCCITY

SUMMARY

DRAG COEFFICIENT = 0.7 g .

s Cont. pres PSI ' 10 Drag coef 0.7 Cont. temp F '

200 Fric coef static 0.6 ss s g- Fric coef dynamic 0.42

Watcr density Lb/cf i 60.1 L Viter2ity water  % 0.000194 ,

3

' Thickness Nils 4.

\

SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf~ s 90 100 300 150 200 Tunblo vol. fps 0.083 0.096 0.118 0.1,44 0.180-

• Dio.in ,

~ ~ -

12. 10.65 12 90 15.08 '18.47 23.04 64 7.53 B,7Lo 10.66 13.06 16.29 32 5.33 L.15' 7.54 9.23 11.52 16 3.77 4.'33 5.33 . 6.53 8.15 8 4.62 5.76 2.66 3.00 3.77 -

4 1.88 2.18 2.67 ' 3.27 4.07 2 1.33 1.54- 1.88 2.31 2.88 1 0.94 1.09' 1.33 1.63 '2.04

-0.5 0.67 0.77 0.94 1.15 1.44 0.25 0.47 0.54 0.67 0.82 1.02 0.125 0.33 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.72 0.0625 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.41 0.51 .

1 4

4,- k

, t .,

s; '> t s

[

4 TABLE 6.2-14' TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

FRIC.COEFF.DYNAM. = 0.1 i

Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static 0.6 Fric coef dynamic 0.1 Watcr density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccccity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils ,

3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumble vel. fps 0.066 0.077 0.094 0.115 0.14; Di o. i n ------ ------ ------ ------ ------

128 4.71 5.44 6.67 S.17 10.19 64 3.33 3.85 4.71 5.78 7.21 32 2.36 2.72 3.33 4.08 5.09 16 1.67 1.92 2.36 2.89 3.60 8 '

1.18 1.36 1.67 2.04 2.55 4 0.83 0.96 1.18 1.44 1.80 2 0.59 0.68 0.83 1.02 1.27 1 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.72 0.90 0.5 0.29 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.64 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.45 0.125 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.0625 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23 L

k l

L

o A

f v

h.

TABLE 6.2-15 ,

TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

FRIC.COEFF.DYNAM. = 0.2

)

Cint. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Crnt. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6

~

Fric coef dynamic O.2 Wstar* density Lb/cf 60.1 Vicccsity' water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 s SLIDE VELOCITY fps Pcint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tumble vel. fps 0.066 0.077 0.094 0.115 0.143 Dic.in - - - - - - - ------ ------ - - - - - ---

128 6.38 7.37 9.03 11.06 13.80 64- 4.51 5.21 6.38 7.82 9.76 32 3.19 3.63 4.51 5.53 6.90 .

16 2.26 2.61 3.19 3.91 4.88 8 1.59 1.84' 2.26 2.77 3.45 4 1.13 1.30 1.60 1.96 2.44 2 i. O.80 0.92 1.13 1.38 1.72 1

O.56 0.65 0.80 0.98 1.22 .

O.5 O.40 :O.46 O.56 O.69 0.86 O'.25 0.28 'O.33 0.40 0.49 0.61 0.125 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.06:5 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.30

(

F / .,

N

=

s e

L

TABLE 6.2-16 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

FRIC.COEFF.DYNAM. = 0.3 Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.3 W tte density Lb/cf 60.1 Vicco3ity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 ~

Tumble vel. fps 0.066 0.077 0.094 0.115. O.143 Dic.in - - - - - -

128 7.51 8.67 10.62 13.01 16.24 64 5.31 6.13 7.51 9.20 11.48 32 3.75 4.34 5.31 6.51 8.12 16 2.65 3.07 3.76 4.60 5.74 8 '1.88 2.17 2.66 3.25 4.06 4 1.33 1.53 1.88 2.30 2.87 2 0.94 1.08 1.33 1.63 2.03

. 1 0.66 0.77 0.94 1.15 1.43 0.5 0.47 0.54 0.66 0.81 1.01 0.25 -0.33 0.38 0.47 0.58 0.72 0.125 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.41 0.51 0.0625 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.29 0.36 k

I l

TABLE 6.2-1? <

TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

FRIC.COEFF.DYNAM. = 0.5 C nt. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static 0.6 Fric coef dynamic O.5 Wnter density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccasity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Paint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200

. Tumble vel. fps 0.066 0.077 0.094 0.115 0.143 Dio.in ------

128 9.02 10.42 12.77 15.64 19.51 64 6.38 7.37 9.03 11.06 13.80 32 4.51 5.21 6.38 7.82 9.76 16 3.19 3.68 4.51 5.53 6.90 8 2.26 2.61 3.19 3.91 4.89 4 1.59 1.84 2.26 2.77 3.45 2 1.13 1.30 1.60 1.96 2.44 1 0.80 0.92 1.13 1.38 1.72 0.5 0.56 0.65 0.80 0.98 1.22 O.25 0.40 0.46 0.56 0.69 0.86

f. 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.49 0.61 r

O.125 i O.0625 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.43 1

e I

TABLE 6.2-18 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

FRIC.COEFF.DYHAM. = 0.6 Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.6 Watcr density Lb/cf 60.1 Vicconity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 3 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Pcint den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 .

Tumble vol. fps 0.066 0.077 0.094 0.115 0.143 Dio.in ------

128 9.57 11.05 13.54 16.59 20.70 64 6.77 7.82 9.58 11.73 14.63 32 4.78 5.53 6.77 8.30 10.35 16 3.38 3.91 4.79 5.87 7.32 8 2.39 2.76 3.39 4.15 5.17 4 1.69 1.95 2.39 2.93 3.66 2 1.20 1.38 1.69 2.07 2.59 1 0.85 0.98 1.20 1.47 1.83 O.5 0.60 0.69 0.85 1.04 1.29 0.25 0.42 0.49 0.60 0.73 0.91 0.125 0.30 0.35 0.42 0.52 0.65 0.0625 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.46 l

i I

TABLE 6.2-19 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

CONCRETE COATINGS PAINT THICKNESS = 20 MILS Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Crnt. temp F 200 Fric coef static 0.6 Fric coef dynamic 0.42 Wr.ter density Lb/cf 60.1 Vicconity water 0.000194 Thickness Nils 20 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 . 200 Tumbio vel. fps 0.171 0.198 0.242 0.297 0.370 Dia.in 128 8.50 9.82 12.03 14.73 18.38 64 6.01 6.94 8.50 10.42 13.00 32 4,25 4.91 6.01 7.37 9.19 16 3.00 3.47 4.25 5.21 6.50 8 2.12 2.45 3.01 3.68 4.59 4 1.50 1.74 2.13 2.60 3.25 2 1.06 1.23 1.50 1.84 2.30 1 0.75 0.87 1.06 1.30 1.62 0.5 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.92 1.15 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.65 0.81 0.125 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.57

-O.0625 O.19 0.22 0.27 O.33 0.41

(

l .

' ' ' ' ' ' ~"

l TABLE 6.2-20 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

CONCRETE COATINGS ,

1 1

e PAINT THICKNESS = 30 MILS '

i Cont. ores PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Wster density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccoaity water 0.000194 Thickness Mils 30 SLIDE VELOCITY fps Point den. Ib/cf 90 100 120 150 200 Tunble vol. fps 0.210 0.242 0.297 0.364 0.454 Dio.in 128 8.50 9.82 12.03 14.73 18.38 64 6.01 6.94 8.50 10.42 13.00 32 4.25 4.91 6.01 7.37 9.19 16 3.00 3.47 4.25 5.21 6.50 8 2.12 2.45 3.01 3.68 4.59 4 1.50 1.74 2.13 2.60 3.25 2 1.06 1.23 1.50 1.84 2.30 1 0.75 0.87 1.06 1.30 1.62 0.5 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.92 1.15

( 0.43 0.53 0.65 0.81 0.25 0.38 0.125 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.0625 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.41 l-O

(

5 TABLE 6.2-21 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

SAND PARTICLES Cont.pret PSI 10 Crag coef 1.1 Cont. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Watcr density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccocity water 0.000194 SLIDE VELOCITY fps CAND DENSITY,1b/cf 87.36 112.32 137.28 PARTICLE SIZE, inches mesh si:e O.0466 18 O.15 O.21 C.26 0.0365 22- O.14 0.19 0.23 26 0.13 0.17 0.21

