ML110700708

February 17, 2011, Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held Between NRC and PSEG, Concerning Information on the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, License Renewal Application

ML110700708
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/05/2011
From:	Bennett Brady License Renewal Projects Branch 1
To:
brady beNNETT, 415-2981
References
Download: ML110700708 (17)

Text

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LICENSEE: PSEG Nuclear, LLC FACILITY: Salem Nuclear Generating Station. Units 1 and 2

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON FEBRUARY 17, 2011, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND PSEG NUCLEAR, LLC, CONCERNING A DRAFT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of PSEG Nuclear, LLC (the applicant), and Exelon held a telephone conference call on February 17, 2011, to discuss the applicant's draft response to the staff's request for additional information (RAI) B.2.1.33-07. The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the intent of the applicant's draft RAI response.

Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the participants. Enclosure 2 contains a brief summary of the discussion and status of the items. Enclosure 3 includes the applicant's response to the RAI, and Enclosure 4 contains a drawing of Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1's spent fuel pool (SFP) liner.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

Bennett M. Brady, Project Manager Projects Branch 1 Division of License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants

2. Summary of meeting discussion

3. Applicant's draft response to the RAI

4. SFP liner drawing cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION LIST OF PARTICIPANTS February 17, 2011 PARTICIPANTS AFFI LlATIONS Bennett Brady U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Abdul Sheikh NRC Bryce Lehman NRC Samuel Cuadrado de Jesus NRC Bo Pham NRC Rajender Auluck NRC Dan Naus Oak Ridge National Laboratory Roberto Palaban Southwest Research Todd Mintz Southwest Research John Hufnagel Exelon Mike Gallagher Exelon Albert Piha Exelon Jim Annett Exelon AI Fulvio Exelon George Seibold PSEG Nuclear, LLC Ali Fakhar PSEG Tom Roberts PSEG Jim Nestell MPR Associates Bob Keating MPR John Simons MPR Cris Bagley MPR ENCLOSURE 1

SUMMARY

OF MEETING ON A DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RESPONSE FOR SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION FEBRUARY 17, 2011 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of PSEG Nuclear, LLC (the applicant) held a telephone conference call on February 17, 2011, to discuss the applicant's draft updated response to the staff's request for additional information (RAI)

B.2.1.33-07 regarding the Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) leakage associated with the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Unit 1 and Unit 2, license renewal application.

In the RAI B.2.1.33-07 draft updated response, the applicant stated that they will monitor the telltales and seismic gap drain to identify any changes in the leak rate and/or chemistry to assess the impact of such changes on the integrity of the fuel handling building. The applicant also provided a table which contained its acceptance criteria for the Structures Monitoring Program Enhancement 5c. associated with testing the water drained from the Salem Unit 1 SFP telltales and seismic gap drain. The applicant further stated that pH, chloride, and sulfate chemistry results that exceed one of the table acceptance criteria thresholds will be entered into and evaluated in its corrective action program.

In its draft response to RAI 2.1.33-7, the applicant assumed that the reinforcing steel located in construction joints and cracks will be exposed to borated water in a de-aerated (oxygen depleted) condition. The staff is concerned that an aerated condition may exist and that the applicant may need to adjust its threshold pH to a more conservative value. The staff asked the applicant to describe and explain the mechanism by which the borated water would become depleted of oxygen and to provide the basis to support this assumption.

The applicant described the mechanism and basis used to reach its assumption as follows:

1. The applicant stated that as the SFP borated water leaks through the liner, it is in contact with the carbon steel leak channels behind the liner (see Enclosure 4). The applicant stated that the oxygen is consumed by the corrosion that results from the interaction of borated water with the large amount of carbon steel behind the SFP liner. The applicant further stated that as a result of this, if the borated water were to reach the rebar, which is beyond the carbon steel channels and embedded in the concrete structure, this borated water would be in a de-aerated condition.

2. The applicant stated that iron concentration measures have been taken at the telltales, and the concentration of iron suggests that the carbon steel channels are subject to corrosion.

