ML22280A029
| ML22280A029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/2022 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Kapellas B Entergy Operations |
| George G | |
| References | |
| 05000416/2022013, IR 2022013 | |
| Download: ML22280A029 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000416/2022013
Text
October 11, 2022
Mr. Brad Kapellas, Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 756
Port Gibson, MS 39150
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE
INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2022013
Dear Mr. Kapellas:
On September 8, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you
and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed
report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these
findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited
violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector
at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000416
License No. NPF-29
Signed by Gaddy, Vincent
on 10/11/22
B. Kapellas
2
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
OFFICE
DORS/EB1/SRI
DORS/EB1/SRI
DORS/EB1/RI
DORS/EB2/RI
DORS/SRA
DRS/EB1/C
NAME
GGeorge
JBraisted
DReinert
JLee
D. Loveless
VGaddy
SIGNATURE
/RA/
JBD
/RA/
JEL
DPL
VGG
DATE
10/7/2022
10/11/2022
10/7/2022
10/7/2022
10/11/2022
10/11/2022
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000416
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-013-0000
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Location:
Port Gibson, MS
Inspection Dates:
August 15, 2022, to September 08, 2022
Inspectors:
J. Braisted, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Lee, Reactor Inspector
D. Loveless, Senior Reactor Analyst
D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Grand
Gulf Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight
Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power
reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Perform Diagnostic Testing of Low Margin Valve Within the Required Test Interval
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
Open/Closed
None (NPP)
02
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR
50.55a(b)(3)(ii) when the licensee failed to establish a program to ensure that motor-operated
valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically,
the licensee failed to shorten the diagnostic test frequency for motor-operated valve E21F011
from 10 years to 6 years following the identification of low safety margin for the closed thrust.
Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure
Differential Associated with a Tornado
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
Open/Closed
None (NPP)
92701
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR
50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to assure that applicable
regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures, systems, and components
to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings,
procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Grand Gulf failed to correctly translate the design
basis for tornado depressurization conditions into specifications for the standby service water
system ventilation inlet and exhaust dampers.
Additional Tracking Items
Type
Issue Number
Title
Report Section
Status
Failure to Ensure Standby
Service Water Pump House
Dampers Would Withstand
Pressure Differential
Associated with a Tornado
92701
Closed
3
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a
Requirements
POV Review (IP Section 03) (10 Samples)
The inspectors:
Determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in
accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or
licensing basis.
Determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis
functions.
Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the
capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis
conditions.
Evaluated maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if
accessible).
(1)
High Pressure Core Spray Injection Shutoff Valve 1E22F004
(2)
High Pressure Core Spray Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve 1E22F015
(3)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Drywell Outboard Isolation Valve
1E51F064
(4)
Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Solenoid 1B21F505C
(5)
Residual Heat Removal Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve 1E21F004A
(6)
Low Pressure Core Spray Injection Shutoff Valve 1E21F005
(7)
Low Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow to Suppression Pool Valve 1E21F015
(8)
Containment Cooling Exhaust Containment Vent Valve 1M41F035
(9)
Standby Service Water Loop B Return to Cooling Tower B 1P41F005B
(10)
Standby Service Water Inboard Supply to Drywell Coolers/CCW Heat Exchangers
1P44F054
OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
92701 - Followup
Followup (1 Sample)
4
(1)
Unresolved Item 05000416/2020012-04 Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water
Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure Differential Associated with a
Tornado
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Perform Diagnostic Testing of Low Margin Valve Within the Required Test Interval
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
Open/Closed
None (NPP)
2
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10
CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) when the licensee failed to establish a program to ensure that motor-
operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Specifically, the licensee failed to shorten the diagnostic test frequency for motor-operated
valve E21F011 from 10 years to 6 years following the identification of low safety margin for
the closed thrust.
Description: On March 18, 2016, the licensee completed motor-operated valve (MOV) static
diagnostic testing of low pressure core spray minimum flow valve E21F011 following a
complete replacement of the valve. E21F011 is a 4-inch gate valve which has safety
functions in both the open and closed positions. E21F011 is categorized as a low risk, Joint
Owners Group (JOG) Class B valve.
The licensees MOV periodic verification program is described in procedure EN-DC-311,
MOV Periodic Verification. The licensee is committed to the JOG MOV periodic verification
program summary as described in MPR-2524-A, Revision 1. The JOG program requires that
the interval between periodic verification (i.e., static or dynamic diagnostic) tests be based
upon the MOVs risk significance and safety margin. Valves with smaller margins or higher
risk are tested more frequently to ensure that the MOV functional margin does not decrease
below the acceptance criteria prior to the next test. Procedure EN-DC-311 includes a matrix
which illustrates the required JOG test interval as a function of a valves risk significance and
safety margin.
