ML19309A764

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Forwards Rept of Actions Taken to Correct Deficiencies in Mfg of Discs for Svc Water Control Valves.Supporting Documentation Is Available at Site for Inspector Review
ML19309A764
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 03/25/1980
From: Gary R
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To: Seidle W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
TXX-3114, NUDOCS 8004010296
Download: ML19309A764 (2)


Text

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TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING CO.ill%NY 2001 ISTAN 70% Ett

  • DAILAbs.TEXAH 75201 n.Aomav March 25, 1980

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Mr. W. C. Seidle, Chief Reactor Construction & Engineering 4 Support Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Dr., Suite 1000 Docket Nos. 50-445 Arlington, Texas 76012 50-446 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 1981-83 2300 MW INSTALLATION

, SERVICE WATER CONTROL VALVES FILE N0: 10110

Dear Mr. Seidle:

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, j In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) we are submitting the attached report i of actions taken to correct deficiencies in the manufacture of discs for the service water control valves. We previously made a verbal report to

Mr. R. G. Taylor on February 22, 1980.

Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your inspector's review.

4 If we can provide any additional information, please advise.

Very truly yours, k /

R. J. Gary Attachment RJG:df cc: NRC Region IV (0 + 1 copy)

Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies) i c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

  • T 8004010796 L

o 9

TXX-3114 Attachment March 25, 1980 SERVICE WATER CONTROL VALVES Description of the Deficiency Service water control valves have been supplied to Comar.che Peak by Fisher i Controls Company. These valves contain aluminum bronze discs which require heat treatment after welding. The valves as supplied by Fisher did not receive the required post weld heat treatment after being repair welded.

Analysis of Safety Implications The nine valves were analyzed for failure by gradual corrosion and none were considered to be subject to a failure which would adversely affect plant safety. Considering catastrophic disc failure, however, the discs could theoretically break from the valves and become lodged downstream.

In the event of such a failure, the Service Water System might not be able to perform its safety function.

Corrective Actions The subject valves will be returned to the vendor for repair work to be accomplished to bring the final product in full compliance with the specification requirements. To support our startup program we do intend 4 to install the subject valves to assist in our system testing, but will replace these valves with equivalent valves originally designated for I

Unit 2 when received, to permit the subject valves to be returned for correction. For the two valves which have no corresponding Unit 2 valves, steps will be taken to return these valves to the vendor once our testing requirements are satisfied.

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