The applicant further stated that the iron concentration supports its assumption that reinforcing steel located in construction joints and cracks will be exposed to borated water in a de-aerated condition.

3. The applicant stated that its assumption is also based on published studies made on corrosion of concrete rebar from borated water flow in simulated cracks and on operating experience at pressurized-water reactors that have experienced SFP through-wall leakage.

ENCLOSURE 2

-2

4. The applicant also stated that visual inspections at Salem Unit 1 have found no rust stains and concrete distress associated with rebar corrosion.

The NRC staff stated that although the oxygen depletion mechanism described by the applicant is plausible, they're not aware of the iron concentration measures done by the applicant or of the studies cited by the applicant to reach its conclusions. The staff requested that the applicant provide in its response to RAI 8.2.1.33-07, the description of the oxygen depletion mechanism and studies cited as technical basis during the meeting. The applicant agreed to provide the information requested.

In addition, the staff asked the applicant what corrective actions might be taken if the monitored parameters do not meet its acceptance criteria. The applicant stated that the following activities will be considered in its corrective action program:

1. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine if an observed change in the parameters could lead to an increase in the rebar corrosion rate

2. Schedule structural walk downs of the fuel handling building structure

3. Accelerate the acquisition of core samples prior to the period of extended operation

4. Consider the use of available non-destructive examinations technology

5. Develop other corrective actions based on the engineering evaluation The staff requested that the applicant include in its response to RAI 8.2.1.33-07 a list of the corrective actions to be considered.

DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI B.2.1.33-07 RAI 8.2.1.33-07

Background:

The Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, spent fuel pool (SFP) has experienced borated water leakage, including leakage through the concrete walls. In response to request for additional information B.2.1.33-05, dated September 1, 2010, the applicant stated: "Presently, there are no indications of active leakage from the SFP through the SFP wall".

Although the applicant has stated that there are no indications of active leakage through the accessible SFP wall, the applicant has not confirmed that there is no through-wall leakage from the three inaccessible walls of the SFP.

Request:

Provide information to confirm the claim that there is no active through-wall leakage from the SFP occurring in any of the SFP walls, including the inaccessible walls.

PSEG Response (Update):

This RAI response addresses the following three items:

1. Leakage at the construction joints at the bottom of the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) walls

2. Ground water monitoring at Salem related to leakage at the Spent Fuel Pool, and

3. The leakage path of the Spent Fuel Pool water.

1. For clarification. there is a small amount of leakage believed to be at the construction joint at the bottom of the Spent Fuel Pool east wall adjacent to the Auxiliary Building. Refer to UFSAR figure 3.6-26 (portion attached) for the plant configuration as it relates to the following discussion.

• There is a small amount of leakage at the east wall construction joint as evidenced by grab samples at the seismic gap drain. which exhibit short-lived isotopes. This wall is 6' thick. The wall at the seismic gap is not accessible below grade. It is believed that the leakage is along the construction joint at the bottom of the wall (Elevation 89-foot).

similar to what was observed at the west wall before the telltale drains were cleared in 2003. The leakage rate from the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool at the construction joint at the bottom of the east wall is estimated to be about 1/8 of a gallon per day from the SFP, as evidenced by seismic gap drain leakage and the associated sampling.

• The west wall of the Fuel Handling Building is accessible below grade, where the telltale drains allow leakage flow to the sump. This wall is 9'-7" thick. No evidence of through-ENCLOSURE 3

-2 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI B.2.1.33-07 wall leakage has been visually observed since clearing of the telltale drains in 2003 allowed for drainage of water trapped behind the Spent Fuel Pool liner.

• Leakage through the south wall is considered to be impossible due to the thickness of the wall south of the transfer pool, which is approximately 39' thick. This wall is not accessible below grade.

• Based upon samples from the monitoring wells in the yard area north and west of the Fuel Handling Building, there is no indication of through-wall leakage from the north wall.

