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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217E0711999-10-14014 October 1999 Grants Approval for Util to Submit Original,One Signed Paper Copy & Six CD-ROM Copies of Updates to FSAR as Listed,Per 10CFR50.4(c),in Response to ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217D3261999-10-0808 October 1999 Responds to Re Event Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature Being Undetected for Approx Two Days at Browns Ferry Unit 3 ML20217F7751999-10-0808 October 1999 Confirms 991006 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & a Belisle of NRC Re Meeting to Be Conducted on 991109 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Various Maintenance Issues ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212M1481999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to Management Meeting Conducted on 990927 at Region II for Presentation of Recent Plant Performance.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML20212D3651999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990430 Proposed Rev to Plant, Unit 3 Matl Surveillance Program ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20211G6491999-08-26026 August 1999 Confirms Telcon with T Abney on 990824 Re Mgt Meeting Which Has Been re-scheduled from 990830-0927.Purpose of Meeting to Discuss BFN Status & Performance ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML20210Q4421999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006. Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr with List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210N1051999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990326 Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI Requirements.Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,pertains to Second 10-year Interval ISI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210G8991999-07-28028 July 1999 Discusses 990726 Open Mgt Meeting for Discussion on Plant Engineering Status & Performance.List of Attendees & Presentation Handout Encl ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210G8051999-07-22022 July 1999 Discusses DOL Case DC Smith Vs TVA Investigation.Oi Concluded That There Was Not Sufficient Evidence Developed During Investigation to Substantiate Discrimination.Nrc Providing Results of OI Investigation to Parties ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML20209J0251999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards SE Which Constitutes Staff Review & Approval of TVA Ampacity Derating Test & Analyses for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Configurations as Required in App K of Draft Temporary Instruction, Fpfi, ML20210B2671999-07-14014 July 1999 Confirms 990702 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & Author Re Mgt Meeting Scheduled for 990830 at Licensee Request in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Status & Performance ML20209E3421999-07-0707 July 1999 Confirms Arrangements Made During 990628 Telephone Conversation to Hold Meeting on 990726 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Plant Engineering Status & Performance ML20209E5511999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 Rai,Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes TACs MA1180,MA1181 & MA1179 ML20196J3531999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to Re Boeing Rocket Booster Mfg Facility Being Constructed in Decatur,Al.Nrc Has No Unique Emergency Planning Concerns Re Proximity of Boeing Facility to BFN ML20196G9111999-06-28028 June 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8741999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206G6611999-05-0404 May 1999 Forwards SE Accepting GL 88-20,submitted by TVA Re multi-unit Probabilistic Risk Assessement (Mupra) for Plant, Units 1,2 & 3 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 DD-99-06, Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9904281999-04-28028 April 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990428 ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML20206C8591999-04-23023 April 1999 Informs That Util Has Determined,Dr Bateman No Longer Needs to Maintain His License,Effective 990331,per Requirement of 10CFR55.55(a) ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping ML18039A7581999-04-23023 April 1999 Responds to Item 4 of 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376 Re Extended EDG Allowed Outage Time,In Manner Consistent with Rgs 1.174 & 1.177 ML20206C1241999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Rept for 1998, IAW TS Section 5.6.1.Rept Reflects Radiation Exposure Data as Tracked by Electronic Dosimeters on Radiation Work Permits ML20205T0971999-04-15015 April 1999 Submits Change in Medical Status for DM Olive in Accordance with 10CFR55.25,effective 990315.