IR 05000395/1979035
| ML19309F602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1980 |
| From: | Long F, Marsh R, Mcguire D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309F596 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-79-35, NUDOCS 8004300135 | |
| Download: ML19309F602 (24) | |
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p2 arroq'o UNITED STATES gs c
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ATLANTA, G EORGIA 30303
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IE Investigation Report No. 50-395/79-35 SUBJECT:
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket Number 50-395 Allegations regarding welding and inspection practices Period of Investigation:
September 10 - December 19, 1979 uT~
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Investigators:
u D. R. McGuire, Investigator Date, Office of the Director r
J-f-N R. W Marsh, Investigator Date
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Of 'c. o thgDirector N/stV a+a A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Date Reactor Construction and Engineering Su port Bran h
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ata E. H. Girard, Reactor Inspector Date
, } Reactor Construction and Engineering S ppp t Bra ch (
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f)J. J. Blake, Metallurgical Engineer Date Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Bran
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Reviewed by:
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F. J. Long, A6tinti Dirept'or 4) ate i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS s
I. INTRODUCTION
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II. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION III. CONCLUSIONS IV. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION A.
Persons Contacted B.
Allegations, Discussions and Findings C.
Additional Items Identified During Investigation
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I. INTRODUCTION An individual contacted the NRC Region II office on August 31, 1979, expres-sing his concern with regard to velding and inspection practices and the use of drugs and liquor at South Carolina Electric and Gas Company's (SCE&G)
Virgil C. Sumner Nuclear Station. Representatives of Region II subsequently met with the individual to discuss his concerns on September 10, 1979.
Telephone conversations were held with the individual to further discuss his concerns on October 30 and 31 and November 7, 9, 20, and 22, 1979. As a result, an investigation was initiated into the following allegations:
A.
QC inspectors were not adequately trained to determine fillet sizes on socket welds. The welders used just enough weld material to get the job passed by the inspectors, who they knew, in some cases, did not know what an adequate weld was.
Necessary tools, such as fillet size gages, were not available. This resulted in preparation and accep-tance of many undersize socket welds. Examples of socket welds which do not meet specified requirements may be observed in Schedule 160 piping in the Reactor Coolant (RC) Safety Injection (SI), and Chemical Volume Control (CS) systems. Examples of specific locations include socket welds on Isometric Drawings (ISO) DE-SI-04 and DE-CS-24, 25, and 26.
(The alleger believes 40% to 50% of all socket welds on safety-related piping in the plant are undersized.)
B.
Rotary wire brushes used for cleaning of pipe and welds during prepa-ration, in process, and after completion were not stainless steel as required, but rather carbon steel brushes were used. Examples of welds subjected to improper brushing and which subsequently rusted can be observed throughout the Waste Disposal (WD) system piping.
C.
QC welding inspectors sometimes signed off as inspecting welds before the welds were performed. This took place in the Fab Shop area.
Three inspectors were named, one of whom was identified as the main offender. Specific examples of items on which inspections were bypassed could not be identified.
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QC inspectors were not adequately trained to perform high-low checks on butt weld fit-ups.
It was common practice when butt weld fit-up problems with high-low checks were encountered to relieve high areas by the grinding away (where accessible in 12-inch diameter and larger pipe) the interior of the pipe surface so that an " apparent" acceptable high-low check would result. Minimum wall thickness limits were frequently not met.
Exterior misalignment continued to be visible on such pipe. Potential examples were identified by the alleger as being in the Service Water (SW) intake pipe and in Component Cooling (CC)
system pipe at the 412 elevation in the Intermediate (IM) Building.
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E.
High-low code requirements on the butt welds were violated on some
difficult to reach welds with the knowledge of both the QC inspector and the welding supervisor (specific examples could not be identified).
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Non-code piping was upgraded to (ASME Section III) Class I with no evidence of proper testing and documentation. The alleger recalls that the Class 1 and non-code pipe differed visibly in surface finish.
The Class 1 pipe was " shiny", while the non-code pipe had a " mill skin" on it.
The alleger believes the heat number recorded on the documentation was a carryover from previously used Class 1 pipe rather than the actual heat number on the pipe being substituted. The pipe may still carry its true heat number. He further stated that the pipe was 2" Sch 160. He thought it was used in the RC system about June or July 1978. About 18 or 20 pieces were used.
G.
A fitting was identified as a 6,000 lb. fitting, but based on its size relative to the piping in which it was being installed, it appeared to the alleger to be a 3,000 lb. fitting instead of a 6,000 lb. fit' ting.
The alleger stated that the fitting was a 2x1 reducing insert and that he believed it was installed in the RC, CS or SI system.
H.
