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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M4461999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security/ Contingency Plan, IAW 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20217J4151999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990624 Application for Amend of TSs That Would Revise TS for Weighing of Ice Condenser Ice Baskets 05000327/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project ML20217G1141999-10-0707 October 1999 Responds to from P Salas,Providing Response to NRC Risk Determination Associated with 990630 Flooding Event at Sequoyah Facility.Meeting to Discuss Risk Determination Issues Scheduled for 991021 in Atlanta,Ga ML20217B2981999-10-0606 October 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Integrity, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2. NRC Also Hereby Solicits Any Written Comments That TVA May Have on Current Rvid Data by 991101 ML20217B8431999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief Requests That Were Identified in Plant Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Both Units.Encl 3 Provides Util Procedure for Calculation of ASME Code Coverage for Section XI Nondestructive Exams IR 05000327/19990041999-10-0101 October 1999 Ack Receipt of Providing Comments on Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04.NRC Considered Comments for Apparent Violation Involving 10CFR50.59 Issue ML20217C7101999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990910 RAI Re Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 URI 50-327/98-04-02 & 50-328/98-04-02 Re Ice Weight Representative Sample ML20212J5981999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plnat,Unit 1 ML20212M1081999-09-29029 September 1999 Confirms Intent to Meet with Utils on 991025 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Pilot Plants,Shearon Harris & Sequoyah Any Observations & Lessons Learned & Recommendations Re Implementation of Pilot Program ML20217A9451999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-05 & 50-328/99-05 on 990718- 0828.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Non-Cited Violation ML20216J9351999-09-27027 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04.Corrective Actions:Risk Determination Evaluation Was Performed & Licensee Concluded That Event Is in Green Regulatory Response Band ML20212F0751999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Util 981021 Request for Relief from ASME Code,Section XI Requirements from Certain Inservice Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20212F4501999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79, Respectively & Ser.Amends Approve Request to Revise TSs to Allow Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20212M1911999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Exercise of Enforcement Discretion Re Apparent Violation Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 Associated with Implementation of Procedural Changes Which Resulted in Three Containment Penetrations Being Left Open ML20211Q0311999-09-10010 September 1999 Requests Written Documentation from TVA to Provide Technical Assistance to Region II Re TS Compliance & Ice Condenser Maint Practices at Plant ML20216F5441999-09-0707 September 1999 Provides Results of Risk Evaluation of 990630,flooding Event at Sequoyah 1 & 2 Reactor Facilities.Event Was Documented in Insp Rept 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 & Transmitted in Ltr, ML20211N5681999-09-0101 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Two Issues Raised in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04,dtd 990813,which Was First Insp Rept Issued for Plant Under NRC Power Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Plant Study ML20211G5881999-08-27027 August 1999 Submits Summary of 990820 Management Meeting Re Plant Performance.List of Attendees & Matl Used in Presentation Enclosed ML20211F8891999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, Re Completed SG Activities,Per TSs 4.4.5.5.b & 4.4.5.5.c ML20211A1851999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary TR WCAP-15128 & non-proprietary Rept WCAP-15129 for NRC Review.Repts Are Provided in Advance of TS Change That Is Being Prepared to Support Cycle 10 Rfo. Proprietary TR Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210V1471999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 on 990601- 0717.One Potentially Safety Significant Issue Identified.On 990630,inadequate Performance of Storm Drain Sys Caused Water from Heavy Rainfall to Backup & Flood Turbine Bldg ML20211A1921999-08-12012 August 1999 Requests Proprietary TR WCAP-15128, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC at Dented TSP Intersections, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210Q5011999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006 at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Sample Registration Ltr Encl ML20210L4291999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept & SG-99-07-009, Sequoyah Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept. Repts Submitted IAW TS 4.4.5.5.b & TS 4.4.5.5.c ML20210L1611999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Request for Relief RV-4 Re ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Prvs, Per First ten-year Inservice Test Time Interval.Review & Approval of RV-4 Is Requested to Support Unit 1 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start 000213 ML20210G5301999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept That Contains Historical Record of Repairs,Replacement & ISI & Augmented Examinations That Were Performed on ASME Code Class 1 & 2 Components from 971104-990511 ML20211B9661999-07-26026 July 1999 Informs That Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Sewage Treatment Plant, NPDES 0026450 Outfall 112,is in Standby Status.Flow Has Been Diverted from Sys Since Jan 1998 ML20210B2521999-07-14014 July 1999 Confirms 990712 Telcon Between J Smith of Licensee Staff & M Shannon of NRC Re semi-annual Mgt Meeting Schedule for 990820 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Recent Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Performance ML20210J1091999-07-10010 July 1999 Submits Suggestions & Concerns Re Y2K & Nuclear Power Plants ML20196K0381999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Written Confirmation of Completed Commitment for Final Implementation of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions at Snp,Per GL 92-08 ML20209E4071999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-03 & 50-328/99-03 on 990328- 0531.Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20196J8261999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI Requirements for Certain Inservice Inspections at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20196G7881999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs NRC of Changes That Util Incorporated Into TS Bases Sections & Trm.Encl Provides Revised TS Bases Pages & TRM Affected by Listed Revs ML20196G1801999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License SOP-20751-1,for Lf Hardin,Effective 990611.Subject Individual Resigned from Position at TVA ML20195G1821999-06-0808 June 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief for ISI Program.Encl 1 Provides Relief Request 1-ISI-14 That Includes Two Attachments.Encl 2 Provides Copy of Related ASME Code Page ML20195E9521999-06-0707 June 1999 Requests Relief from Specific Requirements of ASME Section Xi,Subsection IWE of 1992 Edition,1992 Addenda.Util Has Determined That Proposed Alternatives Would Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20195E9311999-05-28028 May 1999 Informs of Planned Insp Activities for Licensee to Have Opportunity to Prepare for Insps & Provide NRC with Feedback on Any Planned Insps Which May Conflict with Plant Activities ML20195B3631999-05-21021 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for Tj Van Huis,Per 10CFR50.74(a).TJ Van Huis Retired from Util,Effective 990514 ML20207A5721999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Correction to Previously Issued Amend 163 to License DPR-79 Re SR 4.1.1.1.1.d Inadvertently Omitted from Pp 3/4 1-1 of Unit 2 TS ML20206Q8791999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards L36 9990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 10, IAW Plant TS 6.9.1.14.c 05000327/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv)1999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv) ML20206M9341999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rept of SG Tube Plugging During Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage,As Required by TS 4.4.5.5.a.ISI of Unit 2 SG Tubes Was Completed on 990503 ML20206K6271999-05-0606 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for MR Taggart,License SOP-21336 Due to Resignation on 990430 ML20206J2061999-05-0404 May 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME B&PV Code.Tva Requests Approval to Use Wire Type Penetrameters in Lieu of Plaque Type Penetrameters for Performing Radiographic Insps.Specific Relief Request,Encl ML20209J0391999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept, Radiological Impact Assessment Rept & Rev 41 to ODCM, for Period of Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206C6541999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990127 RAI Re GL 96-05 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20206C0841999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-02 & 50-328/99-02 on 990214-0327.No Violations Noted ML20206B9591999-04-20020 April 1999 Responds to 990417 Request That NRC Exercise Discretion Not to Enforce Compliance with Actions Required in Unit 1 TS 3.1.2.2,3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 & Documents 990417 Telephone Conversation When NRC Orally Issued NOED ML20205S5891999-04-17017 April 1999 Documents Request for Discretionary Enforcement for Unit 1 TS LCOs 3.1.2.2,3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 to Support Completion of Repairs & Testing for 1B-B Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217M4461999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security/ Contingency Plan, IAW 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 05000327/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project ML20217B8431999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief Requests That Were Identified in Plant Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Both Units.Encl 3 Provides Util Procedure for Calculation of ASME Code Coverage for Section XI Nondestructive Exams ML20217C7101999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990910 RAI Re Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 URI 50-327/98-04-02 & 50-328/98-04-02 Re Ice Weight Representative Sample ML20216J9351999-09-27027 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04.Corrective Actions:Risk Determination Evaluation Was Performed & Licensee Concluded That Event Is in Green Regulatory Response Band ML20211N5681999-09-0101 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Two Issues Raised in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04,dtd 990813,which Was First Insp Rept Issued for Plant Under NRC Power Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Plant Study ML20211F8891999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, Re Completed SG Activities,Per TSs 4.4.5.5.b & 4.4.5.5.c ML20211A1851999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary TR WCAP-15128 & non-proprietary Rept WCAP-15129 for NRC Review.Repts Are Provided in Advance of TS Change That Is Being Prepared to Support Cycle 10 Rfo. Proprietary TR Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20211A1921999-08-12012 August 1999 Requests Proprietary TR WCAP-15128, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC at Dented TSP Intersections, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210L4291999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept & SG-99-07-009, Sequoyah Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept. Repts Submitted IAW TS 4.4.5.5.b & TS 4.4.5.5.c ML20210L1611999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Request for Relief RV-4 Re ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Prvs, Per First ten-year Inservice Test Time Interval.Review & Approval of RV-4 Is Requested to Support Unit 1 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start 000213 ML20210G5301999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept That Contains Historical Record of Repairs,Replacement & ISI & Augmented Examinations That Were Performed on ASME Code Class 1 & 2 Components from 971104-990511 ML20210J1091999-07-10010 July 1999 Submits Suggestions & Concerns Re Y2K & Nuclear Power Plants ML20196K0381999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Written Confirmation of Completed Commitment for Final Implementation of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions at Snp,Per GL 92-08 ML20196G7881999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs NRC of Changes That Util Incorporated Into TS Bases Sections & Trm.Encl Provides Revised TS Bases Pages & TRM Affected by Listed Revs ML20196G1801999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License SOP-20751-1,for Lf Hardin,Effective 990611.Subject Individual Resigned from Position at TVA ML20195G1821999-06-0808 June 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief for ISI Program.Encl 1 Provides Relief Request 1-ISI-14 That Includes Two Attachments.Encl 2 Provides Copy of Related ASME Code Page ML20195E9521999-06-0707 June 1999 Requests Relief from Specific Requirements of ASME Section Xi,Subsection IWE of 1992 Edition,1992 Addenda.Util Has Determined That Proposed Alternatives Would Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20195B3631999-05-21021 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for Tj Van Huis,Per 10CFR50.74(a).TJ Van Huis Retired from Util,Effective 990514 ML20206Q8791999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards L36 9990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 10, IAW Plant TS 6.9.1.14.c 05000327/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv)1999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv) ML20206M9341999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rept of SG Tube Plugging During Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage,As Required by TS 4.4.5.5.a.ISI of Unit 2 SG Tubes Was Completed on 990503 ML20206K6271999-05-0606 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for MR Taggart,License SOP-21336 Due to Resignation on 990430 ML20206J2061999-05-0404 May 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME B&PV Code.Tva Requests Approval to Use Wire Type Penetrameters in Lieu of Plaque Type Penetrameters for Performing Radiographic Insps.Specific Relief Request,Encl ML20209J0391999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept, Radiological Impact Assessment Rept & Rev 41 to ODCM, for Period of Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206C6541999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990127 RAI Re GL 96-05 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20205S5891999-04-17017 April 1999 Documents Request for Discretionary Enforcement for Unit 1 TS LCOs 3.1.2.2,3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 to Support Completion of Repairs & Testing for 1B-B Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) ML20205B1091999-03-19019 March 1999 Submits Response to NRC Questions Concerning Lead Test Assembly Matl History,Per Request ML20204H0161999-03-19019 March 1999 Resubmits Util 990302 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/98-11 & 50-328/98-11.Corrective Actions:Lessons Learned from Event Have Been Provided to Operating Crews ML20204E8251999-03-0505 March 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321, in Accordance with Requirements of 10CFR55.45 ML20207E6851999-03-0202 March 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/98-11 & 50-328/98-11.Corrective Actions:Lessons Learned from Event Have Been Provided to Operating Crews ML20207J1171999-01-29029 January 1999 Forwards Copy of Final Exercise Rept for Full Participation Ingestion Pathway Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans site-specific to Sequoyah NPP ML20202A7141999-01-20020 January 1999 Provides Request for Relief for Delaying Repair on Section of ASME Code Class 3 Piping within Essential Raw Cooling Water Sys ML20198S7141998-12-29029 December 1998 Forwards Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept, Per GL 95-05.Rept Is Submitted IAW License Condition 2.C.(9)(d) 05000327/LER-1998-004, Forwards LER 98-004-00,providing Details Concerning Inability to Complete Surveillance within Required Time Interval1998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards LER 98-004-00,providing Details Concerning Inability to Complete Surveillance within Required Time Interval ML20198D5471998-12-14014 December 1998 Requests That License OP-20313-2 for Je Wright,Be Terminated IAW 10CFR50.74(a).Individual Retiring ML20197J5541998-12-10010 December 1998 Forwards Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept IAW IWA-6220 & IWA-6230 of ASME Code,Section Xi.Request for Relief Will Be Submitted to NRC Timeframe to Support Second 10-year Insp Interval,Per 10CFR50.55a 05000327/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Automatic Reactor Trip with FW Isolation & Auxiliary FW Start as Result of Failure of Vital Inverter & Second Inverter Failure.Event Is Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)1998-12-0909 December 1998 Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Automatic Reactor Trip with FW Isolation & Auxiliary FW Start as Result of Failure of Vital Inverter & Second Inverter Failure.Event Is Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) ML20196F9841998-11-25025 November 1998 Provides Changes to Calculated Peak Fuel Cladding Temp, Resulting from Recent Changes to Plant ECCS Evaluation Model ML20195H7891998-11-17017 November 1998 Requests NRC Review & Approval of Five ASME Code Relief Requests Identified in Snp Second ten-year ISI Interval for Units 1 & 2 ML20195E4991998-11-12012 November 1998 Forwards Rev 7 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Adds Requirement That Security Personnel Will Assess Search Equipment Alarms & Add Definition of Major Maint.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d)(1)) 05000328/LER-1998-002, Forwards LER 98-002-00 Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip, Resulting from Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer1998-11-10010 November 1998 Forwards LER 98-002-00 Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip, Resulting from Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer ML20195G5701998-11-10010 November 1998 Documents Util Basis for 981110 Telcon Request for Discretionary Enforcement for Plant TS 3.8.2.1,Action B,For 120-VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV.Licensee Determined That Inverter Failed Due to Component Failure ML20155J4031998-11-0505 November 1998 Provides Clarification of Topical Rept Associated with Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies Beginning with Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20154R9581998-10-21021 October 1998 Requests Approval of Encl Request for Relief ISI-3 from ASME Code Requirements Re Integrally Welded Attachments of Supports & Restraints for AFW Piping ML20155B1481998-10-21021 October 1998 Informs That as Result of Discussion of Issues Re Recent Events in Ice Condenser Industry,Ice Condenser Mini-Group (Icmg),Decided to Focus Efforts on Review & Potential Rev of Ice condenser-related TS in Order to Clarify Issues ML20154K1581998-10-13013 October 1998 Forwards Rept Re SG Tube Plugging Which Occurred During Unit 1 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage,Per TS 4.4.5.5.a.ISI of Unit 1 SG Was Completed on 980930 ML20154H6191998-10-0808 October 1998 Forwards Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.14.c 05000328/LER-1998-001, Forwards LER 98-001-00 Providing Details Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip Due to Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer1998-09-28028 September 1998 Forwards LER 98-001-00 Providing Details Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip Due to Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer ML20151W4901998-09-0303 September 1998 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/98-07 & 50-328/98-07.Corrective Actions:Revised Per SQ971279PER to Address Hardware Issues of Hysteresis, Pressure Shift & Abnormal Popping Noise 1999-09-27
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059K6661990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Evaluation That Provides Details of Plug Cracks & Justification for Continued Operation Until 1993 ML20059H4031990-09-10010 September 1990 Discusses Plant Design Baseline & Verification Program Deficiency D.4.3-3 Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/86-27 & 50-328/86-27.Evaluation Concluded That pre-restart Walkdown Data,Loops 1 & 2 Yielded Adequate Design Input ML20059E1851990-08-31031 August 1990 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-22 & 50-328/90-22.Corrective Actions:Extensive Mgt Focus Being Applied to Improve Overtime Use Controls ML20059E2881990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Alternate Testing of Reactor Vessel Head & Internals Lifting Rigs,Per NUREG-0612.Based on Listed Hardships,Util Did Not Choose 150% Load Test Option ML20059H1831990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Nonproprietary PFE-F26NP & Proprietary PFE-F26, Sequoyah Nuclear Plan Unit 1,Cycle 5 Restart Physics Test Summary, Re Testing Following Vantage 5H Fuel Assembly installation.PFE-F26 Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(b)(4)) ML18033B5031990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Financial Info Required to Assure Retrospective Premiums,Per 10CFR140 & 