IR 05000416/2020013
| ML22034A886 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/2022 |
| From: | Alexandra Siwy Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Franssen R Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2020013 | |
| Download: ML22034A886 (19) | |
Text
February 3, 2022
SUBJECT:
AMENDED - GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2020013 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Franssen:
The NRC is issuing this revision to the subject report to accurately reflect the number of samples that were performed under Inspection Procedure 71111.21N.05, Section 03.01 contained in NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2020013, dated December 3, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20338A271). This section of the original report indicated that two partial samples and four complete samples were documented. This section has been amended to indicate that four partial and zero complete samples were documented.
On November 5, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Brad Wertz, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Enclosure 2 discusses a violation associated with a finding of very low safety significance (Green). The NRC evaluated this violation in accordance Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, which can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The violation is cited in Enclosure 1, Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report (Enclosure 2). The violation is being cited in the Notice because it did not meet the criteria to be treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) since your staff did not restore compliance within a reasonable period of time after a violation was previously identified by the NRC as NCV 05000416/2017008-01, Untimely Corrective Action.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure your compliance with regulatory requirements.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in Enclosure 1, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and emailed to R4Enforcement@nrc.gov.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
This letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Docket No. 05000416 License No. NPF-29
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report 05000416/2020013
ML22034A886 X SUNSI Review By: ADS ADAMS:
X Yes No Sensitive X Non-Sensitive Non-Publicly Available X Publicly Available Keyword NRC-002 OFFICE DRP:C/PBC DRS:C/EB2
NAME JEJosey ADSiwy
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
DATE 2/3/2022 2/3/2022
Enclosure 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Docket No. 50-416 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
License No.: NPF-29
During an NRC inspection conducted from August 10-28, 2020, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In a
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000416
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-013-0006
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Location:
Port Gibson, MS
Inspection Dates:
August 10, 2020, to August 28, 2020
Inspectors:
S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector
S. Graves, Senior Reactor Inspector
N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector, Team Lead
Approved By:
Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a triennial fire protection inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Untimely Corrective Actions Associated with Multiple Spurious Operations Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NOV 05000416/2020013-01 Open
[H.1] - Resources 71111.21N.05 The team identified a Green violation of License Condition 2.C.(41) for the failure to correct a condition adverse to fire protection in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee failed to complete corrective actions for multiple spurious operations concerns previously identified in 2011, for which non-cited violation NCV 05000416/2017008-01 was issued in 2017.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), inspectors were directed to begin telework. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21N.05 - Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI)
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) Credited for Fire Prevention, Detection, Suppression, or Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Review (IP Section 03.01) (4 partial samples)
The inspectors verified that components and/or systems will function as required to support the credited functions stated for each sample. Additional inspection considerations are located in the fire hazards analysis (FHA) or safe shutdown analysis (SSA). All sections of 03.01 were completed for the following samples except subsections b and e.
Subsection b states verify that operator actions can be accomplished as assumed in the licensees FHA, or as assumed in the licensees fire probabilistic risk assessment (FPRA)analysis and SSA. Subsection e states Perform a walkdown inspection to identify equipment alignment discrepancies. Inspect for deficient conditions such as corrosion, missing fasteners, cracks, and degraded insulation. Due to conditions related to COVID19 in the area of the licensee, onsite inspector walkdowns of procedures with licensee operations personnel could not be performed at this time. An inspector will visit the licensee's site to perform this activity at a later date. The results of the additional inspection will be documented in a resident inspector's quarterly report.
(1)
(Partial)
Fire suppression and detection in Fire Area 11, Auxiliary Building, 139 Ft Elevation (Fire Zone CA201)
(2)
(Partial)
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System (LPCI injection valve lE12-F042A (3)
(Partial)
Fire Suppression and detection in Fire Area 31, Switchgear Room (Fire Zone OC202)
(4)
(Partial)
Fire Suppression System - CO2 Cardox System Fire Protection Program Administrative Controls (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors verified that the following fire protection program administrative controls were implemented in accordance with the current licensing basis:
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees control of transient combustibles, fire impairments and compensatory measures.
- (2) The inspectors reviewed procedures for fire protection program changes, fire brigade training, procedures, drills, and qualifications.