Sometimes pipe was not properly withdrawn from sockets prior to making socket welds. The frequency of lack of proper withdrawal in socket welds from the Fab Shop should be 25% or less.
Pipe not being cut sufficiently square contributed to this problem. The alleger could not identify specific examples.
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QC inspectors and others use alcohol and drugs on the job.
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Service water line piping was damaged (arc-burns) while cutting lugs
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on nearby items. The damaged area was ground, welded, and ground again to hide the damage. The QC inspectors did not know of the work and did not perform the required inspections. This piping is inacces-
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sible now because it is buried.
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The alleger was performing a qualification test by welding a "Carpen-ter 20" stainless steel test sample. The test sample was submitted and accepted by radiographic examination even though the alleger noted cracking in the test weld. This was not for safety-related welding
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certification. The alleger speculated that this might also have occurred in qualification testing for safety-related welding. He did not know of any such cases however.
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Carbon steel plates in the incore pit liner were improperly installed with backing strip clearances in excess of the required 1/16 inch.
The backing strips were not close enough to the vertical welds for the first sections put in at the bottom. No backing strips were used on the horizontal welds.
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Welds on the carbon steel plates in the liner of the incore pit in some instances entrapped substantial amounts of slag yet were subse-quently ultrasonically tested as acceptable. The alleger is concerned that the nondestructive test examiners were either improperly trained or falsified their findings.
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Welders not properly qualified or certified performed welding on the incore pit liner during late 1976 or early 1977. One of these welders also welded stainless steel at unspecified locations in the IM building while uncertified. The individuals were not identified as performing these welds in the records.
O.
Welders sometimes violated welding requirements (on socket welds) to expedite their work. Examples of violations included single pass welds and undersized fillets on socket welds performed in the Fab Shop. The welding supervisor condoned this practice as a means of expediting work. On occasion workers would not be permitted to leave the job until assigned work was complete.
It should be noted that in several instances where the alleger provided l
specific information related to inadequate workmanship, he indicated 'that
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this knowledge was based on the fact that he had personally performed the inadequate work.
The investigation at the Summer site commenced on September 10, 1979.
During the period of October 29 thru December 19, 1979, the investigators interviewed 33 individuals currently or formerly employed at the site.
In addition to conducting interviews, the investigators reviewed procedures
and records and examined installed piping.
The onsite investigation was concluded on December 19, 1979, with a meeting of NRC and the Summer management during which the preliminary results of the investigation were outlined. During the investigation, three additional items unrelated to the allegations were identified.
On November 2, 1979, the investigators notified the licensee of the first two of these items which were a noncompliance (395/79-35-01, Procedural Omission of Fillet Size Requirements for Socket-Welding Flanges) and an t
unresolved item (395/79-35-03, Missing Documentation of Flange Traceability Information and Installation Verification). On December 19, 1979, the licensee was informed of the third item, an unresolved item (395/79-35-07, Adequacy of UT Utilized to Justify Upgrading Class 2 Piping to Class 1).
This investigation was conducted under the authority provided by Part 1.64, Title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations and required a total of 200 man-hours of investigative effort.
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II. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION The scope of the investigation included the following:
A.
Interviews with 33 engineers, welders, fitters, inspectors and super-visors employed or formerly employed at the Summer site.
B.
Review of licensee requirements for pipe welding and installation, inspection, and documentation.
C.
Review of documentation for piping.
D.
Examination of piping and piping welds.
E.
Measurement of weld size for selected socket welds.
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III. CONCLUSIONS A.
One allegation was substantiated and was identified as an item of noncompliance (see paragraph IV.B.1).
B.
Safety significance could not be substantiated for three of the allega-tions (see paragraphs IV.B.2, IV.B.9 and IV.B.11).
C.
The status of the remaining allegations is unresolved. They have been identified as unresolved items and will be examined further in subse-quent inspections (see paragraphs IV.B.3, IV.B.8, IV.B.10, IV.B.12 and IV.B.15).
D.
During the course of the investigation, one noncompliance (see paragraph IV.C.1) and two unresolved items (see paragraphs IV.C.2 and IV.C.3)
not directly related to the allegations were identified.
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Persons Contacted In addition to the alleger the following individuals were contacted:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G)
J. F. Algar, Site Manager O. S. Bradham, Plant Manager D. A. Nauman, Manager of QA and Security D. R. Moore, Director of Surveillance Systems J. M. Woods, QC Manager A. A. Smith, Site QA Coordinator
T. A. McAlister, QA Surveillance Specialist
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M. W. Eddings, General Superintendent - Welding Daniel Construction Company (DCC)
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C. C. Wagoner, Project Manager J. M. Harvey, Construction Manager W. L. West, Project Quality Manager NRC Resident Inspectpr J. L. Skolds Thirty-three other personnel including engineers, craftsmen, inspectors, and supervisors were interviewed on and off site.