771209 Ltr ML20028G8341990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Calculation SCG1S361, Foundation Investigation of ERCW Pumping Station Foundation Cells. ML20063Q2471990-08-20020 August 1990 Submits Implementation Schedule for Cable Tray Support Program.Util Proposes Deferral of Portion of Remaining Activities Until After Current Unit 2 Cycle 4 Refueling Outage,Per 900817 Meeting.Tva Presentation Matl Encl ML20056B5181990-08-20020 August 1990 Responds to NRC Re Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty & Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-01 & 50-328/90-01.Corrective Actions:Organizational Capabilities Reviewed.Payment of Civil Penalty Wired to NRC ML20063Q2461990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards Cable Test Program Resolution Plan to Resolve Issues Re Pullbys,Jamming & Vertical Supported Cable & TVA- Identified Cable Damage.Tva Commits to Take Actions Prior to Startup to Verify Integrity of safety-related Cables ML20059A5121990-08-15015 August 1990 Provides Clarification of Implementation of Replacement Items Project at Plant for Previously Procured Warehouse Inventory.Util Committed to 100% Dedication of Commercial Grade,Qa,Level Ii,Previous Procurement Warehouse Spare ML20058M2321990-08-0707 August 1990 Forwards Rept of 900709 Fishkill,Per Requirements in App B, Environ Tech Spec,Subsections 4.1.1 & 5.4.2.Sudden Water Temp Increase Killed Approximately 150 Fish in Plant Diffuser Pond ML20058N2361990-08-0707 August 1990 Confirms That Requalification Program Evaluation Ref Matl Delivered to Rd Mcwhorter on 900801.Ref Matl Needed to Support NRC Preparation for Administering Licensed Operator Requalification Exams in Sept 1990 ML20058M4471990-07-27027 July 1990 Responds to Unresolved Items Which Remain Open from Insp Repts 50-327/90-18 & 50-328/90-18.TVA in Agreement W/Nrc on Scope of Work Required to Address Concerns W/Exception of Design Basis Accident & Zero Period Accelaration Effects ML20058M0111990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Plant Condition Adverse to Quality Rept Concerning Operability Determination.Probability of Cable Damage During Installation Low.No Programmatic Cable Installation Problems Exist ML20055J3531990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Revised Commitment to Resolve EOP Step Deviation Document Review Comments ML20055J0771990-07-26026 July 1990 Requests Termination of Senior Reactor Operator License SOP-20830 for Jh Sullivan Due to Resignation from Util ML20055G6611990-07-17017 July 1990 Forwards Justification for Continued Operation for safety- Related Cables Installed at Plant,Per 900717 Telcon.No Operability Concern Exists at Plant & No Programmatic Problems Have Been Identified.Summary of Commitments Encl ML20058L7001990-07-16016 July 1990 Forwards Response to SALP Repts 50-327/90-09 & 50-328/90-09 for 890204 - 900305,including Corrective Actions & Improvements Being Implemented ML20055F6151990-07-13013 July 1990 Provides Addl Bases for Util 900320 Proposal to Discontinue Review to Identify Maint Direct Charge molded-case Circuit Breakers Procured Between Aug 1983 & Dec 1984,per NRC Bulletin 88-010.No Significant Assurance Would Be Expected ML20044B2211990-07-12012 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info Clarifying Certain Conclusions & Recommendation in SER Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program ML20055D2531990-07-0202 July 1990 Provides Status of Q-list Development at Plant & Revises Completion Date for Effort.Implementation of Q-list Would Cause Unnecessary & Costly Delays in Replanning Maint,Mod, outage-related Activities & Associated Procedure Revs ML20043H9061990-06-21021 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementaion of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition or Requirements or Corrective Actions. No Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20043H2281990-06-18018 June 1990 Informs of Issue Recently Identified During Startup of Facility from Cycle 4 Refueling Outage & How Issue Addressed to Support Continued Escalation to 100% Power,Per 900613 & 14 Telcons ML20043G4901990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Tabs for Apps a & B to Be Inserted Into Util Consolidated Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan ML20043F9261990-06-13013 June 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor/Darling Model S3502 Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Design. ML20043F9301990-06-13013 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900516 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-17 & 50-328/90-17.Corrective Action:Test Director & Supervisor Involved Given Appropriate Level of Disciplinary Action ML20043H0361990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Supplemental Info Re Unresolved Item 88-12-04 Addressing Concern W/Double Differentiation Technique Used to Generate Containment Design Basis Accident Spectra,Per 900412 Request ML20043D9921990-06-0505 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900507 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-14 & 50-328/90-14.Corrective Actions:Util Reviewed Issue & Determined That Trains a & B Demonstrated Operable in Jan & Apr,Respectively of 1989 ML20043C2821990-05-29029 May 1990 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Re Hydrostatic Pressure Test Requirements Involving RCS & Small Section of Connected ECCS Piping for Plant.Replacement & Testing of Check Valve 1-VLV-63-551 Presently Scheduled for Completion on 900530 ML20043C0581990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900426 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-15 & 50-328/90-15.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043B3051990-05-22022 May 1990 Forwards Detailed Scenario for 900711 Radiological Emergency Plan Exercise.W/O Encl ML20043B1201990-05-18018 May 1990 Forwards, Diesel Generator Voltage Response Improvement Rept. Combined Effect of Resetting Exciter Current Transformers to Achieve flat-compounding & Installing Electronic Load Sequence Timers Produced Acceptable Voltage ML20043A6101990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20043A2391990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Revised Tech Spec Pages to Support Tech Spec Change 89-27 Re Steam Generator Water Level Adverse Trip Setpoints for Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation & Esfas. Encl Reflects Ref Leg Heatup Environ Allowance ML20043A0581990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Cycle 5 Redesign Peaking Factor Limit Rept for Facility.Unit Redesigned During Refueling Outage Due to Removal & Replacement of Several Fuel Assemblies Found to Contain Leaking Fuel Rods ML20043A0571990-05-10010 May 1990 Forwards List of Commitments to Support NRC Review of Eagle 21 Reactor Protection Sys Function Upgrade,Per 900510 Telcon ML20042G9771990-05-0909 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900412 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-01 & 50-328/90-01 & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Rhr Pump 1B-B Handswitch in pull- to-lock Position to Ensure One Train of ECCS Operable ML20042G4651990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Plant Steam Generator Low Water Level Trip Time Delay & Function of P-8 Reactor Trip Interlock,Per 900430 Telcon.Trip Time Delay Does Not