ML20011D122

Discusses Concerns Re Integrity of Regulatory Process as Affecting Plant

ML20011D122
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	11/20/1989
From:	Garde B ROBINSON, ROBINSON, PETERSON, BERK, RUDOLPH, CROSS
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20011D121	List: ML20011D122 ML20011E444 ML20011E456
References
NUDOCS 8912140328
Download: ML20011D122 (38)

Text

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M A Robinson .

Robinson, Peterson, Berk, Rudolph, Cross & Gr.rde

Mary lou Robinson Attorneys at Luw

, . Nila Jean Robinson 103 East College Menue fJohn'C Peterson' _ Appleton, Wmeonan 6+,1 Avram D: Berk uluiM. wit Michael Rudolph Green Bay +m Dan Crou Fax ta % )

Billie Pirner Garde November 20,1989

. James M, Taylor Acting Executh e Director for Operations

U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,D.C. 20555 -

Re: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance for TU Electric (September 1,1988 July 31,1989)'

Dear Mr. Taylor,

As you know the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) is concerned with the integrity of the regulatory process as it affects the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES). Throughout the history of CASE's involvement with Comanche Peak it has been occasionally necessary to take strong exception to the actions or decisions reached by the NRC staff about Comanche Peak when CASE had reason to believe such were not substantiated by the facts and evidence availabh LEtaff.

CASE had hoped that the establishment and presence of the Office of Special Projects (OSP) would insure that the regulatory process regarding Comanche Peak would be accomplished in accordance with the established regulatory programs for nuclear plants under construction, in fact, on the whole, CASE has been pleased with the performance of the on. site OSP inspection effort. Therefore,on the eve of project comp'etion, CASE was extremely disturbed to leam that the NRC's assessment process for Comanche Peak had been compromised.

CASE, as you know, received a copy of the memo and supporting information that was sent to the Commission by "NRC Staff

. inspectors." The memo was very critical of the NRC board's assessment of performance and the SALP process.- It is our conclusion that evidence exists to demonstrate that the regulatory process was,in fact, compromised to the point that CASE

< . believes a new evaluation should be considered. Although the basis for our position (that the SALP was compromised) is discussed below,it is even more imponant to nMe that our review and analysis revealed that the use of the S ALP process for Comanche Peak at this time was inappropriate anJ, thus, inherently problematic.

The restan of the S ALP process for the period September 1,1987 to July 31,1988 wasinappropriate because many of the areas of performance (i. c. redesign and rework) were stillless than Category "3" as defined in MC 0516.8 That is, NRC Manual Chapter 0516, paragraph 1, describes an evalua don process that assumes that a nuclear plant either falls under the construction 3

• Die categones for nung performance are defsed as follows-Category *l*: 'Ucensee management attenuen and involvement are readily evident and place emphasis on supenor performance of nuclear safety or safeguards acuvides.with the re sulting performance substandally eacceding regulatory requirements. Ucense

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resource: are ample and effect,vely used so that a high level of plant and personnel priormance is being achievec Reduced NRC auenuon may be sppropnate.*

Category *2*: *Ucenise management anemian to and involvement in the performance of nuclear safety orTafeguards activities are good. The licensee has atu ned a level of performance almve that needed to meet regulatory requiremenu. Geensee rescurces are adequate and reasonably succated so that good plant and personnel performance is being schieved. NRC auention may be mainuined as normallevels.*

Category "3": "Ucensee management attenuon to a~' ..vc vement in the perfortnance of nuclear plant safety or safeguards acuviued are not sufficient. The bcenste's rcrformance do : not sigruficandy esceed that needed to meet mirumal regulatory requiremenu Uceniet tesources appeario be strained or not effecuvely used NRC auenuon should be increaied above normal levels."

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or operabonal category and meets minimum regulatory requirements. Unit I at Comanche Peak fits neither category becauw the plant w as considered ready for fuelload in 1984, but was subsequently deemed not ready to load fuel and operate as a result of identified problems. This caused the NRC to increase and maintain a staff at about 10 times above the normal level.

He S ALP process was suspended by the NRC from 1984 until 1987 because of TV Electric's massive correcuve action propram (CAP) to address eleven specific areas of design and construction problems. It is CASE's understanding that this suspension recognized that TU Electric's performance was by definition less than a Category *3

• Using the SALP pro:ess is ill fitted for ,

esaluating TV Electric, a utihty that has been unable to meet the minimum regulatory requirements for over a decade.

