ML20005G538
| ML20005G538 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1990 |
| From: | Garde B Citizens Association for Sound Energy, ROBINSON, ROBINSON, PETERSON, BERK, RUDOLPH, CROSS |
| To: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005G539 | List: |
| References | |
| CAL-89-01, CAL-89-1, NUDOCS 9001190301 | |
| Download: ML20005G538 (14) | |
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. Robinson,
' Robinson, Peterson, Beix,-
0 Rudolph, Cross & Garde
> Mary Lou Robinson Attorneys at Law =
? Nila Jean Robinson.
los East College Avenue
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John C. Peterson-Appleton Wisconsin 64911
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Avram D. Berk '
(414) 781 1817
- Michael Ru,lolph Green Bay 494-9000 Dan Crons Fax 780 8841 h
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January 10, 1990 n.
Dr. Thomas'Murley, Director a
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- Office'of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation
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y i l q' ' s U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission
- !.1555-Rockville Pike-i1LWhite-Flint North-q Rockville, MD: 20852' i
Comanche Peak' Steam Electric Station (CPSES)
-SUBJECT 1 Docket Nos. 50-445/50-446 I
REF:
Letter (January 5, 1990,,from W. J. Cahill, Jr.,
TU Electric to U'.S.
NRC~.
Dear-Dr. Murley,
s Ob behalfI of.my client,. the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE),. I respectfully request your. -immediate attention andLresponse1toLthis' letter.
7 On January 8,' '1990,; CASEa received' a copy of TU Electric's C
1 January 1 5, "1990, tletter - to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
(NRC) advising that the' Comanche Peak nuclear power plant is i
substantially. complete," that "(s)ystems required for fuel load are _ functional and-will be declared OPERABLE by January 22,
-1990, "- and-: thatT Uni t..1 of Comanche' Peak will be. ready for the s
NRC's. Operational? Readiness Assessment. Team to return to complete q
its inspection..for plant readiness.
Attached to the letter'was a i
document-entitled
" Status of Actions to be Taken Prior to Completion iof L the Operational' -Readiness Assessment Team Inspection: Activities."-
Absent from this letter were all the
' issues in dispute between-CASE and TU Electric, substantial
,m unresolved regulatory matters, and any acknowledgement of other J
areas of concern betweeg CASE and TU Electric that also are areas of? interest to the NRC.
1; Although.the NRC has not formally responded to Mr. Cahill's
-January 5, letter, we note that Mr. Christopher Grimes, Director,
-1 There are other CASE concerns that are being pursued with TU Electric outside of any regulatory involvement, either formal or informal.
These concerns are not addressed in this letter.
9001190301 900110 9
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Comanche Peak-Project-Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor hegulation, was quoted in the Texas local media as saying that t
the-plant is ready, and that he would recommend that you sign a t
letter. authorizing low power operations.
We accept the possibility that.Mr. Grimes was misquoted; however,-his alleged response has given rise to great concern that the NRC is going to make its decision about fuel load rea6iness,without consideration E
.and resolution of the important issues CASE has raised about the plant.
These issues - are, for the most part, presently pending 5
before the-NRC Staff for resolution.
Unless TU Electric and CASE
[t reach an agreement on the disputies, CASE expects resolution by the Staff prior to fuel load and cannot fathom any responsible licensing. decision that did not consider these matters.
t When CASE reached a settlement with TU Electric in July g
19_88, and entered into the Joint Stipulation with TU Electric and the-NRC Staff, it was with the expectation that the basis for any u
L-t
. licensing decision would be a responsible, supportable staff b
conclusion on readiness of the plant and its management to become a-operational.
Apparently TU Electric's position is that issues raised by - CASE - in dispute as well as pending regulatory violations and enforcement activity can be ignored until after fuel loading has begun.
We emphatically disagree with that
=
- position, and request an opportunity to meet with you in L
Washington or, preferably in Dallas at your earliest convenience to discuss this.
r As you know, CASE settled the process in contested operating i
license challenge in exchange for the process in the Joint E
Stipulation.
In doing so, CASE abandoned a litigation forum, in L
which lawyers argued with lawyers over events and incidents so far; removed-in time in the evidentiary process that, in our view, F
the benefit to advancing public health and safety was de minimis.
Instead, CASEaggressivelybeganamonitoringandoverspght
~
role 2
of activities at the plant with technical experts.
These P
~
2 These experts include Jack
- Doyle, a CASE technical
-consultant with over thirty years of experience in nuclear and aerospace design and engineering and nine years of experience at Comanche Peak.
Mr.
Doyle's original concerns about the pipe support design at the plant led to a virtual 100% redesign and e
rewcrk activity, as well as substantial other reinspection and corrective action in plant systems; Owen Thero, President of Qual'ity Technology company (0TC),
technical consultant with thirty-four years of experience in the nuclear and aerospace industry and sixteen years of experience in monitoring the compliance of nuclear utilities with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements and development of worker allegation programs; Edna ottney, a CASE consultant with ten years of experience in nuclear quality assurance and related areas; and Shannon Phillips, a
former NRC resident inspector with twelve years of experience with the NRCr the last five at Comanche Peak.
CASE has also p
continued to rely on and utilize the services of former plant employees who have raised a variety of concerns about plant 2
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activities have provided CASE a. day-to-day view of the plant, both its strengths and' its weaknesses.
CASE, unlike the NRC
,1 Staff with a myriad of responsibilities, has been able to i
concentrate its efforts on evaluating certain events, problems, and deficiencies. -in order to determine-programmatic and s
i management weaknesses contributing to the problems that could impact public. health and safety during plant operation.
Our evaluatiens have usually led to self-initiated corrective action by TU Electric.'
However, on a number of issues CASE has had to resort' to raising the. issue f ormally = to the NRC in dispute according '_to the provisions of the Joint Stipulation.
It is CASE's view that, like the resolution of contested issues in front of the Licensing Board, those issues that are the subject of formal dispute between CASE and TU Electric must be resolved prior to a fuel load decision.
1 In addition to the issues in dispute, there_are a number of important regulatory actions that are presently pending resolution and disposition by the NRC Staff.
It is CASE's view that these issues must be resolved prior to fuel load.
Each of the. pending. issues, whether_an open regulatory action or a CASE dispute, identifies serious programmatic deficiencies and process failures that TU Electric has affirmatively denied and/or to which they have failed to promptly and comprehensively respond in 1
a manner that demonstrates responsible management actions.
If the NRC Staff intends to consider the fuel load
)
- readiness-decision without all of these matters being resolved, CASE requests that you inform _us of that intent immediately.so that.we can promptly advise the Commission of our disagreement 1
with the Staff's direction.
