ML20059E288

Forwards Addl Info Re Alternate Testing of Reactor Vessel Head & Internals Lifting Rigs,Per NUREG-0612.Based on Listed Hardships,Util Did Not Choose 150% Load Test Option

ML20059E288
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	08/31/1990
From:	Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 TAC-76425, TAC-76426, NUDOCS 9009100123
Download: ML20059E288 (12)

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TENNE 22EE VALLEY AUTHORITY x,,

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CHATTANOOGA, TEMNRSSEE 374o1

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AUG 311980 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

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Gentlement In the Matter of

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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority

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50-328 1

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - NUREG-0612 - ALTERNATIVE TESTING OF REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND INTERNALS' LIFr!NG RICS m

References:

1.

NRC letter to TVA dated June 29, 1990. " Request for Additional Information - Alternative Testing of Reactor L

Vessel !!ead and Internals Lif ting Rigs (TAC 76425/76426) -

r Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2" 2.

TVA letter to NRC dated March 30,1990. "Sequoyah. Nuclear-jO Plant (SQN) - NUREG-0612 - Reactor Vessel Head (RVr' and V

Reactor Vessel Internals (RVI) Lifting Devices - A1..rnative Testing" t

This letter provides the additional information in response to Reference 1.

TVA. by_ Reference 2. proposed to use alternate nondestructive examination (NDE) techniques (i.e., acoustic emission and/or ultrasonics) for SQN's reactor vessel head (RVH) and reactor vessel internals (RVI) lif ting devices.

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.These alternative examination techniques were considered by TVA to be more practical for the configuration of SQN's lifting devices.

! contains background information and the additional information that supports the use of these alternative examination methods. Enclosure 2 i

contains diagrams of SQN's RVH and RVI lifting devices.

Following discussions between SQN Site Lt:ensing and NRC staff, it was recommended that NRC NDE personnel visit SQN site to witness the upcoming i

acoustic emission test that is scheduled for Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage (October 1990). TVA is also prepared to arrange a presentation to answer any questions the staff may have regarding the acoustics emission and/or-ultrasonic technique.

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'PDR ADOCK 05000327 An Equal Opportunity Employer

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AU6 811990 i

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L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission a

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W Please direct questions concerning this issue to Don V. Goodin at (615) 843-7734

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Very truly yours, j

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY w

t E. G. Wallace, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs 3;

Enclosures

,.i cc (Enclosures):

l' Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director 1

Project Directorate II-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 y

L Mr. ' J. N. Donohew Project Manager

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission One White Flint, North -

i 11555 Rockville Pike

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Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector l

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

'2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy Tennessee 37379 at Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chlef

.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission J4 Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 i

Atlanta, Georgia 30323 1

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tENCLOSURE 1

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Backaround-Q NUREG-0612 requires compliance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.6-1978, Section 5.3.1 to either perform (1) a 10-minute 150 percent load test of the device in conjunction with a visual inspection for defects b

and defcrmation of critical areas and welds or (2) dimensional' testing, visual inspection, and nondestructive examination (NDE) of major load carrying welds and critical areas of.the device.

By letter dated July 27,-1984. TVA originally committed to performing option 2 above. By letter dated March 30, L

1989, TVA proponed the use of acoustic emission and/or ultrasonics as an

. alternative to option 2.

By letter dated Juv., 29, 1990, NRC requented that

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TVA provide'. additional details and justiff.:ation for using alternative techniques. The following provides TVA, response to the five items contained-l in your June 1990 letter.

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NRC ltem 1

"... discuss.the possibility of performing the 10-minute 150 percent load test of the lif ting rign, in conjunction with a visual inspection for defects and deformation of critical areas'and helds, which is allowed by NUREG-06121...."

TVA Response A., Ilead Lift Rig Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's (SQN's). reactor vessel head weighs 156 tons. 'The reactor vessel head lift. rig has a design lift capacity of.165 tons.

Performance of a 150 percent 1 cad test would not be a viable option for the following reasons:

1.

Certified test weights-(247.5 tons) would = have to be procured or fabricated onsite and attached to the head-lift rig to achieve the required test load..

2.

SQN'.s reactor ano auxiliary building cranes are not rated for a 247.5 ton test load.

Performance of a 150 percent load test would-require SQN's lift rig to be disassembled and movet. outside these buildings. A specini mobile crane would then be brought to the. site to conduct this test.

Based on the hardships described above, TVA did'not choose the 150 percent-load' test option.

B.

Internals Lift Rig SQN's reactor' vessel's internals' lifting device is adaptable for lifting

SQN's upper internals (81.5 tons) or the lower internals (154.25 tons).

The upper internal's lif t is considered to be the critical lif t for complying with NUREG-0612. This is due to the fact that the upper i

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internal's lif t is made over the fuel assemblies that remain inside the reactor. -The lower internal's lift is conducted with the reactor vessel e

defueled. Therefore, the lower internal's lift ~does not create a load drop risk as defined by NUREG-0612.

l A load test of the internals' lift rig is feasible using the lower 7. "

L internals as the test weight. This would not be a true 150 percent-load test but would be the neximum load that the internals' lif t rig is

'a subjected to over the life of.the plant..This load test does represent greater than 150 percent of the critical lift weight (upper internals L

weight).

