ML070740767
| ML070740767 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/2007 |
| From: | Laura Smith Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Venable J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-07-006 | |
| Download: ML070740767 (31) | |
See also: IR 05000458/2007006
Text
March 15, 2007
Joseph E. Venable
Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION
REPORT 05000458/2007006
Dear Mr. Venable:
On January 29 through February 15, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the
inspection results which were discussed on February 15, 2007, with you and other members of
your staff.
During this triennial fire protection inspection, the inspection team examined activities
conducted under your license related to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and
regulations and the conditions of your license related to fire protection and post-fire safe
shutdown. The inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and records,
observations of activities and installed plant systems, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Linda Joy Smith, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000458/2007006
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/enclosure:
Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
General Manager
Plant Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Director, Nuclear Safety & Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
1340 Echelon Parkway
Jackson, MS 39213-8298
Manager, Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.
Attorney General
Department of Justice
State of Louisiana
P.O. Box 94095
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
H. Anne Plettinger
3456 Villa Rose Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-
Bert Babers, President
West Feliciana Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 1921
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Richard Penrod, Senior Environmental
Scientist, State Liaison Officer
Office of Environmental Services
Northwestern State University
Russell Hall, Room 201
Natchitoches, LA 71497
Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78701-3326
Jim Calloway
Public Utility Commission of Texas
1701 N. Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78711-3326
Chairperson
Denton Field Office
Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness
and Protection Division
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Preparedness Directorate
Dept. of Homeland Security
800 North Loop 288
Federal Regional Center
Denton, TX 76201-3698
Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (PJA)
Branch Chief, DRP/C (MCH2)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (FLB2)
RITS Coordinator (MSH3)
D. Cullison, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DGC)
ROPreports
RBS Site Secretary (LGD)
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
R. E. Kahler, NSIR (REK)
SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes_ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: __LJS___
/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive
R:\REACTORS\RB\2007\RB2007-006RP-JMM.wpd
SRI/EB2 RI/EB2 EB2 C:EB2 C:PBC C:EB2
JMMateychick(lar) HAbuseini RMullikin LJSmith MCHay LJSmith
/RA/ /RA/ JMMateychick for /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
3/9/07 3/12/07 3/9/07 3/14/07 3/9/07 3/14/07
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Report No.: 05000458/2007006
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: River Bend Station
Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61
St. Francisville, Louisiana
Dates: January 29 through February 15, 2007
Team Leader: J. M. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2
Inspectors: H. Abuseini, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2
R. Mullikin, Consultant
K. Sullivian, Consultant - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Approved By: Linda Joy Smith, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2007006; 1/29/07 - 2/15/07; Entergy Operations, Inc.; River Bend Station; Fire
Protection (Triennial)
The NRC conducted an inspection with a team of two regional inspectors and two contractors.
The inspection identified no findings of significance. The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using MC 0609 "Significance Determination
Process" (SDP). Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may
be Green or may be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC
describes its program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors
in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process", Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
-2- Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1 REACTOR SAFETY
1R05 Fire Protection
The purpose of this inspection was to review the River Bend Stations fire protection
program for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on verification of
the post-fire safe shutdown capability. The inspection was performed in accordance
with the NRC regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting
the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The team used the Individual Plant
Examination of External Events for the River Bend Station (RBS) to choose
risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. Inspection
Procedure 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," requires selecting three to five fire
areas for review. The three fire areas reviewed during this inspection were:
- Fire Area AB-1 (West side crescent area)
- Fire Area C-15 (Division I standby switchgear room)
- Fire Area ET-1 (B-tunnel east)
For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on fire protection features, systems
and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, and
licensing basis commitments.
Documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.
.1 Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensee's methodology for achieving and maintaining post-fire
safe shutdown to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was
available in the event of a fire. The principal sources of this information were the Final
Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System; Appendix 9A, "Fire
Hazards Analysis"; Appendix 9B, Fire Protection Program Comparison With
Appendix R to 10CFR50" and Criterion Number 240.201A, "Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
Analysis". The objectives of this evaluation were to:
(a) Verify that the licensee's shutdown methodology has correctly identified the
components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown
condition.
(b) Confirm the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor
coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system
functions.
(c) Verify that a safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained without off-site
power.
-3- Enclosure
The team focused on the following functions that must be available to achieve and
maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions:
- Reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity
conditions,
- Reactor coolant makeup capable of maintaining the reactor coolant inventory,
- Reactor heat removal capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal,
and
- Supporting systems capable of providing all other services necessary to permit
extended operation of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown conditions.
To assure the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary
to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for equipment in the fire areas
selected for review, piping and instrumentation diagrams were reviewed and compared
to the list of safe shutdown equipment documented in the licensee's post-fire safe
shutdown analysis and referenced supporting calculations. In addition, plant drawings,
operating procedures, operator lesson plans, and other relevant documents were
reviewed to verify the flow paths and operational characteristics of systems relied on to
accomplish required safe shutdown functions.
For each of the above functions, the team verified that the licensees methodology had
properly identified the primary and support systems needed to assure their success. The
team verified that specific safe shutdown functions can be achieved and maintained with
or without off-site power.