Jr. suppon of this position, CASE points out that at the end of the S ALP period, TU Electric had not completed the correcthe action program, had well over 37,000 open items, and has c xperienc ed significant Q A program,Q A management,and technical problems during this SALP period. Fonunately, the NRC inspeciors recognized that something was just not right about the S ALP process. It is not surprising that applying the S ALP criteria and attributes, included in the Appendix of Manual Chapter (MC)0516, for es atuating licensec performance, w ould be problematic w hen the plant being cvaluated is under reconstrucuon, and not yet in operauon.

CASE believes that under the unique situation at Comanche Peak the recent SALP should have followed the NRC's review of '

op'crational readiness by the Operational Readiness Assessment Team (OR AT). We do not understand how the board could cven Nrform a valid S ALP without the information provided by the ORAT. The recent NRC's operational readiness team inspection identified serious deficiencies w hich supponed the concems voiced to the Commission that the plant was not >ct finished or ready. At the cxit the OR AT gave s cry negative findings and emphasized that all actions necessary for a low pow cr license should be complete before the OR AT is called back to determine if the license should be granted.

If the agency decides to use the S ALP process at Comanche Peak, our evaluadon indicates that a new S ALP evaluation should be considered and should follow the final oprational readiness inspection. CASE believes that the standard S ALP process should not be used at this point but a special modified process should be developed to evaluate TU Electric's performance includmg the character and competence to operate a nuclear plant.

The emphasis should be on evaluating management performance from TU Electric's corporate management down to site level supervision to determine attitude, character, competency and operational performance skills. The process should focus on the successful compledon of the corrective action program (eleven areas of design and construction described in the TV Elec'.ric CAP) and on w hether TU Electric has substantially improved to the point that their performance meets the minimum, Category "3". On the operadons side,the emphasis should be on operational readiness because there has been no significant performance by operadons or other areas that support operations such as radiological control, security and emergency preparedness. Board representation and votes should be based on day to-day involvement and weighted heavily to the design and construction side where NRC personnel have had the most experience with TU Electric's ability to react to problems.

We believe you should consider the results of our analysis of the 1989 SALP process at Comanche Peak which led us to conclude that the process was ill Gued and was compromised. MC 0516 states that the objective of the process is to share the results of the assessment with "the licensee and the public", We believe our constructive criticisms can help in reaching that objecdve.

i We also believe that the examples furnished below are sufGcient to suppon our conclusions and provide you a basis for abandoning the recent S ALP without spending valuable time performing a detailed review of the process. If you decide you must perform a detailed review we will be glad to compare the results of our specific assessment and analysis with you. The following exampics are provided as suf0cient information for you to conclude that the 1989 S ALP process at Comanche Peak was flawed.

• The composition of the board was stacked with managers who in some cases had little or nothing to do with day to day h

site inspections. On the other hand senior resident inspectors, who were most knowledicable and represent the  :

inspectors, were excluded from the process in 1988 and 1989.

Note: CASE views the Board composition as one way for management to override negative Gndings. The board selection does not credit the knowledge of the site inspectors who did the inspections. These arc the same inspectors who w rote the inspection reports; gathered, evaluated, wrote up their input for the SALP repon:

rewrote it the way management wanted it; attended the S ALP meeting without a voic; and then saw managers with little direct knowledge vote and override their findings. If the SALP process is really only a tool for management, there is little or no need to include inspectors in a process that literally makes them mbber 2

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starnp management's subjectise opinions.

• ne senior resident for construedon provided a very negathe input and a memorandum about TU Electae perfor.

mance; however, this was not reflected anyw here in the S AL. acess or repon. In fact, according to the list of those panicipating in the process, the senior resident inspector was not even acknowledged as panicipating in the process. 5

- Also an NRC consuhant who performed important inspecdons was dropped from the participants, w hile one consuhant who had been on site less than a month was included.

• NRC man 3Eement excluded and did not adequately consider significant performance problems during the D88 and j 1989 S ALP penods Performance conccming a breakdow n in the QA program service water system was deferred ,

for more than two years because of pending enforcement in report (50445/88 47; $0446/88 42)in the 1988 S ALP ,

period. Ris issue was still not, picked up and evaluated during the 1989 S ALP process, because it was referred to the NRC Officc ofinvestigations?