0.0305 0.0258 30 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.0175 40 0.09 0.13 0.16 O.0107 60 0.07 0.10 0.12 O.007 ' B0 O.06 0.08 O.10 100 0.05 O.07 0.09 0.005 0.0046 120 0.05 0.07 0.08 140 0.05 O.06 0.08

.O.0042 160 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.0038 180 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.0033 NOTES

1. Specific gravity of sand as a raw material is considered as 1.4 to 2.2.

k I

(

TABLE 6.2-22 TRANSPORT VELOCITY

SUMMARY

ZINC DUST PARTICLES l

Cont. pres PSI 10 Drag coef 1.1 Crnt. temp F 200 Fric coef static O.6 Fric coef dynamic O.42 Water' density Lb/cf 60.1 Viccasity water 0.000194

• SLIDE VELOCITY fps ZINC DENSITY,1b/cf 443.04 (note 1) 249.6 (note 2)

PARTICLE SIZE, inches microns 0.001968 50 0.12 0.08 0.001574 40 0.11 0.08

.O.001181 30 0.09 0.06 0.000787 20 0.08 0.05 0.000590 15 0.07 0.05 0.0003?3 10 0.05 0.04 0.000196 5 0.04 0.03 0.000098 2.5 0.03 0.02 0.000049 1.25 0.02 0.01 0.000024 0.625 0.01 0.01 NOTES

11. Density of =inc dust as a raw material.

2. Density of the dry coating film for inorganic =inc primer.

k. .

[

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TABLE 6.2-23

SUMMARY

OF CRITICAL TRANSPORT VELOCITIES FOR PAINT PARTICLES'1*

Velocities (ft/sec) vs Particle Size (Inches) t Density l Paint 1bs/cu.ft. 1/8 i/4 1/2 1 Carbo ine 11 6200'28 >0.57 >0.81 >1.15 >1.62 Phenoline 305 90 0.27 0.38' O.53 0.7 Nutec 11 10088' >0.31 >0.43 >0.61 >0.8 Reactic 1201 90 0.27 0.38 0.53 0.7

-Notes:

(2) At 200 F containment water temperature.

(2) Density 240 lbs/cu.ft.

'88 Density ranges from 100 to 128 lbs/cu.ft.

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TABLE 6.2-24 PERIMETERS OF OPENINGS ON UPPER ELEVATIONS i

i AZIMUTH 905 860 832 RANGE ELEV ELEV ELEV

.0-45 0 0 23 45-90 0 0 0 90-135 0 0 14 135-180 3 6 6 180-225 36 20 28 225-270 23 26 20 -

270-315 ,O 22 0 315-360 0 0 19 62 74 110 l

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TABLE 6.2-25 COATINGS CONTRIBUTION FROM UPPER ELEVATIONS J

AZIMUTH 905 860 832 TOTAL AT 808 RANGE ELEV ELEV ELEV ELEV.(NOTE 1)

~

COATINOS 87800 128200 128200 76480 AVAILABLE

, 0-45 0 0 26805 46743 45-90 0 0 0 19938 90-135 0 0 16316 36254 i 135-180 4248 10395 4993 41573

+

e 180-225 50981 34649 32633 138200 9

225-270 32571 45043 23309 120061 270-315 0 38114 0 58051 315-360 O O 22144 42081

! TOTAL PAINT IN THE NEAR SUMP ZONE (AZIMUTH O/45 '

AFE) 360/315)  : 88824 NOTE 1. CONTRIBUTION FROM LINER PLATE UP TO THE SPRING LINE AND PAINT AT THE 808 ELEV. ARE INCLUDED.

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k 7.0 INSULATION DEBRIS GENERATION

7.1 Tyees of Insulation Most of the thermal insulation inside the containment on both piping and equipment is of the reflective metallic type, composed

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o f. stainless steel. The high efficiency metallic thermal insulation is composed of fibrous media and very fine heat

. resistant particulate matter, totally encased in stainless steel.

All antisweat insulation is fiberglass encapsulated in metal casing and is used on cold water piping.

All metallic insulation, with the exception of the reactor

. coolant pips-insulation inside the primary shield concrete, is designed .to remain in place during an SSE. Figure 7.1-1 shows a

, typical metallic insulatica for piping. Figure 7.1-2 shows the cross-section of a . typical metallic insulation. Figure 7.1-3 shows the clamping arrangement for holding the metallic insulation panel in place. Table 7.1-1 gives the major dimensions, and thickness of each component.

The reflective metallic insulation assemblies are designed to withstand seismic forces resulting from acceleration of 3g in both horizontal directions and 3g in the vertical direction i caused by the SSE. The insulation structural mounting frames and panel attachments to the mounting frames are designed to maintain their structural integrity during the SSE.

Sample panels of insulation were tested to confirm the design.

In order to verify that the insulation meets the required seismic criteria, the insulation supplier has tested a typical assembly on a generic basis. The tests consisted of an initial sinusoidal

' input frequency between 3 and 100 Hz to determine the resonant-frequency condition followed by an endurance test at the lowest-resonant frequency. The insulation assembly was subjected to log's in both the horizontal and vertical directions. No damage or distortion to the structure was observed. .

A series of pressuri=ation tests were also performed to ensure that the insulation maintains its structural integrity under )

i post-accident pressures as well as containment structural I i acceptance test and leakage rate test pressures. A thermal

. transient test was performed on sample insulation panels to ensure that the insulation maintains its structural integrity during post,-accident temperature transients. This test consists E of heat"ng the sample panel to 650 F and quenching it with cold water.

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d 7.2 Insulation Debris Generation ,

7.2.1 Identification of Accident The initiating events for the insulation debris are the postulated LOCAs described in the FSAR. The design basis pipe break locations, their orientations, and their sizes have been determined. With this identification, an enveloping process was l undertaken to_ locate breaks which have maximum potential for unacceptable debris generation. The following criteria were used to isolate the non-critical breaks for this evaluation:

Breaks with barriers interposed between the break and the containment sumps were not considered if no flow path exists which would allow the transport of debris-to the sumps.

- Breaks for which the expanding fluid jet does not impinge on insulated targets were not considered.

Small diameter breaks in the same location and with effects similar to large diameter breaks were not considered. .

- Analysis of longitudinal failures was required only in those cases whose postulated circumferential pipe failures do not target large areas of containment with insulated targets.

The mechanisms which were postulated for insulation debris generation are:

l

e. Jet Impingement

• Pipe Whip

• Pipe Impact Jet Impingement: Jet impingement is the most significant of c

the debris generation mechanisms for insulated pipe. All t targets that intercept the jet resulting from the selected breaks were investigated. It was assumed, for conservatism, that all fibrous insulation within the vicinity of the break being investigated was dislodged and available for transport to the containment sumps. This is more conservative than NUREG/CR2791 which assumes that any insulation subject to a stagnation force in excess of 0.5 psi will result in dislodgement from the pipe. Further, NUREG/CR-2791 assumes the jet from the break covers a certain spray angle. For this report, it was conservatively assumed that all fibrous

[

insulation in the break area is affected.

For reflective metallic insulation, one worst case primary coolant loop break in steam generator compartment #4 was

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7-2

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selected and evaluated for debris generation. Steam generator compartment #4 is the closest area to the sumps where such coolant pipe breaks can be postulated.

Figure 7.2-1 shows the coolant loop postulated break locations for steam generator compartment #4. Break #7 in the hot leg pipe was determined to be the worst case for this evaluation. This makes the choice of this break the worst case for insulation trcnsport and sump blockage potential.

In addition the quantity of metallic insulation released was assumed to be from all the piping and equipment in steam this compartment except the topmost section of the generator.

The second category of worst case break considered for reflective metallic insulation was on the reactor coolant loop cold leg in steam generator compartment #4. It is a 10-inch branch line from the safety injection system.

Figure 7.2-2 shows this break location. The jet portion and the targets were analyzed as part of the CPSES damage study of problem #DSl-17D, break #756 LWR. The damage to the metallic insulation was calculated using all the components and piping within the jet impingement area up to 50 ft.

Pipe Whip: All insulation on the ruptured segment between the break location and the plastic hinge constitutes debris.