The licensees safe shutdown analysis is based on assuring that a minimum set of
systems and equipment, that are capable of performing each shutdown function would
be available in the event of fire. The primary systems relied on to achieve and maintain
hot-shutdown conditions included the reactor protection system, high pressure core
spray, low pressure core spray, reactor core isolation cooling, main steam safety/relief
valve, and the residual heat removal systems. These systems are considered the
primary systems to the extent they directly satisfy the post-fire safe shutdown
performance goals of reactor shutdown, over-pressure protection, maintenance of
coolant inventory, and decay heat removal. Systems necessary to support the operation
of the primary systems, such as ac and dc power, service water cooling (normal and
standby) and instrumentation to monitor for proper operation of required systems were
also identified by the licensee.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-4- Enclosure
.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipment
list, safe shutdown design basis documents, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to
verify whether the shutdown methodology had properly identified the components and
systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for equipment in
the fire areas selected for review. The team also reviewed and observed walkdowns of
the procedures for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of a fire to
verify that the safe shutdown analysis provisions were properly implemented. The team
focused on the following functions that must be ensured to achieve and maintain
post-fire safe shutdown conditions: (1) reactivity control capable of achieving and
maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions, (2) reactor coolant system isolation for
the preservation of inventory, (3) reactor heat removal capable of achieving and
maintaining decay heat removal, (4) supporting systems capable of providing all other
services necessary to permit extended operation of equipment necessary to achieving
and maintaining cold shutdown conditions, and (5) process monitoring capable of
providing direct readings to perform and control the above functions.
The team reviewed the separation of safe shutdown cables, equipment, and
components within the same fire areas, and reviewed the methodology for meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Specifically, this was to determine whether
at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was free of fire damage in the event
of a fire in the selected areas.
The overall approach of the licensees evaluation for fire area compliance with
Section III.G of Appendix R was to determine the fire-induced losses for a fire in each
fire area and then assess the plant impact given those losses. The results of the
analysis are documented in Appendix B, Safe Shutdown Separation Analysis by Fire
Area (Fire Area Compliance Assessment) of Criterion 240.201A.
For each of the selected fire areas, the team reviewed licensee documentation to verify
that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path would remain free of fire damage.
With the exception of the main control room, Division II equipment is relied on in the
event of fire in each of the selected fire areas. On a sample basis, an evaluation was
performed to verify that systems and equipment identified by the licensee as being
required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would remain free of fire
damage in the event of fire in the selected fire areas. Specifically, the team examined
the adequacy of electrical independence, physical separation and fire protection
features provided for cables and equipment needed to assure the operation of systems
that would be relied on to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of
fire. The inspection focused on systems and equipment necessary to achieve and
maintain hot shutdown conditions. The evaluation included a review of cable routing
data depicting the physical location (by fire area) of power and control cables associated
with a selected sample of components.
-5- Enclosure
For each component identified on the Safe Shutdown Equipment List ( Appendix C of
Criterion 240.201A), a Safe Shutdown Cable Analysis Worksheet was developed by the
licensee. For each component, all cables associated with its operation were identified
and their unique identifying cable numbers were entered into the worksheet. From this
list of cables, all cables that could adversely affect the required post-fire position and/or
function of the component were identified and designated as Appendix R cables on the
worksheet. Completed worksheets were then entered into Appendix E, Circuit Analysis
for RBS 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment List Components, of the
RBS Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis (Criterion 240.201A). The specific components
selected for review are delineated in the Attachment.
On a sample basis, the team also reviewed the adequacy of electrical protective devices
(e.g., circuit breakers, fuses, relays), coordination, and the adequacy of electrical
protection provided for nonessential cables, which share a common enclosure (e.g.,
cable trays) with cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown
conditions. The evaluation included a review of cable routing data depicting the location
of power and control cables associated with selected components of the shutdown
systems. Additionally, the team reviewed the protection of diagnostic instrumentation
required for safe shutdown for fires in the selected areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers,
penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical
cables. The team observed the material condition and configuration of the installed
barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The team compared the as-installed configurations
to the approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the team
reviewed licensee documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and
deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association codes to
verify that fire protection features met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and
detection systems. The team observed the material condition and configuration of the
installed fire detection and suppression systems. The team reviewed design documents
-6- Enclosure
and supporting calculations. In addition, the team reviewed licensee basis
documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC
regulations and the National Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire
suppression and detection systems met license commitments.
The team also observed an announced site fire brigade drill and the subsequent drill
critique using the guidance in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ. Team members
observed the fire brigade simulate fire fighting activities in plant Fire Area C-1 (Cable
Chase I) in response to an electrical fire in a vertical cable tray. The inspectors verified
that the licensee staff identified deficiencies, openly discussed them in a self-critical
manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes
evaluated were: (1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing
apparatus; (2) proper use and layout of fire hoses; (3) employment of appropriate fire
fighting techniques; (4) sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; (5)
effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control; (6) search
for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; (7) smoke removal
operations; (8) utilization of pre-planned strategies; (9) adherence to the pre-planned
drill scenario; and (10) drill objectives.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the sample areas, the team verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot
shutdown were not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the
rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of
flooding.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensee's alternative shutdown methodology to determine if the
licensee properly identified the components, systems, and instrumentation necessary to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions from the auxiliary shutdown panel and
alternative shutdown locations. The team focused on the adequacy of the systems
selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process
monitoring, and support system functions. The team verified that hot and cold shutdown
from outside the control room could be achieved and maintained with offsite power
available or not available.