• ne AFW check valve failure and backflow incident was discussed but management action that led to enforcement issues was not discussed because of pending enforcement. TU Electric Operations essentially " flunked" the test w hen faced with an incident that closely resembled emergencies that occur at an operating plant and according to NRC Operadons SALP sheet for NRC repon 50-445/89 30; 50 4a6/89 30, TU Electric was given a Category *3" performance raung in this area.

_ De SALP process apparently went forward without considering extending the SALP period to include imponant i program deficiencies such as discussed above. MC 0516 allows extending the S ALP period from 12 to 18 months.  ;

In the face of cridcal performance indicators, we believe the NRC should have considered extending the period to include information crucial to evaluating performance and deciding whether or not to gmnt a license, The decision to exclude these issues sent the apparent message to NRC inspectors and consultants that it was more imponant to meet TU Electric's erroneous fuel load schedule than to do an accurate evaluation.

The functional areas for design and construction were deemphasized by placing more emphasis on other arcas w here there was no real performance to evaluate. Eleven functional areas in construction that should have been inde-pendently evaluated were combined into one area and this diluted negative findings in these areas. Disciplines w cre not specifically addressed as required by MC 0516.

MC 0516 states that the attributes and criteria listed in the appendix to MC 0516 should be relied on 10 develop a <

uniform and consistent approach. Our analysis of a sample (an early draft repon through a final draft S ALP designated A through D) of the draft reports showed that the approach did not rely on the specified criteria and attributes, nerefore, the approach was not uniform and consistent, and performance was not adequately evaluated,

• De general statements in the S ALP draft D appear to be selected from the criteria in Appendix 0516 that indicate CAT "2" performance; however, these statements were not supponed by data in the sarne paragraph or by reference h

to data. Instead many such statements were only supponed by examples that appear to suppon a CAT "3" finding.

Bus many of the " Cat 2" conclusions were not supponed by any data indicating the equivalent performance.

- MC 0516 does not define the term (repetitive deficiencics). Instead it is interpreted narrowly and subjectively without supporting data. There is no evidence of any detailed trend analysis to determine if findings in the 1988 versus the 1989 SALP were,in fact, repetitive. Similarly, there was no trend analysis of violations and deficiencies found during l the 1989 S ALP period which was compared to findings of violations and deficiencies by the NRC in the CAP from l- the time period 1985 to the present to evaluate recurrence.

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• Comments and observations about TU Electric's inability to address root causes which were evident in inspectors' input in early SALP drafts but wcre either dropped or minimized in the SALP draft D. In the case of TL) Electric responses to violations in NRC repons 50-445/84/32; 50 446/8411, and 50445/86 08; SQd46/86 06 the subjects were not addressed at all, even though meetings were held during the SALP period to discus _s inadequate corrective action regarding these issues.

CASE's analysis showed that many of the NRC staff's other negative findings were provided in the original draft repons but were dropped from the initial S ALP Draft or were rewritten to minimize them.

8 CASE decs noi undersund u hy completed NRC mtpecuun repon 50415/59 23. 50 44/8943. w hich apparendy addresies cerum aspects of management performance donng use service u ater sy stem meident has suti nct been released.

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- We think that the premature restart of the S ALP sent TU Electric the wrong message in 1988 and are alarmed about how the ,

process has affected TV Electric. However, w e are most disturbed that TV Electric's corporate attitude and pohey is retuminE to their 1984 pasture, yet, the NRC seems unwilling to msist that TU Electric maintain their candor exhibited at the time of

.the 1988 CASE TU Electric settlement.

This is demonstrated by the recent statements of TU Electnc's Vice Chairman William Counsil:

. , the plant did not need fixing in the first place....We literally went back and re reviewed ,

everything and found out that w hat we believed in '83, 'S4 timeframe w as right,* he said.

"We reproved it was ready." (Fort Ivorth Star Telegra n, dated October 29,1989).

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Of course this statement is in direct contradiction to his statement in the letter to CASE dated June 28,1988 w hich w as key to the settlement betwecn TU Electric and CASE. In this letter Mr, Counsil conceded that:

• Through the untiring cfforts of CASE representatives, deficiencies which esis'ted in the early 19S0's have been revealed in the design of substantial pordons of the plant which no one else, including TV Electric, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), or other third party experts had fully recognized or discovered. As a result, Comanche Peak is a better, safer plant than before and, through the reinspection and Corrective Action Program, has a greater assurance of safety and reliable gr.neradon."