However, for CPSES Unit 1 containment, the high energy lines are not insulated with fibrous insulation. Therefore, for this this type of concern does not have to be addressed

insult. tion. For high efficiency insulation, where the insulation is wedged between the pipe whip restraint and the pipe, it is not possible for the insulation to be dislodged as a result of pipe whip. Therefore, no insulation debris will be created as a result of the pipe whip for fibrous and high efficiency insulation. The worst case pipe breaks considered for metallic insulation have pipe restraints which prevent pipe whip.

Pipe Impact: NUREG/CR-2791 assumes that five fabrication lengths of insulation on the impacted pipe are dislodged.

This includes two lengths upstream and two lengths downstream of the impact point, and one length at the point of impact.

For this analysis, as discussed above, all fibrous insulation in the vicinity of the break is dislodged. Again, this is more conservative than the NUREG/CR-2791 assumptions. No l .high-efficiency insulation debris can be generated by this mechanism. No metallic insulation is released by pipe impact because of the pipe restraints used to prevent pipe i= pact.

A field walkdown was performed in the containment of Unit 1 to determine which breaks had the greatest potential for generation of insulation debris. Twenty high energy pipe breaks were 7-3

solected for further investigation. The evaluation concentrates on the breaks which generate the maximum amount of debris and where debris transport to the sump is relatively direct. Two of the breaks release reflective metallic insulation and also cause cetivation of safety injection and containment sprays. The other breaks release fibrous insulation. The quantity of fibrous insulation used inside containment is limited to component cooling water and chilled water piping. This type of insulation l is not located in any of the containment areas where high energy large breaks can release this insulation material to form debris.

None of the breaks in the vicinity of the fibrous insulation are of the magnitude which would cause the activation of the safety injection or containment sprays. Therefore, the availability of the safeguards sumps is not required and sump blockage is not a concern. The quantities of debris generated are presented in Tables 7.2-1 through 7.2-5 for information purposes only.

High efficiency insulation was also evaluated. This insulation, which is a mineral wool type, 1/4-inch thick, is fully cncapsulated in 1/8-inch thick sheeting of type 304 SS. The insulation is located at pipe whip restraints and in the gap between the restraints and the pipe.

7.2.2 Quantity of Insulation Debris The quantities of fibrous insulation generated from various postulated breaks are shown on Tables 7.2-1 through 7.2-5. Short

' term transport of fibrous insulation was not analyzed because it was assumed to be transported to the sumps. .

In the case of high efficiency insulation, it was conservatively casumed that insulation from five pipe whip restraints of safety injection pipes would be dislodged as a result of jet impingement about from a pipe break. This resulted in the generation of 40 square feet of high efficiency insulation.

The quantities of metallic insulation generated from the postulated breaks are shown on Tables 7.2-6 and 7.2-7.

Table 7.2-6 is for primary coolant hot leg break. For purposes of this analysis reactor coolant loop breaks are not. postulated as credible in view of the generic work done by Westinghouse regarding alternate pipe break criteria. For the purposes' of this evaluation for debris effects, metallic insulation quantities given in Table 7.2-7 were used. These quantities are based on worst case break external to the reactor coolant loop.

{_ The metallic insulation debris generated by this break produced the maximum quantity of debris. NUREG-0897 Rev 1 (Draft) and of metallic insulation NUREG/CR-3616 discuss the transport

{-

materials. This information is based on experimental work done at Alden Research Laboratories during the second half of 1983.

Based on these experiments, it is postulated by Alden Research 7-4

that metallic insulation inner foil can be transported at very low velocities.

In view- of this new information, further evaluations were made for metallic insulation debris, its damage potential, and transport to the sump screens. In accordance with the recommendations of NUREG-0897 Revision 1 (Draft), it was postulated that all insulation within 7 pipe diameter lengths from the break will be completely destroyed to open up the metallic insulation. Figure 7.2-1 shows a typical metallic insulation section with all the sub-components. Table 7.2-8 gives the quantities of insulation that will be damaged in this manner and the area of the inner foil that will be released.

The short term ' transport of metallic insulation for this break does not have a direct pathway to the door openings in the steam generator compartments. However, for a conservative evaluation, it was assumed that all the insulation released in -this manner will be propelled by the jet through the doorway for steam generator compartment #1.

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.7.3 Insulation Transport The methodology described in this report is based on NUREG/CR-2791 and NUREG/CR-2982 Rev. 1. The evaluation of long term transport. of debris involves only the metallic insulation because, (as discussed in Section 7.2.2) the fibrous insulation will not cause debris during a LOCA and the high efficiency insulation will sink to the floor.

The transport of the insulation debris occurs in two phases. The first phase relates to the transport of debris caused by the initiating event, such as pipe whip and jet impingement. This mechanism of transport is normally a transient, terminated by dislodging of all the insulation in the affected cone.

The second phase of transport begins with the recirculation of the sump water and continues as long as the ECCS recirculation is cetive.

Following a LOCA and the initiation of the ECCS, the containment will be flooded with water. All the water used for the initial phase of the ECCS is provided from the refueling water storage tank. At the end of this phase of ECCS operation, the water collected in the containment sumps is recirculated.

The transport mechanism for the debris is complex because of the various flow paths and hydraulic resistances present in the containment. In order to simplify the methodology, various casumptions 'were made to produce conservatively limiting conditions which reflect the long term debris transport. The major assumptions werer

a. Water cascading from the point of coolant less and the containment spray will eventually flow to the containment sumps.

b. No stagnant areas exist within containment.

c. The force required to transport debris is a resultant of the friction between the debris and the floor, the normal force exerted by the debris and the buoyancy force.

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I 7.3.1 Transport Evaluation The long term transport evaluation for insulation material was done by a step-by-step methodology using the following criteria:

Step-l Determine the flow of water to various zones in the containment during the recirculation phase of the ECCS l and containment spray operation.

Step-2 Determine the minimum. water level inside the containment

> for the postulated accident.

Step-3 Calculate flow velocities for.each path to the ECCS sump inside the containment. The calculation is based on using- open channel flow equations. The flow is apportioned to each parallel path based on equal pressure drops for each flow path.

Step-4 Using the flow velocities established in Step-3, determine the maximum velocity in each zone.

Section 5.0 of this report discusses flow velocities.

Step-5 If the veJocity calculated in Step-4 is less than the velocity required to move the metallic insulation, then the debris will not be transported to the sump screens.

Step-6 Based on the evaluation in Step-5, the quantity of insulation transported to the sump screens and. the resulting sump affects are evaluated as discussed in Section 9.O.

The containment water levels are presented in Table 5.2-1 and flow velocities for each zone are presented in Tables 5.3-1 through 5.4-12 and 5.4-1.

Transport of insulation debris is dependent on the flow velocities inside the containment. The flow velocities at various zones inside the containment were calculated in Section 5.4. Table 7.3-1 summarizes these velocities in the sump zones. These velocities were calculated at high water level and icw water level for one and two train ECCS system operation. The worst case for analysis will be the case which gives highest -

velocities, i.e., low water level and two~ train operation.

l The fibrous insulation which can be released as debris is t quantified in Section 7.2.2 (refer Tables 7.2-1 through 7.2-5).

[ The accident scenarios for the fibrous insulation debris are all short term transients, which will not cause containment spray or ECCS -system pumps to go into recirculation mode. Therefore, there will not be any requirement for the performance of

[

7-7

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cmergency sumps. In the absence of recirculatien flow, the velocities of water at the sump level (EL 808.0 ft) will be ossentially =ero and no motion of debris can be postulated.

Based on this evaluation, it was concluded that the fibrous insulation debris will not reach the sump and impact the safety of the plant.

The small quantity (40 sq.ft.) of high efficiency insulation (refer to Section 7.2.1)encapsulated will not be transported to the sumps because it is fully in 1/8-inch stainless steel cheeting. The maximum water velocity for any zone at the sump olevation (EL 808 ft) is less than 0.7 ft/sec and the minimum velocity required to transport this material is 2 ft/sec in accordance with NUREG-0869 and NUREG/CR-2791 (page A-23).

The quantity of metallic insulation calculated to be released is given in Tables 7.2-6 and 7.2-7. It was very conservatively casumed that the metallic insulation is transported through door openings to areas outside the steam generator compartment. The maximum velocity in the near sump areas of the containment is conservatively calculated to be 0.38 ft/sec at low water level and 0.30 ft/sec at high water level (refer Table 7.3-1). Using guidance from NUREG-0869, it was postulated that the metallic insulation will not be transported to the su=ps because the water velocities inside the containment where metallic insulation ,

debris is generated (zones 3 and 4) is considerably less than 2.0 ft/sec. In accordance with NUREG-0897 (dated April 1983) evaluation procedure, it was concluded that the metallic insulation will not be transported to the sump screens.