The inspectors reviewed work order 398999 which recorded the results from the March 18,
2016, test. The work order documented a margin of 2.5 percent for the closed thrust. Per the
JOG MOV program and the EN-DC-311 JOG test interval matrix, Class B valves having a
margin less than 5 percent are required to be tested every 6 years. The inspectors
questioned why no periodic verification tests had occurred since 2016 for valve E21F011. In
response, the licensee concluded that, when initially reviewing the test data in 2016,
engineers had failed to recognize the low margin and had failed to initiate an action to change
the periodic verification frequency from 10 years to 6 years
Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated condition report CR-GGN-2022-08682 to document
the failure to adjust the periodic verification test frequency. The inspectors reviewed recent
quarterly stroke time tests and preventative maintenance records for valve E21F011 and did
not identify any adverse trends or indications of degradation since the 2016 test.
Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2022-08682
Performance Assessment:
5
Performance Deficiency: The failure of the licensee to adhere to the appropriate diagnostic
test interval in accordance with the JOG test interval matrix in procedure EN-DC-311, MOV
Periodic Verification, for valve E21F011 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating
Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent
undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to conduct testing to conduct more
frequent periodic verification testing of a low margin valve can allow for degradation in the
available thrust to go unrecognized and could lead to the failure of the valve to perform its
safety-related functions. This is consistent with more than minor examples 2.a and 2.b of
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0611, Appendix E.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using
Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding
was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the
design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component and that the system,
structure, or component maintained its operability or probabilistic risk assessment
functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to
this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee
performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) states, in part, the licensee must establish a program
to ensure that motor-operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis
safety functions. Procedure EN-DC-311, MOV Periodic Verification, Revision 7, is the
licensee procedure for establishing a program to ensure motor-operated valves continue to
be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.
Contrary to the above, since March 18, 2022, the licensee failed to establish a program to
ensure that motor-operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis
safety functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to conduct periodic verification testing of
valve E21F011 within six years in accordance with EN-DC-311 Table 1, JOG Test Interval
Matrix, to demonstrate that E21F011 continued to be capable of performing its safety
function.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure
Differential Associated with a Tornado
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
None (NPP)
92701
6
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10
CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to assure that applicable
regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures, systems, and components
to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings,
procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Grand Gulf failed to correctly translate the design
basis for tornado depressurization conditions into specifications for the standby service water
system ventilation inlet and exhaust dampers.
Description: As documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2020012(ADAMS No.
ML20336A237), on October 8, 2020, the inspectors identified that the safety-related, standby
service water system pump house inlet and exhaust ventilation dampers were not designed
or purchased to withstand a tornado design basis pressure differential. Calculation MC-
Q1Y47-17001, "Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump House Safety Related Ductwork
for Tornadic Conditions," Revision 0, was performed in response to condition report CR-
GGN-2017-9728; this calculation evaluated the effect of a 3 pounds per square inch-
differential atmospheric pressure change on the ductwork in the standby service water pump
house to ensure it would remain functional. In October 2020, the inspectors noted that the
calculation did not address the inlet and exhaust dampers which could be in their closed
position and subject to differential pressure during a tornado. The inspectors also noted that
the damper purchase specification, 9645-M-617.1, Rev. 11 did not require the dampers to
remain functional after the pressure differential associated with a tornado event. The
inspectors communicated a concern that questioned whether the licensee had assurance that
the dampers would be capable of opening to perform their safety function after a design basis
tornado event. The failure to design the dampers to remain functional after the pressure
differential associated with a tornado event was entered into the corrective action program as
In response to this concern, the licensee issued calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001, "Evaluation of
Standby Service Water Pump House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic Conditions,"
Revision 0. This calculation determined the maximum pressure differential across the closed
dampers, evaluated the structural integrity of the dampers, and concluded that dampers were
robust enough to withstand a tornado depressurization event. However, the inspectors
determined the calculation did not fully demonstrate that the dampers would remain
functional. Specifically, the inspectors had additional questions on the volume of the pump
rooms, the dimensional modeling of openings in the building, and the differences of the
dampers as-built configuration compared to the design assumed in the calculation. Based on
inspectors questions, the licensee completed additional walkdowns which identified
additional as-built differences from the design for building openings and as-built damper
configuration. Because of the additional as-built configuration issues, the licensee determined
additional analysis was necessary to determine if the standby service water ventilation
system would remain operable to meet the specified safety functions. The inspectors issued a
unresolved item (URI 0500416/2020012-04) to review this analysis once it was complete. The
licensee updated the analysis to address the as-built configuration differences and issued
Revision 1 to calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001 in January 2021.
