ML20044F602

LER 93-007-01:on 930504,unplanned ESF Actuations Occurred. Caused by Inappropriate Jumper Placement by Plant Engineer. Personnel Performing LSFTs Made Aware of Event & Instructed Not to Install Jumpers on Relay Contact arms.W/930521 Ltr

ML20044F602
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	05/21/1993
From:	Beckham J, Tipps S GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HL-3316, LER-93-007-01, LER-93-7-1, NUDOCS 9305280302
Download: ML20044F602 (5)

Text

• , GWa Power Company 40 invemess Center Parkway Post Offce Box 1295

. Berningham, Nabama 35201 Telephone 205 877-7279 L

J. T. Beckham, Jr.

Vk;e President - Nuclear Georgia Power Hatch Project '% w2hern eku c sysium May 21, 1993 Docket No. 50-321 HL-3316 .

005471 i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 '

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Licensee Event Report Inappropriate Jumper Placement by Plant Personnel Results in Unolanned ESF Actuations Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning an inappropriate jumper placement during a functional test which ,

resulted in Group 2 Primary Containment isolations. This event occurred at Plant Hatch Unit 1.

Sincerely,

.y J. T. Beckham, Jr.

OCV/cr

Enclosure:

LER 50-321/1993-007 cc: Georaia Power Company Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant NORMS U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Washinoton. D.C.

Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission. Reaion 11 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch 9305280302 930521 313

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PDR ADOCK 05000321 g PDR

i gg .xn u.5. hJ. tun r.taA.Aw nmissim Aug gw-ciO4 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) iAcillit kAML (i) LacAti humstR tij eIn <<

P1&T HATCH, WIT 1 05000321 1 l9, j 4 11TLE (4)

INAPPROPRIATE JI.MPER FIACIMILT BY PIET PEPSOfNEL RESULTS IN UNPLANNED ESF ACIUATICNS EVEnl DATE (5) EER huMEER (6) REFORT DATE (7) OTnER FACILlllE5 Ihv0LVED (6) j *0hIn LAT YEAR YEAR 5EQ hvM REv MLhle DAY TEAR FACILITY NAME5 00CAET huMEER(5) 05000

05 04 93 93 007 00 05 21 93 05000 0FERATING 1 5dM 15 M ila MW M M WMW5 M N W (11)

MODE (9) 4 ^ 50.73(a)(2)(tv) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 73.71(b)

POWER -

20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL 000 20.405(a)(1)(ii) [ 50.36(c)(2) _

50.73(a)(2)(vii) _

OTHER (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) _

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) -

50.73(a)(2)(ii) -

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)f2)(tii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

EICEh5EL C0hTALI FOR TH15 LER (12) mAME TELEFM0ht huMBER LREA CODE STEM B. TIPPS, MANAGER NUCIIAR SAFE *IY AND CEMPilANCE, HATCH 912 367-7851 CGPPLEIE ChE LIhE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIEED lh THIS REFCRI (13)

R FC T PANDFAC- R PC T CAUSE SYSTEM CCMPONENT jAjurAC-g D5 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT jggE SUPPLEMEhTAL REFCRI EXPECTED (14) MChlh LAT YEAR SUBMISSION

] YES(If yes, complete EXFECTED SUEMI5510N CATE) DATE (15)

% NO AB5 TRACT (16) on 5/4/93 at 1110 CDT, Unit 1 was in the Cold shutdown mode with refueling outage activities in progress. At that time, several Group 2 Primary containment Isolation System (PCIS) valves closed unexpectedly during the performance of procedure 42SV-E11-004-1S, " Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling LSFT." The engineer performing the procedure inadvertently opened a contact in relay 1A71-K59 while attempting to install a jumper across the contact. This caused the PCIS logic downstream of the open contact to de-energize and Group 2 PCIS valves in the drywell pneumatics, fission product monitoring, and hydrogen and oxygen analyzer systems to close per design.

Operations personnel reset the isolation signal and reopened the valvec.

However, at 1130 CDT, when the engineer removed the jumper on relay lA71-K59, he inadvertently opened the contact again. As a result, the same valves closed for a second time. Operations personnel again reset the isolation signal and reopened the valves. The performance of the procedure was halted temporarily.

It was resumed later that day and completed at 2055 CDT on 5/4/93 with no further incidents.

The cause of this event was an inappropriate action by the engineer. In an attempt to provide more secure connection points for the jumper, the engineer placed the jumper clips on the contact arm rather than the terminal screw heads.

However, the force holding the contact together is not very strong; therefore, the engineer was able to push apart the contact with the tip mf the jumper clip when installing and when removing the jumper. Engineering personnel who perform this type of test were made aware of the event and instructed not to install jumpers on contact arms.