Utilize P-8 Interlock in Any Manner ML20042G4541990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Notification of Steam Generator Tube Plugging During Unit 1 Cycle 4 Refueling Outage,Per Tech Specs 4.4.5.5.a.Rept of Results of Inservice Insp to Be Submitted by 910427.Summary of Tubes Plugged in Unit 1 Encl ML20042G0441990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards Nonproprietary WCAP-11896 & WCAP-8587,Suppl 1 & Proprietary WCAP-8687,Suppls 2-E69A & 2-E69B & WCAP-11733 Re Westinghouse Eagle 21 Process Protection Sys Components Equipment Qualification Test Rept.Proprietary Rept Withheld ML20042G1431990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards WCAP-12588, Sequoyah Eagle 21 Process Protection Sys Replacement Hardware Verification & Validation Final Rept. Info Submitted in Support of Tech Spec Change 89-27 Dtd 900124 ML20042G1001990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards Proprietary WCAP 12504 & Nonproprietary WCAP 12548, Summary Rept Process Protection Sys Eagle 21 Upgrade,Rtd Bypass Elimination,New Steam Line Break Sys,Medical Signal Selector .... Proprietary Rept Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20042G1701990-05-0808 May 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Eagle 21 Upgrade to Plant Reactor Protection Sys,Per 900418-20 Audit Meeting.Partial Trip Output Board Design & Operation Proven by Noise,Fault,Surge & Radio Frequency Interference Testing Noted in WCAP-11733 ML20042G1231990-05-0707 May 1990 Forwards Detailed Discussion of Util Program & Methodology Used at Plant to Satisfy Intent of Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 2 Re Licensing Position on post-accident Monitoring ML20042F7741990-05-0404 May 1990 Informs of Completion of Eagle 21 Verification & Validation Activities Re Plant Process Protection Sys Upgrade.No Significant Disturbances Noted from NRC Completion Date of 900420 ML20042F1691990-05-0303 May 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-009, Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Electric Corporation Reactors. Wear Acceptance Criteria Established & Appropriate Corrective Actions Noted. Criteria & Corresponding Disposition Listed ML20042G1381990-04-26026 April 1990 Forwards Westinghouse 900426 Ltr to Util Providing Supplemental Info to Address Questions Raised by NRC Re Eagle-21 Process Protection Channels Required for Mode 5 Operation at Facilities ML20042E9641990-04-26026 April 1990 Forwards Rev 24 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20012E6181990-03-28028 March 1990 Discusses Reevaluation of Cable Pullby Issue at Plant in Light of Damage Discovered at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Previous Conclusions Drawn Re Integrity of Class 1E Cable Sys Continue to Be Valid.Details of Reevaluation Encl 1990-09-17
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1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l CH ATTANOOGA TENNE'SSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II harch 23, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Ms. E. Ad esam, Chier Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Ms. Adensam:
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 By my November 23, 1983 letter to you, we requested NRC approval of a proposed license amendment concerning postaccident sampling for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, units 1 and 2. Additional submittals were made by my December 21, 1983, January 9 and January 10, 1984 letters to you. As a result of the meeting at Sequoyah on February 28, 1984 with Jay Lee of the NRC, enclosure 1 provides revised responses to the November 23,1983 and %
the January 9,1984 letters. Also included is additional information to resolve NRC concerns expressed in the February 28, 1984 meeting. The revised and additional information being provided by this letter was discussed with Jay Lee in a telephone conversation on March 16, 1984.
Enclosure 3 provides a list of drawings associated with the postaccident sampling modifications.
If you have any questions concernirg this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, nager Nuclear Licensing Sworn t subscribed ore me this day of . 1984 dauaAM gg Notary Public W2 My Commission Expires /9' Enclosure cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure)
Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 !
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 q0 8
1 8403290038 840323 k PDR ADOCK 05000327 p PDR 1983-TVA SOTH ANNIVERSARY An Equal Opportunity Employer
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4 ENCLOSURE 1 POSTACCIDENT SAMPLING, ITEM II.B.3 OF NUREG-0737 REVISED RESPONSES TO LEITERS DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1983 AND JANUARY 9,1984 TO ADDRESS NRC CONCERNS IDENTIFIED IN A FEBRUARY 28, 1984 MEETING l
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' Criterion 1 The licensee shall have the capability to promptly obtain reactor coolant samples and containment atmosphere samples. The combined time allotted for sampling and analysis should be 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or less from the timo a decision is made to take a sample.
Response
Each unit has a separate postaccident sampling facility (PASF) that is located in the auxiliary building on elevation 706 between columns AS, W, and X (for unit 1) and A11, W, and X (for unit 2). The PASF contains all the necessary equipment for sample acquisition and portions of the required chemical analysis (except the containment hydrogen, boron, and isotopic analyses) . The existing containment hydrogen analyzers will be used to determine the hydrogen centent inside containment. Boron and isotopic analyses will be performed in the existing plant radiochemical laboratory located in the auxiliary building on elevation 690 between columns A1, S, and U.
Sample acquisition and portions of the diemical analysis are performed by the Sentry Equipment Corporation (SEC) "Model A" High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS). This system is composed of the liquid sample panel (LSP),
chemical analycis panel (CAP), containment air sample panel (CASP), and their associated control panels. During accident conditions, the following samples can be obtained 's om the LSP:
(a) Undiluted and dr 2ted (1000:1) liquid grab samples from the reactor coolant.
(b) An inline sample of reactor coolant which is depressurized and degassed in place. The stripped gas and depressurized coolant is then sent to the CAP.
(c) Diluted (15000:1) stripped . gas grab samples from the reactor coolant pressurized liquid samples.
The LSP, CASP, and CAP have the capability to purge lines before sampling to assure representative samples can be obtained. Sample lines from the LSP, CASP, and CAP can be flushed after the sampling operations are complete to reduce residual radioactivity in the lines.
The LSP uses shielded cart / casks for the removal of the reactor coolant.
The cask is mounted on a cart, which allows the samples obtained to be nobile. A shielded syringe is used to acquire a 5 ml aliquot of diluted (1000:1) reactor coolant from the cart / cask. - This aliquot will then be handcarried to the radiochemical laboratory for offline boron and isotopic analysis. In the laboratory this 5 ml aliquot will be placed in a beaker shielded by 2-inch-thick lead bricks in a fume hood.