-7- Enclosure
The team ensured that required shutdown functions were adequately isolated from the
main control room and capable of being controlled from the remote shutdown panel. As
part of this review, the capability to transfer control from the main control room to the
remote shutdown panel was reviewed to ensure that, once actuated, the isolation
transfer scheme provided an adequate level of electrical isolation so that required
shutdown functions would not be adversely affected as a result of fire damage in the
main control room. The licensee has provided an alternate shutdown capability that is
physically and electrically independent of the main control room with sufficient controls
and indications to enable a safe shutdown of the plant from outside the main control
room.
The team reviewed the operational implementation of the licensee's alternative shutdown
methodology. Team members observed a walk-through of the control room evacuation
procedures with licensee personnel. The team observed operators simulate performing
the steps of Procedure AOP-0031, Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room,
Revision 20B, which provided instructions for performing an alternative shutdown from
the remote shutdown panel and for manipulating equipment in the plant. The team
verified that the minimum number of available operators, exclusive of those required for
the fire brigade, could reasonably be expected to perform the procedural actions within
the applicable plant shutdown time requirements and that equipment labeling was
consistent with the procedure. Also, the team verified that procedures, tools, dosimetry,
keys, lighting, and communications equipment were available and adequate to support
successfully performing the procedure as intended. The team also reviewed records for
operator training conducted on this procedure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the
licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe
shutdown. On a sample basis, the team verified that cables of equipment required to
achieve and maintain hot-shutdown conditions in the event of fire in selected fire zones
had been properly identified. In addition, the team verified that these cables had either
been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage, mitigated
with approved manual operator actions, or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g.,
hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. In
order to accomplish this, the team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data
for power and control cables associated with each of the selected components.
-8- Enclosure
Since the licensee utilizes thermoset cables, the team reviewed the following cable
failure modes for selected required and associated circuits:
- Spurious actuations due to any combination of conductors within a single
multiconductor cable;
- A maximum of two cables considered where multiple individual cables may be
damaged by the same fire;
- For cases involving direct current control circuits, the potential spurious operation
due to failures of the control cables (even if the spurious operation requires two
concurrent shorts of the proper polarity, e.g., plus-to-plus and minus-to-minus);
and
- For cases involving decay heat removal system isolation valves at
high-pressure/low-pressure interfaces, the vulnerability of three-phase power
cables due to three-phase proper polarity hot shorts.
In addition, on a sample basis, the adequacy of circuit protective coordination for the safe
shutdown 4KV and 480V systems and the 120VAC instrumentation bus was evaluated.
Also, on a sample basis, a cable tray that contain both safe shutdown and non-safe
shutdown cables was evaluated for proper circuit protection to ensure that cables are
protected by a proper protective device in order to preclude common enclosure concerns.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant
personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade
duties. The team verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones,
and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The team reviewed
the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the
telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-9- Enclosure
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required to support plant personnel in
the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions to verify it was adequate to
support the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown conditions, and for illuminating access and egress routes to the areas where
manual actions are required. The locations and positioning of emergency lights were
observed during a walk-through of Procedure AOP-0031, Revision 20B, Shutdown From
Outside the Main Control Room, and during review of manual actions implemented for
the fire areas other than the control room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed licensee procedures to determine whether repairs were required to
achieve cold shutdown. The only repair was for the use of electrical jumpers for
temporary power and operation of the residual hear removal shutdown cooling inboard
isolation valve in the event of a main control room fire with the loss of Division II 480V
electrical power. The team verified that the procedures, equipment, and materials to
accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdowns are available and
accessible.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees program with respect to compensatory measures in
place for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection, and post-fire safe
shutdown equipment, systems or features.
The team reviewed the Technical Requirements Manual sections applicable to active and
passive fire protection equipment and Procedures RBNP-038, "Site Fire Protection
Program," FPP-0070, "Duties of Fire Watch"; and FPP-0100, "Fire Protection System
Impairment"; the current fire impairment log and a sample of fire impairments to
determine whether the procedures adequately controlled compensatory measures for fire
protection systems, equipment and features (e.g., detection and suppression systems
and equipment, and passive fire barriers).
-10- Enclosure
The team reviewed Procedure AOP-0096, "Risk Management Program Implementation
and On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment," to determine whether the procedure
adequately controlled compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or
inoperable equipment that could affect post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems or
features.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of condition reports and problem evaluation requests to
verify that the licensee was identifying fire protection-related issues at an appropriate
threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. A listing of
condition reports and problem evaluation requests reviewed is provided in the attachment
to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000458/2004007-01, "Potential Impact of Automatic
Actuations on Safe Shutdown Analysis Conclusions"
During the 2004 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, the inspection team identified that
the Safe Shutdown Analysis credited only manual operation of systems on the Safe
Shutdown Equipment List, but procedures used to implement safe shutdown during a fire
did not implement steps to block automatic operations that might have undesired
impacts. The unresolved item was opened pending further review to determine whether
automatic actuations that result from expected plant conditions during fire scenarios
could have a significant negative impact on achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown
condition.