Fire Protection Program Changes/Modifications (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the following changes to ensure that they did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown post-fire and to verify that fire protection program documents and procedures affected by the changes were updated.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed EC 73397-Revised Engineering Report GGNS-EE-11-0001, GGNS Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, and EC 86851-Appendix R Updates to Address Non-Cited Violations from the 2017 NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection to address the multiple spurious operations (MSO) items.
- (2) The inspectors reviewed engineering change EC 79268 - Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC) Halon 1301 Fire Protection System Replacement.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Untimely Corrective Actions Associated with Multiple Spurious Operations Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NOV 05000416/2020013-01 Open
[H.1] - Resources 71111.21N.05 The team identified a Green violation of License Condition 2.C.(41) for the failure to correct a condition adverse to fire protection in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee failed to complete corrective actions for multiple spurious operations concerns previously identified in 2011, for which non-cited violation NCV 05000416/2017008-01 was issued in 2017.
Description:
In 2011, the licensee convened an expert panel to evaluate multiple spurious operations scenarios identified in NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Revision 3. The panel identified multiple spurious operations scenarios that were not resolved by the evaluations, procedure revisions, and modifications performed based on the earlier guidance in NEI 00-01, Revision 2.
In 2014, the licensee evaluated these additional multiple spurious operations scenarios in Engineering Change EC51550. The licensee resolved most of the scenarios, but identified five scenarios that required additional evaluation. The licensee transferred the five remaining scenarios to Condition Report WT-WTGGN-2015-00090 to be addressed as a plant project.
In 2017, the triennial fire protection inspection team documented a non-cited violation for the failure to correct a condition adverse to fire protection in a timely manner. Specifically, the team documented that the licensee failed to complete the evaluations for the additional multiple spurious operations scenarios that were identified in 2011. In the inspection report, the team noted that the licensee had
approved project funding for 2017 and 2018. The inspection team issued the inspection report on June 2, 2017 as Inspection Report 05000416/2017008 (ML17156A038).
Subsequent to the 2017 inspection, the licensee completed the evaluations for the multiple spurious operations scenarios in Engineering Change EC73397 in July 2019. The licensee combined two of the scenarios into a single scenario, resulting in four multiple spurious operations scenarios to resolve. The licensee resolved two of the scenarios (2-NEW-7 and 2c) through analysis and credited operator manual actions to resolve the remaining two scenarios (2-NEW-6 and 2p). The licensee updated the safe shutdown analysis to reflect the resolution of these scenarios on July 21, 2020.
Scenario 2-NEW-6 was associated with the spurious start of the non-credited residual heat removal and low pressure core spray pumps without a discharge path, resulting in catastrophic seal failure and the subsequent loss of suppression pool inventory and net positive suction head for the credited safe shutdown pumps. The licensee evaluated this scenario in Calculation MC-Q1111-17002, MSO Scenario: Estimated Time for Operator Manual Action After Multiple Pumps Undergo Dead Head Conditions to Affect NPSH of RHR and LPCS Pumps, Revision 0. The licensee determined a limiting time of 12.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (767 minutes) prior to the loss of net positive suction head for the credited safe shutdown pumps. To resolve this scenario, the licensee added operator manual actions to trip the non-credited residual heat removal and low pressure core spray pumps if the suppression pool level was decreasing during a fire.
Scenario 2p was associated with the spurious start of the non-credited standby service water pump and the spurious opening of three valves in the residual heat removal system. The licensee evaluated this scenario in Calculation MC-Q1111-17004, Impact on SSW Basin A Due to Diversion to Suppression Pool Due to MSO, Revision 0. The licensee determined that it would take approximately 309 hours0.00358 days <br />0.0858 hours <br />5.109127e-4 weeks <br />1.175745e-4 months <br /> for the basin to be depleted to the bottom of the siphon inlet. To resolve this scenario, the licensee added an operator manual action to stop the non-credited standby service water pump for fires in Fire Areas 33, 36, 38, 42, and 50 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The licensee issued Condition Report PR-PRGGN-2019-01617 to revise Procedure 10-S-03-2, Response to Fires, on August 6, 2019. This condition report contained Corrective Action 4, which was created to Coordinate review of the proposed procedure changes (attached to CA2) with the GGNS Fire Protection Engineer (owner of 10-S-03-2). Issue next CA for processing the procedure update for EC73397.