However, in view of the more recent information provided by NUREG-0897 Rev 1 (draft June 1984) and NUREG/CR-3616, more

. detailed study of the metallic insulation transport was performed in this evaluatio.n.

p i

s 7-8

The findings of the Alden Research Laboratory test data reported in NUREG-0897 Rev 1 and NUREG/CR-3616 are discussed below:

a. Transport velocities of metallic insulation components:

1) Single sheets of thin stainless steel materials (such as the 0.0025 - 0.004 inch thick foils used within reflective metallic insulation units) are transported at relative low water velocities, 0.2 - 0.5 ft/sec.

2) "As fabricated" reflective metallic insulation units required w'ater velocities of 1.0 ft/see or more for transport.

3) For all tested insulation material, transport of the test specimen was much slower than the flow velocity.

4) When several pieces of foil were tested simultaneously and interacted.before reaching the screen, the group of foil s ceased movement at the low flow velocities which had sustained motion of the individual foil pieces. Higher velocities, up to 1.8 ft/sec, were required to break up the group of foils and again initiate movement of individual foils.

5) The vertical side walls of the test fiume were observed to hinder the transport of .mamples.

Samples in contact with a wall were often pushed and folded against it, needing higher flow velocities to be dislodged.

6) outer covers (0.037 inch thick) - When lying on the floor with their concave side up, the outer covers of the insulation units started to move at a flow t

velocity of approximately 0.7 ft/see and moved continuously to, the screen at a flow velocity of approximately 0.8 ft/sec. When lying with their concave side down, the outer covers did not move at l

a flow velocity of 1.8 ft/sec.

7) Inner covers - When lying with their concave side up, the inner covers moved at a flow velocity of t

approximately 0.7 ft/sec and reached the screen at a flow velocity of approximately 0.8 ft/sec. With l

the covers lying concave side down, these i velocities were respectively 1.1 and 1.6 ft/sec.

7-9 l

8) End Cover's - The end covers never moved, even at the highest fiume flow velocity of approximately 2 ft/sec.

b. Transport and Blockage Modes

1) Thin- foils (0.0025 - 0.004 inch thick) transported in an intermittent folding and tumbling manner,

! whether' originally crumpled or not. Depending on the position and shape of the foils just upstream

- from the screen, the foils would either flip onto the screen to their full area or be pressed onto

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the screen in a folded position.

2) Neither the flexible thin foils, nor the relatively

. stiffer foils, ever became " water borne." A portion of the foil was always in contact with the test fiume floor. Therefore, the screen was never blocked beyond the foil width or length. If the-foil blocked the screen diagonally, the highest blockage would be the diagonal of a foil sheet.

3) Total blockage of the screen did not occur even t' hen the total foil area in a given test was somewhat more than twice the wetted screen area.

The maximum screen blockage observed was 80%. This

factor is mainly due to the significant foil overlap that occurred in the screen blockage pattern.

Table'7.3-2 summarizes the findings of Alden Research Laboratories reported in NUREG/CR-3616.

The worst case water velocities in the near sump zones where metallic insulation debris is deposited (acimuth 60-300*) are less than 0.42 ft/sec. It can therefore be concluded that the only material which has any potential for transport of damaged components of metallic insulation will be the inner foils. The

' following discussion evaluates the transport potential for metallic insulation inner foil.

- The quantity of . inner foil. that can be released is given in Table 7.2-8 (refer Section 7.2.2). term The worst transport location of the resulting from the foils .at the end of short initiating event will be outside doorways from steam generator' compartments 1 and 4. These areas correspond to channel no. 3 sub-channel A for steam generator compartment 1 and channel no. 4 sub-channel A for steam generator compartment 3. ,

From Table 7.3-1, it can be seen that the worst case water flow velocities (low water level and 2 trains in operation) are 7-10 O

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with 128 to 144 sq.ft of flow area. Since the velocity required to transport the foil to the screens is 0.35 ft/sec (refer Tabl~e 7. 3-2, item 5), it can be concluded that the inner foils will not be tranported to the screens. These foils will cccumulate in the Channel 3A and 4A areas and tend to cluster

, into multiple foils and remain stationary.

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TABLE 7.2-1 FIBROUS INSULATION T.KE OFF DRAWING NO. 2323-M1-0507 Feet of Square Case Line Insulated Feet of No. Location Size Pine Insulation 1 El. Below 860'-0" 3" 31 40.6 Southwest Quadrant 6" 68 142.4 Total . 183.0 2 El. Below 860'-O" 3/4" 43 31.0 Northeast Quadrant 1" 29 22.8 2" 74 77.5 3" 163 213.2 4" 141 221.4 6" 109 228.2 Total 794.1 3 El. Below 860'-0" 3/4" 20'*0 14.4 Northeast Quadrant 2" 3'-O 3.1 3" 97'-0 126.9 f 4" 160'-O 251.2 ,

Total 395.6 4 Part Plan 3/4" 17'-O 12.3 El. 842'-0" 2" 44'-0 46.0 Wall 3" 20'-0 26.2 4" 185'-0 290.5 Total 375.0 r

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TABLE 7.2-2 FIBROUS INSULATION TAKE OFF DRAWINGS No. 2323-M1-0511 Feet of Square Case Line Insulated Feet of No. Location Size Pine Insula.icn 1 El. Above 832'-6" 3/4" 20 14.4 O' Near Cont. 1" 21 16.5 Wall 2" 65 68.1 3" 16 20.9 4" 172 270.0 8" 50 130.9 Total 521 2 El. Above 832'-6" '

3/4" 32 23 315" Azimuth 1" 11 8.6 2" 38 40.0 3" 52 68.1 4" 126 197.8 6" 115 240.7 8" 26 68.0 Total 646 3 El. Above 832'-6" 3/4" 38 27.3 19" Asimuth 1" 10 7.8 2" 37 38.7 3" 46 60.2 4" 111 174.3 8" 12 31.4 Total 340 r

a f-L I'

k r

L.

TABLE 7.2-3 FIBRCUS INSULATION TAKE OFF DRAWING No. 2323-M1-0511-01 Feet of Square Case Line Insulated Feet of No. Location Size Pipe Insulation 1 El. Below 832'-6" 1" 40 31.4 Northwest Quadrant of Cont. Total 31.4 2 El. Below 832'-6" 1" 22 17.3 West Side of Cont. 2" 51 53.4 Total 70.7 3 El. Below 832'-6" 1" 5 4.0 Southwest Quadrant 2" 66 69.2 of Cont. 4" 91 142.9 Total 216.1 l

t 8

\

TABLE 7.2-4 FIBROUS INSULATION TAKE OFF DRAWING No. 2323-M1-0513-1 Feet of Square Case Line Insulated Feet of f No. Location Size Pipe Insulation 1 El. Below 836' 1-1/2" 2 2.0 Reactor Coolant Pump No. 01 2" 37 38.8 Total 40.8 2 El. Below 836' 1-1/2" 2 2.0 Reactor Coolant Pump No. 02 2" 44 46.0 Total 48.0

{

3 El. Below 836' 1-1/2" 2 2.0 Reactor Coolant Pump No. 03 3" 30 39.3 Total 41.3

~

4 El. Below 836' 1-1/2" 2 2.0 Reactor Coolant

( Pump No. 04 2" 23 24.1 Total 26.1 r

s f 6

TA3LE 7.2-5 FIBROUS INSULATION TAKE OFF DRAWING No. 2323-M1-0513-01 Feet of Square Cage Line Insulated Feet of Nn. Location Size Pipe Insulation 1 El. 835'-O" Stm. 3/4" 51 36.8 Cen. No. 1 Compt. 2" 11 11.6 3" 90 117.8 4" 15 23.6 Total 189.8 2 El. 836'-O" Stm. 3/4" 38 27.4 Gen. No. 4 Compt. 2" 44 46.1 3" 144 188.3 4" 7 11.0 Total 272.8 3 El. 836'-O" Stm. 3/4" 44 31.7 Gen. No. 2 Compt. 2" 11 11.6 3" 95 124.3 4" 11 17.3 Total 184.9 4 El. 836'-O" Stm. 3/4" 56 40.4 Gen. No. 3 Compt. 3" 138 180.6 4" 12 18.9 Total 239.9

TABLE 7.2-6 METALLIC INSULATICN DAMAGE FROM R.C. LOOP PIPE BREAK STEAM GENERATOR COMPT. NO. 4 No. of Area Foil Pining or Equio. Damaged (ft2) Liners Stm. Gen. No. 4 2670 10 R.C. Pump No. 4 328 13 27 1/2" Cold Leg 71.43 10 29" Hot Leg 132.47 13 31" Crossover 325.42 14 Containment Spray 62.60 5 RTD 61.52 7 Fced Water 346.16 5 Miscellaneous Piping:

Reactor coolant 601.87 5-10 Residual heat- 61.02 3 Safety injection removal 25.66 2 Mnin Steam 153.19 5&8 Total 4830.34 ft2 Total area of insulation foil = 46,600 fta

t i

l

• j l

l

TABLE 7.2-7 METALLIC INSULATION DAMAGE FROM 10" R.C. PIPE BREAK STEAM GEN. COMPT. NO. 4 No. of Area Foil Piping or Equip. Damaged (ftz) Liners Stm. Gen. No. 4 46.70 10 .