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l Also, a 15000:1 diluted strippsd gns se=ple, from the resster coolant, will . .
bo acquired end trensported to the 1sberatcry in a shioided carrier fer isotopic caslysis. F:rther dilutions, if nacassary, vill b3 anda using ges 1 syringes in a shielded fume hood.
Samples from the CASP can be collected in shielded cart / casks which are siellar to those described for the LSP. TVA will use the containment l atmosphere separations device provided by Radiological and Chemical !
Technology (RCT) for obtaining an aliquot of the sample. The RCI device separates the containment air sample into particulates, iodine, and noble gases. Particulates and iodine are removed by a filter and the nobles
- gases are then obtained in a sample vial. This system provides samples that can be handcarried to the radiochemical laboratory for isotopic analysis. Also, samples as small as .10 ml can be partitioned.
SEC provided the following sample acquisition and analysis times:
- a. Reactor coolant (RC) diluted sample
- b. RC inline chemical analysis (Ph, conductivity, dissolveu, oxygen, and chloride)
- c. kC offgas and dissolved H2 l d. Containment atmosphere sample The Of fline boron analysis is expected to require approximately 10 minutes.
It is our intent to meet the three-hour ssapling and analysis times.
Criterion 2 The licensee shall establish an onsite radiological and chemical analysis capability to provide, within the three-hour timeframe established above, quantification of the following:
(a) certain radionuclides in the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere that may be indicators of the degree of core damage (e.g.,
noble gases, lodines and cesiums, and nonvolatile isotopes);
i (b) hydrogen levels in the containment atmosphere; i (c) dissolved gases (e.g., H 2), chloride (time allotted for analysis subject to discussion below), and boron concentration of liquids.
(d)
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alternatively, have inline monitoring capabilities to perform all or part of the above analysis.
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. . Response 2(a) The plant radiochemical laboratory is equipped with multiple high resolution germanium detectors and an ND6620 computerized gamma ray
! spectroscopy system. This equipment will be used to quantify the noble gases, lodines and cesiums, and nonvolatile radionuclides in the required samples.
2(b) The Consip Delphi, Model EIIIM, containment hydrogen analyzer, used to fulfill the requirements of NUREG-0737, item II.F.1, attachment 6, will determine the hydrogen levels in the containment atmosphere.
The analyzer has a range of 0-10% and an accuracy of i 1%.
2(c) Most of the chemical analyses, on the reactor coolant, will be performed by the SEC CAP. Its capabilities are as stated below:
Analysis Ranae Accuracy Chloride Concentration 100-1000 ppb f 15%
1-20 ppa f 20%
Dissolved Hydrogen 10-2000 cc/kg i 15%
Dissolved Oxygen 0-20 ppb i 10%
0-200 ppb 0-20 ppa pH Determination pH 1-13 1 0.5%
Isotopic analysis will be performed in the range of 3 pCi/g--10 C1/g and has a sensitivity better than 1 pC1/g.
The boron analysis will be performed by a Dionux lon chromatograph using 2 al of the 1000:1 diluted sample. This analysis has a range of .5 ppm to 20 ppa and has an uncertainty less than 6 percent (2 sigma percent error).
The 1000:1 diluted reactor coolant will be diluted further, as required, to perform the isotopic analysis if the original activity exceeds 10 C1/g.
It is TVA's intent to do all the above analysis within the three-hour time limit, with the exception of the chloride analysis. The chloride analysis will be done within four days.
2(d) See the response to 2(c). The SEC CAP uses the following inline instrumentation (or equivalent):
- a. Basviine Gas Chromatograph - Model 1030A
- b. Beckman pH Monitor - Model 960B 3
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- c. Dicesx Icn Chronstegraph - M2ds1 10
- d. Raxnerd Dissolved Oxygsn Analyzer - Msdal 3400-5
- e. YS1 Dissolved Oxygen Analyzer - Model 56 Criterion 3 Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling during postaccident conditions shall not require an isolated auxiliary system (e.g., the letdown system, reactor water cleanup system (RWCUS)) to be placed in operation in order to use the soapling system.
Response
l Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling during accident l conditions do not require the use of isolated auxiliary system. The semples are acquired from the following locations:
Sample Locatien 1 Reactor Coolant (2 locations) Hot leg loops 1 and 3
- 2. Containment Sump (2 locations) Discharge of residual heat removal system (RHR) pumps (TRAIN 'A' and 'B')
- 3. Containment Atmosphere Upper and lower containment i
However, sampling operations will require opening select containment isolation valves. Thece remotely operated valves meet IEEE Class 1E requirements.
Criterion 4 Pressurized reactor coolant samples are not required if the licensee can quantify the amount of dissolved gases with unpressurized reactor coolant samples. The aeasurement of either total dissolved gases or H2 gas in reactor coolant samples is considered adequate. Measuring the 02 concentration is recommended, but is not mandatory.
Response
The SEC LSP has the capability to obtain pressurized liquid samples. The normal sampling sequence is to depressurize and degas a liquid sample. The depressurized coolant and stripped gas are then routed to the SEC CAP for dissolved hydrogen and oxygen analysis.
Criterion 5 The time for a chloride analysis to be performed is dependent upon two factors: (a) if the plant's coolant water is seawater or brackish water and (b) if there is only a single barrier between primary containment systems and the cooling water. Under both of the above conditions the i
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lisensso shc11 previds fer a chierids analysis withis 24 hstrs of the sc ple bsing taken. Fer all ether cosas, ths liosasso shall previds for the analysis to be completed within 4 days. The chloride analysis does not have to be done onsite.
Resnonse Factors (a) and (b) described in Criterion 5 do not apply to Sequoyah; therefore, the analysis will be performed within four days. The analysis will be done by the CAP on undiluted samples. For the equipment range and accuracy, see the response to Criterion 2(c).