CASE has expended considerable time and resources on its monitoring and oversight programs.
As stated above, the
- expenditure of time and resources devoted to analyzing facts and background material of issues in dispute has generally overshadowed ' the time and resources that the NRC Staff has
- available to devote to single issues.
CASE's views, supported by its technical work, are studies of TU Electric efforts to deal with problems.
The issues CASE has put in dispute all indicate serious and significant weaknesses with the TU Electric Quality l
Assurance program and its ability to support fuel loading and operations in a manner that will provide reasonable assurance that-the plant will be able to be operated safely.
The various issues in dispute and under regulatory consideration indicate to
~
CASE that TU Electric has not yet demonstrated an aggressive, quality-minded, prudent management style capable of understanding the safety significance of certain
- events, incidents, and deficiencies.
Durin operations such a weakness could lead to serious consequences.g 4
I have included a brief summary of the issues in dispute systems and processes over the years.
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. between CASE and TU. Electric and identified the open - regulatory
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-mattere1that CASE believes must be resolved before fuel load.
I
-have-also included-a summary of some of the issues of concern to CASE'that.it, along.with-the NRC,-has been monitoring and which are-not yet. resolved.-
Although these issues have not'devtJ.oped into. disputes, they have implications on the readiness of the plant for fueliload and operation that must be' considered.
~
I.
UNRESOLVED REGULATORY MATTERS:
I t
1)
Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valve. Issue and pending l
Enforcement Action During the Hot Functional Testing of Unit 1 there were a series of events involving check valve back leakage.
These events-occurred on April 5, 19, 23,-and May 5, 1989.
On May 5, 1989, the NRC-issued a-Confirmation Action Letter (CAL 89-01) to TU Electric regarding the incident.
The issue was also the i
subject-of an Augmented Inspection Team
("AIT")
- effort, documented in1AIT Inspection Report 50-445/50-446, 89/30 issued 4
July 10, 1989.
Subsequently, the handling of this event has'been raised as an item for escalated enforcement action.
Although-the escalated enforcement conference on this matter was held November 17,: 1989,'and apparently the agency has reached
- a decision,,,no - enforcement action has yet been issued.
.Without the issuance of a decision and implementation of any attendant mandated ' corrective action, there can be no assurance that the f ailures' that contributed to the event are corrected.
The'NRC Staff that performed the AIT inspection recognized that the chec valveincidenthasimplicationsforsafeoperationoftheplant.g CASE believes that the Enforcement Action must be issued prior'to fuel load, and corrective action must be demonstrated prior to low power operations.
On September 23, 1989, CASE advised the NRC Staff of its
-view-that'"the fact-that TU Electric personnel did not prevent or j
mitigate.the May 5, 1989, event by recognizing the significance of occurrences on April 5, 19, and 23, 1989, indicates a major 1
3 Por
- example, a
draf t of the AIT inspection report concluded:. "The protracted problem resolution effort (approximately six weeks) coupled with the failure to recognize the. identified precursors did not reflect a strong management commitment to rapid resolution of a safety significant issue.
The issue involved multiple failures of passive components in a system intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
It did.not reflect a proactive management philosophy which is necessary for safe reactor plant operations."
Page
- 117, paragraph 4.1.8 of a September 8,
- 1989, draft.
Although a similar statement appeared in the final AIT report at page 52, the language in the draft is considerably stronger than the final.
4 0
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O' programmatic deficiency."
(See Attachment 1.)
At the November
~1989, enforcementL conference /public meeting CASE consultant
- 17, 4
Jack Doyle-advised the NRC that the_ handling of the check valve incident was similar to the service water system failures in that
- both events were ultimately caused by the inability to understand the root cause _ and generic implications of various problems.
+
_ This is explained more fully in Mr. Doyle's report, sent to the NRC for their review and consid& ration on January 9, 1990.
Our position on this issue has not changed, and in fact the concern' of CASE has increased.
In our view, it would be an irresponsible regulatory action for you to give permission for TU Electric to load fuel without publicly issuing the AIT
^
enforcement _ action and insuring corrective action is in place, o
(See the December 20, 1989, TU Electric letter to the NRC from g
William J.
Cahill, Jr. TXX 89860,
Subject:
CPSES Docket No. 50-
'445, Borg-Warner check valve swing arms.)
n 2). Station Service Water System Enforcement Action The NRC ' Staff is currently reconsidering its earlier decision regarding the violations given to TU Electric stemming from the problems with the Station Service Water System (SSWS) in 1988. (See, NR'C Inspection Report 50-445/88-47; 50-446/88-42 and Notice of Violation dated ~ January 9, 1988.)
In particular, the
,NRC Staff has'not yet issued Inspection Report 50-445/89-23; 50-
. 446/89-23 that identifies a violation in regards to this matter.
The findings of Inspection Report 89-23/23 are also strongly supported by the in-depth study and analytical evaluation
_ performed by CASE consultant Jack Doyle of Root Cause and Generic Implications.
In that study, submitted to TU electric and the.
NRC1 on January 9,
- 1990, he has evaluated the information available to the TU Electric officials at the time of the enforcement conference'(and earlier) and concluded that full and complete information about the causes of the problems was. not
- provided to the NRC.
However, neither Inapection Report 89-23/23 nor Mr.
Doyle 's report,
attempts to charge TU Electric with deliberate
" cover up" of available information, rather they recognize that the information to determine the probable root cause and secondary causes was available within TU Electric's ccrporate files, even if they did not understand the information or'its implications or act on it.
L CASE believes that Inspection Report 89-23/23 must be issued l
and that the reconsideration of the enforcement action in that case is. appropriate.
(See Attachment 2.)
(See,
- also, the December 21, 1989, TU Electric letter from W.
G.
Counsil, Vice-
- Chairman, to Mr.
- Grimes, Log
- TXX-89851, file
- 10086, with Attachments A-D responding to CASE's November 29,
- 1989, Documented Request for Action Concerning Thermolag and the December 11,
- 1989, TU Electric letter to the U.S.
NRC from
(
William J.
- Cahill, Jr.,
- TXX-89847, Re:
a September 22, 1989, L
delivery from an unidentified source of a June 21, 1989, memo I
from Mr.
Phillips with subject TU Electric's response to potential NRC enforcement issues associated with the removal of ll 5
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k:
coating from Unit 1-at SSWS ' at Comanche Peak with three attachments and eight enclosures.)
3)
Welding Issues (MIG vs. STICK) a.
