IR 05000445/2006009

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IR 05000445-06-009 and IR 05000446-06-009; November 27 Through December 20, 2006; Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Baseline Inspection, NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection
ML070360606
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/2007
From: William Jones
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To: Blevins M
TXU Power
References
IR-06-009
Download: ML070360606 (34)
v • d • e


Text

ary 5, 2007

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2006009 AND 05000446/2006009

Dear Mr. Blevins:

On December 20, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on December 20, 2006, with Mr. Rafael Flores and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they related to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).

These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as noncited violations consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the noncited violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.

TXU Power -2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-445, 50-446 License Nos.: NPF-87, NPF-89

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000445/2006009 and 05000446/2006009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION IV==

Dockets: 50-445, 50-446 Licenses: NPF-87, NPF-89 Report: 05000445/2006009 and 05000446/2006009 Licensee: TXU Generation Company LP Facility: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM-56, Glen Rose, Texas Dates: November 27 - December 20 Inspectors: Neil OKeefe, Team Leader Breck Henderson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Brian Larson, Operations Engineer, Operations Branch John Reynoso, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Accompanying: Haywood Anderson, Contractor Farouk Baxter, Contractor Shiattin Makor, Reactor Inspector Approved by: William B. Jones, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000445/2006009 and IR 05000446/2006009; November 27 through December 20, 2006;

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; baseline inspection, NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection.

The report covers an announced inspection by a team of four regional inspectors and two contractors. Three NRC-identified findings were identified. Each of the findings were of very low safety significance. The final significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Green.

The team identified two examples of a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, noncited violation for the failure to translate the design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings. The team found that surveillance testing drained water out of the containment sump suction line for the containment spray system with no provision to ensure the system was refilled prior to declaring it operable. Specifically, in August 2006, the Containment Spray Containment Sump Suction Valve 1-HV-4783 for Train B in Unit 1 was cycled for surveillance testing, draining approximately 61 gallons from the line. This allowed about 8 cubic feet of air into the system. The air remained in the system until it was vented on December 1, 2006, after the team questioned whether the system was filled. The second example included the licensee's failure to assess or take actions to prevent vortexing in the chemical additive tank for the containment spray system in the event of a design basis accident. The team independently determined that vortexing could occur for approximately 20 minutes, entraining air in each of the running pumps before the tank would be isolated.

This violation is more than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of the containment spray system to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. This finding screened as Green during a Phase 1 significance determination process because analyses showed that the amount of air entrainment in these cases was not enough to cause a loss of function or detrimental fluid dynamic effects. This finding had cross-cutting aspects in problem identification and resolution (corrective action program, evaluating and prioritizing problems). There were two prior opportunities to have identified that water was being drained from the suction piping. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Smart Form SMF-2006-3965.

Green.

The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.8 for inadequate inservice testing of safety-related gate valves with stellite seats following maintenance. During maintenance a thin oxide coating can form on the internals of these valves. This coating acts as a lubricant and can significantly reduce the torque and thrust required to operate the valves. Contrary to the inservice testing program requirements, the licensee performed maintenance on Valve 1-HV-4777 in 1998 and used the post-maintenance test for inservice test credit, although the results were not representative of baseline valve performance. Since the results were not representative of baseline behavior, this test was not a valid inservice test. Therefore, no valid test was performed between 1997 and November 27, 2006, which exceeded the required test interval.

Failure to properly assess the test results following maintenance is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern, in that, a valve performance problem might be masked following maintenance. This issue screened as Green during a Phase 1 significance determination process because the examples we reviewed indicated that this condition had never masked a condition that resulted in an inoperable valve in the past. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Smart Form SMF-2006-4161.

Green.

The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion III, Design Control, with two examples for the failure to correctly translate regulatory requirements and design bases associated with the containment spray system into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the functioning of the vacuum breakers on the chemical additive tank and the chemical additive tank isolation valves were not described in the design basis documents for this system. The vacuum breakers must operate for the system to inject sodium hydroxide, and the isolation valves must shut prior to draining the tank to prevent injecting air into the containment spray pump. This finding was entered into the corrective action program under Smart Forms SMF-2006-4073 and SMF-2006-4097.

