IR 05000395/1979003
| ML19261C671 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1979 |
| From: | Conlon T, Girard E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261C664 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-79-03, 50-395-79-3, NUDOCS 7903280098 | |
| Download: ML19261C671 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES
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101 M ARIETTA STREET. N.W.
- ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30303 o,s,*****/
Report No. : 50-395/79-3 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company P. O. Box 764 Columbia, South Carolina 29218 Facility Name: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. : 50-395 License No.
CPPR-94 Inspection at V. C. Summer Site near Columbia, South Carolina Inspector: b 2, ([79 E. H. Girard Date Signed Approved by
4/ ~7 9 T. E. Conlon, Section Chief, RC&ESB Hate S'igned'
SUMMARY Inspection on January 22-25, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 24 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings, piping cold spring, inspector follow-up items, reactor coolant pressure boundary piping-observation of work and work activities, reactor coolant pressure boundary piping (welding) - observation of work and work activities and reactor coolant pressure boundary piping - review of quality records.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (infraction-use of unapproved tape on stainless steel piping, Paragraph 7).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. F. Algar, Nuclear Site Manager
- D. A. Nauman, QA and Security Manager
- A.
A. Smith, Site QA Coordinator
- T.
A. McAlister, QA Surveillance Specialist Other Organizations K. Heaton, QC Engineer, Daniel Construction Company J. H. Witherspoon, Welding Engineer, Daniel Construction Company
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and firidings were summarized on January 25, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1, above. The noncompliance described in Paragraph 7 and the unresolved item described in Para-graph 8 were discussed briefly with licensee management.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (395/78-15-01), Inadequate procedural requirements and training to assure control of cold spring in piping installation.
The licensee stated that definitive cold spring requirements had been added to his QC procedure QCP-VII-09 (Revision 5), but that revision of the work procedure and training of personnel had not been completed. The inspector reviewed the QC procedure cold spring requirements. This unresolved item will remain open until the NRC verifies full implementation of adequate cold spring requirements.
b.
(Open) Unresolved Item (395/78-04-02), Radiographs of welds FW-3 SP-09 and FW-14 CS-04 exhibited what was interpreted as possible rejectable indications.
The licensee agreed to re-radiograph these welds. The licensee was questioned regarding the status of the reshots. The inspector was informed that the welds had been physically inaccessible but would be radiographed when accessible again. This unresolved item will be reinspected late.
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-2-No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified in investi-gating the unresolved items.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 8.
5.
Independent Inspection The inspector examined flanged piping connections at two safety injec-tion charging pumps for cold spring. Two connections were examined at each pump. The code for the piping at the pumps is ASME Section III Class 2 (71 S73). The licensee's cold spring requirements are described in specification SP-220-044461-000 Revision 3, work procedure WP-VII-09 Revision 7, and quality control procedure QCP-VII-09 Revision 5.
Three of the connections inspected were restrained by pipe supports within a few feet of the flanges, such that only relatively severe cold spring could be detected.
The fourth connection was free of restraint for more than about 20 feet. When studs at the pipe flanges were loosened, freeing the connection, no movement occurred at any of the flanges. There was no evidence of cold spring.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Inspector Follow-Up Items (IFI)
a.
(Open) IFT (395/78-16-03), Licensee investigation and evaluation of findings with regard to unsatisfactory structural welding and welding inspection for cable tray and conduit supports.
The licensee informed the NRC inspector that re-inspection and evalua-tion of cable tray support welds had been completed and that tr.ls work had been given a use-as-is disposition. The re-inspection and evaluation of conduit supports was reported to be still in progress. The NRC inspector informed the licensee that the item would be re-examined in a subsequent inspection.
b.
(Closed) IFI (395/78-27-03), Attachment and resolution informa-tion not properly entered in appropriate spaces on some Type I electrical surveillance reports. The inspector reviewed surveil-lance reports 1-7, 1-83 and 1-119 and found the information properly entered.
It was noted that surveillance reports are no longer being categorized into specialty areas (i.e.,
civil, electrical or mechanical). The inspector has no further question on this ite.
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-3-No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified during the examination of inspector follow-up items.
7.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping-Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined non-weld related aspects of installed reactor coolant pressure boundary piping to determine compliance with applicable installation requirements described in the licensee's drawings and procedures. The code applicable to this piping is ASME Section III Class 1 (71 S73).
Procedural requirements were determined from the following licensee work and QC procedures:
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WP-VII-05
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QCP-VII-05 WP-VII-09
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QCP-VII-09 The installed piping runs inspected and the drawings for each run are listed below:
Piping Run Inspected Isometric Drawing Steam Generator to Reactor RC-06C Coolant Pump (Loop C)
Reactor Vessel Cold Leg (Loop B)
RC-06B Pressurizer Surge Line RC-01 In examining the B loop cold leg on January 24, 1979, the inspector observed a piece of tape commonly termed " duct" tape on the stainless steel pipe adjaccut to weld FW-22.