In 1989, CASE accompanied an alleger to-meet with the NRC-OSP to discuss,_ among-other. things, inadequate welds (GMAW-S (MIG) in lieu of the required SMAW (STICK)), inadequate weld procedures, potential falsification of weld records, and employee R
intimidation and harassment concerns related to " MIG vs. STICK" welding.
The NRC-OSP has substantiated the concerns regarding MIG vs.
l STICK, the potential for falsification of weld records, and the X
inadequate welding procedures that were the heart of the
-allegations.
CASE understands that the Office of Investigations
_(OI) will-be investigating the falsification aspect of this matter'during January 1990'.
i
~1n addition, and significant to the issue, CPSES cannot
. verify _that this inappropriate welding process was not used in a safety-related systems;.therefore, there are still indeterminate welds pending further review and inspection by the Staff.
l Based on CASE's briefing on the status of these allegations on January 5,
1990, by the NRC-OSP, we understand that the NRC site inspector has not yet reviewed and accepted TU
=
Electric's-results of its Corporate Security and SAFETEAM findings; nor has NRC-OI even started its investigation 7
pertaining to-the falsification of weld records.
L In our view,-these substantiated allegations are the subject of violations, and must be resolved prior to fuel load.
(This matter is ' the subject at CASE Concern No. 89-0027.1, and 89-0003.1, and has been addressed by TU Electric in two December 20, 1989, letters in response thereto, LIT 89-654 and 89-655.)
II.
DISPUTES BETWEEN CASE AND TU ELECTRIC 1)
The Dispute on the Scaling Calculation and Documentation Review Effort.
CASE and TU Electric have been unable to resolve our disagreement over the Scaling Calculation' and Documentation Review effort (Program),
and formally raised the issue as a dispute to the NRC on December 6,
1989.
The issue involves the complete breakdown of a number of site processes in identifying programmatic failures, determining the probable root cause of the multiple failures within a program, as evidenced by known and
. verified deficiencies, and a failure to implement a lasting corrective action to the identified problems.
The findings of CASE Monitors on this issue are, in essence, that the program failures indicate repetitive violations of, at a 6
k I
F.4 minimum, thirteen (13) of the eighteen (18) criteria in 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix B, and the requirements of 10 CPR 50.55(e).
TU Electric's position, as explained in their December 21,
- 1989, response to the NRC's Christopher Grimes (TXX-89850) is, at
- bottom, that "the safety-related scaling calculations are technically adequate,.. " (Response, at 3) and that although the issues were known to TU Electric and SWEC in late 1987 and the corrective action was not complete, that TU Electric is of the view "that the project was responsive in addressing the items."
(TXX-89850, at page 4, para. 4).
)
These views are no diametrically opposed that the NRC Staff must reach a conclusion on the issues presented.
CASE's position u
is that the undisputed facts establish a programmatic breakdown I
that infected all site scaling documentation, and that the performance of TU Electric's Quality Assurance Department
'g throughout the audit of these issues confirms that the QA department is not yet ready to support operations because of a management style that emphasizes project cost and schedule needs tether than quality requirements.
2)
The Dispute Over the Intimidation and Termination of a Quality Control Inspector ano Implications for the Vendor Quality Assurance Program.
On November 2,
1989, a quality control receiving inspector in the Thermolag Department was told not to write an NCR on identified deficient Thermolag material by a Level III inspector.
The instruction was given in front of other QC inspectors and supervisors.
Tne inspector argued that QC/QA procedures required him to write an NCR on the defective Thermolag.
Within an hour of the incident between the inspector and the Level III, the inspector was " laid off" from employment at CPSES.
(Two months earlier, the Level III told.the inspector if he ever got in a position to terminate the inspector that he [the inspector) would be the first to go, or a threat to that effect.)
These facts are not in dispute.
(See TU Electric's letter to Christopher Grimes, l
dated December 21,
- 1989, from W.
G.
Counsil, Re Thermolag Dispute.)
The inspector has of ficially requested CASE's assistance in pursuing this incident, and on November 29, 1989, CASE filed a formal dispute on TU Electric's handling of the matter.
(Attachment 3.)
Although TU Electric's SAFETEAM and Security Department conducted an investigation into this incident, they concluded that there was no " harassment or intimidation" of the inspector, th&t his lay-off was unconnected to the incident, and that there were implications of this incident that impacted the QA department's performance.
CASE disagrees with this response.
It is CASE's position, based on our own investigation, that there whs a " chilling effect" created by the incident which was not effectively responded to by TU Electric management.
This 7
~
indicates to CASE an inability on the part of site managers to identify and respond to similar situations that violate 10 CPR 50.7 and contributes to an atmosphere in which conditions adverse to quality are not identified for fear of reprisal.
As you may recall, the issue of harassment and intimidation at CPSES was the subject of extensive litigation between CASE and TU Electric between 1984 and 1988.
At the time of the Settlement, the issue was still an essential component of the operating license challenge.
It is interesting, and disturbing, to note that both the supervisor and the Level III inspector involved in this particular incident were also identified by inspectors in the 1984-85 time frame as having engaged in similar conduct.
The supervisor in the current situation was also one of the supervisors that the former TU Electric QA Manager relied on as a
" guard" of the electrical QC inspectors during the "T-shirt incident,"4 and the Level III was identified by two former quality control personnel as having a brusque and intimidating temper that coerced QA personnel to not identify deficient conditions and/or as having to allow QA personnel to document deficient conditions.gefused Notwithstanding that history and the fact that this issue was brought to the attention of top TU Electric management within days of its occurrence, the Level III and the supervisor remain in the same positions of authority at the plant and the inspector remains unemployed.
Thir situation undermines any other actions that TU Electric may. at this late date, undertake to eliminate the chilling effect.
In addition to the issues of coercion and the chilling effect regarding raising concerns, CASE has also raised questions 4
- See, September 10,
- 1984, CASE's Preliminary Proposed Findings of Fact on the Issue of Harassment and Intimidation, page 80, Findings 225-227, ref. transcript pages 55, 105-55, 106 and 71, 598-601, 5
Id., at page 94, Pindings 273-282 describing an incident in which the same Level III directed a QC document reviewer not to identify a discrepancy between disk numbers on quality valve docuinen ta tion, because "it didn't matter," and because "it would cost too much money to open the valves up and check the disks."
(TR 59,015-59,016).
She (the reviewer) testified that this direction created an atmosphere of discouragement because his (the Level III) priority was " money instead of quality."
(TR 59,174-59,175);
- see, also, Pindings 283-293, pages 94-99, detailing two additional incidents in which the same Level III told QA personnel, in essence, to meet schedule deadlines or be
- replaced, and in which he made other comments considered intimidating by the CASE witnesses and that inhibited the free flow of information and open discussions on quality matters.