Failure to correctly translate regulatory requirements and design bases associated with the containment spray system into design basis documents was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern. Absent a proper description of these important functions, operability evaluations or plant changes could be made which negatively impact the functions without being recognized. This issue screened as Green in Phase 1 because there was no identified loss of function as a result of this performance deficiency. This issue had cross-cutting aspects in problem identification and resolution (corrective action program, correcting problems in a timely manner) because a 2003 self-assessment identified that the isolation valves' function was not described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (documented in Smart Form SMF-2003-3860), but this was never corrected.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Inspection of component design bases verifies the initial design and subsequent modifications and provides monitoring of the capability of the selected components and operator actions to perform their design bases functions. As plants age, their design bases may be difficult to determine and an important design feature may be altered or disabled during a modification. The plant risk assessment model assumes the capability of safety systems and components will perform their intended safety function successfully. This inspectible area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability

Main article: IP 71111.21

The team selected risk-significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. In general, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than 2.0, a risk reduction worth of 1.005 or higher, or other risk measures.

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors verified that selected components would function as required by reviewing design bases assumptions, calculations, drawings, and procedures, and conducting walkdowns and interviews with plant engineers. In some instances, the team performed independent calculations to verify the appropriateness of licensee engineers' analysis methods. The team also verified that the condition of the components was consistent with the design basis and that the tested capabilities met the required criteria.

The team reviewed maintenance records, corrective action documents, and industry operating experience information to verify that licensee personnel considered potential degraded conditions and their impact on the components. For the review of operator actions, the team observed operators during simulator scenarios associated with the selected components, as well as observing simulated actions in the plant.

The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions because of modifications, and margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included failed performance test results; significant corrective actions; repeated maintenance; 10 CFR 50.65(a)1 status; operable, but degraded, conditions; NRC resident inspector input of problem equipment; system health reports; industry operating experience; and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in-depth margins.

The inspection procedure requires a review of 15-20 risk-significant and low design margin components, 3 to 5 relatively high-risk operator actions, and 4 to 6 operating experience issues. The sample selection for this inspection was 20 components, 4 operator actions, and 6 operating experience items.

The components selected for review were:

  • Component cooling water expansion tanks
  • Emergency core cooling containment sump suction valves (HV-8811A/B)
  • Engineered safety feature transformers (XST 1 and 2)
  • 6.9kV engineered safety feature buses
  • Refueling water storage tank
  • Refueling water storage tank suction valves (HV-8812A/B, HV-4758 and HV-4759)
  • Diesel fuel oil strainers and filters The operator actions selected for review were:
  • Restore offsite power following loss of offsite power
  • Feed and bleed actions following loss of secondary heat sink
  • Transfer to cold leg recirculation The operating experience issues selected for review were:
  • Instrument air issues
  • Cell switch issues
  • Agastat time delay relay issues
  • Condensate storage tank liner/bladder/foreign material issues
  • Thermal binding of containment isolation valves

b. Findings

b.1 Inadequate Design Control to Exclude Air from Containment Spray Piping

Introduction.

The team identified two examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to translate design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings. The first example involved a surveillance test procedure that failed to refill water drained from the containment spray system containment sump suction line. The second example involved a failure to assess/prevent vortexing in the containment spray chemical additive tank during a design basis accident.

Description.

The team reviewed the design measures intended to keep the containment spray system piping full of water. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the normally dry containment sump suction piping would fill and self-vent during a loss of coolant accident. In the process, the team questioned how the licensee performed periodic surveillance testing of the sump suction valves. Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.6.5 requires cycling each containment sump suction valve once per 18 months. The inspectors were concerned that opening these valves would allow water from the filled suction line to drain out into the dry, sloped pipe leading up to the sump. The licensee determined that the Surveillance Procedure OPT-205A/B, Containment Spray System, Revision 15, did not fill and vent that section of pipe after the test. The licensee promptly checked the system, and found that there was air in both trains in both units as follows:

Unit 1 Train A 1 gallon (0.13 ft3)

Unit 1 Train B 61 gallons (8.15 ft3)

Unit 2 Train A 15 gallons (2 ft3)

Unit 2 Train B 7 gallons (1 ft3)

In the process of checking, the pipes were filled and vented.