This wall is 8'-9" thick, and is not accessible below grade. The monitoring well system and the specific monitoring wells outside of the north west corner of the Fuel Handling Building and at the west end of the Fuel Handling Building do not exhibit any increasing trend of radionuclides (tritium). In addition, the monitoring well closest to the northwest corner of the Spent Fuel Pool exhibits lower levels of tritium than the monitoring well west of the Fuel Handling Building, which would not be the case if there was through wall leakage at the north wall of the Fuel Handling Building.

As a point of clarification, MPR-2613 report, which was docketed in response to RAI B.2.1.33-1 (PSEG letter LR-N1 0-0165), stated that all wall leakage at the construction joints has stopped. The statement in MPR-2613 was based on the observations in the Sump Room that noted no evidence of leakage after the telltales were cleared in early 2003.

However, as described above, there is approximately 1/8 of a gallon per day believed to be migrating through the construction joint at the bottom of the east wall (Elevation 89-foot).

This leakage rate has an insignificant impact on the structural adequacy of the east wall.

The construction joint is the interface between two different concrete pours, not a channel for free flow of Spent Fuel Pool leakage. The construction joint is a path for migration of boric acid through the wall because mini-voids or mini-discontinuities between the two pours provide a transport path through the wall. Any degradation of the concrete will be limited to the immediate vicinity of the leakage pathway and will diminish along the pathway as the boric acid reacts with the concrete (Le., the degradation becomes limited by the availability of boric acid).

Any concrete degradation in the construction joint will be significantly less than that shown in the laboratory testing (Long-Term Test Program, which started in April 2005). The laboratory testing to quantify concrete degradation used a large volume bath in comparison to the exposed concrete surface of the specimens and refreshed the bath periodically to ensure that degradation was not limited by the availability of boric acid (Le., was not reactant-limited). These testing conditions are much more severe than the existing condition of SFP leakage at the construction joint in the east wall. This can be illustrated by comparing the concrete surface area in the construction joint in the east wall (37 feet long and 6 feet thick) and the approximate leakage rate (1/8 of a gallon per day) to the refresh frequency in the tests which related to the ratio of the bath volume to exposed concrete surface area. This comparison shows that the leakage rate through the east wall provides much less exposure to boric acid than the refreshed bath used during the testing of the concrete. As a result, the minor leakage at the construction joint on the east wall is not

-3 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI B.2.1.33-07 structurally significant. In addition, in the same evaluation which included rebar degradation from leakage migration through a wall, the conclusion remains valid for the east wall, that any potential damage to reinforcing steel would not be significant.

The structural assessment of the Fuel Handling Building concluded that migration of Spent Fuel Pool leakage through the construction joint has an insignificant impact on the structural adequacy of the Fuel Handling Building. This conclusion will be further confirmed by additional examinations and testing that PSEG Nuclear will perform in the vicinity of construction joint prior to the period of extended operation. The construction joint in the Sump Room (west wall) previously showed evidence of boric acid migration through the joint. Petrographic examination and compressive strength testing of a core sample will confirm that the concrete is in good condition. In addition, PSEG Nuclear will expose rebar in the vicinity of that construction joint to assess potential rebar corrosion.

This inspection will confirm that the outer rebar, the rebar of interest from a structural standpoint, has not experienced significant corrosion. West wall testing was explained in Salem RAI B.2.1.33-05 response per PSEG letter LR-N10-0321. The concrete examinations in the west wall of the Spent Fuel Pool at the construction joint is judged to also provide a relevant indication of the concrete conditions in the east wall of the Spent Fuel Pool.

Additionally, PSEG Nuclear will perform examinations and testing in the vicinity of the construction joint on the east wall prior to the period of extended operation. Specifically, PSEG will take a shallow core sample approximately 4 inches deep in the east wall in the vicinity of the construction joint for a petrographic examination to confirm that the concrete is in good condition. Reinforcing steel will be exposed for inspection when the core sample is taken from the east wall. This core sample will be taken by the end of 2015. The construction of the east and west walls are very similar, and these core samples in the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool walls (east and west) will provide information focused at ensuring that inaccessible concrete degradation will be addressed before loss of an intended function.

