ML20052H105

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fuel Handling & Sodium Fire Protection as Result of Review of CP Application. Response within 60 Days Requested

ML20052H105
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	05/14/1982
From:	Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF
References
NUDOCS 8205190383
Download: ML20052H105 (9)

Text

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Distribution Docket File WFoster liay 14. 1982 NRC PDR PShuttleworth Local PDR ETomlinson NSIC CRBR Staff Docket lio.: 50-537 CRBR Reading RStark to CThomas 1

Mr. John R. Longenecker PCheck litiCEIVER Licensing and Environmental Coordination RBecker s

3 Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant JSwift g

,M5Y 1pggp Tg U. S. Department of Energy, NE-561 TKing e* #Wy&Y Washington, D.C.

20545 HHolz y

at s

Dear Hr. Longenecker:

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SUBJECT:

CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLAliT, REQUEST FOR A INFORiMTI0il As a result of our review of your application for a construction permit for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant, we find that we need the additional infonnation as requested in the enclosure. Please pr9 vide your final responses to these requests within 60 days.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirerents contained in this letter affect fewer ther ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.

If you desire any discussion or clarification of the information requested, please contact R. H. Stark, Project Manager (301) 492-9732.

Sincerely.

Origin 31 Signed by Paul S. Check Paul S. Check Director CRBR Program Office Office of iluclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

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Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Barbara A. Finamore S. Jacob Scheer Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California Ellyn R. Weiss P. O. Box 247 Dr. Thomas B. Cochran Bodega Bay, California 94923 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 I Street, N.W.

Daniel Swanson Office of the Executive Suite 600 Legal Director Washington, D.C.

20006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Eldon V. C. Greenberg Washington, D.C.

20555 Tuttle & Taylor 1901 L Street, N.W.

William B. Hubbard, Esq.

Suite 805 Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C.

20036 State of Tennessee Office of the Attorney General L. Ribb 450 James Robertson Parkway LNR Associates Nuclear Power Safety Consultants Nashville, TN 37219 8G05 Grimsby Court William E. Lantrip, Esq.

Potomac, MD 20854 City Attorney Municipal Building P. O. Box 1 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 George L. Edgar, Esq.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esq.

General Counsel l

Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, TN 37902 l

l Chase Stephens, Chief Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory l

Comission l

Washington, D.C.

20555 Raymond L. Copeland Project Management Corp.

P. O. Box U Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 l

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ENCLOSURE CRBR-3 Vol. II and PSAR Section 3 CS760.142 Failure criteria for concrete structures given in CRBRP-3, Vol. 2, Rev. o, Sec. 3.2.2.5.1.1.2 are not adequate. The criteria given cover only the inability of concrete to carry stresses at high temperatures and strains.

The criteria appear to be the only ones used to detennine failure of concrete structures under TMBDB loads.

Additional criteria are needed that consider failure of the concrete structures in all failure modes including excessive tensile, compressive, and shear stresses or strains, as appropriate, and i

high temperatures.

For tension and shear the criteria may also have to address the response of steel reinforcement.

CS760.143 At several locations in CRBRP-3, Vol. 2, Rev. O the applicant states that the concrete structures being analyzed can withstand the imposed loads with addit'ional reinforcement.

One example is in Sec. 3.2.2.5.1.2 at the bottom of pg. 3-48.

To make the statement relevant the applicant needs to indicate what the basis for the statement is (i.e., additional to what?).

Does the current design include this additional reinforcement?

CS760.144 For evaluating containment response to thermal loads generated during the TMBDB scenario the applicant assumes an axisymetric distribution of temperatures.

Based on the location of the reactor cavity vent system, this does not seem to be a consistent assumption.

The applicant needs to either rigorously justify the axisymmetric assumption or analyze the containment response to non-axisymetric thermal distributions.

CS760.145 In Table 3-10 in CRBRP-3, Vol. 2, Rev. O the applicant presents containment capability in terms of pressure for a range of temperatures.

How were the stresses calculated to compare with S and S ? Were penetrations and discontinuities considered?

CS760.146 In Sec. 3.2.2.5.3.2 of CRBRP-3, Vol. 2, Rev. O the applicant states that the critical regions for structural integrity are where high bending moments, compressive forces, and shear occur at the junction of the confinement building with the roof slabs.

The criteria tnat were used to determine ultimate capacity of this location need to be more clearly stated.

Can the criteria be referenced to the ACI or ASME codes or to the criteria given earlier for other concrete i

structures, pg. 3-47?

CS760.147 In CRBRP-3, Vol. 2 Rev. O. Secs. 3.2.3.5.2 and 3.2.3.3.1.3 the applicant refers to a 2400F critical containment vessel buckling temperature.

Where does this come from? Are the buckling criteria presented in the PSAR used?

If not, what criteria are used? Possible buckling at points other than the base of the cylinder should be considered and any appropriate assymetries should be included.