Corrective Action 4 was created on November 24, 2019, with an original due date of January 31, 2020. The due date was subsequently extended four times. The due date was extended the first time due to unanticipated turnover in personnel. The due date was extended two additional times due to a lack of input from the action originator. The due date was extended the final time on June 24, 2020, due to the upcoming arrival of the fire protection inspection team. At the beginning on August 10, 2020, the licensee had not updated this procedure to incorporate the operator manual actions to resolve the final two multiple spurious operations scenarios. The licensee subsequently revised the procedure on September 17, 2020, to incorporate these manual actions in response to concerns raised by the inspection team.
The team determined that the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to fire protection in a timely manner since the licensee failed to incorporate the operator manual actions into the post-fire safe shutdown procedure in a timely manner. The team noted that the multiple spurious operation scenarios were first identified in 2011 and this issue had remained uncorrected for nine years.
The team also reviewed the regulatory requirements associated with multiple spurious operations.
Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3, states that the information included in Appendix H of NEI 00-01 may be used in classifying components on the success path required for hot shutdown and those important to safe shutdown, when applied in conjunction with the regulatory guide. NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Revision 2, Appendix H, Required for Hot Shutdown Versus Important to SSD [Safe Shutdown] Components, provides guidance on the classification of equipment as required for hot shutdown and important to safe shutdown. This guidance states (emphasis added): If the evaluation indicates that there is no impact, for an unlimited amount of time, to the required hot shutdown system to perform its required safe shutdown function, then the flow diversion is classified as non-impacting."
The team noted that the plant could not withstand either of these scenarios for an unlimited amount of time without operator manual actions. Therefore, the flow diversions would not be classified as non--impacting and the flow diversions need to be addressed by the licensee. This provided further evidence that the operator manual actions were required corrective actions and not procedural enhancements.
Corrective Actions: There was no immediate safety concern because the multiple spurious operations scenarios did not prevent the ability to achieve safe shutdown. The licensee subsequently revised the procedure on September 17, 2020, to incorporate these manual actions.
Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2020-09284 and CR-GGN-2020-09285
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to correct a condition adverse to fire protection in a timely manner was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The team evaluated the risk significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated May 2, 2018, because it affected the ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown in case of a fire.
The team assigned the post-fire safe shutdown category to the finding because it involved circuit failure modes and effects (e.g., spurious operation issues).
The team discussed the finding with a senior reactor analyst because the finding involved multiple fire areas. In consultation with the senior reactor analyst, the team determined the risk significance for fire areas outside of the control room and the control room separately.
For fire areas outside of the control room, the team determined the finding was of very low risk significance (Green) in Step 1.4.7 because the impact of the finding was limited to equipment that was not required for the credited safe shutdown success path.
For the control room, the senior reactor analyst performed a Phase 3 evaluation to determine the risk significance because it involved a postulated control room fire that led to control room evacuation. For the control room, the analyst used the fire ignition frequency for the control room listed in the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Engineering Report for Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report, Revision 1, as the best available information. The analyst multiplied the fire ignition frequency (FIFCR) by a severity factor (SF) and a non-suppression probability indicating that operators failed to extinguish the fire within 20 minutes, assuming 2 minutes for detection, and the fire required a control room evacuation (NPCRE). The resulting control room evacuation frequency (FCR-EVAC) was:
FCR-EVAC = FIFCR
- SF
- NPCRE = 9.5E-3
- 0.1
- 1.30E-2 = 1.24E-5/yr
The control room had a total of 43 panels and 15 termination cabinets. The analyst determined that four panels and three cabinets were associated with Scenario 2p and four hot shorts were required in at least two independent panels in order for this scenario to occur. The analyst also determined that three panels were associated with Scenario 2-NEW-6 and two hot shorts in a single panel were sufficient for this scenario to occur.
The analyst calculated a bounding change in core damage frequency (CDF) for each scenario by multiplying the control room evacuation frequency by the fraction of panels and termination cabinets containing the affected circuits and the probability of the hot shorts occurring. The analyst calculated a bounding change in core damage frequency for the finding by adding the change in core damage frequency for each scenario.
