IR 05000395/2025001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000395/2025001 and 07201038/2025001

ML25122A033
Person / Time
Site:	Summer, 07201038
Issue date:	05/05/2025
From:	James Baptist NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB4
To:	Carr E Dominion Energy
References
IR 2025001
Download: ML25122A033 (1)

Text

SUBJECT:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2025001 and 07201038/2025001

Dear Eric S. Carr:

On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. On April 22, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Beth Jenkins, Site Vice President and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

May 5, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, James B. Baptist, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000395 License No. NPF-12

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000395; 07201038

License Number:

NPF-12

Report Number:

05000395/2025001; 07201038/2025001

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2025-001-0032; I-2025-001-0086

Licensee:

Dominion Energy

Facility:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

Location:

Jenkinsville, SC

Inspection Dates:

January 01, 2025, to March 31, 2025

Inspectors:

K. Dials, Resident Inspector

A. Ponko, Senior Construction Project Inspector

M. Read, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Vasquez, Construction Project Inspector

J. Walker, Sr Emergency Preparedness Inspector

Approved By:

James B. Baptist, Chief

Projects Branch 4

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to identify and correct water intrusion which degraded the reliability of a safety-related ventilation damper Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000395/2025001-01 Open/Closed

[P.1] -

Identification 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensee's failure to identify and correct water intrusion near safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct water intrusion from the control building (CB) roof which caused unexpected deterioration of a safety-related control room ventilation damper and subsequent failure.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000395/2024-002-01 LER 2024-002-01 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit 1, Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration System 71153 Closed LER 05000395/2024-002-00 LER 2024-002-00 for Virgil C. Summer, Unit 1, Loss Of Control Room Emergency Filtration System 71153 Closed LER 05000395/2024-003-00 LER 2024-003-00 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station,

Unit 1, Common Cause Inoperability of Engineered Safety Features 71153 Closed

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures on January 6-8, 2025, for the following systems: emergency diesel generators, fire service, condensate storage tank, and service water pump house.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Radiation monitor RM-A3, main plant vent exhaust, on January 13, 2025, while radiation monitor RM-A13 was nonfunctional

(2) Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump and flow paths on February 3, 2025, while the 'B' emergency diesel generator was out of service for maintenance

(3) Chemical volume and control system on February 6, 2025, during work on 'B' boric acid transfer pump

(4) Reactor building cooling on March 14, 2025

(5) Chilled water system, completed on March 28, 2025, while 'A' chiller was out of service for preventative maintenance

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Control building elevation 436 feet, cable spreading room and cable chase, on January 21, 2025

(2) Control building elevation 448 feet, fire areas CB22 and CB23, on February 3, 2025

(3) Turbine building elevation 463 feet, fire area TB01, on February 3, 2025

(4) Turbine building lubricating oil storage room, completed on February 25, 2025

(5) PTP-114.095, testing of the CO2 system in the computer room in the control building elevation 436 feet, on March 31, 2025

(6) Service water pump house on March 31, 2025

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the fire brigade training and performance during an annual offsite responder fire drill on March 1, 2025.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reduction of 10 percent reactor power for quarterly turbine valve testing, electro-hydraulic control system leak response, and manual reactor trip on February 10, 2025, and reactor startup on February 12, 2025.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator exercise that covered numerous control failures, feedwater pump issues requiring reactor trip, small break loss of coolant accident, and emergency declaration on March 13, 2025.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Instrumentation card removal from balance-of-plant rack #9 and replacement of 'B' loop delta-temperature card TE-422 on January 27, 2025 (2)

'B' emergency diesel generator preventative maintenance on February 3-5, 2025

(3) Maintenance and testing on the FLEX 80KW diesel generators concurrent with maintenance on the 'A' emergency diesel generator on February 18, 2025

(4) Scaffolding activities in the turbine lubricating oil storage tank room on February 25, 2025 (5)

'A' control room air handler maintenance and control room pressure boundary breach on March 18, 2025

