IR 05000445/2020010
| ML20280A404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/2020 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Peters K Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| IR 2020010 | |
| Download: ML20280A404 (17) | |
Text
October 6, 2020
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2020010 AND 05000446/2020010
Dear Mr. Peters:
On September 3, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. McCool, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Digitally signed by Vincent G. Gaddy Gaddy Date: 2020.10.06 11:43:14 -05'00'
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000445 and 05000446 License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000445 and 05000446 License Numbers: NPF-87 and NPF-89 Report Numbers: 05000445/2020010 and 05000446/2020010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-010-0031 Licensee: Vistra Operations Company LLC Facility: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Glen Rose, TX Inspection Dates: August 10, 2020 to September 3, 2020 Inspectors: W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Use Correct Input in Motor Operated Valve Design Calculation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.
Systems NCV 05000445,05000446/2020010-01 02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensees failure to use the correct input in a motor-operated valve design calculation.
Failure to Verify and Validate Quality Software Used for Motor-Operated Valves in Accordance with Procedure Requirements Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.3] - Change 71111.21N.
Systems NCV 05000445,05000446/2020010-02 Management 02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation with four examples of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow quality assurance procedures for the acceptance of software used for safety-related motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and diagnostic testing.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a. Determined whether the sampled power-operated valves (POVs) are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.
b. Determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions.
c. Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.
d. Evaluate maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).
- (1) 1-8804B - Motor-Operated Valve - Emergency Core Cooling Recirculation Flowpath/Passive Pipe Break Isolation.
- (2) 1-HV-2482 - Motor-Operated Valve - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Emergency Supply Flowpath.
- (3) 1-PCV-0455A - Air Operated Valve - Reactor Coolant Post-Accident Vent Path Isolation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.
- (4) 2-8000A - Motor-Operated Valve - Reactor Coolant Post-Accident Vent Path Isolation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.
- (5) 2-8110 - Motor-Operated Valve - Chemical and Volume Control Emergency Core Cooling Flowpath Boundary.
- (6) 2-8809A - Motor-Operated Valve - Emergency Core Cooling to Cold Legs Flowpath and Emergency Core Cooling to Hot Legs Flowpath Boundary, Passive Pipe Break Isolation, and Containment Isolation.
- (7) 2-8811A - Motor-Operated Valve - Emergency Core Cooling Recirculation Flowpath, Containment Isolation, and Passive Pipe Break Isolation.
- (8) 2-8923B - Motor-Operated Valve - Safety Injection Passive Pipe Break Isolation.
- (9) 2-HV-4572 - Motor-Operated Valve - Component Cooling Water to Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Cooling Flowpath.
- (10) 2-8802B - Motor-Operated Valve - Emergency Core Cooling to Cold Legs Flowpath and Emergency Core Cooling to Hot Legs Flowpath Boundary, Passive Pipe Break Isolation, and Containment Isolation.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Use Correct Input in Motor-Operated Valve Design Calculation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.
Systems NCV 05000445,05000446/2020010-01 02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensees failure to use the correct input in a motor-operated valve design calculation.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed a vendor document titled, "Coefficients of Friction of Selected Westinghouse Motor-Operated Valves at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Based On JOG Qualifying Basis," received by the licensee in 2013. The inspectors questioned how the licensee had incorporated this into their motor-operated valve Calculation ME-CA-0000-1093, "Design Data For CPNPP [Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant], Common Safety Related Valves Within the Scope of NRC Generic Letter 89-10." During the review, the licensee determined that the new design information provided by this vendor was not fully incorporated into the required calculations. Specifically, the coefficients of friction and valve mean seat diameters given in the vendor document were not factored into the rate of loading (ROL) calculations for a group of motor-operated valves. When the licensee performed the ROL calculations with the correct design information, the margin of the pressurizer block valve 2-8000BT and residual heat removal cold leg injection isolation valve 2-8809A reduced, resulting in lower margin classifications.