Unfortunately, after spending billions on redesign and tework, massive changes of site personnel, and other efforts to change attitudes and improve programs, TU Electric's performance cannot be viewed as reformed when corporate management now states that there was nothing wrong in the first place. It follows that less experienced TV Electric middle management will believe and act accordinglyc And so, the argument goes on that there wr.s nothing wrong with the plant and the message is sent that commitments to corrective action and rework need not be taken seriously, CASE is very concerned about this change in approach by TU Electric management. We are equally concerned about the NRC's regulatory process to monitor and insure that overall evaluations,like the S ALP process, pinpoint the key flaws in management attitude and program controls before a final licensing decision. Unfortunately,our analysis showed that the S ALP process did just the opposite.

Respectfully, iW- '

Billic Pimer Garde

- Attorney for CASE cc: William Council,TU Electric George Edgar, Esq., Newman & Holtzinger Susan Palmer,Supulation Manager Christopher Grimes, NRC OSP, Comanche Peak, Director Robert F. Wamick, NRC OSP, Comanche Peak, Assistant Director of Inspecdon Programs

Enclosures:

j; Attachment 1 Attachment 2 l

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l ATT ACllM ENT 1 DET AILED REVIEW OF S ALP 1989 I De NRC requires a Systemade Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) annually, it is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect and evaluate performance information from a vancty of sources. The standard SALP process for nuclear plants nearing the end of construedon includes functional areas that specifically pertain to plant operadons, i. e., plant operauons, maintenance and surveillance, security, radiological conuols, and emergency preparedness. In addinna, at the end of construction the operations department would normally have a strong input in other functional areas such as procurement.

construction, and design where work is vinually complete. Under normal circumstances the NRC inspection program for construction is also vinually complete and preoperadonal testing and operations inspection modules show operational readiness. This w s not t+ue at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) for the 1989 S ALP period.

The history of 5 ALP esaluadons at Comanche Peak is unique. After the NRC Technical Resicw Team (TRT) found serious problems at CPSES the SALP process was suspended for 1951,1985, and 1986, in July 1987 the NRC restaned the S ALP process and issued a repon for the timeframe covering September 1.1987 through July 31,1988. It should N nmed that the evaluadon of performance documented in the 19SS and the cunent draft S ALP repons are evaluntions of a conective netion procram for deden nnd comtruction. That is, because the initial design, procurement, engincenng, construedon, and quaht) assurance actions could not always be prosen, much of the design and consuucdon in Unit I had to vinually be repeated in ordct to meet regalatory design, construction, and quality assurance requirements. Because all work in Unit I was vinually complete, subsequent w ork was actually corrective action and any failures to successfully complete the project a second dme should raise serious questions about management's ab;lity to continue the project. The applicant's failure to promptly idendfy uends of repetitive deficiencies anScr cortcct significant deficiencies demonstrates the inability of the TU Electric Q A program to understand the cause of deficiencies and preclude repeudon.

Based on our teview of the available materials it is clear that the NRC should he'.ve, but did not, perform a formal uend analysis of repcutive dc0ciencies identified by the NRC. Instead the SALP Board made general statements that major or minor violations were not repeddve and did not indicate a program breakdown. De narrow and subjective use of the term "repeduve" precludes finding any repeUtisc deficiencies < As applied it almost means the exact same thing happening again or occuning within this S ALP period. There were a number of violadons in this SALP period that were similar to violadons that have occurred in the past. For example, repetitive is narrow if the fnHure to adeauntelv inencet in the electrical arta is considered to be nonrepetidve even though the same problem (i. e., failure to adequately inspect) existed in the mechanical, Even more exueme, the interpretation of repetitive would render a failure to inspect in the mechanical discipline nonrepetidve because the first case involved welding and the second involved a failure to inspect maintenance area. Yet, in all cases there was a failure by the Quality Assurance / Quality Control depnrnent to perform adequately and according to procedures.

EVALUATION OF DRAFT SALP REPORTS The following findings are based on the evaluation of the inidal information that NRC site inspectors included in the draft S ALP repons, drafts submitted to the board, and the inidal draft S ALP by the board and in cenain cases other information about the process which was provided to CASE, Our analysis followed the NRC's own criteria in MC 0516. The SALP requirements set forth specific criteria for raung each functional arca: construction / corrective acdon program, enginecr-ing/ technical support, safety assessment / quality, plant operation, maintenance / surveillance, security, radiological conuols, and emergency preparedness. The following specific criteria were set fonh for evaluating each funcdonal area: Assurance of Quality, Approach to Resolving Technical Issucs, Responsiveness To NRC Initiadves, Enforcement History, and Operational and Construcdon Events. In Tabic 1 of the appendix of MC 0516 detailed attributes are set fonh under each respective enterion g

and required in order to evaluate performance in an organized and uniform manner.

