ML20050E040
| ML20050E040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1982 |
| From: | Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204130003 | |
| Download: ML20050E040 (5) | |
Text
_ ________ ________ _
Distribution Docket File March 15,1982 NRC PDR Local PDR NSIC CRBR Reading Docket flo.: 50-537 R. Stark C. Thomas P. Check Mr. John R. Longenecker E. Sylvester Licensing and Environmental Coordination W. Foster Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant P. Shuttleworth U. S. Department of Energy, ilE-561 B. Mann Washington, D.C.
20545 i
Dear Hr. Longenecker:
SUBJECT:
CLIllCil RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLAtlT, REQUEST FOR ADDITI0tuu.
INFOR!1ATION As a result of our review of your application for a construction permit for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant, we find that we need addt-tional infonnation in the area of Auxiliary Systems.
Please provide your final responses by May 15, 1982.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore. 0HB clearance is not I
required under P.L.96-511.
If you desire any discussion or clarification of the information requested, please contact R. H. Stark, Project Manager (301) 492-9732.
Sincerely, un;uaal Signed by 1%ul S. Check Paul S. Check, Director CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT (CRBRP)
CS 410.1 Discuss whether failure of nonseismic Category I or non tornado
( 3.4.1 )
protected water tanks and vessels due to the SSE or design tor-nado can result in flooding of essential structures, systems and components.
If this possibility exists, provide the results of a failure modes and effects analysis that demonstrates that required safety functions, including safe shutdown, will not be compromised by the postulated failures.
CS 410.2 It is our position that overhead cranes whose failure could damage (9.1.4) spent fuel or essential equipment be designed such that in the event of the SSE they can retain control of and hold their load.
The bridge and trolley should be designed to remain in place on their respective runways with their wheels prevented from leaving the tracks during the SSE.
The bridge should remain on the runway with brakes applied, and the trolley should remain on the crane girders with brakes applied. The crane should be designed and constructed in accordance with Regulatory Position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
The maximum critical load plus operational and seismically induced pendulum and swinging load effects on the crane should be considered in the design of the trolley, and they should be added to the trolley weight for the design of the bridge.
For the polar crane, cask handling crane, and other cranes whose failure could damage spent fuel or essential equipment, demonstrit'e that you meet this position.
CS 410.3 Provide the results of an analysis which demonstrates that spent (9.1.4) fuel and essential equipment will not be damaged by a heavy load drop due to a handling system malfunction.
Include consideration of cask handling crane failure resulting in a cask drop, polar crane failure resulting in dropping the heaviest load handled, by this crane over essential equipment including the reactor vessel, and other pertinent potential handling system malfunctions. The analysis should satisfy the guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," Section 5 and Appendix A with due consideration for the differences between CRBR and LWR ---
design.
CS 410.4 Describe the " emergency cooling" process instituted in case of (9.1.4) power failure to the fuel transfer port cooling insert blower during core component pot (CCP) transfer. (Refercnce:
Section 9.1 - 4. 7. 3 )
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-2 CS 410.5 The control room HVAC system can be operated in normal, outside
( 9. 6.1 )
air filtration and total recirculation modes of operation.
Provide a tabulation of valve / damper position and equipment status for the control room HVAC system for each of the possible modes of operation.
CS 410.6 The kitchen and toilet exhaust fans are nonsafety-related.
Veri fy (9. 6.1 )
that the ducts leading to these fans are at least seismic Category III.
It appears from Figure 9.6-1 that these fans exhaust air from other spaces in addition to the kitchen and toilets.
Discuss the consequences of loss of these fans.
> CS 410.7 On a signal of high levels of toxic chemicals or smoke in the con-( 9. 6.1 )
trol room HVAC intake ducts, the path for outside air supply to the control room will be routed through filter units.
Provide the capability of these filters to remove toxic chemicals and products of combustion.
CS 410.8 On Figure 9.6.3 indicate the interface between the safety-related
( 9. 6.1 )
switchgear room HVAC air intake ducting and the nonsafety-related MG set HVAC subsystem air intake ducting.
CS 410.9 One exhaust fan is provided for each of the four battery rooms.
( 9. 6.1 )
Verify that the exhaust duct from each battery room is provided with' positive air flow indication with annunciation in the control room for loss of flow and instrument failure.
Describe the steps that will be taken to prevent hydrogen buildup to a combustible concentration on loss of a battery room exhaust fan.