Note:
The pronoun "he" is used throughout this report without regard to the sex of the individual to protect the identity of confidential sources to the maximum extent possible.
B.
ALLEGATIONS, DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS
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1.
ALLEGATION
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s QC inspectors were not adequately trained to determine fillet sizes on socket welds. The welders used just enough material to get the job passed by the inspectors, who they knew, in some cases, did not know what an adequate weld was. Necessary tools, such as fillet size gages, were not available. This resulted in preparation and acceptance of many undersize socket welds.
Examples of socket welds which do not meet specified requirements may be observed in schedule 160 piping in the Reactor Coolant (RC), Safety Injection (SI), and Chemical Volume Control (CS)
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Systems. Examples of specific locations include socket welds on Isometric Drawings (ISO) DE-SI-04 and DE-CS-24, 25 and 26.
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alleger believes 40% to 50% of all socket welds on safety-related piping in the plant are undersized.)
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DISCUSSION The investigators reviewed licensee requirements, examined socket welds and obtained measurerents on selected examples, interviewed personnel, and reviewed documentation for measured socket welds.
a.
Requirements The Summer FSAR, Table 3.2.1, designates ASME Section III as the applicable Code for safety-related piping with edition and addenda based on contract award date. The licensee identifies the edition and addenda as 1971, Summer 1973 in his procedures. DCC inspection procedure QCP-II-06, R4,
" Visual Inspection of Welds", references the welding tech-nique sheets for socket weld size requirements. Welding technique sheets 1-1-B-11, R2 and 8-8-B-11, R3 specify the minimum socket weld size as 1.09 x pipe thickness, but not less than 1/8" for ASME Section III piping. This is the requirement specified in ASME Section III (71S 73).
b.
Examination and Measurement of Socket Welds The investigator examined socket welds from the ISO locations identified by the alleger (see above) and from piping in the RC, WD and,EF (Emergency Feedwater) systems. The piping included welds from all three ASME Section III Classes and of both carbon and stainless steel. From the welds observed the investigator selected 46 for size measurement. He deliberately chose the smaller welds in each location and size category observed. Measurements were performed by the licensee's inspector and were witnessed and recorded by the investigator. Twenty-six of the 46 welds were found to be undersize.
Some examples of the undersize welds are listed below:
Applicable ISO Weld Welding Technique Sheet DE-SI-04 SW-31 8-8-B-11
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DF-CS-02 SW-4 8-8-B-11 DE-CS-24 FW-27 8-8-B-11 DE-EF-09 FW-3 1-1-B-11 DE-RC-08 SW-3 8-8-B-11 These examples of welds which fail to meet the size require-ments of the applicable Technique Sheets are considered to be a noncompliance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B
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which the licensee implements through Section 17.1.5 of the FSAR.
It is categorized as an infraction and is identified as item 395/79-35-02, " Undersize Socket Welds".
This item was subsequently identified to Region II as a 50.55(e) item on November 5,1979. The 30-day report was provided on December 5, 1979.
c.
Interviews A total of 14 inspectors, welders and fitters were questioned as to the cause of the undersize welds after the noncompliance had been identified. Each of these individuals had been directly involved with the fabrication or inspection o,f socket welds. They identified the primary cause to be inadequate training and unavailability of gages, with welders relying on the inspectors to indicate proper sizes. Other factors mentioned as contributing to the situation included
insufficient numbers of inspectors, the unavailability of Welding Technique Sheets in some areas, and inadequate management support of inspectors' decisions in borderline acceptance determinations.
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d.
Review of Documentation
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The investigator reviewed the documentation for the welds inspected and the licensee's listing of nonconformance
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reports and surveillances. The weld documentation was examined to determine whether the undersize welds might be attributed to specific welders, inspectors or other factors.
No clear trends were noted. The licensee's nonconformance reports and surveillances were reviewed for any indication that undersize socket welds had been previously identified but not properly addressed by corrective action. There was no evidence of this. Also, there was no apparent indication that the licensee had ever examined socket weld size in his
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surveillance program.
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FINDINGS
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The allegation was substantiated. One item of noncompliance was identified as noted above. No deviations were identified.
2.
ALLEGATION Rotary wire brushes used for cleaning of pipe and welds during preparation, in process, and after completion were not stainless e
steel as required, but rather carbon steel brushes were used.
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Examples of welds subject to improper brusting and which subse-quently rusted can be observed throughout the Waste Disposal (WD)
system piping.