During this inspection, the team reviewed the licensee's efforts to resolve the issue. The
licensee had entered the issue into it's corrective actions program as
CR-RBS-2004-00455 and had performed Engineering Request ER-RB-2004-0140-000,
"Evaluate the Impact on the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis if Automatic Functions are
NOT Lost Due to A Fire" to document the results of evaluations performed by licensee
personnel and contractors. The team determined that the engineering request did not
provide sufficient technical details to justify a conclusion on this issue. The engineering
request provided a detailed comparison of the licensee's circuit analysis to the guidance
-11- Enclosure
in Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-03, "Risk-Informed Approach For Post-Fire
Safe-Shutdown Circuit Inspections," Revision 1. The engineering request did not
specifically address the unresolved item. The licensee has initiated Corrective Action
Number 10 in CR-RBS-2004-00455 to perform the fire induced automatic actuation
evaluation.
The team further reviewed the fire safe shutdown analysis, circuit selection, and circuit
routing during this inspection. The team concluded that instrumentation and control
circuits which only impact one division of equipment were addressed in the current
analysis of required safe shutdown equipment. Review of control systems which could
result in automatic actuations of both divisions of equipment noted that inputs from
instruments in both divisions must exceed their trip setpoints to initiate automatic
actuations. Fire damage to the instruments and/or cables could result in spurious input
signals. Generally, these inputs are based on reactor pressure vessel level, reactor
pressure vessel pressure, and drywell pressure. Due to the physical separation of the
divisions in the plant, the control room was identified as the only fire area where a single
fire could damage the inputs from both divisions.
For fires requiring evacuation of the control room, control of equipment required for safe
shutdown is transferred to the remote shutdown panel (RSP) within ten minutes of the
reactor trip. Should spurious actuations occur, the transfer isolates the control room
circuits including automatic actuation signals and provides manual control of the
equipment from the RSP. The team did not identify any scenarios where control of
spuriously actuated equipment could not be reestablished from the RSP. No deficiencies
in the ability to meet the requirements for post-fire safe shutdown were identified. This
unresolved item is closed.
.2 (Discussed) Licensee Event Report 05000458/2006001-00: Unanalyzed Condition
Regarding RCIC Availability in Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Scenario
On January 2, 2006, an engineering assessment of circuits required for post-fire safe
shutdown identified a deficiency with the analysis for the case of a fire in the control
room. For a fire requiring evacuation of the control room, safe shutdown would be
accomplished from the remote shutdown panel. The reactor core isolation
cooling (RCIC) system would be used to establish hot-shutdown conditions.
Motor-Operated Valve E51-MOVF063, the RCIC inboard steam supply valve, is normally
open and must remain open for the RCIC system to operate.
Control of this valve is isolated from the control room and transferred to the remote
shutdown panel. If off-site power is lost and the diesel generators do not automatically
start, the safe shutdown analysis assumed the RCIC system would operate to maintain
reactor water level. The safe shutdown analysis provides for the manual starting of the
Division 1 and 3 diesel generators. The licensee identified that Valve E51-MOVF063 is
powered from Division 2 which is not assured to be available during a control room fire.
Should the valve spuriously close due to fire induced circuit damage prior to isolation
from the control room and Division 2 power is lost, RCIC system operation would not be
possible. The valve is located in the drywell so local manual action to reopen the valve is
not possible.
-12- Enclosure
The licensee has established interim compensatory measures and is planning a plant
modification to allow Division I power to be available for operation of
Valve E51-MOVF063 from the remote shutdown panel. The inspectors noted the NRCs
expectation that the corrective actions be completed at the first opportunity allowed by
plant conditions which would be the next refueling outage. The licensee event report will
remain open until the final corrective actions are completed.
4OA6 Management Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On February 15, 2007. the team leader presented the inspection results to
Mr. J. Venable and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the
inspection
During this meeting, the team leader confirmed to the licensee's management that no
materials considered to be proprietary had been examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
-13- Enclosure
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
L. Ballard, Manager, Quality Assurance
R. Barnes, Supervisor, Engineering
R. Beauchamp, Shift Manager, Operations
R. Biggs, Coordinator, Safety & Regulatory Affairs
E. Borazanci, Senior Engineer, Electrical Engineering
B. Ellis, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection
C. Forpahl, Manager, Corrective Action & Assessment
H. Goodman, Director, Engineering
K. Higginbotham, Assistant Operations Manager
K. Huffstatler, Technical Specialist IV, Licensing
A. Johnson, Fire Brigade Training
H. Johnson, Manager, Programs & Component Engineering
R. Kerar, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection
R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
R. Mashburn, Manager, Programs & Components
O. Miller, Manager, Training & Development
P. Russell, Manager, System Engineering
J. Venable, Vise President, Operations
D. Vinci, General Manager, Plant Operations
NRC
P. Alter ,Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch C
M. Miller, Resident Inspector , Project Branch C
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
None
Opened and Closed
None
Closed
05000458/2004007-01 URI Potential Impact of Automatic Actuations on Safe
Shutdown Analysis Conclusions (Section 4OA5.1)
Discussed
05000458/2006001-00 LER Unanalyzed condition Regarding RCIC Availability in
Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Scenario (Section 4OA5.2)
A-1 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following documents were selected and reviewed by the team to accomplish the objectives
and scope of the inspection.