8
7 i
about the implications of the inspector's findings on the QA program that are not yet resolved.
For example, CASE raised the i
issue to the NRC of how so much defective material could be received from an allegedly approved vendor with an allegedly f unctional 10 CPR Part 50, Appendix B program.
(See Attachment i
3, Question 2,
page 1.)
Although CASE has not yet submitted their rebuttal on this matter, we believe that the NRC must resolve this dispute prior to fuel Ioad.
- 3) Reactor System Cold Hydrostatic Test It remains the CASE Monitors' position,.that after extensive review of the record-compiled by TU Electric in 1982, regarding i
the Reactor Coolant System Cold Hydrostatic
- test, that TU Electric failed to comply with the ASME Section III construction i
requirements as well as the requirements mandated by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
The CASE Monitors maintain that the test, as conducted, did not fulfill the final construction milestone (Reactor Coolant System Cold Hydrostatic test) required in order to prove the L
. integrity of the system to function in the
" cold" test configuration and that from a OA/QC perspective no other substitute test can adequately fulfill that requirement, although the VT-2 additional test performed did give some added assurances and was succoesfully completed from an engineering perspective.
Although the NRC accepted TU Electric's original test, along with the VT-2 test results, (with which CASE consultant, Jack Doyle agrees) the other CASE consultants continue to have concerns about the integrity of the test.
(See the NRC letter to Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President of CASE and Mr. William G. Counsil, Vice-Chairman of TU Electric Company from Christopher I. Grimes, Director Comanche Peak Project Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated August 18,
- 1989, in response to the dispute between CASE and TU Electric regarding the acceptability of the 1982 Reactor Coolant system Hydrostatic Test, with enclosure, Staff Evaluation of Dispute.)
j III.
ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN WITH POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SAFE OPERATION OF THE FACILITY j
l 1)
The Analytical Evaluation of Station Service Water System for Comanche Peak.
The " Analytical Evaluation of Station Service Water System
)
for Comanche Peak," prepared by CASE Consultant Jack Doyle, dated December 31, 1989, studies the complete historical and current status of the multiple failures connected with the SSWS.
The result of his independent analysis is a determination of the most probable cause of the failures.
(Further refinement of secondary roet cause would have required considerable testing which was not undertaken for this report.)
The report also evaluates the methodology used by TU Electric and its various contractors to
)
9 J
g.
l h
determine the root cause of problems that occurred over an eight (8) year time span at Comanche Peak.
At bottom, Mr. Doyle concludes that the multiple failures in the SSWS resulted from a fundamental inability of TU Electric pernonnel (as well as contractors) to perform a thotough and accurate root cause analysis of incidents, events, systems or component
- failures, and identified deficiencies in order to understand the generic implication of those flaws.
Although Mr.
Doyle's report uses the SSWS issue as the basis of his study, the conclusion and findings must be extrapolated to the plant in its current pre-operational phase.
(See the January 9, 1990, letter from Billie Pirner Garde to Christopher Grimes, attached to this letter as Attachment 4.)
- 2) The Use of Teflon Tape During CASE monitoring of M&TE Audit TUG-89-15 conducted in June, 1989, the misapplication and unauthorized use of Teflon tape as a thread sealant was observed by a CASE consultant.
Further unauthorized applications of Teflon tape were also discovered by the CASE Monitor during plant area and room Valkdown inspections While monitoring a TAP EBASCo Interaction Audit.
The,,ssue has been raised as a CASE Concern 89-0031 (S
Attachment SA) and responded to by TU Electric (Attachment SB).ge The concern identifies noncompliances to CPSES l
Specifications CPSES-I-1018, para.
1.11.5 and CPSES-M-1041G, j
para.
5.1.2.1 and Appendix A, which resulted in SWO 89-002 and CAR 89-008 being issued.
The specificationc basically prohibit the use of Teflon tape for "any new construction,
- rework, calibration, maintenancg or operation activities whether permanent or temporary."
Certain areas of exception were allowed; however, the use identified by CASE were not Lncluded in taose exceptions.
Additionally, several days following the SWO/ CAR releases, Teflon tape was still being utilized in the field.
Upon investigation by CASE, it was determined that not only was the SWO not even known by construction, operations, or I&C, but was also not known within the TU Electric Quality Assurance organization (i.e.,
QA Auditors, TAP Auditors, Surveillance Personnel).
6 This CASE concern and response are an example of the type of communication between CASE and TU Electric on issues of concern.
Although not all issues have yet been documented and turned over to TU Electric, the substance of the issues are known to TU Electric personnel.
7 The use of Teflon tape was originally raised by CASE during the operating license hearings through CASE Exhibit 562, Brown & Root NCR #M-621R2, dated May 12, 1977.
(Attachment SC.)
10
It should be noted that SWO 89-002 was issued only days after CAR-87-043 (opened in early 1987), which dealt with the issue of unauthorized use of Teflon tape at CPSES, had been closed.
Further, on December 24, 1989, TU Electric "ONE" Form 89-614 was
- issued, resulting from an NRC Inspection which again identified unauthorized areas where Teflon tape had been installed on " temporary fittings" on "various systems in the plant," and not removed.8 This finding was observed only a month after CAR 89-008 was closed, and led to the discovery of twenty-three locations where connections were opened, and the Teflon tape had to be. removed.
It is disappointing to note that these problems with Teflon tape use are still occurring twelve years after the initial identification of the tape being misapplied.
(See, also the TU Electric letter to Mrs. Ellis, CASE, from W. G.
Counsil dated November 21, 1989, Log # LIT 89-635, File #10086,
Subject:
Teflon Tape Issue CASE Concern No. 89-0031.)
s 3)
Paint coatings TU Electric was required by the NRC to identify and report all current or incipient coating degradation before plant operations.
- See, NUREG-0797, Supplement No.
21, Appendix L,
dated April, 1989, page 1 on "THE EFFECTS OF PAINT AND INSULATION DEBRIS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF POST ACCIDENT FLUID SYSTEMS AT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 and 2":
The applicant provided the methods and criteria for operational surveillance of the coatings inside the containment buildings of Units 1 and 2.
Before plant 1
operations and at each respective refueling outage, a surveillance of the protective coatings will be conducted to identify and report any current or incipient coating degradation or failure...
{
CASE is not aware of whether this surveillance has been performed or evaluated as required, or in light of the recent findings of the SSWS failures.
4)
HVAC pressure test In late 1988, CASE was made aware that the 1/8 negative pressure test in the Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 8 The "ONE" Form procedure STA-421 " Purpose" states:
"The purpose of this procedure is to describe the method for initiation of Operations Notification and Evaluation Forms (ONE Forms) to report potential adverse conditions."