DISCUSSION The NRC does not consider the use of carbon steel brushes on stainless steel to be harmful.* Violations of controls on such practices would be considered to have safety significance only if they were so extensive as to represent a flagrant disregard for procedural requirements. The NRC investigators reviewed procedural requirements, examined piping, interviewed personnel, and examined documentation relative to the subject allegation as described below.
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Requirements The licensee's requirements relative to use of brushes on
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stainless steel pipe are given in DCC Welding Procedure WPS 8-8R15, " Welding of Stainless Steel".
This procedure requires that brushes for use on stainless steel be " stain-less steel brushes that have not been used on materials other than stainless steel".
b.
Examination of Piping The NRC investigator examined runs of piping in the WD, RC, CS and SI systems for evidence of rust at welds. Some evidence of rust was found at or near welds in all four systems and was seen with greatest frequency in the WD system.
c.
Interviews Nine welders and fitters anj two inspectors were asked whether they were aware of any use of carbon steel brushes on stainless steel piping. Ten individuals stated they were not.
One stated he had seen improper brushes used.
d.
Review of Documentation l
The investigator reviewed the licensee's nonconformance reports for violations regarding improper use of carbon
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steel brushes on stainless steel. None was found.
- Reference USAEC Memo of April 30, 1974, R. T. Carlson, Chief, Facility Construction and Engineering Support Branch, Region I from K. V. Seyfrit, Chief, Technical Assistance Branch, Directorate of Regulatory Operations.
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The investigator also reviewed memos and data from the licensee's files which expressed concerns with regard to rust found at stainless steel welds and attributed such rust to material changes produced by the heat of welding. These documents also indicated that tests performed to determine
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whether such conditions were harmful proved negative. The i.
i licensee documents reviewed included SCE&G QA Telephone and Conference Memot'ndum of March 20, 1978, by T. Frady, and a letter from C. H. Steck of Southwest Fabricating to M. Sedlack of Gilbert Associates, Inc., dated March 27, 1978.
FINDINGS No evidence was found of any flagrant disregard for licensee requirements in regard to this area. Therefore the allegation is not considered to have safety significance. Further, while rusting was noted at stainless steel welds, the licensee provided an alternate explanation to that of the alleger for its presence.
Because of the apparent lack of safety significance, the investi-gators will make no further attempt to establish the cause of the rust at the welds.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
ALLEGATION
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QC inspectors sometimes signed off as inspecting welds before the welds were performed. This took place in the Fab Shop area.
Three inspectors were named, one of whom was identified as the main offender. Specific examples of items on which inspections were bypassed could not be identified.
DISCUSSION The investigators interviewed 23 inspectors, welders, fitters, and supervisors relative to this allegation. Thirteen of these individuals had either been employed in the Fab Shop or had visited there frequently for inspections. Each individual was
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asked whether he had knowledge of inspectors signing off inspec-tions of welds before the welding was performed. Twenty-one stated they did not.
Two stated that they did and named the inspector who had been identified by the alleger as the main offender. There was no confirmation that the two other inspectors identified by the alleger had bypassed inspections.
FINDINGS The allegation was partially substantiated in that two of the individuals interviewed agreed that one of the named inspectors had bypassed inspections. The investiagtor has requested the licensee to include this inspector's work in with other planned s. --
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reinspections and evaluations of areas questioned in this investi-gation (see, for example, IV.B.8 below). The allegation with regard to the one inspector and its significance with regard to inspections he performed will be examined further in subsequent inspections.
It is identified for record as unresolved item 395/79-35-04, "QC Inspector's Work Questioned Because of Reportedly Bypassed Inspections".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
ALLEGATION QC inspectors were not adequately trained to perform high-low checks on butt weld fit-ups.
It was common practice when butt weld fit-up problems with high-low checks were encountered to relieve high areas by the grinding away (where accessible in 12-inch diameter and larger pipe) the interior of the pipe sur-face so that an " apparent" acceptable high-low check would result.
Minimum wall thickness limits were frequently not met. Exterior misalignment continued to be visible on such pipes.
Potential examples were identified by the alleger as being in the Service Water (SW) intake pipe and in the Component Cooling (CC) system pipe at the 412 elevation in the Intermediate (IM) Building.
DISCUSSION
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The investigators reviewed licensee requirements, examined butt welds in piping, interviewed personnel and reviewed documentation for butt welds.
a.
Requirements As noted in IV.B.1 above, the applicable Code for safety-related piping is ASME Section III (71S73). The Code specifies fit-up dimensions (which are verified in high-low checks) and exterior alignment requirements for final welded joints. The investigator initiated a review of licensee implementing procedures and drawings which will be completed in a subsequent inspection.
b.
