Text

Forwards Updated Project Status Rept of All Fire Protection Mods
	ML18139A794
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/31/1980
From:	Sylvia B; VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	Harold Denton, Varga S; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18139A793	List: ML18139A792; ML18139A794; ML19339A685;
References
	NUDOCS 8011040519
	Download: ML18139A794 (9)
	v • d • e

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Attachment II FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS PROJECT STATUS

SUMMARY

SURRY POWER STATION FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS PROJECT STATUS

SUMMARY

Modifications MODIFICATIONS SCHEDULE AND STATUS Item No. I Descriptions q 7q 10/79 11 *79' 12/79 01 BO n* /RO n, 80 n& 80 n.~ 80 06i'Rn 07 /Rn nA. an oqn ,n, An 11 /an , ,, Al 1/ 11 1 Al ~, II ~ Al ~ 8 3.1.1 Administrative Controls

3.1.2 Air Flow Detectors .,, "'""

Breathing Apparatus 111111

3.1.3 ~

3.1.4 3.1.5 Csble Trey Covers Safe Shutdown Circuitry

"" "" 11111""'"' "' 11111 II Ill

'" Ill"'"

"" t Ulfll 3.1.6 Combuatible11 3.1. 7 Charcoal Filter11 1111 111111 ..

3.1.8 Emergency Lighting "'""' 1111 3.1.9 Fire Detection Sy11t~II

Ullll llllll

""' " _,a 3.1.10 Fire Barrier11 '" ... '"""'"' ...... '"' ....... ""' , ....

ulf*rt 3.1.11 Fire Do0r11 Ill .......

3.1.12 Fire Damper11 111111 "111111111 llllnn,,m., mn,

- -* -** *-*- -*** .. - . """"'"""' Ill 3.1.13 Fire l!xtinguillher11 *, I 3.1.14 Fire Ladder

-.** 3.l.15A 3.l.15B 3.1.16 Floor *Drain11, Dike11 Oil Collection System11 Ga* Suppre11eion Systems Ill 111111111111 1111111 111111 111 111! II !II

!II

'" ,.... . . ,Pl ....r~

3.1.17 Ho11e Nozzle11 1

3.1.18 Ho11e Station11 C,

11111111 11111 3.1.19 Hydrogen Linl!II 11111111111111 3.1.20 Ho11e Foam Cart11 3.1. 21 Hydrants i w

3.1.22 Valve Supervieion "'

3.1.23 3.1. 24 Monitoring Panel11 Penetration11 111111 1111 111111 1111

'II 1111111111111

UNIT I ......

3.1.25 Safe Shutdown li"""'ll*n '""'ii"""" """"Ii"'" Ill

"'""" "'"'"""'" 111111111 .. .,,,,r, ..,.,r2.

3, 1.26 Water Suppre1111ion Systems 1111 Ill "'"II "'"""""' 1111 ""

I

3.1.27 Ventilation System 1111 .. ,m 11111111111

- 1111""" lllln"II ""'"'"'"' 111111nm 111Dffl""'

3.1. 28 Fire Detection System Power * ..... Ill llfll11111111l

3, l. 29

3.1.30 Water Spray Shields Technical Specification11 lmnmnm 3.2,l Auxiliary Boiler Room ..

3.2,2 Fire Dampers "" .....

3.2.3 Safe Shutdown

"'"lllllln" mllllllllll UIIIIIIIIII '

3.2.4

.. Charcoal Filter Hazard ' IIUII 111111 3.2.5 In-Situ Testing KEY l. Beginning of bar represents project start date, 5. Asteri11k

indicates the date of complete submittal of required information.

2. End of bar represents project target completion date, 6; Delta 6 indicates the date of partial submittal of required information.

3, Shaded portion represents percent co11plete. ISSUE DATE:

4. Absence of block indicates project has not been started,

~l Attachment III FIRE PROTECTION DESIGN INFORMATION

e Attaclunent III Pagel of ~J 3.1.5 Safe Shutdown Circuitry At the present time, control wiring to those circuits associated with the safe shutdown of the reactor is set up such that the control devices on the main control board located in the main control room are electrically in parallel with the control devices on the auxiliary shutdown panel located in the emer-gency switchgear area. This condition could lead to an electrical fault in the control circuit wiri-ng which would render the circuit inoperative in the event of a fire in the main control room propagating into the affected areas of the main control board and shorting the wires.

In order to resolve this problem isolation contacts are proposed to be wired into the control devices mounted on the main control board and the auxiliary shutdown panel to allow both locations to be isolated from the electrical control circuit.

On 4160 volt switchgear control circuits, a new transfer relay will be added to each affected cubicle to provide the isolation contacts required.

On 480 volt motor control center control circuits, a new transfer relay will be added to provide the required isolation contacts. These new relays will be mounted in separate enclosures located near the associated motor control center.

A control switch will be added to each side of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel to operate the transfer relays being added to the individual control circuits. The transfer relays will be provided with an operating handle such that, in the unlikely event of a fire near the auxiliary shutdown panel causing an inadvertent transfer of control, or loss of power, the operator can manually transfer control to the proper location.