CASE is currently evaluating the validity of the use of the "ONE" Form, which appears similar to the "In Process Inspection Notices" used by Bechtel at Midland in 1982-83, and which was the subject of enforcement action.
Docket No. 50-329/330, EA 83-3, February 8, 1983, and Inspection 82-22, February 8, 1983.
11
y-t i
. i' System. (UVAC) failed around 1984.
This is a required test and
-this test shows evidence that the release of contaminants would be minimiced.
CASE has made numerous inquiries as to the status of this test prior to fuel. load (TU Electric, NRC Exit Meetings, and the ORC).
CASE has been informed that the subject test would
'be performed successfully prior to fuel load, but has not been notified by TU Electric or the NRC that the 1/8 negative pressure test been successfully performed.
5)
Maintenance inspections CASE inquired of the NRC-OSP during the 1989 SALP Exit Meeting when the NRC would conduct their final maintenance Inspection of Unit 1.
The NRC-OSP responded that that would be the responsibility of the NRC-Region IV.
Since then CASE has been informed that NRC-Region IV does not plan to perform this
+.
normally required maintenance inspection prior - to fuel load.
Insufficient maintenance inspections were done throughout the 1988-89 assessment Licensing Performance (SALP). period for the NRC's Systematic Assessment of CASE believes that prior to fuel load Unit 1 must receive an NRC maintenance inspection, as is a normal practice in the industry.
This is particularly true because of the length of time this plant has been under construction, and because inadequate regulatory oversight has been provided on this critical issue.
{
6)
Vendor Surveillance (Falsified Bolts and Fasteners)
Due to the ever growing list of potential vendors that have supplied CPSES with substandard and/or counterfeit material may (i.e., fasteners and bolts)-CASE is concerned that the NRC advise TU ' ' Elect ric of those suppliers 'and perform an evaluation and inspection of the fasteners purchased and installed at CPSES from vendors, other than AIRCOM, where products are now suspect.
7)
Temporary modifications Inadequate control of Temporary Modifications continues to be of concern to both the NRC and CASE at CPSES.
NRC on site observations of these problems continue.
CASE does not yet have assurance that CPSES now has sufficient control of the Temporary Modifications in such a manner as to not detract from the safe operations of the plant.
CASE believes that this issue must be reviewed by the ORAT and the NRC on site Staff and resolved prior to fuel load.
8)
KAPTON The NRC-OSP was performing an inspection on the appropriate of Kapton and how it was being applied at CPSES.
CASE's use latest information was that it was still under NRC investigation.
CASE is concerned that the NRC-OSP completes their inspection of 12
Kapton and its application at CPSES prior to fuel load.
- 9) Documentation i
It ' has been a long standing concern of CASE, initially raised in the operating license hearings that site documentation l
is irretrievable, unreliable, or retrievable only after much I
searching.
CASE has observed, both from the QA Monthly Activity j
Reports submitted to the ORC, and attending the NRC Exit Meetings (as well as reviewing NRC Inspection Reports),
that missing, incomplete,
. inaccurate, non-retrievable, and illegible i
l-documentation continues to be a problem at CPSES.
This issue was the subject of hearings, comments and concerns of the Licensing i
Board, and has continued and has continued to be a concern of CASE.
CASE submitted this concern to TU Electric via CI-88-0001 Package (Cold Hydrostatic issues) in their Position Statement.
lc As of December 1989, CASE was informed by TU Electric that the documentation (Work Packages, Travelers) now only receives a QA
{
review in lieu of both a technical (engineering) and QA review.
1 In addition, TU Electric QA stated that at that time there was no checklist to be used by QA personnel listing the technical criteria, nor were any planned to be generated for use.
CASE is concerned that the NRC has not fully evaluated the 1
documentation problems at CPSES to ascertain that the i
documentation meets applicable regulatory requirements for nuclear power plant permanent records.
10)
PCHVP Allegations During CASE Monitoring of TAP Audit ATP-88-138S conducted during November and December of 1988, the CASE Monitor was part of an interview whereby an employee informed the TU Electric l
Auditor and the CASE Monitor of significant allegations dealing l
with intimidation and harassment of a QC inspector associated I
with PCHVP program and other concerns dealing with hardware and inspection concerns.
The NRC was contacted by CASE informing them of the concerns expressed by the employee.
TU Electric was also informed of the concerns expressed by the employee, and l
informed of the concerns identified when the CASE monitor determined that nothing had been done by TU Electric almost a year later to investigate and resolve the concerns.
To date, CASE has not been informed of the results of any investigation conducted by the TU Electric Quality Assurance / Security organizations.
Additionally, to the best of our knowledge the NRC has not performed any inspection of this matter, either to assure that employee concerns reported to the
. utility are promptly or independently investigated to reach a determination on this matter.
CASE has serious questions regarding the PCHVP issues identified.
1 11)
SAFETEAM Inputs CASE has repeatedly voiced deep concerns that the NRC has 13
t i
not performed an in-depth audit of either the SAFETEAM or TU
~ Electric's Corporate Security programs in regards to the handling and closure of worker allegations.
It is our view based on the experience of CASE witnesses and some allegers that the SAFETEAM and the Security Department have not fulfilled their safety-related obligation to properly:
1)
Conduct comprehensive independent interviews that fully capture the specific and aggregate concerns being identified by concerned individuals:
j 2)
Maintain strict confidentiality; and, 3)
Investigate safety-related technical and programmatic concerns to assure not only that the specific concern has been resolved in the eyes of the employee, but that a review of the aggregate issues was accomplished, root cause determined, and lasting corrective action implemented.
This concern, originally raised in the hearings, has been magnified by the handling of the most recent Thermolag and.
Scaling Calculation Disputes.
CASE reiterates that an audit of TU Electric's SAFETEAM and Security files by the NRC Office of Investigations or Special Projects is appropriate prior to fuel load.
These types of audits have been regularly performed at other NTOL plants, i.e.,
Fermi, Waterford, Wolf Creek, South Texas, and TVA plants.
t IV.
CONCLUSION CASE is vitally concerned that issues in dispute and matters of concern to CASE and the NRC be resolved prior to any fuel load decision.
We also believe that the open regulatory matters identified in this letter must be closed out as well.
As is obvious from the issues identified in this letter and as further described in the attachments and references, these issues raise serious questions that go to the heart of the TU Electric's readiness -to receive an operating license and operate the Comanche Peak plant.
To grant permission to load fuel against these open questions would, in our view, be imprudent and violate the NRC obligation.to public trust as a party to the Joint Stipulation.
i Sincerely, i
SS.)
