ML20029E207

LER 94-004-00:on 940416,discovered That Surveillance Frequency for Sp 34SV-SUV-008-1S Not Correct for Seven Primary Containment Vent & Purge Valves Due to Personnel Error.Surveillance Brought Up to date.W/940509 Ltr

ML20029E207
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/09/1994
From:	Beckham J, Tipps S GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HL-4591, LER-94-004, LER-94-4, NUDOCS 9405170222
Download: ML20029E207 (6)

Text

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Georgia Power Company j 40 Inverness Center Parkway

$g Post Ofice Box 129s Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 877 7279 J. T. seekham, Jr. Georgia '

Power Vice President - Nuclear Hatch Project !ne southesn electic :ystem Docket No. 50-321 HL-4591

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ' ,

ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 LicePsee Event Report Personnel Errors Result in Incorrect Inservice Testing Surveillance Frequency and Missed Surveillance Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), Georgia Power Company.

is submitting the enclosed licensee event report (LER) concerning personnel errors which resulted in a missed inservice testing surveiliance. This event occurred at Plant Hatch Unit 1.

If you have any questions, please contact this oflice.

Sincerely, 0

J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/cr

Enclosure:

LER 1-94-004 cc: Georgia Power Company Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant NORMS U.S. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region 11 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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9405170222 940509 PDR ADOCK 05000321 S PDR

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, NRC (ORJi 364 U.S. NUCLEAR AEQULATORY COMMi&SION APPROVEO OMB NO.31504104 (342) EXPtKES: S/31795 EST! MATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50 0 HRS FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CfogET0N"

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WASHINGTON. DC 205554001 ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104).OF FICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503 panr n FACluTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) i Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 0l5l0l0l0l3l2l1 1 OF 5 TITLE (4)

Incorrect Smveillance Schedule Results in Missed Surveillance EVENT DATE (S) LER NUMBER ($) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER F ACILiflES INv0LVED l8)

MONTH DAY TEAR YEAR stove AL MONTH DAY YEAR F ACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBEh(5) nlsInInInl l l F ACIUTY NAME 0 14 1 16 9 14 9 14 0 l014 0 l0 0l5 0 19 9 14 oIslo10l0l l l l THi$ REPORT is SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ? :(ChecA one or more of the fbuowng1(11)

OPERATING MODE (9) } 20 402(b) 20 40S(c) 50 73(a)(2)(w) 73 71(b)

POWER 20 405(a)(1)0) 50 36(c)(1) 50 73(a)(2)(v) 73 71(c)

LEYEL (10) 11010 20 4miax1xn) w3=)m 50 73(ax2)(o) a, gg y ,3,,c,,, , ,,,,,,, ,,,,,

'.'I, 20 405(aX1)(W) X 50 73(a)(2)(i) 50 73(aX2)(wn)(A) armim Teut, NRC Farm 3664)

[, 20 405(a)(1)(w) SO 73(a)(2)(n) 50 73(ax2)(wi)(B)

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, s 20 405(aK1)(v) 50 73(a)(2)(m) 50 73(a)(2Xs)

UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THl$ LER (12) )

NJ.ME TELEPHONE NUMBER (mclude area code)

ARE A CODE Steven B. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager 9 l 1 12 31617l-17l8l511 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURdR REPORTABLE + CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUF ACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS ;ggg TO NPRDS I I I I I I I <

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$UPPLEMENTAL REPORT EAPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY VLAR SUBMISSION YEs tif yos. compbele EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO N DATE(16) l l l ABSTRACT (Luwt to 1400 speces, o e. appronomerely 1$ smgoe-space typewertten knes)(16)

On 4/16/94, Unit I was in the Run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100 percent rated thermal power). At that time, a non licensed individual performing surveillance procedure 34SV-SUV-008-1S,

" Primary Containment Isolation Valve Operability," discovered that the surveillance frequency was not correct for seven primary containment vent and purge valves. The surveillance was brought up to date that same day. The valves were not declared inoperable, nor should they have been, because they fully satisfied their closure time requirements as set fonh in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

When this surveillance was performed in November 1993, the test results indicated the frequency should have bcen changed from quarterly to monthly. However, a licensed Shift Supervisor erroneously requested that the frequency be doubled (which is typical for In-Service Testing results), or changed to once per six weeks. Subsequent reviews and verifications also failed to detect the error. During the period in which the surveillance frequency was not correct, the surveillance was performed four times and should have been performed five times.

The surveillance was brought up to date on the day the condition was discovered, and the surveillance frequency has been corrected to once per month for the afTected valves. In addition, the individuals involved in this event have been made aware of their error and the importance of strict procedure compliance has been reemphasized to them. These actions are complete.