Examination of Butt Welds in Piping The investigator, assisted by the licensee's inspector, began examination of CC system piping at the 412 level in the IM Building. The piping was visually examined for weld joint 0.D. misalignment at or near the Code maximum. None was found. Further examination will be conducted in a subsequent inspection.
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Interviews The investigators interviewed 17 welders, fitters, inspectors, and engineers with responsibilities in the area of safety-related pipe butt welding. These personnel were asked whether they had knowledge, direct or indirect, that inspec-tors were not properly trained to perform high-low checks and that this resulted in unacceptable welds.
(Note: At the time of these interviews the alleger had not yet informed the NRC of the alleged overgrinding of misaligned weld
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I.D.s).
Two individuals stated that they knew of several isolated instances where fit-ups that did not meet require-ments were accepted by QC inspectors. They both stated that these were x-rayed welds and had to be cut out and rewelded.
The other individuals interviewed responded "no" to the
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question.
d.
Review of Documentation for Butt Welds
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The investigator began a -review of documentation for CC system butt welds located on the 412 elevation of the IM Building. Welds were identified for possible future exami-nation and welders and inspectors were identified for possible future interviews.
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FINDINGS
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Investigation of this allegation is incomplete.
The licensee has agreed to select and sample welds for evidence of alleged I.D.
misalignment. This work will be reviewed in subsequent NRC inspections. The allegation will be considered an unresolved item, identified as 395/79-35-05; "Fitups for Butt Welds Did Not Meet Requirements and Grinding to Correct the Misalignment Resulted
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in Underwall Conditions".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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ALLEGATION High-low Code requirements on the butt welds were violated on some difficult to reach welds with the knowledge of both the QC inspector and the welding supervisor (specific examples could not be identified).
DISCUSSION The investigators interviewed 13 welders, fitters, inspectors and engineers relative to this allegation. All of these individuals had responsibilities with regard to safety-related pipe butt
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welding. Each was asked if they had knowledge of any instances where butt weld fit-ups did not meet requirements but were accepted
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and welded. Eleven of those questioned stated they did not know of any such instances. The two individuals who replied positively to questioning with respect to allegation 4 above, indicated they knew of isolated instances where fit-ups not meeting requirements were accepted sud welded. Neither individual knew whether inspectors or supervisors were aware that the fit-ups were unacceptable.
As-noted for allegation 4 above, the improperly fit-up welds were stated to have been cut out and repaired.
FINDINGS The validity of this allegation remains unresolved.
It will be examined further in light of information provided from the licensee's program for fit-up checks relative to allegation 4 described above.
It has been identified as unresolved item 395/79-35-14, " Violation of High-Low Code Requirements on Difficult to Reach Welds".
6.
ALLEGATION Non-code piping was upgraded to (ASME Section III) Class I with no evidence of proper testing and documentation. The alleger recalls that the Class 1 and non-code pipe differed visibly in surface finish. The Class 1 pipe was " shiny", while the non-code pipe had a " mill skin" on it.
He believes the heat number recorded on the documentation was a carryover from previously used Class 1 pipe rather than the actual heat number on the pipe being substi-tuted. The pipe may still carry its true heat number. He further stated that the pipe was 2" Sch 160. He thought it was used in RC system subassemblies during June or July 1978.
(About 18 or 20 pieces were used.)
DISCUSSION The investigators reviewed licensee requirements, examined piping, interviewed personnel and reviewed documentation relative to this allegation.
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Requirements As noted in IV.B.1 above, the applicable Code for this piping is ASME Section III (71S73) which provides the require-ments for testing, traceability, and documentation for the subject piping. Traceability between test reports and actual piping is required. The licensee maintains this traceability through heat and/or serial numbers that are identifiable to certified test reports.
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b.
Examination of Piping The investigators examined piping from ISO DE-RC-08 which the licensee identified as the only Class 1, 2" Sch 160 RC system pipe assembled in June or July 1978. All but one short piece of this pipe was identified with a heat number and it appeared that the heat number might have been removed from that piece by cleaning. RC-08 did not include sufficient pipe to account for the 18 or 20 pieces indicated by the alleger.
c.
Interviews The investigators interviewed 16 welders, fitters and inspectors.
Nine of these individuals worked in the Fab Shop where, piping like that described by the alleger would have been assembled. They were asked if they knew of any non-code piping being substituted for safety-related piping. Fifteen replied "no".
One stated that he did. This latter individual indicated he thought it occurred about March or April 1979.
d.
Review of Documentation The investigator reviewed the documentation for ISO DE-RC-08.
The heat numbers recorded matched those on the pipe.