In addition to the core samples described above, Salem will monitor the telltales and seismic gap drain to identify any changes in leak rate andlor chemistry and to assess the impact of such changes on the Fuel Handling Building. The following table is provided to tabulate the acceptance criteria from the Structures Monitoring Program Enhancement 5 c. associated with testing the water drained from the Salem Unit 1 SFP telltales and seismic gap drain.

Investigation Thresholds Aggressive i Chemical Frequency for Environment Analysis SFP Telltales Seismic Gap Drain monitoring limits per the (West Wall) (East Wall) GALL Report

Outside +/-1.5 Samples taken LPH < 6.0 <5.5 units of monthly

-4 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI B... 21 33-07 12-month average I  !

or < 5.5 i I

i Samples taken Chloride > 500 ppm > 500 ppm >500 ppm every 6 months Samples taken >1500 ppm Sulfate > 1,500 ppm > 1,500 ppm every 6 months For Information For Information Samples taken Soron Not Reported Only Only monthly I

Chemistry results that exceed one of the thresholds above will be entered into the corrective action program. An evaluation of the chemistry results will be done by engineering every 12 months.

Chemistry results outside the acceptance criteria do not necessarily indicate an adverse condition. If a threshold is crossed, an investigation will be initiated to better characterize the situation and determine appropriate follow-up actions (if any).

The thresholds and their basis are described below.

Threshold for pH The investigation threshold value for pH of the water from the leak chase telltales is based upon the definition for aggressive groundwater/soil from the GALL Report, Chapter XI.S6, Structures Monitoring, page XI S6-3. The expected pH of the water from the leak chase telltales is driven by the leakage of the SFP water through the SFP liner. As explained in Salem RAI S.2.1.33-01 response per PSEG letter LR-N10-0165, the leakage in the SFP liner is through multiple small cracks in liner seam welds and/or plug welds. This leakage enters the channels behind the liner either directly from cracks in seam welds or indirectly by migrating over concrete from cracks in plug welds, which are not backed by leak chase channels.

The leakage in the channels travels through the tell tale drains in the west wall and flows to the SFP sump room. In general, the SFP water has a pH of 4.6. The pH of the telltale drains is affected by the proportion of the leakage from the seam welds (which will not contact concrete) relative to leakage from the plug welds (which will contact and react with concrete, increasing the pH). The pH of water collected from the telltales during the removal of the telltale blockage in 2003 was 7.1, which is consistent with expected values for SFP water in contact with concrete.

The thresholds for pH of telltale discharge include the following:

• The pH differs by more than 1.5 pH units from the average of the sample results from the baseline value of the previous 12 months, which would suggest a potential change in the leakage phenomena.

- 5 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI B.2.1.33-07

• The pH has decreased below 5.5. This value is based upon the definition in GALL Report, Revision 2, Table IXD, page IX*15, which states that a pH less than 5.5 may affect steel embedded in concrete.

The investigation threshold value for pH of the water from the seismic gap drain is set to below 6.0. This value is higher (i.e., less acidic) than the aggressive environment pH criterion of GALL Report (i.e., 5.5) is due to the different sources of water leakage into the seismic gap. The SFP water leakage pH is subjected to the neutralization reaction with concrete during transport through construction joints to the seismic gap, which will increase the pH. This SFP water combined with other sources of water intrusion into the seismic gap such as precipitation, surface water, and groundwater which will have a more neutral pH. As explained in Salem RAI B.2.1.33-03 response per PSEG letter LR-N10-0165, the pH of the groundwater near the Fuel Handling Building south wall had an average value of 6.2 over the last 3 years. The adjustment to the GALL criterion is intended to focus the threshold on rebar in the Fuel Handling Building that is potentially exposed to boric acid migration through the construction joint to the seismic gap.

However, published studies and operating experiences at other PWRs indicate that degradation of reinforcing steel from SFP leakage is negligible.