In August 2022, the inspectors reviewed calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision 1, and
completed a walkdown of the standby service water pump house ventilation system to
confirm the calculations assumptions and initial conditions. The results of the calculation
determined that the dampers would remain functional because the results met the
acceptance criteria of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III Appendix F-
1323.1(a). Specifically, primary stresses in the damper blades did not exceed 120 percent of
7
the materials yield strength. However, the inspectors identified that the licensee did not apply
the additional provisions of the Appendix F-1323.1(a) acceptance criteria; specifically, the
results were not compared to the more limiting condition that primary stresses shall not
exceed 70 percent of the materials ultimate stress. The inspectors determined that the
results of the analysis failed the more restrictive acceptance criteria and did not support
functioning of the inlet and exhaust dampers. This concern was entered into the corrective
action program as CR-GGN-2022-08597. The licensee reperformed the analysis with a more
detailed physical model of the damper blades. The new analysis, MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision
2, results determined that the dampers would remain functional.
Corrective Actions: In October 2020, the concern that the safety-related dampers inlet and
exhaust dampers were not designed for design basis tornado differential pressure was
entered into the corrective action program as CR-GGN-2020-10908. A compensatory
measure was initiated for control room operators to start the ventilation system when notified
of tornado warning, until the design analysis could be completed. This action ensured the
standby service water pump house would depressurize to reduce differential pressure across
the dampers. Following inspector review of the analysis, the licensee entered the
misapplication of ASME Code acceptance criteria into the corrective action program as CR-
GGN-2022-08597. The licensee maintained the compensatory measure while a new analysis
was completed. The new analysis, MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision 2, results determined that the
dampers would remain functional.
Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2020-10908 and CR-GGN-2022-08597.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to translate design basis tornado design requirements
into specifications for service water pump house ventilation dampers to ensure that the
dampers remain functional following a design basis pressure differential in accordance with
GDC 2, Design basis for protection against natural phenomena, was a performance
deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, the failure to design the dampers to withstand effects of tornado
depressurization could cause them not to open, which causes standby service water
pumphouse temperatures to exceed equipment limits.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using
the significance determination process mitigating screening questions from MC 0609
Appendix A, the issue screens to a detailed risk evaluation because the degraded condition
represents a loss of the PRA function. The NRC Senior Reactor Analyst performed an initial
detailed risk evaluation.
The Risk Assessment of Operational Events, Volume 2, External Events, Section 5.0,
Other External Event Modeling and Risk Quantification, provides the best method for
quantifying the initiating events of concern for this evaluation. Referenced is the Review of
Methods for Estimation of High Wind and Tornado Hazard Frequencies, prepared by Amitava
Ghosh from the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses and Scot Rafkin, from the
8
Southwest Research Institute, in December 2012. Using these methods, the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Research developed tornado hazard curves for U. S. nuclear power plants. The data
for these curves were published in the Tornado Frequencies by Plant, spreadsheet. The
published frequency of a tornado greater than 200 miles per hour striking the Grand Gulf
Nuclear Station was 1.25E-06/year.
Using hand calculations that were corroborated by several wind loading calculators on the
web, the analyst determined that it would take a wind speed of 400 miles per hour with
negligible local friction to cause a loading equal to the licensees design parameter of 3
pounds per square inch-differential. The inspectors compared the results of the licensees
calculations with the acceptance criteria of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section
III Appendix F-1323.1(a) to determine that, under all conditions, the subject dampers would
have survived a differential pressure of 1.9 pounds per square inch-differential. The analyst
calculated that it would take a wind speed of at least 274 miles per hour to cause a loading of
1.9 pounds per square inch-differential.
A wind speed of 274 miles per hour would be greater than the highest wind ever officially
recorded and is significantly above the 200 miles per hour wind used to calculate the
frequency of an EF-5 tornado striking the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Using a qualitative
assessment of this data along with a hand extrapolation of the hazard curve, the analyst
determined that the frequency of a tornado striking the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station with
maximum wind speed of 274 miles per hour is less than 1.0E-07/year. Because the frequency
of the initiating event alone is below 1.0E-07, this finding is of very low safety significance
(Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to
this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee
performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
Design Control, requires Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory
requirements and the design basis, for those structures, systems, and components to which
this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and
instructions. Contrary to this requirement, from initial licensing to November 2020, failed to
assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures,
systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into
specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Grand Gulf failed to
correctly translate the design basis for tornado depressurization conditions into specifications
for the standby service water system ventilation inlet and exhaust dampers.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI: 05000416/2020012-04.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
9
On September 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance (programs)
inspection and unresolved item follow-up inspection results to Mr. B. Kapellas, Site Vice
President and other members of the licensee staff.