COMPONENT SELECTION FOR CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
Component number Description
1E12*FTN052B RHR B Discharge Flow Transmitter
1B21*PTN068A Reactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter
1B21*PTN068B Reactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter
1B21*PTN068E Reactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter
1B21*PTN068F Reactor Vessel Pressure Transmitter
1E12*MOVF004B RHR Pump B Suppression Pool Suction Valve
1E12*MOVF006B RHR B Shutdown Cooling Suction
1E12*MOVF006A RHR A Shutdown Cooling Suction
1E12*MOVF011B RHR B Discharge to Suppression Pool
1E12*MOVF024B RHR B Test Return/HX Discharge to Suppression Pool
1E12*MOVF042B RHR B Injection Valve
1E12*MOVF064B RHR B Min Flow Line Isolation Valve
1E12*VF082 RHR B/C Discharge Line Fill Pump Suction
1E12*PC003 RHR B/C Line Fill Pump
1SWP*P2B Standby Service Water Pump
1SWP*MOV40B Standby Service Water Pump 2b Discharge
1SWP*MOV505A Standby Service Water Division I / Division II Crossover
Valve
1SWP*MOV505B Standby Service Water Division I / Division II Crossover
Valve
A-2 Attachment
CALCULATIONS
Number Title Revision
G13.18.3.6*07 Common Enclosure Associated Circuit Concerns 1
G13.18.12-27 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Manual Action Time Frame 1
E-200, ATT.3 4160VAC & 480VAC Protective Device Coordination 1
PB-106 Water supply Data for Specification 214.400 - Water 2
Spray and Sprinkler Fire Protection Systems
7214.400-273-091B Calculation Sys AS-12 B
7214.400-273-092B Calculation Sys WS-20 B
CONDITION REPORTS (CRs)
CR-RBS-2004-00428 CR-RBS-2006-04434 CR-RBS-2007-00358*
CR-RBS-2004-00455 CR-RBS-2006-04467 CR-RBS-2007-00394*
CR-RBS-2006-00046 CR-RBS-2006-04661 CR-RBS-2007-00411*
CR-RBS-2006-00402 CR-RBS-2006-04657 CR-RBS-2007-00422*
CR-RBS-2006-04003 CR-RBS-2006-04702 CR-RBS-2007-00598*
- CR initiated due to inspection activities.
DRAWINGS
Number Title Revision
CE-001A Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 3
Lighting - Control Building El. 98' - 0"
CE-001B Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 5
Lighting - Control Building El. 116' - 0"
CE-001C Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 4
Lighting - Control Building El. 136' - 0"
CE-001F Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 4
Lighting - Diesel Generator Building El. 98' - 0"
A-3 Attachment
CE-001H Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 1
Lighting - Auxiliary Building El. 95' - 0"
CE-001J Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 4
Lighting - Auxiliary Building El. 114' - 0"
CE-001K Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Analysis Emergency 4
Lighting - Auxiliary Building El. 141' - 0"
EB-003AB Fire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 65'-0" 4
to 90'-0"
EB-003AC Fire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 65'-0" 5
to 90'-0"
EB-003AD Fire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 109'- 8
0" to 148'-0"
EB-003AE Fire Area Boundaries, Plant Plan View-Elevations 113'- 4
0" to 186'-0"
EB-003BB Fire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 65'-0" to 3
90'-0"
EB-003BC Fire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 83'-0" to 4
106'-0"
EB-003BD Fire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 109'-0" 4
to 148'-0"
EB-003BE Fire Area Features, Plant Plan View-Elevations 113'-0" 4
to 186'-0"
EE-001AB 480V One Line Diagram StandBy Bus 1EJS*LDC 1B & 11
2B
EE-001AC Start Up Electrical Distribution Chart 34
EE-001L 4160 One Line Diagram StandBy Bus 1ENS*SWG1B 15
EE-001TG 480V One Line Diagram 1EHS-MCC2F Auxiliary 14
Building
EE-001TC 480V One Line Diagram EHS-MCC2E 10
Auxiliary Building
EE-001TF 480V One Line Diagram 1EHS-MCC2B 10
Auxiliary Building
EE-001WA 480V One Line Diagram EHS-MCC14A & 14B StandBy 10
SWGR Room 1A
A-4 Attachment
EE-001WB 480V One Line Diagram EHS-MCC16B StandBy 12
Cooling Tower No. 1
EE-001XA 480V One Line Diagram EHS-MCC15A, 15B & NHS-
MCC15A Diesel Generator Rooms 1A & 1B 8
EE-001ZG 125VDC One Line Diagram, Standby Bus A, ENB- 20
SWG01A, ENB-PNL02A,03A
EE-001ZH 125VDC One Line Diagram, Standby Bus B, 1ENB- 20
SWG01B, 1ENB-PNL02B,03B
EE-003A Wiring Diagram 1RSS*PNL 102 Control Building 11
EE-003LX Wiring Diagram 1C61*PNLP001 Bay C Control Building 7
EE-003LY Wiring Diagram 1C61*PNLP001 Bays A&B Control 14
Building
EE-3SB Wiring Diagram 1HVK*PNL3A & PNL3B Electrical 2
Isolation Panel
EE-3SC Wiring Diagram 1IHA-PNL1 Control Building Data 1
Acquisition System
EE-7B External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 10
Cabinet 1H13*P730 Bay B
EE-7CK-4 External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 3
Cabinet 1H13*P702 Bay D
EE-7CQ External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 6
Cabinet 1H13*P703 Bay D
EE-7DU External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 7
Cabinet 1H13*P714 Bays A and B
EE-007DV External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 6
Cabinet 1H13*P714 BAY B
EE-7DW External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 10
Cabinet 1H13*P714 Bays D and E
EE-007G External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 11
Cabinet 1H13*P731 BAY B
EE-8AX 4160V Wiring Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B 12
EE-8AY 4160V Wiring Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B 12
EE-8AZ 4160V Wiring Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B 10