%. E om M u.5. NJLuin hA.A#Jki N5im Wxunu tPfo NJ alWGiD4 (FM) D71RES: 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (IER)

TEXT CONTINUATION '

rACIL17Y NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)

TEAR SEQ hum kiv PLANT HATCH, UNIT 1 05000321 93 007 00 2 or 4 Tln PIANT AND SYSTD4 IDENTIFICATION General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as (EIIS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 5/4/93 at 1110 CDT, Unit 1 was in the Cold Shutdown mode with refueling outage activities in progress. At that time, several inboard Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS, EIIS Code JM) valves closed unexpectedly during the performance of plant surveillance procedure 42SV-Ell-004-IS,

" Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling LSFT." The plant engineer performing the procedure inadvertently opened a contact in nuclear steam supply shutoff system (EIIS Code JM) relay 1A71-K59 while attempting to install a jumper across the contact. The surveillance procedure required a jumper to be placed across terminals 3 and 4 of relay 1A71-K59 to prevent a simulated isolation signal from causing actual closure of Group 2 PCIS valves.

Normally, the jumper is placed on the terminal sr ew head for each terminal point. However, the screw heads are round, sometimes making it difficult to get a secure connection with the jumper clips. The plant engineer therefore decided to secure the jumper to the relay contact arm which offered a better connection point for the jumper clips. He successfully made one such connection to a contact arm, but when he attempted to attach the other end of the jumper to the next contact arm, he inadvertently opened the contact with the jumper clip  ;

resulting in an open circuit in this portion of the Group 2 PCIS logic. This caused the logic downstream of the open contact to de-energize and Group 2 PCIS valves in the drywell pneumatics (EIIS Code LK), fission product monitoring (EIIS Code IJ), and hydrogen and oxygen analyzer (EIIS Code IK) systems to close per design.

The plant engineer immediately informed licensed Operations personnel of the event. They reset the Group 2 PCIS isolation signal and reopened the affected valves. However, at 1130 CDT, when the engineer removed the jumper from the contact arm in order to reconnect it to the terminal point screw heads, he  ;

inadvertently opened the same contact again. This resulted in an open circuit in the same portion of the Group 2 PCIS logic and the aforementioned Group 2  :

PCIS valves closed for a second time. Licensed Operations personnel again reset l the isolation signal and reopened the valves. The performance of procedure  :

42SV-E11-004-lS was halted temporarily at that time. It was resumed later that l day and completed at 2055 CDT on 5/4/93 with no further incidents.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT i

The cause of this event was an inappropriate action by the plant engineer l performing the surveillance procedure. In an attempt to provide more secure l connection points for the j umper, the engineer placed the jumper clips on the

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

. TEXT CONTINUATION FAOIL11Y NAME (1) DDCKET huMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3) vtAR SEQ hum Elv PiAhT HATCH, LNIT 1 05000321 93 007 00 3 0F 4 Itu contact arm rather than the terminal screw heads. (The surveillance procedure does not provide specific instructions regarding the securing of jumpers.)

However, after the event, it was determined that the force holding the contacts together is not very strong; therefore, the contacts opened when installing the jumper and again when removing the jumper.

REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT This report is required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) system occurred. Specifically, several Group 2 PCIS valves unexpectedly closed during the performance of a surveillance procedure in which isolation of the valves was to have been prevented. These valves are components in an ESF system, namely the Primary Containment Isolation System.

The Primary Containment Isolation System provides timely protection against the onset and consequences of accidents involving the release of radioactive materials from the fuel and nuclear system process barriers. To accomplish ,

this, the PCIS initiates automatic isolation of appropriate lines which penetrate the Primary Containment whenever monitored variables such as reactor vessel water level and drywell pressure exceed preselected operational limits.

In this event, several Group 2 PCIS valves unexpectedly closed during the performance of a logic system functional test (LSFT). No actual condition, e.g., low reactor vessel water level or high drywell pressure, existed which would have required these valves to close. Instead, the valves closed when, in effect, an isolation signal was simulated by the inadvertent opening of a contact in the isolation logic. The Group 2 PCIS logic system functioned as designed to isolate the applicable lines given the signal which was generated when the contact opened.

Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. This analysis is applicable to all power levels and operating modes.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Engineering personnel who perform LSFTs were made aware of the event and were instructed not to install jumpers on relay contact arms. The remaining Unit 1 LSFTs were performed with no further occurrences of reportable events.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION No systems other than those mentioned in this report were affected by this event.

No failed components caused or resulted from this event.

i

E torm aM u.5. hJCLUn ntuiAd1 W% nim h e'ndetu OMb NJ a130-01u4 (6-89) EXPIRES: 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATICN FAC]L]TY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQ huh KEV PIANI HATCH, UNIT 1 05000321 93 007 00 4 0F 4 IEAT Previous similar events in the last two years in which an unplanned ESF system actuation occurred due to a problem with the installation or removal of jumper (s) were reported in the following Licensee Event Reports:

50-321/1991-021, dated 10/25/91,  ;

50-366/1991-010, dated 5/13/91, l 50-366/1992-002, dated 2/19/92, 50-366/1992 023, dated 12/14/91.

In three of these events, unplanned ESF system actuations occurred when a jumper was grounded. Corrective actions included steps to help prevent the grounding of jumpers. In one of these events, unplanned ESF system actuations occurred when jumpers were installed in the wrong panel. Corrective actions included steps to help ensure jumpers are installed in the correct panel (s). This event was not caused by grounding a jumper or installing it in the wrong panel; therefore, previous corrective actions would not have addressed the cause of ,

this event, I

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