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR1259562, 'B' service water pump house fan motor high current readings, completed on February 21, 2025

(2) CR1283389, secondary parameter differences post-trip, review completed on February 27, 2025

(3) CR1280545, reactor vessel level indication system indicator LI-1320 reading high, review completed on March 3, 2025

(4) CR1263051, 'B' emergency diesel generator governor failure on June 27, 2024, review completed on March 3, 2025

(5) CR1284910, turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump speed indications not functioning following governor replacement, review completed on March 17, 2025

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

(1) SOP-505, air handling damper testing for XDP-22B, 23B, and 24B, on January 15 and 16, 2025, following actuator preventative maintenance

(2) STP-345.002, testing of 'B' loop delta-temperature card TE-422, on January 27, 2025, following card replacement

(3) EMP-300.012, agastat relay calibration, on January 29, 2025, following relay replacement for breaker XSW1EA04

(4) SOP-306, emergency diesel generator testing, on February 5, 2025, following 'B' emergency diesel generator preventative maintenance

(5) ERTP-100.008, testing for XEG0141 FLEX 80KW diesel, following automatic transfer switch and annual maintenance, on February 19, 2025

(6) STP-125.002A, 'A' emergency diesel generator operability testing, on February 21, 2025, following annual maintenance

(7) SOP-505, testing of the 'A' train control room ventilation train, on March 20, 2025, following fan motor and damper maintenance

(8) PTP-113.002, 'A' chiller testing, on March 28, 2025, following preventative maintenance

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1) STP-360.032, control room supply air atmospheric radiation monitor RM-A1 channel operational test, on January 7, 2025

(2) STP-228.001, fire protection system fire pumps test, on January 15, 2025

(3) STP-360.007, reactor building area radiation monitor RM-G18 calibration on January 17, 2025

(4) STP-220.002, turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump and valve test, on March 4, 2025

(5) STP-223.002A, for stroke testing service water valve 3107B, on March 11, 2025

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) STP 222.002, component cooling pump 'B' Group A Inservice pump test, on February 3-4, 2025

(2) STP-225.001A, 'A' emergency diesel generator pump and valve testing, on February 21, 2025, following fuel oil and air start system maintenance

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CR1280961, radiation monitor RM-A2 reactor building atmospheric particulate high radiation alarm, review completed on January 24, 2025

(2) CR1263051, 'B' emergency diesel generator governor failure, review completed on March 3, 2025

(3) CR1273279, 'A' residual heat removal pump breaker failure, review completed on March 20, 2025

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in failures of safety-related ventilation dampers that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The review was completed on March 31, 2025.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000395/2024-002-00 (01), Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration System (ADAMS Accession No. ML25028A244). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section IP71152 and are documented in Inspection Report 05000395/2024004 under Inspection Results Section IP71111.15. This LER is Closed.

Reporting (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determinations to ensure it complies with reporting requirements:

(1) LER 05000395/2024-003-00, Common Cause Inoperability of Engineered Safety Features (ADAMS Accession No. ML24323A154). This LER was retracted by the licensee on January 30, 2025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML25030A188). This LER is Closed.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855 - Operation Of An ISFSI Operation Of An ISFSI

(1) Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted.

Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel and Reactor-Related Greater-than-Class C Waste at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) and for 10 CFR Part 71 Transportation Packagings."

Operation of an ISFSI (1 Sample)

From March 17-20, 2025, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees ISFSI activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. During the on-site inspection, the inspectors observed and reviewed licensee activities in each of the five safety focus areas including occupational exposure, public exposure, fuel damage, confinement, and impact to plant operations.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Additionally, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of the heavy load lifting equipment, the ISFSI haul path, and the ISFSI pad.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to identify and correct water intrusion which degraded the reliability of a safety-related ventilation damper Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000395/2025001-01 Open/Closed

[P.1] -

Identification 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensee's failure to identify and correct water intrusion near safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct water intrusion from the control building (CB) roof which caused unexpected deterioration of a safety-related control room ventilation damper and subsequent failure.