EE-009FL 480V Misc Wiring Diagram Auxiliary Building 9
A-5 Attachment
EE-009HK 480V Misc Wiring Diagram EHS-MCC2F 10
EE-009HK-6 480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC2E & Details Auxiliary 0
Building
EE-009HJ 480V Misc Wiring Diagram EHS-MCC2F 9
EE-009NG 480V Wiring Diagram EHS-MCC2E Auxiliary Building 7
EE-009NH 480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC2E Auxiliary Building 7
EE-009NL 480V Misc Wiring Diagram EHS-MCC2E Auxiliary 10
Building
EE-009NN 480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building 7
EE-009NP 480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building 8
EE-009NR 480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building 9
EE-009QA 480V Misc Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC14B 7
EE-009NQ 480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building 7
EE-009PE 480V Wiring Diagram EHS*MCC2K Auxiliary Building 7
EE-009PG 480V EHS*MCC2K Auxiliary Building 8
EE-009PY 480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC14B Standby 8
Switchgear Room 1B
EE-009RA 480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC16B Standby Cooling 7
Tower Area
EE-009RB 480V Wiring Diagram 1EHS*MCC16B Standby Cooling 6
Tower Area
EE-009RU 480V Misc Wiring Diagram EHS-MCC16B Standby 6
Cooling Tower Area
EE-010W 125VDC Wiring Diagram Standby 1ENB*PNLS Control 13
Room& Diesel Generator Buliding
EE-018AE Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection Sys., 8
Auxiliary Building
EE-018AS Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection Sys., 6
RDAC-15
EE-018F Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection, Control 4
Building El 98'-0"
EE-018L Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection System 4
Tunnels El 67'-6"
A-6 Attachment
EE-018M Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection System- 14
Tunnel 67'-6" & 70' and XFMR Yard #1
EE-018R Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection Sys., 9
RDAC-2
EE-018Y Wiring Diagram, Fire and Smoke Detection, Multiplex 3
Data Loop
EE-034YA Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 5
EE-034YC Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 6
EE-034YD Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 5
EE-034YE Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 3
EE-034YP Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 0
EE-034YQ Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 0
EE-034YR Appendix R Raceway Fire Protection Details 0
EE-36BU-3 Wiring Diagram Electrical Pen. Terminal Cabinet 3
1RCP*TCR14A AND 1RCP*TCA14
EE-36BW Wiring Diagram Electrical Pen. Terminal Cabinet 5
1RCP*TCR15A AND 1RCP*TCA15
EE-80AH Communication Plan - Control Building El. 70' - 0" 5
EE-80AL Communication Plan - Tunnels Sh.2 4
EE-80AS Distributed Antenna System Auxiliary Building Plans El. 1
70' - 0" & 95' - 9"
EE-080AT Distributed Antenna System Auxiliary Building Plans El. 1
114' - 0" & 141' - 0"
EE-080AU Distributed Antenna System Auxiliary Building Plans El. 1
170' - 0"
EE-080AY Distributed Antenna System Containment Building 1
Standby Switchgear El. 98' - 0"
EE-80P Communications Plan Fuel Building El. 70' - 0" 95' 0' 3
ESK-5RHS02 SH.1 Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Switchgear Residual Heat 12
Removal Pump 1E12*PC002B
ESK-5RHS03 SH.1 Elementary Diagram 4.16KV Switchgear Residual Heat 13
Removal Pump 1E12*PC002C
A-7 Attachment
ESK-06RHS05 Sh. 1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 7
Heat Removal System
ESK-06RHS16 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 9
Heat Removal System
ESK-06RHS06 Sh. 1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 11
Heat Removal System
ESK-06RHS09 Sh. 1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 9
Heat Removal System
ESK-06SWP09 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Service 12
Water System MOV's
ESK-06SWP10 Sh. 1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Service 19
Water System MOV's
ESK-06SWP16 Sh. 1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Service 16
Water System MOV's
ESK-06SWP27 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Control Bldg 12
Chiller Cond Recirc Pumps
ESK-06RHS04 SH.1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 12
Heat Removal System
ESK-6RHS17 SH.1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 6
Heat Removal System
ESK-6RHS17 SH.6 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 6
Heat Removal System
ESK-06SWP38 Sh. 1 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Heat 14
Exchanger Service Water Discharge Valves
PID-15-01A Engineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection- 17
Water & Engine Pumps
PID-15-01B Engineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection- 12
Water & Engine Pump
PID-15-01C Engineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection- 13
Wt & Eng Pump
PID-15-01D Engineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection- 7
Water & Engine Pump
PID-15-1E Engineering P & I Diagram System 251, Fire Protection- 11
Water & Engine Pump
RBS-SSD-FD-104 Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Train A RHR 3
A-8 Attachment
RBS-SSD-FD-105 Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Train B RHR 3
RBS-SSD-FD-106 Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Train C RHR 3
RBS-SSD-FD-107 Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Main Steam Safety and 2
Relief Valves.