I. Narruw Interpretation Of "Repetitise" i ne criteria conecming enforcement are not properly addressed even if one were to accept the narrow and subjective definition of "repeti ive." (See the Inuoduedon of MC 0516 w hich states that, as applied repcutive deficiencies or NRC s iolations would rarely be identified). The draft S ALP repon tables only list the severity levels of NRC violations. No formal uend analysis was performed by the NRC. For example, general criteria, such as failure to take corrective acdon reladvc to the critens of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B were not addressed.

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Although no formal trending was performed, it is CASE's understanding that inspectors attempted to point out the repeat program w caknesses in the initial drafts,i. c., TU Electric's QA program was sull not idenufying and correcting problems that are now part of their corrective aedon program. (See Section IV. A). For example, the pipe support angulanty suppon pretslem that finally had to be identified by the NRC and resuhed in the reinspection of over 5000 supports and required a signincant amount of rcwork. In subsequent drafts,this negatis e finding in Secdon IV. A was tewntten and the statement about inadequate configuration conuol was dropped. In Secdon IV, B.of the S ALP Board's version of the repon it only stated that an effecus c

- configuration control program was implemented. This change substantially alters the message being given to TU Electri: and the public about the repedtive nature of this problem.

II. S ALP Unard Composition Several years ago S ALP boards were generally composed of fewer managers and supervisors, but had a larger number of inspectors w ho performed the inspecdons, had a personal and direct involvement w ith an applicant or licensee, and s oted. As the Regions has e become top heavy with more and more managers, the Board composition has steadily changed in the other direction w here the senior resident inspector (SRI) is the only working level person on the Board.

Since the SRI is classified as a supervisor, no working inspectors are usually on the board. The S ALP Boards for 1988 and 1989 at Comanche Peak wcre selected by the Office of Special Projects. Rey went a step funher than the rest of the Agency and removed the senior residents from the board.

The composition of the first board was lopsided and stacked with 5 high managers who had no day-to day involvement with inspections versus one site manager and two site supervisors who did. (See the early draft repon which initially indicated that the board would be composed of: Special Projects Director and Deputy Director of Comanche Peak Project, Assistant Director for Projects, and the Assistant Director for Technical Programs who were from HQ: the Director of Reactor Safety Division w ho resides in Arlington's Region IV Office and; the Assistant Director for Site Inspections and two site supervisors w ho are responsible for inspections but did not do a significant amount of inspection.)

De final board composition became even more lopsided. Two more Region IV managers were added w ho had no day to day knowledge of the site inspections. This made it anpear as if the S ALP board was structured to assure votes that would result in a rating of category "2" or to have undue influence over work that they did not have first hand knowledge of.

Senior inspectors had no vote and would have been outvoted even if they had been allowed to vote as board members. De

- eleven to twelve site NRC inspectors /consuhants who did the work had the least say in the whole matter. It is CASE's understandtng that the S ALP of 1988 demoralized senior resident inspectors because they were not on the Board. In the 1989 S ALP report the SRI for construction was not even acknowledged as participanng in the process. Even worse his input, which w as very negative and was provided to the Commission in a memo, never showed in any draft of the S ALP repon or was given any consideration. This is in drastic contrast to the 1982 83 umeframe in which the opinion of the senior resident for construction was relied upon heavily by the NRC staff in the licensing hearings in support of licensing.

Ill. Functional Areasinappropriately Weighted And Condensed An original S ALP draft showed confusion about whether the main areas to be evaluated were in construction or operations.

Dat is, on page 7 in Section 1. A.," Introduction" of the initial draft it addresses the applicant's acuvities (perfonned dunng the S ALP period) necessary to complete the Corrective Acdon Program (CAP) and other activities necessary to demonstrate operational readiness. Eleven areas concerning design and construction were referenced and were stated to be in the applicant's

= Project Status Reports but these areas were not specifically addressed in any of the SALP drafts. He eleven functional areas appeared to be lumped into one or two areas. Accordingly, construction had two areas compared widtsix areas in operations even though the plant was not operstmg. Specific areas for construction were not addressed per MC 0516: soits/ foundations; containment, major structures and steel supports, piping systems / supports; mechanical components, auxiliary systems, electrical equipment / cables; and,instrumentat ion.