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7441999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00,providing Details Re Inoperability of Two Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Due to Breaker Trip on One Train in Conjunction with Planned Maint Activities on Other.Ltr Contains No New Commitments ML18039A7431999-03-30030 March 1999 Responds to NRC 990112 RAI Re BFN Program,Per GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs. ML18039A7421999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Results of Analysis of Design Basis Loca,As Required by License Condition Re Plants Power Uprate Operating License Amends 254 & 214 ML18039A7411999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Partial Response to NRC 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376,proposing to Extend Current 7 Day AOT for EDG to 14 Days ML18039A7371999-03-26026 March 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,1989 Edition.Encl Contains Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7331999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to TVA-COLR-BF2C10, Bnfp,Unit 2,Cycle 10 COLR, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5.d.COLR Was Revised to Extend Max Allowable Nodal Exposure for GE GE7B Fuel Bundles ML18039A7291999-03-22022 March 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Index,Rev 26A to EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure & Rev 26A to EPIP-5, General Emergency. Rev 26A Includes All Changes Made in Rev 26 as Well as Identified Errors ML20204G8471999-03-19019 March 1999 Reports Change in Medical Status for Ma Morrow,In Accordance with 10CFR55.25.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld from Pdr,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6).Without Encl ML20207M0611999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Goals & Objectives for May 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3,radiological Emergency Plan Exercise.Plant Exercise Is Currently Scheduled for Wk of 990524 ML18039A6971999-02-22022 February 1999 Forwards Typed TS Pages,Reflecting NRC Approved TS Change 354 Requiring Oscillation PRM to Be Integrated Into Approved Power uprate,24-month Operating Cycle & Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML18039A6961999-02-19019 February 1999 Provides Util Response to GL 95-07 Re RCIC Sys Injection Valves (2/3-FCV-71-39) for BFN Units 2 & 3.Previous Responses,Dtd 951215,1016 & 960730,0315 & 0213,supplemented ML18039A6911999-02-19019 February 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Unit 2 Cycle 10 & Rev 1 to Unit 3 Cycle 9, Colr.Colrs for Each Unit Were Revised to Include OLs Consistent with Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML20203B6031999-02-0404 February 1999 Requests Temporary Partial Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.65,maint Rule for Unit 1.Util Requesting Exemption to Resolve Issue Initially Raised in NRC Insp Repts 50-259/97-04,50-260/97-04 & 50-296/97-04,dtd 970521 ML18039A6741999-01-21021 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981209 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/98-07,50-260/98-07 & 50-296/98-07,respectively. Corrective Actions:Will Revise Procedure NEPD-8 Re Vendor Nonconformance Documentation Submission to TVA ML20199F6951999-01-0808 January 1999 Submits Request for Relief from ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Valve Program to Extend Interval Between Disassembly of Check Valve,Within Group of Four Similar Check Valves for EECW Dgs,From 18 to 24 Months 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L5741990-09-19019 September 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Cable Issues Supplemental Rept Corrective Actions,Sept 1990. Rept Revised to Clarify Cable Bend Radius & Support of Vertical Cable & Document Resolution of Jamming Issues ML20064A6871990-09-18018 September 1990 Requests Closure of Confirmatory Order EA-84-054 Re Regulatory Performance Improvement Program ML20059L4931990-09-17017 September 1990 Provides Addl Info Re 900713 Tech Spec Change 290 Concerning Hpci/Rcic Steam Line Space Temp Isolations,Per Request ML18033B5171990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re 900524 Tech Spec Change 287 on Reactor Pressure Instrument Channel.Schematic Diagrams Provided in Encl 2 ML20064A6851990-09-17017 September 1990 Responds to NRC Recommendations Re Primary Containment Isolation at Facility.Background Info & Responses to Each Recommendation Listed in Encl 1 ML20059K2971990-09-14014 September 1990 Responds to NRC 900208 SER Re Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97, Rev 3, Neutron Flux Monitoring Instrumentation. TVA Endorses BWR Owners Group Appealing NRC Position Directing Installation of Upgraded Neutron Flux Sys ML20059H3861990-09-10010 September 1990 Forwards Corrective