RBS-SSD-FD-202A Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Service Water- 2
StandBy
RBS-SSD-FD-202B Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Service Water- 3
StandBy
RBS-SSD-FD-203B Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Service Water- 3
StandBy
RBS-SSD-FD-205 Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II Control 3
Building Chilled Water
RBS-SSD-FD-206 Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II HVAC-Control 2
Room
RBS-SSD-FD-207B Safe Shutdown Flow Diagram Division II HVAC-Control 3
Building
RBS-SSD-FD-216 Safe Shutdown Diagram Electrical Division II Single 2
Line Diagram
TLD-CMS-016 Test Loop Diagram Suppression Pool Temperature 0
Sh. 1-4 CMS-RTD24B
TLD-ADS-019 Test Loop Diagram Reactor Vessel Safety Relief Valve 1
Sh. 1-4 Pressure B21-PTN068B
TLD-CMS-010 Test Loop Diagram Suppression Pool Level CMS-LT23 0
Sh. 1&2
TLD-RPS-010 Test Loop Diagram Reactor Vessel Level 3 AND 8 B21- 0
Sh. 1&2 LTN080B
0214.400-273-015 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection G
Sheet 1
0214.400-273-015 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection G
Sheet 2
0214.400-273-015 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection G
Sheet 3
0214.400-273-016 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection F
0214.400-273-019 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection F
A-9 Attachment
0214.400-273-023 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection G
Sheet 1
0214.400-273-023 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection G
Sheet 2
0214.400-273-081 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection C
Sheet 1
0214.400-273-081 Water Spray & Sprinkler Fire Protection C
Sheet 2
828E534AA SH 9 Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 28
828E534AA SH 10 Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 26
828E534AA SH 17 Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 25
828E534AA SH 24 Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 28
12210-EE-7CK External Connection Diagram PGCC Termination 4
Cabinet 1H13*P702
12210-ESK-6RHP21 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Residual 3
Heat Removal System
12210-ESK-6SWP17 Elementary Diagram 480V Control Circuit Service 8
Water System MOV'S
ENGINEERING REPORTS
Number Title Revision
ER-RB-2003-0711-001 Revising Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Operator Manual 0
Action Evaluations Following Release of RIS 2006-10
ER-RB-2004-0011-000 Revise the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis and 0
Emergency Light Drawings to Add Lights
ER-RB-2004-0126-000 Return Inappropriately Removed Components to the 0
Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment List (Keep Fill
Pumps)
ER-RB-2004-0140-000 Evaluate the Impact on the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown 0
Analysis if Automatic Functions are NOT Lost Due to A
Fire
ER-RB-2004-0275-000 Summarize all RBS NFPA Code Deviations 0
A-10 Attachment
1-TS-06-0662 1-TS-06-0748 1-TS-06-0776 1-TS-06-0803
PROCEDURES
Number Title Revision
AB-070-500 Pre-Fire Strategies, ECCS Piping Penetration Area, 4
Fire Area AB-1/Z-1 and AB-15/Z-1
AB-095-510 Pre-Fire Strategies, CCP Heat Exchanger Room, Fire 4
Area AB-1/Z-2
AB-114-520 Pre-Fire Strategies, Penetration Area West, Fire Area 3
AB-1/Z-3
AB-114-521 Pre-Fire Strategies, MCC Area West, Fire Area AB-1/Z- 3
3
AB-114-522 Pre-Fire Strategies, Unit Cooler HVR-UC6 Room, Fire 3
Area AB-1/Z-3
AB-141-529 Pre-Fire Strategies, Mezzanine Area West, Fire Area 4
AB-1/Z-4
ADM-0096 Risk Management Program Implementation and On- 04B
Line Maintenance Risk Assessment
AOP-0031 Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room 20B
AOP-0052 Fire Outside the Main Control Room In Areas 14
Containing Safety Related Equipment
CB-098-118 Pre-Fire Strategies, Standby Switchgear 1A Room, Fire 2
Area CB-15
CB-116-124 Pre-Fire Strategies, Cable Chase I, Fire Area C-1 2
CB-136-138 Pre-Fire Strategies, Control Room, Fire Area CB-25 3
EN-DC-128 Fire Protection Impact Reviews 1
ET-067-403 Pre-Fire Strategies, B Tunnel East, Fire Area ET-1 3