Section 1. B. of a draft stated that the majority of NRC inspections coscred the applicant's CAP and preoperational testing.

Den it stated that other NRC inspecdons covered operational readiness, indicating less inspection in this area. On page 11 of an onginal draft it showed the eight funcdonal areas,de scribed in the Introduction of Attachment I above, and designated NRC operations as lead in six of the eight areas.

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8 IV, Specific information Excluded De h7C's draft S ALP repons for the period September 1,1988 through July 31,1989 are two examples of a w eak regulatory _

policy regardmg TV Electric's failure to determine the root cause of condinons adverse to quality and preclude repeuuon. In the case of the removal of a coating from service water system there were multiple breakdowns in TU Electric's technical and quality assurance programs but the January 9,1989 N'odce of Violadon downgraded the Leveill! violations recommended by all NPC personnel (senior resident inspector, inspector's site supenisor, assistant director for site inspection program through the Director of the Comanche Peak Program). The draft S ALP reports do not really address the senousness of these prograrn _j deficiencies. he exclusion of these matters appears especially suspect since the final S/_LP excludes the negative comments- ,j about Unit 1, but praises the corrective acdon taken for work on unit 2 service water system. ]

i ne issue of TU Electric's response to the senice water system enforcement action not being accurate and complete w as not  :

considered in the as >ct unissued 57C inspccuon repon 50-445/89 23; 50 446/S9 23. The NTC deferred the evaluadon of i this issue effcctively forever by refernns it to be investigated and considered in the next S ALP The subject performance goes l to the character and competence of TU Electric reladve to completely and accurately evaluating and reporting matters to the i N7C. This is a very important area for an operating plant and should hase been evaluated it is hard to tsliese that N7C  !

- management deferred addressing or considering taking action on the repeated failure of TU Electric to have a program that lt controls safety related work.

A second example is the failed check vah e problems in the Auxiliary Feedwater System. TU Electric performance in this area <

was also unirstated in the SALP report and evaluation of enforcement activity as relates to performance in this area has 1 deferred for another year on the basis of considering escalated enforcement. Yet, the d.ismal performance in this area is a ,

glimpse into how TU Electric will perform during the plant operations. Yet TU Electric has already taken the cavalier position l that w hat happened dunng the test is typical of preoperational testing. John Beck was quoted as saying," There's a heck of a  !

difference in how one reacts in a test mode than in an operating mode " (Fr. Worth Star Telegram, dated October 29,1989) l What Beck did not state was the volves were not scheduled for testing and the probicm was nnN dhcovered because of this  ;

incident. In addition the applicant did not repon an earlier and related event May 5,1989) to the S7C.

l The S ALP repon is otherwise apologetic for the applicant, narrowly interprets repedtive deficiencies, and considers single ,

occurrences unimponant. This is like telling the public that a major airline will not view a single incident seriously and take corrective action concerning a pilot w ho just caused a crash because he only missed one thing on his checklist - seuing the j flaps correctly for takeoff. This type of performance evaluation misses the point that the one item missed,i.e., failure to set the flaps, was fatal. It became irrelevant that the puot completed all other items on the checklist. So, even if one could contend that missing different items on a checklist was not precisely the same (repetitive) deficiency, the results of missing any single item could be very serious. Thus, unless the correcdve action correctly defines the incident as a repetitive failure to follow the 3 pre. flight checklist, no meaningful corrective action can be accomplished. j The 57C policy of deferring key programmatic failures connected with enforcement or investigations that occurred during  !

the S ALP period undl the nex t S ALP is illogical and is a serious flaw in the S ALP process as MC 0516 does not specifically prohibit such practices. There is no indication that fuel loading would be deferred for the same period of time in order for the NTC to determine whether TU Electric's performance was and will be adequate before granting a license.

V. Inability To Address Root Cause s i

h7C inspection repons and the draft S ALP reports contain a large number of cxamples where TU Electric did not addre

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• . Page 17 stated. *... failure to perform an evaluation of reponability of cenam 'unsat' inspection reports. Needed I imptovements in procedural cor, trol for identifying and documenting problems identified by operations is a major concem." Dropped in S ALP draft repon B.