The investigator also reviewed a noncompliance (DCC Noncon-formance Notice 1094 dated September 31, 1979) relative to
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use of pipe that had been identified as Class 2 in a Class 1 system.
Its use in the Class I system was determined accept-able by the licensee based on a review of test data and receipt inspection records for the piping.
FINDINGS The investigation of this allegation is incomplete. Additional piping and documentation will be examined in subsequent NRC inspec-tions. This allegation will be investigated further as an
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unresolved item, identified as 395/79-35-06, "Small Diameter Non-code Piping Used in ASME Section III Class 1 Application".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
ALLEGATIONS
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A fitting was identified as a 6,000.1h fitting, but based on its size relative to the piping in which it was being installed, it appeared to the alleger to be a 3,000 lb. fitting instead of a
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6,000 lb. fitting. The alleger stated that the fitting was a 2x1 l
reducing insert and that he believed it was installed in the RC, l
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DISCUSSION The investigators reviewed requirements, examined piping and interviewed personnel as indicated below relative to the possible existance of underwall fittings installed in safety-related piping.
a.
Requirements
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The dimensional requirements for the alleged underwall fitting are given in ASA B16.11, " Forged Steel Fittings, Socket Welding and Threaded".
b.
Examination of Piping The inspectors requested the licensee to identify the loca-
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for evaluation. The O.D dimensions of two of those initially identified were examined by the investigator to determine
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compliance with ASA B16.11 0.D. requirements. The first was located in DE-RC-08 and the other in DE-SI-04 at weld SW-33.
O.D. dimensions on the fittings were found to be in compliance with the specified requirements. It should be noted, however, that this does not necessarily assure adequate wall as the j
visually inaccessible I.D.'s of these fittings could be oversize. The investigator requested checks on wall thickness of the licensee's 2x1 reducers.
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c.
Interviews The investigators interviewed a total of 21 welders, fitters, inspectors and supervisors regarding any knowledge they might have regarding installation of underwall fittings in safety-related piping. All of these individuals had direct responsibilities relative to the fabrication or inspection of piping assemblies. Nineteen of those questioned responded that they had no knowledge of any underwall fittings being installed in the piping. One individual stated he thought he might have seen some socket welding 90* ells that were underwall and another stated that he definitely had. Neither
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identified a specific location, but the latter individual stated that the ells were installed between Christmas 1978 and May 1979.
FINDINGS The validity of this allegation is unresolved. The licensee has been requested to address this allegation through measurements on his installed 6,000 lb. 2x1 reducing inserts. This will be carried as an unresolved item, identified as 395/79-35-08, "Under-wall Condition on 6,000 lb. 2x1 Reducing Insert".
It will be
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examined further in subsequent inspections. The new closely related allegation obtained in the interviews will also be examined further and is identified as unresolved item 395/79-35-13, "Under-wall Socket-Welding 90' Ells".
The licensee was requested to develop and propose plans for testing this latter allegation and provide them to Region II.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
ALLEGATION Pipe was not properly backed out of sockets prior to making socket welds. The frequency of lack of withdrawal in socket welds from the Fab Shop should be 25% or less.
Pipe not being cut sufficiently square contributed to this problem. The alleger could not identify specific examples.
DISCUSSION
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The investigators examined licensee requirements and interviewed personnel as indicated below.
a.
Requirements
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As noted in IV.B.1 above, the applicable Code for safety-related piping is ASME Section III (71S73). The Code requires that pipe be withdrawn from the I.D. face of socket weld fittings approximately 1/16" before welding. The licensee implements this requirement by specifying a 1/16" withdrawal in his Welding Technique Sheets (e.g., Technique Sheet 8-8-B-11R3).
In addition, the licensee has provided instruc-tions to his personnel stating that withdrawal is to be 1/16" minimum and 1/8" maximum.
(Reference Memos from D. L. Welter to E. Coleman dated December 27, 1976, " Fit-up of Socket Weld Joints to Provide for a Way to Inspect the Amount of Withdrawal" and from J. Witherspoon to QC Inspectors dated August 28, 1978, " Socket Weld Withdrawal").
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i b.
Interviews The investigators interviewed a total of 19 welders, fitters, supervisors and inspectors with responsibilities' for inspection or preparation of socket welds. These individuals were asked if they knew of instances where piping had not been properly withdrawn from socket welds before welding. Three stated that they knew of instances where pipe had not been properly withdrawn, three stated they thought they had
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witnessed this,.and the remainder indicated they had no knowledge of any improper withdrawals.