The proposed resolution for those instrument circuits which require electrical isolation will involve wiring a signal isolator into the signal loop at the instrument rack to isolate the wires to the indicator mounted on the main control board from the original loop.

e Attachment III Pagel of 3 3.1.23 Monitoring Panels An indicating panel, monitoring reactor coolant hot leg temperature, pressurizer level and pressure is to be installed in the cable tray area of Unit 1 of the Surry Power Station. The panel is to be shared by both units and powered from each unit's 125V station batteries.

Signals to the panel are to be transmitted from instruments dedicated to the panel ~nd via cable independently routed from cables trans-mitting the same reactor coolant parameter data to the control room.

The above panel will give the station an alternative capability for monitoring the reactor coolapt system parameters of either unit in the event that a postulated fire in the electrical tunnel, cable vault, emergency switchgear and/or relay room disables the effected units control room instrumentation and control devices.

The design basis for the panel and it's associate instrumentation and control devices are the requirements specified in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, dated 19 September 79. The location of the panel is the cable tray area above the control room. Power for the panel and it's associated instrumentation is to be obtained from the 125 distribution panels located in the respective vertical section 1-2 and 2-2 of the main boards for Units 1 and 2. The multisource DC power gives the panel a reliable power feed for the required panel functional operational period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months with or without the availability of off-site power.

There are four indicators provided on the front of the panel that will monitor the RCS parameters (reactor coolant hot leg temperature, pressurizer level and pressure and steam generator level from either unit. One indicator is for each of the four parameters. A two position (Unit 1, Unit 2) LOOP selection switch on the front of the panel for selecting either unit's inputs to the indicators.

Selection of Unit 1 or Unit 2 inputs is indicated, respectively, by the energized state of the amber and opalescent indicating lights located above the switch.

e e Attachment III Pagel_ of 3 3.1.25(2) Charging Pump Service Water Redundant Water Supply The present location of the charging pump service water ptnnps 1-SW-P-lOA, lOB, and 2-SW-P-lOA, lOB prevents the use of fire barriers as a means to protect against the loss of all four pumps in the case of a fire in Mechanical Equipment Room No. 3.

The proposed resolution is to supply a redundant source of water to the charging ptnnp service water pumps that can be used as an emergency backup supply. This supply of water still comes from the fire protection system. Presently, a 2 1/2 in fire line runs at the 25 ft. el. in*the auxiliary building directly above the four 2 in lines for the charging ptnnp service water system.

The service water lines are at the 9 ft. el. A tee will be installed in the 2 1/2 in fire lane, and four reduced lines will branch off to supply the charging pump service water systems.

Manual isolation valves wtal be installed to prevent inadvertently cross-connecting the two systems. The backup supply will be used as a manual backup only when the normal service water ptnnps are out of service. To adequately fulfill charging pump lubrication oil cooling requirements, each oil cooler co.uld require up to 20 gpm of service water. During normal operation, inlet and outlet valves for all the coolers are open with flow controlled by a temperature control valve on the outlet. When conditions require the use of the fire protection system, operation of all three lube oil coolers will cause required flow to exceed the capacity of fire loop pressure maintenance ptnnp. This will cause automatic energization of the motor-driven fire ptnnp. The motor-driven fire pump has a capacity of 2500 gpm. The charging pump cooling water requirements are minute and will not degrade the performance of the fire protection system.

e - ATTACHMENT IV PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

e TS 3.21-3 Attachment IV Page _l of I

c. Plant Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems

1. The spray and sprinkler systems securing the following areas shall be operable.

(a) cable tunnel (b) cable vault

2. a. With a sprinkler system inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s), within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

b. Restore the system to operable status within 14 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Speci-fication 6.6.4 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of in-operability and the plans for restoring the system to operable status.

F. Plano. Fi~e Hose Stations

1. The following fire hose station shall be operable at all times when equipment in the area is required to be operable:

LOCATION SIZE

a. Auxiliary building hose 1 1/2" Stations 37 through 51 and 41A

b. Fuel building hose 1 1/2 11 Stations 52 and 53

c. Hose stations 12, 16, 20, 21A, 1 1/2" 22, 23, 33, 34, 54, 55, 56, and 57 in Turbine Building to be used as backup to control room, emergency switch gear room and diesel generator room.

d. Unit 1 containment dry standpipes 11/2" (Hose Stations 75 through 87)

e. Unit 2 containment dry standpipes 1 1/2" (Hose Racks 60 through 72)

2. With a hose station inoperable, route an additional equivalent capa-city hose to the unprotected area from an operable hose statruon within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

e

TS 4.18-2 Attachment IV Pagel of l

c. Plant Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems

1. The spray and sprinkler systems shall be demonstrated operable:

a. At lea~t once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

b. By a visual inspectio~ of the spray headers to verify their integrity, and

c. By a visual inspection of each nozzle's spray area to verify the spray pattern is not obstructed.

d. At least once per 3 years by performing an air flow test through each open head spray/sprinkler header and verifying each open head spray/sprinkler nozzle is unobstructed.

ML18139A794

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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