In accordance with Comanche Peak Procedure IST-301, Inservice Testing of Motor-Operated Valves, the change to a lower margin classification required more frequent testing for the motor-operated valves.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed the calculations with the updated design input from Westinghouse to determine the correct rate of loading calculation for the affected motor-operated valves. As a result, the licensee will update the testing frequency for more frequent testing of the affected motor-operated valves. The licensee confirmed that the affected valves were tested within the corrected testing frequency.
Corrective Action References: CR-2020-006003 and CR-2020-005963
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to incorporate new design information provided by a vendor into design Calculation ME-CA-0000-1093, "Design Data For CPNPP, Common Safety-Related Valves Within the Scope of NRC Generic Letter 89-10, for safety-related motor-operated valves was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, use of the correct data from the vendor for the motor-operated valve design calculation for ROL led to a change in margin classification for two motor-operated valves based on inservice testing program requirements. This adverse change in margin required more frequent testing for these motor-operated valves.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train, did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled." Contrary to this requirement, from 2013 to August 13, 2020, the licensee did not correctly translate into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions updated design information provided by a vendor. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly translate design bases information provided by a vendor into design Calculation ME-CA-0000-1093, "Design Data For CPNPP, Common Safety-Related Valves Within the Scope of NRC Generic Letter 89-10, for safety-related motor-operated valves.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Verify and Validate Quality Software Used For Motor-Operated Valves in Accordance with Procedure Requirements Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.3] - Change 71111.21N.0 Systems NCV 05000445,05000446/2020010-02 Management 2 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation with four examples of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow quality assurance procedures for the acceptance of software used for safety-related motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and diagnostic testing.
Description:
The inspectors inquired about how a software program, MIDAS, was implemented at the site for motor-operated valve calculations and diagnostic testing. During review of the question, the licensee discovered that no documentation existed for the quality acceptance review of the MIDAS software in accordance with procedures used for the acceptance and implementation of quality software, STA-170, Nuclear Software Quality Assurance Program, and ECE-5.07, Design Verification and Control of Quality Software.
The licensee performed additional reviews and found that another quality software used for motor-operated valve calculations, Quiklook, also did not have quality acceptance paperwork.
In total, four examples were identified where the licensee did not perform a quality acceptance review of software used for motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and diagnostics as required by quality assurance procedures. The following is a list of the individual examples:
MIDAS Version 2017.4, which was implemented in spring 2017
Quiklook Version QL3 2014.58, which was implemented in spring 2014
Quiklook Version QL3 2014.197, which was implemented in fall 2014
Quiklook Version FS 2016.365, which was implemented in spring 2016 The MIDAS and Quiklook software is used to perform motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and provide inputs for diagnostic testing. The motor-operated valve diagnostic testing is used to demonstrate operability of the valves. Quiklook can be considered part of the measuring and test equipment used for motor-operated valve testing requiring review and quality acceptance. The failure to review the software brought into question the operability of motor-operated valves that have undergone diagnostic testing using results of the software.
Corrective Actions: The licensee documented the issue in IR-2020-006166 and IR-2020-006129. The licensee plans to complete the review and generate the required paperwork to document the quality acceptance of MIDAS and Quiklook. The licensee also performed an operability evaluation to determine whether or not the motor-operated valves, which have been tested with this software, are operable. The licensee concluded that the motor-operated valves are operable.
Corrective Action References: IR-2020-006166, IR-2020-006129
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow Procedures STA-170, Nuclear Software Quality Assurance Program, and ECE-5.07, Design Verification and Control of Quality Software, for quality acceptance of software used for safety-related motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and diagnostic testing was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the MIDAS and Quiklook software is used to perform motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and provide inputs for diagnostic testing.
The motor-operated valve diagnostic testing is used to demonstrate operability of the valves.