Actions Re Radiological Emergency Plan, Per Insp Repts 50-259/89-41,50-260/89-41 & 50-296/89-41. Corrective Action:Plant Manager Instruction 12.12,Section 4.11.3.1 Revised ML18033B5031990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Financial Info Required to Assure Retrospective Premiums,Per 10CFR140 & 771209 Ltr ML20059E1741990-08-31031 August 1990 Informs That Plant Restart Review Board & Related Functions Will Be Phased Out on Date Fuel Load Commences ML20059D7061990-08-28028 August 1990 Requests That Sims Be Updated to Reflect Implementation of Program to Satisfy Requirements of 10CFR50,App J.Changes & Improvements Will Continue to Be Made to Reflect Plant Mods, Tech Spec Amends & Recommendations from NRC ML18033B4931990-08-20020 August 1990 Suppls Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-14,50-260/90-14 & 50-296/90-14.Corrective Actions: TVA Developed Corporate Level std,STD-10.1.15 Re Independent Verification ML20063Q2431990-08-20020 August 1990 Responds to 900807 Telcon Re Rev to Commitment Due Date Per Insp Rept 50-260/89-59 Re Electrical Issues Program ML20063Q2451990-08-17017 August 1990 Provides Revised Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of USI A-47, Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants & Notification of Commitment Completion ML20063Q2441990-08-17017 August 1990 Advises That IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Masonry Wall Design Implemented at Facilities.Design Finalized,Mods Completed, Procedures Issued & Necessary Training Completed.Sims Data Base Should Be Updated to Show Item Being Implemented ML20059A4861990-08-16016 August 1990 Responds to Verbal Commitment Made During 900801 Meeting W/Nrc Re Control Room Habitability.Calculations Performed to Support Util 900531 Submittal Listed in Encls 1 & 2 ML20059A5141990-08-16016 August 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 88-008,Suppl 3 Re Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs.Util Does Not Anticipate Thermal Cyclic Fatique Induced Piping,Per Suppl 3 to Occur in Plant.Ltr Contains No Commitment ML18033B4821990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Revised Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-16,50-260/89-16 & 50-296/89-16.Extends Completion Dates for Commitments to 901203 ML18033B4831990-08-13013 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900713 Ltr Re Violations & Deviations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-18,50-260/90-18 & 50-296/90-18. Corrective Actions:Craft Foreman Suspended for Three Days & Relieved of Duties as Foreman ML18033B4811990-08-10010 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900710 Ltr Re Power Ascension Testing Program.Four Hold Points Selected by NRC Added to Unit 2 Restart Schedule ML18033B4801990-08-0808 August 1990 Forwards Response to SALP Repts 50-259/90-07,50-260/90-07 & 50-296/90-07 for Jul 1989 - Mar 1990 ML20044B2121990-07-13013 July 1990 Clarifies Util Position on Two Items from NRC 891221 Safety Evaluation Re TVA Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 88-01 Concerning IGSCC in BWR Stainless Steel Piping.Insp Category for Nine Welds Will Be Changed from Category a to D ML18033B4371990-07-13013 July 1990 Forwards Corrected Tech Spec Page 3.2/4.2-45 to Util 900706 Application for Amend to License DPR-52 Re ADS ML18033B4331990-07-13013 July 1990 Requests Temporary Exemption from Simulator Certification Requirements of 10CFR55.45(b)(2)(iii) ML20055F6091990-07-12012 July 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 88-003 Re Insp Results. No Relays Found to Have Inadequate Latch Engagements. Therefore,No Corrective Repairs or Replacement of Relays Required ML18033B4251990-07-10010 July 1990 Forwards Cable Installation Supplemental Rept,In Response to NRC Request During 900506 Telcon.Rept Contains Results of Walkdowns & Testing Except Work on Ongoing Cable Pullby Issue ML18033B4241990-07-0606 July 1990 Advises That Util Expects to Complete Implementation of Rev 4 to Emergency Procedure Guidelines by Mar 1991.Response to NRC Comments on Draft Emergency Operating Instructions Encl ML18033B4201990-07-0505 July 1990 Provides Basis for Closure of Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3. Util Has Concluded That Analyses Presented in BWR Owners Group Repts Acceptable for Resolving Issue,Subj to Listed Conditions ML18033B4091990-07-0202 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900601 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-53,50-260/89-53 & 50-296/89-53.Corrective Actions: Condition Adverse to Quality Rept Initiated & Issued to Track Disposition of Deficiency in Chilled Water Flow Rates ML20043G4901990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Tabs for Apps a & B to Be Inserted Into Util Consolidated Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan ML20043H3511990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Corrected Pages to Rev 15 to Physical Security Contingency Plan,As Discussed During 900606 Telcon.