ML21021A259

NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI - Salem 1 - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report

ML21021A259
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/21/2021
From:	James Kim NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL1
To:	Duke P Public Service Enterprise Group
References
L-2020-LRO-0057
Download: ML21021A259 (4)

Text

From: Kim, James Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2021 7:36 AM To: Duke, Paul R.

Cc: Marabella, Lee A.

Subject:

Salem 1 - Final RAI RE: Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (L-2020-LRO-0057)

Attachments: Final RAI - Salem 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report.docx Mr. Duke, By letter dated September 17, 2020 (Agencywide Document Access and Management System Accession No. ML20261H589) PSEG Nuclear, LLC. (the licensee) submitted information summarizing the results of the spring 2020 steam generator (SG) inspections at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1.

The NRC staff has determined that the additional information is required for the staff to complete its review. On January 12, 2021, the NRC staff sent PSEG the draft Request for Additional Information (RAI). This RAI relates to inspections performed during a refueling outage in March 2020 according to 10 CFR 50.36 that include a SG Program with specific criteria for the structural and leakage integrity, repair, and inspection of SG tubes.

On January 19, 2021, the licensee indicated that no clarification call was required and the licensee agreed to respond to this request by February 26, 2021. A publicly available version of this final RAI (attached) will be placed in the NRCs ADAMS.

James Kim Project Manager - Hope Creek and Salem NRR/DORL/LPL1 301-415-4125

Hearing Identifier: NRR_DRMA Email Number: 977 Mail Envelope Properties (DM6PR09MB50484B3233ED168657B9CE39E4A19)

Subject:

Salem 1 - Final RAI RE: Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (L-2020-LRO-0057)

Sent Date: 1/21/2021 7:36:14 AM Received Date: 1/21/2021 7:36:00 AM From: Kim, James Created By: James.Kim@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Marabella, Lee A." <Lee.Marabella@pseg.com>

Tracking Status: None "Duke, Paul R." <Paul.Duke@pseg.com>

Tracking Status: None Post Office: DM6PR09MB5048.namprd09.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1094 1/21/2021 7:36:00 AM Final RAI - Salem 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report.docx 34138 Options Priority: Normal Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NO. 1 REGARDING STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION REPORT EPID L-2020-LRO-0057 By letter dated September 17, 2020 (Agencywide Document Access and Management System Accession No. ML20261H589) PSEG Nuclear, LLC. (the licensee) submitted information summarizing the results of the spring 2020 steam generator (SG) inspections at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1.

In Appendix A of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), General Design Criteria (GDC) 14, 15, 30, 31, and 32, define requirements for the structural and leakage integrity of the RCPB. As part of the RCPB, the SG tubes must also meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a with respect to inspection and repair requirements of the ASME Code. All pressurized water reactors have Technical Specifications (TS) according to 10 CFR 50.36 that include a SG Program with specific criteria for the structural and leakage integrity, repair, and inspection of SG tubes. These inspections were performed during a refueling outage in March 2020. Technical Specification (TS) 6.9.1.10 requires that a report be submitted within 180 days after the initial entry into hot shutdown following SG inspections performed in accordance with TS 6.8.4.i, which requires that an SG Program be established and implemented to ensure SG tube integrity is maintained.

To complete its evaluation of the information provided by the licensee, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff requests the following information:

1. The May 7, 2018 SG Tube Inspection Report (ML18127A119) referred to the refueling outage in the fall of 2017 as the twenty-fifth refueling outage (1R25). The current report from September 2020 also refers to the March 2020 refueling outage as the twenty-fifth refueling outage (1R25). Please clarify.

2. Page 2 of the subject report appears to indicate that there are over expansion (OEX) indications within the hydraulically expanded tubesheet that have localized variations in tube diameter that are greater than 0.25 inches. Please confirm this understanding or clarify the correct value. If true, please discuss the largest OEX indication in the Salem U1 SGs and the total number of OEX indications greater than 0.25 inches.

3. Paragraph g on page 4 of the subject report refers to the tube in row 57 column 54 three times, in the discussion of in situ pressure testing that was performed on three tubes because of foreign object wear. The tubes affected by foreign object wear are documented in the table in Attachment 9. Please confirm that the three tubes in situ pressure tested were the three tubes with 100 percent through wall indications shown in the table in Attachment 9.

4. Please discuss the scope and results of any secondary side inspections, including foreign object search and retrieval, upper bundle inspections, steam drum, and moisture separator inspections. Also, please discuss the scope and results of any visual exams of plugs and the primary channel head that were performed.

5. In May 2017, the licensee identified a transitory (lasting for approximately two weeks) primary-to-secondary leak in SG 13. In the subsequent refueling outage, October 2017, the source of the leak was determined to be located on the cold-leg side of the SG, in the tube in row 2 column 91. The eddy current signal in this tube was characterized as an indication of loose part wear. In February 2020, the licensee identified a primary-to-secondary leak in SG 14, which resulted in a forced shutdown of Salem Unit 1. The resulting inspections revealed four tubes with significant through-wall wear from a foreign object, of which three tubes were 100 percent through-wall. Please discuss any analyses you have performed to assess the possible source of loose part intrusions and any actions you have taken with regards to strengthening your foreign material exclusion program.

6. In the Fall 2017 refueling outage, the licensee was evaluating tapered welded plugs manufactured by Areva that possibly had fatigue life issues. During the outage, it was determined that the evaluation that call the fatigue life into question was determined to be overly conservative, and that the plugs were good for at least two additional operating cycles, or until 2020. An additional analysis was to be performed that would determine if the plugs were acceptable for the full 40-year design life. Please discuss the final disposition of the analyses performed on the plugs in question.