29" Hot Leg 132.47 13  !

RC Pipe 18.77 10 I SI Piping 7.26 -

2 MS Pipe 3.04 5 ]

Total 89.49 fta Total area of insulation foil = 815.64 fta i

o e

9

- , . - - , - - - - - - ---------e--, _ . . ,w r , ,---------,----n - - - n - - -

TABLE 7.2-8.

REFLECTIVE METALLIC INSULATION LOCATED WITHIN 7 PIPE DIA. OF JET FROM PIPE BREAK 756 LWR l Line No. Area Hit No. of or Ecruip. By Jet Foil Liners 1-RC-1-156-2501R-2 2.072 fta 7 1 1/2-SI-1-202-2501R-1 .548 ft2 2 STM. GEN. #4 6.925 ft2 10 Total 9.545 ft2 Total foil area - 84.85 ft 2 4

5 W

, ,..p , . - . , , . . , - ,,.,,,,-..,n.,.-n- ..n, .-.. .- - - . , . - . . ,.... ,--

s TABLE 7.3-1 WATER VELOCITIES IN CHANNELS APPROACHING THE SUMJS (ft/sec)

Water Level High Low Channel (1' Sub-Channel'1' One Two One Two No. No. Train Trains Train Trains 3 A 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.15 3 B 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.25

4. A 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.12 4 B 0.15 0.30 0.21 0.42 4 C 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.16

. Nntes:

1. See Figure 5.4-1 for the channel locations 2 '.1 See Figure 5.4-4 for the sub-channel locations t -

t e

e

TABLE 7.3-2 ,

, TRANSPORT IdID BLOCKAGE TEST RESULT _S W

Velocity Velocity to to

, ,. initiate transport ,

Sample motion to screen Description (ft/sec) (ft/sec) Comments

1. Undamaged unit (half assembly) concave side up 1.0 1.0 - Either flipped on screen or got stuck par-

- tially flipped concave side down above 2.2 Never moved.

2. dutside Cover (0.037" thick) concave side up 0.7 , 0.8 Same blockage mode as un-damaged units.

concave side down above 1.8 ,

3. I'nside Cover (0.015" thick) concave side up 0.7 0.8 With both initial

2. concave side down 1.1 1.6 positions, covers flipped against the screen on arrival and got flattened against it by the flow force.

6 1

D

.-- , , -- , , . , , , - - - , . . - - , . - - - - . -- . , _ , - , . , . . - , . ,r-- ,.,- n., . - . . - , . . - . . , . - - - _ . ,..,,,4-, ,,

Table 7.3-2 (Continued)

Velocity Velocity to to initiate transport Sample motion to screen Description (ft/sec) (ft/sec) comments

4. End Covers above 2 Never moved.

.5. 0.0040 inch foil (36 x 36 inches) uncrumpled 0.25 0.40 Folding and tumbling transport mode, occasionally sliding.

Flips on screen upon arrival, often folded, crumpled 0.25 0.35 Folding and tumbling or sliding transport

. mode.

multiple sheets 0.25 0.9 to Foil (2 crumpled 1.1 interactions 2 uncrumpled) often create j ams needing higher velo-cities to break up.

Signficant overlapping on screen.

Blockage up to about 80% observed.

8.0 NEAR SUMP EFFEC"'S This section of the report summarises the results of analyses conducted to study the behavior of paint flecks which become dislodged in the event of paint failure and fall to the surface of the pool of water existing at the containment lower floor during the post-LOCA recirculation mode.

Ac will be evident from the results of these analyses, only paint which is located near the ECCS sumps or can be washed to the pool curface in the vicinity of the sumps (including the paint on the containment liner segment defined between the a:imuthal angles of 30 and 330' which can be washed down by the action of the containment spray water) has the potential for adversely offecting the performance of the sump.

This section of the report is subdivided into two subsections.

The first subsection addresses the theories employed to describe the motion of the paint particles through the pool of water. The occond subsection considers the propensity for particles reaching the screen to stick to it and result in partial or full clogging of the ECCS sump fine screens.

8.1 Motion of Paint Fragments Throuch the Pool of Water o.. Introduction .

Motion of paint fragments through the pool water is affected by mtny parameters including fragment size, shape, density, and water. velocity. In general, however, the principal characteristics of the fragment motion are related to the local Roynolds number and the fragment mass moment of inertia.

For very low local Reynolds numbers (N g <1.0), paint fragments (herein idealized as thin disks) will move through the water maintaining their original orientation, i.e., the pitch angle with which they begin their descent through water. This particular type of behavior can be described by a theory which maintains the initial angle of the fragment constant throughout its descent through the water. Since the local Reynolds number is defined as:  ;

g . \A/ d R~ r where W is the particle relative velocity (relative to the water), d is the fragment (disk) diameter, and y' is the kinematic viscosity of water, values of Ng less equal to one exist only in regions of low fragment velocity and/cr virtually stagnant pool conditions. These conditions would not simultaneously exist for fragments which exceed 1/8 inch diameter (particles having diameters less than 1/8 inch will not clog the ECCS sump ccreens).

B-t

For higher local Reynolds numbers (1<Ng< 100), the motion of the fragment is characterized by an initial adjustment occurring as '

~its. travel begins through water, whereby any initial orientation -

will adjust itself to an attitude normal to the velocity resultant from pool drift and gravity.

For_ yet higher local Reynolds numbers (100<Ng), the motion will -

ba characterized by a periodic pitching (flutter) which persiste throughout the descent of the fragment. The pitching occillations are damped in the case of the low local Reynolds numbers (1Ng< 100) and hence the adjustment mantioned above rosults, but are not damped for 100<Ng1 (or the damping is very cmall). In the case of the smallest and lightest fragment that cannot pass through the ECCS sump 2 screens, i.e., a *./8-inch disk, 5 mils thick, with 90 lb/ft density, the local Reynolds number 10 generally above 250. Hence unstable oscillations can be expected to persist until the fragment reaches the bottom of the pool or the ECCS screens, whichever occurs first.

Finally, Reference 14 notes that the type of motion that can be expected is also influenced by the mass moment of inertia of the fragment. The latter is given by 1 = m d, .

where m is the fragment mass which equals Ppkft I

and (Pp = fragment density, d = fragment (disk) diameter t = fragment 4 thickness).

When the dimensionless mass moment of inertia of the fragment d3 fined as

( p =.I/Pw 8 where pygd5 is proportional to the mass moment of inertia of a rigid sphere of water about its diameter d, exceeds 10 2, l tumbling motion of the fragment can be expected for Ng < 100.

The tumbling motion probability is increased for progressively i

higher Ng.

For the 1/8-inch fragment, the dimensionless moment of inertit is cpproximately 3 x 10 8 and Ng= 250; thus, no tumbling is expected. As the fragment size increases, the local Reynolds

number increases (for instance a 1/2-inch-diameter fragment will h0ve a Reynolds number of 1000), but the dimensionless mass moment of inertia decreases; hence, tumbling is also not to be cxpected. However, if the size of the fragment remains the same, i.e'., 1/8 inches, but the thickness is increased to about 15 mils (about the maximum expected), then the fragment may tumble.