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Billie Pirner Garde Attorney for CASE cc See Service List l
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Mary ku Robinson Attorneys at 1aw
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Nils Jean Robinson 106 East College Avenue i
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John C Peterson Appicton, Wtoconsta H911
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Avram D. Berk (414) 781 1817 Michael Rudolph Green Bay 4968000 kl:
Dan Cross -
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September 23, 1989 l
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Christopher I. Grimes, Director Comanche Peak Project Division
' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
2055 k
RE: Auxiliary Feedwater System Check Valves SDAR: CP-89-015 t
U Docket No. 50-445; Permit No. CPPR-126 p
Dear Mr. Grimes
. As you know, Citizens Association for Sound Energy (" CASE") has been
[
M actively involved in monitoring the deficiency involving-a May 5, 1989, incident that led to backleakage through the Auxiliary Feedwater ("ATW")
f, System check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station ("CPSES").
The incidents that gave rise to the backleakage are well documented in i
the various pieces of correspondence related to this event and thus are not 7
3 repeated in this letter.
(See list of references at the end of this
..(.
lettero);
The purpose of this letter is to inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") of CASE's position regarding the need for regulatory enforcement action in response to the management process, and administrative g
control failures evidenced by this event.
In our view, the fact that TU Electric personnel did not prevent or mitigate the May 5, l#69, event by recognizing the significance of occurrences on April 5, 19, and 23, 1989 indicates a major programmatic deficiency.
This programmatic deficiency deserves' escalated enforcement action in the form of a Severity 1.evel III violation and issuance of a civil penalty.
CASE believes that the deterrent effect of the issuance of a civil penalty is needed in this case to emphasize the seriousness of this management and programmatic f ailure. This is particularly true because if the plant had been operating, the result of F
this event could have been an unplanned release of radioactivity.
Further, CASE believes that this action is appropriate because one of the " root causes" of this problem apparently was the lack of coordination and knowledge between the Task Team developed by CPSES to investigate all of the aspects of the April 23, 1989, AFW system check valve problem and the
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E site. management responsible for planning and executing the Hot functional y
Test. This basic lack of coordination resulted in TU Electric's proceeding L
with a critical, expensive, milestone test in virtual ignorance of a problem with hardware that was subject to the thermal stress and temperatures of the HFT, with no consideration of the potential consequences.
(See Section 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 of Reference 3.)
CASE recognizes that TU Electric took prompt and comprehensive corrective action once upper management became involved in this incident.
The actions and responses of management should, of course, be considered in
- the NRC's evaluation of mitigating circumstances. However, the retroactive analysis of management in response to a high-profile problem does not negate the seriousness of.the programmatic and management flaws that allowed leaking valves to escape reportability by system operators on April 5,1989, and the failure of site management to direct a timely evaluation of the April 19 and 23, 1989, events to insure a coordinated response to the problem in a manner that should have, and would have, prevented the incident from occurring in the first place.
These concerns about management's attitude and ability to respond to identified problems are particularly important in light of the forthcoming fuel load date for CPSES.
For further information, please feel f ree to contact CASE's President, Mrs. Juanita Ellis, (214) 946-9446.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely, h & l/
A k
Billie Pirner Garde Attorney for CASE cc:
U. S. NRC:
James Lieberman, NRC, Director of Enforcement Robert F. Warnick, OSP, NRC TU Electric:
Dr. A. Husain, ORC Chairman, TU Mr. William G. Counsil, Vice President, TU Hr. W. J. Cahill, Vice President, TU Ms. Susan Palmer, Stipulation Manager, TU 1
2 1
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'l List of Referencest t
1.
Hay,5,1989, letter f rou C.1. Crimes to W. J. Cahill, CAL 89-01 2.
June 19, 1989, letter from H. J. Cahill to U. S. NRC, TXX-89424 (50 55(e) Report) 3.
July 10, 1989, letter from R. F. Warnick to W. J. Cahill, AIT Report 50-445/6-89-30 7
4.
July 24, 1989, letter from W. J. Cahill to U. S. NRC, TXX-89492 5.
August 18, 1989, letter from W. J. Cahill to U. S. NRC, TXX-89596 (Response to IER 89-30) 6.
August 31, 1989, Information Notice No. 89-62, "Halfunction of Borg-Warner' Pressure Seal Bonnet Check Valves caused by Vertical i
Hisalignment of Disk."
7.
CPSES " System Functional Test: Check Valves and Hot Functional Safety Injection," 1CP-PT-57-09SFT, Rev. 0 8.
Meeting Notes from June 17 and 19, 1939 briefings on the check valve 4
incident.
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' Mary Lou Robinson Attarocys at Law Nila Jean Robinson-los East College Avenue John C. Peterson Appletoa. Wloconsin s.4911 s
Avram D. Berk-(414) 761 1817 -
Michael Rudolph Gross Boy 494-e000 b
Dan Crose
. Faz 7soas41 Billie Parner Garde September 23, 1989 JamesM. Taylor,Act$nkExecutiveDirector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,-D. C.
20555 Christopher I. Grimes, Director Comanche Peak Project Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
-James-Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatery Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 h
Ret Service Water System Enforcement Action (EA 88-310)
Docket No. 50-445; Permit No. CPPR-126 Gentlemen:
On Janua'cy 9,1989, the Nuclear Regula:ory Commission ("NRC") issued Inspection Report No. 50-445/88-47; 50-446/88-42 to Texas Utilities Electric Company ("TU Electric"). This inspection report referred to an inspection conducted on July 7 through August 2, 1988 at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Glen Rose, Texas,~ of the station service vater system (SSWS) coating removal. The inspection reported violations of.Various NRC i
requirements identified during the inspection.
It also summarized TU Electric's review and evaluation of the coating removal activities from a i
September 13, 1988 meeting, a September 23, 1988 engineering report on the SSWS coating removal project, and referenced additional information provided in an enforcement conference held with TU Electric of ficials and members of the NRC Staff on November 9, 1988.
Finally, the Notice of Violation ("NOV") reported that af ter revie9 of I
the information presented in the engineering report, the public meeting. and the enforcement conference, the NRC staf f had been persuaded that the violations did not present a significant regulatory concern and the violations were downgraded from Severity Level III to Severity Level IV.
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Shortly af ter issuance of the NOV, CASE informed the NRC that it tock strong exception to the decision of the staff to downgrade the violations from Severity Level 111 to Level IV.
As we indicated to you at that time, I
it was CASE's view that TV had not presented information at either the public meeting, the enforcement conference, or in the engineering report that justified the downgrade.