Criterion 6 The design basis for plant equipment for reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling and analysis must assume that it is possible to obtain and analyze a sample without radiation exposures to any individual exceeding the critera of GDC 19 (Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50) (i.e., 5 rem whole body, 75 rem extremities) . (Note that the design operational review criterion was changed from the operational limits of 10 CFR Part 20 (NUREG- ,
0578) to the GDC 19 criterion (October 30, 1979, letter from H. R. Denton to all licensees.)
Response
The design basis for plant equipment for reactor coolant and containment I atmosphere sampling and analysis are consistent with the radiation exposure limits of GDC 19 (Appendix A 10 CFR Part 50).
Criterion 7 The analysis of primary coolant samples for boron is required for PWRs.
(Note that Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, when issued, will likely specify the need for primary coolant boron analysis capability at BWR plants.)
Response
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is a PWR; therefore, boron analysis will be performed. The range and the method to perform this analysis is discussed in the response to item 2(c).
Criterion 8 ,
If inline monitoring is used for any sampling and analytical capability specified herein, the licens'ee shall provide backup sampling through grab samples, and shall demonstrate the capability of analyzing the samples.
Established planning for analysis at offsite facilities is> acceptable.
Equipment provided for backup sampling shall be capable of providing at-least one _ sample per day for 7 days following onset of the accident. and at
~5-
losst ene sa ple par vock until the cocid2nt conditien as 1cagsr exists. ' '
Response
i The SEC panels provide inline analysis as well as backup grab samples. See the response to Criterion 1 for a discussion of the SEC equipment and its capabilities.
The capability to obtain additional samples through grab sampling exists
' with the SEC equipment. Portions of the inline analysis will be backed by the shipment of the reactor coolant to an offsite laboratory for analysis.
Arrangements have been made for a DOT-approved shipping cask and we will have a contract with an offsite laboratory to perform the analysis. The analyses to be performed will include pH, chloride, boron, and gamma-ray spectroscopy.
Criterion 9 The licensee's radiological and chemical sample analysis capability shal.1 include provisions to:
(a) Identify and quantify the isotopes of the nuclide categories discussed above to levels corresponding to the source terms given in Regulatory Guide 1.3 or 1.4 and 1.7. Where necessary and practicable, the ability to dilute samples to provide capability for measurement and reduction of personnel exposure should be provided.
Sensitivity of onsite liquid sample analysis capability should be such as to permit measurement of nuclide concentration in the range from approximately 1 C1/g to 10 C1/g.
(b) Restrict background levels of radiation in the radiological and chemical analysis facility from sources such that the sample analysis will provide results with an acceptably small error (approximately a factor of 2). This can be accomplished through the use of sufficient i
shielding around samples and outside so7rces, and by the use of ventilation system design which will control the presence- of airborne radioactivity.
Response
9(a) The isotopic analysis will be performed in the range of 1 pC1/g to 10 l C1/g. This analysis has a sensitivity better than 1 pC1/g. Also, see the responses to Criterion 1 and 2.
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9(b) The isotopic measurement will be performed in a 4-inch lead shield or equivalent to reduce the background and produce results with a range of accuracy within a factor of 2.
Also, the postaccident radiation levels are not expected'to have any measurable effect on the accuracy of measurement components, of the l
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9 CAP cad the Diezsx ica chromstegraph, which will b3 expossd to radiatien. Ths rediation levels cre oxysoted to have a nsgligible effect on the operating lifetime of those components. These conclusions are based upon information provided by the equipment supplier, limited testing results, literature reviews, and contacts with experienced personnel engaged in similar analyses under high radiation levels.
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Criterion 10 ',
l Accuracy, range, and sensitivity shall be adequate to provide pertinent :
data to the operator in order to describe radiological and chemical status of the reactor coolant systems.
I, Resnonse See the response to Criterion 2. '
Criterion 11 In the design of the postaccident sampling and analysis capability, consideration should be given to the following items:
(a) Provisions for purging sample lines, for reducing plateout in sample lines, for minimizing sample loss or distortion, for preventing blockage of sample lines by loose material in the RCS or containment, for appropriate disposal of the samples, and for flow restrictions to limit reactor coolant loss from a rupture of the sample line. The postaccident reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples should be representative of the reactor coolant in the core area and the containment atmosphere following a transient or accident. The sample lines should be as short as possible to minimize the volume of fluid to be saken from containment. The residues of sample collection should be returned to containment or to a closed system.
t (b) The ventilation exhaust from the sampling station should be filtered.
with charcoal absorbers and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.
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Response
11,A.1 Provisions for purging sample lines.
The LSP has the capability of regulating a pre- and post-sample purge of 1900 milliliters per minute.
The flow on the CASP sample can be varied by adjusting the nitrogen flowrate on an eductor. The eductor draws the containment air sample from the disabled unit to the sampling panel.
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i 11. A.2 Provisicas for rodscing picteort in sc=plo limos.
To reduce plateout in liquid sampling lines, the purge flow shall
- be turbulent (Reynolds number > 4000).
l To reduce plateout in the containment atmosphere sampling lines, l
the lines are heat traced to maintain a surface temperature of 280*F and are thermally insulated. This heat trace shall maintain the sample stream temperature en route to the PASF, thus reducing lodine plateout and steam condensation, thereby retaining the sample integrity.
- 11. A.3 Provisions for minimizing sample loss or distortion.
To minimize sample losses, a tight system must be maintained. The sampling lines will be pressure tested af ter being installed. All valves, whether hand, check, or solenoid, and line welds were chosen for their abilities to minimize fluid leakage. To minimize samplo distortion the samples should arrive at the PASF with basically the same characteristics as the systems being sampled.
See our response 11.A.2.
l Following each sample acquisition process, the liquid lines are backflushed with demineralized water, and the atmosphere sampling lines are backflushed with nitrogen. These flushing operations clean out the previous sample fluids and reduce residual r radioactiFity in the lines; thereby aiding in the prevention of sample distortion.
11.A.4 Provision for preventing blockage of sample lines by loose material in the RCS or Containment.