Licensee procedure WP-VII-05, Revision 4, paragraph 3.6-11 lists three tapes approved for use on stainless steel piping.
" Duct" tape is not included.
The licensee stated he had reported use of the unapproved " duct" tape on stainless steel in two of his recent nonconformance notices (NCN's). The inspector verified one of these (NCN No. 0592, dated January 16, 1979). The use of unapproved tape observed by the NRC inspector represents noncom-pliance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, as implemented by paragraph 17.1.5 of the licensee's FSAR. The noncompliance is cate-gorized as an infraction and is identified as item 395/79-03-01. A similar item of noncompliance by the licensee was cited in Report No.
50-395/78-15. No deviations and no items of noncompliance, othei than 395/79-03-01 described above, were identified in the areas inspecte.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Welding)-Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector observed field welding and welding-related work activities for reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) piping. The code applicable to RCPB piping is identified in paragrah 7, above.
The licensee implements NRC requirements and his FSAR commitments for this work through his specification, procedures and drawings. Specification and general procedural requirements for the activities observed by the NRC inspector were determined from the specification and procedures listed below:
Specification SP-220-044461-000 Work Procedures WP-VII-02, WP-VII-03, and WP-VII-09 Welding Procedures WE-II-02 and WE-II-03 QC Procedures QCP-II-02, QCP-II-03, QCP-II-06, QCO-VII-02, QCP-VII-03, and QCP-VII-09 Observation of field welding and welding-related activities included, where applicable, the following areas: weld identification and location, qualified weld procedure, welder qualification, specified weld material, specified purge, specified temperature (pre-heat and interpass),
welding variables within limits, evidence of QC verification, physical appearance of weld, control of unused weld material at work locations, and sufficient QA and inspection personnel. Each of the welds observed in this inspection were in progress beyond the root pass. The welds were identified as:
Weld Number Pipe Size Isometric Joint *
Welding Procedure FW-3C1 12.75x1.125 RH-09 PE 8-8-BA-3 FW-14R7 32x2.21 RC-06C PW 8-43-BA-3 and Repair Instr.
907-1
- PE is pipe to elbow, PW is pipe to weld metal (butter)
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-5-Welder qualifications were verified from the licensee's list of quali-fied welders.
Weld material control was examined for proper identification, segregation, oven temperature, use and completion of issuance slips, and control of unused material at issue stations W.R #3 and W.R #4.
In reviewing the licensee's work and QC requirements applicable to RCPB pipe welding, the NRC inspector found that this licensee's engi-neering specification SP-220-044461-000 Revision 3 (paragraph 1.14.8-1A)
designated certain welds to be " flush welds" in accordance with NB-3683.2-1 of ASME Section III (71 S73). This requirement was specified for all field welds in the reactor coolant loop piping and the welds at either end of the pressurizer surge line.
The inspector was unable to find any procedural requirements or written instructions in the licensee's documents to implement grinding the welds flush to the code requirements or for verification that they met the requirements. Cognizant licensee contractor (Daniel Construction Company) welding and QC engineering personnel verified that they did not have such requirements included in their procedures or instructions but stated that they had verbally requested flush grinding of the welds.
In observing the three RCPB pipe runs described in paragraph 7, above, the NRC inspector verified flush grinding of the 0.D.'s of the welds in those runs. In addition, the inspector examined the I.D.'s of all reactor vessel nozzle to pipe welds and found them ground. The inspector requested that the licensee inspect all of the welds subject to the " flush" requirement and document their compliance with the code requirements. The licensee agreed to do so.
Verification that the flush grinding requirement has been met is being designated an unresolved item and will be identified as item 395/79-03-02.
In the areas described above, no deviations er items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Welding)-Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed quality related records relative to completed field welding of RCPB piping. The code applicable to RCPB piping is identified in paragraph 7 above. Records for six welds were examined for compliance with applicable procedure requirements in areas which included visual and dimensional inspection, weld history, preheat and interpass temperature, NDE including radiographs, weld repair, welder qualifications and inspector qualifications.
Licensee procedural requirements in the above noted areas were determined from the following work, welding and QC procedures:
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-6-Work and Welding Procedures WP-VII-02 and WE-II-03 QC Procedures QCP-II-03 and QCP-II-06 and QCP-VII-02 The welds for which records were examined are identified as follows:
Weld Pipe Size Isometric Drawing FW-21 32x3.1 wall RC-06B FW-22 33x2.3 wall RC-06B FW-1 31x2.5 wall RC-06C FW-3 31x2.5 wall RC-06C FW-1 14x1.4 wall RC-01 FW-2 14x1.4 wall RC-01 Note:
The above welds are located near the 412 foot level in the reactor building.
In the areas inspected, no deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.