CDF2p = FCR-EVAC * (7/58)
- PShort4 = 1.24E-5/yr * (7/58) * (0.64)4 = 2.50E-7/yr
CDF2-NEW-6 = FCR-EVAC * (3/58)
- PShort2 = 1.24E-5/yr * (3/58) * (0.64)2 = 2.62E-7/yr
CDF = CDF2p + CDF2-NEW-6 = 2.50E-7/yr + 2.62E-7/yr = 5.12E-7/yr
This change in core damage frequency was considered to be bounding because it assumed:
- Fire damage in the applicable cabinets would create circuit faults such that the multiple spurious operations scenarios would occur
- The conditional core damage probability given a control room fire with evacuation and the multiple spurious operations scenarios was equal to one
- The probability a hot short occurred is the maximum value of 0.64 provided in NUREG/CR-7150, Joint Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE), Volume 2; and
- The performance deficiency accounted for the entire change in core damage frequency (i.e., the baseline core damage frequency for this event was zero)
In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, dated March 23, 2020, the analyst screened the finding for its potential risk contribution to large early release frequency because the bounding change in core damage frequency provided a risk significance estimate greater than 1E-7/yr.
Given that Grand Gulf Nuclear Station has a Mark III containment, the control room evacuation scenarios of concern do not include intersystem loss of coolant accidents or station blackouts, and the control room evacuation scenarios of concern do not result in a high reactor coolant system pressure, the analyst determined that this finding was not significant with respect to large early release frequency. The analyst determined the finding was of very low risk significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. The team assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources because the licensee failed to provide sufficient resources to complete the corrective actions in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee failed provide sufficient resources to update the analyses and procedures for multiple spurious operations scenarios in a timely manner.
Enforcement:
Violation: License Condition 2.C.(41) requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in Revision 5 to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and as approved in the Safety Evaluations, dated August 23, 1991, and September 29, 2006.
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5.1.3 states, in part, that, as noted in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG 0831), the NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report concluded, based on evaluation of the fire protection program and related commitments, that the fire protection program meets the applicable guidelines of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, dated August 23, 1978.
Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Position C.8, states, in part, that measures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from August 2011 to September 17, 2020, the licensee failed to promptly correct a condition adverse to fire protection. Specifically, the licensee failed to complete corrective actions for multiple spurious operation concerns identified in 2011 and documented as non-cited violation, NCV 05000416/2017008-01, Untimely Corrective Action. The licensee failed to incorporate operator manual actions into the post-fire safe shutdown procedure.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being cited because the licensee failed to restore compliance within a reasonable period of time after the violation was identified consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On November 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the triennial fire protection inspection results to Mr. B. Wertz, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.05 Calculations
GGNS-EE-11-
00001
GGNS Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis (FPP-1)
004
GGNS-NE-10-
00003
GGNS EPU Appendix R - Fire Protection
GGNS-NE-16-
00004
Time Critical Operator Actions for Grand Gulf Nuclear
Station
MC-Q1111-
17002
MSO Scenarios: Estimated Time for Operator Manual