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FINDINGS i
Interviews with personnel indicate that this allegation may be correct. The licensee has agreed to sample socket welds with radiography to further test the validity of this allegation. The results of this radiography will be examined by the NRC in subse-quent inspections. This allegation is considered an unresolved item and is identified as item 395/79-35-09, " Pipe Not Properly Backed Out of Sockets".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
ALLEGATION
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QC inspectors and others use alcohol and drugs on the job.
DISCUSSION
The investigators discussed this allegation with site management and questioned 24 welders, fitters and inspectors.
Both management and the individuals interviewed indicated that they were aware of some use of alcohol and drugs on the site in violation of licensee policy. However, they noted that it was not open or common and that it was difficult to identify the persons involved.
It was stated that persons caught were discharged as a matter of policy.
Proprietary information contained within internal investigations conducted by the licensee was reviewed and found to reflect an awareness and responsive attitude on the part of the licensee to this problem. No one, including the alleger, was able to identify any unacceptable work that could be attributed to any individual's i
use of alcohol or drugs. Also, the individuals interviewed indicated they had no knowledge of QC inspectors using drugs.
FINDINGS The investigators were unable to confirm or identify any safety-significance to this allegation.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
ALLEGATION
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Service water line piping was damaged (arc-burns) while cutting lugs on nearby items. The damaged area was ground, welded and ground again to hide the damage. The QC inspectors did not know of the work and did not perform the required inspections. This piping is inaccessible now because it is buried.
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DISCUSSION The validity of this allegation is not easily determined. This pipe is not accessible for examination and craft personnel identi-fled by the alleger as being present at the time the work was done are not available for questioning. The licensea has been requested to provide the investigators with information or records he may have with regard to the validity of this allegation.
In addition, the licensee has been requested to provide the investi-gators with a written engineering evaluation of the safety signifi-cance of the alleged unauthorized SW line repairs.
FINDINGS The validity of this allegation has not been determined. Further
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investigation is planned which will be directed toward review of licensee provided data as described in the discussion above.
This allegation is considered an unresolved item and is being identified for subsequent inspection as item 395/79-35-10, " Improperly
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Repaired SW Line Piping".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
ALLEGATION The alleger was performing a qualification test by welding a
" Carpenter 20" stainless steel test sample. The test sample was submitted and accepted by radiographic examination even though the alleger noted cracking in the test weld. This was not for safety-related welding certification. The alleger speculated that this might also have occurred in qualification testing for
safety-related welding.
.4e did not know of any such cases however.
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DISCUSSION NRC Region II has previously examined the licensee's program for qualification of welders.
(Reference Region II Report 50-395/78-26).
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FINDINGS This allegation is not considered to have safety-significance.
12. ALLEGATION l
Carbon steel plates in the incore pit liner were improperly
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installed with backing strip clearances in excess of the required
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1/16". The backing strips were not close enough to the vertical welds for the first sections put in at the bottom. No backing
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strips were used on the horizontal welds.
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DISCUSSION As with the SW line piping against which allegation 10 above is directed, the incore pit liner was completed several years ago and is no longer accessible for examination.
The licensee has been requested to provide the investigators with any records or special information he may have with regard to the acceptability of this item, and to provide a written engineering evaluation of the safety significance of the actions described in this allega-tion and the related allegations 13 and 14 below.
Note:
This incore pit liner is variously referred to in the licensee's documentation as the neutron detector box liner, the incore pit low alloy steel liner and the reactor cavity liner.
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FINDINGS The validity of this allegation remains unresolved.
It will be investigated further in subsequent inspections.
It is identified as unresolved item 395/79-35-11, " Improper Welding on the Incore Pit Liner". Allegations 13 and 14 below also refer to improper welding on the incore pit liner and further investigation of all three will be conducted under this one unresolved item.
No items of nondompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
ALLEGATION Welds on the carbon steel plates in the liner of the incore pit in some instances entrapped substantial amounts of slag yet were subsequently ultrasonically tested as acceptable. The alleger is concerned that the nondestructive test examiners were either improperly trained or falsified their findings.
DISCUSSION
i See DISCUSSION for allegation 12 above.
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FINDINGS The validity of this allegation remains unresolved.
It will be addressed in subsequent inspections as part of the unresolved item identified for allegation 12, item 395/79-35-11, " Improper Welding on the Incore Pit Liner".
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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14.
ALLEGATION Welders not properly qualified or certified performed welding on the incore pit liner during late 1976 or early 1977. One of these welders has also welded stainless steel at unspecified locations in the IM Building while uncertified. The individuals were not identified as performing these welds in the records.
DISCUSSION See DISCUSSION for allegation 12 above.
FINDINGS The validity of this allegation remains unresolved.
It will be addressed in subsequent inspections as part of the unresolved item identified for allegation 12, item 395/79-35-11, " Improper Welding on the Incore Pit Liner".