Quiklook can be considered part of the measuring and test equipment used for motor-operated valve testing requiring review and quality acceptance. The motor-operated valves, which have undergone diagnostic testing since 2014, were impacted and the inspectors questioned whether they were operable. Since the licensee had to provide further explanation beyond the diagnostic testing results, the inspectors concluded that the performance deficiency was more than minor.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train, did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.3 - Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.
While the most recent example, spring 2017, falls outside of the nominal 3-year window, the inspectors believe this performance deficiency is indicative of current performance. The licensee has performed no corrective action that would make it more likely for the site to follow these quality software acceptance procedures. Additionally, the motor-operated valve testing procedures do not have steps for the user to verify that the current version has been approved through the quality acceptance process. For these reasons, the inspectors determined that if the licensee put in place a version update for either software, it most likely would not go through the quality acceptance process. Therefore, the performance deficiency is reflective of current performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" states, in part, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings." Contrary to this requirement, from 2014 to August 20, 2020, the licensee failed accomplish activities in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee did not follow procedures to perform acceptance of quality software related to motor-operated valve calculations, trending, and diagnostics.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
- On September 3, 2020, the inspectors presented the Design-Basis Capability of Power Operated Valves inspection results to Mr. T. McCool, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21N.02 Calculations 16345 Component Cooling Water - Residual Heat Removal Heat 1
Exchanger Outlet Valve Shutoff Differential Pressure
71111.21N.02 Calculations ME-CA-0000- Design data for CPSES Unit I, 2, Common Safety-related 26
1093 Motor-Operated Valves (MOY) within the
scope of NRC Generic Letter 89-10.
71111.21N.02 Calculations ME-CA-0000- Quarter-Turn AOV Capability Evaluation 1
5175
71111.21N.02 Calculations ME-CA-0000- Midas-CP Version 2014.261 Build 1.1 Configuration 0
5541 Baseline
71111.21N.02 Calculations ME-CA-0229- EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program Butterfly 1
201 Required Actuation Torque Calculations
71111.21N.02 Corrective Action CR-2006-
Documents 000702-00, CR-
2016-008643.
TR-2017-001160,
TR-2020-004176,
CR-2017-
011259, CR-
2018-001914,
CR-2018-
001985,CR-
2018-008757,
CR-2019-
001180, CR-
20-003384,
CR-2020-
004173, TR-
20-004176,
71111.21N.02 Corrective Action IR-2020-005963,
Documents CR-2020-
Resulting from 006003, IR-2020-
Inspection 006129, IR-2020-
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
006166, IR-2020-
006224, IR-2020-
006278
71111.21N.02 Drawings 2D00014 Motor Op Gate Valve Mod 10000GM88FNB010 06/1984
71111.21N.02 Drawings 75710, Sh. 01 Borg Warner 8 Inch, 150 Lb Motor Operated Gate Valve CP-1
Assembly (Carbon Steel) Units 1 and 2
71111.21N.02 Drawings 8372D34 Motor Op Gate Valve Mod 06000GM82FBB000 11/1976
71111.21N.02 Drawings E1-0064 Nitrogen Operated Valve 1-PCV-0455A Pressurizer Power CP-8
Relief Valve
71111.21N.02 Drawings E2-0061 Chemical and Volume Control System Typical Internal CP-6
Wiring Diagrams and Developments, Sheet 00
71111.21N.02 Drawings E2-0061 Motor Operated Valve 2-8110 Charging Pump Miniflow CP-6
Isolation
71111.21N.02 Drawings E2-0062 Safety Injection System Typical Internal Wiring Diagrams CP-2
and Developments, Sheet 00D
71111.21N.02 Drawings E2-0062 Motor Operated Valve 2-8811A Sump to 1 Residual Heat CP-8
Removal Pump, Sheet 22
71111.21N.02 Drawings M2-2401 2-8811A - CPSES Motor Operated Valve Setpoint Control CP-5
Document, Sheet 92
71111.21N.02 Drawings M2-2401 CPSES Motor Operated Valve Setpoint Control Document CP-5
- 2-8923B, Sheet 116
71111.21N.02 Drawings M2-2401 CPSES MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SETPOINT CP-5
CONTROL DOCUMENT - 2-HV-4572, Sheet 224