On September 8, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance (programs)
inspection and unresolved item follow-up inspection results to Mr. B. Kapellas, Site Vice
President and other members of the licensee staff.
10
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CC-Q1111-91037
Henry Pratt Valve Analysis
11
GGNS-NE-10-00075
GGNS EPU Containment System Response
2
GGNS-NE-12-00021
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station MELLLA+
Containment System Response
1
M-242.0-Q1E22F004-8.0-1-
0
Design and Seismic Analysis Report for 12 Inch
Class 900 Flex Wedge Gate Valve With SB-3-
150 Actuator
A
MC-Q1111-91132
Minimum Stem Thrust Required for Motor
Operated Gate and Globe Valves
16
MC-Q1111-93035
Calculation of Degraded Voltage Actuator
Capability Torque, Using Motor Torque Derated
for Temperature Effect, for Select Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Gate and Globe Valves
With AC Motor Actuators
15
MC-Q1111-97019
Design Torque Capability of the Actuator
Assemblies Installed on GGNS Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Butterfly Valves
1
MC-Q1E12-94002
Calculation of the Maximum Expected
Differential Pressure for Valves in the Residual
Heat Removal System
3
MC-Q1E21-04019
LPCS flow calc with min flow line open
0
MC-Q1E21-93042
Calculation of the Maximum Expected
Differential Pressure for Valves in the Low
Pressure Core Spray System
0
MC-Q1E22-93043
Calculation of the Maximum Expected
Differential Pressure for Valves in the High
Pressure Core Spray System
0
MC-Q1E30-90054
Calculation of the Maximum Expected
Differential Pressure for Valves in the
Suppression Pool Makeup System
5
71111.21N.02
Calculations
MC-Q1E51-93044
Calculation of the Maximum Expected
Differential Pressure for Valves in the Reactor
1
11
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Core Isolation Cooling System
NPE-E12F004A,B,C
Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation S-
67773
2
NPE-
E12F026A,B/F049/E21F011
Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation S-
67776
3
NPE-E12F042A,B/E21F005
Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation D-
67770
5
NPE-E22F015
Supplement to the Anchor Darling Seismic
Calculation 1815-1
3
NPE-E51F063/F064
Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation D-
67761
5
PC-Q1E22-00002
PPM Thrust Calculation for Motor Operated
Valve Q1E22F004
0
PC-Q1M41-02233
Calculation of the Maximum Differential Pressure
for Air Operated Valve 1M41F035 for GGNS
AOV Program
2
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Report(CR-GGN-)
2014-06703, 2022-06459, 2019-0573, 2020-
02283, 2021-01483, 2021-00599, 2022-00760
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Report(CR-GGN-)
2022-08215, 2022-08218, 2022-08221, 2022-
08226, 2022-08227, 2022-08229, 2022-08244,
2022-08597, 2022-08644, 2022-08681, 2022-
08682, 2022-08597
E-1161-013
B21 Automatic Depressurization System
Safety/Relief Valves
10
E-1183-003
E22 High Pressure Core Spray System Pump
Injection Shut Off Valve F004-C Unit 1
7
M-1086
P&I Diagram, High Pressure Core Spray System
Unit 1
35
M-KA97/0285-01-
Q1E22F004-1.2-001
12-900 LB Flex Wedge Gate Valve, Weld Ends,
Carbon Steel, High Pull-Out Thrust
Requirements, for Limitorque SB-3-150 Actuator
A
Drawings
SFD-1086
System Flow Diagram, High Pressure Core
Spray System
4
Engineering
51117
Flex M41 Vent Child EC 1 - Div 1 Valve and
0
12
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Tubing Modifications
84/3107
Replacement of the Main Steam Safety Relief
Valve Solenoids.