15.
ALLEGATION Welders sometimes violated welding requirements (on socket welds)
to expedite their work. Examples of violations included single pass welds and undersized fillets on socket welds performed in the Fab Shop. The welding supervisor condoned this practice as a means of expediting work. On occasion workers would not be permitted to leave the job until assigned work was complete.
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DISCUSSION The investigators interviewed personnel and reviewed requirements
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as described below.
a.
Interviews The investigators questioned 20 welders, fitters, inspectors and supervisors regarding this allegation. Eleven of these individuals had direct responsibilities with regard to l
inspection or welding performed in the Fab Shop. The informa-i tion provided by the individuals questioned is listed below:
(1) All of the individuals questioned indicated that they knew of no occasions when welders were so pressured to expedite their work that they should find it necessary to violate requirements such as fillet weld size or number of passes required.
(2) Nineteen of the individuals questioned stated they knew of no instances where welding supervisors were aware of
and condoned welding violations.
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(3) One individual stated he believed his supervisor knew of violations by a named individual and condoned these violations.
(4) Seven of the individuals questioned stated that they had witnessed welding procedure violations that might be interpretted as shortcuts to expedite welding.
These procedure violations were all on socket welds and included single pass welding, excessive interpass temperature (stainless steel), insufficient preheat (carbon steel), excessive amperage (stainless steel),
and lack of purge (on 3/4" Sch 40 stainless pipe).
(5) Two of the individuals who stated they had witnessed welding procedure violations indicated that the violations
were not on safety-related items.
(b) Requirements
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The licensee's welding procedure requirements such as those noted in (4) above are given on his welding technique sheets.
For stainless steel socket welds the licensee's welding technique sheets (e.g., 8-8-B-11R3 and 8-8-B-11T RI) specify a minimum of two passes, a maximum interpass temperature of 350'F, a maximum amperage of 120 amps, and oacking gas (purge) for tube or for pipe with less than 1/8" wall.
Preheat requirements for carbon steel socket welds will be reviewed in future inspection.
As may be noted above, information obtained during interviews offers no support for some areas of the allegation but expands other areas. Specifically, the interview information supports the contention that welding procedure requirements were violated and adds to the alleged areas of violation. The licensee has been requested to evaluate the consequences of the alleged pro-cedure violations, provide his evaluation to Region II and address this item in additional inspections of completed welds. The radiography proposed to evaluate the socket weld withdrawal
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allegation may provide useful information in this regard (see IV.B.8).
FINDINGS
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The alleged condonement of welding violations by a welding super-visor to expedite work was not substantiated. However, interview
information did confirm and broaden the extent of alleged violations l
of welding requirements in the Fab Shop. The validity and safety l
significance of the alleged welding requirement violations will
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require further investigation. This area will be addressed in
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" Alleged Violations of Socket Wesolved item, identified the Fab Shop".
elding Procedure Requirements i 395/79 35-12,
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No items of noncompliance or d n
C.
Additional Items Identified D eviations were identified
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During the course of the inv uring Investigation the attention of the investiestigation, three additional ite gators:
1.
described in IV.B.1 aboveIn reviewing procedures f ms came to ocket weld size requirements welding flanges had not teen iweld size requirem
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, an investigator found that the so k
, as ncluded in the licensee's proce Further, measurement found so k c et DE-CS-24 to have a c et welding flange weld SW-4 o Section III.
size below that minimum specifi d ures.
This is considered a noncompli ments of 10 CFR 50.55a and App n ISO by ASME e
as implemented by the FSAR endix B to 10 CFR 50 Criterion Vance w Omission of Fillet Size Req ias an infraction and is This noncompliance is being
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e as item categorized IV.B.1 above, an investigatoIn reviewing 2.
a anges".
r found that heat number a tion verification for flan are required by DCC Work Procedrecorded on the ge Pc.38 from ISO DE-WD-04 was nspec-a s.
ure WP-VII-02R9.These document tion is required to determi not omission.
" Missing Documentation of Flit is being identified as unne the Installation Verification" resolved item s
ange Traceability Information a d395/79-35-03 3.
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IV.B.6 aboveIn reviewing DCC Nonconforman n
(used to supp, ort the contentian investigatorce Notice 1094, as noted that the III Class 1 requirements) did on that the material met ASME Sattached UT tory Guide 1.66 The licensee was requested tnot indicate compliance whether the commitment was m tcommitment in reg ection gula-u atory Guide o identify his subject piping.
It is identified as unresolv dThis will be e e
inspection
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n the
r in subsequent f UT Utilized to Upgrade Cla item 395/79-35-07, e
ss 2 Piping to Class 1".
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