71111.21N.02 Engineering DBD-ME-260 Residual Heat Removal System 30
Changes
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-1999- Temporarily increase flowrate "setpoint" on 1,2-HV-4572, 10/05/2000
Changes 001397-06-00 3, 4, 5 butterfly valves after receipt of S- and P-signal.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-1999- Restore the throttled position setpoint on CCW valves 1, 2- 01/11/2001
Changes 001397-07-00 HV-4572, 3, 4, 5 to the "original" position prior to that
which it was changed to in FDA-99-1397-06.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2001- The following actuators are scheduled in 2RF06 to be 10/29/2001
Changes 001473-01-00 refurbished. Replace or modify actuator torque spring pack
to preclude hydraulic lock for each of the actuators 2-
8802A-MO,2-8802B-MO, 2-8812A-MO, 2-HV-4075B-MO,
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2-HV-4696-MO, 2-HV-4782-MO and 2-HV-4783-MO .
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2001- Revise drawing M2-2401 Rev. CP-05 to include correct 11/30/2001
Changes 002232-02-00 CTQun,ds values for the valves
identified
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2002- Revise M1/2-2401 for minimum voltage increases per 06/13/2002
Changes 000691-02-00 MCC electrical calcs.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2003- Replace or modify actuator spring packs with new model 08/25/2003
Changes 000556-01-01 with grease reliefs.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2003- Redesign MOVs 1/2-HV-4572, and 1/2-HV-4574 to ensure 02/18/2004
Changes 002036-01-01 the spline adapter does not disengage from the motor
operator.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2004- Revision 2: 04/16/2007
Changes 000089-02-02 Revised SK-0007 and SK-0013 for a revised lead on 1-TE-
5408 necessary to make
computer point work correctly.
Revision 1:
IDA rollup . Allow JB 1C-448 installation above El. 885'-6",
using Det. 26 from DWG.
Series 0210-TCO-0002. Evaluate anchor spacing
violations caused by installation of 2"
and under Train 'C' conduit supports and existing
component supports.
Revision 0:
Modify the Unit 1 Pressurizer Cubicle as follows:
1. Re-insulate the tailpipe and safety relief valves to
maintain the temperature in the
associated loop seals.
2. Modify the HVAC duct exhaust at El. 905' by adding a
flow splitter in the air stream.
3. Install new surface mounted temperature
instrumentation on the upstream and
downstream sides of the safety relief valves and PORVs.
4. Install new room air temperature monitoring inside the
room.
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2007- Revise M1/2-2401 based on the use of run efficiency in 03/06/2007
Changes 000775-01-00 lieu of pull out efficiency (POE) for 1/2-8000A/B.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2007- Replace spring packs to preclude hydraulic lock for 2- 06/28/2010
Changes 001925-01-02 8100, 2-HV-4075C, 2-HV-8808D, 2-8813, 2-8811A.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2007- REV. 1 - Change affected components to "approved 11/05/2009
Changes 003405-01-01 design" and evaluate potential
impact to the PM basis and activity when the new actuator
cap screws are installed.
REV. 0 - Replace all affected actuator cap screws on
Copes-Vulcan D-100 and D-1000
actuator in response to vendor notification of failures.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2010- This revision provides clarification for the type of heat 10
Changes 000172-46-10 shrink tubing required to cover the end of the shield of a
Hot Short Prevention Cable (HSPC) when the shield is left
floating.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2010- Revision 4 to this FDA is being initiated because the 05/17/2016
Changes 000172-49-04 wrong MCC breaker was identified as an AC. Void MCC
1EB4-2/4B/COMP as an AC for this FDA and pull 1EB4-
2/4M/COMP in as an AC.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2012- Provide drilled and threaded holes in the bottom of the 10/12/2012
Changes 000083-01-01 Limit Switch Cover's (LSC) to relocate the T-drains from
the top of the cover when the embossed name 'Limitorque'
is right side up.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2017- Resolve the System Train problem in Maximo for the 02/14/2017
Changes 000019-01-00 components identified in CR-2016-003343.