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043F4951990-06-11011 June 1990 Advises That Facilities Ready for NRC Environ Qualification Audit.Only Remaining Required Binder in Review Process & Will Be Completed by 900615 ML18033B3651990-06-0808 June 1990 Forwards Revised Page 3.2/4.2-13 & Overleaf Page 3.2/4.2-12 to Tech Spec 289, RWCU Sys Temp Loops. ML18033B3391990-06-0404 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900504 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-08,50-260/90-08 & 50-296/90-08.Corrective Actions: Individual Involved Counseled on Importance of Complying W/Approved Plant Procedures When Performing Assigned Tasks ML20043D3251990-06-0101 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900502 Ltr Re Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Snm Program Action Plan Being Developed & Implemented,Consisting of Improved Training for Control Personnel & Accountability ML18033B3551990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Response to 891219 Request for Addl Info on Hazardous Chemicals Re Control Room Habitability ML20043C1951990-05-30030 May 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-04 Re Status of Implementation of Generic Safety Issues ML20043C0601990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-12,50-260/90-12 & 50-296/90-12.Util Admits Violation Re Access Control to Vital Areas,But Denies Violation Re Backup Ammunicition for Responders ML18033B3351990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Basis for Closure of Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability. Analyses Presented in BWR Owners Group Repts Acceptable for Resolving Issues Subj to Listed Conditions ML18033B3221990-05-21021 May 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to ED-Q2000-870135, Cable Ampacity Calculation - V4 & V5 Safety-Related Trays for Unit 2 Operation, as Followup to Electrical Insp Rept 50-260/90-13 Re Ampacity Program ML18033B3101990-05-18018 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900417 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-05,50-260/90-05 & 50-296/90-05.Corrective Action: Senior Reactor Operator Assigned to Fire Protection Staff for day-to-day Supervision of Fire Protection Program ML20043A6101990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20043A4091990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Rev 14 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043A4081990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Rev 15 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan, Consisting of Changes for Provision of Positive Access Control During Major Maint & Refueling Operations to One of Two Boundaries.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML18033B2921990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Info for NRC Consideration Re Plant Performance for Current SALP Rept Period of Jan 1989 - Mar 1990.Util Believes Corrective Actions Resulted in Positive Individual Changes & Programmatic Upgrades ML20042F7401990-05-0404 May 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants.' TVA Will Finalize Calculations for Switch Setpoints Prior to Units Restart ML20042F7701990-05-0404 May 1990 Provides Results of Review of Util 890418 Submittal Re Supplemental Implementation of NUMARC 87-00 on Station Blackout.Implementation of 10CFR50.63 Consistent W/Guidance Provided by NUMARC 87-00 ML20042F3721990-05-0202 May 1990 Forwards Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Jan-June 1989 & Aug 1989 - Jan 1990.Discrepancies Involve Cumulative Unit Svc Factors & Unit Availability Capacity Factors ML18033B2631990-04-12012 April 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900212 Request for Info Re Power Ascension & Restart Test Program at Unit 2.Util Has Refined Power Ascension Program to Be More Integrated & Comprehensive ML18033B2551990-04-0909 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900309 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-16,50-260/89-16 & 50-296/89-16.Corrective Actions: Contractor Will Perform Another Check Function Review for Mechanical Calculations & Area Walkdowns Will Be Conducted ML18033B2431990-04-0202 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900302 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-43,50-260/89-43 & 50-296/89-43.Corrective Action: Surveillance Insp Revised to Prevent Removal of All Eight Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Pumps from Water 1990-09-19
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- TENNESSEE VALLEYi AUTHORITY-; j CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401- )
- U , j SN 1578 Lookout Place. j 00T 06 BBS
, U.S._ Nuclear Regulatory' Commission -!