Removal of SQN's lower internals is scheduled in conjunction with the I

10-year inservice inspection. Following tnis load test, a visual inspection of the critical areas and welds would be required. Critical areas, such as roots'of fillet welds, are inaccessible and would thereby t

L reduce the quality of the visual examination. Accordingly, the use of this method would not provide a high quality inspection.

TVA's proposal to use acoustic emission was preferred over the visual examination technique since the acoustic method provides a 100 percent-volumetric 4

examination of the lift rig and would identify hidden defects that could be located in the fillet weld root areas.

NR0 Item 2

. discuss in more detail why disassembly of the lifting rigs for visual-1 or surface examination would involve a significant hardshipt...."

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. TVA Res_ponse A.

IIead Lif t Rig - Removal of pins from the upper clevises is required to l

allow a complete inspection of critical areas of the lift rig. Removal of these pins has not been performed since before unit startup.. Springing of f

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the lifting legs would make removal and replacement of the pins dif f icu'l t. Potential problems that may occur include galling of threads:

i on pins, nuts, and clevises.

Disassembly of the load cell assembly, which y,

is an-integral part af the head lift rig, involves unthreading and threading of the load cell into the upper and lower adaptors. This is a ngl ;

delicate operation with a high potential for thread galling.

TVA would qi :

thereby send the load cell to the vendor (Westinghouse Electric Corporation) for disassembly, inspection, and reassembly.

This would' i

result in an additional undetermined cost to TVA.

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man-rem.

g For-the above reasons. TVA does not consider disassembly to be practical.

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B.

Internals Lift Rig - Disassembly cf the internals lift rig is not recommended for several reasons.

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Extensive work in the refueling canal (equipment pit area) would be required for disassembly and reassembly of the rig. Personnel exposure resulting from disassembly and reassembly in this area would be. prohibitively high (several hundred man-rem). Disassembly and reassembly would be followed by detailed adjustments that can be adequately checked only with the lift rig-instal:ed on the uppe. and lower internals. These adjustments and checks mus' be performed by i

hand in radiation fields of several rem per hour.

2.

A potential exists for misadjustment of the lift rig follsaing reassembly. The consequences of misadjustment include inability to engage the lower or upper internals and binding of loads in the reactor vessel or stand.

l 3.

Disassembly and reassembly would damage the protective coating on the lift rig and require repainting of damaged areas.

NRC Item 3

"... discuss in more detail the hardship in removing paint from the weld l

- surfaces in the lifting rigs for non-destructive examinations of tne welds and the ensuing radiation exposure from airborne contaminationt... "

TVA Response A '. Head Lift Rig - Removal of paint for NDE would require a tent to be built for containing airborne contamination.

Relatively low contamination on the head lift rig and load cell assembly makes paint removal and reapp11 cation primarily a time and cost factor for these components and not a serious radiological concern.

B.

Internals' 1,1ft Rig - The protective coating on the internals' lift rig is i

qualified for underwater use since the lift rig is submerged during refueling.

Extensive repair of the protective coating and complete removal and reapplication of large areas would be necessary for surface J

examination of critical welds and areas. The lift rig is highly

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contaminated and has numerous crevices where hot particles or highly i

contaminated residue could be lodged.. Removal and reapplication of-paint l

on this lift rig must be highly controlled, and a suitable containment.-

built for containing all dust and residue. Work inside a tent would requir9' protective clothing and respiratory equipment.

Portable filtration and/or ventilation equipment would also be necessary for work inside the airborne contaminati;A area.

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NRC Item 4 l

provide in more detail the justification for using the alternative testing instead of the more recognized liquid penetrant or magnetic particle examination; and.

TVA Response

. Acoustic Emissions (AE) is a volumetric examination technique that examines 100 percent of the component. The proposed surface examinations (i.e., liquid penetrant or magnetic particle) would not detect subsurface or hioden defects located in areas such as the embedded clevis pins and the fillet veld root area. AE is designed to' identify defects in these areas.

J It should be noted that-although ANSI N14.6-1978 does not specifically reference ASME Section XI, alternate examination methods, a combination.of m

methods or newly developed techniques that are equivalent or superior to the

l NDE methods specified, are allowed by ASME Section XI Article IWA-2240.

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NRC Item 5

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"... discuss the acceptance criteria and the suitable sensitivity fer the proposed acoustic emission and ultrasonics techniques including what qualification testing has been done to demonstrate the efficacy of thesc techniques for this application and what qualification testing is proposed 'for -

the examiners.... "

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Acceptance criteria w

For the lift rig tests performed on Unit 1 during the Unit'1 Cycle 4 outage,'a 16 sensor linear array of sensors was arranged to monitor the full volume of-the lift rigs with additional sensors at critical locations as identified by i

. stress analysis. A series of lifts and traverses were conducted and_ fully monitored so that any continuoup signal emanating from an active defect would 3

be identified. A backup AE analyzing system is used throughout the test.

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This test was repeated five days later for data comparison and verification of no active defect emissions.