Description:

On July 19, 2023, the control room air handling unit A inlet control damper (damper 22A) failed to fully stroke open, but the open position and its effects did not affect operability of the system. Damper 22A was lubricated and verified to fully stroke open on July 22, 2023.

On August 1, 2023, damper 22A failed to shut during alignment of the system to support ventilation testing. This failure impacted the operability of the A train of the control room emergency filtration system. Damper 22A was lubricated and verified to stroke closed on August 1, 2023.

On August 9, 2023, the system was tagged out to perform inspections and additional maintenance. Damper 22A was lubricated and stroked until it stroked freely. Work order closure notes stated, The [as-found] damper wouldnt satisfy the limit switch during fan start.

[F]ound damper rusted and hard to stroke. Duct is sweating causing damper to rust. The work order notes covered the August 1 to 9, 2023, maintenance discussions.

On August 20, 2024, damper 22A failed to shut during alignment of the system for maintenance, causing an entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3. The damper was manually closed to exit the TS. During troubleshooting, mechanics noted that the damper was stuck closed. On August 23, 2024, damper 22A was found tight and was inspected, cleaned, lubricated, and manually stroked until free movement.

Damper 22A is safety-related and required to close on a signal from the control room to protect the control room in the event of an onsite radiological release.

Inspectors assessed past maintenance of damper 22A and interviewed mechanics to determine if other factors were contributing to the negative performance trend of damper 22A.

Inspectors reviewed deficiencies that were identified during CB roof inspections in September 2022 and March 2023 and were closed to Work Orders and minimal repairs. Inspector discussions with mechanics in January 2025 revealed that the licensee had knowledge of exterior deterioration of the damper linkage caused by water intrusion. Puddles were evident on the floor under the ducting, but the 22A damper is located high enough that a ladder would have been required to view the trapped water in the frame of the damper and the rust on the surrounding metal components. Mechanics stated that they had been asked to evaluate a tenting strategy to divert the water intrusion away from the damper, which was not possible due to the configuration.

Inspectors concluded that the additional humidity from standing water caused unexpected deterioration which resulted in stroke issues on July 19 and August 1, 2023. Although the damper was lubricated and retested after each of these instances, the licensee failed to adequately identify and correct the water intrusion onto the damper frame which continued to degrade the damper linkage until a subsequent failure on August 20, 2024.

Corrective Actions: In August 2024, the licensee established a bridging strategy to pump the roof membrane to minimize future water intrusion and repaired the roof penetration over the 22A damper. Inspectors have not identified any rainwater intrusion near the 22A damper since the repairs. The license also performed additional preventative maintenance and internal inspections of the 22A damper.

Corrective Action References: CR1266916, CR1266660, CR1234525, CR1233577, CR1281551

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to identify and correct water intrusion onto the frame of the 22A damper was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly identify water intrusion onto the 22A damper when workers had knowledge of the water and damper deterioration and failed to correct the condition prior to a successive failure of the 22A damper. This performance deficiency was within the licensees ability to foresee and prevent.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. This PD adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events because the A train control room ventilation was rendered inoperable. This violation is similar to Example 4.G of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Appendix A states, in part, "Findings that impact control room habitability require further evaluation. Findings related to the radiological barrier functions of the control room, auxiliary building, reactor building, and spent fuel pool building are not expected to impact CDF or LERF. If degradation of the radiological barrier could result in a substantial potential for overexposure, the finding should also be evaluated using IMC 0609 Appendix C." This example did not meet the definition of "substantial potential for overexposure" in Appendix C and therefore screened to Green.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, the licensee did not completely and accurately document the discovery of water intrusion onto the 22A damper and associated deterioration.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality (CAQ), such as nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Section 16, Corrective Action, of the V.C. Summer Quality Assurance Program Description, Revision 35, described the methods to meet Criterion XVI, which stated, in part, The Company has established and implements corrective action programs, procedure, and processes to assure that conditions adverse to quality at Company nuclear facilities are promptly identified and corrected.