S-2

3:cause of -l e uncertainty inherent in the behavior of the fragment as it travels through the water, all of the motions dascribed above have been studied, so that the most conservative type of motion, ie that resulting in the longest horizontal distance travelled, could be selected. The theory and results for each type of motion are described below.

b. Analysis of Motion With Constant Angle This analysis assumes that the paint fragment is idealised as a disk which hits the pool surface at any incident angle.

Conservatively, and because of surface tension effects (particles cmaller than 1/8" will break through* the surface with difficulty), small paint fragments (i.e., 1/8-inch diameter, 5 mils thick) are assumed to be momentarily arrested at the water curface, then to start their travel through the water at the cngle of impact with zero initial velocity. Any angle of impact is assumed to be equally probable since for travel in air (or together with spray droplets) the local Reynolds number is high and the dimensionless mass moment of inertia (with respect to cir) is also large and hence tumbling motion would be expected.

Referring to Figure 8.1-1, the equations describing the motion of the paint fragment through water when the pitch angle is assumed constant are the following:

PP du =pVg-pVpS de pp - 0) Aproj sin S  %/

2 ,

p,Aproj cosS g/

1. V du = -C PP-d D (0)p Aproj cos B W + CL (9) 0 A sin 6W 2 , 2 W Proj r

W =u + (V -v)2 2

A proj.= d sin (0) l B .3 l

t

.Harein u = vertical ec=ponent of the fragment velocity defined as positive downward v = horizontal component of tdum fragment velocity Pp= paint density (assumed to be the minimum - 90 lb/ft2)

Pw = water density (60 lb/ft 3 at 200*F)

W = fragment relative velocity Ve = velocity of pool water toward the screen (0.08 ft/sec)

, Cg= Drag coefficient which varies with 9 Cg = Lift coefficient which varies with @

B = angle from pool surface to the velocity vector i

The equations . describing the motion of the paint particle have 4

been written for a two dimensional problem only. Strictly cpeaking, the problem is tridimensional, and under the assumption of constant angle with presence of lift, a particle can travel cideways with respect to the direction of the pool drift volocity. However, if one assumes that lift is negligible, then

side motion can be cor.sidered negligible, and the problem reduces to a two dimensional problem.

The value of' CD fot the circular disk is described as a sine function of the incident angle of the disk relative to flow. It has a maximum value of 1.9 when the disk is oriented normal to 0

, the relative velocity vector and a minimum value of Cp= .074/Ng *

.. when the disk is parallel to the flow (Reference 15). The lift coefficient, C, L is, conservatively assumed to be negligible for consistency with the observations of References 14 and 16, which found it to be so for low Reynolds numbers. However, ccmments by W.W. Willmarth to Reference 16 point out that if the 2 motion is accompanied by large oscillation, appreciable lift is d;veloped. Hence, neglect of lift may not be entirely justifiable.

Ac will be shown later inclusion of lift results in lesser horizontal distance travelled by the fragment.

The results of the constant angle analysis, indicated on Figure 8.1-2, show that if the initial incident angle assumed for i the disk approaches 90', the relatively large downward vertical volocity dominates over the pool " drift" (recirculated pool velocity) velocity so that the fragment does not travel horizontally a significant distrance.

i While mathematically this result is correct, physically it may be unrealistic because the actual behavior at the local Reynolds 9-4 i

numbers (N e 250) is expected to result in an adjustment of the pitch angle An Reference 14 indicates, at the local Reynolds numbers of interest, the fragment will tend to orient itself in the most stable equilibrium state (unless large oscillations are present).

This state-is defined as that which would have the largest dimension ,being normal to the relative velocity, i.e., the disk will move in a perpenticular position to the velocity that

propels it (or drags it).

The results of this analysis show that only paint contained within a distance of 8.6 feet of the edge of the screens has the

_ potential for reaching the screen (i.e., bottom of screen from 9.5 ft. pool surface). Moreover, since the angle remains constant, not all paint within this area will reach the screen, but only a certain fraction.

That fraction is related to the angle with which the paint fragment hits-the surface. Since, as will be discussed later, this is not the most conservative mode of paint transport, discussion of the quantity of paint transported in this fashion ic deferred to a later subsection of this section.

c. Oscillatory Motion of Fragment The second analytical method employs the same equations as the ,

mothod desc.tibed in Item b above, but adds one additional cquation which describes the rotation cf the particle fragment.

This-equation is 2

de . ty 2 (CD Dw L v sin 9 + cosG) .

dt d 2 Ep pp 2t p

Pv Eere tp is the paint fragment thickness, and L is the distance from the fragment center of mass to the center of applied pressure. This distance is given by L= 0. q where a = 90 - /0/

2 H

s. .

Using the two equations given in Item b, plus the third equation given above, the maximum horizontal distance travelled by the fragment as a function of its initial angle of descent is given in Figure 8.1-2. As this figurs sh'ows, the maximum distance which, the fragment can travel is the same as computed by the first me: hod. However, proportionately more paint located within this distance away from the edge of the screen can reach the 85

ccreen, since paint which begins its travel at angles near 90*

can now reach the screen frcm distances farther away than calculated in the prior method.

In the results shown in Figure 8.1-2 lift has been neglected. As Reference 17 ir.dicate s , lift may be present when large oscillation occur. Analyses performed with consideration of lift indicate that in general lift will reduce the maximum horizontal distance that a particle can travel. Because of the large uncertainty associated with the choice of a value for lift coefficients, no credit can obviously be taken for the effect.

However, one can intuitively understand this effect by visualizing that since the particle will travel substantially with its face aligned normal to its motion (en the average since the particle oscillates about this position), it presents an engle of attack to lift which causes lift to reduce its forward motion.

The equation describing the rotation of the paint particle about its center mass contains r.o damping term. This is considered appropriate for the range of Reynolds numbers of interest and when lift is neglected. As the amplitude of the occillation increases and lift becomes pronounced, the absence of a damping

. term will probably lead to incorrect solutione (this is one of the- reasons why lift has been ignored). Actually, the damping term would not be a true damping, but rather a virtual mass offect, whereby the effect of hydrodynamic mass introduced by the angular acceleration through a large rotation is t add an inertia term which opposes the rotation of the fragment.

Figure 8.1-3 illustrates the trajectory of a 1/8-inch paint fragment descending through a pool of water with a drift velocity of 0.8 fps. Two trajectories are shown, one trajectory assumes no lift, and the other assumes a large lift coefficient. As previously stated, little confidence can be placed on the

.cccuracy of the latter. However, its behavior tends to confirm '

that lift will reduce the horizontal distance travelled.

The frequency of oscillation of the particle illustrated in Figure 8.1-3 is 4.17 sec-1. Reference 16 provides an equation from which the expected frequency of oscillation of disks falling through a medium can be predicted from the equation.

~

n(frequency of oscillation) = 0.169 V(p,CD p herein all symbols have been previously defined, one computes that for a particle 1/8 inch in diameter falling with a velocity cpproximately equal to 0.8 fps, its frequency of oscillation chould be about 4.53 sec-1 ,

i S-G

4 i

d. Tumbling Fragments The third analysis performed assumes that the fragment tumbles as l it descends through the water. For tumbling, the fragment is I

idealized as a sphere having an equivalent mass as the disk (a

cphere having a diameter equal to the disk would travel a much j shorter distance horizontally).

Under this assumption the equations of motion are considerably simplified since there is no preferred orientation. This sphere corresponding to the 1/8-inch paint fragment is computed to

~

travel horizontally a maximum distance of 2-1/2 feet.

. Drag for the sphere in the range of Reynolds numbers of interest is approximated by C

D N

(+

6 8.2 Analysis of Potential for Sumo Cloccing 1

If one conservatively assumes that any paint fragment larger than 4 the minimum screen opening which reaches thg screen surface eticks to the surface, and further conservatively assumes that no fragment overlays another fragment, then results of the analysis cmploying method a) (Item (b) above indicate that a large percentage of the fine screens can be blocked.

The precise amount of screen blockage depends on may factors, including the amount of paint, insulation and other debris which may have been transported to the screen by mechanisms described in other sections of this report. This section however, demonstrates that regardless of mechanism of transport, i.e.,

global transport from other containment areas as addressed in the other sections of this report, which clogs the lower portion of the screens, or local transport through the pool in the-immediate vicinity of the sumps, as addressed in this section, which clogs a significant percentage of the upper portion of the screens, there will remain on the top portion of the screen a band j ostimated to be a minimum of 2 inches wide, which will be free of

, paint. This is not the only area of the screen free of paint, 1 debris, etc. The maximum amount of sump clogging resulting from failure of all paint in containment will be 94 percent. Results of the full scale test conducted by Western Canada Ltd.' have chown that this percentage of blockage is acceptable frc= the otandpoint of sump performance and NPSH requirements of the ECCS

,- pumps.