- ATTN
- Document _ Control Desk'
- Hashington, D.C. 20555, n Gentlemen:.
.In the. Matter of- .) Docket Nos. 50-259 )
Tennessee Valley Authority ) '50-260-
, 50-296 BROWNS FERRY. NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PROGRAM "
COMPLETION (TAC 00316, 00317, 00318) l This: letter pro" ides notification that the design, testing-and modifications.
required to resolve a. discrepancy between' Appendix F of'the BFN Final Safety
. Analysis Report:and'the as-constructed. configuration-of secondary containment
[ penetrations has,been completed. The, enclosure to this, letter provides.
- specific details. -The discrepancy regarding the degree of seismic L . qualification'of-the penetrations is discussed in Revision-2.to the Browns l L Ferry Nuclear' Performance. Plan,Section III.3.11. . A description of the program was submitted from R.,Gridley_to NRC on March 16; 1988. The Safety -
Evaluation which approved this' program was;sent by letter from G. G. Zech to S~ A. White,. dated April 11, 1988. 'There are no commitments contained in-this-
. letter. ,
.TVA requests your review of this material and your concurrence regarding the L closure of this issue. If you have any questions, please get in touch with L Patrick Carter at (205) 729-3570.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
)
Manag r, Nuci Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
-Enclosure K :cc: See pag'e 2 l
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An Equal Opportunity Employer
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Ms.'S..C. Black; Assistant Director ,
for Projects- ,
TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ;
One White Flint, North 11555.Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II . -
101 Marietta-Street, NN, Suite 2900.
. Atlanta,-Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12,-Box 637 l Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 1
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t R. k v- - Page-1 of 8 ENCLOSURE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
- Program Description TVA's program for resolution of this 1ssue ensures the secondary containment boundary would maintain sufficient integrity after a design basis earthquake (DBE). Accordingly, the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) would maintain o the minimum one quarter inch of water negative pressure inside secondary containment which is required by Technical Specification 4.7.C.1.a. This approach provided sufficient confidence that the resulting pressure differential would prevent unfiltered radiological releases from the secondary containment. The program involved three steps:
- 1. Determination of the margin available for post-DBE inleakage flow. 4
- 2. Evaluation and quantification of the potential post-0BE inleakage flow rate into the secondary containment.
- 3. Modification of the potential flow paths if required to ensure that the-total post-DBE inleakage flow was within the full flow SGTS flow rate.
Inleakage Flow Description Inleakage flow through the secondary containment boundary arises from the airlocks, refueling floor roof and siding, piping penetrations, heating ventilating and' air conditioning (HVAC) duct penetrations, electrical conduit penetrations and cable tray penetrations. These flow paths potentially presented two types of inleakage flow:
- 1. Normal _inleakage.
- 2. Post-DBE inleakage flow increase.
Normal leakage is evaluated and measured periodically by the secondary containment /SGTS surveillance testing required by Technical Specification 4.7 C.I.a. The normal lei,kage plus any additional leakage due to normal inprocess plant activities (e.g., maintenance, modifications, etc.) i s required to be less than 12,000 CFM. The full flow SGTS flow rate is that
. SGTS flow developed with two trains operable. Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 allows operation and fuel handling with a minimum of two trains of SGTS for seven consecutive days. The margin available for post-DBE inleakage flow increases is the difference between the full flow SGTS flow rate and the Technical Specification 4.7.C.l.a limit of 12,000 CFM.
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Page 2 of 8 ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
/ BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
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Full Flow Test Description A special test was performed to determine the full SGTS flow rate that would be produced by two trains of the SGTS operating in parallel while maintaining all four zones of secondary containment as close as practical to one quarter inch of water negative pressure. Trains A and B were chosen since, historically, they have yielded the lower flow rates of the three trains and
-thus would.yleid a conservative full flow SGTS flow rate. This test was performed with all three units defueled and at a time when secondary containment was not required. The SGTS trains were operated at a maximum flow !
rate while the secondary containment pressure was regulated-by opening doors that penetrate secondary containment in unit 3. The test demonstrated that l the full SGTS flow is at least 16,200 CFM which provides a margin of 4200 CFM.