Chapter 15 Questions CS 760.148 During startup testing of FFTF a non-linearity of the ex-vessel neutron detector response, as a functfon of reactor power level was observed. This non-linearity was due to temperature changes during the power ascent affecting the leakage of neutrons from the core to the detectors. The observed non-linearity caused indicated power to be different from actual power at operating points other than full power and caused an extensive revision of the FFTF FSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis to account for this affect.

In consideration of the above please provide the following information:

a)

The predicted non-linearity affect on the CRBR ex-vessel nertron detectors in going from zero to 100% power.

b)

A description of how this affect will be accommodated in the plant operating plans / procedures and in the Chapter 15 Safety Analysis.

CS 760.149 Power operation over an operating cycle may cause changes in the ex-vessel neutron detection readings due to flux profile changes caused by burnup affects and control rod withdrawals.

Please provide:

a)

The predicted change in ex-vessel neutron detector readings over an operating cycle due to flux profile changes.

b)

A description of how this affect will be accommodated in the plant operating plans / procedures and in the Chapter 15 Safety analysis.

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Section 9.1 CRBRP Fuel Handling System Questions CS760.150 How is the temperature of a new fuel element in a EVST preheat tube determined? What is the maximum a T allowed when a new fuel element is put in a sodium-filled CCP? Where is the temperature of the fuel determined by the operator of the fuel handling equipment?

CS760.151 What would be the consequence of placing a new fuel element at ambient temperature into a sodium-filled CCP in the EVST? Does the step change in temperature change the life expectance of the fuel element? How is this prevented other than by administrative control?

CS760.152 Provide a description of the new fuel transporter and the transfer of a fuel assembly through inspection equipment and safety procedures following unloading and transport to inplant storage.

CS760.153 Describe the procedure of manually raising or lowering a CCP in case of a EVTM mechanical failure or with power loss.

CS760.154 Describe the " emergency cooling" process instituted in case of electrical power failure to the fuel transfer port cooling insert blower during CCP transfer.

For each case what is the maximum time allowed without heat removal for the hottest fuel subassembly?

CS760.155 Describe the installation of the reactor fuel transfer port adapter.

CS760.156 Discuss the leak test method used following replacement of the equipment hatch.

How were the permissible leak rates determined?

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Section 9.13.2 Sodium Fire Protection 4

CS760.157 The design basis spill is listed as being based on leakage from a sharp edged circular orifice whose area is equal to one quarter of the pipe wall thickness multiplied by the pipe inside diameter.

Discuss why this is an appropriate design basis leak.

CS760.158 In air filled cells, the PSAR states that the catch pan sides extend up the wall to a height sufficient to prevent spilled liquid metal from flowing over the edge of the plate between the plate and the wall.

Additionally, a continuous lip pla.te is provided at the top of the catch pan side walls to prevent sodium or NaK from running down the structural concrete walls into the region behind the catch pan plate sidewalls.

Also, in the event of a liquid metal spill, the catch pan contains the liquid metal and prevents contact between the liquid metal and the concrete structure.

If liquid metal can run down the structural concrete walls, what prevents liquid metal-concrete reactions on the vertical structural concrete wall areas above the catch pans? What penetration or degradation of the fire wall between equipment spaces would be expected? Discuss your i

acceptance criteria for this event.

CS760.159 Along with question 2 above, has any allowance been made on the height of the catch pan walls to allow for thermal expansion of the liquid metal and for addition of any fire extinguishment?

Can the catch pans be expected to perform their functions under all anticipated events?

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CRBRP-3 and Section 5 CS760.160 It is not clear from CRBRP-3, Vol. 1, Rev. 2 what criteria have been used in developing the component margin requirements presented in Sec. 5.2.

Section 5.1.1.4 indicates that the REXCO-HEP code has been used to generate these loads and in Sec. 5.1.1.3 the applicant presents several reasons why the REXCO-HEP calculations are con-servative approximations to the loads that would actually be experienced by the structure.

The applicant is expected to give some experimental basis for the general assumption that the loads l

are indeed. conservative. This would involve a discussion of how the REXCO-HEP calculations were compared with the SM-4 and SM-5 scale model test results.

The comparison should include peak pressures, total impulse delivered to the component in question, and a discussion of frequency content where dominant frequencies in the loading function may possibly be in tune with natural frequencies of vibration for structural components.

For any component margin requirements that are not taken directly from REXCO-HEP predictions at the obvious point of application, such as the load to be applied to the UIS given in Fig. 5-19, a full description is needed of how the requirements are derived.

CS760.161 In CRBRP-3, Vol. 1, Rev. 2 it is unclear how the component margin requirements are to be applied.

Are any to be applied simultaneously?

Where the requirements are given in terms of pressure histories, how are the loads to be distributed? What boundary conditions will be used or what will be the criteria for choosi.ng, boundary conditions when separate components are analyzed?