The 94 percent is a composite figure, since as will be shown later there are other areas of the screen which will only be partly blocked. To understand how the 94 percent ccmpesite figure is derived, it is necessary to understand the precise a .

7-7

s .. _

gecmetry of the top portion of the sump. This gecmetry is shown in Figure 8.2-1.

The top of the sump rack is a solid steel plate which extends more than 1 foot outward from the fine screen, and approximately 8 inches outward from the course screens.

A distance of 5-3/8 inches separates the fine and coarse screens (5.5 inches from outer edge); and a solid plate connects the bottem of the fine screen frame to the bottem of the coarse screen frame.

The top of the fine screens is a solid plate extending downward approximately twelve inches. Likewise, the coarse screens are separated from the top plate by a gap, which is approximately ten inches. The top of the coarse screen consists of a solid plate 2-11/16 inches wide.

The results of the analyses in this section indicate that at the beginning, when the screens are relatively free and the inlet velocity at the fine screen is 0.08 fps, the descent of the

~

smallest paint particles through the pool (1/8 inch, 5 mils thick) takes place at approximately 45* trajectory. As particles accumulate against the screen (including debris from the other transport mechanism described in other sections), the inlet velocity at the fine screen itself will increase, although farther away from the fine screen (i.e., just outside the coarse ,

screens) the velocity will not change nearly as much.

Ultimately, as the fine screens become blocked to the maximum extent, the inlet vclocity reaches a value of about 1.3 fps at the fine screens.

At this point the flow through the fine screens behaves as two dimensional flow through an orifice of diameter equal to the screen cpen band. Particles of paint which fall in the pool immediately adjacent to the top plate edge would fall at most along a 45' trajectory until they experience the increased velocities in the region influenced by the orificing effect of the severely blocked fine screens. Those particles which are brought in the vicinity of the lower edge of the coarse screen frame will then be transported at an angle defined as a = can -1 oo Where U S is the terminal velocity of the particle modelled as a sphere, since for the higher Reynolds numbers the particle will tend to tumble, and V.3 is the average of the flow velocity over the distance travelled. Solution for this angle is iterative since Veo depends on the si=e of the orifice which in turn is dictated by the angle.

S-6

At an orf.fice sica of 2 inches the velocity at the fine screen inlet is about 1.3 fps and the velocity at the coarse screens inlet is about .4 fps. At these higher velocities the particle fragment will tumble and behave more as an equivalent sphere.

For a 1/8 inch particle the vertical velocity component will be about 0.3 fps. From the moment the particle crosses the coarse tcreen its trajectory will be defined along a parabola roughly bounded by an angle given byeC = tan 0.3/O.8 or 20 degrees where 0.8 fps is the average velocity over the distance travelled.

Since 5.5 (distance separating two screens) times tan 20' is 2.0 inches, this dimension is the band width of the top of the fine screens which is computed to remain free of paint debris.

-In addition to the free band of fine screens that would remain on all sides of the sump, there is some additional area of the ccreen which will not be blocked.

The screen facing the steam generator wall is computed to be not ccmpletely blocked. Most of the paint on concrete walls is ccmputed not to reach the screen because of its relatirely large thickness (m25-30 mils). of the remainder of the paint a fraction consisting of approximately 35 ft of paint from the coiling plus about 30 ft of paint on pipes, supports, etc., is computed to reach the screen over about half its width. The rcmainder of the width is completely clogged by the ceiling paint end support paint. If there were no other debris against that side of the sump, the screen open area would be about 25 ft2 With debris covering the bottom half of the screen, only about 12.5 ft2 would remain open. This figure is equally applicable to oither sump. Together with the free area at the very top of the ccreen, the total free area would be approximately 24 fta. This blockage would not impair the capacity of the ECCS sump to function, since as stated in Section 4, 19 fta is sufficient.

1 t

7-9

l g Vo s-

'V T f 1 1

I e

Py 8 .

if N Y (L .

k FlGURE 8 ;-;

a OT IO N WITH CON STANT ANGLE 4

6

-- - , --,-.--...e,- - - - - - , , , ,-~.,.r -

m g 0. 8 - t I h 0.'7 -

D i LIFT ASSUMED TO BE ~

> 0.6- NEGLIGIBLE w .

U C

a 0.5-W:  ! .

0.4-i i CONSTANT INCIDENT ANGLE N 0. ,3 -  ;

cc w i  :

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50.!i-

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, i.

0 ,

9'O Is0 PEEL INCIDENT ANGLE C O) (DEGREES )

10-  !

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a .

aw>m .

. V ~

c zo *c s. , .

w i V .

o{

z- j CONSTANT INCIDENT ANGLE

,W t

o .

0 ', 9'O 15 0

PEEL; INCIDENT ANGLE C 0 ) (DEQREES ) ,,

FIGURE 8.1-2 CONST ANT ANGLE. ANALYSIS RESULTS

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FIGURE 8.2- 1 SUMP GEOMETRY

, , _ , _ , , _ - _ _ . _ , . - . - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----e,

9.0 DEBRIS EFFECTS ON EMERGENCY SUMPS Ecch of the two containment recirculation sump screens has a total through-flow area of 386 ft2 The sump screen design is in cecordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.82 with a through-screen velocity of 0.11 fps. Figure 3.2-2 shows the arrangement of the Emergency Sumps.

.The NPSH for RER/SI pumps and containment spray pumps during the rceirculation phase is given in Table 4.1-2.

Blockage of the sumps by debris will tend to increase the pressure losses across the sump screens. The increase in pressure losses will depend on the extent of the blockage and the porosity of the debris. The increase in pressure losses will r duce the available pump NPSH. This can have an adverse effect on the operation of the recirculation pumps, if it exceeds the

. margin between available and required NPSH.

For totally impermeable debris, the pressure loss across the sump ccreens was calculated based on the area available for flow, excluding the projected blockage area.

The evaluation of fibrous insulation debris generation shows that there are no cones inside the containment where such insulation can fail to cause debris coincident with a demand for the cmergency sump operation.

The insulation debris transport analysis discussed in Section 7.3 datermined that the high efficiency insulation and metallic insulation will not be transported to the sump screens.

Any paint debris that is transported to the sump by sliding along the concrete surface will accumulate on the floor. This is b:cause the water velocity at the screens is much lower than che volocity required to put the debris into suspension. However, for a conservative first approximation, to determine if pressure losses were excessives it was assumed that the screens will be blocked by the paint particles forming a heap next to the screens with an angle of repose of 45 degrees. Figure 9-2 shows a graph of the quantity of paint accumulation at the sump screens corresponding to different levels of sump screen blockage.

The quantity of paint that has any potential for transport to the cump screens is the paint in the sump area itself as discussed in Section 6.2 Paint Debris Transport.

Table 6.2-25 gives about 89,000 sq. ft., as the quantity of paint that can accumulate in the near sump cone (acimuth 45-0/360 - 315*). This quantity includes:

9-1

~ . - . . -

4

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\. g ai All the paint _ ' debris from upper floors of the containment which can be transported to the near sump zone. .

b. All the paint on the containment liner in the sector for the'near sump =ene.up to the spring line.

c. All the epaint between elevations 808' and 832' in the near sump sone.

- The 89,000 sq. ft. of paint Yin the near sump =ene will consist of concrete and steel coatings." For a conservative estimate of the volume of paint debria, it-was assumed that most of this coating 10 from concrete surfaces with an ' average paint thickness of 20 mils. It was also conservatively assumed that the bulk d nsity of the pai.nt debris is only 50 percent of the actual d:nsity. Based on these conservative assumptions, the volume of point debris in the near sump area was calculated to be about 300 cubic feet. This amount of debris constitutes about 50 percent sump screen blockage.