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All the data is stored as hard copy and on discs. The hard copy is included in the. test report along with source significant factors, source locations,

, energies, etc.

i Acceptance criteria require that no active defects exist.

Given that the electronic analyzers and sensors are accredited for hit-counts sensitivity, it is required to apply the ASME' lead break test to align each channel to + or -

2 decibels (dBs).

Under load, all sources of emission are recorded, located, 3

measured, and given a source significance factor.

Acceptance criteria for ultrasonic examination of the pins were based on critical flaw size calculations and implemented in an Aspect Ratio Chart for determination of maximum allowable flaw size (see Attachment 1).

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Sensitivity Electronic alignment and seasitivity checks of the multichannel systems and sensor calibrations use standards traceable to the National Bureau of Standards. Further input is taken from American Society for Testing and J

Materials (ASTM) E610 82 Definitions. ASTM E500 71 Monitoring during F

Controlled Simulation, ASTM E650 78 Mounting Piezo Electric Acoustic Emission L

Contact Sensors and ASIM E750 80 Measuring the Operational Characteristics of f

'AE Emission.

I A TVA Ultrasonic Testing (UT) procedure was. S veloped to accurately record.

detect, and size.both elliptical surface and sub.urface cracks in all lift rig pins..A total of four calibration standards '.ere fabricated for the range of pins in both the head and lower internals' lifting device. The calibration L>

notches fabricated in each standard were 33 percent less.than the allowable l

critical flaw alre-in order to achieve a high degree of sens!tivity. All-relevant conditions are recorded while scanning the pin provided the indication is indicative of the following:

1.

Lies in the critical examination area.

'2.

Exceeds 50 percent of Distance Amplitude Curve at scanning sensitivity.

3.

Not evaluated to be an indication because of part geometry.

Qualification of Equipment' The principal AE: system used on SQN's lift rig test's (ECHO 2000) is produced

and operated by Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection Services.

Qualification of the equipment and test application is traceable to the followings b

1. -ASME Code Case 471.

2.

Article 12 ASME Section V.

t 3.. ASME Section VIII Cas Transport Cylinders.

In addition, input is taken from ASME Proposed Mandatory Appendix (see ASME.

3:

BC 85 033) with regard tot 1.' Couplant.

2.

Preamplifiers.

3.

Filters.

4 Power Signal Cable.

15.

Power Supply.

6.

Main Amplifier.

b The ultrasonic testing methodology for defect verification and sizing was developed by TVA.

The ultrasonic flaw detector (USD-10) was manufactured by Krautkramer Branson.

Search units (i.e., transducers) and calibration P

standards were designed by TVA and fabri::ated by Southwest Research Institute.

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The. ultrasonic procedures and equipment were qualified by successfully calibrating and producing a distance amplitude curve (DAC) from the

. calibration standard. The images'of the reflectors from the calibration notches are recorded and documented as-qualification records.

Li Qualification of the equipment'and test applications meet the parameters of I

-ASME Section V, Article 5.

Reference is made to. material evaluation article r

" Ultrasonic Inspection of Pin Assemblies in Bridges " December 1989 g-Personnel Qualification F,

.The principal Hartford Steam Boiler (HSB) Inspector is a level III inspector p'

whose activities include American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT)

. Task Group; member on qualifying examinations. The HSB supervisor and the AE' Il - >

contract superv sor (Level III) were nembers of the above task groups and.have AE. testing experience spanning the past 25 years.

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Qualifications of personnel performing ultrasonic examination are in accordance with TVA's written practice Quality Methods Procedure (QMP 102.4),

whichicomplies with SNT-TC-1A 1980 or 1984 Edition.

Personnel performing examinations are certified to at least Level I in ultrasonic examination.

Personnel evaluating the test results are required to be certified to at least Level' II in ultrasonic examination.

The qualification of the individual who developed the method to.ultrason'.cally E

fexamine the ' lift rig pins has over 20 years' experience in ultrasonics. He is r, ~

, certified'as an NDE Level III.

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03/31/1990 14839 SO4 SITE DIFNSITE LIC 615.943 7129 P.C2 1

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LIFT RIO PIN ALLOWABLE PLANAR INDICATIONS ARE EQUAL TO OR LESS TilAN THE TOLLOW!H0 Materiais: ASTM A304, Class BD, A!S! 4340 A8TM A434 Class 80, A!82 4340 J

Minimum yield stress of L20 kai er less at 80'F.

For lif ts at temperaturen below 40'F the listed allowable indication shall be reduced by 3.4 percent i

for each 10'F.

Pin giameter Range (d): Nominal 81ses 3,4 in.

Aspect Surface Crack subsurface Crack Ratio, a/A Indications a, in.

Indicationes a, in.

n 0.0 0.056 0.066 0.10 0.056 0.066 O.20 0.068 0.079 0.30 0.086 0.099 0.40 0.104 0.123 0.50 0.131 0.152 (1) Dimensions a, 4 and e are defined in above figures.

For intermediate flaw aspect ratios a/R, linear interpolation ts' permissible.

(, 2) The total depth of an allowable subsurface indication is p

twice the listed value.

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