ML20247R038

Advises of Case Position Re Need for Regulatory Enforcement Action in Response to Mgt Process & Administrative Control Failures Evidenced by 890505 Event at Facility

ML20247R038
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	09/23/1989
From:	Garde B Citizens Association for Sound Energy, ROBINSON, ROBINSON, PETERSON, BERK, RUDOLPH, CROSS
To:	Charemagne Grimes Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CP-89-015, CP-89-15, NUDOCS 8909290153
Download: ML20247R038 (3)

Text

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. Robinson,

. Robinson, Peterson, Berk, Rudolph, Cross & Garde f Mary Lou Robinu>n - Attorneys at Law -

Nila Jean Robinson los East College Avenue

John C Pete.roon ' Appicton, Wisconsin 54911'.

' Avram Di Berk : . (414) 781 1817

E Michael Rudolph -- . Green Bay 494-9600 Dan Cross Fax 7soas41 Billie Pirner Garde September 23, 1989 Christopher I. Grimes, Director Comanche Peak' Project Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 2055

> 1 RE: Auxiliary Feedwster System Check Valves

-SDAR:-CP-89-015 Docket No. 50-445;

< Permit No. CPPR-126

Dear Mr. Grimes:

As you know,-Citizens.' Association for Sound Energy (" CASE") has.been actively involved in monitoring the deficiency involving a May.5, 1989, incident that led to backleakage through.the Auxiliary Feedwater ("AFW")

System check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station ("CPSES").

The incidents that 'gave rise to the backleakage are wellf documented in -

the various pieces of correspondence related to this event and thus are not repeated in this letter. (See list of references at the end of this letter.)

The purpose of this letter is te inform the Nuclear Regulatory Coinmission.("NRC") of CASE's position regarding the need for regulatory enforcement action in response to the management procecs, and administrative control failures evidenced by this event. In our view, the fact'that TU Electric personnel did not prevent or. saitigate the May 5,1989, event by recognizing-'the significance of occurrences on April 5, 19, and 23,~1989, indicates a major programmatic deficiency. This programmatic deficiency deserves escalated enforcement action in the form of a Severity Level III violation and issuance of a civil penalty. CASE believes that the deterrent effect of the issuance of a civil penalty is needed in this case'to emphasize the seriousness of this management and programmatic failure. This is particularly true because if the plant had been operating, the result of this event could have been an unplanned release of radioactivity.

Further, CASE believes that this action is appropriate because one of the " root causes" of this problem apparently was the lack of coordination and lenowledge between the Task Team developed by CPSES to investigate all of the aspects of the April 23, 1989, AFW system check valve problem and the 1

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l-site management responsible for planning and executing the Hot Functional

-Test. This basic lack of coordination resulted in TU Electric's proceeding with a critical, expensive, milestone test in virtual ignorance of a problem with hardware that was subject to the thermal stress and temperatures of the

'HFT, with no consideration of the potential consequences. _( See Section 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 of Reference 3.)

CASE recognizes that TU Electric took prompt and comprehensive corrective action once upper management became involved in this incident.

The actions and responses of management should, of course, be considered in the NRC's evaluation of mitigating circumstances. However, the retroactive analysis of management in response to a high-profile problem does not negate the seriousness of the programmatic and management flaws that allowed leaking valves to escape deportability by system operators on April 5, 1989, and the failure of site management to direct a timely evaluation of the April 19 and 23, 1989, ev- ots to insure a coordinated response to the problem in a manner that should have, and would have, prevented the incident from occurring in the first place.

These concerns about management's attitude and ability to respond to identified problems are particularly important in light of the forthcoming fuel load date for CPSES.

For further information, please feel free to contact CASE's President,

-Mrs. Juanita Ellis, (214) 946-9446.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely, A & 4t,4 Billie Pirner Garde Attorney for CASE cc:

U. S. NRC:

James Lieberman, NRC, Director of Enforcement Robert F. Warnick, OSP, NRC TU Electric:

Dr. A.'Husain, ORC Chairman, TU Mr. William G. Counsil, Vice President, TU Mr. W. J. Cahill, Vice President, TU Ms. Susan Palmer, Stipulation Manager, TU 2

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i List of

References:

1. May 5, 1989, letter from C. 1. Grimes to W. J. Cahill, CAL 89-01

2. June 19, 1989, letter from W. J. Cahill to U. S. NRC, TXX-89424'  ;

(50.55(e) Report)

3. July 10, 1989, letter from R. F. Warnick to W. J. Cahill, AIT Report 50-445/6-89-30

4. July 24, 1989, letter from W. J. Cahill to U. S. NRC, TXX-89492

5. August 18, 1989,- letter from W. J. Cahill to U. S. NRC, TXX-89596 (Respense to IER 89-30)

6. August 31, 1989, Information Notice No. 89-62, " Malfunction of Borg-Warner Pressure Seal Bonnet Check Valves caused by Vertical Misalignment of Disk."

7. CPSES " System Functional Test: Check Valves and Hot Functional Safety.

Injection," 1CP-PT-57-09SFT, Rev. O i

8. Meeting Notes from June 17 and 19, 1989 briefings on the check valve incident.

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