0
1E51F064 LLRT Failure Engr Input CR-GGN-
2018-06132 and 05845
05/31/2018
GGN Appendix J Program Scope Reduction
Evaluation EC
0
ER 97-0282
ER 97/0282-02, Revision 0
SCN 97/0009A to MS-25.0, Revision 11
SCN 97/0006A to ES-18, Revision 1
0
ER-GG-1997-0279-000
MOV Torque Margin Improvement for
Q1P44F067, Q1P44F054, Q1P44F042
0
Changes
MCP 92-1059
Replacement of SMB-000-5/H2BC Actuator
Assemblies on Motor Operated Valves
Q1P41F001A, Q1P41F001B, Q1P41F005A, and
Q1P41F005B with SMB-00-10/H3BC Actuator
Assemblies
0
Engineering
Evaluations
GGNS-92-0035
Evaluation of Safety Related Gate Valves for
Susceptibility to Thermal Binding and Bonnet
Pressurization
3
460000412
Henry Pratt Company Nuclear Class Butterfly
Valves
06/23/05
460002941
GH Bettis Operating and Maintenance
Instructions Disassembly and Assembly,
T3XX-SRX, T3XX-SRX-M3, T3XX-SRX-M3HW,
T4XX-SRX, T4XX-SRX-M3, and T4XX-SRX-
M3HW
05/09/1995
EQDP-EQ27.1
Seitz Type 1166 Control Valves, and Type 6A39
Solenoids
3
Motor Operated Valve - Wiring and Limit Switch
Control
5
GGNS-E-100.0
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Environmental
Parameters for GGNS
10
Miscellaneous
GGNS-EP-10-00001
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JOG MOV Periodic
0
13
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Verification
GGNS-MS-25.0
Mechanical Standard for Motor Operated Valve
Torque and Limit Switches
19
GGNS-MS-56.0
Mechanical Standard for Program Air Operated
Valves
1
GGNS-SDC-E21
System Design Criteria Low Pressure Core
Spray
2
GNRO-2021/00014
Inservice Testing Program Relief Request VRR-
GGNS-2021-1
06/01/2021
SEP-GGNS-IST-1
GGNS Inservice Testing Basis Document
8
SEP-GGNS-IST-2
GGNS Inservice Testing Plan
10
SEP-MOV-GGN-001
GGNS MOV Torque Switch Setpoint
Methodology
1
01-S-07-43
Control of Loose Items, Temporary Electrical
Power, and Access to Equipment
7
CEP-APJ-001
Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing
(10CFR50 Appendix J) Program Plan
7
MOV Thrust / Torque Setpoint Calculations
4
MOV Periodic Verification
7
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Test Data Review
9
MOV Program
8
Event Notification and Reporting
21
Procedures
PC-Q1M41-07014
Calculation of the Required Operating
Thrust/Torque, Actuator Output Capability, and
Available Actuator Capability Margin for Air
Operated Valve 1M41F034/F035
1
Work Orders
Work Order (WO-GGN-)
00042100, 00072001, 00112295, 00150130,
00252759, 00252585, 00278961, 00317907,
00316562, 00348281, 00440583, 00440898,
00454435, 00455126, 00528777, 00529534,
52567149, 52567288, 52619778, 52625484,
52648937, 52694825, 52707023, 52703222,
52703475, 52704867, 52707196, 52711011,
52747632, 52762558, 52798141, 52814606,
14
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
52831672, 52839483, 52839706, 52842249,
52849745, 52850392, 52858527, 52870462,
52876375, 52903814, 52907030, 52907031,
52925992, 52945246, 52935613, 52936488,
52936496, 52936861, 52936866, 52940666,
52941071, 52978087, 52982530, 52985700,
52986599, 52990981, 52993728, 52994677,
52999346, 53002185, 00167219, 00317902,
00423196, 00594499, 00352085, 52947772,
00284155, 00394896, 00398999, 00501196
MC-Q1Y47-20001
Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump
House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic
Conditions
1
MC-Q1Y47-20001
Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump
House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic
Conditions
2
Calculations
XC-Q1Y41-92007
SSW Pump House Room Temperature for a
LOCA and for SSW Pump House Cooling
0
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Report(CR-GGN-)
2017-09728, 2017-09746, 2017-09755, 2020-
10908
Outside Air Fans, SSW Pump House Ventilation
System
4
SSW Pump House Ventilation System Motor
Operated Dampers
5
SSW Pump House "A" Standby Outside Air Fan
3
SSW Pump House "A" Standby Motor Operated
3
Drawings
SSW Pump House Ventilation System Motor
Operated Dampers
1
Engineering
Evaluations
GGNS-NE-16-00004
Time Critical Operator Actions for Grand Gulf
Nuclear Station
5
92701
Miscellaneous
9645-M-619.0
Technical Specification for Miscellaneous Fans
for Mississippi Power & Light Company, Grand
13
15
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
E100.0
Engineering Standard Environmental Parameters
for GGNS
10
04-1-01-Y47-1
Standby Service Water Ventilation System
104
Procedures
04-1-02-1H13-P870
Alarm Response Instruction Panel No: 1H13-
P870
161