Thresholds for Chloride and Sulfate Concentrations The investigation thresholds for chloride and sulfate concentrations for the water from the leak chase telltales and seismic gap are based upon the definition in the GALL Report, Revision 2, Chapter XI.S6, Structures Monitoring, page XI S6-3.

Chloride and sulfate concentrations are expected to be low, because the concentrations of these ions in the SFP are extremely low. However, if ground water intrusion is occurring, the chloride and sulfate concentration could be higher. Ground water inside the cofferdam typically has a chloride/sulfate concentration of less than 125/94 ppm respectively, although one recent data point of 4,200/1048 ppm was observed as referenced in Salem RAI B.2.1.33-03 response per PSEG letter LR-N10-0165. Therefore, concentrations in the discharge exceeding the GALL recommended threshold might potentially represent a Significant change, which requires evaluation. Any deviations will be entered in the corrective action program for disposition.

Threshold for Boron Concentration The investigation of the boron concentration from the telltales and seismic gap drain is primarily of interest as a rough indicator of how much dilution may have occurred. Boron levels in the ground water, and surface water are very low so a reduction in boron levels relative to the SFP may suggest that other sources of water are contributing to the volume being discharged. As such, the boron concentration in the telltale discharge will be obtained for information only, and no investigation threshold will be assigned. The boron concentration is for trending and to assist in interpretation of other chemistry results.

- 6 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI 8.2.1.33-07 Monthly testing for pH and boron is appropriate in both the telltales and seismic gap, as these parameters relate to SFP leakage, which is the focus for the potential degradation of the Fuel Handling Building. Less frequent monitoring (six months) is appropriate for chlorides and sulfates as these species relate to general consideration of the impact of surface water and groundwater on concrete structures, which is not specific to the SFP leakage.

The above acceptance criteria information will be added to the Structures Monitoring Program Bases Document and implementing procedure. These frequencies and threshold values will also be added to the station chemistry sampling procedures.

These procedure updates will ensure that Fuel Handling Building deterioration will be addressed before loss of intended function.

Enhancement 5 associated with the Structures Monitoring Program is revised as part of the response to this RAI, as shown below. This revision updates LRA Appendix A, Section A.2.1.33 (the UFSAR Supplement) and Appendix B, Section B.2.1.33 (the Structures Monitoring Program description) as follows. Note that Enhancement 5 is found in the original LRA within Appendix A on pages A-26 and A-27, and within Appendix B on page B 153.

This Structures Monitoring Program enhancement is changed to read as follows:

Text from the LRA and from the original RAI B.2.1.33-07 response is shown in normal font. Information added as part of this update is highlighted with bolded italics.

5. Require the following actions related to the spent fuel pool liner:

a. Perform periodic structural examination of the Fuel Handling Building per ACI 349.3R to ensure structural condition is in agreement with the analysis.

b. Monitor telltale leakage and inspect the leak chase system to ensure no blockage.

c. Test water drained from the telltales and seismic gap for boron, chloride, and sulfate concentrations; and pH. Acceptance criteria will assess any degradation from the borated water. Sample readings outside the acceptance criteria will be entered into and evaluated in the corrective action program.

d. Perform one shallow core sample in each of the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool walls (east and west) that have shown ingress of borated water through the concrete. The core samples will be examined for degradation from borated water. Also the core samples (east and west walls) will expose reinforcing steel, which will be examined for signs of corrosion. The core sample from the west wall will be taken by the

-7 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI B.2.1.33-07 end of 2013 and the core sample from the east wall will be taken by the end of 2015.

e. Perform a structural examination per ACI 349.3R every 18 months of the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool wall in the sump room where previous inspections have shown ingress of borated water through the concrete.

The License Renewal Commitment List, LRA Appendix A, Section A.5 is also updated to reflect this revision to Enhancement 5. See Enclosure B of this letter for the Commitment List updates.

2. The response to the subsection, "Ground water monitoring at Salem related to leakage at the Spent Fuel Pool," was not affected by this updated response and is not repeated here.