Post-DBE Response of Seismic Commodities i The airlocks and the Reactor Building roof and siding are seismically quallfled and will not experience an increne in post-DBE inleakage flow rate. The programs to verify the seismic qualification of cable tray, conduit ;
and HVAC are discussed in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan, Sections
^
III.3.3, III.3.4 and III.3.5, respectively. Thus, the cable tray, conduit and _
HVAC penetrations are not considered sources of increases in post-DBE 'l inleakage. The seals for these types of penetrations were not considered to
-be sources of post-DBE inleakage since the item penetrating secondary containment was seismically qualified.
Post-DBE Piping Penetration Response As stated previously, the piping penetrating the secondary containment boundary presents two potential types of secondary containment inleakage flow:
- 1. Normal inleakage, j
- 2. Post-DBE inleakage flow increase.
Potential post-DBE inleakage flow increase for piping penetrations could arise from two different failure mechanisms. Inleakage area could be created by:
- 1) failure of the annular seal around the piping where the piping passes 1 through the secondary containment boundary, or 2) if the piping itself failed such that a leakage path internal to the piping was created. The secondary containment piping program demonstrated earthquake resistant annular seals were at the secondary containment boundary and that the piping penetrating the boundary would survive the DBE.
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- BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR
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Annular Seal Types and Responses l.
The secondary containment penetration program confirmed or established an earthquake resistant seal around the piping at the secondary containment boundary. Through comparison of the Browns Ferry secondary containment .
annular seal types to an earthquake experience database, it was determined that some of the existing seals are earthquake resistant. .These included i penetration seals comprised of welded caps, bolted plates, no annular area, '
welded plates, caulk, fiberglass boots, rubber boots and lead oakum seals. A few small seals were assumed to totally fail and thus create a leakage area equal to the penetration seal area. This conservative approach was utilized for seals for which seismic response characteristics were not available. All other penetrations were sealed using flexible foam type seal materials (i.e., !
Promaflex and RTV silicone foam). The expected response of each seal type is discussed below:
t Welded Caps and Bolted Plates Some piping penetrations are not used and are capped off with either plates welded directly to the steel penetration sleeve or. bolted to the secondary containment wall. These types of penetrations would not experience any increase in inleakage following a seismic event.
No Annular Area This class of seal is characterized by a pipe which has the same outside diameter as-the inside diameter of the penetration. Thus, this seal configuration has no potential for inleakage flow increase via the seal.
Welded Plates i
Welded plates are typically bolted or welded to the secondary containment wall and then usually welded to the piping. For piping which will l experience small seismic or thermal induced movement, no increase in .
- l. Inleakage was assumed. For piping experiencing large. movement, the weld was assumed to fall for the purpose of this program only and create an annular flow area equal to the weld gap between the plate and the piping.
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ENCLOSURE (CONTIN 0ED) 1
' I BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR' PLANT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS i m
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Caulk Caulk seals were assumed to totally fall if the piping was expected to
, have substantial movements and thus form a flow area equal to the annular-gap between the wall and the piping. No increase in inleakage was ,
assumed for caulk seals experiencing.small pipe movement.
Fiberglass Boots Sealed boots constructed of a fiberglass-like material are used to seal ,
the-annular area between the mainsteam/feedwater lines and the secondary ,
containment blowout panels in-the steam vault. Through plant walkdowns and dynamic modeling of the lines, it was determined that the seismic induced motion of the lines would be less than the slackness in the boot
'and would not experience any increase in inleakage following a seismic !
event.
. Rubber Boots Rubber boots are used for a number of piping penetrations throughout the 1 plant as Appendix R fire seals. Piping using rubber boots was evaluated to determine its seismic induced motion. Based upon the evaluation I results, the slackness in the boots was adjusted to ensure that boots l would remain intact and would not experience any increase in inleakage following a seismic event.
L Lead Oakum l.