CS 410.10' Provide indications on Figures 9.6-4, 9.6-5, 9.6-6 and 9.6-9 to (9.6.2) show the location between safety class and nonsafety-class portions of the reactor containment building, centainment :nnulus, Radioactive Argon Processing Subsystem (RAPS) and Cell Atmosphere Processing Subsystem (CAPS) HVAC systems.
The means for isolating the essential portions from the nonessential portions should be shown on the figures.
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, CS 410.11 Manual valves are provid.sd in the RAPS cells HVAC exhaust ducts.
(9.6.2)
These valves are the only means cf isolating a contaminated RAPS cell from the remainder of the HVAC exhaust system.
Justify the lack of remotely-operating valves for this isolation function.
Discuss the adverse consequences of high radiation levels preventing operation of a manual RAPS cell isolation valve when required by a release of radioactivity to the RAPS cell.
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. CS 410.12 Describe the protection afforded redundant, safety-related components (9.6.2) of the reactor containment building HVAC system, annulus filtration (9.6.3) system, and reactor service building HVAC system to prevent common mode failures of the components.
CS 410.13 As shown on Figures 9.6-7 and 9.6.7a, several lengths of reactor (9.6.3) service building HVAC system ducting in the " fuel handling accident mode" flow path are not seismic Category I.
Justify the lack of a seismic Category I rating for this ducting.
CS 410.14 The RAPS and CAPS cells HVAC exhaust system could potentially vent (9.6.2) airborne radioactivity from these cells.
Justify the lack of a (9.6.3) seismic Category I classification for these exhaust ducts and a safety classification of Quality Group C for the exhaust ducts.
CS 410.15 Radiation monitors are provided in the exhaust ducts of the reactor (9.6.3) service building-radwaste area HVAC systen.
If abnormal radioactivity is detected, the exhaust air is directed to the system's exhaust filter unit and exhausted by an exhaust filter fan to the exhaust vent. Justify the lack of a seismic Category I, Quality Group C classification for the exhaust isolation dampers and the downstream exhaust filtration piping and filter units.
CS 410.16 The turbine generator building HVAC system is provided with a radia-(9.6.4) tion monitoring systen to sample and analyze tritium in the exhaust air released frun the building to meet the requireaents of 10 CFR 20.
Justify the lack of seismic Catc3 cry I, Quality Group C isolation dmpers to contain'an excessive release of radioactivity.
CS 410.17 The primary sodium tank cell unit cooler is not safety grade. ' Describe (9.6.6) the consequences of the loss of this unit ccoler.
CS 410.18 The normal chilled water systen is a nonsafety-related system with (9.7.3) some seismic Category I piping.
Verify that the normal chilled wagr system piping and equipment which is. located in cells containing sodium or NaK piping is designed to seismic Category I criteria.
CS 410.19 The nomal and mergency chilled water systems provide cooling for (9.7.3) plant HVAC systens.
HVAC units serving areas containing sodium or NaK are provided with drains to carry away chilled water leakage to prevent moisture carry-over in the HVAC ducting.
Leak detectors are provided in the drains to detect chilled water system coil failure.
Activation of the detector results in automatic closure of the chilled water coil isolation valves.
Justify the use of nonsafety-related normal chilled water system piping and valves in HVAC units serving areas'containing sodium and NaK.
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Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Barbara A. Finamore Bodega Marine Laboratory S. Jacob Scherr University of California Ellyn R. Weiss P. O. Box 247 Dr. Thomas B. Cochran Bodega Bay, California 94923 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Daniel Swanson 1725 I Street, N.W.
Office of the Executive Suite 600 Legal Director Washington, D.C.
20006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eldon V. C. Greenberg Washington, D.C.
20555 Tuttle & Taylor 1901 L Street, N.W.
William B. Hubbard, Esq.
Suite 805 Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C.
20036 State of Tennessee Office of the Attorney General L. Ribb 450 James Robertson Parkway LNR Associates Nashville, TN 37219 Nuclear Power Safety Consultants 8605 Grimsby Court William E. Lantrip, Esq.
Potomac, MD 20854 City Attorney Municipal Building P. 0. Box 1 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 George L. Ecgar, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, TN 37902
^
Chase Stephens, Chief Docketing and Service Section i
Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D.C.
20555 Raymond L. Copeland Project Management Corp.
P. O. Box U Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
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