3. The response to the subsection, "The leakage path of the Spent Fuel Pool water," was not affected by this updated response and is not repeated here.

-8 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAt B.2.1.33-07 A.S License Renewal Commitment List The following table identifies revisions made to license renewal commitment 33 as a result of this RAI Update. Text from the LRA and from the original RAI 8.2.1.33-07 response is shown in normal font. Information added as part of this update is highlighted with bolded italics. Pre-existing text has been repeated here to provide context for the changes. Any other actions described in this submittal represent intended or planned actions. The intended or planned actions are described for the information of the NRC and are not regulatory commitments.

UFSAR ENHANCEMENT OR SUPPLEMENT NO. PROGRAM OR IMPLEMENTAllON COMMITMENT LOCATION SOURCE TOPIC SCHEDULE (LRA APP. A) 33 Structures Structures Monitoring is an existing program A.2.1.33 Program to be Section Monitoring that will be enhanced to include: enhanced prior to the B.2.1.33 Program period of extended

5. Require the following actions related operation.

to the spent fuel pool liner: Salem letter

a. Perform periodic structural Core sample LR-N10-0165 examination of the Fuel Inspection schedule RAI B.2.1.33 Handling Building per ACI identified in 1 349.3R to ensure structural commitment.

condition is in agreement with Salem letter the analysis. LR-N10-0321

b. Monitor telltale leakage and RAI B.2.1.33 inspect the leak chase system 05 to ensure no blockage.

c. Test water drained from the Salem letter telltales and seismic gap for LR-N10-0414 boron, chloride, and sulfate RAI 8.2.1.33 concentrations; and pH. 07

- 9 DRAFT RESPONSE TO RAI 8.2.1.33-07 Acceptance criteria will assess any degradation from the Salem letter borated water. Sample LR-N11 readings outside the 0041 acceptance criteria will be RAI entered into and evaluated in B.2.1.33-07 the corrective action program. update

d. Perform one shallow core sample in each of the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool walls (east and west) that have shown ingress of borated water through the concrete. The core samples will be examined for degradation from borated water. Also the core samples (east and west walls) will expose reinforcing steel.

which will be examined for signs of corrosion. The core sample from the west wall will be taken by the end of 2013 and the core sample from the east wall will be taken by the end of 2015.

e. Perform a structural examination per ACI 349.3R every 18 months of the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool wall in the sump room where previous inspections have shown ingress of borated water

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@ 12" c-c on floor, 1,h" x along concrete and liner gap, to channel 5.1875 @18" c-c uno ENCLOSURE 4

April 5, 2011 LICENSEE: PSEG Nuclear, LLC FACILITY: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON FEBRUARY 17, 2011, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND PSEG NUCLEAR, LLC, CONCERNING A DRAFT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of PSEG Nuclear, LLC (the applicant), and Exelon held a telephone conference call on February 17, 2011, to discuss the applicant's draft response to the staff's request for additional information (RAI) B.2.1.33-07. The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the intent of the applicant's draft RAI response. provides a listing of the participants. Enclosure 2 contains a brief summary of the discussion and status of the items. Enclosure 3 includes the applicant's response to the RAI, and Enclosure 4 contains a drawing of Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1's spent fuel pool (SFP) liner.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

IRA!

Bennett M. Brady, Project Manager Projects Branch 1 Division of License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants

2. Summary of meeting discussion

3. Applicant's draft response to the RAI

4. SFP liner drawing cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION: See next page ADAMS Accession No'.. ML110700708 OFFICE LA:DLR PM:RPB1:DLR BC:RPB1 :DLR PM:RPB1 :DLR NAME IKing I BBrady BPham BBrady DATE 3/16/11 3/28/11 3/30/11 4/5111 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy

Memorandum To PSEG Nuclear. LLC. From B. Brady Dated AprilS, 2011

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON FEBRUARY 17, 2011, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND PSEG NUCLEAR, LLC, CONCERNING A DRAFT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION DISTRIBUTION:

HARDCOPY:

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