Action After Multiple Pumps Undergo Dead Head
Conditions to Affect NPSH or RHR and LPCS Pumps
MC-Q1111-
17003
Impact of Spurious HPCS on RHR Alternate Shutdown
Cooling
MC-Q1111-
17004
Impact on SSW Basin A Due to Diversion to Suppression
Pool Due to MSO
MC-Q1111-
17006
MOV Thrust Evaluation for MSO 2-NEW-6
MC-Q1B21-
11001
RPV Inventory Loss Through Outboard MSIV Drain Lines
and RHR NPSH During an Appendix R Control Room Fire
MC-Q1B21-
14001
Boiling Off Reactor Inventory through the Steam Line
Drains and MSIV-LCS due to Multiple Spurious
Operations (MSO)
MC-Q1E12-
05007
RHR NPSH During an Appendix R Control Room Fire
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-2002-00645 CR-GGN-2017-03996 CR-GGN-
2017-04011 CR-GGN-2017-04028 CR-GGN-2019-
210 CR-GGN-2019-10214 CR-GGN-2017-03368
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-GGN-2020-08956 CR-GGN-2020-09284 CR-GGN-
20-09285 CR-HQN-2020-01662
Drawings
A-0634
Unit 1 Aux & Diesel Gen Bldg and SSW Pump House -
Fire Protection Floor Plans at El. 133-0 & 139-0
A-KG0630
Control Building Fire Protection Plan
A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
E-1086-001
MCC Tabulation 480 V ESF MCC-16B11, Auxiliary
Building
E-1181-036
Schematic Diagram, E12 Residual Heat Removal System
RHR Injection Valve F0426 (F42-B)
M-1085C
P&I Diagram, Residual Heat Removal Diagram
M-652.0-NS-1.1-
6-C
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Extinguishing System Building
Lay-Out Elev. 113 _ 119FT
M-652.0-NS-1.1-
7-G
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Extinguishing System Building
Lay-Out Elev. 113 _ 119FT
M-652.0-NS-1.1-
8-F
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Extinguishing System One
Hazard Details
M652.0-NS-1.1-
10-E
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Extinguishing System One
Hazard Details
M652.0-NS-1.1-
3-2
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Extinguishing System
M652.0-NS-1.1-
4-D
Low Pressure CO2 Fire Extinguishing System
Engineering
Changes
Revised Engineering Report GGNS-EE-11-0001, GGNS
Appendix R safe Shutdown Analysis to address multiple
MSO items
Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC) Halon 1301
Fire Protection System Replacement
Appendix R Update to Address Non-cited Violations from
the 2017 NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection
Miscellaneous
460000437
Chemetron Fire Systems
01/08/1979
FB Quals
Fire Brigade Member Qualifications
7/15/2020
Water Suppression Effects Study
01/03/1985
GGNS-ME-19-
00002
Engineering Report Review of the Aboveground Metallic
Tanks Program for License Renewal Implementation
GGNS-ME-19-
00005
Engineering Report Review of the Buried Piping and
Tanks Inspection Program for License Renewal
Implementation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
GLP-FB-ELEC
Fighting Electrical Fires
GLP-FB-INTRO
Introduction to Grand Gulf Nuclear Fire
GLP-FB-PPE
Fire Brigade Protective Equipment
GLP-FB-SUPRS
Fire Suppression Techniques
LO-GLO-2018-
00175
GGNS Pre-FPTI (Fire Protection Team Inspection) Self-
Assessment
MSO White
Paper #1
The NRC Inspection Team requested a discussion of the
timeliness of corrective actions for the violations
documented in the 2017 NRC Fire Protection Inspection
Report.
N/A
MSO White
Paper #2
Timeliness of Corrective Actions for 2017 NRC Fire
Protection Inspection Violations
N/A
MSO White
Paper #3
The NRC Inspection Team requested a discussion of the
timeliness of corrective actions for the violations
documented in the 2017 NRC Fire Protection Inspection
Report
N/A
MSO #4
Response
Fourth Response from GG on NOV for untimely MSO
resolution Procedure revision
10/13/2020
N/A
50.59 Evaluation 2020-002 for EC85716
N/A
Licensing Basis Document Change Request LBDCR-
20-0027
04/08/2020
N/A
Process Applicability Determination Form for EC86851
N/A
Process Applicability Determination Form for EC85716
N/A
Technical Data Sheet - 3M' Novec' 1230 Fire
Protection Fluid
01/2020
N/A
Condition Report List - Penetration Seal Work
08/10/2020
Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
1973
NFPA-12A
Standard on Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent
Systems Halon 1301
1973