No strainers or filters are used to prevent line blockage of RCS or containment atmosphere samples. These devices would conflict with one of the goals of the sampling system which is to obtain representative samples.
i Loose material and some plateout, if they exist, will be swept out by the flushing fluids which empty into the disabled reactor unit.
- Also, pipe scale or crud should be minimized due to the use of stainless steel as the piping and tubing material.
The samples are taken at right angles from the sampled sources and constitute a relatively small volume of the systems being sampled.
Therefore, it is our belief that only fine entrained particles will be present in the samples.
, 11.A.5 Provisions for appropriate disposal of the samples.
All samples will be returned back to the disabled unit or to a
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The sampling system has in its design a 250 gallon waste tank.
Samples from the PASF will be routed to this tank. From this tank they can be routed to the disabled reactor unit during accident conditions. During training exercises, the contents of the waste tank are routed to the radwaste system.
11.A.6 Flow restrictions to limit reactor coolant loss from rupture of the semple line.
Redundant IEEE Class 1E solenoid operated isolation valves which trip by operator action are used for this function.
11.A.7 The postaccident reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples should be representative of the reactor coolant in the core area and the containment atmosphere following a transient or accident.
Those samples are acquired from the locations described in the response to criterion 3. These sample locations are expected to provide representative samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere.
i Criterion 11.B The ventilation exhaust from the sampling station should be filtered with charcoal adsorbers and high-ef ficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.
Resnonse '
During normal plant operation, ventilation air is supplied to the PASF via the auxiliary building general ventilation system and an auxiliary supply fan. Exhaust air is ducted directly to the Auxiliary Building general ventilation system.
During postaccident conditions or sampling operations, the normal supply and exhaust systems are isolated, and ventilation air is taken directly from the outside at a point on the roof of the unit 1 additional equipment building. Both the unit I and unit 2 systems share this common intake. A supply fan provides air to the sampling side of the facility in response to a differential pressure controller. Air is drawn from both the sample and valve gallery areas by an exhaust fan. This air then' passes through the postaccident sampling facility gas treatment system (PASF GT3) air cleanup unit and is then routed to the exhaust duct downstream of the Auxiliary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS) air cleanup unit. The air cleanup unit consists of a profilter, electric heating coil, charcoal filter, and HEPA filters upstream and downstream of the charcoal filter beds. Design, testing, and maintenance of the unit complies with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.140 (Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for :
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N:rcal Vcstilctica Exhcast Syston Air Filtratics ecd Adaceptica Units of . ,
Light-Ustor-Cbeled Nxclear Pcwsr Plants) . The staplies crea is scintainsd at a positive pressure of 0.125 insh sator gangs (PG) with raspset to atmosphere while the valve gallery is kept at a negative pressure of -0.25 inch WG with respect to the sample side.
The radiological gas treatment subsystem, of the PASF GTS, consists of one HEPA/ Charcoal-type air cleanup unit located just upstream of the exhaust fan. Air supplied to the f acility during postaccident conditions or sampling operations is processed through the air cleanup unit before being discharged to the atmosphere.
The postaccident sampling facility environmental control system is not a nacicar safety-related system. However, it has redundant isolation capability in all ductwork that interf aces with the ABGTS or penetrates the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE). The isolation valves and ductwork which interf ace with the ABGTS and ABSCE are designed to seismic category 1 criteria. Also, the isolation ,alves are backed by Class 1E power. All remaining portions of the system are designed to seismic category I(L) criteria requirements.
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ENCLOSURE 2 Additional Information on Postaccident Sampling to Address NRC Concerns NRC Concern Please identify the operational procedures planned for ut111 ming the ventilation system and the sampling system.
TVA Response The following procedurea will be revised to incorporate all the necessary instructions for operation of the postaccident sampling system:
- 1. System Operating Instructions (SOI-30, -70) used for system configuration controls (valvo alignment, etc.);
- 2. Emergency Operating Instruction (E0I) which specifies when system is i required;
- 3. Technical Instruction (TI-66.1) which gives operating instructions in use of equipment.
All procedure changes will be implemented before unit I criticality.
NRC Concern Please provide a commitment to verify the design flow for the ventilation system during the postmodification tests.
TVA Response Verification of the system design flow for the PASF ventilation system is a test requirement specified in the EN DES issued scoping document for Postmodification Test PWT-14. Change sheet number 1 to the scoping document adds the requirement of design flow verification during ABGT3 operation. These requirements are incorporated in the test procedure foe PMT-14.
NRC Concern Provide an explanation of t'he power source for' equipment and how they are affected by loss-of-offsite power.
TVA Response All equipment in the PASF which is required to_be operational during postaccident operations will have power supplied by two independent offsite j I
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p wsr s:pplios thrgash tho vitc1 b:s. Tablo 3 of NRC Ragulatcry Guida 1.97 - - l shows cocidaat socpling instrumsntatien to b3 olossified cs Cotogsry 3. l Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.97 states that Category 3 equipment has specific power requirements. However, in the very remote possibility of a i severe accident and loss of offsite power, a portable generator could be utilized to power the PASF cleanup fans which is the only equipment not powered by the vital bus.
NRC Concern Please address the 4;ilability of a procedure for assessment of core damage.
TVA Response A procedure currently exists for determining core damage. TVA in conjunction with the WOG has developed a more comprehensive assessment methodology.
A copy of the WOG core damage assessment methodology has been previously transmitted to NRC by a letter es s:d February 29, 1.984 from J. J. Sheppard, Chairman of the WOG, to J. A. Norris, Project Manager of Operating Reactors Branch 1. This methodology will be available for use by TVA.
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ENCLOSURE 3 DRAWINGS ASSOCIATED Willi Tile POSTACCIDENT SAMPLING MODIFICATIONS 47W610-43-9 R1 47W610-43-10 R1 47W611-43-1 R1 47W625-14 R$
47W625-15 R4 47W625-16 R1 47W625-17 R4 47W920-40 R4 47W920-41 R3 47W920-42 R3 1
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