Also, the team assessed whether vortexing and air entrainment was possible during operation of the containment spray chemical additive tank. The system used an eductor, driven by discharge flow from each of the four containment spray pumps, to draw sodium hydroxide from the single chemical additive tank during a design basis accident. Vacuum breakers allowed air into the tank as the liquid drained. The team found that vortexing was possible with the tank approximately half-full, due to the high velocities that would result from four eductors taking a suction through a single pipe.

The team was concerned that the air entrained could damage or degrade the containment spray pumps.

Analysis.

Failure to implement design control measures to ensure that the containment spray piping remained full of water as intended in the original design was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment spray system to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, entraining air would reduce the flow rate of water supplied to the spray header. This finding screened as Green in the

Phase 1 significance determination process because analyses showed that the air in this case was not enough to cause pump damage, a loss of function, or other detrimental dynamic effects.

The licensee's evaluation of voids in the containment spray system containment suction line, using the methodology of WCAP-16631-NP, Testing and Evaluation of Gas Transport to the Suction of ECCS [emergency core cooling system] Pumps, dated October 2006, determined that the maximum air volume in the suction piping would result in the Unit 1 Train B containment spray pump having up to 27 percent void fraction peak (15 percent average) for a duration of about 4 seconds. This estimate was conservative, using atmospheric pressure inside containment for the calculation when actual pressure would likely be higher.

The licensee's bounding analysis of the potential vortex in the containment spray chemical additive tank conservatively calculated that there would be less than 4 percent void fraction at a pump while vortexing lasted. The pump vendor concluded that neither of these conditions would damage or degrade pump performance. The licensee also confirmed with the eductor vendor that the conditions evaluated could not stall the eductors because the gravity feed of the chemicals would prevent it, even with the presence of air.

The team confirmed that the safety function of containment spray system was limited to containment heat removal. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, a containment spray failure would not contribute to the large early release frequency. The team also determined that vortexing might reduce the rate of chemical addition into containment somewhat, but the timing of the pH change was not critical to the function.

The intended pH effect was expected to be achieved within the first hour of the accident.

This finding has cross-cutting aspects in problem identification and resolution (corrective action program, evaluating and prioritizing problems). Specifically, there were two prior opportunities to have identified that water was being drained from the suction piping.

Comanche Peak corrective action documents Smart Forms SMF-2002-1142 (April 2002)and SMF-2006-3464 (October 2006) both documented system inspections that identified boric acid buildup inside drained portions of sump suction pipes without determining the cause.

Enforcement.

Two examples of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for failure to translate design basis into instructions, procedures, and drawings were identified. Specifically, the design capability of the containment spray system requires that the system be full of water in order to achieve and maintain the design rate of flow.

Contrary to this, Procedure OPT-205A/B, Containment Spray System, Revision 15, directed cycling of the containment spray sump suction valves for testing without ensuring the system was refilled. In August 2006, the containment sump suction valve for containment spray Valve 1-HV-4783 for Train B in Unit 1 was cycled for surveillance testing, draining approximately 61 gallons and introducing a like amount of air. The air remained in the suction lines until vented on December 1, 2006.

Also contrary to the above, since plant construction, the containment spray chemical additive tank has been without measures to prevent vortexing and the associated entrainment of air during a design basis accident. The analysis demonstrated that air entrained from vortexing would be acceptable.

The issues were entered into the corrective action program as Smart Form SMF-2006-3965. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program, it is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000445/446;2006009-01, Inadequate Design Control to Exclude Air from Containment Spray Piping.

b.2 Improper Evaluation of Post-Maintenance Test for Inservice Testing Credit

Introduction.

The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.8 for inadequate inservice testing of safety related gate valves with stellite seats following maintenance. During maintenance a thin oxide coating forms on the internals of these valves, which acts as a lubricant and significantly reduces the torque and thrust required to operate the valves for some period of time. The post-maintenance test results were inappropriately credited as satisfying inservice testing requirements for Valve 1-HV-4777 in 1998, despite the knowledge that these results were not representative of baseline valve performance.

Description.