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
2018
NUC2018139-
NSR-CIF-001
Fire Water Storage Tank A (Interior) As-Found Visual
Coating Condition Assessment Report
08/20/2018
NUC2018139-
NSR-CIF-002
Fire Water Storage Tank B (Interior) As-Found Visual
Coating Condition Assessment Report
08/20/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OBS-2019-67673 CNS Fire Drill Observation
6/28/2019
PR-PRGGN-
2019-01617
Procedure Request PR-PRGGN-2019-01617
PR-PRGGN-
20-00942
Procedure Request PR-PRGGN-2020-00942
PR-PRGGN-
20-01018
Procedure Request PR-PRGGN-2020-01018
Operability
Evaluations
Corrective Action Program
Procedures
04-1-01-P64-3
Fire Protection Cardox System
28
04-1-02-1H13-
P870
Alarm Response Instruction, Panel No.: 1H13-P870
160
04-S-01-P64-1
Fire Protection Water System
05-1-02-II-1
Shutdown from The Remote Shutdown Panel
2
05-1-02-II-1
Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel
05-S-01-EP-3
Emergency Procedure Containment Control
031
06-EL-SP64-R-
0002
CO2 SYSTEMS TIMING RELAY CALIBRATION AND
FUNCTIONAL TEST
104
06-EL-SP64-R-
0003
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE Auxiliary Building CO²
Systems Timing Relay Calibration and Functional Test
103
06-EL-SP64-R-
0005-01
111 Control Building CO2 System Panel N1 P64D207
Timing Relay Calibration and Functional Test
101
06-EL-SP64-R-
0005-01
111 Control Building CO2 System Panel N1P64D207
Timing Relay Calibration and Functional Test
2
06-EL-SP64-SA-
0001
Novec 1230 Detectors and Supervisory Panels Functional
Test
107
06-EL-SP64-SA-
1001
CO2 System Thermal Detectors And Supervisory Panel
Functional Test
106
06-EL-SP65-SA-
0001
Surveillance Procedure Control Building Fire Detector And
Supervisory Panel Functional Test
106
06-ME-SP64-R-
0016
Surveillance Procedure Unit 1 Fire Hose Check
109
06-ME-SP64-R-
0045
Surveillance Procedure Ventilation System Fire Dampers
Inspection
113
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
06-OP-1M61-V-
0003
Surveillance Procedure Local Leak Rate Test - Low
Pressure Water
009
06-OP-SP64-D-
0044
Fire Door Check
119
06-OP-SP64-M-
0011
Surveillance Procedure Fire Protection System Valve
Lineup Verification
116
06-OP-SP64-M-
0043
Fire Door Alarm Check
115
06-OP-SP64-M-
0047
Surveillance Procedure Unit I Fire Hose Station And Fire
Extinguisher Maintenance
119
06-OP-SP64-R-
0002
2
06-OP-SP64-R-
0048
Visual Inspection of Fire Wrapped Raceways
108
06-OP-SP64-R-
0049
Surveillance Procedure Fire Rated Sealed Penetrations
Visual Inspection
2
06-OP-SP64-W-
0045
Weekly Fire Door Check
118
07-1-24-P64-5
Carbon Dioxide Storage Unit Safety Valve Setpoint
10-S-03-2
Response To Fires
030
10-S-03-2
Response to Fires
10-S-03-7
Fire Protection Training Program
016
Fire Protection Impact Reviews
Process Applicability Determination
29
CFR 50.59 Evaluations
Conduct of Operations
28
Fire Brigade Drills
010
SEP-FPP-GGN-
001
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Fire Protection Plan
Work Orders
00492605
SP64F469 Replace CO2 Storage Unit Pressure Relief
Valve
11/12/2019
00492606
SP64F470 Replace CO2 Storage Unit Pressure Relief
Valve
11/12/2019
259153
06OPSP64-R-0049-07 Fire Rated Sealed Penetrations
10/06/2015
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Visual Ins
2655775
06OPSP64-R-0049-02 Fire Rated Sealed Penetrations
Visual Ins
07/01/2017
2716253
06ELSP64-R-0005-01 D207**CNTL BLDG DIV 1 SWGR
ROOM**
01/25/2018
2720762
06OPSP64-R-0002 10 TON CO2 SYSTEM PUFF TESTS 03/24/2018
2745113
06ELSP64-R-0005-04 D212**REMOTE S/D DIV 1 & 2
07/24/2018
2751208
06ELSP65-SA-0001-04 TEST ZONE: 1-04 / CONTROL
BLDG 1
08/21/2018
2805223
06ELSP64-R-0005-01 D207 CNTL BLDG DIV 1 SWGR
RM **DIV 1**
03/20/2019
2814441
06OPSP64-R-0002 10 TON CO2 System Puff Tests
06/09/2019
2833271
06ELSP64-R-0005-04 D212**REMOTE S/D DIV 1 & 2
09/26/2019
2842514
06MESP64-R-0045-01 CNTL BLDG DAMPER
INSPECTION (21 TOTAL )
03/13/2018
2848954
06ELSP64-R-0003-01 1P64D200A**DIV 1 SE SWGR RM
119 A-7
05/16/2020
2850968
06OPSP64-R-0048-06 VISUAL INSPECTION OF FIRE
WRAPPED RACEWAY
05/14/2020
2859363
06OPSP64-R-0049-01 FIRE RATED SEALED
PENETRATIONS VISUAL INS
06/25/2020
2935304
06OPSP64-M-0043 FIRE DOORS ALARM CHECK
07/30/2020