NnC Form 366 (5-82)

I NRC FORM 366A U S. NUCLEAR AEQULATO.tY COMMi&$lON APPwCVED OMJ NO.3160 4104 N MATION EC RE O S WAR ARDI R ES MATE TO THE INF MAT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LoMM,E" E $ORR TEXT CONTINUATION W GAR RgAggOgCN TON N g 5 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20$03 FACILITY NAME (t) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQ IAL R l

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 rEn w r,- .n. n.a. a. mm, a mC m uenm 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l3 l2 l1 9 l4 0 l0 l4 0l0 l2 OF l5 l l

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes appear in the text as (EIIS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT .

l On 4/16/94, Unit I was in the Run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100 percent rated thermal power). At that time, a non licensed individual performing procedure 34SV-SUV-008-lS, l

" Primary Containment Isolation Valve Operability," discovered that the surveillance frequency was not correct for seven valves. The valves are Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS, EIIS Code JM) valves in the Primary Containment Purge and Inerting system. He reported his discovery l

to licensed supervision. The surveillance frequency was not correct because a previous surveillance l on these valves, from November 1993, showed excessive change in the time required for them to l close. The Hatch In-Service Testing (IST) Plan requires that when the closure time of these valves l changes by 50 percent or more, the surveillance frequency must be changed from quarterly to monthly. In this case, the stroke times changed by more than 50 percent in November 1993, but the frequency was mistakenly changed to once per six weeks (twice the normal surveillance frequency)  ;

l rather than once per month as it should have been. Therefore, in the period from December 1993 to April 1994, the surveillance was performed four times and should htve been performed five times.

When the condition was discovered on 4/16/94, the licensed Shift Supervisor determined that the operability of the valves was not impacted. The required testing was performed that day (4/16/94),

and no other actions were required to ensure the operability of the valves.

j CAUSE OF EVENT Following the surveillance performed in November 1993, the licensed Shift Supervisor on duty at

! that time submitted a " Surveillance Program Data Base Revision Request" form asking that the frequency of the test be doubled to once per six weeks (although this information was entered in the wrong blank on the form). The individual who was acting as Manager of the Operations Department then approved the form and forwarded it to the Planning and Controls (P&C) ofTice for review. It is not unusual for IST-related surveillance problems to result in doubling the surveillance frequency.

Therefore, the P&C reviewer mistakenly assented to doubling the frequency and wrote the new requested frequency of once per six weeks in the correct blank on the form. He then sent the fc em to the Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSAC) Department for independent verification. The NSAC i

NRC FORJ 366A U S. NUCLEAR REOULOTOQY COMMi&5 ION CPPROVED OMB NO.3130411,4 (502) EXPIRES: 5131195 MA COLLECT REQU 0 S WAR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 31,j8RgARD cg NA t "gTES M,A H ( B771 U TEXT CONTINUATION r gR R A S TON. 2055 DT OFFICE OF M ANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503 F ACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGEY

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NU Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 TEXT (11more space na requved, use addshonel copes d NRC fcrm 366A){11) 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l3 l2 l1 9 l4 0 l0 l4 0l0 l3 oF l5 verifier also mistakenly agreed that doubling the surveillance frequency was correct, so he signed the request form and returned it to the P&C office for the surveillance scheduling computer to be updated. These errors occurred because personnel did not strictly adhere to the procedures which governed the activities for which they were responsible.

REPORTABIL.lTY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the plant entered a condition which is prohibited by the Technical Specifications. Specifically, the frequency of performing IST stroke time surveillances on several PCIS valves was less than what was required.

The Primary Containment Isolation System provides automatic isolation capability of Primary Containment penetrations to preclude release of radioactive material in the event of an accident.

Group 2 PCIS valves are generally located in lines which penetrate the Primary Containment but which do not communicate directly with the reactor coolant system. Group 2 PCIS actuations occur when sensed process conditions such as high drywell pressure or low reactor water level indicate the possibility of a leak in the reactor coolant system. The Group 2 PCIS valves which are the subject of this report are located in the Primary Containment Purge and Inerting System. These particular valves are mainly used to supply the Primary Containment with breathable air during periods of Refueling or Cold Shutdown. They can also be used at other times to vent the Primary Containment.

In this event, seven 18-inch PCIS valves were surveilled at a frequency less than what is required by the IST Plan. The IST Plan required them to be surveilled monthly because changes in the stroke times of greater than 50 percent had been observed. It is important to note that Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 3.7-1 requires these valves to close within five seconds and all of the valves performed better than the five second requirement. The test results are tabulated on the next page.