It was our concern then, as it is now, that c
the downgrade decision was made at a. management level without regard to a number of significant f actual details that were excluded from the final
~
inspection report jgt issued, but not excluded from the base of knowledge
'available to the NRC site inspection staff at the time t. heir observations were recorded and recommendations made. In addition, as we informed you and TU, the findings from our independent review of all the information which
.provided the basis of the engineering report led CASE to the conclusion that TU had substantial forewarning by both Stone & Webster and the NRC Inspector that the activity could result in damage to the pipe if not properly implemented.
s More importantly, it was CASE's concern that the NRC's downgrade decision represented a serious NRC management miscalculation of the appropriateness of regulatory laxness toward TU Electric. Again, it was our concern that the enforcement decision was removed from the NRC site inspection staf f at a time when their recommendations should have been heeded and deferred to.
CASE believes that subsequent events at CPSES have demonstrated that our concerns were valid, and that the enforcement decision needs to be revisited on the basis of information not considered by the enforcementstafff1/.
For the reasons discussed below, CASE believes it is appropriate for the NRC to conduct further inspection and enforcement review on this matter, and to consider the issuance of escalated enforcement action and imposed corrective action.
BACKGROUND In July 1988, a one-half by three-eighths-inch hole was discovered in one of the ten (10) inch supply lines to the Emergency Diesel Cenerators.
The supply line is part of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station service water system (SSWS). The SSWS is a safety-related cooling water system.
The system functions during normal operations by providing cooling to the component cooling water heat exchangers, and during accident conditions it is supposed to cool certain equipment necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
/1/ CASE does not attempt to address here the information apparently forwarded to the NRC Staff by H. Shannon Phillips which was reported in the local press on September 22 and 23, 1989.
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-The hole in the pipe was the result of a dry sandblasting operation to L
remove'an improperly applied and failing protective coating liner from the inside of the carbon and stainless steel piping. Coatings at the plant were r
L originally applied in the 1970's. Although the coatings were supposed to be applied in accordance with 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, the site proceedures failed to control the paint coatings process.
Subsequently the coatings repairs were downgraded. However, all coatings which could have a safety impact were to-be a controlled activity. The deterioration and failure of a
the coatings inside the piping posed a safety risk which was discovered and acknowledged in 1985 by TU and the NRC. The risk resulted from detachment (flaking) of the Plasite liner which could cause unacceptable blockage of the SSWS flow to the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers (CCWHX's) and other vital equipment.
1 In addition to the immediate problem of the deteriorating coatings which had to be removed, the corrosion and erosion damage to the piping itself raised questions about the system reliability and longevity.
f_,',i.'
This situation was the subject of a study and recommendation by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation to TU Electric, which ultimately decided upon removal of the liner through dry sandblasting by an unapproved vendor who was not required to comply with regulatory requirements of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B.
The removal process began.in April 1988, and was completed in July 1988, allegedly without incident. However, when the piping system was filled with water, a hole was discovered.
Subsequently, TU Electric developed a recovery plan consisting of a technical evaluation of the originally discovered hole and other damage in the SSWS piping and a determination of those actions necessary to return the SSWS to its design condition, and an evaluation of the root cause and generic implications of the process and administrative controls applied to the sandblasting operation..TU Electric concluded in its September 23, 1988,
)
report (TXX-88699 and enclosures) that the hole in the pipe occurred when the dry sandblaster stalled for severa3 minutes in one place while the sandblast gun was being manually pulled through the pipe and getting " stuck" on the build-up of sand. TU further concluded that the stalling was limited to a small portion of 10-inch piping in one train of the SSWS, early in the removal process, and that the operation was thereafter modified to eliminate stalling of the sandblaster. TU made videotapes of the entire inside of the piping system to determine all additional damage caused by the sandblaster, or excessive erosion or corrosion of the pipe.
As a result of the testing, three sections of pipe where damage was determined to be the most extensive were removed from the system. On the l
basis of examination of the pipe, the videos, wall thickness tests, and related reviews, TU Electric determined that the SSWS, although obviously in l
need of replacement prior to the 40-year expected system life, was l
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i acceptable for service once the plant went into operation, Further, TU concluded that the erosion / corrosion testing program would adequately monitor the condition of the piping.
.With respect to the failure of the administrative, management, and proces:: ::r.tsols utilized t.hroughout the events leading up to the discovery of the hole in the pipe. TU only evaluated the controls applied to the
'l sandblasting operation itself. TU Electric concluded that appropriate i
management decisions were made regarding technical processes, management resources, and pre-implementation project planning.
It is TU's po:,ition
' that - there were several " shortcomings" that contributed to the problems during implementation, including the f ailure to pre-qualify the sandblasting process in order to determine if any problems (like stalling) would occur, and the f ailure to insure that the coating removal project was a process controlled by the TU Electric Quality Assurance Program.
l TU Electric concluded in its report on this subject that this was an isolated case with maximum generic implication limited to those specialty contractors who did not have an approved quality assurance program, but who were hired to perform quality-related work under TU's Quality Assurance Program. These were called the Code V vendors.
1 The NRC's inspection activities in regard to this matter began in Spring of 1988, before the sandblasting operation began, when NRC Resident Inspector Shannon Phillips routinely reviewed the activities being planned and expressed a variety of concerns and questions to the TU personnel involved with reviewing the operation.
Mr. Phillips, who had some doubts about the operation, raised his issues to TU personnel who did not act on, t
consider, or respond to his concerns, Subsequent to the discovery of the hole in the pipe, the NRC formally began the inspection which is the subject of Enforcement Action 88-310.
CASE began its own review of the process and the technical aspects of
.the problems in the fall of 1988. CASE consultant Jack Doyle has viewed the videotapes of the piping and done a walkdown and review of the TU Electric corrosion /crosion testing program.
In addition, he has reviewed the associated documentation with the testing and discussed the project and its results with SWEC and TU Project of ficials.
In addition to Mr. Doyle's technical review, CASE has completely reviewed all available relevant material on the history of the problem and the implications for other programmatic deficiencies stemming from, or similar to, the problems in this case.
Our review and inspection efforts to date have led CASE to conclude:
(1) that the potential safety problem posed by the hole in the pipe and other pipe damage has probably been remedied for the immediate safe operability of the system; (2) that the erosion / corrosion monitoring and verification program, if implemented prudently and correctly, has the 4
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F i-l l-ability to determine the extent of damage to pipe wall thickness during the operation of the plant; and (3) that the recent clinination of the Code V program will probably remove the potential of similar problems in other saf ety-related projects.