One piping line penetrating the Reactor Building roof uses a lead and oakum seal. Evaluation of the expected piping movement coupled with l experience data on the performance of such seals indicated that they
- l. woeld not experience any increase in inleakage following a seismic event.
1 Promaflex i Promaflex is an Appendix R fire barrier material distributed by the Promatec Corporation. It is a putty-like foam material which is poured into place using a back dam. Following cure time, the material remains as a soft putty-like foam substance which readily deforms and then '
l returns to its original shape. Based on the results of the seal material tests described below, the material is able to withstand considerable piping deflections before any significant increase in inleakage would OCCUR.
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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
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The material can detach from the piping surface and allow the piping to slide axially within the seal due to either thermal or seismic induced pipe motion. Once the piping motion ceases, the material reattaches to the piping and reestablishes its seal with a minimum amount of inleakage increase. The material can withstand both axial and lateral pipe movements. During small lateral deflections, Promaflex deforms and.
experiences very small increases in inleakage. Extreme lateral movements tend'to leave a hole in the material as it detaches from the pipe surface and leaves a void in the seal material; however, under most geometries the seal is reestablished when the pipe is returned to near its original position. .
The Promaflex material does not exhibit good sealing properties.for penetrations with small annular gaps (e.g., 10-inch penetration with 8-inch piping yielding a 1-inch gap around the pipe). Geometries of this '
type tend to make the material rc11 out of the penetration and experience '
total failure; thus, this type of material was not utilized for penetrations with annular gaps which are small compared to the penetration radius, RTV Silicone foam The RTV silicone foam Appendix R fire seals are made by using Type 3-6548 RTV silicone foam manufactured by the Dow Corning Company. The RTV foam is a spongy type material similar to the foam in a water ski life vest.
Based on the results of the seal material tests described below, this material can withstand large axial piping movements but tends to tear due to combined lateral and axial pipe novements. As the piping oscillates axially from seismic induced lateral motion, the piping abrades the material leaving an open path through the seal. The expected lateral piping deflection was assumed to remove a corresponding area of RTV foam and the post-DBE flow area (and hence flow rate) determined accordingly.
This material does not experience the total failure exhibited by Promaflex for small annular area configurations; thus, this material was used for piping with small annular areas or small lateral movements.
Seal Material Test
. In order to demonstrate the expected post-DBE performance of the flexible foam piping seals (Promaflex and RTV silicone foam), a series of special tests were conducted. Mockups of piping and penetrations with the seal material in place were subjected to cyclical axial displacements of the piping. The magnitude L of the displacements was increased stepwlse until being in excess of both the T 1 &v w ---
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rated displacement for the material and the expected selsmic induced motion.
With the seals subjected to a one quarter' inch of water pressure differential.
-the seal leakage flow rate was measured before and after a specified number of displacement cycles. Similarly, the test apparatus was subjected to stepwlse i lateral displacements and the flow rate measured before and after. Multiple tests for each piping :onfiguration were conducted to demonstrate the repeatability of the data. Piping penetration mockups were utilized which ,
simulate the actual conditions in the plant in terms of both penetration and piping size.
Piping Displacements -
l Seismic and thermal induced-pipe motions were estimated using experience based l~
criteria along with limited dynamic analysis. The majority of the piping !
exhibited estimated axial and lateral deflections of less than one inch. The piping configurations with deflections exceeding one inch were generally rod 1 hung flexible systems with little or no axial support. These were on piping systems such as service air, drains, fire protection and demineralized water.
Piping movements were determined using field walkdowns in which the piping configuration and seal on both sides of each penetration ware inspected and 4 equivalent span lengths determined. Estimates of piping movement at each .
penetration were determined using the overall support configuration and )
- deflection estimation screening charts which were based on the bounding L configuration for simply supported span cases.