FPP-0010 Fire Fighting Procedure 12
FPP-0015 Post-Fire Ventilation/Smoke Management 00
FPP-0020 Guidelines For Preparation of Pre-Fire Strategies and 10
Pre-Fire Plans
A-11 Attachment
FPP-0070 Duties of Fire Watch 10
FPP-0100 Fire Protection System Impairment 09
OSP-0019 Electrical Bus Outages 7A
RBNP-038 River Bend Nuclear Procedures - Site Fire Protection 06B
Program
STP-250-4530 FPM-PNL2 Fire Detection Functional Test and 01
Operability Tests for Zone SD4, SD5, SD6, SD15,
SD16, SD17(A&B), SD18(A&B), SD19(A&B), SD20,
SD50, SD61, SD79(A&B), SD80(A&B), SD162, and
SD163
STP-250-4534 FPM-PNL10 Fire Detection Functional Test and 01
Operability Tests for Zone SD105, SD81(A&B),
SD82(A&B), FD16, FD17, and FD18
STP-250-4535 FPM-PNL11 Fire Detection Functional Test and 01
Operability Tests for Zone FPS11A, FDS11B, SD28,
SD29, SD30, SD83(A&B), SD97, SD98, and SD99
STP-250-4536 FPM-PNL12 Fire Detection Functional Test and 03
Operability Tests for Zone FPS12A, FDS12B, SD31,
SD32, SD43, SD56, SD86(A&B), SD100, and
SD164(A&B)
STP-250-4538 FPM-PNL14 Fire Detection Functional Test and 01
Operability Tests for Zone FPS14A, SD49, SD52,
SD55, SD101, SD106, FD28 and FD33
STP-250-4539 FPM-PNL15 Fire Detection Functional Test and 01
Operability Tests for Zone SD53, SD103,SD165(A&B),
AND FD34
STP-251-3505 Fire Protection Sprinkler System Functional Test 8
TTP-7-021 Fire Protection Training and Qualifications 11
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
Number Title Revision
Design Criterion No. Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis 3
240.201A
Design Criterion No. Emergency Lighting Analysis for Manual Actions 3
240.201A, Appendix H Associated with Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
A-12 Attachment
Final Safety Analysis Fire Protection System 8
Report, Section 9.5.1
Final Safety Analysis Fire Protection System 17
Report, Section 9.5.1
Final Safety Analysis Fire Hazards Analysis 10
Report, Appendix 9A
Final Safety Analysis Fire Protection Program Comparison With Appendix 15
Report, Appendix 9B R to 10CFR50
Licensee Event Report Unanalyzed Condition Regarding RCIC Availability in 0
2006-001 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Scenario
LO-RLO-2006-00001 Pre-NRC Fire Protection Triennial Self-Assessment 98/18/06
CA-00031
NUREG-0989 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of May 1984
River Bend Station
NUREG-0989 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of August
Supplement No. 3 River Bend Station 1985
QA-9-20005-RBS-1 Quality Assurance Audit of the Fire Protection 5/15/05
Program
RBS Lesson Plan AOP-0031, Shutdown From Outside the Main Control 0
R-LPHLO-0537 Room
RBS Lesson Plan AOP-0052, Fire Outside the Main Control Room in 0
R-LPHLO-0544 Areas Containing Safety Related Equipment
RBS Preventive Annual Emergency Lighting Maintenance
Maintenance Task
RBS Preventive Quarterly Emergency Lighting Maintenance
Maintenance Task
RBS Repetitive Task App R Bat replace 286 Weeks
RBS Simulator LOR Module 7, 2004 Simulator Instructor Guide 0
Instructor Guide
RSTG-LOR-40407
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Fire Detection 5
3.3.7.4 Instrumentation
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Fire Suppression 93
3.7.9.1 Systems
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Spray and/ or 58
3.7.9.2 Sprinkler Systems
A-13 Attachment
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Halon Systems 79
3.7.9.3
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Fire Hose Stations 58
3.7.9.4
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Yard Fire Hydrants 58
3.7.9.5 and Hydrant Hose Houses
Technical Requirement Technical Requirements Manual - Fire Rated 58
3.7.9.6 Assemblies
3242.423-292-004A Vendor Technical Manual for Exide Lightguard July 9,
Installation and operating Instructions 1997
3232.423-292-005A Vendor Manual for 6 Volt and 12 Volt Emergency November
Batteries 14, 1996
6240.201-795-007C Thermo-Lag Assessment Report 2
Training Attendance List for Course Number RSTG-
LOR-40407, Simulator Instructor Guide, Module 7
2004"
WORK ORDERS
00098805 50972728 01 50687719 01 50690738 01
A-14 Attachment