Licensee procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Revision 41, step 3.1.4 stated, Submit a CR [Condition Report] for any issue or concern that does not meet specific requirements of procedures, policies, management expectations, or accepted industry standards. Attachment 1 provides an example of Degradation, damage, failure, malfunction, or loss of plant equipment. Step 3.5.6 allows closure of Level 3 condition reports to the Work Management Process. Several condition reports were identified related to CB roof inspection deficiencies, and all were closed to work orders without addressing the leakage near the 22A damper. The water intrusion onto the frame of the 22A damper and that the deterioration had caused stroke issues on August 1 and 9, 2023, were not adequately identified or corrected in a CR.

Contrary to the above, upon discovery of the water intrusion causing deterioration of the 22A damper in August 2023, the licensee failed to identify and correct the water intrusion onto the damper frame which continued to degrade the damper linkage until a subsequent failure on August 20, 2024. The licensee properly identified the condition on January 27, 2025.

Inspectors noted that a bridging strategy to pump the roof membrane had been established in August 2024 to address a personnel safety issue and this action limited additional water intrusion.

Additionally, inspectors previously identified that this event resulted in a violation of Technical Specifications, which was previously documented in inspection report 05000395/2024004 (ML25037A330).

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Beth Jenkins, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On March 20, 2025, the inspectors presented the ISFSI inspection results to Beth Jenkins, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Calculations

DC04160-032

Thermal Evaluation of HI-TRAC FW inside Decon Pit

Revision 4

CR1196658

CR1269904

CR1282343

Corrective Action

Documents

CR1283828

Dominion Energy,

ETE-NAF-2021-

20

V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel

Storage Installation 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report,

Revision 1

Engineering

Evaluations

Dominion Energy,

ETE-NAF-2025-

0012

Holtec MPC 547 Fuel Assembly Certification and Canister

Loading Map

Rev. 0

Miscellaneous

Holtec Report No.

HI-2114830

Final Safety Analysis Report on the HI-STORM FW MPC

Storage System

Revision 21

Dominion Energy,

CM-A-A-400

CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and

Experiments

Revision 17

Holtec

International,

EXT-000671

High Temp Liquid Penetrant Examination

Revision 0

Holtec

International,

EXT-001028

High Temp Liquid Penetrant Examination

Revision 0

Holtec

International,

EXT-001029

Visual Examination of Welds

Revision 0

Holtec

International,

HPP-2036-0200

MPC-37 Loading

Revision 15

Holtec

International,

HPP-2036-0300

MPC-37 Sealing, Drying, Backfilling

Revision 16

60855

Procedures

Holtec

International,

MPC-37 Stackup (Transfer)

Revision 10

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

HPP-2036-0400

Holtec

International,

HPP-2036-0500

HI-STORM FW Movements

Revision 12

Audit 24-07:

Operations

ETE-NAF-2021-

20

CFR 72.48 Screenings

Revision 1

Evaluation No.

1335

CFR 72.49 Evaluation

Revision 1

Evaluation No.

1435

CFR 72.49 Evaluation

Revision 0

Evaluation No.

1577

CFR 72.49 Evaluation

Revision 2

Evaluation No.

1646

CFR 72.49 Evaluations

Revision 0

EXT-000671

CFR 72.48 Screening

Revision 0

EXT-001028

CFR 72.48 Screening

Revision 0

EXT-001029

CFR 72.48 Screening

Revision 0

EXT-001098

CFR 72.48 Screening

Revision 0

HPP-2036-0300

CFR 72.48 Screening

Revision 16

HPP-2036-0400

CFR 72.48 Screening

Revision 10

HSP-1105

CFR 72.48 Screenings

Revision 11

QA-AUD-201905

QA-SUR-201817

Self-Assessments

QA-SUR-201902

Work Orders

WO 201754174

Miscellaneous

N/A

post-trip report for the reactor trip on February 10, 2025

February 11,

25

71153

Procedures

OP-AP-105

Post Trip Review

2