• - ' Conceming submittals of FSAR changes page 1718 stated,"The applicant relied on meeting the ' minimum' NRC requirements, as determined by the applicant, as a basis for not performing certain important preoperational tests (instrument air) rather than providing an adequate technical justification." Dropped from D.

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• Page 17 of draft C submitted to board stated.

• Seven of the violations were for QC inspection errors and appear to be isolated. However, most of the remaining deficiencies were for programmatic problems such as, field .

verification methods (FVMs) failing to provide sufficient instruction for verification of inaccessible attributes -!

and QC measurement techniques being adequate to correctly idend fy valve stem angles." Retained in D but these are examples of problems found in the CAP.

• Page 23 of S ALP draft repon B stated that " management involvernent was lacking" conceming the removal of ,

the coating from service water piping. Dropped from C.

b. Operations NRC did not find as many repetitive deficiencies in this arca because inspections have focused on construction. ,

However, deficiencies in certain areas can be shown to be repetitive because lessons leamed in construction should have prevented similar deficiencies in operations. The following are examples from SALP draft repon A unless otherwise stated: <

• Page 19 20 stated that management was not as aggressive as it could have been in all areas and ... " operations l procedures were not being maintained to a level w hich the staff felt was necessary for safe operation of a newly -

licensed plant." Dropped from B.

• Concerning operational decisions page 20 stated, "Some failures to document minor operational events or identified preoperational problems were noted; however, when issues were escalated to senior management's attention the issues were resolved." Dropped from B.

NOTE: NRC had to inappropriately escalate issues that should have been handled by supervision and senior staff members. This was inappropriate because senior management will not be operating the plant.

Page 20 stated *The applicant has experienced increased enforcement activity in the operations area during the S ALP period." Dropped from B, Page 21 stated,"The major concern to the staff is the applicant's apparent ' lack of attention to detail' which was evidenced by the results of the recently completed Operation Procedure Review." Dropped from B.

Page 21 stated, "Although the licensed operators, as a general rule do not have a great deal of power plant operations experience senior management recognizes this deficiency and is taking necessary steps. ."

VI, SALP Board Dropped Negatit e Findings Most of the negative findings quoted and discussed in the previous paragraph (inability To AddresrRoot Cause) were cither

. dropped from the S ALP final draft repon or reworded to the point that the negative finding was minimized. Inexplicably, in some cases, the findings were changed to become positive program / management statements.

VII. Insufficient S ALP Data To Support Conclusluns in general the S ALP drafts showed a lack of data or references to data to suppon conclusions about large complex arcas of work performed by TU Electric Without such a collection of all of the data about cach functional arca, ratings became

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exuemely arbitrary and lost much of the purpose for the SALP.

No systematic NRC program was implemented to perform uend analysis of violations of the criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.and analyze the_ data to determine if deficiencies were repeddve. Such an analysis and evaluation was especially imponant and should have been performed to provide data to back up S ALP conclusions.

De eleven areas in design and construction were not specifically identified and evaluated in the S ALP. Since most of R1 ,

Electric's work in unit I was under the CAP, this was a large pan of the NRC's inspection cffon, his area of the, S ALP lacLed specific data to suppon many findings and ratings assigned, insufficient inspeedons were done in the functional area of maintenance / surveillance and should not have been rated (The senior resident for construedon was assigned to perform inspec tions in this area but performed very little inspecdon because TU Electric did not take adequate correcdve aedon on service water violadons and extra work had to be done in that areal It is doubtful that the NRC performed the necessary inspection effon during the two wecks left in the S ALP period after the said inspector left.-

CASE CONCLUSIONS

1. The S ALP pro;ess should follow, not precede, the Operational Readiness Assessment Team inspection because that inspection should be considered when evaluating TU Electric's performance.

2. De S ALP repon process is viewed as a poor vehicle for evaluating TU Electric at this stage of project completion.

3. The current SALP process and report have been compromised from many standpoints and some other sedon must be taken to show the satisfactory completion of correcdve action relative to design and construction, plant testing, and operational readiness.

4. If used, the S ALP process should be objectively and rigorously performed in accordance with the criteria and attnbutes in MC 0516 in order to be uniform, logical and supponable. De conclusions for CAT 1,2,3, or below findings should be based on supporting data paraphrased in the S ALP and/or referenced data summaries on file.