From Figure 9-2, it can be concluded that about 35 percent of the cump screens will be, blocked if all the coating were from steel curfaces and about 50 percent blockage if all the coatings were from concrete surfaces.t 'Ihis amount of blockage must be combined with the blockage frcm near field effects as determined from SOction.8.\ As can be ,seen~from the last paragraph of 'section 8, this combination leads to the conclusion that 24 square feet of ccreen area is available. Using data from Table 4.1.3, \tdie head loss through the screens is estigated to be 0.4 feet. Because of this loss, the elevation of water in the containment required to cupply the minimum NPSH to the ECCS pumps is increased. Using data from table 4.1.J,- the NPSM margin for these pumps will be as chown in Table 9-1. .,

Bnsed on the above_ evaluations for insulation and paint debris off<ects on the emergency , sump performance, the following conclusions were arrived at:

a. Insulation has.no potential for forming debris which can block the sump screens.

b. Paint debris accumulating in the near sump area resulting from all the coating systems failing in the containment cannot.: result in unacceptable sump screen blocknae.

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I TABLE 9-1 SPRAY AND RER PUMP !GSH Punp PARAMETER CSS RER Loss through screen with 24 ft* area, feet 0.4 0.4 Water elevation to supply required NPSH, feet (1' 1.02 2.6 Water elevation available, feet (18 6.83 6.83 NPSH margin, feet 5.81 6.63 NOTE:

'1' Feet above containment floor (EL. 808 ft) l

APPENDIX 1 APPENDIX TO REPORT ON EVALUATION OF PAINT AND CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PERFORMANCE BY GIBBS & HILL, INC.

WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATION OF PAINT DEBRIS EFFECTS ON THE CPSES EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM um m

INTRCDUCTION Wantinghouse was requested to evaluate the CPSES Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) to determine if the system function /ccmponents would be degraded by the ingestion of paint debris postulated to be present in the containment sump following a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This evaluation was made based on the folleming assumptions:

a. Carboline Carbo ine-11 fails during the LCCA and releases sine to the ECCS.

b. The cine remains suspended in the ECCS coolant.

c. Leachable chloride from all containment paint has the potential to reach the ECCS.

Using the above assumptions an in-depth review was made of the ECCS and its critical components to determine what potential corrosion / erosion degradation effects might be expected. Also, no deleterious effects are postulated in the reactor core for the mhterial concentrations assumed in this evaluation.

A chemical analysis of all containment paints was made to determine the amount of leachable chlorides which could potentially be absorbed into the ECCS. .

s Evaluation of the Emergency Core Cooling System, Potantial Decradation The Emergency Core Cooling System and its critical operating components which include the high and medium head injection pumps, the low head Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps, valves, orifices and RER heat exchangers were evaluated for potential corrosion and erosion degradation associated with the failure of the Carboline carbo:ine-11 paint at LOCA conditions and the subsequent ingestion of =inc into the ECCS. Cinc particles in the range of two to 50 microns were assumed to be present in the coolant water and remained in suspension during the post-accident ECCS cperating sequences. Leachable chlorides from all the containment paints were also assumed to be absorbed into the ECOS coolant.

w The in-depth evaluation of the ECOS and its critical components failed to identify any condition or component that would experience significant erosien or corrosion damage. Chemical analysis of the six paints used in containment identified potential chloride concentration levels which are significantly <

below those levels which could cause stress corrosion cracking problems in sensitized austenitic stainless steel.

If the sinc assumed to be present in the ECCS coolant should cattle / drop out of suspension a major portion of the drop out

would occur in the reactor vessel lower plenum where flow velocities are expected to be s .1 ft/sec during ECCS recirculation. The available drop out volume of the reactor vessel lower plenum is > 300 ft 3 and would adequately contain all the zine which could be ingested into the ECCS.

Containment Paint Chemical Analysis Results The impurity contribution of the various containment paint nystems to contamin'ation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) assuming all paint leachables are released to the ECCS was calculated assuming the following parameters:

Volume of Fluid in Containment 550,000 gallons Metal Paint Volume 7.85 x los e=s Concrete Paint Volume 2.02 x 107 cm 3 Touch-Up Paint Volume Insignificant compared to the above volumes.

The analy=ed chloride content of the various containment paints, their contribution to the total chlorides and the total chlorides contained in these paints are presented in Table 1.

The total chlorides from the paint systems (6,192 grams) would result in an ECCS coolant chloride concentration of 3.0 ppm.

This value is significantly lower than the 96.5 ppm concentration level below which no cracking of sensitized austenitic stainless steel would occur in 12 months when exposed at 150 F to a solution of boric acid and sodium hydroxide at pH 8.5. This 96.5 ppm value is obtained using two plots presented in WCAP-7628, Stress Corrosion Testing, D.D. Whyte, 1978, and which conservatively assumes that the slope of the chloride concentration versus time to crack plot is the same at high pH (8.5) as at low pH (4.5). This value was calculated to be 96.5 ppm of chloride. Since the total chloride leachables from all containment paint would result in only r 3.0 ppm concentration, no stress corrosion cracking of any of the nustenitic stainless steels would occur.

Effects of Fluoride Content of Paint on Corrosion If any fluoride ions were present in the paints, no fluoride cracking of sensitized stainless steel would occur since it would form fluoroborates which do not crack stainless steel.

m L

E TABLE 1 z

~

Total Chloride Total Weight Chloride Concentration, of Paint, Released, Material ecm grams grams R

E Metal Paint Phenoline-305 170 to 180 7.25 x 108 1269 Carbo inc-11 70 to 80 1.0 x 107 750

! Concrete Paint Nutsc-115 + 11 + 1201 95 te 120 3.9 x 107 4173 g Touch-Un Paint

[ Carboline-191 250 to 300 Insignificant compared to a above quanti-ties.

e F Total paint chloride which would be potentially released = 6,192 grams.

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Summarv and Conclusions ]

The evaluation of the ECCS and its critical operating components 1

revealed no potential erosion or corrosion degradation with respect to the postulated ingestion of sinc into the ECCS. The j conclusions resulting from this evaluaiton and the related _

containment paint chemical analysis are as follows: =

+ No significant erosion or corrosion damage to the ECCS or to its critical components. 5

=

• Leachable chloride concentration levels (for all containment M paints) which could enter the ECCS are significantly below chloride concentration levels which could cause cracking <

the in sensitized austenitic stainless steel.  ;

• No fluoride cracking of sensitized stainless steel will occur '

since any fluoride ion, if present, would form fluoroborates which have no effect on stainless steel. 1 9

= No deleterious effects are postulated in the reactor core for -

the material concentrations assumed in this evaluation. ',

M d

b

-im W

3 m

W E

d 5

3 5

_a a

REFERENCES -

i a

1) ANSI N101.2 -

1972 Protective Coatings (Paints) for Light -

Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities --

SSPC, Volume 1, Steel Structures Painting Manual, Chapter 23 a

2) '

- 1982 3

3) ASTM D772-47, Standard ;1ethod of Evaluating Degree of Flaking .,

(Scaling) of Exterior Paints, Volume 06.01 - 1984 4:

E714-56, Standard Method of Evaluating Degree of -

4) ASTM Blistering of Paints, Volume 06.01 - 1984 2 D660-44, Standard Method of Evaluating Derree of j

5) ASTM Checking of Exterior Paints, Volume 06.01 - 1984 7

6) NUREG/CR -2791 1

7) Regulatory Guide 1.82 !_

8) Western Canada Hydraulic Laboratory Report, Dated November

1981

9) Open Channel Hydraulics, Vente Chow, McGraw Hill, 1959 _

of Hydraulics, Brater King, McGraw Hill, 5th

10) Handbook Edition, 1963 4

11) Design of Small Dams, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Government Printing office, 1974 -

?

12) NUREG - 0897, Rev. 1 (Draft), June 1984 -

m

13) NUREG/CR'- 3616 #

14) W.W. Willmarth, N.E. Hawk, and R.L. Harvey, " Steady and  ;

Unsteady Motions and Wakes of Freely Falling Disks," The 2 Physics of Fluids, 7, 2, 197-208 (1964).

" Aerodynamics, Aeronautics, and Flight 5

15) B. McCormick "

Mechanics," John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1979.

16) E.K. Marchildon, A. Clamon, W.H. Gauvin, " oscillatory Motion j of Freely Falling Disks," Physics of Fluids, 9, 2018 (1964).

Willmarth " Reply to Cc=ments by E.K. Marchildon,

17) A.W.W.

A. Clamen, and W.H. Gauvin," The Physics of Fluids, 9, 2019 f (1964). -7 a

J

=

a n .--

. _ . .