CS760.162 In CRBRP-3, Vol.1, Rev. 2 the applicant describes a method for evaluating certain components loaded during an HCDA wherein component response is evaluated using linear static calculations with " appropriate" dynamic amplification factors. The reactor vessel nozzles, head mounted components, and vessel appurtenances i

l will be evaluated with this method.

The first step is to evaluate the complete reactor vessel system with a dynamic inelastic model.

Components then will be evaluated using the system response at their specific location as input.

Each component will be analyzed first by applying loads and/or displacements to a static model using what is called an " appropriate" dynamic amplification factor.

If the component in question fails this test, it is evaluated using a dynamic elastic model.

Finally, if the component fails this test, a more complex inelastic dynamic analysis is performed.

The procedure of using a static analysis with dynamic amplification factors is common in linear systems where the appropriate amplification factors are easily obtained.

Results are usually conservative because dynamic phasing of different i

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. load components is neglected. The appropriate amplification factors for a nonlinear system are not easy to obtain and may not even be unique definable quantities since the vibration frequencies and damping of the component change as it plastically deforms.

The applicant must describe how the dynamic amplification factors are to be: derived.

CS760.163 In Sec. 5.3.1 of CRBRP-3, Vol.1, Rev. 2, the applicant presents SMBDB structural criteria in terms of stress and strain limits.

To perform the staff's review we need the appropriate reference or f

references from which these criteria were obtained.

CS760.164 In Sec. 5.4 of CRBRP-3, Vol.1, Rev. 2 the applicant states that results of both analyses and experiments indicate that the closure head will withstand SMBDB loads without structural failure.

This conclusion is based in part on the results of scale model tests SM-4 and SM-5 where the head model showed no visiple plastic deformation.

A problem exists in using these test results to demonstrate the capability of the head in that the design of the scale model heads was non-prototypic.

The shielding plates were bolted directly to the bottom of the head, possibly overstiffening it considerably and, therefore, not allowing deformations that lead to the most probable head failure mode (disengagement of the intermediate rotating plug).

Because of the design of the model head, we are not convinced that the applicants conclusions regarding the acceptability of the head design can be made based on the experiments done to date.

The analysis presented does indicate that, under SMBDB loading, the This head only displaces 23% of its predicted failure displacement.

analysis is acceptable if the applicant can benchmark the analytical l

model with experimental data.

Benchnurking with other analyses is not acceptable, especially because many analytical techniques, in j

particular the finite element method, overpredict the stiffness of structures being modeled by several percent.

To resolve this issue of vessel head capability the applicant should benchmark the analytical model being used and show that it predicts a comfortable margin to head failure. The required margin will be less if the model'is benchmarked with both static and dynamic test l

data.

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.o' Questions to Applicant on Sodium Fire Proctection CS760.165 Will fire suppression decks be tested for their effectiveness, using an actual sodium spill test?

If not, how will the assumption that the fire will extinguish and the sodium will cool be justified?

CS760.166 Please provide a description of how the cell liners and catch pans will be installed in the plant (i.e. construction sequence) to maintain the desired gap for venting between the steel and concrete.

How will it be verified that these spaces were installed correctly after construction?

CS760.167 For those catch pans which drain into other areas, what is the slope of the catch pan floor and the size of the drain?

CS760.168 What are the site boundary Na aerosol concentrations for the sodium spill events listed in Table 15.6-17 Section 9.13.2.1 states that the catch pan system-for air filled CS760.169 cells is an Engineered Safety Feature.

However, no inservice inspection requirements are listed either here or in Section 3.8-C.

Please provide your plans in this area.

Pg. 3.8-B.31 states the inservice inspection requirements for all CS760.170 liners.

The criteria for selection of the welds to be examined is also stated; however, the rational for these criteria are not given.

It would seem logical to select for periodic examination those welds calculated to have the highest stresses, both during normal steady 5 tate operation and under the sodium spill condition.

This would necessitate identification of these welds in the design stage so that when equipment and piping are designed into the cell, access to these critical weld areas can be provided, Please address the application of such a criteria on CRBR.

j CS760.171 Section 3A.8.4 describes the development testing programs to support the cell liner design.

Please describe the differences and similarities in the cell liners used in the sodium spill design qualification test I

t Versus the liner design proposed for CRBR.

Address such items as l

plate material and thickness, weld type, vent space and vent path size, liner design and support.

Please provide simplified sketches of all sodium systems (exclusive CS760.172 of the primary and intermediate HTS) showing the sodium volumes in each major portion of the system and the location (cell number) of each system or portion of the system.

j CS760.173 Section 15.6.1.2 presented the analysis of a 7,500 gal sodium spill in the RSB.

What RSB leakrate was assumed in this analysis?

Is this leakrate a design requirement on the RSB?

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