5, More inspectors with direct site experience and fewer managers should be voting members of the Board to make the process credible.

6. TU Electric performance is obviously, at a minimum, a Category "3" in the area of corrective action and root cause analysis by vinue of their performance in the service water system evaluation and check valve incident.

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, . ,c m.....a June 23,19B3 s 1

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Mrs. Juanita Euis '

President, CASE 1426 South Polk Street *

~ Dauas, Texas 752 1

Dear Juanita:

We have apeed that when the NRC licensing proceecings for the Comanene Peak Steam Electric Station (NRC Docket Nos. 50-445-OL, 50-446-OL and 50-445-CPA) have been dismissed and the Joint Stipulation has become. effective, you win ce autner::ed to release inis letter to the public and the news media and we wiu file .it with the NRC as part of the reccrd of the !jeensing proceecing. I am duly autneri:ed to ma,ce ine statements herein on behalf of TU Electric and to sign this letter.

TU Electric recognizes that the ~ Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) anc its

• L ' President, Mrs. Juanita Euls.' have made a substantial, personal, and unselfish contr:Dut:en I

to the regulatory process wnich assures tnat Comanene Peak-5 team Eleett:0 Stat;:n ,

' PComanene Peax") wiu be a safer plant. .Througn the untiring efforts of CASE representatives, deficiencies which existed in the early 1980's have oeen revealed in tne design of sucstantial portions of the plant which no.one else, including TU Electric the - ,.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),'or other third-party experts had fuuy recognized '

or discovered. As a result,. Comanche Peak is n' better, safer plant than before and, througn the reinspection- and Corrective Action Program, has a greater- assurance of m safety and reliable generation. We commend CASE, together with.its technical acvisors, L Jack Doyle and. Mark Walsh, and other workers, public interest organizations, and f supporters for their courage and devotion to CASE's goals of finding the facts and L -informing the public. Because of these activities, CASE's President,-Mrs. Euls, has eeen -

. appointed to the Operations Review Committee (" ORC") at Comanche Peak, an unpaid cut important position.which win provide CASE with the opportunity to continue to play an

. active part in assuring itself that Comanche Peak is as safe a nuclear facility as possiole.

y The ORC-is required by the Comanche Peak technical specifications and functions as an

' independent bocy assigned the responsibility for review of various safety related matters l' -

including nuclear. power plant operations, nuclear engineering, radiological safety and

_ quauty assurance practices among others. Among its duties, the ORC wtu be responstole for inde;andent review of proposed modifications to the Comanche Peak factlities or procedures, changes to the Technical Specifications and license amendments, any violations or deviations which are required to be reported to NRC and other safety related i

matters deemed appropriate by the ORC members. The CRC meets periodically to

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Mrs. Juanita E' dis -

June 23,15!3

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review and- d!seuss various ' issues bearing on the safe eperation of Comanene Pea < an:

re;crts its fincings and recom.T.encations citee'Jy to the Executive Vice Pres: cent.

Nuclear Engineering and Operations.

'TU Electric a.lso recognizes its own shortcomings in assuring the NRC that tney fulfillec NRC Regulations. e'eracknowledge that nuclear expertise did not exist to meet trese demands and that its nuclear. management did not have full sensitivity to the regulat:ry '

environment. ' CASE, Mrs. Ellis and her colleagues played a sumstantial part in acnteving our current level of awareness.

Sincerely,

/.?,f/

'1' W. G. Cou/$7nsil Executive Vice President, Generating Division TU Electric M F 6

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' LIST!!'G OF DP0 REVIEW PANEL llEETINGS DATE ATTEllDEES ACTIVITIES 15 NOV'65- Panel Members Review of inspecto'r survey and.

genert, tion of request to Sperir1 v Projects for additional infor-mation.

20 NOV E9 Panel Members Review of' inspector survey and-D. Crutchfield discussion of review status.

L 11 DEC 89 Panel Members Review of initial findings from special independent review of SALP report.

~21-DEC 89 Panel tienbers Review of initial findings from L. Plisco SALP process review.

26 DEC P.9 Panel Members Preparation of questions for SALP Board members.

~04 JAt 90 Panel Members Meeting with selected SALP Board C. Grimes . Members.

R. Warnick H. Livermore J. Wiebe L. Plisco 04 JAN 90 Panel Members Meeting with SALP Board Observer

' R. Ramirez

L. Plisco N

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l Enclosure 3 l

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