The team evaluated the inservice testing results of motor-operated Valve 1-HV-4777, and the associated operability assessment documented in Smart Form SMF-2006-3907. This test found that the valve had increased unseating torque and thrust when compared with the previous test, resulting in less than the required margin.

The team reviewed the maintenance and testing history for this valve, as well as the design basis for the testing acceptance criteria. The team also reviewed industry documentation that demonstrated improved valve performance was expected following maintenance, which exposed the internals to air. Exposure of the valve internals to air caused an oxide layer to coat the stellite parts, which acted as a lubricant for a period of time. The team confirmed that all the sister valves of Valve 1-HV-4777 experienced significantly improved performance in unseating thrust and torque following maintenance. Post-maintenance unseating thrust and torque values were noted to be approximately half the previous baseline values.

The team noted that the licensee used the post-maintenance test to satisfy operability and inservice testing requirements. However, the licensee had not adequately evaluated whether the test results were appropriate to meet these requirements.

The team assessed the licensees method of ensuring these valves had adequate unseating thrust and torque to permit opening during conditions of high differential pressure or thermal binding. These conditions could be present during design basis accidents, but were not present during testing. The licensee used a calculation to correct the test results to verify that the more restrictive conditions would be met.

However, the team found that this methodology did not account for the temporary

improvement in valve performance, and the eventual return to higher required values of thrust and torque. The team reviewed test data and concluded that the post-maintenance testing was sufficient to conclude there was a reasonable expectation that the valves would be capable of performing their intended safety function in the short term, but that additional testing was necessary to verify that the valves returned to baseline performance and continued to satisfy the thrust and torque requirements.

The team evaluated whether the post-maintenance testing satisfied the requirements of the inservice testing program. The team found that the initially improved valve performance did not represent baseline performance. This temporary improvement was not adequately evaluated to ensure that it did not mask possible valve performance problems. Contrary to the inservice testing program required by Technical Specification 5.5.8, the licensee performed maintenance on Valve 1-HV-4777 in 1998 and used the post-maintenance test for inservice test credit without evaluating the validity of the temporarily improved results. Since the results were not representative of baseline behavior, this test was not a valid inservice test. The inspectors determined that a valid test was not performed on Valve 1-HV-4777 between 1997 and November 27, 2006, which exceeded the required test interval.

Assessment. Failure to properly assess the test results following maintenance was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern, in that, a valve performance problem could be masked following maintenance. This issue screened as Green during a Phase 1 significance determination process because test data history indicated that this condition had never masked an inoperable valve in the past. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Smart Form SMF-2006-4161.

Enforcement.

Failure to perform adequate inservice testing of Valve 1-HV-4777 between 1997 and November 27, 2006, was a violation of Technical Specification 5.5.8.

The licensee converted from the basic ASME code inservice testing requirements to an NRC-approved, risk-informed inservice testing program on December 21, 2000. The time between valid tests exceeded the quarterly testing requirement that existed prior to the change in the program. In order to extend the test frequency, the NRC approval required that the licensee either evaluate the valve performance to ensure that an extended interval was warranted, or perform a new baseline test. No evaluation was performed for Valve 1-HV-4777, and no new baseline test was performed, but the test interval was extended to 9 years in December, 2000. Since the conditions for extending the test interval were not met, the basic test interval was required to be met. Contrary to this, no valid inservice testing was performed on Valve 1-HV-4777 between 1997 and November 27, 2006. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program, it is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000445/446;2006009-02, Improper Evaluation of Postmaintenance Test for Inservice Testing Credit.

b.3 Two Containment Spray System Functions Not Described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report or Design Basis Documents

Introduction.

A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, with two examples, was identified for failure to correctly translate regulatory requirements and design bases associated with the containment spray system into the system design basis document.

Description.

The team identified that the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and Design Basis Document DBD-232, Containment Spray System, did not describe the functions of two important components. The vacuum breakers on the containment spray chemical additive tank must function for the system to be able to inject sodium hydroxide because air must be admitted into the tank as liquid is drained. The containment spray chemical additive tank isolation valves must shut on a low tank level signal in order to prevent injecting air into the containment spray pump. The vacuum breaker function was described in only one calculation (used to demonstrate that the vacuum breakers were properly sized), and the isolation valve function was not described in any design basis document that the team reviewed. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Smart Forms SMF-2006-4073 and SMF-2006-4097.