71111.21N.02 Engineering FDA-2019- MOV Limit Switch setpoints 05/02/2019
Changes 000051-01-00
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous 5859659 Luminant CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Updated Fire PRA 04/15/2020
Reconciliation Deliverables
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous 661-76268-003 Limitorque Operation and Maintenance Manual and 48
Bulletins
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous CP-0001-009 Westinghouse Valves 35
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous CP-0020B.1-001 Borg-Warner Nuclear Valves 39
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous CP-0020B.1-004 Borg Warner 4-Inch 300 Pounds S.S. Gate Valve 5
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous DBD-ME-229 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 43
Design Basis Document - Component Cooling Water
System
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous DBD-ME-255 Chemical and Volume Control System 50
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous DBD-ME-260 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, 30
Design Basis Document, Residual Heat Removal System
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous DBD-ME-261 Safety Injection System 38
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous VDRT-4575039 Luminant Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Units 1
and 2 Westinghouse Motor Operated Valve Qualifying
Basis
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous VDRT-5168541 Limitorque Operation and Maintenance Manual and 48
Bulletins
71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous VDRT-5384727 Westinghouse Valves 35
71111.21N.02 Procedures ECE-5.07 Design Verification and Control of Quality Software 6
71111.21N.02 Procedures IST-100 Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program 1
71111.21N.02 Procedures IST-101 Risk Informed - Inservice Testing 7
71111.21N.02 Procedures IST-301 Inservice Testing of Motor-Operated Valves 6
71111.21N.02 Procedures IST-302 Inservice Testing of Power-Operated Valves 6
71111.21N.02 Procedures IST-305 Air Operated Valve Program Document 7
71111.21N.02 Procedures IST-321 Position Indications Testing 4
71111.21N.02 Procedures MSE - C0 - 8806 Limitorque Actuator Refurbishment for Types SMB-0 thru 5
SMB-3/SB-0 thru SB-3/SBD-3
71111.21N.02 Procedures MSE-C0-8802 Limitorque Actuator with Springpack 2
Disassembly/Reassembly for SMB/SB/SBD - 0, 1, 2, 3
71111.21N.02 Procedures OPT-512B RHR and SI Subsystem Valve Test 11
71111.21N.02 Procedures PPT-P0-6008 Torque Spring Pack Testing 3
71111.21N.02 Procedures PPT-S0-6000 Motor Operated Valve Risk-Informed IST Testing 3
71111.21N.02 Procedures STA-170 Nuclear Software Quality Assurance Program 7
71111.21N.02 Work Orders 4086531,
265516,
4308127,
4345047,
4367550,
4552167,
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
4570020,
4577132,
4577740,
4615870,
4664908,
4668651,
4695325,
4713437,
4733809,
4734180,
27964,
27979,
4848837,
4848838,
4850482,
4932046,
4953076,
4967821,
4967923,
4986934,
4995345,
5019726,
5035872,
5040406,
5158241,
5161049,
5165114,
5195965,
252829,
262022,
288431,
299794,
5302874,
5314532,
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
25783,
25783,
54531253,
5431855,
5435281,
5471705,
5516458,
20696,
5538796,
5538926,
5558435,
5580769,
5599271,
5599272,
5634652,
5662270,
56899179,
5691577,
5698391,
5691628,
5700872,
5713274,
5713275,
5735550,
5794401,
580769,
5866973,
5896145,
5986934,
5995346
14