However, it also appears that-actions were motivated by the discovery of the hole in the pipe after completion of the Plasite removal process, and that a serious management attitude problem and mindset existed throughout the entire timeframe of 1985 through. July 1988,, and that this mindset was further exacerbated throughout the regulatory review process (July-November, 1988), and that the residual effect of this attitude has existed since the beginning of the year and persists at the plant today. This attitude has resulted in other hardware problems with potential safety impact and is evident in many of the day-to-day decisions as the plant nears fuel load.
As a result of this, it is imperative that the NRC revisit tnis issue immediately.
BASIS OF UPGRADE REQUEST According to the January 9,1989, NOV, the' NRC initially considered the collective significance of the violations at a Severity Level III. However, af ter review of the information presented by TU through the engineering report and supplement, the public meeting, and the enforcement conference, the NRC management concluded that the violations identified did not fit "the examples" in Supplement II of the Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
NOV Letter, at page 1.
~
The criteria for a Level III violation on a construction site are:
"l) OA Program deficiency relating to a tangle work activity (e.g.,
structural, piping, electrical, etc.) involving multiple examples of deficient construction.
"2)
Inadequate preopetational tecting to demonstrate design safety requirements."
It is CASE's view that sufficient information always existed within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff that demonstrated that this issue l
presented a significant regulatory concern. It also appears that TU was well aware of accurate and complete information on the development of this problem and did not fully inform the NRC.
The most significant issue not fully disclosed to the NRC management, and apparently not considered by enforcement staff, deals with the Code V program. TU conceded throughout the Fall of 1988 to both CASE and the NRC that the programmatic probicas that resulted in the procurement of services without adequate Quality Assurance criteria were limited to Code V vendors 5
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1 only. 70 did not disclose that there were six Code V service procurements j
involving 6.pecialty work on safety-related equipment on the Comanche Peak j
site.
In one instance the activity (steam generator nozzle measurement) was
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actually completed before the purchase order was finalized.
I A September 30, 1988 TU Electric Memorandum (NE-22156) to L. D. Nace i
from W. G. Guldemond concludes that the following shortcomings existed in I
procurement documentation and prequalification testing:
1 l
"1) Unlike Service Water coating removal, all involved well developed 4
and previously employed processes. Consequently, no pre-qualification testing was required.
"2) Unlike Service Water coating removal, the verification plan for each explicitly required that TU Electric Quality Assurance monitor Vendor activities. With the exception of one procurement (6R-3450861 CPF-14/220-S) which does not appear to have been i
finalized. Quality Assurance contractor Surveillance Reports exist I
demonstrating that the activities were properly conducted.
However, in the case of Steam Generator Nozzle measurement and inspection, the activity was completed before the purchase order was finalized.
"3) Each procurement required that the vendor submit procedures for approval. With the exception of the Steam Generator Nozzle measurements end inspection, and the one procurement which was not finalized, these procedures were incorporated into quality-related work process control documents which were reviewed by Ouality Assurance prior to work performance. Given that Steam Generator Nozzle Measurement and inspection did not involve physica) work on hardware, and that the results were required to be documented in a special vendor report to TU Electric, this exception is acceptable.
4 "4)
Detail was found to be lacking in the verification plans for each procurement. Those associated with chemical cleaning did require Chemistry to take periodic samples, but did not specify sample type or frequency.
"5) The procurement documents did not clearly define the relatianship between the organizations involved and the TU Electric Quality Assurance Program.
However, in the case of Purchase Orders 661-74340 and 661-74038, Operations prepared special tempotary procedures which clearly delineated the duties and responsibilities of the parties involved.
"6)
None of the procurements explicitly addressed the identification and disposition of nonconformirg e.onditions.
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"?) The procurement for protective coating application to the i
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers (CPT-13597-S) permitted l
activities which should have f allen under the auspices of ASKE l
Section XI.
This was not addressed in the p'rocurment or the implementing work order." (Emphases added.)
l On the basis of the memo, there is no indication that the procedural deficiencies were ever crocs checked against the hardware work performed in order to determine whether deficiencies or f ailures existed in the field i
work performed by the vendors.
It is obvious on the f ace of the identified programmatic deficiencies that TU Electric's paperwork review of inspection and surveillance reports alone and some work packeges or final reports could not demonstrate reasonable assurance that the work activities were actually performed satisf actorily.
More to the point, even if some documentation existed in each of these areas to indicate successful completion, it is not a reliable conclusion because no CA requirements were ever established, procedures were non-existent or inadequate, inspection activities were non-existent or inadequate because no uniquely defined process controls were established.
and there was no process for identifying deficiencies.
In addition to the Code V programmatic deficiencies, there was apparently specific f actually incorrect or incomplete information provided i
to the NRC through the enforcement conference materials.
For example, there was a serious error in understanding the NRC's requirements in regards to coating applications during the initial application stage. This programmatic flaw, identified repeatedly to Brown & Root by Paint Coatings OC inspectors in 1983, ultimately led to paint coating f ailures throughout the entire plant and the determination that paint coatings had not been procured or applied in accordance with 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B criteria.
~
In 1983 the NRC issued IE Bulletin 83-24 regarding industry-wide problems in the coatings area. Meanwhile, TU was required to undergo a series of paint coatings inspections and reviews by NRC Region IV, the Construction Appraisal Team, the Special Assessment Team, the Technical Review Team, Brookhaven National Laboratories, and ultimately by the utility following the issuance of SSER #9.
TU Electric apparently never understood and applied the correct criteria to determine the dif ference between safety-related and non-safety related work. This historical inability to fully recognize root causes that reflect adversely on quality of systems and processes is a significant concern to CASE, and should have been recognized as a significant regulatory concern.
Other inconsistencies or omissions between information presented at the public meetings, in the engineering report, and in the enforcement conference are found in the numerous materials presented to CASE for review 7
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o of this matter. These include the additional damage caused by the L>
spinblaster to the piping in Train B.
i CONCLUSION CASE is extremely concerned that the NRC's handling of this matter has
' i allowed this significant problem to escape full regulatory consideration.
F in its present form, it will not-be considered in the SALP report, nor will its implication be considered prior to fuel load. Therefore, on the basis of the information contained herein, we respectfully request that you i
reconsider classification of this event.
Sincerely,
&<.)
.t i
Billie Pirner Garde, Attorney for CASE cc t '
U. S. NRC:
Robert F. Warnick, OSP, NRC l
,TU Electrict Dr. A. Husain, ORC Chairman, TU Mr. William G. Cronsil. Vice President, TU i
Mr. W. J. Cahill, Vice President, TU l
Ms. Susan Palmer, Stipulation Manager, TU l
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