Lateral displacement estimations did not take credit for any restraint capability of the seal material. If displacement estimates were greater than the gap between the pipe and the sleeve, the total displacement was considered equal to 100 percent of the gap dimension. Also, if deflection estimates L resulted in deflections which were very small (i.e., less than 1/8 inch), they I were considered to-be essentially fixed and a zero-inch movement was assumed. .
i i l The piping on each side of the penetration was reviewed to determine the ;
l potential-for plastic deformation of a support resulting in a permanent offset of the piping within the penetration. Piping supports were reviewed to l
determine if the failure of any particular support would result in permanent piping displacement.
The procedure utilized for fleid estimation of piping system deflections was verifled by limited dynamic analysis bounding typical piping layout
- configurations. Response spectrum analyses utilizing simple span piping layouts were used to obtain selsmic Induced deflections. These calculated
! deflections were then compared with the deflections obtained using the screening charts. It was shown that the screening charts over estimated the seismic induced deflection compared with that depicted by detailed analyses in all cases but two. In two cases, the simple screening chart under-estimated deflection by less than 1/10 of an inch. Since field estimated deflections were typically rounded up to the nearest 1/2 inch, use of the screening charts was conservative in all cases.
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E ENCLOSURE ~(CONTINUED)
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
- SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
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Thermal growth estimates were determined by estimating the length of piping which could contribute to growth in a particular direction. Using length and temperature range on the thermal deflection screening charts, the total piping
-thermal induced movement was determined.
Throughwall Failure Evaluations
- Secondary containment inleakage can be created if the piping which passes through the secondary containment boundary falls such that a leakage path internal to the piping is created. This failure mechanism requires a throughwall path on both sides of the secondary containment boundary. For piping which is open to the atmosphere either inside or outside the secondary l' containment, only one throughwall piping failure on the other side of the wall l 1s required to breach'the secondary containment boundary. For piping closed both inside and outside secondary containment, a throughwall failure of the piping on both sides of the boundary is required.
1:
In order to determine the anticipated structural response of the piping, the piping was divided into two categories. Piping for which pressure boundary integrity is being vertfled by other programs such as the IE Bulletin L 79-02/79-14 or small bore piping programs or piping already covered by the
' seismic class II/I water spray hazard walkdowns were considered acceptable (i.e., not expected to form throughwall piping failures). If an operability issue is identified on a particular piping component during the performance of l these programs, an evaluation of the situation will be performed and appropriate actions taken. The remaining piping was evaluated using the deflection estimation walkdown data and associated analyses. Terminal ends of I
the piping were inspected to ensure that unanchored equipment would not result in loss of pressure' boundary integrity. This could be caused by unanchored equipment (or other large unanchored masses) dragging or displacing the piping during an earthquake.
These evaluations used seismic experience data and were based on the ability of the piping to maintain pressure boundary integrity either inside or outside ,
the secondary containment boundary. These evaluations considered the presence of any existing isolation device (e.g., automatic vaive, check valve, loop seal, etc.). For piping which does not contain isolation devices, the entire system either inside or outside the secondary containment was reviewed to ensure that no throughwall paths would be created on that side of the boundary. The evaluations did not identify any piping systems which would form a leakage path through the secondary containment boundary, i
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.Page 8 of 8 ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)-
'- 1 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT .
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
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Program Acceptatc_e Criteria' .
Using data from the seal material tests, the inleakage flow response for various perietration/ pipe configurations versus axial / lateral pipe movements was correlated. The expected post-DBE response of the other seal designs (e.g., weld plates, caulk, etc.) were correlated-for various '
penetration / piping configurations. These correlations were used to determine the total expected post-DSE inleakage flow increase. The total expected post-DBE inleakage flow increase was determined to be approximately 3280 CFM which-ts less tnan the available margin (i.e., 4200 CFM). ,
Conclusions The Browns Ferry Secondary Containment Program has-been implemented. The secondary containment /SGTS is be capable of maintaining a one quarter inch of r.egative pressure following a DBE and will prevent unfiltered radiological releases from secondary containment.. As stated in the March 16, 1988 letter
.from R. L. Gridley to NRC, TVA intends to revise the BFN FSAR to clarify the performance and design of the secondary containment, f
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