The team also identified that, since initial licensing of the plant, these functions were not described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report is a primary document that must be reviewed when evaluating the impact of potential plant changes under 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee contended that a 50.59 review could be completed successfully by inferring the functions from the component nomenclature for these valves. The team concluded that having only the nomenclature of the components would not be enough information to positively demonstrate that these functions were necessary for the associated safety analysis to remain valid.

Assessment. Failure to correctly translate regulatory requirements and design bases associated with the containment spray system into the system design basis document was a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern. Absent a proper description of these important functions, operability evaluations or plant changes could be made, which negatively impact the functions without being recognized. This issue screened as Green in Phase 1 because there was no identified loss of function as a result of this performance deficiency. This issue had cross-cutting aspects in problem identification and resolution (corrective action program, correcting problems in a timely manner), because a 2003 self-assessment identified that the isolation valves function was not described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (documented in Smart Form SMF-2003-3860), but this was never corrected.

Enforcement.

Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix B, Criterion III, requires that regulatory requirements and design bases be translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this, since original plant licensing, the licensee failed to translate the functions of the vacuum breakers on the containment spray chemical additive tank and the containment spray chemical

additive tank isolation valves into the system design basis document. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program, it is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000445/446;2006009-03, Two Containment Spray System Functions Not Described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report or Design Basis Documents.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team reviewed action requests associated with the selected components, operator actions and operating experience notifications.

The inspectors also examined corrective actions entered in the licensees program for other components with known issues to assure that actions were complete and effective. These components are as follows:

  • Containment sump pump modifications
  • Emergency diesel generator potential for flooding on activation of the fire protection deluge system. Also reviewed the modification package for the voltage regulator and excitation system upgrade
  • Containment electrical penetration protection
  • Power operated relief valve solenoid valves
  • Battery post cell creep corrosion In addition, this report contains the following issues that had problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects:
  • Section 1R21.b.1 documents a failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The issue has cross cutting aspects because it was identified in two earlier corrective action documents, but was never corrected.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On December 20, 2006, the inspectors presented the baseline inspection results to Mr. R. Flores, Site Vice President, and other members of staff at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector verified no proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

I. Ahmad, Consulting Engineer
G. Erskine, Senior Nuclear Technologist
C. Feist, Mechanical - Design Engineering
B. Gastine, Consulting Nuclear Technologist
T. Gibbs, Regulatory Affairs
A. Hall, Operations Support Manager
B. Henley, Consulting Engineer
T. Hope, Regulatory Performance Manager

R. Hull - Residual Heat Removal System - Systems Engineering

S. Karpyak, Risk & Reliability Supervisor
D. Kissinger, Consulting Engineer
D. Kross, Director, Nuclear Maintenance
S. Lakdawala, Manager, Corrective Action Program
J. Lee, MOV engineer
M. Lucas, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering & Support
S. Maier, Manager, Design Engineering Analysis
G. Merka, Regulatory Affairs
J. Meyer, Manager, Technical Support
N. Ortiz, Staff Engineer
M. Osterman, Consulting Engineer

K. Pitilli - Consulting Engineer

L. Pope, Main Steam system engineer
J. Skelton, CCW & SW system engineer
L. Slaughter, Engineer
S. Smith, Director System Engineering
J. Taylor, Plant Reliability Manager
T. Terryalt, SMART Team 2 Manager
C. Tran, Manager, BPO Interface
L. Windham, Consulting Engineer
H. Winn, Auxiliary Feedwater System - Systems Engineering
G. Yezefski, Emergency Diesel Generator - Systems Engineering

NRC

T. Scarbrough, Senior Mechanical Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000445/446;2006009-01 NCV Inadequate Design Control to Exclude Air from Containment Spray Piping. (Section 1R21.b.1)
05000445/446;2006009-02 NCV Improper Evaluation of Postmaintenance Test for Inservice Testing Credit. (Section 1R21.b.2)
05000445/446;2006009-03 NCV Two Containment Spray System Functions Not Described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report or Design Basis Documents. (Section 1R21.b.3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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