I NRC FORC3 366A U.S. NUCLEAR QEQULoiORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3150 0104 (502) EXPIRES; IW31/95 MATK)N COLLE R S 0 S WAR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 7,NT ARD g,

ES MA TO THE MAT U

TEXT CONTINUATION gA,R,RgG A

cog SgT,0N. DC 2055 9

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503 f ACluTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR  ; $EQ E,N, A ,

Rv NU B Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 0 l5 l0 l0 l01312 l1 9 14 0 l0 l4 0l0 l4 OF l5 TEXT r,-. .-, o. --r m.% a mC % mum l

4 l Surveillance Test Results l Valve Number, Size, Type, Previous Allowable Actual Percent Tech. i Size, Type Function Closure IST Closure Closure Change Spec.

Time 8/93 Time 11/93 Time 11/93 Required Closure IT48-F308 Outboard Drywell 1.56 sec. 2.34 sec. 2.83 sec. 81 5 sec.

18" Butterfly Purge Inlet IT48-F326 Outboard Torus 1.38 sec. 2.07 sec. 2.25 sec. 63 5 sec.

18" Butterfly Vent Outlet IT48-F320 Outboard Drywell 1.29 sec. 1.94 sec. 2.28 sec. 77 5 sec.

18" Butterfly Vent Outlet IT48-F309 Inboard Torus 1.00 sec. 1.50 sec. 2.04 sec. 104 5 sec.

18" Butterfly Purge Inlet IT48-F307 Inboard Drywell 1.00 sec. 1.50 sec. 1.68 sec. 68 5sec.

18" Butterfly Purge Inlet IT48-F318 Inboard Torus 1.00 sec. 1.50 sec. 1.59 sec. 59 5 sec.

18" Butterfly Vent Outlet

( l T48-F319 Inboard Drywell 1.23 sec. 1.85 sec. 2.01 sec. 63 5sec.

18" Butterfly Vent Outlet As shown in the table, the valves were capable of performing as required by the Technical Specifications and as assumed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The isolation logic for these valves was not affected by the erroneous surveillance frequency, and the valves were operable at all times during this event. Therefore, had the need arisen for the valves to close automatically, they would have done so within the times assumed in the FSAR analysis.

Based on this analysis, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. This analysis is applicable to all operating conditions.

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NRC FORM 364A U S. NUCLEAR REGULQTORY COMQlSb40N CPPROVED OMS NO.31304104 ESTIMATED BURDEN PE E SE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50 0 HRS FORWARD N TO TH MAT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Co" jy & GARD , %ESMA 1,N,F u TEXT CONTINUATION N LEAR RE 9

ATOR COMM EDUCT 'O SCLO OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503 F ACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER p) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE p)

YEAR .

SEQUENTIAL ,- REV 5 N Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l3 l2 l1 9 l4 0 l0 l4 0l0 l5 oF l5 TEXT (u mwe space se requand. use addotwas cwnes of kRC Ftwo's 366AX17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The surveillance was brought up to date on the day the condition was discovered and the surveillance j frequency has been changed to once per month for the affected valves. In addition, the individuals involved in this event have been made aware of their error and the importance of strict procedure compliance has been reemphasized to them. These actions are complete ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Other Systems Affected: No systems were afTected by this event other than those already mentioned in this report.

2. Failed Equipment Information: No failed components contributed to or resulted from this l

! event.

3. Previous Similar Events: Events reported in the past two years in which personnel error l resulted in the plant entering a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications are described in the following LERs:

50-321/1992-008, dated 04/20/92 50-366/1992-011, dated 08/14/92 50-321/1992-019, dated 08/04/92 50-366/1992-017, dated 10/21/92

50-321/1993-003, dated 05/10/93 50-366/1992-022, dated 12/07/92 l

50-321/1993-008, dated 06/03/93 50-366/1992-024, dated 12/14/92 50-366/1992-004, dated 04/30/92 50-366/1992-025, dated 12/21/92 50-366/1992-006, dated 06/22/92 50-366/1993-003, dated 05/03/93 Corrective actions for these events included reviewing and revising procedures, counseling i personnel, bringing surveiliance requirements up to date, issuing a Standing Order concerning l the paniculate filters in the Reactor Building Vent (EIIS Code IL), training personnel on self verification, monitoring alertness of Control Room personnel, and performing a special review of personnel error-related events. These actions would not have prevented this event because the ci.cumstances were unique to each event. Also, training and disciplinary actions are l

intended to heighten attention to task performance in involved personnel as well as the general plant population. However, by their nature, these actions cannot completely eliminate the potential for task performance errors in any particular individual.

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